

St Thomas Aquinas

# Summa Theologiæ

A CONCISE TRANSLATION

EDITED BY

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punishing is listed as an effect of law but not rewarding. Someone who gets used to avoiding evil and doing good from fear of penalties may in time come to do these things by choice because he enjoys it. So even by punishing law can foster goodness in men.

9.93 **START** **↓**  
**The eternal law.** Just as craftsmen must have in mind plans of what they are making – blueprints – so those who govern must have in mind plans of what those subject to their government ought to do – laws. God's wisdom, thought of as the plan by which he created everything, is a blueprint or model; thought of as the plan by which he directs everything to its goal, it is a law. The eternal law is indeed nothing else than God's wise plan for directing every movement and action in creation. Law directs things to one common good, and however diverse the things so directed, as coordinated to one common good they are unified. So the eternal law is one law, one single universal plan. No one but God and those blessed with the vision of God can know the eternal law in itself. But all knowledge of truth is a light radiating from the eternal law, and everyone knows some truth, if only the general principles of the law that we have in us by nature. Those who know more than others know the eternal law better. *We can know the hidden things of God by looking at the things that he has made*, but no one fully comprehends the eternal law, because its effects do not fully reveal it.

3 When agents are ordered the agency of the secondary agents derives from that of the primary agent: without it they could not act. Now the eternal law is the plan of government adopted by the supreme authority in the world, so all other plans of government that subordinate authorities adopt must derive from it. In other words all laws that proceed from right reason derive from the eternal law. The inflammability of our sensual nature is called a *law in our body* because of its nature as a penalty imposed by God's justice, and as such it obviously derives from the eternal law. But by inclining us to wrongdoing it runs counter to God's law and is not law at all. Human law is law when it accords with right reason, and as such it obviously derives from the eternal law. But when it deviates from reason it is lawless, and is more a kind of violence. Even lawless law however can bear a certain likeness to law inasmuch as it proceeds from lawful authority; and so in that sense it derives from the eternal law, for *all authority is from the Lord God*. Certain things human law allows not because it approves them but because it is powerless to control them; and that law should not intervene where it is powerless is itself derived from the eternal law. But it is a different

matter entirely when human law approves what the eternal law disapproves.

Everything created, whether it could have been otherwise or had to be as it is, is subject to the eternal law; only God himself is exempt since he is the law. As to God's will, if by that we mean the will itself, identical with God, then it is not subject to the eternal law but is itself the law; but if we mean by God's will what God wills for creation, then that is subject to the law as to God's wise plan. It is in this latter sense that we call God's will reasonable; in the former sense we should rather say his will is reason itself. Even things that have to be as they are, are nevertheless caused, and have their impossibility to be otherwise imposed on them. Far from needing no compulsion to be as they are, they are subject to the most effective compulsion of all.

Law governs the behaviour of those things subject to the lawmaker (nobody, properly speaking, imposes law on his own behaviour). However, when we make use of things subject to us but lacking reason, what gets done counts as our behaviour, the user's not the things', for such things are more acted on than acting. So man can't impose law on non-reasoning things, however subject they are to him. But on reasoning creatures subject to him he can impose law, imprinting on their minds rules of action in the form of the commands he utters. And just as man by utterance imprints inner principles of behaviour on men subject to him, so God imprints principles of behaviour appropriate to them on all natural things, and in so doing commands all nature. So that every movement in nature is subject to God's eternal law. But non-reasoning creatures, though subject to eternal law by being set in motion by divine planning, do not understand divine commands as rational creatures do. The imprinting of intrinsic principles of action on natural things is to them what promulgation of a law is to men. Creatures lacking reason neither share man's plans nor obey them; but they share God's plan by obeying it, since the plan of God is more powerful than those of men. Just as our limbs move according to our plan without sharing (that is, grasping) the plan, so creatures lacking reason are set in motion by God without thereby possessing reason.

We, as reasoning creatures, are subject to eternal law in both ways: in common with creatures lacking reason we have a natural tendency to do what the law commands (for *we are born to virtue*, as Aristotle says); but what is peculiar to us is that we are aware of the law. In evil men both ways of being subject to eternal law are decayed as it were: the natural tendency to virtue spoilt by vice, and the natural knowledge of what is good darkened by passion and habitual wrongdoing. Good men

share the eternal law more perfectly in both ways: to their natural knowledge of what is good is added faith and wisdom, and to their natural tendency to do good is added the interior stimulus of grace and virtue. So good men are perfectly subject to the eternal law, always acting in accordance with it; whereas bad men are imperfectly subject to it in the way they act, knowing and tending to good imperfectly. But what is lacking in the way they act is recompensed by the way they are acted on, for when they fail to obey the law that is in them by nature they suffer its decrees. *If you are led by the Spirit of God*, says St Paul, *you are not under the law*. Spiritual men fulfil the law voluntarily with the love of charity poured into their hearts by the Holy Spirit, and so are not under the law as under a burden of obligation they are unwilling to bear. Or we could say that since the Spirit of God himself is not under the law, neither are deeds which are more his than men's: *where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom*. The eternal law decrees who deserve happiness or misery and thus who will remain happy or miserable; so both the blessed and the damned are subject to it.

9.94 1 The law we have in us by nature. The law we have in us by nature is the sort of product of reason propositions are. Now we do not identify dispositions with what they produce: our grammatical competence is not itself a grammatically correct sentence. So the law in us by nature is not itself a disposition in the proper sense of the word. Sometimes however we talk of what we are disposed to as though it was itself the disposition: we talk of what we hold to by faith as the faith. In the same way we can talk of the injunctions of the law in us by nature (to which our mind is always disposed but not always attending) as though they were the disposition. In the pursuit of truth the same is true of the premises we accept without proof: they are what we are disposed to rather than themselves a disposition. We can all have such a disposition and yet on occasion be hindered from using it: men can't attend to what they know when sleeping, and children cannot use their dispositions to first premises and to the law in them by nature at all, because they aren't old enough.

2 The injunctions of the law in us by nature are to reason planning action what the first premises of the sciences are to reason pursuing truth: the self-evident starting-points. Man grasps things in a certain order: in the grasp of anything is included a grasp of *being*, so that the first starting-point of thought, accepted without proof, presupposed to everything else, is that you can't simultaneously affirm and deny, being excludes not being. And just as this grasp of being underlies a grasp of

anything at all, so a grasp of *good* underlies all grasp by reason planning action, for action is goal-seeking, and to be a goal is to be good. Since good is grasped as always desirable, the first premise in reason's planning of action is that good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided. And on this are based all the other injunctions of the law in us by nature, which command us to do whatever reason, when planning action, naturally grasps to be good for man, whatever man naturally seeks as a goal. That includes, firstly, whatever accords with the natural tendency every substance has to try and preserve its natural being: so the law in us by nature commands whatever conserves human life and opposes death. Secondly, man naturally seeks whatever accords with his generic animal nature, whatever *nature teaches all animals*: mating between the sexes, and bringing up one's young. And thirdly, man naturally seeks whatever accords with the rational nature that distinguishes him as human: to know the truth about God, for example, and to live a social life; so the law in us by nature commands whatever is relevant to such inclinations, like avoiding ignorance and not offending those we live with. What makes man human is his rational soul, so all men tend by 3 nature to act reasonably, which is to act virtuously. That does not mean that the law which is in us by nature prescribes every specific act of every virtue that can be defined; rather it prescribes the acts to which nature immediately inclines us, but not those that only reasoned investigation can show help us live well. All wrongdoing is unreasonable and thus against nature, if we mean the nature man has as man; but some wrongdoing is specially called unnatural because it goes against even animal nature: homosexual acts, for example, which run counter to the natural mode of intercourse between male and female.

Isidore says *all peoples agree about what is by nature right*. Now reason 4 when pursuing truth chiefly concerns itself with what must always be so, and the truth of its particular conclusions is as free from exceptions as the truth of its general premises. But reason when planning action concerns itself with things that might possibly be otherwise, the field in which men can act; and so, even if its general starting-points allow of no exceptions, the more we get down to particulars the more exceptions occur. In the sciences then both premises and conclusions are as true for you as for me, though not everyone knows them; not everyone knows the angles of a triangle add up to two right angles, yet it is true for everyone. But in practical matters though the general starting-points are as true and right for you as for me, particular courses of action are not; and even when they are, not everyone knows it. Usually deposits ought to be refunded, but cases occur when it would be dangerous and therefore

unreasonable to do so: when, for example, what is refunded would be used against one's country. And the more detail we add, saying perhaps that we should return deposits only with such and such provisos and in such and such a manner, the more opportunity we give for exceptional cases where refunding (or not refunding) will be wrong. So particular recommendations occasionally fail. They fail to be right because of other intervening factors, just as in the physical world natural processes occasionally fail when other factors interfere. Or they fail to be recognized as right, due to reason being distorted by passions or bad customs or temperaments: Julius Caesar reported for example that German tribes in the old days didn't think robbery wrong, though it is expressly against the law that is in us by nature.

5 The law of God and the laws of men have *added* many things helpful for human living to the law we have in us by nature. But can they ever subtract from it, so that something which once was law by nature ceases to be so? The first premises of the law that is in us by nature are altogether unalterable. And secondary injunctions (which can be regarded as close consequences of these first premises though less general) must remain right in the majority of cases, though exceptionally because of intervening factors they may change in some particular. Because innocent and guilty alike all die by nature as God's penalty for inherited sin, it is not unjust for God to command the death of any man, innocent or guilty, [as he did Isaac's death]. And since adultery is intercourse with a wife assigned by God's law to someone else, to go in to any woman by divine command [as Hosea did] is neither adultery nor unmarried sex. The same applies to theft, for the things God commands one to take [e.g. the goods of the Egyptians taken by the Israelites] are taken with the consent of their owner, the master of the universe. Whatever God commands in the world of human affairs is just, just as whatever he does in the physical world is in some sense natural. Things can be by nature right either because nature inclines us towards them (e.g. not doing harm to others), or because nature does not incline us to the contrary (going naked, since clothes are products of artifice not of nature). *Common ownership and universal freedom are by nature right* in this latter sense, because private property and slavery are not arrangements of nature but human contrivances for the good running of society. So even here the law in us by nature has been altered only 6 in the sense of being added to. The most general premises of the law we have by nature are known to all and there is no way in which they can be altogether effaced from men's hearts; but passion can stop reason applying general premises in a particular case. And secondary more

particular injunctions (close consequences so to say of the primary premises) can be effaced by mistaken arguments or by perverse customs and habits.

Human law. Men have a natural bent to virtue, but complete or perfect virtue needs moral training. Compare the way man has to manufacture necessities of life like food and clothing: nature starts him off with a mind and hands, but doesn't provide a completed product as it does for other animals. Man however finds moral training hard work on his own. For those blessed by God with good natural temperaments and customs, parental training by admonition is enough; but those who are rebellious and prone to vice and unresponsive to words have to be kept from evil by force or fear, so that others at least are left in peace, and they themselves gradually start doing from choice what earlier they did from fear and so grow virtuous. Now training that operates through fear of penalties is the kind of training law imposes. So men's peace and virtue required human laws: as Aristotle noted, *man when perfectly virtuous is the best of animals, but without law and justice he is the worst*, since he, by reason, can devise weapons to satisfy his lusts and savagery, which other animals cannot. Aristotle thought it *better to regulate issues by law than to leave them for judges to decide*. It is easier to find the few wise men needed to frame good laws than the many needed to judge every case aright. Laws can also be formulated at leisure from accumulated experience, whereas particular cases have to be judged under pressure as they crop up. And finally lawmakers making general judgments for the future are likely to be less prejudiced than those sitting in judgment over immediate issues. The *living justice* needed in a good judge is rare and fragile, so it became necessary wherever possible to decide judgments by law in advance, leaving very little to men's choice; though certain particular issues like what in fact happened can't be covered by law and must be left to judges to decide.

Reason's ultimate standard is the law we have in us by nature, and law framed by men is law only to the extent it derives from that law. If it runs counter in any way to the law in us by nature, it is no longer law but breakdown of law. Some human laws however develop the law in us by nature in the way conclusions develop premises in scientific proofs (you mustn't kill people because you mustn't do them harm); whilst others develop it in the way that craftsmen, by adopting particular specifications, develop some general design (attaching some particular penalty to a crime, for example). Laws of the first type, though humanly enacted, draw some of their force from the law we have in us by nature,

dispense from the human laws he has enacted, and to allow certain people in certain cases where the law fails not to observe it. The general injunctions of law that are in us by nature never fail and cannot therefore be dispensed. But injunctions derived as consequences of these can sometimes be dispensed by men, e.g. not refunding a loan to a traitor. God's law relates to individual men as public law does to private people; and so, just as nobody except the public authority or his delegate can dispense from public law, so nobody but God or his special delegate can dispense from the law of God.

vol 29] 98 1 The Old Law. St Paul says *the law itself is holy and the commandment is holy, right and good*. There can indeed be no doubt that the Old Law was good, since it was reasonable. But to be perfect what serves a goal must be able to achieve that goal itself. The goal of human law is a state's this-worldly tranquillity, and that can be achieved by forbidding any external behaviour disruptive of the peace. But the goal of God's law is to lead us to eternal happiness, and any wrongdoing, internal or external, will hinder that. So though forbidding wrongdoing and assigning penalties is perfectly adequate as human law, it is not enough for God's law, which must fully equip man to share eternal happiness. That needs the grace of the Holy Spirit, pouring love into our hearts, by which the law is perfectly fulfilled. For the grace of God is eternal life. Now grace is something only Christ can confer, not the Old Law; *the law was given through Moses, grace and truth through Jesus Christ*. So the Old Law was good, but it was not perfect: *for the Law of Moses could not make anything perfect*.

Indeed St Paul says the law killed – not as an agent of death, but as giving death an opportunity. Being imperfect the law gave no grace to help man do what it commanded and avoid what it forbade. The opportunity for death however was not so much given by the law as taken by men. *Sin found its chance*, says St Paul, *and by means of the commandment deceived me and killed me*. So when he also says, *law was introduced so that wrongdoing increased*, the words *so that* express consequence rather than purpose: men took the opportunity offered by the law to do graver wrong: graver because now forbidden by law and so done with greater desire, since we lust all the more after what is forbidden to us. It is a mark of good law that nature and custom find it possible: St Peter calls the Old Law *a yoke which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear* because its yoke was unbearable without the help of a grace which the law did not give.

2 The Old Law was given us by the good God and Father of our Lord

Jesus Christ, to direct us towards Christ, by witnessing to him – *Moses wrote of me*, says Jesus – and by preparing us for him, withdrawing us from idolatry into worship of the one God who was to save the whole human race through Christ – *Before faith came the law kept us all locked up until this faith should be revealed*. Clearly whoever has to ensure something achieves its goal must dispose it to its goal, either by himself or by subordinates. The law which was to bring men to Christ could not have been a product of the devil, since Christ himself was to cast out the devil; *and if Satan casts out Satan his kingdom is divided*. Rather, the same God that was to save men through Christ's grace also gave them the law. But commands given to children must be suited perfectly to the child's condition rather than be perfect in some abstract sense; and that is how the commands of the law were: *the law was our tutor in Christ*. When the time came for its fulfilment by grace the Old Law was supplanted; not because it was evil, but because it was too weak and useless for the new time: *Now that faith has come we are no longer under a tutor*. The Old Law could not save men on its own, but God did not fail men: together with the law he gave the saving help of faith in a go-between to come: faith in Christ saved our forefathers just as it saves us.

St Paul says the law was given by angels. And indeed in any ordered exercise of craft or power, though the main act which completes the work is reserved to the person in charge, everything preparatory is delegated to assistants. So though it was appropriate for the perfected law of the New Covenant to be given directly by God himself made man, the Old Law was given to men by God's assistants, his angels. In the New Testament *God spoke to us in his Son*, in the Old Testament by angels. God instituted the law by his own authority but promulgated it through angels. And it was bestowed together with other special advantages on the people of the Jews, because of the promise made to their forefathers that Christ should be born from them. This promise was made to Abraham not because Abraham earned it but because God freely chose him. And if you press the question as to why he chose this people rather than any other for Christ to be born from, then Augustine's answer will have to do: *why he attracts this one rather than that don't try to decide – you will only make mistakes*. Christ was destined in the future to save every nation, but still he had to be born from one. So, although certain injunctions of the Old Law proclaimed the law which is in us by nature and as such had to be observed by all – not as Old Law but as law of our nature, certain other injunctions of the Old Law were peculiar to it and obliged only the people of the Jews: designed to give



that people a special holiness out of reverence for Christ who was to be born from them. The special worthiness of the Jewish people as opposed to others lay in their consecration to the worship of God: the same sort of worthiness attaches today to the clerical state as distinct from that of the laity, and to the religious state as distinct from that of the non-religious. Non-Jews could however be admitted to the observances of the law, since they could be saved more perfectly and safely in that way than by simply following the law that was in them by nature. Just as today laity become clerics and non-religious religious, though they could be saved without doing so.

6 It wouldn't have been suitable to give the Old Law immediately after Adam sinned. At that time men still trusted their own reasons and didn't recognize any need of law: what the law that is in us by nature told them had not yet become obscured by customs of wrongdoing. Moreover, law is for peoples. In Abraham's time God gave rules for conducting a household, but only when Abraham's descendants multiplied and became a people freed from slavery was it time to give them a law; for *slaves*, as Aristotle says, are *excluded from the political community*, to which laws are appropriate. For the same reason the law was given to the whole people marked by circumcision, the sign of the promise made to Abraham and believed by him. It was not given solely to the household of David from which Christ would be born.

99 : Subdivisions of the Old Law. The Old Law is one law with one goal, but issues different commands to cover the different steps to be taken towards that goal. *The goal of the law is the love of charity*, for all law aims at friendship of men with each other and with God. So the whole law is *summed up* in the one commandment: *You shall love your fellowman as yourself*; that is the goal of all other commands, for loving one's fellowmen for God's sake includes loving God, so that this single commandment embraces the two mentioned by our Lord to *which all the law and the prophets reduce*. St Matthew's *Do to men everything you would wish them to do to you* is a sort of explication of *Love your fellowman as yourself*.

2 Just as human law aims primarily at friendship between men, so God's law aims primarily at friendship of man for God. But love is based on likeness, and to love God, who is most good, man must become good himself. So the Old Law had to contain moral injunctions commanding virtuous behaviour. God's law presupposes the law that is in us by nature just as grace presupposes nature. Human reason couldn't go universally wrong about the most general injunctions of law in us by

nature, but customs of wrongdoing obscured them in particular cases, and many people's reasons so mistook the moral injunctions derived from those general principles that they judged things licit which were intrinsically evil. So the authority of God's law was needed to help man overcome both of these deficiencies.

Since man is related to God not only by inner acts of believing and hoping and loving, but also by external actions in which he confesses himself God's servant – ritual acts of worship – the Old Law also contained ritual or ceremonial injunctions regulating God's worship. The injunctions of the law that is in us by nature are general and require particular specification. Such specifications made by human law form part not of the law in us by nature but of positively enacted law, and in a similar way the specifications made by God's law remain distinct from the moral injunctions that belong to the law that is in us by nature. Thus the worship of God is virtuous behaviour commanded by a moral injunction, but the specifications put on this command – that God must be worshipped with such and such sacrifices and gifts – are ritual injunctions. Pseudo-Denys says God can't be revealed to men except through sense-images; so the scriptures express him not only verbally in figures of speech, but also symbolically to the eye in prescribed rituals.

And just as the Old Law specified the general command to worship God by ritual injunctions, so it specified the general command to be just to one's fellowmen by judicial injunctions. Judicial injunctions share with moral injunctions a dependence on reason, and with ritual injunctions the character of specifying general commands. That we must act justly in general is a moral injunction, but the specifications put on this are judicial injunctions.

6 In the scientific pursuit of truth men are led to assent to conclusions by logical argument, but in the area of law men are led to observe injunctions by penalty and reward. So, just as we need to learn sciences in an orderly manner beginning with what we best know, whoever wants to lead men to observe injunctions of law should build on their inclinations: we persuade children to do things by offering the kind of presents that appeal to them. When men are perfect they think nothing of temporal goods and stick to spiritual things; when imperfect they still desire temporal goods though in subordination to God; only when they are gone astray do they make temporal goods their goal. So it was fitting for the Old Law to make use of the imperfect man's inclination to temporal goods to lead him to God.

**Moral injunctions of the Old Law.** The judgments reason makes when planning action spring from naturally known premises. Some human behaviour can be assessed immediately in the light of these general first premises with a minimum of reflection. Some however cannot be assessed without prolonged consideration of different circumstances, needing great wisdom and prudence. Yet other behaviour requires for its assessment the help of God's instruction: matters of faith, for example. So, though all moral injunctions belong in some way to the law that we have in us by nature, some belong immediately like *Thou shalt not kill*, some only by way of wise men's instruction such as *Honour the person of an aged man*, and some only by way of God's instruction, such as *Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord your God in vain*.

2 Human law serves the civil community in which men are linked together by external activities governed by justice, the virtue directly concerned with bringing order into the human community. So the injunctions of human law command acts of justice, and acts of other virtues only in so far as they relate to justice in some way. But God's law serves man's community with God now and hereafter, and men are united to God by way of their mind and reason in which God is imaged. So the injunctions of God's law command anything which will set man's reason in order. Clearly then it is appropriate for God's law to command acts of every virtue: obliging us to behaviour without which orderedness of reason and virtue is impossible, and counselling us to behaviour which will perfect virtue.

3 [The primary injunctions of the law are *Love the Lord your God*, and *your fellowman as yourself*.] The ten commandments differed from the other injunctions of the law in being promulgated to the people directly by God himself. They contain commands that man knows of himself from God, either because they follow immediately from general first premises of behaviour with a minimum of reflection, or because they are known straightaway from divinely instilled faith. But they do not contain the general first premises themselves (written in man's natural reason and self-evident); nor such remote conclusions as require long reflection by wise men: e.g. injunctions prohibiting certain interior disorderliness in men. The goal of man's natural personal and social life is God. So the ten commandments direct us first towards God so as to remove the greatest disorder in our lives: requiring us in order of seriousness to be his faithful subjects, to have no truck with his enemies, to respect him and give him service. As regards orderedness to our fellowmen, our gravest offence against reason is to fail to pay our dues

to our greatest creditors, our parents. And then in order of seriousness we are commanded to do no wrong, say no wrong and wish no wrong. Murder which takes away life already given is adjudged worse than adultery which undermines the secure identity of children about to be born, and both these are counted worse than theft which relates to external goods. The ten commandments are inalterably right about what is just, but what can alter are the criteria which decide in particular cases whether this or that is murder or adultery or theft. Sometimes only God can alter these criteria since he alone instituted them (e.g. the criteria for marriage, in the story of Hosea); but sometimes the alteration is subject to human jurisdiction. In such matters, though not in all, men represent God.

Does the law oblige us to do virtuous deeds virtuously? According to 9 Aristotle, we act virtuously when we act *knowingly, choosing what we do voluntarily for some intended goal, and doing it wholeheartedly with a firm and unswerving commitment*, i.e. from a rooted disposition. Now both human and divine law take ignorance into account when punishing or pardoning; but choosing and intending are inner acts subject only to God's law: human law does not punish those who want to kill but don't. And neither human nor divine law obliges us to act with a virtuous disposition. So when law commands us to act justly it obliges us to act in a way that observes people's lawful rights, but not to possess the habitual disposition of so acting. Lawmakers have two things in view: virtue itself, to which we are brought by observing law, and the particular virtuous acts the law commands, which lead eventually to virtue. For the content of injunctions and their goal are not the same, just as in other matters goals and means are different. In this connection loving 10 can be thought of in two ways. It is on the one hand the content of a special injunction: *Love the Lord your God and love your fellowman*. But it is also the goal of all the commandments, and the manner in which all other virtuous acts should be done in pursuit of that goal. In this respect love is not part of the content of injunctions commanding particular acts of virtue. Somebody who honours his parents and yet is devoid of the love of charity does not infringe the particular commandment regarding parents; but he does infringe the commandment to love and so earns punishment. Both these commandments are affirmative commandments that cannot oblige us to be always obeying them, but only at such times as are appropriate. So it can happen that someone fulfilling the injunction of honouring parents might not at that time infringe the commandment to love with charity. But observing every injunction of the law includes observing the particular one commanding

love of charity, and that needs grace to do. So Pelagius' view that one can fulfil the law without grace is wrong.

11 Judicial and ritual injunctions derive their force solely from their enactment, and before they were enacted it didn't matter how you did such matters. But moral injunctions derive their force from what reason tells us by nature, and that would bind even if never enacted into law. Yet because the reasons for some of these injunctions are only clear to wise men, they were not part of the ten commandments but additions handed on from God to the people by way of Moses and Aaron. Thus to the first commandment, forbidding worship of foreign gods, were added injunctions concerning idolatry. To the second commandment, forbidding perjury, were added prohibitions of blasphemy and false teaching. To the third were added all the ritual injunctions. To the fourth, on honouring parents, were added commands to honour the aged, to respect superiors, and show kindness to equals and inferiors. To the fifth, forbidding murder, were added prohibitions of hatred and all kinds of violence against our fellowmen. To the sixth, forbidding adultery, were added prohibitions of prostitution and unnatural vice. To the seventh, forbidding theft, were added prohibitions of usury and fraud and every kind of sharp practice and robbery. To the eighth, forbidding false testimony, were added prohibitions of corrupt judgments, lying and disparagement. But to the last two commandments no others were added, since they already forbade all manner of evil desire.

12 The primary and strict meaning of *justifying* is making just; though secondarily, and somewhat loosely, it can mean symbolizing justice or disposing towards justice. In these last two senses the injunctions of the law justified and reconciled men by preparing them to be justified and reconciled by the grace of Christ, which those injunctions prefigured. But strictly speaking true justice is a virtue instilled in us by God's grace, and cannot be caused by moral injunctions which govern human action; though the injunctions of human law can generate in us an acquired virtue of justice, which is not our concern at the moment.

101 1 Ritual and judicial injunctions. The ritual injunctions regulated the sacrifices by which God was worshipped, the sacred things employed in worship, the sacramental actions which consecrated men to God's worship, and the sacred observances which distinguished the way those worshippers lived. The worship of God has two parts: the first – external bodily worship – is at the service of the second – an interior worship uniting our minds and hearts to God. In the life to come our minds will see the true God himself, and our outer worship will need no symbols

but consist in praise of God from heart and mind. At present however God's truth can only express itself to us in symbols we can sense. At the time of the Old Law, when the way towards seeing God was still closed, man's external worship not only prefigured the revelation of truth to come in our heavenly home, but also Christ, who was to be our way home. Now, in the New Law, when this way has already been revealed, it is no longer prefigured as something to come, but remembered as something past and present; only the truth of glory yet to be revealed is prefigured. As Hebrews says: *the law foreshadowed the good things to come, but it did not reflect them*. A shadow is less clear than a reflection, the Old Law less clear than the New.

There was no natural reason for the Old Law observances, e.g. for refusing to make garments of wool and linen. The reason was symbolic. But New Law decrees, since they chiefly command us to believe and love God, are of their nature reasonable. However, just as Old Testament history has a literal sense besides the figurative sense in which its happenings symbolize Christ, so too the ritual injunctions of the Old Law have literal as well as symbolic reasons. The literal reasons explain the ritual injunctions in terms of what the divine worship meant at that time. The symbolic reasons relate rather to Christ and the church to come. So, just as to understand metaphorical turns of phrase in scripture as metaphors is to grasp their literal sense (since that's what the words were used to mean), so the literal significance of Old Law rituals is to be found in the symbolic reason for instituting them at the time, namely, to commemorate some deed of divine favour. The literal significance of the Passover is that it symbolized the liberation of the Jews from Egypt, and of circumcision that it symbolized God's pact with Abraham.

The Old Law distinguished two kinds of uncleanness: the spiritual 103 2 uncleanness of sin and the bodily uncleanness which made men unfit to take part in the worship of God. There were Old Law rituals of purification from this latter uncleanness, since the law could prescribe remedies to take away uncleanness it had itself established. But only Christ has the power to take away the sins of the world; and since the mysteries of Christ's taking flesh and dying to it had not yet become reality, no Old Law ritual could yet contain the power that flowed from Christ's crucified flesh as New Law sacraments do. Nevertheless, believers could at that time join themselves in mind to the Christ who was to suffer, and so be reconciled to God through their faith in Christ. Indeed the Old Law rituals prefigured Christ, and observing them was a sort of proclamation of faith in him. The sacrifices for sin offered in