Week-15

An Alternate Approach to Labor-Management Relations

Walter Morely Baike, Kenneth R. Hammond, and G. Date Meyer

This study applies social judgment theory and interactive computer graphics to labor-management negotiations.^ It is based on a reenactment of actual negotiations. Self-understanding and understanding of one's counterpart were found generally to be poor. Union negotiators showed a high degree of agreement with one another whereas management did not. Two pairs of negotiators given feedback from the computer graphics device achieved consensus. Participants reported gaining new insights and indicated that the use of interactive graphics is feasible and desirable.

Labor-management negotiation processes today differ little from bargaining methods used in the past. In a recent text Karrass (1970) emphasized the unchanging nature of the negotiating process: If a five-thousand-year-old Babylonian were to dress in a business suit and sit opposite us at the table, there is little reason to believe his methods would differ from ours. It is as though time stood still; as though the written word, the printing press, management and the scientific method had never been invented.

The rudimentary state of negotiating practices cannot persist indefinitely. The time has arrived for the introduction of new approaches to union-management negotiations—approaches which take advantage of modern science and technology. Both the public and their representatives are showing increasing impatience with the social cost of widespread strikes and the inflationary effects of wage increases without corresponding productivity increases.

This study introduces an alternative to negotiating methods. It is based on the psychological theory of human judgment and interpersonal conflict developed by Hammond (1965) as well as modern computer graphics technology (Hammond, 1971; Hammond and Boyle, 1971; Flack and Summers, 1971; Stewart and Gelberd, 1972).

The research on which this article is based was supported by funds from the National Institute of Menial Health (Grant MH-16437) and Ihe School of Business Administration, Unrversity of Colorado. The authors are indebted lo David Summefs. Kenneth Boulding, Thomas Stewart, Ernest Flack, Peter Boyle, Karene Will, Margaret Marshall, and the six negotiators from Dow Chemical Company and the Allied and Technical Workers' Union for their assistance.

SOCIAL JUDGMENT THEORY VERSUS MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES OF CONFLICT

Traditional theories of conflict focus on such self-serving motives as greed as explanatory devices. Social judgment theory breaks with this tradition for three reasons: (1) motivational theory has not sufficiently enhanced our ability to analyze, manage, or reduce human conflict; (2) motivational theory requires us to look for self-serving behavior in the other person whenever conflict occurs, a process which is divisive and aggravates, rather than reduces, conflict; and (3) preoccupation with differential gain as the prime cause of conflict diverts our attention from other possible causes and thus leads to self-fulfilling prophecies. Motives are indeed found to be sufficient causes of conflict because there is no competing theory to point to other plausible explanations; consequently, none are found.

Social judgment theory provides an alternative. It argues that the nature of human judgment is such that it also provides a prime source of conflict and that many, though not all, disagreements flow from the exercise of human judgment. Consequently, even if self-serving motives are eliminated, interpersonal conflict will persist. If true, or even if partly true, social judgment theory would require significant revisions in our approach to the analysis and management of important conflict situations.

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THREE CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT

When applied to complex circumstances, the human judgment process is found to be (a) covert, (b) inaccurately described, and (c) inconsistent (Hammond and Brehmer, 1973; Hammond, 1971).

Covertness means that under ordinary circumstances subjective reports of one's judgmental process must be relied upon. Under ordinary circumstances it is the sole means by which complex judgmental processes can be uncovered and explained. Inaccurate reporting means that such explanations are incomplete at best and misleading at worst. This is due not to evil intent, but to the fallible nature of subjective reports about the process of judgment.

Inconsistency means that identical circumstances do not always evoke identical judgments. When inconsistency is noticed by others, it may give rise to the observation that words do not match deeds. When this observation is combined with the traditional motivational explanation, it leads us to assume that an individual's behavior is self-serving, if only because plausible alternatives are lacking. Social judgment theory, however, finds judgmental inconsistency to be a product of the fact that human judgment is not a fully analytic, fully controlled process and that when employed under ordinary circumstances, inconsistency is an inherent part of the process. Motivational explanations are thus not essential.

TECHNOLOGICAL AIDS FOR HUMAN JUDGMENT

These three characteristics of the judgment process do not exhaust the conceptual system of social judgment theory. They serve to indicate, however, why the judgment process provides an enormous potential for mistrust and conflict. They also suggest why social judgment theorists have developed methods to assist persons whose professional responsibilities require them to exercise their judgment. These methods have been developed with particular concern for those who must reach judgments which are mutually acceptable to several parties. Such cognitive aids could prove to be invaluable to the management of social organizations in which human judgment plays a large role.

Modern computer graphics devices provide the necessary means for coping with covertness, inaccurate reporting, and inconsistency as well as with other problems (Hammond and Brehmer, 1973; Hammond and Summers, 1972; Hammond and Boyle, 1971). Such devices provide immediate analyses of the judgment process and immediate pictorial, nontechnical descriptions of the essential parameters of that process. They also provide a means whereby the person who must exercise his judgment may do so with perfect control. In short, they externalize accurately what was formerly an internal process inaccurately described. They also provide a means for eliminating inconsistency.

JUDGMENT PROCESS PARAMETERS

Of the several judgment parameters to be externalized by means of computer graphics procedures, three are described here. The function of each is illustrated in connection with the labor-management negotiation process.

Weight

Weight indicates the importance of each dimension of a judgment task. When making a judgment about the

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

acceptability of a contract, union and management negotiators give various weights to different aspects of the contract (for example, duration and wage provisions). A source of disagreement between negotiators lies in the different weights they attach to various aspects of the contract. What makes externali2ation of weighting systems valuable is that the subjective reports of weights used in making a judgment—even by professionals—are frequently inaccurate (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1973).

While previous research has led judgment theorists to be doubtful about the accuracy of self-reports, the large degree of inaccuracy discovered in this study was surprising.

Function-Form

The term function-form refers to the form of the functional relation between dimensions of the judgment task and the judgment a person makes. When evaluating the acceptability of different contracts, for example, the judgments of the negotiators may be related to various dimensions or aspects of the contracts in different ways. In some cases aspects of the contracts may be related to judgments of acceptability in a positive linear f o r m : the more of a certain item in the contract, the greater its acceptability. Other aspects of the contract may be related to judgments of acceptability in curvilinear f o r m : a small amount of a certain item in the contract may cause the contract to be judged unacceptable, a moderate amount may cause it to be judged highly acceptable, but a large amount may also cause it to be unacceptable. Such function-forms might be expected to occur in relation to wage increases. Increases which are too small or too large might be judged as equally unacceptable.

Differences in function-forms can be expected to occur between negotiators. One side might relate its judgments of the acceptability of contracts to a given aspect of the contract in a positive linear manner (the more—or less—the better) whereas the other side might relate its judgments of acceptability to the same aspect in an inverted U-shaped manner (the more the better—up to a point—beyond which the more the worse).

There are a wide variety of function-forms which can be employed by a person exercising his judgment (Hammond, 1971; Hammond and Brehmer, 1973) but the important point is that the function-forms actually used by persons attempting to reach an agreement should be externalized—that is, made visible—so that they can be dealt with explicitly. A major difficulty in uncovering the specific parameters of judgment processes by unaided self-report is that persons are frequently unaware of the specific function-forms they employ and do not describe them with clarity even when they are aware of them.

Inconsistency

Because of a general unawareness of the extent of inconsistency in the judgment process, it is essential that it be calculated and reported whenever possible. Some means should be provided for allowing a person to have the opportunity to eliminate inconsistency, to control his judgments more effectively than is ordinarily the case.

THE RESEARCH

A study of a labor-management negotiation was undertaken based on the assumption that much of what social judgment theory argues is true. What is at issue is the extent to which the externalization of the parameters of the judgment process

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can be demonstrated to be of potential value to union-management negotiators.

The specific objectives of the study were to: (1) investigate the accuracy of the negotiators' understanding of their own and their counterparts' judgments, (2) measure the nature and amount of real (as against apparent) conflict between union and management negotiators, (3) determine whether the application of judgment theory and computer graphics techniques would result in greater agreement than that obtained by the usual verbal exchanges, and (4) evaluate the feasibility of using this approach in actual union-management negotiations.

Research Site

The Dow Chemical Company was approached in February 1971 because the strike at their Rocky Flats Plant (from June 28, 1970 to September 5, 1970), involving the Allied and Technical Workers' Union, appeared to be an appropriate site for applying the theory and technology under investigation. Subsequent to consultation with both labor and management, it was decided to reenact the negotiations for two reasons: these procedures were being applied to a union-management negotiation situation for the first time and it was assumed that negotiators could be more candid about their policies during a reenactment than they could during actual negotiations. The situation was sufficiently controversial and recent that the issues were still clear to the negotiators. The five months which intervened had not served to relieve the tension.

Participants, Issues, and Evaluation of Contracts

Three of the seven management negotiators and three of the seven union negotiators who took part in the bargaining agreed to participate in the reenactment. The six participants included the two chief negotiators and the most influential members of each side; no one refused to participate. As a result of months of negotiations, they knew one another well. Cooperation was sought from both sides on the grounds of (a) the paucity of research on actual negotiations and (b) the possibility that something of value would be learned from the use of new procedures. Information acquired later indicated that agreement to participate stemmed from curiosity, interest in learning about new procedures, and interest in making a contribution to research. One participant agreed because he hoped that some method might be developed to "prevent useless strikes and to really get union and management to level with each other." The union compensated their negotiators for time spent in participating in the study.

The reenactment was designed to simulate two periods during the strike: one week prior to signing the contract and the final hour of negotiations. The four key issues which were chosen by both union and management representatives to define the negotiation problem at those time periods were (1) duration of contract in years, (2) wage increases (annualized percent), (3) number and use of machine operators, and (4) number of strikers to be recalled. Time was spent with one management negotiator and one union negotiator discussing the issues involved in the original negotiations in order to make certain that no issue of importance was omitted.

Sample contracts, each representing a different combination of values with respect to these four issues, were created. In order to insure clarity and ease of evaluation, each issue was subdivided into five scale values (from lowest to highest) and

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

Union-Management Contract No. 10

Duration, Years

1 1 1 1 1V2

W a g e Increase, %

1 1 1 5 7

M a c h i n e O p e r a t o

M a x .

N o . of Strikers t o

I 1 1

Min.

1 • 2 2V2

, Annualized

9 n

, No. 8 Use

1 1

be Recalled

3

1 13

1 Min.

IZ^ All

Figure 1. Example of contract shown to negotiators

represented in graphic form (see Figure 1 for example). By using different combinations of the four issues, 625 different possible contracts were produced. To facilitate the process of contract evaluation, twenty-five such possible contracts were selected on a random basis in order to comprise a representative sample of the 625 possible choices. (For technical reasons the original sample was slightly modified to make the various levels of each issue independent and to eliminate redundancy.) A seven-point evaluation scale ranging from "recommend rejection of contract" to "recommend acceptance of contract" was designed with the help of one union and one management representative. The aim was to have the scale points correspond to the type of judgments made during the actual negotiations.

The Interactive Computer Graphics Device

An interactive computer graphics device was used to provide key information for each of the negotiators in regard to his own judgmental process and that of his counterpart. Each negotiator's 25 contract judgments were analyzed in terms of a special form of multiple regression statistics.

The regression analysis was computed separately for each union and management negotiator with his judgments as the dependent variable. The independent, or predictor, variables in the analysis were the values of the issues and the squares of these values. Thus, there were eight independent variables in each regression analysis. This procedure permitted the analysis of both linear and quadratic components of judgmental variance (Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch, 1964; Tucker, 1964; Hammond and Summers, 1972; Hammond and Brehmer, 1972; Stewart, 1972).

The following characteristics of each negotiator's contract evaluation policy were externalized immediately following data entry: the weight each participant attached to each issue (duration of contract, amount of wage increase, and so forth) was displayed on the graphics device. Figure 2 provides one example of how the participants were shown their differential weighting system in pictorial form, providing a direct visual representation of one source of conflict. Figure 3 shows the

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Figure 2. Examples of how differential weights attached to the four contract issues were shown to the negotiators (The width of the line denotes the weight placed on each issue. Hollow lines denote negative weights. In this example the largest difference occurs in connection with the recall issue, which the union negotiator weighted strongly positively and the management negotiator weighted moderately negatively.)

necessity for and value of Figure 2. The display in Figure 3 illustrates the extent to which one negotiator misunderstood his own weighting system. In making his contract judgments he underestimated the weight he attached to wage increases and overestimated the weight he attached to duration.

While Figure 3 provides an example of a display of self-misunderstanding. Figure 4 provides an example of how misunderstanding of one's counterpart is externalized. The counterpart's actual weighting system (derived from the analysis of his contract judgments) is compared with the negotiator's weights derived from predictions of his counterpart's acceptability ratings of the contracts as well as the negotiator's subjective estimates of his counterpart's weights. In this example the negotiator not only makes incorrect subjective estimates of his counterpart's weights (compare bottom bar with top bar), but when predicting his counterpart's contract judgments, he uses a weighting system which is different from that which he intended to use (compare bottom bar with center bar). The data in Figures 3 and 4 are not fictitious. They represent the degree of misunderstanding which, in fact, still existed between two negotiators even after several months of discussion during the actual negotiations.

Percent

Negotiator's Issue Weights Derived From Own Judg- ments of Contracts

Subjective Estimate of Own Weights

0

Duration = D Wage Incr. = W

Mach. Op. = M Recall = R

Figure 3. Example of display showing a negotiator's subjective report of his issue-weighting system in comparison with the actual weighting system he used when judging the acceptability of contracts

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

Percent

Counterpart's Issue Weights Derived from Judgments of Contracts

Issue Weights <5 "̂ ^ ^ Derived f r o m Predictions of C o u n t e r p a r t ' s J u d g m e n t s

Subjective Estimate of Counterpart's Weights

Duration = D Mach. Op. = M Wage Incr. = W Recall = R

Figure 4. Example of a display shewing negotiator's subjectrve estimates of his counterpart's weights, the weights the negotiator used in predicting his counterpart's judgments, and the counterpart's actual weights

The function-forms each participant used in relating his judgment to each of the four issues were also displayed on the graphics device. Figure 5 provides an example of how function-forms were shown to negotiators. Both positive and negative linear function-forms were used in connection with the machine operator issue (lower left) and opposing curvilinear functions were used in connection with the recall issue (lower right). The notion of an optimal wage settlement can be seen In Figure 5 to have been held by both the union and management negotiators. In this case both negotiators appear to agree on the same optimal point, which Is quite close to the settlement point reached in the actual negotiations.

Figure 5 also illustrates that the settlement point in relation to the recall issue is by coincidence at the point of intersection of two very different function-forms. This point lies close to neutral on the evaluation scale. The main purpose of describing the data of Figure 5 is to illustrate that such information can be provided by negotiators and to indicate the form in which it can be displayed. (All of the information contained in the illustrations could have been viewed directly by the participants had they carried out their negotiations at the site of the interactive computer graphics device; instead, the graphs were reproduced on microfilm, from which unretouched 8-1/2" x 11" prints were obtained and brought to the negotiators. Present technology now makes it possible, however, for portable computer graphics devices to be placed wherever telephones are available.)

Pretest, Posttest, and Negotiation Phases

Pretest phase. The pretest phase consisted of two parts. First, the participants were given brief instructions and shown the 25 contract cards for the first time. Each participant judged each of the 25 contracts, using the seven-point acceptance-rejection scale. He then made an estimate of the weight (in terms of a percent) he felt he had placed on each of the four issues.

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Duration of Contract Wage Increase

Neutral Neutral

M3

1 IV? 2 2Vz Years

No./Use of Mach. Op.

3 5 7 9 11 Percent

Recall of Strikers

Neutral

Max. Min. * Indicates actual settlement point.

Min. Max.

Figure 5. Example of how function-forms are shown to negotiators (Note the appearance of positive linear—U3, lower left—•, negative linear—M3, lower left—, and parabolic—U3, M3, lower right—function-forms.)

Second, each negotiator was paired with a member of the other side, thus forming three pairs, coded U l , M l ; U2, M2; and U3, M3 (where U = union and M ^ management). Each participant predicted his counterpart's evaluations of the 25 contracts on the acceptance-rejection scale and the weight his counterpart would place on each of the four issues. Posttest phase. The first part of the posttest phase was administered three weeks after the pretest phase. Its purpose was to provide feedback to all the negotiators (except U3 and M3, who were a control pair). Feedback consisted of data concerning the negotiator's own weights for each of the four contract issues (see Figures 2, 3, and 4) as well as graphs showing the form (linear, curvilinear) of relations between each issue and his evaluations (see Figure 5). After receiving this form of feedback about their evaluations, each of four negotiators (Ul and M l , and U2 and M2) then reevaluated the 25 contract cards and estimated the weights he used on this occasion.

In the second part of the posttest each negotiator saw his counterpart's weights for each of the four issues and graphs of the relations between issues and judgments. Each negotiator

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

then made new predictions of his counterpart's evaluations of the contracts and predictions of his counterpart's weights. No discussion between participants was permitted in the posttest, thus ensuring that feedback was nonverbal.

The control pair (U3 and M3) also evaluated the 25 contract cards a second time. They did not have the benefit, however, of the information produced by the computer graphics device before remaking their predictions. U3 and M3 explained their policies verbally to the investigator and to each other, as might be done during ordinary negotiations.

Negotiation phase. The negotiation phase began immediately following feedback. In this phase of the study each of the three pairs of negotiators attempted to reach agreement on the evaluation of each of the 25 contracts (on the assumption that they were in the final hours of negotiation). This was a far more difficult procedure than the usual one of attempting to find only one contract which would be the operational one. Evaluations of the acceptability of all 25 contracts was requested in order to ascertain the degree to which mutual judgment policies had developed as a consequence of the provision of the nonverbal, pictorial feedback provided by the graphics procedure, in comparison with the conventional verbal procedure.

Where participants could not reach agreement, a minimum of 'bargaining' was permitted in which the value of only one or two issues could be changed only one point to achieve agreement on a specific contract. Such bargaining occurred slightly more often with U3 and M3.

RESULTS

Self-Understanding of Individual Judgment Policies

Only two of the four issues thought to be significant were in fact significant. Although both union and management representatives agreed prior to the experiment that there were at least four major issues, the judgments made by the six participants revealed that only two of the issues were in fact significant. Only the wage issue was important to management and only the recall issue was important to the union (see Table 1).

Negotiators did not estimate accurately the weight they had placed on each issue. Only M i ' s estimates of the weights he had used approached those he actually used in his contract card judgments (see Table 1) and this occurred only in his pretest estimates. His accuracy in self-understanding decreased in the posttest. There were wide individual differences among the management negotiators' evaluations of their own weights. The union negotiators' evaluations, however, were more closely grouped. Al! the union negotiators assumed that they had placed a higher weight on the wage issue than they in fact did when evaluating the contract cards. They also estimated a lower weight for the recall issue than they demonstrated in evaluating the contract cards.

Conclusion. Self-understanding on the part of the negotiators was poor. The implications for negotiation are clear: defects in self-understanding lead to the unwitting communication of false information. An inaccurate report of one's own position—particularly if unwittingly so—is, of course, a barrier to the achievement of agreement, despite the best of intentions.

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Table 1

Comparison of Subjective and Qbjective Weights for Each Negotiator for Each Issue

Negotatior Duration Wage Increases Machine Operators

Number of workers

to be recalled

Pretest S RW S RW

Posttest

M l M2 M3

Ul U2 U3

M l M2 M3

U l U2 U3

10 20 35

5 20 10

10 20 35

8 15 10

6 5 12

3 5 1

5 3 48

3 2 2

65 40 40

20 30 50

65 40 35

20 25 40

68 74 40

1 2 0

90 89 14

6 4 3

5 25 15

0 10 10

CJ I

30 20

2 10 10

8 19 25

3 10 10

1

CJ I

23

8 13 6

s 20 15 10

75 40 30

20 10 10

70 50 40

HW

18 2 23

93 83 89

5 0 15

83 81 89

Where Sindicatesthesubjective importance in percent and fllVindlcates

the empirical importance in percent relative weight, namely, , in terms fl2'

of multiple regression statistics.

Understanding Others

Both sides proved to be inaccurate. Prior to the exchange of information, neither side was able to predict the judgments of the other side with any significant degree of accuracy (see pretest data in Table 2). Each negotiator's a priori understanding of his counterpart, therefore, was poor; neither side had an accurate understanding of the contract evaluation policy of the other side.

Conclusion. This finding illustrates one of the more important contributions of externalization. The negotiators were confident that they understood their counterpart's policies, a belief based on years of association and negotiation. Yet they were wrong.

Table 2

Predictive Accuracy *

Predictor Pretest Posttest Pretest Posttest

Ml M2 M3

Ul U2 U3

.252

.368

.317

.191

.360

.498

.472

.627

.834

.166

.264

.553

.343

.432

.311

.386

.766

.591

.642

.836

.954

.330

.360

.713

Where r^ indicates the degree of correlation between predicted evalua- tions and actual evaluations by counterpart. G indicates the same value corrected for the inconsistency of predictee and predictor.

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

Table 3

Intraunion and Intramanagement Uniformity'

Pretest Posttest Negotiation Pretest Posttest Negotiation

Management Pair

M1-M2 M2-M3 M1-M3

Union Pair U1-U2 U2-U3 U1-U3

.395

.488

.364

.896

.919

.918

.121

.195

.318

.913

.840

.884

.075

.058

.094

.765

.763

.753

.539

.639

.364

.934

.973

.966

.330

.332

.393

.990

.935

.971

.366

.123

.126

.958

.880

.847

' Where r̂ indicates the correlation between judgments of two members of the same team and G is the correlation corrected for inconsistency.

Intraunion and Intramanagement Unrformity

A high degree of uniformity existed among union negotiators. All comparisons between union members' evaluations produced fairly high indications of agreement (all correlations were over +.7B; see Table 3, also Figure 6). When corrected for inconsistency (see column labelled " G " in Table 3), it is clear

Duration of Contract Wage Increase

Neutral Neutral

2 2 years

No/Use of Mach. Op.

3 5 7 9 11 Percent

Recall of Strikers

Neutral

Max. Min. Min. Max.

Figure 6. Illustration of the uniformity of the union negotiators with regard to function-forms (pretest data)

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that the union negotiators were in nearly perfect policy agreement with one another. Union negotiators could have readily substituted for one another without affecting contract evaluations.

A low degree of uniformity existed among management negotiators. Management negotiators were in wide disagreement among themselves, even when corrected for inconsistency (see Table 3; see also Figure 7). All correlations between management evaluations were low in the pretest and posttest. In the negotiation phase they approached zero.

Duration of Contract Wage Increase

Neutral Neutral

1 IV2 2 2'/2 years

No./Use of Mach. Op.

5 7 9 Percent

Recall of Strikers

Neutral Neutral

. M l M2 M3

Max. Min. Min. Max.

Rgure 7. Illustration of nonuniformity of management negotiators with regard to function-form (pretest data)

Conclusion. Management negotiations had a uniform system with which to cope. The contract evaluation policies of the union did not vary from negotiator to negotiator. Union negotiators, however, had three management policies, rather than one, with which to cope.

Self-Consistency

Self-consistency was generally low. The three union negotiators were quite self-consistent at the pretest stage, although the management negotiators were less so. On subsequent evaluations in the postttest and negotiation phases, however, all negotiators were much less consistent (see Table 4).

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ALTERNATIVE APPRQACH

Table 4

Consistency (R )̂ of Contract Evaluations

Negotiator Pretest Posttest Negotiation

M l .578 .531 .618 M2 .710 .606 .465 Mt3 .810 .775 .617

gi .921 .788 .757 U2 .892 .726 .673 U5 .905 .843 .807

Conclusion. Inconsistency of contract evaluations w o u l d make negotiation very difficult since inconsistency implies that policies change f r o m the evaluation of one contract to the next.

Change in Policy

Changes occurred in evaluation policy. All participants' policies exhibited some changes between the pretest and posttest periods (see Tables 1 and 5). As in real negotiations, however, the greatest changes occurred just prior to the signing of the contract (see the pretest versus negotiation columns in Table 5).

Only M i ' s and M2's judgments changed significantly in the negotiation phase. There were no main changes for any of the negotiators between the pretest and posttest stages (see Table 5). In the negotiation phase, however, there were sharp changes f r o m M i ' s and M2's test policies. (In contrast, M3, a member of the control pair, made almost no change in his policy.)

Table 5

Stability In Each Negotiator's Policies Between Pretest and Between Pretest and Negotiation*

Negotiator

M l M2 M3

U l U2 U3

'A

Pretest versus posttest

.689

.525

.755

.917

.823

.913

Pretest versus negotiation

.153

.214

.719

.906

.775

.780

G

Pretest versus posttest

.885

.774

.934

.988

.924

.985

and Posttest

Pretest versus negotiation

.218

.469

.925

.994

.932

.879

* Where r̂ indicates the correlation between one negotiator's evaluations in the pretest and the same negotiator's evaluations in succeeding phases of the study. G indicates the same values corrected for inconsistency.

C o n c l u s i o n . Access t o i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y t h e g r a p h i c s d e v i c e led t o c h a n g e o n t h e part of t h e m a n a g e m e n t n e g o t i a t o r s . T h i s c h a n g e led t o increased a g r e e m e n t .

A c c u r a c y of P r e d i c t i o n s of t h e C o u n t e r p a r t ' s C o n t r a c t E v a l u a t i o n s A f t e r Feedback

A c c u r a c y w a s g e n e r a l l y p o o r . On b o t h t h e pretest a n d posttest, f i v e of t h e six n e g o t i a t o r s w e r e g e n e r a l l y inaccurate in t h e i r p r e d i c t i o n s of t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t ' s e v a l u a t i o n s . M 3 , h o w e v e r , w a s h i g h l y accurate in t h e posttest (see Table 2).

In o r d e r f o r accuracy t o i m p r o v e , b o t h t h e target p e r s o n s a n d t h e p r e d i c t o r s w o u l d have t o be m u c h m o r e self-consistent. If

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the target person changed his evaluation policy between the pretest and posttest, his evaluations would be more difficult to predict. Such changes occurred with two management negotiators.

Management improved in the accuracy of its predictions. The union side did not. Although the negotiators were generally inaccurate in their predictions of their counterpart's evaluations. Ml and M2 (the management participants having access to the information provided by the graphics device) improved their overall accuracy of prediction between the pretest and posttest (see Table 2). The union participants (Ul and U2) having access to the graphics device did not improve their accuracy. Because the union negotiators offered a more stable target (both within and between pre- and posttest phases), their evaluations were less difficult to predict. Because the management negotiators were less stable, they were more difficult to predict.

The control pair (M3 and U3) also Improved the accuracy of their predictions. Their improvement may have been due to the fact that U3 was stable and that M3—the only management negotiator who did not change his policy—was also stable.

Conclusion. Understanding of the counterpart prior to the exchange of information about contract evaluations was poor, as might have been expected from the finding that self-understanding at the pretest stage was poor, improvement in predictive accuracy appears to have been largely due to the stability of the judgments of the target person at least as much as to the utility of the graphics device.

Accuracy of Understanding of Degree of Conflict and Agreement

Some negotiators were correct. Four of the six negotiators had a reasonably accurate understanding of the amount of conflict between themselves and their counterparts, but not the bases for it (see Table 6). Negotiator U l , however, assumed that his counterpart was in agreement with him in both phases (positive assumed similarity) when they were actually in conflict. In the pretest negotiator M3 greatly underestimated the degree of conflict, but showed the greatest improvement in his accuracy of understanding of conflict.

Conclusion. These results suggest that amount of conflict is more readily detected than the reasons for it.

Union-Management Conflict

The groups were in wide disagreement initially. The pretest data show that all three pairs were far apart in their judgments of the acceptability of contracts (all three correlations between evaluation judgments are negative: -.50, -.27, and -.50).

The negotiators receiving graphics feedback achieved agreement in the negotiations phase, while the others did not. Only the negotiators who received pictorial feedback about their policies achieved significant change and produced agreement (positive r^ and G coefficients) in the negotiation phase. The control pair which received conventional verbal explanations as feedback continued to be in conflict in the negotiation phase. (Note the righthand column in Table 7.)

Conclusion. The results indicate that the use of judgment theory and the interactive computer graphics facility led to agreement; the conventional verbal discussion produced no change.

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Table 6

Assumed Similarity, Compared With Accuracy *

P a i r # 1 : U1-M1 Actual Similarity Assumed Similarity

Predictive Accuracy

Pair # 2 : U2-M2 Actual Similarity Assumed Similarity

Predictive Accuracy

Pair #3: U3-M3 Actual Similarity Assumed Similarity

Predictive Accuracy

M l U l M l U l

M2 U2 M2 U2

M3 U3 M3 U3

Pretest

- . 5 0 - . 4 8

.15

.25

.19

- . 2 7 - . 3 3 - . 3 3

.37

.35

- . 5 0 -.05 - . 3 5

.32

.50

Actual Similarity and Predictive

Posttest

- . 3 8 - . 4 1

.27

.47

.17

- . 1 2 - . 1 4 - . 1 5

.63

.26

- . 4 3 - . 3 2 - . 5 1

.83

.55

G Pretest

-.63 - . 8 9

.33

.34

.39

- . 4 0 - . 7 8 - . 4 1

.43 11

- . 5 7 - . 2 0 - . 5 0

.31

.59

Posttest

-.47 - . 9 5

.70

.64

.33

- . 1 7 - . 3 2 - . 1 3

.84

.36

- . 5 4 - . 3 9 - . 9 4

.95

.71

Where r^ for assumed similarity indicates the degree of correlation between the negotiator's own evaluations and his predictions of his counterpart's evaluations. G indicates the same values corrected for inconsistency. Data for actual similarity taken from Table 7 and data for predictive accuracy taken from Table 2.

Table 7

Union-Management Conflict and Agreement (Actual Similarity)*

Negotiating Pair

U1-M1 U2-M2 U3-M3

'A

Pretest

-.504 -.269 -.498

Posttest

-.384 -.123 -.432

Negotiation

.393

.495 -.161

G Pretest

-.628 -.401 -.572

Posttest

-.467 -.174 -.544

Negotiation

.514

.459 -.378

' Where r^ indicates the correlation between opposing negotiators' evaluations and G indicates the same value corrected for their inconsis- tences.

Negotiators' Evaluation of Graphics Procedure

The negotiators participating in this first application of judgment theory and computer technology to a labor-management bargaining situation reported that they gained considerable insight into their own and their counterparts' judgmental processes. They became particularly aware of their inability to predict their counterpart's policies. All felt that negotiations would have proceeded differently had the type of information provided by the present analysis been available to them during the real negotiations—especially in the more rapid identification of important issues.

Participants also suggested that it would be valuable to supply a mediator with the kind of information that was made available to them, with the understanding that he would use such information to supplement his usual procedures. Such information would be particularly valuable if used early in the bargaining process. If applied to critical phases of a negotiation by a third party, judgment theory and computer graphics

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technology could improve understanding of one's self and others and shorten negotiating time to an extent heretofore not possible.

CONCLUSIONS

The most significant result obtained in this study was that the two pairs of negotiators who made use of social judgment theory and its associated technology were able to achieve a modest amount of agreement over a set of 25 contracts. It is important to observe that the criterion for agreement used here is far more stringent than that applied to ordinary negotiation situations in which only one contract is agreed upon. In short, the results of the present study lead us to conclude that policies of the negotiators {Ml and U l , M2 and U2) regarding the degree of acceptability of various contracts shifted from dissimilarity to similarity after participation in the study. While it cannot be assumed that the time required for this shift would be as short in actual negotiations, only a fraction of the time ordinarily involved in negotiation was required.

The fact that a similar change was not observed in a third pair of negotiators who used conventional verbal discourse to negotiate does not mean that the utility of the alternate approach demonstrated here is proved. The study involved too few negotiators and was restricted to only one negotiation situation. Furthermore, it was a reenactment rather than an actual negotiation. Nevertheless, several circumstances predicted by the theory were found to occur. For example, self-understanding was poor, understanding of the policy {and policies) of the other side was poor, and inconsistency was a factor contributing to poor understanding (as well as conflict). The fact that these circumstances were found lends some credence to the utility of social judgment theory—particularly when it can provide a technology for uncovering and displaying this type of information for the participants in a negotiation situation.

The results from this study, therefore, are encouraging. They indicate that the theory and technique described here may be useful for union-management negotiation and mediation proceedings. If so, an alternate approach to labor-management conflict reduction would become available. Further research seems warranted.

Walter Morley Baike is assistant professor at the School of Business Administration, California State University at San Diego. Kenneth R. Hammond is professor of psychology and Director of Research on Human Judgment and Social Interaction at the Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. G. Dale Meyer is assistant professor at the School of Business Administration, University of Colorado.

REFERENCES

Flack, J. Ernest, and David A. Summers 1971 "Computer aided conflict

resolutions in water resource planning: an illustration." Water Resources Research, 7: 1410-1414.

Hammond, Kenneth R. 1965 "New directions in research

on conflict resolution."

Journal of Social Issues, 21: 44^66.

1971 "Computer graphics as an aid to learning." Science, 172: 90:^908.

Hammond, Kenneth R., and Peter J. Boyle 1971 "Quasi-rationality, quarrels

and new conceptions of feedback." Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 24: 103-113.

Hammond, Kenneth R., and Berndt Brehmer 1973 "Quasi-ratlonality and

distrust: implications for international conflict." In L. Rappoport and D. A. Summers (Eds.), Human Judgment and Social Interaction. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Hammond, Kenneth, and David A. Summers 1972 "Cognitive control."

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ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Psychological Review, 79: and regression approaches Stewart, Thomas, and 58-67. to the study of information Linda Gelberd ^ „ , „ .. „ processing in judgment." In 1972 Capturing Judgment

Hursch, Carolyn, Kenneth R ^ Rappoport and D. A. Policies: A New Approach Hammond, and John Hursch Summers (Eds), Human for Citizen Participation in 1964 • Some methodological Judgment and Social Planning. Institute of

considerations in rnultiple Interaction. New York: Holt, Behavioral Science Report cue probability studies Rinehart and Winston. No. 151, University of Psychological Review, 7 1 : Colorado 42-60. Stewart, Thomas R.

1972 Components of Correlations Tucker, Ledyard R. Karrass, Chester L. ^ ^ ^ Extension of the Lens 1964 " A suggested alternative 1970 The Negotiating Game. New ^^^^^l Equation. Institute of formulation in the

York: World. Behavioral Science Report developments by Hursch, Slovic, Paul, and No. 146, University of Hammond and Hursch, and Sarah Lichtenstein Colorado. by Hammond, Hursch and 1973 "Comparison of Bayesian Todd." Psychological

Review, 7 1 : 528-530.

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