Business Finance - Management assignment busn 311

ORIGINAL PAPER

Are Marketers Egoists? A Typological Explication

Jayasankar Ramanathan1 • Biswanath Swain1

Received: 24 October 2016 / Accepted: 17 March 2017 / Published online: 27 March 2017

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to explicate the idea

of egoism in the context of marketing. The idea of egoism

is reviewed and contextualized into a framework for

interpreting different marketer types. Marketers’ potential

trade-offs with consumers and competitors are examined.

Four types of marketers are explicated: extremely egoistic

marketer, moderately egoistic marketer, moderately altru-

istic marketer, and extremely altruistic marketer. The

framework offered in the paper is of relevance to mar-

keters, media, and agencies rewarding marketing perfor-

mance. The framework may help in assessing the ethical

quotient in marketers’ preferences and behaviors. Studies

recognizing the pertinence of egoism in marketing are

scarce, and the typological framework discussed in the

paper is a contribution to the marketing ethics literature.

Keywords Altruism � Competitor � Consumer � Egoism � Marketer

Introduction

In the last few decades, the extent of customer abuse has

reached new heights. This is evidenced from the increasing

number of legal cases filed against marketers across dif-

ferent countries in the world (cf. Pride and Ferrell 2009).

Many countries (e.g., India) have laws on consumer pro-

tection (e.g., The Consumer Protection Act), have depart-

ment of consumer affairs under their government, and have

special courts to deal with the consumer complaints about

marketers1.

Although only some marketers may be notorious, people

may generalize their behavior to other marketers. This may

happen because of various reasons. At times, the court

judgments that ruled against some of the marketers are

carried in media2. These news reports become talks of the

town and create a negative panoramic view before the

consumers that all the marketers are cheats. Such percep-

tions about marketers may also be formed by people

because of their individual instances of witnessing uneth-

ical behavior. For example, when a seller projecting herself

falsely as a representative of a company takes a group of

consumers into her confidence, and then cheats them, the

act of that seller creates a bad image of the company.

In a similar vein, Farmer (1967, p. 1) mentions that ‘‘the

field of marketing has been thought of as made up of fast-

buck artists, con-men, wheeler-dealers, and shoddy-goods

distributors.’’ Assael (1995, pp. 99–100) notes that ‘‘All

marketers are portrayed as hawkers, con artists and

cheats.’’ Desmond (1998, p. 173) observes that the mar-

keters are ‘‘damned either way: in the first instance by

turpitude, in the second by ineptitude.’’

& Jayasankar Ramanathan

[email protected]

1 Indian Institute of Management Indore, Prabandh Shikhar,

Rau-Pithampur Road, Indore, Madhya Pradesh 453556, India

1 For example, in India these courts are referred to as Consumer

Disputes Redressal Forum which operate at three different levels:

District (known as District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum),

State (known as State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission),

and National (known as National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission) (sources: http://admis.hp.nic.in/himpol/Citizen/LawLib/

C066.HTM; http://ncdrc.nic.in/; and http://ncdrc.nic.in/bare_acts%

5C1_1_2.html: accessed on September 8, 2016). 2 http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/dipika-pallikal-

wins-consumer-case-against-axis-bank-114032400993_1.html and

https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=consumer%20complaint%

20cases (accessed on September 8, 2016).

123

J Bus Ethics (2019) 155:611–621

DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3515-5

The preceding views suggest a claim that the common

perception among people is that marketers are cheats. A

possible assumption behind the claim is that the mar-

keters are egoistic in nature (cf. Mccabe et al. 2006). In

this paper, the merit of this assumption is examined, and

it is explicated that not all marketers are egoists and a

marketer need not display egoistic behavior at all times.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The

implications of egoism for business as observed in prior

studies are noted. The concept of egoism is reviewed and,

accordingly, different types of marketers are explicated.

Practical implications, contribution to marketing ethics

literature, limitations, and future research directions are

offered.

Implications of Egoism for Business

Researchers have examined the implications of egoism for

business, where business is usually understood as an

activity done for profit. Longenecker et al. (1988) posited

that entrepreneurs are egoists and found empirical support

for their beliefs. Specifically, when compared with non-

entrepreneurs, Longenecker et al. (1988, p. 70) reported

that entrepreneurs tended to ‘‘approve of actions that

maximize personal financial rewards.’’ Lane (1995)

reported that majority of business students are ready to act

unethically for competitive advantage and personal gain.

More recently, Beekun et al. (2015) found that business

students are significantly more egoistic than nonbusiness

students. Steiner and Steiner (1988), as cited in Shepard

and Hartenian (1991), noted a view, which suggests that

the best way for businesses to achieve the common good is

by their individual pursuit of self-interest and profits.

Medlin (2006) noted that firms need to ensure adequate

combination of self-interest and collective interest for

realizing their profit goals. Bowie (1991) contended that

businesses that are altruists will succeed, whereas those

that are egoists are set to fail. Bowie (1991) argued that

more a business deliberately pursues profit, lesser are the

chances for it to achieve this goal. Lynch (2009) found that

some of the moral justifications for businesses to be ego-

istic are problematic. Locke and Woiceshyn (1995) and

Woiceshyn (2011) suggested that businesses should act in

their self-interest, but this requires that they find out the

actions that are essential for achieving long-term happiness

and existence.

While the studies cited above focused on the implica-

tions of egoism for business in general, scarcity is observed

in the marketing ethics literature on studies examining

egoism in the context of marketing (see also Tsalikis and

Fritzsche 1989 for a similar observation).

The Concept of Egoism

The concept of egoism is observed to be discussed in moral

philosophy literature under two notions: ethical egoism and

psychological egoism. Accordingly, a brief review of def-

initions is presented as under.

Ethical Egoism: A Normative Principle of Egoism

Ethical egoism is broadly understood as a moral principle

which lays emphasis on the self-interest of an individual.

The normative nature can be inferred from the usage of the

words such as ‘‘ought,’’ ‘‘should,’’ ‘‘duty,’’ and ‘‘obliga-

tion’’ in various formulations of the principle. Several

formulations of ethical egoism can be classified into two

broad themes (Campbell 1972; Quinn 1974; Regis

1979, 1980; Sterba 1979): individual egoism and universal

egoism.

Individual egoism is formulated in various ways.

According to Nielsen (1959, p. 502), it is a view that ‘‘man

ought always to seek his own good.’’ Hospers (1961, p. 10)

suggests that it is the doctrine that the ‘‘sole duty’’ of an

individual is to seek his own interests ‘‘exclusively.’’

Glasgow (1971, p. 65) defines that individual egoism refers

to the ‘‘basic duty’’ of an individual ‘‘to produce for him-

self the greatest balance of good over evil.’’ As per

Campbell (1972, p. 249), it means that an individual

‘‘ought (morally) to do what will benefit [her] the most in

any given situation.’’ Quinn (1974, p. 458) defines it as

‘‘Morally speaking, [an individual]ought always to act so

as to maximize [her] self-interest; and any practical choice

that does not affect [her] self-interest is morally indifferent

(i.e., a choice [she] neither ought nor ought not to make)’’.

Sterba (1979, pp. 92–93) holds it as ‘‘For every person X

and every action y, X ought to do y if and only if y is in the

overall self-interest of a particular person Z’’ [emphasis

added]. Regis (1980, p. 61) proposes that it is a view which

holds that ‘‘both that one ought to pursue one’s well-being

and happiness and that one has no unchosen moral obli-

gation or duty to serve the interests of others.’’ Hunt and

Vitell (1986, pp. 6–7) note it as ‘‘an act is ‘‘right’’ for an

individual only if the consequences of that act for an

individual are more favorable than the consequences of any

other act.’’ Lillie (1986, p. 246) mentions it as a ‘‘duty of an

individual to seek his own good, and … that an individual

ought to have no regard whatever for the good of others,

except where the good of others is a means to his own

good.’’ Hansen (1992, p. 525) observes it as the view which

holds that ‘‘An act is ethical when it promotes the indi-

vidual’s best long-term interests. If an action produces a

greater ratio of good to evil for the individual in the long-

run than any other alternative, then the action is ethical.’’

612 J. Ramanathan, B. Swain

123

Smith (1993, p. 144) holds individual egoism as a view that

‘‘it is right for a person to act primarily to advance her own

well-being.’’

Universal egoism is formulated in different ways.

Lemos (1960, pp. 540–541) discusses that universal egoism

is an assertion of ‘‘the way men ought to act. The [uni-

versal] egoist contends that all men ought always to act so

as to promote their own interests or welfare or happiness or

pleasure, regardless of whether they do in fact do so’’

[emphasis added]. Emmons (1969, pp. 311–312) holds it as

a view that ‘‘each and every man ought to look out for

himself alone,’’ and ‘‘everyone ought to concern himself

with his own welfare alone’’ [emphasis added]. Campbell

(1972, p. 249) considers universal egoism as the view that

‘‘everyone ought (morally) to do what will benefit him the

most in any given situation.’’ According to Williams (1973,

p. 250), universal egoism means that ‘‘everyone ought

exclusively to pursue his own interests’’ [emphasis added].

Cornman and Lehrer (1974, p. 444) define it as ‘‘each

person ought to act to maximize his own good or well-

being.’’ Burkholder (1974, p. 654) interprets universal

egoism as ‘‘the doctrine that everyone ought to do which-

ever of those acts he can do, will benefit him the most in

any situation.’’ Quinn (1974, p. 458) defines it as ‘‘Morally

speaking, everyone ought always to act so as to maximize

his or her self-interest; and any practical choice that does

not affect one’s self-interest is morally indifferent.’’

Facione et al. (1978, p. 45) define universal egoism as ‘‘the

view that human conduct should be based exclusively on

self-interest.’’ Sterba (1979, pp. 92–93) holds it as ‘‘For

every person X and every action y, X ought to do y if and

only if y is in the overall self-interest of X’’ [emphasis

added]. Hunt and Vitell (1986, p. 6) note it as a view which

‘‘holds that individuals should always try to promote their

own greatest good.’’ The concept of universal egoism, as

reviewed above, espouses that all individuals should pursue

their self-interests. However, its implementability requires

that each individual has the liberty to act in her self-interest

and permits other individuals to act in their self-interests.

Such requirements necessitate rights-based egoism (e.g., all

individuals have some inalienable rights such as funda-

mental rights) and rules-based egoism (e.g., certain rules

such as laws are in the interests of all individuals to

observe), which are otherwise known as the concept of

social contract (Donaldson 1982; Dunfee 1991; Hobbes

2006; Locke 1967; Rousseau 1987).

Apart from individual egoism and universal egoism,

Lemos (1960, p. 541) suggests a notion of ‘‘ethical altru-

ism,’’ which holds that people should act to promote both

their interests and that of others and ‘‘when there is a

conflict between promoting our own interests and those of

others, sometimes we ought to sacrifice our own so as to

promote those of others.’’

Psychological Egoism: A Positive Conception

of Egoism

Psychological egoism refers to a positive conception about

the actual state of egoism that is inferred from human

thoughts and actions. Sharp (1923, p. 86) observes that an

egoist has ‘‘some kind of concern for one’s own interests,

and therefore can never include the wish to injure self

solely for the sake of injury.’’ Attlee (1928, p. 551) notes

that ‘‘Egoism is constituted by the attitudes or dispositions

which have as their conscious end the advantage of the

personal self.’’ Edel (1937, p. 617) mentions that ‘‘To the

egoist the ultimate justification of his acts lies in their being

conducive of his personal interest.’’ Brunton (1956, p. 291)

observes that an ‘‘Egoist’s whole aim in life is to satisfy his

wants and desires’’ and he ‘‘can certainly give reasons and

a rule for his individual acts.’’ Nielsen (1959, p. 502)

observes that ‘‘psychological egoism is a theory about

human motivation’’ and adds that ‘‘the psychological egoist

argues that man always in fact seeks his own good.’’ Lemos

(1960, p. 540) holds that psychological egoism refers to

‘‘the view that every time a man does something he does it

in order to promote what he conceives to be his interests or

welfare or happiness or pleasure.’’ Gert (1967, p. 505)

holds that ‘‘Psychological egoism’s philosophical interest

rests upon its claim that men never act in order to benefit

others, or because they believe a certain course of action to

be morally right.’’ An egoist, as Barnhart (1976, p. 102)

notes, ‘‘is concerned to gain his happiness first and fore-

most’’ and ‘‘always watches out for himself.’’ McConnell

(1978, p. 44) suggests psychological egoism as a view

which holds that ‘‘human nature is such that no person can

perform an act unless he believes that it is in his best

interests.’’ Lillie (1986, p. 246) mentions it as a view which

posits that ‘‘a human being is so made he can seek only his

own good.’’ Reidenbach and Robin (1990, p. 652) note that

‘‘psychological egoism [is a view] which contends that

everyone is psychologically programed to behave only in

their own self interest.’’ Bowie (1991, p. 3) observes that

‘‘Many economists seem to believe that egoistic behavior is

a universal feature of human behavior. This view is called

psychological egoism and is meant to be an empirical

theory of human behavior.’’ Frankena (1999, p. 21)

explains it as a view which conceives that ‘‘each of us is

always seeking his own greatest good, whether this is

conceived of as pleasure, happiness, knowledge, power,

self-realization, or a mixed life.’’ Debeljak and Krkac

(2008, p. 217) discuss that it is ‘‘the phenomenon of acting

in strict accordance with one’s own desires, wishes, and

best interests in terms of self-preservation, or self-interest

satisfaction, or preference satisfaction.’’

Contrasted with the conception of psychological egoist,

some researchers have suggested a notion of psychological

Are Marketers Egoists? A Typological Explication 613

123

altruist. For instance, Sisson (1910, pp. 158–159) observes

that an altruist seeks to promote ‘‘other-regarding impul-

ses’’ and discusses that ‘‘altruism has come to be identified

with righteousness.’’ Barnhart (1976, p. 105) observes that

an altruist ‘‘loves others but has absolutely no self-interest

in so doing, not even an interest in his own pleasure or

happiness.’’ Krebs (1991, p. 137) defines it as a state of

‘‘self-sacrifice (cost to self).’’ Hu and Liu (2003, p. 679)

observe that ‘‘the conception of altruism is often associated

with a sense of giving.’’ Further, Hu and Liu (2003, p. 679)

note that altruism is viewed from the perspective of

behavior (‘‘as an act of one person providing another per-

son with goods or services without asking for compensa-

tion’’) and intention (‘‘as a concern for someone else’s

economic bundles besides one’s own’’).

As seen from the preceding discussion, the concept of

egoism is either normative (ethical egoism) or positive

(psychological egoism). Similarly, the concept of altruism

is also either normative or positive. The common theme

evident across both the notions of ethical egoism and

psychological egoism is that of self-interest. Similarly, the

common theme evident across both the notions of norma-

tive and positive altruism is that of self-sacrifice. In the

ensuing discussion, the focus is more toward analyzing the

logical possibilities of egoism and altruism rather than

espousing normative doctrines. Marketers are analyzed as

egoists and altruists, and different types of marketers are

explicated.

Marketers as Egoists: A Typological Explication

Conceptions of egoism assume two kinds of preferences

that one may have: self-directed preference (a preference

whose content refers to one’s own situation, but does not

indicate the well-being of anybody else) and other-directed

preference (its content refers to another’s situation, but

does not indicate the well-being of oneself) (Lynch and

Walsh 2003; Sober 1989). The egoism of entities can be

seen as a bipolar continuum ranging through ideal types

such as extreme egoism, moderate egoism, moderate

altruism, and extreme altruism (Lynch and Walsh 2003;

Sober 1989; cf. Kaler 2000)3. In this paper, the entity under

focus is the marketer. American Marketing Association

defines marketing as an activity4 (as applicable for any

focal organization) and the term ‘‘marketer’’ here is taken

to refer to the focal organization per se (e.g., a hawker on

the street/a retail store/an advertising agency/a firm/a legal

person) and not necessarily a manager working in the

marketing department of the organization.

Marketers have self-directed preferences and other-di-

rected preferences. The ‘‘other’’ in the other-directed pref-

erences refers broadly to the ‘‘market’’. Market orientation

(of a marketer) is an important concept in marketing, which

has been found to be associated with business performance

(Jaworski and Kohli 1993; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Narver

and Slater 1990). Narver and Slater (1990, pp. 21–22)

specified that market orientation consists of three compo-

nents, viz. consumer orientation, competitor orientation,

and interfunctional coordination. Consumer orientation is

‘‘the sufficient understanding of one’s target buyers to be

able to create superior value for them continuously.’’

Competitor orientation means that ‘‘a [marketer] under-

stands the short-term strengths and weaknesses and long-

term capabilities and strategies of both the key current and

the key potential competitors.’’ Interfunctional coordination

refers to ‘‘the coordinated utilization of company resources

in creating superior value for target consumers.’’ The con-

cept of market orientation suggests that the other-directed

entities for a marketer include consumer and competitor.

Accordingly, different types of egoistic marketers are

explicated keeping the other-directed entity as the con-

sumer, and various types of egoistic marketers are expli-

cated keeping the other-directed entity as the competitor.

Marketer Versus Consumer

In this section, the egoism of marketers with respect to

consumers is explicated. Here, gain in sales (S) and its

absence (:S) are used as examples of self-directed prefer-

ences for the marketer. These examples are selected as they

are suggestive of a particular form of egoism. ‘‘Gain in sales’’

is assumed as a relevant variable. But it can be replaced with

any self-directed preferred state. Similarly, ‘‘gain in value’’

(V) for the consumer is discussed as a state about which the

marketer may have a consumer-directed preference. Here,

‘‘gain in value’’ is assumed as a relevant variable. But there

could be other such variables about which the marketer may

have consumer-directed preferences.

Marketer as Extreme Egoist

The preference structure for the extremely egoistic mar-

keter is given in Table 15. The entries in Table denote the

overall preferences that a marketer has regarding the four

possible combinations. The letters (a, b, c, d) displayed as

entries are meant for illustration alone. However, the order

of preference (a\ b\ c\ d) is to be noted.3 Lynch and Walsh (2003) refer to similar types using the following

terms: lucrepath, strong lucrephile, weak lucrephile, and lucrephobe. 4 https://www.ama.org/AboutAMA/Pages/Definition-of-Marketing.

aspx (accessed on January 6, 2017).

5 The analytical approach adapted here is inspired by the invitation in

Sober (1989, p. 102).

614 J. Ramanathan, B. Swain

123

Consider that the marketer is faced with a choice

between the actions represented on the main diagonal. If

the choice is to add value for the consumers and gain sales

(V&S), or to not add value for the consumers and not gain

sales (:V&:S), extremely egoistic marketers will add

value for consumers. In this case, adding value for the

consumers is a mere association but not a cause.

Now consider that the marketer is faced with a choice

between the actions represented on the anti-diagonal. This

shows a case of conflict between self-interest and con-

sumer-directed interest. Here, the marketer is considering

choices between adding value for consumers and not

gaining sales for oneself (V&:S), and gaining sales for

oneself while not adding value for consumers (:V&S). An

extremely egoistic marketer will choose the latter.

A near practical example can be provided. Consider that

a pharmaceutical company based out of a particular

country has developed a drug for curing a life-saving dis-

ease. The company had invested a sizable amount for

developing the drug. The cost of producing one unit of the

drug is C$. Assume that the target segment is price

inelastic and net quantity demanded (S) is fixed. No gov-

ernment or NGO agrees to buy the drug, and there is no

rival drug available for curing the disease. Further, there is

no reward beckoning the company in the future for selling

the drug for free. No specific law or regulation on pricing is

de facto in force. Under such circumstances, the marketer

is planning to choose one of the following prices for the

drug: L$, M$, N$, O$, where L = 3C; M = 1.5C;

N = 0.5C; O = 0C. The marketer stands to obtain the

following sales (revenue) for the respective price options

given above: 3CS$, 1.5CS$, 0.5CS$, 0CS$. The value for

consumers is understood as a ratio of benefit to cost.

Consumers’ value is hence inversely proportional to the

four price options of the marketer. In such a scenario, an

extremely egoistic marketer would choose to price the drug

at L$ so that the sales gained is 3CS$, but the value added

for the consumers is the least.

Marketer as Moderate Egoist

The moderately egoistic marketer is not an extremely

egoistic marketer, as Table 2 shows.

Moderately egoistic marketers care about the value for

consumers, much apart from their interest in gaining sales.

The gain of sales is not everything for such marketers,

since adding value for consumers while gaining sales for

themselves (V&S) is rated more highly than gaining sales

while not adding value for consumers (:V&S).

However, when moderately egoistic marketers face the

choice between the actions in the anti-diagonal, they will

always prefer selfish gain in sales (:V&S) over adding value

for consumers (V&:S). Such marketers are still egoists,

because they always prioritize themselves over consumers.

In the near practical example of the pharmaceutics

marketer considered earlier, a moderately egoistic marketer

would choose to price the drug at M$ so that the sales

gained is limited to 1.5CS$ but the value added for the

consumers is still marginal.

Marketer as Moderate Altruist

The preference structure of moderately altruistic marketer

is given in Table 3. When faced with the options shown on

the main diagonal, moderately altruistic marketers will

prefer adding value for consumers and gaining in sales

(V&S) rather than not adding value for consumers and not

gaining in sales (:V&:S). Hence, for such marketers,

adding value for consumers and gaining in sales happen to

coincide.

However, when faced with the options on the anti-di-

agonal, moderately altruistic marketers prefer differently

compared with the egoistic marketers. As self-sacrifice is

referred as the essential condition for altruistic behavior

(Krebs 1991; Sober 1989), it is assumed that altruists

would prefer self-sacrifice in the anti-diagonal choice sit-

uation, whereas egoists would not. Thus, moderately

altruistic marketers are prepared to sacrifice their sales gain

for the sake of adding value for consumers (V&:S) com-

pared with an option to gain in sales at the cost of not

adding value for consumers (:V&S). Clearly, marketers

with such preference structure cannot be egoists.

In the near practical example of the pharmaceutics

marketer considered earlier, a moderately altruistic mar-

keter would choose to price the drug at N$ so that value

added for the consumers is substantial but the gain in sales

happens to be a mere 0.5CS$.

Table 1 Extremely egoistic marketer (consumer-directed)

Self-directed

S :S

Consumer-directed V d a

:V d a

a\ b\ c\ d

Table 2 Moderately egoistic marketer (consumer-directed)

Self-directed

S :S

Consumer-directed V d b

:V c a

a\ b\ c\ d

Are Marketers Egoists? A Typological Explication 615

123

Marketer as Extreme Altruist

The preference structure of extremely altruistic marketer is

given in Table 4. Table attests to the fact that, unlike

moderately altruistic marketers who give some importance

to their sales gain, extremely altruistic marketers give no

importance to their sales gain.

Consider what extremely altruistic marketers do when

faced with a choice between the actions shown on the main

diagonal. They have to decide whether to add value for

consumers and obtain sales gain (V&S), or not add value

for consumers and forgo sales gain (:V&:S). Extremely

altruistic marketers will choose the former option. They

would prefer an action that brings them sales gain. But they

do not make this choice because they take an interest in

their sales gain. For extremely altruistic marketers, the

sales gain that results from this choice is merely an artifact,

and it is not a cause. Extremely altruistic marketers have a

positive preference for adding value for consumers, but

none for gaining sales for themselves.

In the near practical example of the pharmaceutics

marketer considered earlier, an extremely altruistic mar-

keter would choose to price the drug at O$ so that value

added for the consumers is huge, whereas there is no sales

gain at 0CS$. Indeed, this is close to what was reported to

be have been done by Merck & Company, the pharma-

ceutical firm, which invested millions of dollars to develop

a drug for treating ‘‘river blindness’’ (which was affecting

almost 18 million people) and pledged to supply the drug

for free forever (cf. Brenkert 2008, pp. 83–84; Carroll and

Buchholtz 2006, p. 188).

In the preceding discussion, four types of marketers are

explicated keeping the other-directed entity as the con-

sumer. In the ensuing discussion, various types of

marketers are explicated keeping the other-directed entity

as the competitor.

Marketer Versus Competitor

Here, gain in market share (SMS viz. Self-market share)

and its absence (:SMS) are used as examples of self-di-

rected preferences for the marketer. These examples are

selected as they are suggestive of a particular form of

egoism. ‘‘Gain in market share’’ is assumed as a relevant

variable. But it can be replaced with any self-directed

preferred state. Similarly, ‘‘gain in market share’’ of the

competitor (CMS, viz. Competitor’s market share) is dis-

cussed as a state about which the marketer may have a

competitor-directed preference. Here, ‘‘gain in market

share’’ of the competitor is a relevant variable. But there

could be other such variables about which the marketer

may have competitor-directed preferences.

Marketer as Extreme Egoist

The preference structure for the extremely egoistic mar-

keter is given in Table 5. The entries in Table denote the

overall preferences that a marketer has regarding the four

possible combinations. The letters (p, q, r, s) displayed as

entries are meant for illustration alone. However, the order

of preference (p\ q\ r\ s) is to be noted.

Consider that the marketer is faced with a choice

between the actions represented on the main diagonal. If

the choice is to increase competitor’s market share and gain

one’s own market share (CMS&SMS), or to not increase

competitor’s market share and not gain one’s own market

share (:CMS&:SMS), extremely egoistic marketers will

help increase competitor’s market share. In this case,

increasing competitor’s market share is a mere association

but not a cause.

Now consider that the marketer is faced with a choice

between the actions represented on the anti-diagonal. This

shows a case of conflict between self-interest and competi-

tor-directed interest. Here, the marketer is considering

choices between increasing market share for the competitors

and not gaining market share for oneself (CMS&:SMS),

and gaining market share for oneself while not increasing

Table 3 Moderately altruistic marketer (consumer-directed)

Self-directed

S :S

Consumer-directed V d c

:V b a

a\ b\ c\ d

Table 4 Extremely altruistic marketer (consumer-directed)

Self-directed

S :S

Consumer-directed V d d

:V a a

a\ b\ c\ d

Table 5 Extremely egoistic marketer (competitor-directed)

Self-directed

SMS :SMS

Competitor-directed CMS s p

:CMS s p

p\ q\ r\ s

616 J. Ramanathan, B. Swain

123

market share for the competitors (:CMS&SMS). An

extremely egoistic marketer will choose the latter.

A near practical example can be provided. Consider that

two marketers (X and Y), who are competitors, are selling

mobile phones. X and Y each hold half of the market share

(volume). The cost of producing one unit of mobile phone

is C$ for both X and Y. Each unit of mobile phone is sold

at a price of 2C$ by both X and Y. Assume that the

products of X and Y are identical in terms of product

features, and the target segment is price sensitive. Assume

that for 0.1C$ increase (decrease) in price, the market share

drops (spikes) by 4%. Suppose that X has found a new way

to produce every unit of mobile phone for 0.5C$. Further,

X is aware that if she will do good to Y, Y will not

reciprocate. No specific law or regulation on pricing is de

facto in force. Under such circumstances, X is planning to

choose one of the following as the revised price for the

mobile phone: L$, M$, N$, O$, where L = 0.75C$;

M = 1.5C$; N = 2.5C$; O = 3C$. The marketer stands to

obtain the following market shares for the respective price

options given above: 100, 70, 30, 10%. In such a scenario,

an extremely egoistic marketer would choose to price the

mobile phone at L$ so that there is enormous gain in her

market share (50%) but the market share of the competitor

is reduced to nothing.

Marketer as Moderate Egoist

The moderately egoistic marketer is not an extremely

egoistic marketer, as Table 6 shows. Moderately egoistic

marketers care about the competitor’s market share, much

apart from their interest in gaining their own market share.

The gain of market share is not everything for such mar-

keters, since increasing market share of competitors while

gaining market share for themselves (CMS&SMS) is valued

more highly than gaining market share for themselves while

not increasing market share of competitors (:CMS&SMS).

However, when moderately egoistic marketers face the

choice between the actions in the anti-diagonal, they will

always prefer selfish gain in market share (:CMS&SMS)

over increasing market share for the competitors

(CMS&:SMS). Such marketers are still egoists, because

they always place themselves first and competitors next.

In the near practical example of the mobile phone

marketer considered earlier, a moderately egoistic marketer

would choose to price the mobile phone at M$ so that there

is substantial gain in her market share (20%) but the market

share of the competitor is reduced considerably (by 20%).

Marketer as Moderate Altruist

The preference structure of moderately altruistic marketer

is given in Table 7. When faced with the options shown on

the main diagonal, moderately altruistic marketers will

prefer increasing market share of competitors and gaining

market share for themselves (CMS&SMS) rather than not

increasing market share for competitors and not gaining

market share for themselves (:CMS&:SMS). Hence, for

such marketers, increasing market share for competitors

and increasing their own market share happen to coincide.

However, when faced with the options on the anti-di-

agonal, moderately altruistic marketers prefer differently

compared with the egoistic marketers. Since self-sacrifice

is considered as the essential condition for altruistic

behavior (Krebs 1991; Sober 1989), it is assumed that

altruists would prefer self-sacrifice in the anti-diagonal

choice situation, whereas egoists would not. Thus, mod-

erately altruistic marketers are prepared to sacrifice their

gain in market share for the sake of increasing market share

for competitors (CMS&:SMS) compared with an option to

gain market share at the cost of not increasing market share

for competitors (:CMS&SMS). Clearly, marketers with

such preference structure cannot be egoists.

In the near practical example of the mobile phone

marketer considered earlier, a moderately altruistic mar-

keter would choose to price the mobile phone at N$ so that

there is substantial gain in the market share of the com-

petitor (20%) whereas her own market share is reduced

considerably (by 20%).

Marketer as Extreme Altruist

The preference structure of extremely altruistic marketer is

given in Table 8. Table attests to the fact that, unlike

moderately altruistic marketers who give some importance

to their gain in market share, extremely altruistic marketers

give no importance to gain in their market share.

Table 6 Moderately egoistic marketer (competitor-directed)

Self-directed

SMS :SMS

Competitor-directed CMS s q

:CMS r p

p\ q\ r\ s

Table 7 Moderately altruistic marketer (competitor-directed)

Self-directed

SMS : SMS

Competitor-directed CMS s r

:CMS q p

p\ q\ r\ s

Are Marketers Egoists? A Typological Explication 617

123

Consider what extremely altruistic marketers do when

faced with a choice between the actions shown on the main

diagonal. They have to decide whether to increase market

share of competitors and obtain gain in market share for

themselves (CMS&SMS), or not increase market share for

competitors and forego gain in market share for themselves

(:CMS&:SMS). Extremely altruistic marketers will

choose the former option. They would prefer an action that

brings them gain in market share. But they do not make this

choice because they take an interest in their market share

gain. For extremely altruistic marketers, the market share

gain that results from this choice is an artifact, and it is not

a cause. Extremely altruistic marketers have a positive

preference for increasing market share of competitors, but

none for gaining market share for themselves.

In the near practical example of the mobile phone marketer

considered earlier, an extremely altruistic marketer would

choose to price the mobile phone at O$ so that there is huge

gain in the market share of the competitor (40%), whereas her

own market share is reduced drastically (by 40%)6.

In the preceding discussion, four types of marketers are

explicated keeping the other-directed entity as the com-

petitor. It is to be noted that a marketer’s preference

structure may vary from one situation to another. Few

marketers are egoists in every choice situation. Similarly,

few marketers are altruists irrespective of the conse-

quences. Marketers are altruists or egoists with respect to a

given choice situation. Each marketer can hence be viewed

as a mixture of these different preference structures. In

addition, a marketer may have an extremely egoistic

preference structure when the concerned other-directed

entity is the competitor, whereas the same marketer may be

a moderately egoistic preference structure when the con-

cerned other-directed entity is the consumer. In the ensuing

section, the difference between preference and behavior of

marketers is discussed.

Difference Between Preference and Behavior of Marketers

As discussed earlier, the difference between egoism and

altruism is focused on whether self or the other (viz. consumer

and competitor) is more important to the marketer. If it needs

to be known whether a marketer has an egoistic or an altruistic

preference structure, one needs to look at what she would have

done in the context of an anti-diagonal choice situation. For

this, a hypothetical anti-diagonal problem may be framed. For

instance, what would the marketer choose if she were to either

add value for consumers or obtain a sales gain? In order to

ascertain this, assume that the marketer is made to clearly

visualize the following scenario in very certain terms (cf.

Margolis 1982; Sober 1989): She will be deprived of a sales

gain if she adds value for consumers, but will be appropriately

awarded a sales gain if she abstains from adding value for

consumers. If the marketer would choose to appropriate sales

gain by abstaining from adding value for consumers, it would

be clear that she has an egoistic preference structure. On the

contrary, if the marketer would choose to add value for con-

sumers and, therefore, forego a sales gain, it would be clear

that she has an altruistic preference structure.

It is to be noted, however, that preference and behavior are

two different things. For instance, if a marketer has an altru-

istic preference structure, it does not follow that her behavior

is also an altruistic one. On some occasion, a marketer with an

altruistic preference structure may be correct in thinking that

the choices available are the ones in which sales gain and value

addition for consumers are associated. In such a case, her

behavior is egoistic. If a marketer needs to claim that her

behavior is altruistic, she must sacrifice herself for the sake of

others (viz. consumers and competitors). Said differently, the

display of the altruistic preference should happen in an anti-

diagonal choice situation.

Similarly, if a marketer is seen to engage in an appar-

ently altruistic behavior, it does not mean that she has an

altruistic preference structure. Suppose that marketer is

seen to add value for consumers in some real circumstance.

The marketer’s preference in this case may, however, be

egoistic. This is because the marketer may have faced the

choice situation on the main diagonal in which value

addition for consumers and sales gain are associated.

In sum, the preference and behavior of marketers may

not be consistent, but this is, however, amenable to judg-

ment by others.

Summary

In this paper, the idea of egoism is discussed and contex-

tualized for understanding marketers. It is explicated that

marketers can be extremely egoistic, moderately egoistic,

Table 8 Extremely altruistic marketer (competitor-directed)

Self-directed

SMS :SMS

Competitor-directed CMS s s

:CMS p p

p\ q\ r\ s

6 Although self-sacrifice is taken as the essential condition for

identifying an altruistic preference structure, the motivations for such

a self-sacrifice may be several such as contentment, empathy, and

mercy. A question such as ‘why would any marketer do this?’ is

beyond the scope of this study.

618 J. Ramanathan, B. Swain

123

moderately altruistic, and extremely altruistic in terms of

their preference and behavior (cf. Lynch and Walsh 2003;

Sober 1989). This can happen in various scenarios such as

when the other-directed entity is the consumer and when

the other-directed entity is the competitor. For instance,

adding value for consumers does not make any difference

for the extremely egoistic marketers, whereas one’s own

sales gain does not make any difference for the extremely

altruistic marketers. One’s own sales gain is, however,

more important than value addition to consumers for the

moderately egoistic marketers, whereas value addition for

consumers is more important than the sales gain for the

moderately altruistic marketers. The contrast drawn

between the egoistic marketers and the altruistic marketers

is located in the anti-diagonal choice situation where self-

sacrifice becomes obvious.

In this paper, the focal entity considered is the marketer

and the discussion is focused on the following dyads:

marketer vis-à-vis consumer and marketer vis-à-vis com-

petitor. However, a marketer may (prefer to) engage in

actions such that one party (e.g., consumer) gains and the

other party (competitor) loses. In such situations, the

framework discussed here can be used to locate the mar-

keter on the egoism–altruism continuum as shown in

Fig. 1.

Implications for Practice

The paper has implications for marketers. The framework

explicated in the paper suggests that marketers in general

can be extremely egoistic, moderately egoistic, moderately

altruistic, and extremely altruistic in their preferences and

behaviors. Marketers can use the framework as a self-di-

agnosing tool to introspect on their preferences and actions.

Marketers may want to avoid the extreme types discussed

in the framework although they may empathize with the

moderate types. The framework may help them justify their

actions in terms of ethical quotient.

The paper has implications for the media who often

analyze marketers’ actions. The media may recognize that

the preferences and behaviors of marketers can be reflec-

tive of egoism and altruism. The interpretations of the

marketers’ actions will gain accuracy when the anti-diag-

onal choice situations are analyzed to portray marketers in

one way or another.

The framework discussed in this paper may also inform

agencies which felicitate marketers for their performance7.

These agencies may wish to take note of the relevance of

the framework for their selection process to award

marketers.

Contribution to Literature

It is observed that the literature on marketing ethics includes

several studies which are focused on contextualizing the

relevance of ethical doctrines such as deontology and util-

itarianism for interpreting marketing phenomena. Many

researchers such as Gaski (1999), Nill and Schibrowsky

(2007), Schlegelmilch and Öberseder (2010), Tsalikis and

Fritzsche (1989) and Whysall (2000) have surveyed the

literature on marketing ethics and have made similar

observations. Interestingly, few published studies are,

however, focused on explicating the relevance of egoism

for marketing (see Tsalikis and Fritzsche 1989). This paper,

hence, squarely contributes to the paucity noted above.

Marketer’s competitor directed altruism

P

Marketer’s competitor directed egoism

Marketer’s consumer directed altruism

Marketer’s consumer directed egoism

Fig. 1 Marketer’s egoism–

altruism vis-à-vis consumer and

competitor. Note: As an

illustration, point ‘‘P’’ reads that

marketer is egoistic more

toward competitor than

consumer

7 For examples of such agencies, refer: http://contentmarketinga

wards.com/; https://www.b2bmarketing.net/en/events/awards; and

http://fortune.com/businessperson-of-the-year/ (accessed on Septem-

ber 8, 2016).

Are Marketers Egoists? A Typological Explication 619

123

Though there are studies in philosophy literature which

use self-interest as the basis for typologies (Lynch and

Walsh 2003; Sober 1989), the novelty of this study is in

directing and adapting such focus within marketing. Given

the possible widespread perception of marketers as cheats

(see Assael 1995; Desmond 1998; Farmer 1967), explica-

tion of different types of marketers using the concept of

egoism gains importance and provides better resolution to

understanding marketers.

Limitations and Future Research Avenues

In this paper, different types of marketers such as egoists

and altruists are explicated based on their current prefer-

ence structures. Figuring out how the current preference

structure of a marketer is formed is beyond the scope of

this paper and can be explored in a future study (cf. Sober

1989). For instance, desire for a sales gain may be assumed

to be rudimental to the formation of a marketer’s prefer-

ence structure. However, further study is required to find

out whether altruistic marketers started giving acute

importance to value addition for consumers because value

addition was once associated with sales gain. Similarly,

suppose that a marketer understands some moral impera-

tive to be impersonal and takes the imperative as binding

both on oneself and on consumers equally (cf. Sober 1989).

The role of such moral imperatives in a marketer’s pref-

erence structure is not examined in this paper, and it could

be explored in another study.

The preferences of marketers considered in this paper

are first order. For instance, these are concerned with

whether marketers may prefer sales gain for themselves or

value addition for the consumers. Marketers may also have

second-order preferences. These preferences may be in

terms of the very preference structures they would like to

have. For instance, marketers may want to be altruists.

They may want to be quite generous to others and

rationalize such preferences by arguing that it makes them

feel good about themselves. Discussion on such second-

order preferences is not considered in this paper, and this

could be an avenue for further research (cf. Sober 1989).

In a real-life scenario, marketers may confront each other

in terms of setting up the most effective marketing mix for

their respective products. These marketers may have extre-

mely egoistic, moderately egoistic, moderately altruistic,

and extremely altruistic preference structures. Accordingly,

their choices in trade-off situations with competitors and

consumers would be different. Do these choices influence

business profitability? Said differently, should marketers

need to cultivate egoistic preference structures, rather than

altruistic ones or vice versa, to improve business profitabil-

ity? Future study may explore this association.

Narver and Slater (1990) reported that market orienta-

tion (customer orientation and competitor orientation)

positively influences business profitability. However, is this

relationship moderated by the type of the marketers dis-

cussed in this paper? This could be an area for further

research.

Acknowledgements The authors gratefully acknowledge the helpful

comments received from George Brenkert (Professor Emeritus,

McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University) on an

earlier version of this manuscript. The authors further acknowledge

the constructive comments received from the three anonymous

reviewers and the section editor. Any errors in the manuscript are

solely that of the authors.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of interest Jayasankar Ramanathan declares that he has no

conflict of interest. Biswanath Swain declares that he has no conflict

of interest.

Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with

human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.

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