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Archive1.zipLEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE_ CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIVERSE WORKFORCE - CL.pdf
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This technical note was prepared by Martin N. Davidson, Associate Professor of Business Administration. It was written as a basis for class discussion. Copyright © 2000 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. The author thanks Rachel Bagby, James Clawson, Joseph Harder, C. V. Harquail, and Heather Wishik for helpful comments. To order copies, send an e-mail to [email protected]. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev. 12/00.
LEADERS WHO MAKE A DIFFERENCE: CRITICAL SKILLS FOR LEADING A DIVERSE WORKFORCE
You can’t excel as a leader in today’s global economy if you can’t skillfully lead diverse groups of people, many of whom are different from you in significant ways. As more traditional organizations adapt to the demands of global business, the most successful leaders of these organizations are adapting as well. Many of the traditional core competencies of leadership remain central to the success of these leaders—articulating vision, inspiring and motivating subordinates, and maintaining integrity in relationships. But the increasing diversity of the people in these organizations is compelling leaders to grapple with questions they didn’t have to deal with only a generation ago: How do I make my organization more diverse? How do I leverage the benefits that are supposed to be a product of diverse perspectives? Is there an “uneven playing field” in my organization? How do I manage diversity-related governmental requirements such as affirmative action? How do I manage the conflicts that arise due to differences?
Leaders who are effective in organizations that value (or aspire to value) diversity possess a distinct set of characteristics and skills. This note describes some of those characteristics and skills and culls the best practices of several leaders who are creating competitive advantage from diversity.
Key Characteristics of Effective Leaders of Diversity
Ability to articulate the business case for diversity
Effective leaders embody and communicate a vision for the organization that is compelling for the members of that organization. In diverse organizations,1 that vision has as
1 I will use the term “diverse organizations” to mean organizations comprised of individuals who differ from one another along a variety of dimensions including but not limited to race, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, age, and physical ability.
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part of its foundation an explicit understanding of the business case for diversity for that organization. In their classic article on diversity as a competitive advantage, Cox and Blake outline several domains in which competitive advantage should derive from explicitly valuing the diversity in an organization. These domains include: (1) enhanced skill in entering untapped markets; (2) innovation and creativity flowing from new perspectives; and (3) increased ability to adapt to changing environments.2
In order for an organization to truly leverage its diversity, that diversity must position the organization to manifest its mission and accomplish its goals more effectively. Effective leaders in diverse organizations articulate precisely how diversity will help the organization succeed in its core businesses. By analyzing their business in this way, these leaders are prepared to articulate the long-term benefits and challenges of the diversity within their organizations. Honeywell’s vice-president of Corporate Diversity and Multicultural Business Affairs, Patsy Randell, summarizes the importance of making a business case for diversity:
We want to make sure we are thinking and executing from a multicultural perspective on all levels—internally, externally, domestically, and internationally. Multiculturalism recognizes that diversity is broad; it touches talent, customers, suppliers, relationships in general, and the work environment and company culture. These components tie this directly to business strategy and practices.3
Commitment to fairness
Effective leaders in diverse organizations exhibit a strong ethical commitment to fairness. In essence, these leaders believe strongly that they want a “level playing field” in their organizations. Pragmatically, since they have defined the business case for diversity, they believe that a true meritocracy emerges when all people within the organization have a fair chance to contribute to the goals of the business. But even more profound is the notion that if inequities do exist in the organization, they must be eradicated as effectively as possible because it is the right thing to do. Leaders who champion diversity invariably reveal an ethical commitment to fairness that does not allow them to tolerate easily the inequities that often accompany differences in organizations.4
One successful leader, Henry B. Schacht, CEO of Lucent Technologies, describes his experience:
I came from very modest means, a single parent, and was given the opportunity to achieve the best, limited only by my ability. I think that a human being should
2 T. H. Cox, Jr. and S. Blake, “Managing Cultural Diversity: Implications for Organizational Competitiveness,” Academy of Management Executive 5 (1991): 45–56.
3 Ibid. 4 J. R. Meindl and K. J. Thompson, “Justice and Leadership: A Social Co-Constructionist Agenda,” Current
Societal Concerns about Justice: Critical Issues in Social Justice, (New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1996), 137–153.
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have an equal chance at the starting line independent of their monetary circumstances and independent of their package size. What has to be controlling is your ability to do whatever the task better than the next person.5
Commitment to fairness, such as that articulated by Schacht, is grounded in concrete and personal experience, not simply in an abstract idea. One interesting observation about leaders who manage diverse organizations well is that they often have profound personal experiences of injustice. Sometimes that experience comes vicariously as when someone with whom they are in a relationship is harmed.6 But an even more powerful motivator is the personal experience of being different and being mistreated at some point in life because of that difference. Whatever the dimension of difference, these leaders learn from their experience of being different from the norm.
Willingness to learn about specific dimensions of difference
Effective leaders of diverse organizations are educated about the dimensions of difference that are relevant to the people in their organizations. This education stems from at least two sources. First, these leaders gather data about the experiences and perspectives of their diverse employees. They accomplish this by attending classes and training programs, conducting personal research, and discussing critical issues around differences with knowledgeable individuals.
Second, these leaders cultivate relationships with people who are different from them. This process serves both to offer insight into general information about the difference (akin to straightforward educational discussion) and to create an interpersonal bond that allows the leader to engage the issues around difference in more depth. These relationships are often catalysts for leaders to learn about and understand the inequities in their organization, as well to understand the painful impact of these inequities upon the people in the organization.
Ability to develop diverse members in the organization
Because they are experienced in creating relationships with people who are different, effective leaders of diverse organizations are able to develop individuals who are different from them with the same skill they use to develop individuals similar to them. There are three stages to this developmental technique: identifying promising individuals, mentoring those individuals, and actively creating a supportive environment in which those individuals may thrive.
First, effective leaders find talent. They are able to do so because they reject attitudes that prejudge any individual as less or more talented based solely on identity characteristics like gender, national origin, or race. Rather, as part of their training on dimensions of difference, these leaders have identified some of the fallacies that hinder fair evaluation of talent (e.g., women aren’t assertive enough to lead men), and they can set them aside.
5 Personal interview with Henry B. Schacht.
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But success in identifying talent does not stem solely from an attitudinal shift. Effective leaders also recognize that homogeneous organizations need an influx of diverse members and that one must look to diverse sources to find those members. When an electronics company sought to increase the number of African American engineers in its workforce, its leaders tapped Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs); a source the company had not paid attention to previously.
The second way in which these leaders develop talented individuals is through mentoring, the dynamic process between two individuals consisting of activities and interactions related to work, skill acquisition, and social or emotional aspects of functioning and thriving in the organization. Mentoring is an important process of training and preparation that generates successful outcomes, including increased salaries, greater numbers of promotions, greater access to resources, and higher levels of job satisfaction.6 Mentoring across difference—choosing to mentor a junior colleague who is dissimilar to the mentor—is more difficult than mentoring someone who is similar. The challenges of negotiating a professional relationship with someone who may have very different attitudes, values, and worldviews are significant and the outcomes can be disheartening. Protégés who are members of minority groups in the organization may leave the organization in spite of the mentor’s support, an action that may leave the mentor feeling unappreciated or betrayed. Nevertheless, effective leaders take this risk because they understand that when leaders mentor protégés different from themselves, it increases the protégé’s chances for success in their socio-political adjustment in the organization.7 This in turns furnishes the organization with diverse talent and perspectives.
Third, effective leaders prepare the way for their protégés by using their power as a leader to influence the environment in which the protégé operates.8 One savvy CEO, wary of the prospect of his protégée trying to succeed as a single racial token in his management team, identified and persuaded another talented individual of the same race to join the team. This made the environment more conducive to success for both individuals as well as for the entire team.9 Although it could be argued that one more person of similar racial background is an inadequate remedy in this case, the example demonstrates the leader’s awareness that situational factors like size of the minority group, organizational climate, and team norms can affect the likelihood of success for protégés entering organizational systems where the protégé is distinctive.
6 G. F. Dreher and R. A. Ash, “A Comparative Study of Mentoring among Men and Women in Managerial, Professional, and Technical Positions,” Journal of Applied Psychology 75 (1990): 539–546.
7 D. A. Thomas, “Racial Dynamics in Cross-Race Developmental Relationships,” Administrative Science Quarterly 38 (1993): 169–194.
8 B. R. Ragins, “Diversity, Power, and Mentorship in Organizations: A Cultural, Structural, and Behavioral Perspective,” Diversity in Organizations: New Perspectives for a Changing Workplace (Thousand Oaks, CA.: SAGE Publications, 1995), 91–132.
9 Personal communication from Richard Orange.
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Critical Skills for the Leaders of Diverse Organizations10
Effective leaders in diverse organizations have cultivated a core set of managerial skills that aid them in managing the diversity of their employees’ experiences well. If we were to extrapolate from the examples discussed, six skills stand out as critical to success in leading diverse organizations.
Shifting frame of reference
Effective leaders of diverse organizations are empathic, and, as was noted in the discussion of learning about differences, they are skilled at putting themselves in another person’s position or shifting frames of reference. As a starting point for building this competence, you can attend events and engage in activities where the culture and customs are different from your normal ones. Some people experience this when they travel to countries outside of the United States, but you can accomplish such immersion simply by attending a religious service that is different from your own or look for local events where the themes emphasize the differences in which you are interested.
Listening effectively
The best leaders have outstanding listening skills. While there are many ways to improve listening skills, one approach is especially useful in cultivating relationships across differences. First, adopt an attitude of humility and openness in listening to someone who is different. Try to suspend the common habit of listening in preparation to respond or argue. Rather, assume you are about to be treated to a story. Second, when listening, restrain from interjecting comments, questions, or other responses until you have listened for a period of time (an imperfect heuristic is about 20 seconds, but each person must make the determination based on the situation). When you do ask questions, be patient and listen for a complete response before you ask another question. Sometimes, it is so exciting to learn about differences that we openly display our enthusiasm and curiosity. But, for those who differ from us, those expressions of enthusiasm can be overwhelming or off-putting.
Telling one’s personal story
All of the leaders described are skilled in talking about themselves in a personal way that reveals aspects of who they are along specific dimensions of difference. A number of leaders have spoken with passion about their lower-class upbringing and how their class experience has shaped their leadership style. Others have taken the opportunity to talk about what it means to them to be white, or to be male and to lead.
10 This list of skills is distilled from the set of core competencies articulated by a consortium of consultants and scholars, including Barbara Berry, Janice Eddy, Ann Akiko Kusumoto, Richard Orange, Bill Page, Anita Sanchez, Kit Tennis, and Heather Wishik.
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Effective leaders in diverse organizations are able to tell these stories because they are willing to be introspective about what the dimensions of difference mean. Every aspect of difference has social, psychological, and political implications regardless of where we reside along that dimension. There is a “race story” for blacks, Asians, whites, and Latinos; a “gender story” for men and women; a “sexual orientation story” for gays, lesbians, heterosexuals, and bisexuals. These leaders have taken the effort to discover and elaborate upon their own stories so they can talk about them with those they lead.
You can discover aspects of your story by researching your place on a specific dimension of difference in the same way you would research another’s place along the dimension—using books, articles, or the Internet. For example, if you are a white U.S. citizen, you can examine the scholarly work on whiteness in the United States as a means of gaining insight into your own whiteness.11 In addition, you can engage in personal research by talking with family members about your family history. Interestingly, people who have embarked upon this personal research often find family and friends are quite interested in talking about these issues, and they want to hear what you have learned.
Finally, you can explore how you learned about difference from past experiences—from family, friends, and institutions. For example, you can reflect upon what messages were received early in life about people whose religion differs from your own. What did your parents say? Your siblings? Your clergy? Identifying these messages as they pertain to any given dimension of difference is one way to discover your own sense of identity along these dimensions. This technique is especially helpful when you are trying to understand your identity as a member of the majority or dominant part of any given identity group (e.g., you are a man learning about gender, a white learning about race, a heterosexual learning about sexual orientation).
Separating intent from impact
Leaders in diverse organizations cultivate the recognition that actions and behaviors in which they engage may negatively impact individuals who are different from them, even if the leader had no intention of harming the individual. The leader is able to reconcile the fact that his or her comment or action may have had a negative effect upon the recipient without experiencing the recipient’s negative reaction as an indictment of the leader’s sense of social awareness and self esteem.
For example, one leader jokingly referred to his friend and colleague as “girl,” a terminology for him that was meant to convey collegial closeness and platonic affection. He meant it as a compliment. However, his female colleague experienced the term as demeaning to her professionalism and was insulted. The leader was able to acknowledge the insulting experience his colleague had, without feeling insulted or hurt that his intended expression of
11 R. Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), x+289.
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colleagueship was met with anger. He was clear that he intended a positive message and was open to apologizing for the unintended impact of his comment. Moreover, he remained committed to finding other ways to express his high regard for his colleague.
Accepting feedback
Effective leaders are able to accept feedback about their own behavior and modify that behavior appropriately. Everyone, regardless of position, improves his or her individual competence by receiving and acting on valid feedback. Rarely does anyone completely master the intricacies and subtleties of intergroup and intercultural differences, so the ability to change a behavior that is dysfunctional in diverse settings is essential.
Practice enhances this skill. Ask trusted others for feedback on your behaviors in the presence of people who are different. It is best to have two sources of feedback—one person who is similar to you, and one who is different from you. This structure can provide the requisite amount of help you need to consider the feedback without becoming too defensive to act on it.
Demonstrating courage
Finally, leaders in diverse organizations are courageous. This courage manifests in two ways. Invariably, negotiating difference in organizations means various constituents in the organization will dislike you. Each of the leaders described above was willing to alter the status quo.12 Moreover, in challenging others on issues that are as sensitive as diversity can be, these leaders make themselves unpopular.
But equally trying are difficulties in confronting our own imperfections. No leader is free from prejudiced attitudes regarding differences. Whether along dimensions of race, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other differences, we all carry beliefs that range from innocently embarrassing to profoundly hurtful to others. Empathy, listening, and accepting feedback help us in behaving more effectively, but we must also be willing to confront aspects of ourselves about which we are not proud.
Conclusion
Two important points should be made about the characteristics and skills discussed here. First, these are not simply skills for the leader who happens to work with people who are different along some obvious dimension. Even people who look the same embody a vast array of differences that, if managed effectively, can enhance what happens in the organization.
12 M. N. Davidson, “The Value of Being Included: An Examination of Diversity Change Initiatives in Organizations,” Performance Improvement Quarterly 12 (1999): 164–180.
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Second, effective leadership in a diverse context is not a competency reserved only for individuals at the highest levels of management. Rather, each of the competencies described here is applicable for managers and team leaders trying to thrive amidst diversity in their work environments. Much is made of the importance of top management commitment to engaging diversity effectively, and there is no question that top management buy-in is necessary. But in most organizations, difference is engaged initially when lower-level members of the organization use the characteristics and skills described here to analyze how work is done. It is the awareness of problems on the margin that jumpstarts change.
Finally, consider that the one quality that pervades the greatest leaders of diverse organizations is that they are always learning. David Thomas and Robin Ely wrote:
Leaders in diversity-valuing companies are proactive about learning. They encourage people to make explicit use of cultural experience at work. They fight all forms of dominance and subordination, and they ensure that the inevitable tensions that come from a genuine effort to make way for diversity are acknowledged and resolved with sensitivity.13
13 D. A. Thomas and R. J. Ely, “Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity,” Harvard Business Review 74 (1996): 79–90.
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making-dumb-groups-smarter - Sunstein and Hast.pdf
MAKING DUMB GROUPS 90 Harvard Business Review December 2014
Cass R. Sunstein is the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard Law School. Reid Hastie is the Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business. They are the authors of Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter (Harvard Business Review Press, 2015), from which this article is adapted.
The new science of group decision making by Cass R. Sunstein and Reid Hastie
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have made decisions in groups. As the saying goes, two heads are better than one. If so, then three heads should be better than two, and four better still. With a hundred or a thousand, then, things are bound to go well—hence the supposed wisdom of crowds.
The advantage of a group, wrote one early ad- vocate of collective intelligence—Aristotle—is that
“when there are many who contribute to the process of deliberation, each can bring his share of goodness and moral prudence…some appreciate one part, some another, and all together appreciate all.” The key is information aggregation: Different people take note of different “parts,” and if those parts are prop- erly aggregated, they will lead the group to know more (and better) than any individual.
Unfortunately, groups all too often fail to live up to this potential. Companies bet on products that are doomed to fail, miss out on spectacular oppor- tunities, pursue unsuccessful competitive strategies. In governments, policy judgments misfire, hurting thousands or even millions of people in the process.
“Groupthink” is the term most often applied to the tendency of groups to go astray. Popularized in the early 1970s by the psychologist Irving Janis, it has de- servedly entered the popular lexicon. But Janis’s con- tribution is more an evocative narrative than either a scientific account of how groups go wrong or helpful guidance for group success. Many researchers have tried to find experimental evidence to support his specific claims about how cohesion and leadership styles shape group behavior, to little avail.
Since Janis produced his theory, though, psychol- ogists and other behavioral scientists have built up a rich base of evidence on how and when individual decision makers blunder. This work has attained sci- entific acclaim (including several Nobel prizes) and widespread popularity thanks to best sellers such as Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow, Dan Ariely’s Predictably Irrational, and Nudge (which one of us, Sunstein, coauthored with the economist Richard Thaler).
A smaller but nonetheless substantial body of research—some of it our own—has focused on the decision-making strengths and weaknesses of groups and teams. But little of this work has trickled into
the public consciousness, and it has yet to have a no- ticeable effect on actual practice. It’s time for that to change. We aim to bring behavioral research into direct contact with the question of group performance—to describe the main ways in which groups go astray and to offer some simple suggestions for improvement.
Why Do Errors Occur? Groups err for two main reasons. The first involves informational signals. Naturally enough, people learn from one another; the problem is that groups often go wrong when some members receive incor- rect signals from other members. The second in- volves reputational pressures, which lead people to silence themselves or change their views in order to avoid some penalty—often, merely the disapproval of others. But if those others have special authority or wield power, their disapproval can produce seri- ous personal consequences.
As a result of informational signals and repu- tational pressures, groups run into four separate though interrelated problems. When they make poor or self-destructive decisions, one or more of these problems are usually to blame:
• Groups do not merely fail to correct the errors of their members; they amplify them.
• They fall victim to cascade effects, as group mem- bers follow the statements and actions of those who spoke or acted first.
• They become polarized, taking up positions more extreme than those they held before deliberations.
• They focus on what everybody knows already—and thus don’t take into account critical information that only one or a few people have.
Amplifying Errors With the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and the late Amos Tversky in the vanguard, behavioral scien- tists have identified some common mental shortcuts (known as heuristics) and biases that lead individuals astray. The planning fallacy, for example, leads us to underestimate how much time projects will take and how much money they’ll cost. Overconfidence leads us to believe that our forecasts are more accurate and precise than in fact they are. The availability heuristic
SINCE THE BEGINNING OF HUMAN HISTORY, PEOPLE
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leads us to seize on whatever springs most readily to mind, because it is memorable or we recently experi- enced it. The representativeness heuristic leads us to believe that things or events or people that are similar in one way are similar in other ways, too. Egocentric bias leads us to exaggerate the extent to which our tastes and preferences are typical. The sunk-cost fal- lacy leads us to stick with a hopeless project because we have already invested so much in it. Framing effects influence our decisions according to the semantics of how the options are presented. (For example, people are more likely to agree to an operation if they are told that 90% of people are alive after five years than if they are told that 10% of people are dead after five years.)
For our purposes, the central question is whether groups can avoid or mitigate these errors. Experimental evidence indicates that they usually do not. The psychologists Roger Buehler, Dale Griffin, and Johanna Peetz have found, for example, that the planning fallacy is aggravated in groups. That is, groups are even more optimistic than individuals when estimating the time and resources necessary to complete a task; they focus on simple, trouble- free scenarios for their future endeavors. Similarly, Hal R. Arkes and Catherine Blumer have shown that groups are even more likely than individuals to es- calate their commitment to a course of action that is failing—particularly if members identify strongly with the group. There is a clue here about why com- panies, states, and even nations often continue with doomed projects and plans. Groups have also been found to increase, rather than to lessen, reliance on the representativeness heuristic; to be more prone to overconfidence than individual members; and to be more influenced by framing effects.
Both informational signals and reputational pres- sures are at work here. If most members of a group tend to make certain errors, then most people will
see others making the same errors. What they see serves as “proof” of erroneous beliefs. Reputational pressures play a complementary role: If most mem- bers of the group make errors, others may make them simply to avoid seeming disagreeable or foolish.
Fortunately, we have evidence that deliberating groups can correct or reduce certain biases. For prob- lems that have “eureka” solutions (the right answer, once announced, is clear to all), groups do well even if individual members start out biased. Groups are also better than individuals at overcoming egocen- tric bias. An individual will focus on his own tastes— what he likes and what he doesn’t. If he consults with others, he is likely to learn that his tastes are idiosyncratic. In such cases, group deliberation sup- plies an important corrective. Note that we’re less apt to get that corrective if the group consists of like- minded people. The influence of the availability heu- ristic, too, is slightly reduced in groups. Individual members may each rely on “what comes to mind,” but they are likely to have different memories, yield- ing a more representative sample at the group level.
The larger point, however, is that many individual biases are not systematically corrected at the group level and often get worse. The mechanisms by which errors are compounded can usually be found in the other three problems of group decision making.
Cascading to the Wrong Answer The human brain may be wired from birth to syn- chronize with and imitate other people. It is no exaggeration to say that herding is a fundamental behavior of human groups. When it comes to group decisions and information flow, the favored term among social scientists is “cascade”—a small trickle in one direction that soon becomes a flood.
Consider a brilliant study of music downloads by the sociologists Matthew Salganik, Peter Dodds, and
Idea in Brief THE PROBLEM Groups often fail to live up to their potential as decision-making bodies. Instead of aggregating the knowledge and wisdom of their members, they end up making bigger errors than individuals would.
WHY IT HAPPENS Group members take informational signals from what others say, even when the information is wrong or misleading, while reputational pressures can cause them to silence themselves or change their views in order to fit in. As a result, groups often amplify individual errors, stampede toward bad decisions, foment polarization and extremism, and ignore information that isn’t already widely held.
THE SOLUTION Leaders can structure group deliberations to make them more likely to succeed. One very simple way is to let others speak first. Another is to assign specific roles or areas of expertise to members of the group. The key is encouraging individuals to share their diverse knowledge rather than suppress it.
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Duncan Watts. They allowed test subjects to listen to and download one or more of 72 songs by new bands. In the control group, individuals were told nothing about what others had downloaded or liked and were left to make independent judgments. In other groups, the participants could see how many people had previously downloaded particular songs. The researchers were testing how much difference it made, in terms of ultimate numbers of downloads, if people could see the behavior of others.
It made a huge difference. Although the worst songs (as established by the control group) never ended up at the very top, and the best songs never at the very bottom, essentially anything else could hap- pen. If a song benefited from a burst of early down- loads, it might do quite well. Without that benefit, it might be a failure. And as the researchers later found, these effects occurred even if they lied to the test subjects about which songs were downloaded a lot.
If a project, a product, a business, a politician, or a cause gets a lot of support early on, it can win over a group even if it would have failed otherwise. Many groups end up thinking that their ultimate conver- gence on a shared view was inevitable. Beware of that thought. The convergence may well be an artifact of who was the first to speak—and hence of what we might call the architecture of the group’s discussions.
Two kinds of cascades—informational and repu- tational—correspond to our two main sources of group error. In informational cascades, people si- lence themselves out of deference to the information conveyed by others. In reputational cascades, they silence themselves to avoid the opprobrium of others.
Here’s an example of an informational cascade in jury deliberations, which has important implica- tions for business. One of us (Hastie) has conducted dozens of mock-jury studies with thousands of vol- unteer jurors, many of them from big-city jury pools. In these studies the volunteers privately write down their preferred verdicts before deliberations begin and indicate how confident they are in their judg- ments. Deliberations then start, as they often do in real trials, with a straw vote to see where everyone stands. The vote circles the jury table and frequently begins with a small set of two or three jurors who favor, with increasing confidence, the same verdict.
In one mock trial, jurors 1, 2, and 3 endorsed a verdict of second-degree murder both privately and in the straw vote. Juror 4 had voted not guilty and indicated the highest level of confidence in his choice
on the pre-deliberation private ballot. What did juror 4 do when confronted with three second-degree murder ver- dicts? He paused for a second and then said, “Second degree.” Juror 7, an un- decided vote, suddenly spoke up and asked, “Why second degree?” The re- searchers saw a deer-in-the-headlights expression flit across juror 4’s face be- fore he replied, “Oh, it’s just obviously second degree.” We have no doubt that similar scenarios play out every day in jury rooms, boardrooms, and confer- ence rooms all over the world.
A reputational cascade has a differ- ent dynamic. Group members think they know what is right, but they nonetheless go along with the group in order to maintain the good opin- ion of others. Suppose, for example, that Albert suggests that his compa- ny’s new project is likely to succeed. Barbara is not confident that he’s right, but she concurs because she wishes
Many groups end up thinking that their ultimate convergence on a shared view was inevitable. Beware of that thought.
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not to seem ignorant, adversarial, or skeptical. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree that the project will go well, Cynthia not only won’t contradict them pub- licly but might even appear to share their judgment— not because she believes it to be correct (she doesn’t), but because she doesn’t want to face their hostility or lose their good opinion. Once Albert, Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their col- league David will be most reluctant to contradict them, even if he’s pretty sure they’re wrong and has excellent reasons for that belief. (Incipient evidence indicates that women are especially likely to self- censor during discussions of stereotypically male subjects, such as sports, and that men are especially likely to self-censor during discussions of stereotypi- cally female subjects, such as fashion. In both cases, groups lose valuable information.)
“Political correctness,” a term much used by the political right in the 1990s, is hardly limited to left- leaning academic institutions. In both business and government there is often a clear sense that a certain point of view is the proper one and that those who question or reject it, even for purposes of discussion, do so at their peril. They are viewed as “difficult,”
“not part of the team,” or, in extreme cases, as misfits. The group members in the examples above are, in
a sense, entirely rational. They care about their repu- tations, but there’s nothing irrational about that. As noted, however, people use heuristics, which can lead them astray, and are subject to biases. For the purposes of understanding how cascade effects work, the most important heuristic involves avail- ability: A vivid idea or example moves rapidly from one person to another, eventually producing a wide- spread belief within a group and possibly a city, a state, or even a nation.
In the area of risk, availability cascades are com- mon. A particular event—involving a dangerous pes- ticide, a hazardous waste dump, a nuclear power ac- cident, an act of terrorism—may become well-known to the group, even iconic. If so, it will alter members’ perceptions of a process, a product, or an activity. Availability cascades are familiar in business, too. Reports of a success or a failure may spread like wild- fire within or across companies, leading to judgments about other, apparently similar events or products. If a movie (Star Wars?), a television show (The Walking Dead?), or a book (involving Harry Potter?) does well, businesses will react strongly, eagerly looking for a proposal or a project that seems similar.
A by-product of availability is “associative block- ing” or “collaborative fixation,” whereby strong ideas block the recollection of other information. This phe- nomenon is a big problem when a group sets itself the task of generating creative solutions. The innovative thinking of individual members is suppressed by the powerful ideas generated by other members.
In the actual world of group decision making, of course, people may not know whether other members’ statements arise from independent in- formation, an informational cascade, reputational pressures, or the availability heuristic. They often overestimate the extent to which the views of others are based on independent information. Confident (but wrong) group decisions are a result.
Polarizing Groups Polarization is a frequent pattern with deliberating groups. It has been found in hundreds of studies in more than a dozen countries. We found it in dramatic
To examine the phenomenon of group polarization, the two of us (along with the social scientist David Schkade) created an experiment in group deliberation— one that, we believe, accurately reflects much deliberation in the real world.
We recruited citizens from two Colorado cities and assembled them in small groups (usually six people), all from the same city. The groups were asked to deliberate on three of the most contested issues of the time: climate change, affirmative action, and same-sex civil unions. The two cities were Boulder, known by its voting patterns to be predominantly liberal, and Colorado Springs, known by its voting patterns to be predominantly conservative. We did a reality check on the participants before the experiment started to ensure that the Boulder residents were in fact left of center and the Colorado Springs residents were right of center.
Group members were asked first to record their views individually and anonymously and then to deliberate together in an effort to reach a group decision. After the deliberations the participants were again asked to record their views individually and anonymously. Here’s what we found:
1 People from Boulder became a lot more liberal, and people from Colorado Springs became a lot more conservative. Not only were
the group “verdicts” more extreme than the pre-deliberation averages of group members, but the anonymous views of individual members became more extreme as well.
2 Deliberation decreased the diversity of opinion among group members. Before the groups started to deliberate, many of them
showed considerable divergence in individual opinions. Discussion brought liberals in line with one another and conservatives in line with one another. After a brief period of discussion, group members showed a lot less variation in the anonymous expression of their private views.
3 Deliberation sharply increased the disparities between the views of Boulder citizens and Colorado Springs citizens. Before deliberation,
many people’s opinions overlapped between the two cities. After deliberation, group dynamics left liberals and conservatives much more sharply divided.
A Tale of Two Cities
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form when we conducted an experiment in which residents of two Colorado cities discussed their po- litical beliefs (see the sidebar “A Tale of Two Cities”).
The earliest experiments on the polarizing effects of deliberation involved risk-taking behavior, with a clear finding that people who are initially inclined to take risks become still more so after they deliber- ate with one another. (Examples of risky decisions include accepting a new job, investing in a foreign country, escaping from a prisoner-of-war camp, and running for political office.) On the basis of this evi- dence the conventional wisdom became that group deliberation produced a systematic “risky shift.”
Later studies called this conclusion into ques- tion—and created a puzzle. On many of the same issues on which Americans made a risky shift, Taiwanese participants made a cautious shift. Even among American participants, deliberation some- times produced cautious shifts. Cautious shifts took place most often in decisions about whether to marry and whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain.
What explains these unruly findings? As the psy- chologists Serge Moscovici and Marisa Zavalloni discovered decades ago, members of a deliberating group will move toward more-extreme points on the scale (measured by reference to the initial me- dian point). When members are initially disposed toward risk taking, a risky shift is likely. When they are initially disposed toward caution, a cautious shift is likely. A finding of special importance for business is that group polarization occurs for matters of fact as well as issues of value. Suppose people are asked how likely it is, on a scale of zero to eight, that a prod- uct will sell a certain number of units in Europe in the next year. If the pre-deliberation median is five, the group judgment will tend to go up; if it’s three, the group judgment will tend to go down.
Even federal judges—experts in the law and sup- posedly neutral—are susceptible to group polariza- tion. Research by one of us (Sunstein, along with David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and Andres Sawicki) has found that both Democratic and Republican appointees show far more ideological voting pat- terns when sitting with other judges appointed by a president of the same party. If you want to know how an appellate judge will vote in an ideologically contested case, you might want to find out whether she was appointed by a Republican or a Democratic president. It’s a pretty good predictor. But in many
Leaders can refuse to take a firm position at the outset, thus making space for more information to emerge.
areas of the law, an even better predic- tor is who appointed the other judges on the panel.
Why does group polarization occur? There are three principal reasons:
The first and most important in- volves informational signals—but with a few twists. Group members pay at- tention to the arguments made by other group members. Arguments in any group with an initial predisposition will inevitably be skewed in the direction of that predisposition. As a statistical mat- ter, the arguments favoring the initial position will be more numerous than those pointing in another direction. Individuals will have thought or heard of some but not all the arguments that emerge from group deliberation. Thus deliberation will naturally lead people toward a more extreme point in line with what they initially believed.
The second reason involves repu- tation again. As we have seen, people want to be perceived favorably by
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other group members. Sometimes their publicly stated views are a function of how they want to present themselves. Once they hear what others be- lieve, they will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position in order to preserve their self-presentation.
The third reason stresses the close links among three factors: confidence, extremism, and corrobo- ration by others. When people lack confidence, they tend to be moderate. The great American judge Learned Hand once said, “The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right.” As people gain confidence, they usually become more extreme in their beliefs, because a significant moderating fac- tor—their own uncertainty about whether they are right—has been eliminated. The agreement of oth- ers tends to increase confidence and thus extremism.
Focusing on “What Everybody Knows” Our last group problem may be the most interesting of all. Suppose a group has a great deal of informa- tion—enough to produce the unambiguously right outcome if that information is elicited and properly aggregated. Even so, the group will not perform well if its members emphasize broadly shared informa- tion while neglecting information that is held by one or a few. Countless studies demonstrate that this re- grettable result is highly likely.
“Hidden profiles” is the technical term for accurate understandings that groups could but do not achieve. Hidden profiles are a product of the “common knowl- edge effect,” whereby information held by all group members has more influence on group judgments than information held by only a few. The most obvi- ous explanation of the effect is that common knowl- edge is more likely to be communicated to the group. But faulty informational signals play a big role as well.
Consider a study by Ross Hightower and Lutfus Sayeed on how groups make personnel decisions. Résumés for three candidates for the position of mar- keting manager were placed before three group mem- bers. The experimenters rigged the résumés so that one applicant was clearly the best for the job. But each test subject was given a packet of information contain- ing only a subset of attributes from the résumés.
Almost none of the deliberating groups made what would have been, if all the information were considered, conspicuously the right choice. The win- ning candidates tended to be those about whom all three test subjects were given positive information.
Negative information about the winner and positive information about the losers (revealed to only one or two group members) did not reach the full group.
While many hidden-profile experiments involve volunteers from college courses, similar results have been found among real-world managers. In a study of hiring by high-level executives conducted by Susanne Abele, Garold Stasser, and Sandra I. Vaughan-Parsons, the experimenters did not con- trol the information the executives had about the various candidates; instead, the executives did their own information searches. As a result, some infor- mation was known to all, some was shared but not by all, and some was held by only one person.
The finding? Common information had a dispro- portionately large impact on discussions and conclu- sions. The executives gave disproportionately little weight to valuable information held by one person or a few, and as a result made bad decisions.
The study also found that some group members are “cognitively central,” in that their knowledge is held by many other group members, while other group members are “cognitively peripheral,” in that their information is uniquely held. To function well, groups need to take advantage of cognitively periph- eral people. But in most groups, cognitively central people have a disproportionate influence on dis- cussion. A simple explanation for this is that group members prefer to hear information that is com- monly held—and prefer to hear people who have such information. Cognitively central people are thus accorded high levels of credibility, whereas cog- nitively peripheral people are accorded low levels.
Making Groups Wiser A central goal in group decision making should be to ensure that groups aggregate the information their members actually have and don’t let faulty informa- tional signals and reputational pressures get in the way. Here are six ways to achieve that goal, starting with the simplest:
Silence the leader. Leaders often promote self- censorship by expressing their own views early, thus discouraging disagreement. Leaders and high-status members can do groups a big service by indicating a willingness and a desire to hear uniquely held infor- mation. They can also refuse to take a firm position at the outset and in that way make space for more information to emerge. Many studies have found that members of low-status groups—including
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less-educated people, African-Americans, and sometimes women—have less influence within de- liberating groups (and may self-silence). Leaders who model an open mind and ask for candid opin- ions can reduce this problem.
“Prime” critical thinking. We have seen that when people silence themselves in deliberating groups, it is often out of a sense that they will be pun- ished for disclosing information that runs counter to the group’s inclination. But social norms are not set in stone. Social scientists have done a lot of work on the importance of “priming”—that is, triggering some thought or association in such a way as to af- fect people’s choices and behavior. In experiments on group decision making, engaging participants in a prior task that involves either “getting along” or “crit- ical thinking” has been shown to have a big impact. When people are given a “getting along” task, they shut up. When given a “critical thinking” task, they are far more likely to disclose what they know. So if the leader of a group encourages information disclo- sure from the beginning, even if it goes against the grain, members will probably do less self-silencing.
Reward group success. People often keep si- lent because they receive only a fraction of the ben- efits of disclosure. Careful experiments have shown that incentives can be restructured to reward group success—and hence to encourage the disclosure of information. Cascades are far less likely when each individual knows that he has nothing to gain from a correct individual decision and everything to gain from a correct group decision. The general lesson is that identification with the group’s success is more likely to ensure that people will say what they know, regardless of whether it fits “the party line.” (This, by the way, is one reason that prediction markets work and deserve careful attention.)
Assign roles. To understand one especially promising strategy, imagine a deliberating group consisting of people with specific roles that are known and appreciated by all members. One person might have medical expertise; another might be a lawyer; a third might know about public relations; a fourth might be a statistician. In such a group, sen- sible information aggregation would be far more likely, simply because every member would know that each of the others had something to contrib- ute. Indeed, experiments have found that the bias in favor of shared information is reduced when test subjects are openly assigned specific roles. If a group
wants to obtain the information that its members hold, they should be told before deliberations begin that each has a different and relevant role—or at least distinctive information to contribute.
Appoint a devil’s advocate. If hidden profiles and self-silencing are sources of group failure, a tempting approach is to ask some group members to act as devil’s advocates, urging a position that is con- trary to the group’s inclination. Those who assume that role can avoid the social pressure that comes from rejecting the group’s dominant position, be- cause they have been charged with doing precisely that. But be careful with this approach: Authentic dissent and a formal requirement of devil’s advo- cacy are different; the latter does far less to improve group performance, because members are aware that it’s artificial—a kind of exercise or game.
Establish contrarian teams. Another method, related to appointing a devil’s advocate but shown to be more effective, is “red teaming.” Red teams come in two basic forms: those that try to defeat the primary team in a simulated mission, and those that construct the strongest possible case against a proposal or a plan. Red teams are an excellent idea in many contexts, especially if they sincerely try to find mistakes and exploit vulnerabilities and are given clear incentives to do so.
The Delphi method. This approach, developed at the RAND Corporation during the cold war, mixes the virtues of individual decision making with social learning. Individuals offer first-round estimates (or votes) in complete anonymity. Then a cycle of re- estimations (or repeated voting) occurs, with a re- quirement that second-round estimates have to fall within the middle quartiles (25%–75%) of the first round. This process is repeated—often interspersed with group discussion—until the participants con- verge on an estimate. A simple (and more easily ad- ministered) alternative is a system in which ultimate judgments or votes are given anonymously but only after deliberation. Anonymity insulates group mem- bers from reputational pressures and thus reduces the problem of self-silencing.
Group failures often have disastrous conse- quences—not merely for businesses, nonprofits, and governments, but for all those affected by them. The good news is that decades of empirical work, alongside recent innovations, offer some practical safeguards and correctives that can make groups a lot wiser. HBR Reprint R1412F
98 Harvard Business Review December 2014
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Manzoi%252C%2BJ.%2BBaroux%252C%2BJ.%2B-%2BThe%2BSet-Up-To-Fail%2BSyndrome.pdf
How bosses create their own poor performers.
The Set-Up-to-FaU Syndrome
by Jean-Frangois Manzoni and Jean-Louis Barsoux
WHEN AN EMPLOYEE FAILS - or even just performs poorly - managers typically do not blame themselves.
The employee doesn't understand the work, a manager might contend. Or the employee isn't driven to succeed, can't set priorities, or won't take direction. Whatever the reason, the problem is assumed to be the employee's fault- and the employee's responsibility.
But is it? Sometimes, of course, the answer is yes. Some employees are not up to their assigned tasks and never will he, for lack of knowledge, skill, or simple desire. But some- times-and we would venture to say often-an employee's poor performance can be blamed largely on his boss.
ARTWORK BY SIDNEY HARRIS
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
Perhaps "blamed" is too strong a word, but it is directionally correct. In fact, our research strongly suggests that bosses-albeit accidentally and usually with the best intentions-are often complicit in an employee's lack of success. (See the insert "About the Research.") How? By creating and reinforcing a dynamic that essentially sets up perceived under- performers to fail. If the Pygmalion effect describes the dynamic in which an individual lives up to great expectations, the set-up-to-fail syndrome ex- plains the opposite. It describes a dynamic in which employees perceived to be mediocre or weak per- formers live down to the low expectations their managers have for them. The result is that they often end up leaving the organization - either of their own volition or not.
The syndrome usually begins surreptitiously. The initial impetus can be performance related, such as when an employee loses a client, under- shoots a target, or misses a deadline. Often, however, the trigger is less specific. An employee is trans- ferred into a division with a lukewarm recommen- dation from a previous boss. Or perhaps the boss and the employee don't really get along on a per- sonal basis-several studies have indeed shown that compatibility between boss and subordinate, based on similarity of attitudes, values, or social charac- teristics, can have a significant impact on a boss's impressions. In any case, the syndrome is set in motion when the boss hegins to worry that the em- ployee's performance is not up to par.
The boss then takes what seems like the obvious action in light of the subordinate's perceived short- comings: he increases the time and attention he focuses on the employee. He requires the employee to get approval before making decisions, asks to see more paperwork documenting those decisions, or watches the employee at meetings more closely and critiques his comments more intensely.
These actions are intended to boost performance and prevent the subordinate from making errors. Unfortunately, however, subordinates often inter- pret the heightened supervision as a lack of trust and confidence. In time, because of low expecta- tions, they come to doubt their own thinking and
fean-Frangois Manzoni is an assistant professor of ac- counting and control at INSEAD, in Fontainebleau. France. His research and consulting work focus on man- agement control and the management of change at botb the individual and organizational levels. Jean-Louis Barsoax is a research fellow at INSEAD. wbere he spe- cializes in organizational bebavior. He is the coauthor witb Susan C. Schneider of Managing Across Cultures (Prentice-Hall, 1997I
ABOUT THE RESEARCH
This article is based on two studies designed to understand better the causal relationship be- tween leadership style and subordinate perfor- mance-in other words, to explore how bosses and subordinates mutually influence each oth- er's behavior. The first study, which comprised surveys, interviews, and observations, involved so boss-subordinate pairs in four manufactur- ing operations in Fortune 100 companies. The second study, involving an informal survey of about 850 senior managers attending INSEAD executive-development programs over the last three years, was done to test and refine the find- ings generated by the first study. The execu- tives in the second study represented a wide diversity of nationalities, industries, and per- sonal backgrounds.
ability, and they lose the motivation to make au- tonomous decisions or to take any action at all. The boss, they figure, will just question everything they do - or do it himself anyway.
Ironically, the hoss sees the suhordinate's with- drawal as proof that the subordinate is indeed a poor performer. The subordinate, after all, isn't con- tributing his ideas or energy to the organization. So what does the boss do? He increases his pressure and supervision again-watching, questioning, and double-checking everything the subordinate does. Eventually, the subordinate gives up on his dreams of making a meaningful contribution. Boss and sub- ordinate typically settle into a routine that is not really satisfactory but, aside from periodic clashes, is otherwise bearable for them. In the worst-case scenario, the boss's intense intervention and scru- tiny end up paralyzing the employee into inaction and consume so much of the boss's time that the employee quits or is fired. (For an illustration of the set-up-to-fail syndrome, see the exhibit "The Set- Up-to-Fail Syndrome: No Harm Intended-A Rela- tionship Spirals from Bad to Worse.")
Perhaps the most daunting aspect of the set-up- to-fail syndrome is that it is self-fulfilling and self- reinforcing - it is the quintessential vicious circle. The process is self-fulfilling hecause the boss's actions contribute to the very behavior that is ex- pected from weak performers. It is self-reinforcing because the boss's low expectations, in being ful- filled by his subordinates, trigger more of the same behavior on his part, which in tum triggers more of the same behavior on the part of subordinates. And
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THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
on and on, unintentionally, the relationship spirals downward.
A case in point is the story of Steve, a manufac- turing supervisor for a Fortune 100 company. When we first met Steve, he came across as highly moti- vated, energetie, and enterprising. He was on top of his operation, monitoring problems and addressing them quickly. His hoss expressed great confidence in him and gave him an excellent performance rat- ing. Because of his high performance, Steve was chosen to lead a new production line considered essential to the plant's future.
In his new job, Steve reported to Jeff, who had just been promoted to a senior management position at the plant. In the first few weeks of the relationship, Jeff periodically asked Steve to write up short analy- ses of significant quality-control rejections. Al- though Jeff didn't really explain this to Steve at the time, his request had two major objectives; to gen- erate information that would help both of them learn the new production process, and to help Steve develop the habit of systematically performing root cause analysis of quality-related problems. Also, being new on the job himself, Jeff wanted to show his own boss that he was on top of the operation.
Unaware of Jeff's motives, Steve balked. Why, he wondered, should he submit reports on informa- tion he understood and monitored himself? Partly due to lack of time, partly in response to what he considered interference from his boss, Steve in- vested little energy in the reports. Their tardiness and below-average quality annoyed Jeff, who began to suspect that Steve was not a particularly pro- active manager. When he asked for the reports again, he was more forceful. For Steve, this merely confirmed that Jeff did not trust him. He withdrew
Up to 90% of all bosses treat some siiboidiiiates as tliough they were part of an in-group, while they consign others to an out-group.
more and more from interaction with him, meeting his demands with increased passive resistance. Be- fore long, Jeff became convinced that Steve was not effective enough and couldn't handle his job with- out help. He started to supervise Steve's every move-to Steve's predictable dismay. One year after excitedly taking on the new production line, Steve was so dispirited he was thinking of quitting.
How can managers break the set-up-to-fail syn- drome? Before answering that question, let's take a closer look at the dynamics that set the syndrome in motion and keep it going.
Deconstructing the Syndrome
We said earlier that the set-up-to-fail syndrome usually starts surreptitiously - that is, it is a dy- namic that usually creeps up on the hoss and the subordinate until suddenly both of them realize that the relationship has gone sour. But underly- ing the syndrome are several assumptions about weaker performers that bosses appear to accept uni- formly. Our research shows, in fact, that executives typieally compare weaker performers with stronger performers using the following descriptors: • less motivated, less energetic, and less Ukely to go beyond the call of duty; • more passive when it comes to taking charge of problems or projects,- • less aggressive about anticipating problems; • less innovative and less likely to suggest ideas; • more parochial in their vision and strategic perspective; • more prone to hoard information and assert their authority, making them poor bosses to their own suhordinates.
It is not surprising that on the hasis of these assumptions, bosses tend to treat weaker and stronger performers very differently. Indeed, nu- merous studies have shown that up to 90% of all managers treat some subordinates as though they were members of an in-group, while they consign others to membership in an out-group. Members of the in-group are considered the trusted collabora-
tors and therefore receive more au- tonomy, feedback, and expressions of confidence from their hosses. The boss-subordinate relationship for this group is one of mutual trust and reciprocal influence. Members of the out-group, on the other hand, are re- garded more as hired hands and are managed in a more formal, less per- sonal way, with more emphasis on rules, policies, and authority. (For
more on how bosses treat weaker and stronger per- formers differently, see the chart "In with the In Crowd, Out with the Out.")
Why do managers categorize subordinates into either in-groups or out-groups? For the same reason that we tend to typecast our family, friends, and ac- quaintances: it makes life easier. Labeling is some- thing we all do, because it allows us to function
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THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME NO HARM INTENDED-A RELATIONSHIP SPIRALS FROM BAD TO WORSE
1 Before the set-up-to-fail syndrome begins, the boss and the subordinate are typically engaged
in a positive, or at least neutral, relationship. 2 The triggering event in the set-up-to-fail
syndrome is often minor or surreptitious. The subordinate may miss a deadline, lose a client, or submit a subpar report. In otber cases, the syndrome's genesis is tbe boss, wbo distances bimself from tbe subordinate for personal or social reasons unrelated to performance.
3 Reacting to tbe triggering event, the hoss increases his supervision of the subordinate,
gives more specific instructions, and wrangles longer over courses of aetion.
4 The subordinate responds by beginning to suspect a lack of confidence and senses be's
not part of tbe boss's in-group anymore. He starts to withdraw emotionally from the boss
and from work. He may also fight to cbange tbe boss's image of bim, reaching too high or running too fast to be effective.
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THE SET-UP-TO-PAIL SYNDROME
5 The boss interprets this prohlem-hoarding, overreaching, or tentativeness as signs that the
subordinate has poor judgment and weak capabih- ties. If the subordinate does perform well, the boss does not acknowledge it or considers it a lucky "one off."
He limits the subordinate's discretion, withholds social contact, and shows, with increasing open- ness, his lack of confidence in and frustration with the subordinate.
6 The subordinate feels boxed in and under- appreciated. He increasingly withdraws from
his boss and from work. He may even resort to ignoring instructions, openly disputing the hoss, and occasionally lashing out because of feelings of rejection.
In general, he performs his job mechanically and devotes more energy to self-protection. Moreover, he refers all nonroutine decisions to the boss or avoids contact with him.
7 The boss feels increasingly frustrated and is now convinced that the subordinate cannot
perform without intense oversight. He makes this known by his words and deeds, further under- mining the subordinate's confidence and prompting inaction.
8 When the set-up-to-fail syndrome is in full swing, the hoss pressures and controls the sub-
ordinate during interactions. Otherwise, he avoids contact and gives the subordinate routine assign- ments only.
For his part, the subordinate shuts down or leaves, either in dismay, frustration, or anger.
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THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
more efficiently. It saves time by providing rough- and-ready guides for interpreting events and inter- acting with others. Managers, for instance, use cat- egorical thinking to figure out quickly who should get what tasks. That's the good news.
The downside of categorical thinking is that in organizations it leads to premature closure. Having made up his mind about a subordinate's limited ability and poor motivation, a manager is likely to notice supporting evidence while selectively dis- missing contrary evidence. (For example, a manager might interpret a terrific new product idea from an out-group subordinate as a lucky onetime event.) Unfortunately for some subordinates, several stud- ies show that bosses tend to make decisions about in-groups and out-groups even as early as five days into their relationships with employees.
Are bosses aware of this sorting process and of their different approaches to "in" and "out" em- ployees? Definitely. In fact, the bosses we have studied, regardless of nationality, company, or per- sonal background, were usually quite conscious of behaving in a more controlling way with perceived weaker performers. Some of them preferred to label this approach as "supportive and helpful." Many of them also acknowledged that-although they tried not to - they tended to become impatient with weaker performers more easily than with stronger performers. By and large, however, managers are aware of the controlling nature of their behavior toward perceived weaker performers. For them, this behavior is not an error in implementation; it is intentional.
What bosses typically do not realize is that their tight controls end up hurting subordinates' perfor-
VVhai bosses do not realize is that their tight controls end up hurting subordinates' performance by undermining their motivation.
mance by undermining their motivation in two ways: first, by depriving subordinates of autonomy on the job and, second, by making them feel under- valued. Tight controls are an indication that the boss assumes the subordinate can't perform well witbout strict guidelines. Wben tbe subordinate senses tbese low expectations, it can undermine his self-confidence. This is particularly problematic because numerous studies confirm tbat people per-
form up or down to the levels tbeir bosses expect from tbem or, indeed, to tbe levels tbey expect from tbemselves.'
Of course, executives often tell us, "Ob, but I'm very careful about tbis issue of expectations. I exert more control over my underper form ers, but I make sure tbat it does not come across as a lack of trust or confidence in tbeir ability." We believe wbat these executives tell us. Tbat is, we believe tbat they do try bard to disguise their intentions. Wben we talk to tbeir subordinates, bowever, we find that tbese efforts are for tbe most part futile. In fact, our re- searcb sbows tbat most employees can - and do - "read tbeir boss's mind." In particular, tbey know full well whether they fit into tbeir boss's in-group or out-group. All they bave to do is compare bow tbey are treated witb bow their more bigbly regarded colleagues are treated.
Just as tbe boss's assumptions about weaker per- formers and tbe rigbt way to manage tbem explains bis complicity in tbe set-up-to-fail syndrome, tbe subordinate's assumptions about wbat the boss is thinking explain bis own complicity. Tbe reason? When people perceive disapproval, criticism, or simply a lack of confidence and appreciation, they tend to sbut down-a behavioral phenomenon that manifests itself in several ways.
Primarily, shutting down means disconnecting intellectually and emotionally. Subordinates sim- ply stop giving tbeir best. Tbey grow tired of being overruled, and tbey lose tbe will to figbt for tbeir ideas. As one subordinate put it, "My boss tells me how to execute every detail Rather than arguing witb bim, I've ended up wanting to say, 'Come on, just tell me what you want me to do, and I'll go do
it.' You become a robot." Another perceived weak performer explained, "When my boss tells me to do some- tbing, I just do it mechanically."
Shutting down also involves dis- engaging personally - essentially re- ducing contact with the boss. Partly, this disengagement is motivated by tbe nature of previous exchanges that bave tended to be negative in tone. As one subordinate admitted,
"I used to initiate mucb more contact with my boss until tbe only tbing I received was negative feed- back; tben I started shying away."
Besides tbe risk of a negative reaction, perceived weaker performers are concerned with not tainting their images further. Following the often-heard aphorism "Better to keep quiet and look like a fool than to open your moutb and prove it," tbey avoid asking for belp for fear of further exposing their lim-
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THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
itations. They also tend to volunteer less informa- tion-a simple "heads up" from a perceived under- performer can cause the boss to overreact and jump into action when none is required. As one perceived weak performer recalled, "I just wanted to let my boss know about a small matter, only slightly out of the routine, hut as soon as I men- tioned it, he was all over my case. I
Finally, shutting down can hecoming defensive. Many perceived underperformers start devoting more energy to self-justification. Antici- pating that they will be personally blamed for failures, they seek to find excuses early. They end up spending a lot of time looking in the rearview mirror and less time looking at the road ahead. In some cases-as in the case of Steve, the manufacturing supervisor de- serihed earlier-this defensiveness can lead to non- compliance or even systematic opposition to the hoss's views. While this idea of a weak subordinate going head to head with his boss may seem irra- tional, it may reflect what Albert Camus once ob- served: "When deprived of choice, the only freedom left is the freedom to say no."
The Syndrome Is Costly
There are two obvious costs of the set-up-to-fail syndrome: the emotional cost paid by the suhordi- iiate and the organizational cost associated with the company's failure to get the best out of an em- ployee. Yet there are other costs to consider, some of them indirect and long term.
The hoss pays for the syndrome in several ways. First, uneasy relationships with perceived low per- formers often sap the boss's emotional and physical energy. It can he quite a strain to keep up a facade of courtesy and pretend everything is fine when both parties know it is not. In addition, the energy devoted to trying to fix these relationships or im- prove the subordinate's performance through increased supervision prevents the boss from at- tending to other activities - which often frustrates or even angers the boss.
Furthermore, the syndrome can take its toll on the hoss's reputation, as other employees in the organization observe his behavior toward weaker performers. If the boss's treatment of a subordinate is deemed unfair or unsupportive, observers will be quick to draw their lessons. One outstanding per- former commented on his hoss's controlling and hypercritical behavior toward another subordinate:
"It made us all feel like we're expendahle." As orga- nizations increasingly espouse the virtues of learn- ing and empowerment, managers must cultivate their reputations as coaches, as well as get results.
The set-up-to-fail syndrome also has serious con- sequences for any team. A lack of faith in perceived
' Strong performer said ol his boss's hvpercri ticul bctiavior fOWOrd aTlOthcr eiliploVee: '* 11
S all fccl like We're exDendable/'
weaker performers can tempt bosses to overload those whom they consider superior performers; bosses want to entrust critical assignments to those who can be counted on to deliver reliably and quickly and to those who will go beyond the call of duty because of their strong sense of shared fate. As one boss half-jokingly said, "Rule number one: if you want something done, give it to someone who's busy-there's a reason why that person is busy."
An increased workload may help perceived supe- rior performers learn to manage their time better, especially as they start to delegate to their own sub- ordinates more effectively. In many cases, however, these performers simply ahsorh the greater load and higher stress which, over time, takes a personal toll and decreases the attention they can devote to other dimensions of their johs, particularly those yielding longer-term henefits. In the worst-ease scenario, overburdening strong performers can lead to burnout.
Team spirit can also suffer from the progressive alienation of one or more perceived low performers. Great teams share a sense of enthusiasm and com- mitment to a common mission. Even when mem- hers of the boss's out-group try to keep their pain to themselves, other team members feel the strain. One manager recalled the discomfort experienced by the whole team as they watched their boss grill one of their peers every week. As he explained, "A team is like a functioning organism. If one memher is suffering, the whole team feels that pain."
In addition, alienated suhordinates often do not keep their suffering to themselves. In the corridors or over lunch, they seek out sympathetic ears to vent their recriminations and complaints, not only wasting their own time hut also pulling their col- leagues away from productive work. Instead of fo- cusing on the team's mission, valuable time and
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
energy is diverted to the discussion of internal poli- tics and dynamics.
Finally, the set-up-to-fail syndrome has conse- quences for the suhordinates of the perceived weak performers. Consider the weakest kid in the school yard who gets pummeled by a bully. The abused child often goes home and pummels his smaller, weaker sihlings. So it is with the people who are in the hoss's out-group. When they have to manage their own employees, they frequently replicate the hehavior that their bosses show to them. They fail to recognize good results or, more often, supervise their employees excessively.
Breaking Out Is Hard to Do The set-up-to-fail syndrome is not irreversihle. Suh- ordinates can hreak out of it, hut we have found that to be rare. The suhordinate must consistently deliver such superior results that the boss is forced to change the employee from out-group to in-group status - a phenomenon made difficult hy the con- text in which these suhordinates operate. It is hard for suhordinates to impress their bosses when they must work on unchallenging tasks, with no auton- omy and limited resources; it is also hard for them to persist and maintain high standards when they receive little encouragement from their hosses.
Furthermore, even if the subordinate achieves hetter results, it may take some time for them to register with the hoss hecause of his selective oh- servation and recall. Indeed, researeh shows that bosses tend to attribute the good things that happen to weaker performers to external factors rather than to their efforts and ahility (while the opposite is true for pereeived high performers: successes tend to he seen as theirs, and failures tend to be attributed to external uncontrollable factors). The suhordinate will therefore need to achieve a string of successes in order to have the hoss even contem- plate revising the initial categorization. Clearly, it takes a special kind of eourage, self-confidenee, competence, and persistence on the part of the sub- ordinate to hreak out of the syndrome.
Instead, what often happens is that members of the out-group set excessively amhitious goals for themselves to impress the boss quickly and power- fully-promising to hit a deadline three weeks early, for instance, or attacking six projects at the same time, or simply attempting to handle a large prob- lem without help. Sadly, such superhuman efforts are usually just that. And in setting goals so high that they are hound to fail, the subordinates also come across as having had very poor judgment in the first place.
The set-up-to-fail syndrome is not restricted to incompetent hosses. We have seen it happen to peo- ple perceived within their organizations to he ex- cellent hosses. Their mismanagement of some suh- ordinates need not prevent them from achieving success, particularly when they and the perceived superior performers achieve high levels of individ- ual performance. However, those hosses could he even more successful to the team, the organization, and themselves if they could hreak the syndrome.
Getting It Right As a general rule, the first step in solving a prohlem is reeognizing that one exists. This ohservation is especially relevant to the set-up-to-fail syndrome because of its self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing nature. Interrupting the syndrome requires that a manager understand the dynamic and, particularly, that he accept the possibility that his own behavior maybe contributing to a subordinate's underperfor- mance. The next step toward cracking the syn- drome, however, is more difficult: it requires a care- fully planned and structured intervention that takes the form of one (or several) candid conversa- tions meant to bring to the surface and untangle the unhealthy dynamics that define the hoss and the subordinate's relationship. The goal of such an in- tervention is to hring ahout a sustainahle increase in the suhordinate's performance while progres- sively reducing the hoss's involvement.
It would he difficult-and indeed, detrimental-to provide a detailed script of what this kind of con- versation should sound like. A hoss who rigidly plans for this conversation with a suhordinate will not he ahle to engage in real dialogue with him, he- cause real dialogue requires flexibility. As a guiding framework, however, we offer five components that charaeterize effective interventions. Although they are not strictly sequential steps, all five com- ponents should be part of these interventions.
First, the boss must create the right context for the discussion. He must, for instance, select a time and place to conduct the meeting so that it presents as little threat as possihle to the suhordinate. A neutral location may be more conducive to open di- alogue than an office where previous and perhaps unpleasant conversations have taken place. The hoss must also use affirming language when asking the subordinate to meet with him. The session should not be hilled as "feedback," because such terms may suggest haggage from the past. "Feed- hack" could also he taken to mean that the conver- sation will be one-directional, a monologue deliv- ered by the hoss to the subordinate. Instead, the
108 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
IN WITH THE IN CROWD, OUT WITH THE OUT
Boss's behavior toward perceived stronger performers
Discusses project objectives, wjth a limited focus on project implementation. Gives subordinate the freedom to choose his own approach to solving problems or reaching goals.
Treats unfavorable variances, mistakes, or incorrect judgments as learning opportunities.
Makes himself available, as in "Let me know if I can help." Initiates casual and personal conversations.
Is open to suhordinate's suggestions and discusses them with interest.
Gives suhordinate interesting and challenging stretch assignments. Often allows subordinate to choose his own assignments.
Solicits opinions from subordinate on organizational strategy, execution, policy, and procedures.
Often defers to subordinate's opinion in disagreements.
Praises suhordinate for work well done.
intervention should be deseribed as a meeting to discuss the performance of the subordinate, the role of the hoss, and the relationship between the suhor- dinate and the boss. The hoss might even acknowl- edge that he feels tension in the relationship and wants to use the conversation as a way to decrease it.
Finally, in setting the context, the boss should tell the perceived weaker performer that he would genuinely like the interaction to he an open dia- logue. In particular, he should acknowledge that he may be partially responsihie for the situation and that his own behavior toward the suhordinate is fair game for discussion.
Second, the boss and the subordinate must use the intervention process to come to an agreement
Boss's behavior toward perceived weaker performers
Is directive when discussing tasks and goals. Focuses on what needs get done as well as how it should get done.
Pays close attention to unfavorable variances, mistakes, or incorrect judgments.
Makes himself availahle to suhordinate on a need- to-see basis. Bases conversations primarily on work-related topics.
Pays little interest to suhordinate's comments or suggestions about how and why work is done.
Reluctantly gives suhordinate anything hut routine assignments. When handing out assignments, gives suhordinate little choice. Monitors suhordinate heavily.
Rarely asks subordinate for input ahout organizational or work-related matters.
Usually imposes own views in disagreements.
Emphasizes what the subordinate Is doing poorly.
on the symptoms of the problem. Few employees are ineffective in all aspects of their performance. And few-if any - employees desire to do poorly on the joh. Therefore, it is critical that the interven- tion result in a mutual understanding of the specific joh responsibilities in which the suhordinate is weak. In the case of Steve and Jeff, for instance, an exhaustive sorting of the evidence might have led to an agreement that Steve's underperformance was not universal but instead largely confined to the quality of the reports he suhmitted (or failed to sub- mit). In another situation, it might he agreed that a purchasing manager was weak when it came to finding off-shore suppliers and to voicing his ideas in meetings. Or a new investment professional and
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998 109
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
his hoss might come to agree that his performance was suhpar when it came to timing the sales and purchase of stocks, hut they might also agree that his financial analysis of stocks was quite strong. The idea here is that before working to improve per- formance or reduce tension in a relationship, an
As [)art ofthe intervention, the boss should bring up the subject of how his own behavior may affect lhe subordinate's performance.
agreement must he reached about what areas of per- formance contrihute to the contentiousness.
We used the word "evidence" above in discussing the case of Steve and Jeff. That is hecause a hoss needs to back up his performance assessments with facts and data - that is, if the intervention is to be useful. They cannot be based on feelings-as in Jeff telling Steve, "I just have the feeling you're not putting enough energy into the reports." Instead, Jeff needs to describe what a good report should look Uke and the ways in which Steve's reports fall short. Likewise, the suhordinate must he allowed- indeed, encouraged - to defend his performance, compare it with colleagues' work, and point out areas in which he is strong. After all, just hecause it is the hoss's opinion does not make it a fact.
Third, the boss and the subordinate should arrive at a common understanding of what might be caus- ing the weak performance in certain areas. Once the areas of weak performance have heen identified, it is time to unearth the reasons for those weak- nesses. Does the suhordinate have limited skills in organizing work, managing his time, or working with others? Is he lacking knowledge or capabili- ties? Do the hoss and the suhordinate agree on their priorities? Maybe the subordinate has heen paying less attention to a particular dimension of his work because he does not realize its importance to the boss. Does the subordinate become less effective under pressure? Does he have lower standards for performance than the hoss does?
It is also critical in the intervention that the hoss hring up the suhject of his own hehavior toward the suhordinate and how this affects the suhordinate's performance. The hoss might even try to descrihe the dynamics of the set-up-to-fail syndrome. "Does my behavior toward you make things worse for you?" he might ask, or, "What am I doing that is
leading you to feel that I am putting too much pres- sure on you?"
This component of the discussion also needs to make explicit the assumptions that the hoss and the subordinate have thus far heen making ahout each other's intentions. Many misunderstandings
start with untested assumptions. For example, Jeff might have said, "When you did not supply me with the reports I asked for, I came to the conclusion that you were not very proactive." That would have allowed Steve to hring his buried assump- tions into the open. "No," he might have answered, "I just reacted nega- tively because you asked for the re- ports in writing, which I took as a
sign of excessive control." Fourth, the boss and the subordinate should ar-
rive at an agreement about their performance objec- tives and on their desire to have the relationship move forward. In medicine, a course of treatment follows the diagnosis of an illness. Things are a bit more complex when repairing organizational dys- function, since modifying hehavior and developing complex skills can be more difficult than taking a few pills. Still, the principle that applies to medi- cine also applies to husiness: boss and suhordinate must use the intervention to plot a course of treat- ment regarding the root prohlems they have jointly identified.
The contract hetween boss and suhordinate should identify the ways they can improve on their skills, knowledge, experience, or personal relation- ship. It should also include an explicit discussion of how much and what type of future supervision the hoss will have. No hoss, of course, should suddenly abdicate his involvement; it is legitimate for bosses to monitor subordinates' work, particularly when a suhordinate has shown limited ahilities in one or more facets of his joh. From the subordinate's point of view, however, such involvement hy the hoss is more likely to he accepted, and possihly even wel- comed, if the goal is to help the subordinate develop and improve over time. Most suhordinates can ac- cept temporary involvement that is meant to de- crease as their performance improves. The prohlem is intense monitoring that never seems to go away.
Fihh, the boss and the subordinate should agree to communicate more openly in the future. The boss could say, "Next time I do something that communicates low expectations, can you let me know immediately?" And the suhordinate might say, or be encouraged to say, "Next time I do some- thing that aggravates you or that you do not under-
110 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Marcb-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-PAIL SYNDROME
Stand, can you also let me know right away?" Those simple requests can open the door to a more honest relationship almost instantly.
No Easy Answer
Our research suggests that interventions of this type do not take place very often. Face-to-face dis- cussions ahout a suhordinate's performance tend to come high on the list of workplace situations peo- ple would rather avoid, because such conversations have the potential to make hoth parties feel threat- ened or embarrassed. Suhordinates are reluctant to trigger the discussion because they are worried ahout coming across as thin-skinned or whiny. Bosses tend to avoid initiating these talks because they are concerned about the way the suhordinate might react; the discussion eould force the hoss to make explicit his lack of confidence in the subordi- nate, in turn putting the suhordinate on the defen- sive and making the situation worse.̂
As a result, hosses who ohserve the dynamics of the set-up-to-fail syndrome being played out may be tempted to avoid an explieit discussion. Instead, they will proceed tacitly by trying to encourage their perceived weak performers. That approach has the short-term henefit of hypassing the discom- fort of an open discussion, but it has three major disadvantages.
First, a one-sided approach on the part of the hoss is less likely to lead to lasting improvement he- cause it focuses on only one symptom of the prohlem-the boss's behavior. It does not address the subordinate's role in the underperformance.
We are not saying that intervention is always the hest eourse of action. Sometimes, intervention is not possible or desirable. There may he, for in- stance, overwhelming evidence that the suhordi- nate is not capahle of doing his joh. He was a hiring or promotion mistake, which is hest handled by re- moving him from the position. In other cases, the relationship between the hoss and the suhordinate is too far gone - too much damage has oecurred to repair it. And finally, sometimes hosses are too husy and under too much pressure to invest the kind of resources that intervention involves.
Yet often the biggest ohstacle to effective inter- vention is the hoss's mind-set. When a boss believes that a subordinate is a weak performer and, on top of everything else, that person also aggravates him, he is not going to he able to cover up his feelings with words; his underlying convictions will come out in the meeting. That is why preparation for the intervention is crucial. Before even deciding to have a meeting, the boss must separate emotion from reality. Was the situation always as bad as it is now? Is the subordinate really as bad as I think he is? What is the hard evidence I have for that belief? Could there he other factors, aside from perfor- mance, that have led me to label this suhordinate a weak performer? Aren't there a few things that he does well? He must have displayed ahove-average qualifications when we decided to hire him. Did these quaiifieations evaporate all of a sudden?
The hoss might even want to mentally play out part of the conversation beforehand. If I say this to
The boss must separate emotion Second, even if the boss's encour- —
were successful in improv- froiTi reaUtv: Is tile subord ina te employee's performance, a -̂
approach would limit really as Dad as I til ill k he is? what both he and the subordinate ^ could otherwise learn from a more up-front handling of the prohlem. The suhordinate, in particular, would not have the benefit of observ- ing and learning from how his hoss handled the dif- ficulties in their relationship - prohlems the subor- dinate may come across someday with the people he manages.
Finally, bosses trying to modify their behavior in a unilateral way often end up going overboard; they suddenly give the suhordinate more autonomy and responsibility than he can handle productively. Pre- dictably, the subordinate fails to deliver to the hoss's satisfaction, which leaves the boss even more frustrated and convinced that the suhordinate eannot function without intense supervision.
the suhordinate, what might he answer? Yes, sure, he would say that it was not his fault and that the customer was unreasonahle. Those excuses-are they really without merit? Could he have a point? Could it he that, under other circumstances, I might have looked more favorahly upon them? And if I still helieve I'm right, how can I help the suhor- dinate see things more clearly?
The hoss must also mentally prepare himself to be open to the suhordinate's views, even if the suh- ordinate challenges him ahout any evidence regard- ing his poor performance. It will he easier for the hoss to he open if, when preparing for the meeting, he has already challenged his own preconceptions.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998 111
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
Even when well prepared, hosses typically experi- ence some degree of discomfort during intervention meetings. That is not all had. The suhordinate v̂ îll prohahly he somewhat uncomfortahle as well, and it is reassuring for him to see that his boss is a hu- man being, too.
Calculating Costs and Benefits
As we've said, an intervention is not always advis- able. But when it is, it results in a range of out- comes that are uniformly hetter than the alter- native - that is, continued underperformance and tension. After all, hosses who systematically choose either to ignore their suhordinates' under- performance or to opt for the more expedient solu- tion of simply removing perceived weak performers are condemned to keep repeating the same mis- takes. Finding and training replacements for per- ceived weak performers is a costly and recurrent expense. So is monitoring and controlling the dete- riorating performance of a disenchanted suhordi- nate. Getting results in spite of one's staff is not a sustainahle solution. In other words, it makes sense to think of the intervention as an investment, not an expense -with the payhack likely to be high.
How high that payback will be and what form it will take obviously depend on the outcome of the intervention, which will itself depend not only on the quality of the intervention hut also on several key contextual factors: How long has that relation- ship been spiraling downward? Does the suhordi- nate have the intellectual and emotional resources to make the effort that will be required? Does the boss have enough time and energy to do his part?
We have observed outcomes that can he clustered into three categories. In the best-case scenario, the intervention leads to a mixture of coaching, train- ing, joh redesign, and a clearing of the air; as a re- sult, the relationship and the suhordinate's perfor- mance improve, and the costs associated with the syndrome go away or, at least, decrease measurahly.
In the second-best scenario, the subordinate's performance improves only marginally, but be- cause the suhordinate received an honest and open hearing from the hoss, the relationship between the two becomes more productive. Boss and subordi- nate develop a better understanding of those job dimensions the subordinate can do well and those he struggles with. This improved understanding leads the hoss and the subordinate to explore to- gether how they can develop a better fit hetween the job and the subordinate's strengths and weak- nesses. That improved fit can he achieved hy signif- icantly modifying the suhordinate's existing joh or
hy transferring the suhordinate to another job with- in the company. It may even result in the subordi- nate's choosing to leave the company.
While that outcome is not as successful as the first one, it is still productive; a more honest rela- tionship eases the strain on hoth the hoss and the subordinate, and in turn on the suhordinate's suh- ordinates. If the subordinate moves to a new joh within the organization that hetter suits him, he will likely hecome a stronger performer. His reloca- tion may also open up a spot in his old joh for a het- ter performer. The key point is that, having been treated fairly, the subordinate is much more likely to accept the outcome of the process. Indeed, recent studies show that the perceived fairness of a pro- cess has a major impact on employees' reactions to its outcomes. (See "Fair Process: Managing in the Knowledge Economy," hy W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, HBR July-August 1997.)
Such fairness is a benefit even in the cases where, despite the hoss's hest efforts, neither the subordi- nate's performance nor his relationship with his hoss improves significantly. Sometimes this hap- pens: the subordinate truly lacks the ability to meet the job requirements, he has no interest in making the effort to improve, and the boss and the suhordinate have hoth professional and personal differences that are irreconcilable. In those cases, however, the intervention still yields indirect bene- fits hecause, even if termination foUoM̂ s, other em- ployees within the company are less likely to feel expendahle or betrayed when they see that the sub- ordinate received fair treatment.
Prevention Is the Best Medicine The set-up-to-fail syndrome is not an organizational fait accompli. It can he unwound. The first step is for the hoss to become aware of its existence and acknowledge the possihility that he might be part of the prohlem. The second step requires that the hoss initiate a clear, focused intervention. Such an intervention demands an open exchange hetween the boss and the subordinate based on the evidence of poor performance, its underlying causes, and their joint responsibilities - culminating in a joint decision on how to work toward eliminating the syndrome itself.
Reversing the syndrome requires managers to challenge their own assumptions. It also demands that they have the courage to look within them- selves for causes and solutions hefore placing the burden of responsibility where it does not fully belong. Prevention of the syndrome, however, is clearly the best option.
112 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Maich-April 1998
THE SET-UP-TO-FAIL SYNDROME
In our current research, we examine prevention directly. Our results are still preliminary, but it ap- pears that bosses who manage to consistently avoid the set-up-to-fail syndrome have several traits in common. They do not, interestingly, hehave the same way with all suhordinates. They are more in- volved with some subordinates than others - they even monitor some subordinates more than others. However, they do so without disempowering and discouraging suhordinates.
How? One answer is that those managers hegin by heing actively involved with all their employees, gradually reducing their involve- ment based on improved perfor- mance. Early guidance is not threat- ening to subordinates, because it is not triggered by performance short- comings,- it is systematic and meant to help set the conditions for future success. Frequent contact in the beginning of the relationship gives the boss ample opportunity to communicate with subordinates about priorities, performance measures, time allocation, and even expectations of the type and frequency of commu- nication. That kind of clarity goes a long way to- ward preventing the dynamic of the set-up-to-fail syndrome, which is so often fueled by unstated expeetations and a lack of elarity about priorities.
For example, in the case of Steve and Jeff, Jeff could have made explicit very early on that he wanted Steve to set up a system that would analyze the root causes of quality control rejections sys- tematically. He could have explained the henefits of estahlishing such a system during the initial stages of setting up the new production line, and he might have expressed his intention to he actively involved in the system's design and early operation. His future involvement might then have decreased in such a way that could have been jointly agreed on at that stage.
Another way managers appear to avoid the set- up-to-fail syndrome is hy challenging their own assumptions and attitudes about employees on an ongoing basis. They work hard at resisting the temptation to categorize employees in simplistic ways. They also monitor their own reasoning. For example, when feehng frustrated ahout a subordi- nate's performance, they ask themselves, "What are the facts?" They examine whether they are
expecting things from the employee that have not been articulated, and they try to be objective about how often and to what extent the employee has really failed. In other words, these hosses delve into their own assumptions and hehavior hefore they initiate a full-blown intervention.
Finally, managers avoid the set-up-to-fail syn- drome by creating an environment in which em- ployees feel comfortable discussing their perfor-
it reouires maiiagers to cliallenge
i OWll
mance and their relationships with the hoss. Such an environment is a function of several factors: the boss's openness, his comfort level with having his own opinions challenged, even his sense of humor. The net result is that the hoss and the subordinate feel free to communicate frequently and to ask one another questions about their respective behaviors before problems mushroom or ossify.
The methods used to head off the set-up-to-fail syndrome do, admittedly, involve a great deal of emotional investment from hosses - just as inter- ventions do. We helieve, however, that this higher emotional involvement is the key to getting subor- dinates to work to their full potential. As with most things in life, you can only expect to get a lot back if you put a lot in. As a senior executive once said to us, "The respect you give is the respect you get." We concur. If you want-indeed, need-the people in your organization to devote their whole hearts and minds to their work, then you must, too.
1. The influence of expectations on performance has been observed in numerous experiments by Dov Eden and his coUeagues. See Dov Eden, "Leadership and Expectations: Pygmalion Effects ami Other Self-fulfilling Prophecies in Organizations," Leadership Quarterly. Winter 1991, vol. 3, 00. 4, pp. 271-305.
2. Chris Argyris has written extensively on hciw and why people tend to behave unproductively in situations they see as threatening or embarrass- ing. See, for example, Knowledge for Action: A Guide to Overcoming Bar- riers to Organizational Change (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1993I.
Reprint 98209 To order reprints, see tbe last page of this issue.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1998 113
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Session 10 - Power - TNF - Spring 2017 ZVR.pptx
Session 10: Power and Influence
Spring 2017
Today’s agenda
Team Case Assignments
Sources of Power
Katherine Graham Case
Debrief and Discussion
Teams
The New Leaders
Pie Face
University of North Carolina – rape complaints
LaGuardia High School
Teams
ded Kings
Golden Girls
Poultry Farmers
CitiBank and millennials
Four Frames
A frame or mental model, is a set of assumptions you carry with you to help understand and negotiate a particular situation or territory
Power and Influence
Defining Power
Power refers to a capacity that “A” has to influence the behavior of “B”, so that B acts in accordance with A’s wishes.
Power is a function of dependency
The greater B’s dependence on A, the greater is A’s power in the relationship.
A person can have power over you only if he or she controls something you desire.
Alternatives that B perceives and the importance that B places on the alternative(s) that A controls.
7
Assumptions about Power
1. Power is a potential force
To have effect must operationalize through influence and persuasion into action
Need to consider influence/persuasive tactics
2. Power is situational
Changes in context will impact degree of power
Can be difficult to transfer
Beware of “halo effect” bias attractiveness/success in one area obscures faults/weakness/incompetence in others
3. Power is a social relation
Power is ability to impact or influence others
No power independent of others
Sources of Power
Personal Power
Relational Power
Positional Power
Sources of Power
1. Positional power
Reflects the power that a person has as a direct result of their job title, responsibilities, and position or placement within an organizational
2. Personal power
Derived from an individual’s unique combination of personal attributes and skills
3. Relational power
Derived from relationships with others (source of emotional support, advice, information and resources)
10
Sources of Power
Personal Power
Relational Power
Positional Power
Positional Power
1. Formal authority
A position within an organizational hierarchy that grants a person specific rights and responsibilities (i.e., Supervisor)
It does not give the person the ability to exercise this power and influence others
To create effective leadership, formal authority needs to be aligned with credibility in the organization
2. Control over critical resources
Have access to resource that other are dependent on to function
People whose activities are closely aligned with corporate priorities will be more powerful than others
3. Legitimate
Licensing boards, clergy, academic institutions
12
Sources of Power
Personal Power
Relational Power
Positional Power
Personal Power
1. Gaining cooperation - Personal attributes enhances one’s ability to encourage or gain others’ cooperation
Building trust and increasing understanding of others’ attitudes and interests
Sensitivity : enables you to understand others’ beliefs and behaviors and how to best attain their cooperation
Submerging ego: ability to submerge your ego enhance your ability to consider the interest of others and see clearly potential bases for cooperation
Flexibility: allows you to focus on your “ultimate objective” and remain emotionally detached from the situation, as well as adapt your style and position meet the needs of others
14
Personal Power (continued)
2. Winning competitions – attributes that enhance ability to endure and succeed in competitive environments
Energy and stamina: the ability to sustain the effort necessary to outpace and outlast competitors
Focus: ability to remain focused in demanding and difficult situations
Tolerance for conflict: conflict is inherent in competition; must be willing to “up the ante” to call the bluff of competitors
Expertise and self-confidence: to convey to others the worthiness of your endeavors and ability to achieve success
15
Personal Power (continued)
3. Solidifying support– ability to obtain others’ social support through your interpersonal attractiveness
Charisma: allows you to draw people to you more easily and convince them to believe in your cause
Linguistic ability: strong communication skills enhances attractiveness and enables one to articulate their position more effectively and persuasively
Track record: a strong track record and recognition will attract people
16
Sources of Power
Personal Power
Relational Power
Positional Power
Relational Power
Choices
Relationships require investment and nurturing, so we choose with whom we will interact, how often, and on what terms
Choices affect our relational power
Network Structure
Centrality
Those occupying central positions tend to have power because others in more peripheral positions must depend on them for access to resources or information
Multiplexity
A wide range of multiplex relationships, in which personal and professional tie intersect
Breath and depth: allow one to stay in touch and maintain relevance in most situations
18
Relational Power (continued)
1. Direct ties - all the people you interact with during the day, week, year
Tie strength: indicates the quality (duration, frequency, mutuality)
Tie content: resources that passes along the “tie” between you and the other person (information, emotional support, friendship, professional)
2. Indirect ties - The people your direct ties interact with:
Considers a more complete analysis of “ties.”
Valuable source of information/resources
The fewer the connections between indirect ties the better
3. Overall structure of your network: the structural characteristics of your social system both determine and constrain the power you can wield
Boundary of your network (work group, organization, industry)
19
Power Tactics
Power Tactics
Ways in which individuals translate power bases into specific actions
Nine influence tactics:
Legitimacy
Rational persuasion
Inspirational appeals
Consultation
Exchange
Personal appeals
Ingratiation
Pressure
Coalitions
* Most effective
(Pressure is the least effective)
20
Power Tactics (continued)
| Legitimacy | Relying on your authority position or saying a request accords with organizational policies or rules |
| Rational Persuasion | Presenting logical arguments and factual evidence to demonstrate a request is reasonable |
| Inspirational Appeals | Developing emotional commitment by appealing to a target’s values, needs, hopes, and aspirations |
| Consultation | Increasing the target’s support by involving him or her in deciding how you will accomplish your plan |
21
Power Tactics (continued)
| Exchange | Rewarding the target with benefits or favors in exchange for following a request |
| Personal Appeals | Asking for compliance based on friendship or loyalty |
| Ingratiation | Using flattery, praise, or friendly behavior prior to making a request |
| Pressure | Using warnings, repeated demands, and threats |
| Coalitions | Enlisting the aid or support of others to persuade the target to agree |
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Power/influence tactics and their contingencies
Some tactics are more effective than others
Rational persuasion, inspirational appeals, and consultation are most effective when the audience is highly interested in the outcomes
Pressure tends to backfire
Both ingratiation and legitimacy can lessen the negative reactions from appearing to “dictate” outcomes.
23
Factors Influencing Power Tactics
Choice and effectiveness of influence tactics are moderated by:
Sequencing of tactics
Softer to harder tactics work best
Political skill of the user
The culture of the organization
Culture affects user’s choice of tactic
24
Katherine Graham Case
How did Graham employ the three bases of power - positional power, personal power, and relational power? Did she tend to use one of these forms of power more frequently than another?
What were Graham’s professional values and how did they affect the choices she made throughout her career? How did she use her values to guide her organization?
How did she respond to the challenges of being a female executive in the 1960 and 70s, particularly in the male world of newspapering? What tactics did she use to gain respect and power in her role? How might you expect Don Graham’s experience to differ from his mother?
Katherine Graham Case
How did Graham employ the three bases of power discussed in the McGinn article, positional power, personal power, and relational power? Did she tend to use one of these forms of power more frequently than another?
Positional Power
Formal authority through family
Control over critical resources
Personal Power
Gain cooperaion, trusted and let others lead
Cultivated credibility and solidifying support
Relational Power
Centrality, increasing autonomy
Multiplexity, personal and professional ties mixed
Katherine Graham Case
What were Graham’s professional values and how did they affect the choices she made throughout her career? How did she use her values to guide her organization?
Family Legacy
Father’s chosen heir
Keep paper in the family
Truthtelling and impartiality
“Tell the truth as nearly as the truth may be ascertained”
Pentagon papers and Watergate
Katherine Graham Case
How did she respond to the challenges of being a female executive in the 1960 and 70s, particularly in the male world of newspapering? What tactics did she use to gain respect and power in her role? How might you expect Don Graham’s experience to differ from his mother?
Only female executive of Fortune 100 company
Male dominated industry
Resistant to traditional gender roles
Switched between masculine and feminine roles
Used both male and female communication styles
Easier for man to gain respect
Reflections
What are some of the deeply held values and beliefs that impact your choices as leader? How has this shaped your career?
Reflect upon the three basis of power and a role you are currently playing, where do you see most of your power coming from? How might you strength other forms of power?
How might you leverage your awareness of power to influence a group/organization you are currently working with? What tactics might you use?
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__MACOSX/._Session 10 - Power - TNF - Spring 2017 ZVR.pptx
Session 11 - Negotiation - TNF Spring 2017 - ZVR.pptx
Negotiating Effectively
Spring 2017
Today’s agenda
Integrative vs distributive negotiation
MedLee case and negotiation
Debrief and Discussion
Negotiation
Negotiation (Bargaining)
A process in which two or more parties discuss in order to settle differences, exchange goods or services, or reach a mutually beneficial outcome
Two General Approaches:
Distributive Negotiation (Bargaining) video 1
Negotiation that seeks to divide up a fixed amount of resources; a win-lose situation
Integrative Negotiation (Bargaining) video 2
Negotiation that seeks one or more settlements by focusing on underling issues in order to create a win-win solution
(c) 2008 Prentice-Hall, All rights reserved.
3
Common Distributive Negotiation Dynamics
Anchoring (make high first offer)
Averaging
Reciprocal concessions (“negotiation dance”)
Gravitation toward “focal values” (e.g. round numbers)
Forced deadline (time pressure)
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Key Negotiation Concepts
BATNA:
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, what you can achieve away from “the table”
Reservation value
Reservation price - “bottom line” or walkaway price; resistance point – often related to BATNA but different
ZOPA:
Zone of Possible Agreement (bargaining range; settlement range)
Aspiration value
Target point or price, ideal goal in successful negotiation
Distributive vs. Integrative Negotiation
| Bargaining Characteristic | Distributive Negotiation | Integrative Negotiation |
| Goal | Get all the pie you can (zero-sum) | Expand the pie so that both parties are satisfied |
| Motivation | Win-Lose | Win-Win |
| Focus | Positions (I can’t go beyond this point on this issue) | Interests (can you explain why this issue is so important to you?) |
| Information Sharing | Low (sharing information will only allow other party to take advantage) | High (sharing information will allow each party to find ways to satisfy interests of each party) |
| Duration of Relationships | Short-Term | Long-Term |
Source: Based on R. J. Lewicki and J. A. Litterer, Negotiation (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1985), p. 280.
(c) 2008 Prentice-Hall, All rights reserved.
6
Integrative Negotiation
The Seven Elements of Negotiation
Alternatives
Interests
Options
Legitimacy
Relationship
Communication
Commitment
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ALTERNATIVES
AWAY from the table
Don’t require the other party’s agreement
Best is “BATNA”
Includes:
Agreements with third parties
Self-help
Maintaining status quo
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Eg -Last week – BebsiCo’s BATNA was to use Jayyid Juices as a distributor; Bakra’s BATNA was to look for some other products to distribute
buying my house (seller had lots of alternatives; I had few)
Asking for a raise (easier with another job offer in pocket)
Alternatives (cont’d)
Before the negotiation:
Can you improve your own BATNA?
Can you worsen the other party’s BATNA (in appearance or in reality)?
During the negotiation:
Compare any potential agreement to your BATNA
Recognize that the other party will likely do the same
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Improve own BATNA? (e.g., negotiating for a job – might try to secure an offer from someplace else first)
Worsen other party’s BATNA? (APPEARANCE: eg, in settlement negotiations – if other party says “give me what I want or I’ll take you to court – might point out disadvantages of going to court, show them some case law that’s unfavorable to their position, remind them of costs involved, etc. – try to change their perception of how attractive court really is)
Eg – pressure to join labor union – b/c consequences of not joining are worse than status quo
INTERESTS
A party’s true needs, desires, or concerns
Not always the same as stated positions
Positions = what parties say they want
Interests = why they want it
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WHY is that important to you? What’s your interest in that? Positions might directly opposed, but real interests might not be
WHY is the key question.
Eg: case of the orange
Camp David accords (1978 – Begin & Sadat – re Sinai)
Argentina story – a couple of summers ago, Bryan wanted to go to Europe for vacation; I said I was tired of going to Europe. Europe’s great! Let’s go somewhere else for a change! Finally – looked into interests. WHY did he want to go to Europe? Liked the feeling of European cities – cafe culture, historic architecture, cultural events, etc. WHY did I want to go somewhere else? Didn’t want to go to Europe in summer – hot, expensive, crowded, touristy; wanted someplace that felt a bit more exotic. Agreed on Argentina: Buenos Aires is a very European-style city – Bryan got the culture he wanted; and b/c it was winter, I got to go somewhere off-season, non-touristy, non-expensive.
INTERESTS (cont’d)
Before the negotiation:
Identify and prioritize your own interests
Try to identify their interests
Look for areas of potential clash and/or overlap
During the negotiation:
Distinguish interests from positions
Offer “yesable” proposals that address their interests
Look for ways to trade on differing interests
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Not always so easy to say “look at interests” – people aren’t always aware of their true interest (maybe haven’t thought it through) AND if they are, they might be reluctant to say
One way “What would be wrong with this?” It can be hard for people to articulate their interests BUT it’s easy to criticize! Offer a proposal and invite criticism – often will reveal what’s important to client. Client wants particular loan for which they don’t qualify (“give me this or I’ll go to another bank” “why is this package so important to you” “ that’s just what I need”) – offer an alternative package and ask “what would be wrong with this?” (well, credit line isn’t big enough – don’t need all $$ right now but new company & worried abt making payroll if anything happens with business – what if bank can offer package with lower credit line but client can purchase additional protection w/ certain eventualities?)
Or – labor-mgt negotiations in school district – teachers were insisting on a 5% pay raise; administration only wanted to give 3%; teachers were up in arms threatening to strike. Mgt kept asking union why they needed 5% - they said that’s what they needed, that’s what they committed to, etc. Finally asked what would be wrong with 3%. Why can’t you live with 3%? Turned out major concern was rising health care costs – worried about high costs of health insurance. BUT – school district could get much better deals on health insurance than teachers could as individuals – so increased school-based health care subsidy in exchange for lower pay raise -
OPTIONS
ON the table
The various things to which the parties could agree
Different options may exist for different issues
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e.g. – Heart to Heart case (no-one thought of option that PLAINTIFF would change name)
Employment neg’ns – often talk about salary (as surrogate for other issues) – but other things impt – eg, benefits, relocation options, title, etc. -- esp in down economy
OPTIONS (cont’d)
BEFORE the negotiation:
Generate options for meeting both parties’ interests
DURING the negotiation:
Separate inventing from deciding (no commitment yet)
Package options on different issues
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Tension between CREATING and DISTRIBUTING value – might be hesitant to suggest options b/c worried that other party will hold you to commitment – be very clear that commitment comes later – suggesting an option does not mean that you’re willing to commit to it
LEGITIMACY
External criteria, standards, or norms
Can help select among many options
Can be a “sword” (to support a proposal)
Can be a “shield” (to protect against an unfair proposal)
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Eg – buying car – can look at various standards
Doesn’t have to be monetary – company setting policy on issues such as dress code, vacation time, etc. will look to other criteria (what have we done in past? What do other companies in our field & of our size do? Do we want to identify with them or distinguish ourselves from them?)
Sword: I propose this amount because I’ve researched xxxx and determined that that’s standard.
Shield: Someone says: I want $1M ! Response: Where did that number come from? My research indicates that a different number is more appropriate – can you tell me where that came from? “It’s what I want!” Well, we could talk all day about what we want – you want $1M, I’d prefer to pay zero. Can we agree to try to reach a number that’s fair for both of us? I’m prepared to pay what’s fair. Do you want more than is fair? (Hard to say yes!)
Somerville house story: house on market for $440K; drops to $400; then $380; then $370; then $365 …. Indicating “bottom line” of $360k. Buyer “breaks” bottom line and commits to sale at $358K, thinking has great deal – puts down deposit, signs p&s, etc. BUT – had bought house a few months before for $250K, invested about $20K into sprucing it up – was really worth only about $270, $280K max.
LEGITIMACY (cont’d)
BEFORE the negotiation:
Research relevant standards
Identify the standards that they might consider relevant
DURING the negotiation:
Use standards to evaluate and choose among options
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Problem? No legitimate criteria! Buyer based “good outcome” on how close he got to seller’s apparent bottom line & how far he was from his own (prepared to spend $450K if necessary). But reservation prices aren’t necessarily related to house’s value. Look at objective standards.
RELATIONSHIP
Between the parties
Between the agents
Between the parties and their agents
Between the parties and their constituencies
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What is it? What would we like it to be?
Recognize influence of, and impact on, relationships with parties away from the table.
Usu. best to assume that you will meet this person again – small world
Joint problem-solving relationship often most productive – works with friends, business colleagues, even adversaries.
Lord Caradon story? (see GTY) British ambassador to UN was trying to get Soviets to vote “yes” on a particular resolution – this was during a the Cold War, so major tensions between the countries. But British & Soviet ambassadors had a strong personal relationship. Soviet amb asked Brit to agree to postpone the vote for 2 more days. Brit says, “I’m sorry – you know I can’t justify letting your government delay the vote for 2 days.” Soviet says: “I’m sorry if I wasn’t clear. My government is not asking for 2 more days. I am asking you for 2 more days.” Brit said “In that case, my friend, you shall have it.” Turned out Soviet amb had been instructed to vote “no” but used the extra 2 days to persuade his government to change their mind – came back and voted “yes.” Power of the relationship.
RELATIONSHIP (cont’d)
BEFORE the negotiation:
Compare current relationships with preferred relationships
If gap exists, diagnose possible causes
Identify steps to change the relationship
DURING the negotiation:
Consider effect of various moves on relationships
Separate people from problem
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Distinguish between people & problem. You can disagree completely, but no reason to be personally insulting/offensive. Some equate being “nice” with giving in – the way you treat the other party is a separate issue from the substance of the negotiation. Use criteria & interests to insist on a fair agreement; still be respectful.
Escalation – w friends, spouses, colleagues, etc – separate intent from impact – otherwise danger of escalation
Sometimes – don’t care about long-term relationship BUT rare that you have anything to gain thru a bad relationship – (1) small world; don’t know if you’ll see someone again AND (2) will have a relationship during the actual negotiation – do you want it to be efficient, productive, etc.?
COMMUNICATION
Exchange of information (substantive, emotional, etc.) between the parties
Includes verbal and non-verbal
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Consider: my story & their story; intent vs. impact; joint contributions
COMMUNICATION (cont’d)
BEFORE the negotiation:
What do you want to listen for/ask about?
What do you want to say/disclose?
Identify possible communication barriers
Consider cultural differences
DURING the negotiation:
Test for efficient communication – demonstrate understanding
Inquire and ask questions – interests
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Listening extremely important! Doesn’t hurt to listen. Often, tougher the problem, the more negotiator will prepare speech, to argue his/her position – doesn’t listen to other party. Doesn’t cost anything & may give you valuable information – also makes other party feel respected & that you’re a reasonable person, if you’re willing to listen.
Listening exercise? (Both parties read aloud – inner voice) – usually judging, defending, preparing next speech, daydreaming…. – concentrate on trying to understand what they’re saying – summarize/paraphrase to ensure you’ve got it and (as impt) let them know you’ve got it. The more you listen to them, the more likely they are to listen to you. You’ll never persuade if they don’t even listen to you. The harder someone is to listen to – probably the more important it is to do so. [example????]
Listening ex: in pairs; one student tells other what they did last weekend; other partner does everything they can to NOT listen – then debrief how each feels – ask nonlistener what they did to not listen; flipchart; then reverse everything (eg – no eye contact to eye contact) then redo listen
COMMITMENT
Level of authority to reach agreement
Enforceability and durability of agreement
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Do I have full authority to reach any sort of agreement? Anything need to be approved? Will I need to consult with anyone before committing? When we do commit, how do we know agreement will last? Are there built-in incentives or checkpoints? Are there consequences for non-agreement?
Bank loan – take stock to ensure commitment
COMMITMENT (cont’d)
BEFORE the negotiation:
Confirm your level of authority
Identify your preferred level of commitment
DURING the negotiation:
Ensure that any commitments are operational and durable (if desired)
Consider commitment incentives or contingency contract
22
Level of commitment: Final signed agreement? Draft agreement? MOU? Agreement on certain issues? Agreement to meet again? (In ME peace negotiations – sometimes agreement on PROCESS alone is big step)
Operational & durable commitments: are all parties able to carry out their commitments? Do they have any incentive to try to undermine the agreement? What about commitment incentives? EG – bonus if live up to commitment (as in Sally) or penalty if fail
Integrative Negotiation
MedLee Case
MedDevice, Inc.
US based Fortune 500 company, 30,000 employees, manufacture high-tech medical equipment, seeking to grow their Asian markets
Ralph Thompson, CEO
Lee Medical Supply
Small family owned/operated medical supply company based in Bangkok, Thailand, 30 employees based company seeking to enter the high-tech medical technology market
An Lee, Owner and President
MedLee Case
Pat Armstrong
Director of International strategy, representing MedDevice
T.S. Lee
Vice President of Lee Medical Supply, son of owner An Lee
Negotiating the following issues:
Decision-making
Staffing
Profit Distribution
Conflict Resolution Mechanism
Results
Written agreement for how to partner going forward
MedLee Debrief
The Negotiation Process
What was difficult about this negotiation? Where did you get stuck? How did you get unstuck?
What did you do that worked well?
What might you do differently?
What creative options did you generate? Did you consider options as “packages” that covered several issues?
What Agent/Principle Tensions did you notice? How will your boss react to your agreement? Did you feel you had conflicting interest?
MedLee Debrief
The Impact of Culture on Negotiation:
How did you perceive your counterpart in the negotiation?
Were his/her issues/interests/options in-line with your expectations during preparation?
Did you have any misunderstandings? How did you handle them?
How did you attempt to bridge the cultural differences?
What can be done going forward to help mitigate these tensions in the joint venture?
MedLee Debrief
Potential Pitfalls:
Selective attention – Blocking information inconsistent with culturally based assumptions
Self-fulfilling prophesies – projecting a set of assumptions and then finding information to support these assumptions
Stereotyping – Attributing motives derrived from group-based assumptions
Reflections
Reflect upon the negotiation activity how might you approach a cross cultural negotiation going forward? How is this different from what you might have done in the past?
What are some of your strengths as a negotiator? What do you feel comfortable doing?
What are some of your opportunities for growth as a negotiator? Where do you feel uncomfortable?
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__MACOSX/._Session 11 - Negotiation - TNF Spring 2017 - ZVR.pptx
Session 4 - Org Frames pt 1 - Fall 2016.pptx
Lenses of Organizational Analysis and Design – Part 1
Fall 2016
Agenda
Ambiguous images
Four Frames of analysis
Machine and Organism Metaphor
Systems Thinking
Diagraming problems
Case analysis
Discussion and debrief
What do you see?
We construct the world through our psychological filters and habits of perception
3
What do you see?
We construct the world through our psychological filters and habits of perception
4
Frames
A frame or mental model, is a set of assumptions you carry with you to help understand and negotiate a particular situation or territory
Structure Frame
Considers the functions, processes, and systems of organizations:
Authority, reporting lines
Rules policies, and procedures
Planning and control Systems
Strategies and goals
Machine Metaphor
Organization is a machine with clear goals, and operating processes
Emphasizes rational and linear structures of organization, with clear reporting lines and procedures
Derived from military and engineering principles
Taylorism – time and motion studies – Efficiently and productivity
Assumes stability and consitency
Closed system modeling
Instrumental focus
Organism metaphor
Clusters of interconnected human, business, technological, and environmental needs
Focus on survival of organization in its environment
Considers the ecology of an organization, systems and subsystems, and their dynamic and changing needs
Emphases finding a fit between the organization and its environment
Assumes uncertainty and instability
Based on open systems
Adaptive in focus
What is a system?
“A system is an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves something.”
- Donnela Meadows
1. Understand what a system is, how it is structured, it’s important dimensions
2. How to apply this to leadership challenges
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Systems Thinking Basics
Structure of a system
Dimensions of a System
Stocks
flows
Feedback loops:
Balancing (goal seeking), reinforcing (positive or negative)
Structural (elements)
Temporal (dynamic)
Hierarchical (context)
Systems Thinking and Leadership
Three rules of thumb:
Ponds (structural/spatial)
Trim Tabs (temporal/dynamic)
Thermostats (hierarchical/contextual)
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Single stock system - Structure
Single stock system - Process
Need to think long term
13
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“Pond Thinking”
Interconnected elements, that work together to produce results. Can’t look at the parts in isolation, always interconnected. Often we focus on the symptoms, not the cause.
Easy or most obvious answers to a solutions are not always the best. Need to understand the relationship between all the parts
Bundle structure of systems – stocks/flows/feedback loops
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“Call me Trim Tab”
Buckmeister Fuller – designer/archetect/systems theorist – Geodesic domes,
Temporal dimension, systems have a history of behavior, his history can point to the
Current changes (problems) are often the result of prior causes.
Appreciate delays (bullwhip effect)
Sensitivity to initial conditions, small changes over time can have big effect.
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“Call Me Trim Tab”
Something hit me very hard once, thinking about what one little man could do. Think of the Queen Mary—the whole ship goes by and then comes the rudder. And there's a tiny thing at the edge of the rudder called a trim tab.
It's a miniature rudder. Just moving the little trim tab builds a low pressure that pulls the rudder around. Takes almost no effort at all. So I said that the little individual can be a trim tab. Society thinks it's going right by you, that it's left you altogether. But if you're doing dynamic things mentally, the fact is that you can just put your foot out like that and the whole big ship of state is going to go.
So I said, call me Trim Tab.
—Buckminster Fuller
“Call me Trim Tab”
Buckmeister Fuller – designer/archetect/systems theorist – Geodesic domes,
Temporal dimension, systems have a history of behavior, his history can point to the
Current changes (problems) are often the result of prior causes.
Appreciate delays (bullwhip effect)
Sensitivity to initial conditions, small changes over time can have big effect.
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“Be smarter than a thermostat”
Thermostate is a simple system – Room (stock), heat/cold (flow), thermostat (feedback).
The system is governed by a set of rules the define its performance. These rule are a single loop, if too hot send cold, if too cold send hot.
These rules at defined by larger system of assumptions (e.g. 70 degrees is the correct temperature) These assumptions govern how the system functions. If you want to change a system need to understand these assumptions and how they function. Reflecting on the assumptions is double loop. Why are these the governing values. This is a hierarchal shift. Subsystem are governed by superordinate systems.
Systems that make their own systems are self-organizing.
Self-regulations needs hiearchy.
Most challenges are too complex (adaptive) for simple solutions/rules (technical)
As systems become more complex, the integrate hierachicaly, cells/organs/organisms. Cognition, working memory, only hand so much.
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Rich Pictures
Compilation of drawings, symbols, and text that represent a situation or issues from a particular view point
Can show relationships, connections, influences, causes and effects, etc.
Spray Diagram
Used to show connections between related elements, or concepts associated with a particular issue or situation
Useful in working with concepts and ideas, but tends not to show the nature of the relationship between the elements
Systems map
Provides a snapshot of a system and its environments at a given time
Shows how themes or elements might be grouped together as components,
Often organized hierarchically to show systems and subsystems
Shows the relationship between the system and its environment
Case analysis
“Policing the Police” and “Business of Disaster”
Individually and in your small groups you will discuss and analyze the case based on your metaphor (Machine or Organism) and present your findings to the class
Questions to consider:
What are the important things to consider?
Are some more important than others? Why?
Who are the key players? What are their relationships?
What are the underlying causes or contributing factors?
How does your metaphor help you understand these issues? How does it limit your understanding?
What might you do to address these challenges using your metaphor?
Groups
Group 1:
Policing the Police - Machines
Group 2:
Business of Disaster - Machines
Group 3:
Policing the Police - Organisms
Group 4:
Business of Disaster - Organisms
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__MACOSX/._Session 4 - Org Frames pt 1 - Fall 2016.pptx
Session 5 - Org Frames pt 2 - Fall 2016 - v4.pptx
Lenses of organizational Analysis And Design Part 2 – The Organization Simulation
Fall 2016
P‹#›
Today’s agenda
Overview of the Organization Simulation
Organization Simulation
Debrief and Discussion
P‹#›
Organization Simulation
The organization simulation is a temporary system established to promote learning, particularly about topics of structure, people and power in organizations.
Each participant will be a member of:
One of the three levels in an management consulting firm, Management Resources Corporation (MRC)
Public Administrators' Benevolent League (PABL)
Itinerant Anthropologists
You will receive a briefing sheet appropriate to your organizational membership
Simulation will approximately 1 hours and end promptly
I will be observing but not participating or clarifying
Simulation developed by Lee Boman and Terry Deal
Based on the “Power simulation” by Barry Oshry
P‹#›
Organization Simulation
To increase your learning it is important to attend to several dimensions:
The Content – Most obvious, but LEAST important
The Four Frames
Structure, People, Culture, Power
Focus on Structure - notice aspects that are more “Mechanical” and those that are more”organic”
How does this impact process?
Leadership – Direction, Alignment, Commitment
Where is it showing up or not?
What is your role in contributing to the leadership of the group?
How is your social style help or hinder
Personal behavior, feelings, and reactions
Cultivate a meta-mindset or “going to the balcony”
Develop the ability to be more flexible and adaptive in using different analytic frames
P‹#›
Debrief
In your group, reflect on what happened from your perspective and your story of the events. Be prepared to share:
1. What occurred for you all? Your intentions/motivations? What worked or didn’t?
2. How do the four frames help you to make sense of the underlying dynamics you observed?
Individually, consider your own experience in the simulation:
What feelings came up? Anger, frustrations, happiness, joy, sadness, boredom, etc.
What was surprising about your behavior? Anything unexpected?
How are you using the four frames to understand what happened?
How did you take up leadership or not?
How did your social style come into play?
P‹#›
Structural Configuration
Mintzberg’s Fives
Strategic apex
Middle management
Operating core
Techno structure
Support staff
P‹#›
Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy
P‹#›
Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy
P‹#›
Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy
P‹#›
Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy
P‹#›
Mintzberg’s Structural Configurations
Simple Structure
Machine Bureaucracy
Professional Bureaucracy
Divisionalized Form
Adhocracy
P‹#›
Generic Issues in Restructuring: each component exerts distinct pressures
Strategic apex: pushes for more alignment, centralization
Middle managers try to protect autonomy and room to run their own unit
Techno structure pushes for standardization, believes in measurement and monitoring
Support staff prefers less hierarchy, more collaboration
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Structural Dilemmas
Differentiation versus Integration
Gaps versus Overlaps
Underuse versus Overload
Lack of Clarity versus Lack of Creativity
Excessive Autonomy versus Excessive Interdependence
Too Loose versus Too Tight
Goalless versus Goal bound
Irresponsible versus Unresponsive
P‹#›
McDonald’s and Harvard: A Structural Odd Couple
McDonald’s: clearer goals, more centralized, tighter performance controls
Harvard: diffuse goals, highly decentralized, high autonomy for professors
Why have two successful organizations developed such different structures?
P‹#›
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__MACOSX/._Session 5 - Org Frames pt 2 - Fall 2016 - v4.pptx
Session 6 - DiffCon - ZVR - Fall 2016.pptx
People Frame - Difficult Conversations
Objectives for Today
Identify key challenges in leading and managing people
Recognize the role leaders play in contributing to followers’ poor performance
Develop strategies for having difficult conversations and giving constructive feedback
Apply these strategies to Carol Nagy case
Assess the effectiveness of these strategies
Four Frames
| Structure Frame | Political Frame |
| Goals, task, technology, rationality, environment, rules, roles, linkages, differentiation, integration | Power, conflict, coalitions, scarcity, enduring differences, politics, bargaining, negotiation |
| Human Resource Frame | Symbolic Frame |
| Needs, skills, feelings, motivation, satisfaction, norms, interpersonal interactions, fit (between person and organization) | Symbols, meaning, belief, faith, culture, ceremonies, rituals, myths, stories, play |
Change Blindness and Bias
Limits of attention and awareness
Blind spot bias
Confirmation bias
Hindsight bias (retrospective sense making) post-hoc rationalization
Fundamental attribution bias
False consensus effect
Dunning-Kruger effect
Frames of mind/mental models shape perception/Reality
Single-loop/double loop, theory in use vs theory in action
Decreased when working in teams to identify changes
Be careful of Group Think
Difficult Conversations
Think of a recent time when you had a difficult conversation or interpersonal situation that did not go well:
What happened?
What made it difficult?
What feelings were you left with?
Why do you think it did not go well?
What did you learn?
Every difficult conversation is really three conversations:
The WHAT HAPPENED? Conversation
Who’s right? Whose fault is it? What are we trying to accomplish?
The FEELINGS Conversation
How do we handle the strong feelings involved?
The IDENTITY Conversation
What does this say about the kind of person I am?
Based on the book Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most
By Doug Stone, Bruce Patton & Sheila Heen (Viking/Penguin, 1999)
Sometimes explicit, sometimes not. Often, “what happened” conversation is the spoken conversation, and the other two are unspoken
6
What Happened
The WHAT HAPPENED? Conversation
Perception: What are the different ways we view the situation?
Contribution: How have we each contributed to the situation?
Impact: What are the possible gaps between intent and impact?
Sometimes explicit, sometimes not. Often, “what happened” conversation is the spoken conversation, and the other two are unspoken
7
The WHAT HAPPENED? Conversation
People tend to argue over:
Who’s right: “The truth is that…”
Blame: “It’s your fault!”
Intentions: “You’re just trying to hurt me”
The Ladder of Inference **
Conclusions
The Final stage of reasoning e.g., “You’re wrong.”
Reasoning & Interpretations
How do my past experiences impact this? What
implicit rules & assumptions underlie my reasoning?
Selected Data
What data do I notice? What do I ignore? What
might the other person notice that I don’t?
** The Ladder of Inference was developed by Chris Argyris of Harvard
Business School and Don Schon of MIT.
DATA
EG
9
Common Ladder Mis-matches
DATA
DATA
We have access to different data
We select based on interests, assumptions and biases.
We interpret based on our own past experiences and implicit rules
We come to different conclusions
So, we argue about who’s right…
But the difficult conversations are not usually about “facts”
They’re more about judgments, values, emotions, interpretations, and expectations
Shift from Arguing to Inquiring
The truth is that…!
You’re crazy!
The truth is that…!
I wonder how you see this situation?
What’s your reasoning?
Is there a plausible interpretation here?
Blame lurks below the discussion
Costs of blame:
People cover up information and mistakes
Relationships are damaged
Problems persist because they’re not accurately diagnosed
Shift Blame to Contribution
Contribution assumes:
We have each contributed to this situation
My purpose is to fix the problem, not assign blame
Understanding contributions tell us what to do differently going forward
We assume we know their intentions…
Intentions matter- but other people’s intentions are invisible to us
We often make up attributions about their intentions based on their impact on us (attribution bias)
And we often assume the worst!
From Assuming Intent to Explaining Impact
Observe your attribution: what data is it based on?
Intentions are complex: people can act with good, bad, mixed, or no intentions. These are invisible to us
Don’t assume intentions, but share their impact on you
Summary: Shifting the “What Happened”
From “the truth” perceptions
What’s my story? What’s their story?
From the blame contribution
What have we each contributed to this situation?
How can we fix things going forward?
From intentions impact
What assumptions am I making about their
intentions? What is the impact on me?
The FEELINGS Conversation
How am I feeling about this situation?
How might they be feeling about this situation?
Does it make sense to explicitly discuss emotions?
Sometimes explicit, sometimes not. Often, “what happened” conversation is the spoken conversation, and the other two are unspoken
19
The FEELINGS Conversation
We tend to translate emotions into:
Judgments: “That’s wrong”
Attributions: “You did this because…”
Problem Solving: “Here’s the answer…”
Substitutes: “I’m furious” vs. “I’m worried”
Find the emotion and translate back: “I’m disappointed and confused” vs. “I deserved the account!”
Should we discuss emotions?
What’s my purpose?
If:- To vent
-To tell them off
-To feel better
Then: NO
If: - To improve working relationship
-You can’t get work done without it
- The real issue is how people feel treated
Then: YES
Remember: expressing emotion does not equal being emotional
The IDENTITY Conversation
What do I worry this might say about the kind of person I am?
What might they worry that this situation suggests about them?
Sometimes explicit, sometimes not. Often, “what happened” conversation is the spoken conversation, and the other two are unspoken
24
The IDENTITY Conversation
Becomes difficult when our self-identity is questioned
Triggers: I’m not the kind of person who…
Makes mistakes
Can be taken advantage of
Takes advantage of others
Acts irresponsibly or unethically
Is a lousy colleague, partner, employee, etc.
When our identity is questioned:
We deny what is true (“I couldn’t have made a mistake!)
Or we exaggerate everything (I’m worthless/incompetent/ a horrible person!)
Our effectiveness is disabled:
Internal voice is turned up full volume
You lose the skills you normally have (intellectual curiosity, listening, expressing, yourself clearly, professional skepticism, objectivity…)
Ground Your Identity
FROM: This is a definitive, declarative moment about me.
TO: This is a moment I can help resolve, and can learn from.
We often underestimate how our world view shapes our sense of identity.
When things feel tough or painful, it’s worth looking beneath the iceberg to see what’s really at stake for us.
Explore our identity and what’s shaped it, and return to it when we feel threatened
Add complexity to our identity.
We can make mistakes and its okay
Our intentions are not always one-dimensional
We play a role in a problem we find ourselves in
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When facing a difficult conversation
Be clear on objectives and strategies: anticipate the other party’s objectives/strategies
Prepare, practice, or rehearse
Consider it several conversations, or an ongoing dialogue
Debrief for process, tone, outcome, feelings, etc.
By Thomas P. Ference
Copyright © The Riverside Group 2015
Role Play
A framework for action
Understanding your objective
Paying attention to others
Working to understand
Accepting all information
Committing to action
Reflecting on results
By Thomas P. Ference
Copyright © The Riverside Group 2015
Afterwards
Debrief for process, outcome, feelings, effectiveness, etc.
“Do we want to come back to this?”
Track the path forward through concrete action planning
“Are we fulfilling our commitments?”
Final Thoughts
Difficult conversations are never easy, but can be made easier through preparing a strategy
Rarely one-shot deals, often need to revisit
Improving is a life-long endeavor
Start with a strategy and awareness of the Three Conversations
Reflection
What are some key insights/take aways?
What difficult conversation do you have coming up in your life, how will you approach it differently now?
How does this shape your understanding of what it means to be an effective leader who manages others well?
