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USA vs. Mexico: history, geopolitics and economics of one of the world’s oldest rivalries in soccer

Steven Apostolov

To cite this article: Steven Apostolov (2018) USA vs. Mexico: history, geopolitics and economics of one of the world’s oldest rivalries in soccer, Soccer & Society, 19:5-6, 783-797, DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2017.1399616

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2017.1399616

Published online: 27 Nov 2017.

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USA vs. Mexico: history, geopolitics and economics of one of the world’s oldest rivalries in soccer

Steven Apostolov*

Mercy College, School of Business, Dobbs Ferry, NY, USA

This essay tracks one of the oldest and most intense rivalries in soccer. First, it focuses on the early historical aspect of the soccer rivalry between the United States and Mexico. Second, the essay focuses on the geopolitics and evolution of CONCACAF. It concludes with an economic analysis of the derby and its impact on the development of professional soccer in the United States.

Introduction

If you ask any soccer aficionado to name the world’s most intense rivalries, the list would be quite substantial. Soccer fans, depending on their nationality and geo- graphic location, would all provide different answers. In 1872, the city of Glasgow hosted the very first official international game between Scotland and England.1

Soon after, the rivalry between the cradle of soccer and its northern neighbour was born and fiercely disputed. The post-Second World War matches of England vs. Germany and Germany vs. Holland continue to have a deep impact on and off the pitch. Competitions between France and Italy have been played with a lot of passion and marked by dramatic events. On the other side of the world in Asia, even friendly games involving Japan, South Korea and China are intense and followed by an enormous number of spectators. Furthermore, the North African derby between Algeria and Egypt has become known over the last couple of decades as the ‘hate match’. In South America, soccer fans would most likely agree that Argentina vs. Uruguay and Brazil vs. Argentina are among the oldest and most fiercely disputed soccer matches on their continent. There are even some intercontinental soccer rival- ries such as Argentina vs. England: the ‘hand of God’ of Maradona and the kick of David Beckham have both impacted the relationship between the two countries.

Obviously, this list of rivalries is not exhaustive. A good number of them will continue to exist, and certainly new ones will be created – it is the nature of soccer. Most fans outside the CONCACAF zone2 would probably not place the United States vs. Mexico in a short list of famous global derbies. Yet, it is one of the world’s oldest rivalries, having begun in 1934. Thereafter, even friendly matches involving the US and Mexico have been played with utmost intensity. Since it is a rivalry that predates many other famous rivalries, its historical context deserves to be analysed carefully. The contemporary part of the historical aspect of the rivalry has fascinated many sports writers, and it is well-known to fans on both sides: American fans constantly remind the supporters of El Tri about their defeats in

*E-mail: [email protected]

© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Soccer & Society, 2018 Vol. 19, Nos. 5–6, 783–797, https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2017.1399616

Columbus, Ohio and the elimination of Mexico from the World Cup in 2002 – they were nicknamed dos a cero. Therefore, this essay will focus on the early history of the rivalry which has been less analysed and described by sports writers and schol- ars. It is also useful to examine the impact of the derby in terms of geopolitical and economic aspects: CONCACAF, which stands for Confederation of North and Cen- tral American and Caribbean Football, was one of the most obscure confederations in FIFA for decades. It is currently one of the most important members in terms of elections and sport governance; it has more members, and therefore more votes, than some confederations with very strong teams and much older tournaments. That includes the South American Football Confederation CONMEBOL (the governing body of soccer on the continent). About a decade ago, long-time enemies on the pitch ─ the United States and Mexico ─ became business partners. Both national teams are managed by SUM (Soccer United Marketing), an American firm, which is the marketing arm of MLS (Major League Soccer). This strategic partnership is unique in the world of soccer and has a deep impact on the development of profes- sional soccer in the United States.

Literature on the US–Mexico rivalry is not abundant. Most documents on the topic are written by journalists and self-educated historians.3 Even though those writers were not academically trained, they conducted solid research and developed fascinating narratives about the United States national team and the early develop- ment of CONCACAF and its predecessors. Very few scholars have dealt with those topics.4 Investigative reporters provided a couple of thought-provoking pieces after FIFA and CONCACAF became involved in a series of corruption scandals.5 Those writings shed some important light on the role of Jack Warner and Chuck Blazer in the scandals. It is a well-known fact that there are serious allegations of corruption and misappropriation of funds against the duo. It would be futile to write about that since it has already been documented and analysed in documentaries, substantial articles, and books written by investigative journalists. Therefore, this essay will focus on the role of Warner and Blazer for the transformation of CONCACAF from above and below, and how that affected the revival of the rivalry between the US and Mexico. The formation of tournaments such as the Gold Cup and the foundation of SUM are well-illustrated in a couple of reviews dedicated to sport marketing and administration.

Historical aspects of one of the world’s oldest soccer rivalries

In 1930, Team USA became one of the original teams to join the competition for the Jules Rimet World Cup Trophy (see Figure 1). After a good performance during the 1924 Olympics and participation in the 1928 Olympics, the Americans achieved one of their biggest international successes ever during the first World Cup in Uru- guay. Struck by the Great Depression, most countries could not afford the expenses of sending teams to the tournament, and since soccer was still a semi-professional or amateur sport in many countries around the world, very few players could afford to leave their jobs to play for their countries. In order to encourage participation, the South American hosts generously offered to cover all expenses. The United States Football Association (USFA) received a payment of $5,873.47 from its Uruguayan counterpart.6 Mexico was invited too. All participating teams benefited from first- class travel accommodations. On 13 June 1930, Americans and Mexicans sailed on the same ship – the USMC Munargo.

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On June 26, 1930, as is revealed by the official dinner program and menu printed in Spanish and English by the Munson Steamship Lines, both teams attended the same farewell gala dinner. Players and officials from both countries together enjoyed gourmet food and fine wines. They were entertained by the Munargo Orchestra with Strauss’s ‘The Blue Danube’. It was followed by the tango, fox trot and other genres of music.7 Mexicans and Americans also engaged in different tour- naments and field-day events. Several American players, among them George Moor- house, James Brown and Alexander Wood, acted as committee members in charge of events. Tournaments included bridge, checkers, deck tennis and deck golf; field- day events consisted of a spar fight, an egg-and-spoon race, a cigarette-and-ties con- test, an ice-cream-eating contest and a 1/8-mile race. One of the more interesting events was the Court of Neptune Ceremony, during which players from both coun- tries celebrated the crossing of the equator. Upon arrival to Montevideo, the Ameri- can and Mexican teams enjoyed a very warm welcome. ‘Notwithstanding the rain, a very large crowd cheered our arrival from the docks and packed our lane of auto tra- vel along the streets to the Florida hotel, a battery of cameramen, cartoonists and sports writers dogging each and every individual of our party seeking first-hand information as to our football status and abilities’, observed Wilfred R. Cummings, Manager of the USFA, in his official report.8

The draw took place on 13 July 1930 with the schedule finding France and Mexico pitted against each other at Penarol Field, and Belgium taking on the US at

Figure 1. Team USA 1930. Source: Robert Millar Papers, Courtesy National Soccer Hall of Fame.

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Central Park, the home of Nacional FC. To the complete surprise of everybody, the US defeated Belgium 3-0. Since Belgium was a former Olympic champion, their defeat was rather unexpected, and international newspaper articles that preceded the game had largely favoured the Europeans.9 After the first US win and to commemo- rate an official Uruguayan holiday, Constitution Day, the hosts invited the Ameri- cans to a full-dress midnight military ball with the elite of Uruguayan government and society in attendance. ‘Dainty foods were served and champagne flowed like water far into the next day’, documented Wilfred R. Cummings.10

In their group, the Americans had to face another solid opponent – Paraguay. ‘Our team appeared to be the crowd’s favourite even though opposed by South Americans: Paraguay were considered the dark horses for the championship as they had eliminated Uruguay in the South American Championship the previous year’, observed the manager of the Americans again. A strong US team defeated Paraguay 3-0 and qualified for the semi-finals (see Figure 1). The game became a famous ref- erence in most World Cup history books as Bertrand Patenaude became the first per- son to score a hat trick in the tournament. The Americans became the preferred guests of the Uruguayan elite: The Archbishop of Montevideo hosted an extraordi- nary reception long remembered by the overwhelmed guests. The President of Uru- guay, Juan Compisteguy, hosted a lavish barbeque at his country home in Los Predras for athletes and officials: Lamb and pork were paired with domestic fine wines, and the meal concluded with a tasting of French pastries and champagne.11

Reaching the semi-finals was impressive and would remain the biggest achieve- ment of the American team for decades to come. Mexico’s stint at the tournament, on the other hand, was far from impressive. The team was credited with conceding the first goal of the tournament and lost all of its group-stage games, finishing at the bottom of the table in the group. After the fraternal relations of the American and Mexican teams during the sea voyage, the teams would not interact with each other for another four years. In 1934, they crossed paths again during the World Cup in Italy.

Thirty-two teams competed for the World Cup in Italy. As a result, the hosts organized a different format from that of the Uruguayans four years earlier. Instead of dividing all teams into groups of four and three as it was in 1930, the Italians organized the first pre-tournament qualification. Oddly, some of the qualifying matches were disputed on Italian soil. After the qualification, the 16 winning teams participated in the final tournament. The United States had to play its qualifying game against Mexico. The match took place in Rome on 24 May 1934. The US humiliated its Mexican neighbours 4-2. It was a rough game; the referee had to eject a Mexican player for trying to brutally stop Aldo Donelli, the American who scored all four goals.12 After the trashing of Mexico, the United States faced Italy. The US was crushed 7-1 by the hosts, who would go on to win the World Cup a few weeks later.

From 1934 until the 1990s, the balance of power shifted, and Mexico dominated its northern neighbour on the pitch, regardless of where the matches were played. Professional Mexican teams visited the Unites States as early as the 1940s. An All- Star team of the Southern New England Soccer Association (SNESA) played a match against Atlante FC, the Mexican champion of 1940. ‘Soccer Champions of Mexico Play at Tiverton’, announced the Fall River Herald.13 The All Stars of the SNESA were mainly made up of players of the amateur club Ponta Delgada FC. In a photograph found in the Louie Souza papers, veteran John Souza recognized

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himself. Kicked viciously in the jaw, Souza ended up in the hospital (see Figure 2). ‘The Mexicans were brutal, but they also played better than us; we only played after work and on weekends, whereas they were true professionals and you could sense that immediately on the field’, remembered the former US international.14 Atlante FC was loaded with elegant athletes such as former FC Barcelona player Benjamin Alonso. Many talented soccer players fled Francoist oppression after the Spanish Civil War. Most of them moved to South America and Mexico, and that certainly affected the performance of the clubs there.

The shift of balance of domination towards Mexico was largely due to the fact that professional soccer in the United States struggled. Professional soccer in the US enjoyed several moments of popularity throughout the twentieth century. It was a popular game at the turn of the century; it was almost permanently established as a professional sport during the golden years of the American Soccer League (ASL) in the 1920s. That explains why the United States performed so well during the first World Cup in 1930. After a decline in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, soccer came back to America’s sports arenas in the 1970s. But even Pele and other famous inter- national players could not save the North American Soccer League (NASL), which collapsed in 1984. Professional soccer leagues have not only been in the shadow of baseball, American football, basketball and most recently ice hockey, but with the exception of Major League Soccer (MSL), a newcomer on the mainstream sporting scene, all of them have folded within a couple of decades. The ups and downs of professional soccer obviously affected the United States national team in a negative way. From 1934 until 1994, the United States only participated twice in the World Cup: In 1950, a mixed team of amateurs and semi-professionals managed to defeat

Figure 2. All Stars SNSA and Atlante FC, 1940. Source: Louie Souza Papers, Courtesy, National Soccer Hall of Fame.

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England – one of the biggest upsets of the history of the tournament. In 1990, a team made up of mostly college players could not reach the knock out stage, losing all of its group stage matches. On the other hand, soccer in Mexico prospered. Dur- ing the same time period, the country hosted two World Cups and one Summer Olympics. As compared to its northern neighbour, with the exceptions of 1938, 1982 and 1990, Mexico has been omnipresent in the World Cup and has generally performed quite well. After having followed the origins of one of the oldest soccer rivalries in the world, it is interesting to now shift to and focus on the evolution and geopolitics of CONCACAF, the confederation from which both rivals evolve.

Geopolitics and evolution of CONCACAF

CONCACAF was founded in 1961. Prior to its formation, soccer tournaments in North America were organized and supervised by several organizations, notably the North American Football Confederation (NAFC), the Central American and Carib- bean Football Confederation (CACFC), and a couple of smaller organizing bodies. Most of them ceased to exist before the foundation of CONCACAF. Founded in 1947 with only four members – the United States, Canada, Mexico and Cuba – the NAFC was more active than the other predecessors of CONCACAF. It organized four tournaments.15

The first tournament took place during the inaugural year of the NAFC. The USFA sent a semi-professional team to represent the country at the North American Championship. It was Ponta Delgada FC, a predominantly Portuguese soccer team from Fall River, Massachusetts. According to John Souza, a member of the US national team that defeated England during the World Cup in 1950, at least seven players for Ponta Delgada FC were Portuguese-Americans.16 The USFA selected the entire team to represent the country because during the same year, Ponta Delgada FC became a double champion, winning the National Amateur Championship and the US Challenge Cup. However, exhausted by the tropical climate in Cuba, where the tournament was held, Ponta Delgada FC/Team USA lost all of its games. In 1949, the North American Championship was used as a World Cup qualifier, too. This time, a mixed team of the North-east and the Midwest qualified the United States for the Word Cup in 1950.

Originally, CONCACAF was run by Ramon Coll Jaumet of Costa Rica. He was replaced by Mexican Joaquin Soria Terrazas, who remained at the helm of the orga- nization until 1990, when Jack Warner was elected president of CONCACAF. Between 1963 and 1989, the championship of the confederation was dominated by Mexico and Costa Rica. It is interesting to note that between 1973 and 1989, the championship was used as a World Cup qualifier, just as it was in 1949.

Until the late 1980s, CONCACAF was an obscure organization with only $140,000 for an operating budget, no television deal and only a handful of employ- ees. Its 26 members came from three different zones or regional subgroups affiliated with CONCACAF: First, the North American Zone (or the North American Football Union); second, the Central American Zone (the Central American Football Union); and third, the Caribbean Zone (the Caribbean Football Union). The North American Zone counted only three members – Canada, the United States and Mexico – whereas the Central American Zone had seven members in its ranks: Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. The largest subdi- vision was the Caribbean Football Union, with 16 affiliated members. The number

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of affiliated members of the Caribbean Zone is currently 29 – having almost doubled since the late 1980s and brought the number of CONCACAF-affiliated members to 41. Most of the newly admitted football associations became members during the leadership of Jack Warner, who simply replicated what FIFA president Joao Have- lange had done to win elections and stay in power for so long.

Between 1974 and 1998, Havelange turned FIFA from a mediocre organization into a global empire with $4 billion in its bank account and more members than the United Nations.17 While running for the FIFA presidency, Havelange understood the political changes that affected the African continent and took advantage of them. During the 1960s and 1970s, many African countries won their independence from former colonial powers. Their football associations became full members of FIFA. By 1974, FIFA membership had grown to 140, with Europe and South America making up less than a third of the total membership. The other 90 or so members came from Africa and Asia. Most of the new members came from Africa – in less than a decade, more than 30 African nations joined FIFA.18 The growing number of African countries joining FIFA did not affect the allocation of spots for participation in the World Cup. In fact, for the World Cup in 1966, only one spot was allocated to the confederations of Africa, Asia and Oceania combined. Presidents of African football associations were frustrated. As a result of both this frustration and the active leadership of Nkrumah’s Ghana, many decided to boycott the qualifiers for the tournament.19 Havelange understood that frustration. Before the elections, endorsed by his countryman and soccer legend Pele, he travelled and courted many leaders of African football associations. He promised more money for the develop- ment of African soccer and more spots at the World Cup for African teams. His efforts paid off. On 11 June 11 1974, he won 68 votes against Sir Stanley Rous’s 52 and became the first non-European President of FIFA.

Havelange must have been a role model to Warner. A former history teacher and part-time sociology faculty member at The University of the West Indies, Warner became the secretary of the Trinidad and Tobago Football Association in 1973. In 1983, he became CONCACAF vice-president and also joined the powerful FIFA executive committee ─ members of which designate the host of the World Cup. In 1990, he was elected president of CONCACAF and shortly afterwards became FIFA’s vice-president. After the election of Warner, the Caribbean Zone of CONCA- CAF almost doubled in size. Small islands such as Saint Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, Montserrat, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, to cite just a few, were admitted as members of CONCACAF, and therefore, were eligible to vote during elections at FIFA. Warner was very successful at changing the bal- ance of power in sports governance. During his time at the helm of CONCACAF, he wielded disproportionate power presiding over football associations that had a fifth of all votes. In other words, CONCACAF was not as powerful as UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) or CAF (Confederation of African Football) with their 50-plus members each; it was almost as powerful as the AFC (Asian Foot- ball Confederation) and its 47 members, and it was definitely more powerful than CONMEBOL and the OFC (Oceania Football Confederation) with their combined 24 members. This change in the balance of power was achieved by admitting new members ─ mostly Caribbean islands regardless of their size. The Turks and Caicos Islands, with a population of just 50,000 people, has one vote during the FIFA con- gress, as does Germany with a population of 80 million and solid traditions in soc- cer. Tiny Montserrat, with a population of only 5,000 people, has one vote as well,

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just like mighty Brazil and its 200 million people and five World Cup titles. If sport governance and the politics of FIFA and CONCACAF reflected American political life, each state regardless of its population would have an equal number of seats in the US congress (e.g. Texas and Rhode Island having one congressman each; in fact, based on the 2010 US Census, the Ocean State has only two representatives in the US Congress, whereas the Lone Star State has 36). In a similar fashion, in the Euro- pean Parliament, a small country such as Estonia (with a population of 6 million) would have the same number of members as France (72 million): In reality, France has 72 members in the European Parliament, whereas Estonia has only six.

CONCACAF is a unique confederation in several ways. For political reasons, UEFA has members from geographic locations beyond the borders of Europe, nota- bly in the Middle East and Asia Minor. So does CONCACAF, which counts in its ranks two countries in South America – Guyana and Suriname – as well as French Guyana, an overseas territory of France. As compared to UEFA, which includes a few affiliated members of rather small sizes, such as Lichtenstein, the Faroe Islands and San Marino, CONCACAF counts in its ranks mostly small countries. And that is the origin of the joke that ‘Every time a tiny atoll pierced the warm blue-green waters of the Caribbean, Jack Warner would give it a football federation [and make it a part of his “empire”]’.20 Another feature of CONCACAF’s uniqueness is that France technically could be drawn to play against one of its overseas territories such as Martinique, Guadeloupe, or French Guyana. Jocelyn Angloma’s Guadeloupe lost to Mexico in the semifinal of the Gold Cup in 2007. However, had Guadeloupe won the Gold Cup (and that was within the realm of possibility) and had France captured the Euro in 2008, the mother country and its Caribbean overseas department could very well have played against each other during the Confederations Cup in 2009. A similar scenario could have opposed either Suriname or Guyana against its former colonial power – the Netherlands or England. Although that is highly unlikely to happen, the structure and regulations of CONCACAF make it a possibility. The fol- lowing part of the essay will analyse how the transformation of CONCACAF affected the revival of the rivalry between the US and Mexico. It will also analyse how the perpetual enemies on the pitch became business partners and how that affected professional soccer in the United States.

Economics of the rivalry between US and Mexico: from obscurity to prominence

There is no doubt that Jack Warner transformed CONCACAF from above by almost doubling the number of associations in the Caribbean Zone, and therefore, increas- ing CONCACAF’s geopolitical influence in sports governance. It was Chuck Blazer, however, who transformed the confederation from below and turned it into a suc- cessful business enterprise. He assisted Warner in being elected as president of CONCACAF and was appointed by him immediately as a general secretary. Blazer transformed the confederation not only by creating new tournaments, such as the successful Gold Cup, but also by organizing more tournaments on American soil and by obtaining essential television deals from which CONCACAF benefitted tremendously. All this was crucial for the revival and the shift of balance of the riv- alry between Mexico and the United States. But before getting into that story, it is important to know who was Blazer, and how did he become involved in soccer?

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Very few top-level soccer administrators, perhaps with the exception of Michel Platini, were ever actively involved in professional soccer as players. Chuck Blazer was not any different than most of his counterparts. He has never played any soccer and would have probably never been involved in the game had he not coached his son’s junior team. Charles Gordon Blazer was born in 1945 in a middle-class Jewish family in the New York City borough of Queens. He assisted his father at an early age running a small family business. After his secondary studies, he became an accountant, obtaining a degree from the New York University. He then enrolled in an MBA program at the same institution but never fulfilled the requirements to com- plete the degree. In the 1970s, he successfully ran his father-in-law’s small company, which manufactured the world’s original emoticon yellow smiley-face buttons. The popularity of the smiley-face fad ended abruptly, and Blazer had to rebrand the enterprise to manufacturing and selling promotional and marketing materials such as ashtrays and monogrammed beach towels.21 The company struggled, and Blazer found himself almost unemployed and with plenty of spare time. In 1976, he started coaching his son’s junior soccer team. Blazer demonstrated exceptional qualities as a soccer administrator and moved very quickly up the ranks of the Youth Soccer Organization of New Rochelle, New York, and afterwards in the Eastern New York State Soccer Association. ‘He is remembered as a motivated, an adroit and active administrator, more interested in organizing game schedules, lining fields, or design- ing uniforms than actual coaching’.22 In 1984, after fewer than 10 years as a youth coach and league official, Blazer was elected executive vice-president of the United States Soccer Federation (USSF) in charge of international competition. He utilized his connections and was even able to convince Pele to advocate for his election. Bla- zer’s achievements as a USSF official were impressive: between 1981 and 1983, the US national team had only played a couple of official games, whereas after his elec- tion, the team played more than a dozen games in less than a two-year period. That was essential for the qualification of the United States for the World Cup in 1990 – its first participation in 40 years! Blazer played a pivotal role in staging and winning the US bid to host the 1994 World Cup. Despite his successful tenure, Blazer was not reelected. He spent the next four years running the American Soccer League (ASL) – an obscure semi-professional soccer league with 10 teams along the Eastern Coast which had the same name as its powerful predecessor of the 1920s. He even briefly managed one of the ASL’s franchises in Miami. In 1989, Blazer ran the elec- tion campaign of Jack Warner, whom he had met at corporate functions during his tenure as a USSF vice-president. Warner won the election and became President of CONCACAF. After his election, he quickly appointed his ‘campaign manager’ as a general secretary of the confederation, and that catapulted Blazer into the ‘strato- sphere’ of international soccer. In less than two decades, he became one of the most influential men in international soccer. From 1990 until 2015, he exercised the func- tion of CONCACAF general secretary – running and overseeing all operations. In addition to that, in 1995, he became a member of FIFA’s powerful executive com- mittee, and he also served as a board member of the organization’s marketing and TV committee from 2002 until 2007.23

Prior to the leadership of Warner and Blazer, all competitions of the CONCA- CAF Championship were organized on Central American and Caribbean soil and were dominated by Mexico and Costa Rica. After Blazer became general secretary, he replaced the CONCACAF Championship with the Gold Cup. Since then, tourna- ments have been organized in the United States, and twice they have been co-hosted

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by Mexico. Blazer was a pragmatic leader and quickly realized that the US had plenty of big stadiums. As compared to Central America and the Caribbean, the US had bigger crowds and considerably higher ticket-revenue potential. CONCACAF Gold Cup matches averaged 41,854 fans across 14 sites during the 2015 tournament. It was an increase in more than 6% from the average of 39,348 in 2013.24 Average attendance of the tournament has grown steadily: In 2007, it was only 37,752. Good attendance at soccer matches in the United States convinced promoters to organize the centennial edition of Copa America in the United States. ‘The predominantly Latino crowd of 69,491 at the Argentina vs. Chile final reinforced the financial point. The same two teams had met in the previous Copa final in Chile, and on that occasion the smaller stadium in Santiago had limited the crowd to 45,693’, con- cluded veteran reporter Paul Gardner.25 One of the major British dailies estimated that ‘it looks like [Copa] will end up with a total attendance of about 1.5 million, good for an average crowd of roughly 47,000. Last year’s Copa in Chile garnered and average of 25,227 fans, whereas the 2011 tournament drew an average of 33,947’.26 The financial point was clear given the fact that ticket prices for sporting events in the United States are much higher than those in South America. During the group-stage matches, Ticketmaster priced its cheapest tickets from $117 to $156, whereas some of the expensive tickets were sold in the range of $347 to $645. Before the referee blew the whistle to start the first game of the tournament, the offi- cial Copa site had already advertized tickets for the final at $1,500 each. South American organizers during previous Copas, on the other hand, could only charge 10 percent of what organizers charged for the 2016 edition of the tournament in the United States.27 Good attendance during any sporting event is a blessing for the organizers; good television ratings and obtaining television deals, however, is essen- tial. Any successful sporting enterprise nowadays generates its biggest revenue from lucrative television deals. With the financial support of such deals, professional teams, leagues and tournaments are immensely successful even before counting the gate receipts.

Good television ratings are essential to convince television companies to sign deals to broadcast the events. In 2009, the Gold Cup match between the United States and Mexico drew 5.38 million viewers on Univision; it became the most watched sporting event of the weekend.28 By 2012, television ratings had signifi- cantly improved. ‘The final match between the United States and Mexico … was the highest-rated sports broadcast in Univision’s history, with more than 10.8 million viewers. Between 2009 and 2011, Spanish-language viewership for the Gold Cup increased 36 per cent’.29 The Gold Cup, held every other year, became CONCA- CAF’s biggest generator of funds. By 2011, CONCACAF had $60 million in rev- enue with only about $31 million in expenses.30 In 2011, CONCACAF attracted more official corporate partners. That obviously contributed to a significant increase in sponsorship revenue as compared to 2009 when the tournament had only six part- ners. Each one of these sponsorships was valued in the mid-six-figure range.31

Although these numbers might seem insignificant compared to World Cup soccer sponsorships and any recent revenue from the Euro, organized by UEFA, there was a tremendous increase after Warner and Blazer assumed leadership of the confedera- tion. And the growth of tournaments such as the Gold Cup undoubtedly convinced South American soccer officials to organize the historic centennial edition of Copa America on North American soil. The predecessors of Warner and Blazer were either not interested in making money, just like the aristocrats who ran FIFA before

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the election of Havelange, or they were simply not capable of making it happen. Warner and Blazer certainly brought CONCACAF out of the obscurity in which it was kept by previous leaders. But how was that related to the US–Mexico rivalry, and how did that affect the development of professional soccer in North America? The following part of the paper essay attempt to answer these questions.

Broadcasting of soccer was almost nonexistent in the United States until the World Cup took place in the country. A few times in the late 1960s and early 1980s, CBS and ABC tried to broadcast soccer. Other sports in the US allowed TV compa- nies to broadcast many commercials and to generate colossal sums from companies willing to advertise their products. Because of its format, soccer was considered commercially unfriendly. US marketing officials were frustrated that the format of soccer would not allow them to sell anything. Coverage of Word Cup soccer was almost nonexistent until 1994. According to Clive Toye, who was a British journal- ist and later became general manager of the New York Cosmos and commissioner of the NASL:

The only places where you could watch the World Cup of 1970 was by closed circuit in Madison Square Garden and the Forum in Los Angeles, rights purchased by the NASL for a very few thousand dollars. Nobody else wanted it. Nobody else was avail- able to do the play-by-play or the expert commentary, at least not for nothing, so I was elected and trotted off to Mexico City to get my credentials and broadcast position.32

In 1974, the World Cup coverage consisted of a week of old highlights on CBS Sports Spectacular, whereas in 1978, the World Cup had no coverage in the English language at all. In 1982, certain games were broadcast by ABC. It was in relation to a contract at the time between the TV company and the NASL. ABC utilized the same crew: play-by-play was done by veteran reporter Jim McKay, colour commen- tary was provided by Mario Machado and Paul Gardner, and NASL star Giorgio Chinaglia acted as analyst. ABC registered very low ratings with the broadcasts of the NASL and subsequently lost interest in soccer. It did not broadcast soccer for the next decade. In the meantime, NBC and TNT broadcast World Cup matches sporadically.

Since there was very little interest in World Cup broadcasting until the end of the millennium (even some of the games during the World Cup in the US were not broadcast live), in 2001, MLS had no competitors when it bid $40 million for US English-language rights to the 2002 and 2006 World Cups. MLS concluded the deal with the help of SUM, the league’s newly created marketing branch. SUM bought time afterwards for the matches on ABC and ESPN and sold the advertising inde- pendently. It was a very profitable deal that forever changed the business of soccer broadcasting in the US FIFA saw the breakthrough and decided to trade the broad- casting rights with the television companies directly. Ironically, it was done during Blazer’s involvement as a board member of the organization’s marketing and TV committee. For the 2010 and 2014 tournaments, a total of $425 million was spent by ABC/ESPN to acquire the rights to broadcast the World Cup. It was the largest rights package in FIFA history.33 The creation of SUM and the purchase of the World Cup television rights in 2002 and 2006 were the idea of Don Garber, then the recently appointed Commissioner of the struggling league. SUM, the marketing arm of MLS and an offspring of Garber, was designed to manage rights to international soccer games and broadcasts in the United States. Interestingly, at that time, MLS was not making any money from television broadcasting of its own games.

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The league would buy air time from television stations and cover the cost of produc- tion for the MLS matches. However, MLS made money by buying air time on ABC and ESPN for World Cup matches and by selling commercial spots for those games on its own. Having been bypassed by the television companies which dealt directly with FIFA, SUM found an alternative. It acquired the rights to the US and Mexican national-team broadcasts and venue management.

The Mexican national team quickly became the most marketable property of SUM, often drawing more than 50,000 spectators to its games and attracting televi- sion audiences of between 2 and 5 million in the United States. As a result, most of its friendly games are played on American soil. For example, in 2007, six out of the 11 friendly matches of El Tri took place in the United States. Of those six matches played on American soil, only one was against the United States. Simply imagine Spain and Germany playing a friendly game in Paris at a packed stadium while also racking up respectful TV ratings on TF1, one of the major television channels in France that broadcasts most international games! SUM attempted to organize matches in cities where demographics showed significant Mexican presence. Such was the case of the US vs. Mexico game, played at the University of Phoenix Sta- dium in Glendale Arizona, on 7 February 2007. Two other games took place at San Diego’s Qualcomm Stadium and McAfee Coliseum in Oakland, California. Some matches took place in areas with insignificant Mexican populations. ‘We thought that we were flying to the US but landed by mistake in Brazil’, joked Hugo Sanchez after the friendly match opposing Brazil and Mexico which took place at the Gillette Stadium in Foxboro, Massachusetts on September 12, 2007.34 More than 200,000 Brazilians live in Massachusetts and the surrounding New England states. It is not surprising why the game was played in front of a capacity crowd dressed in yellow shirts (see Figure 3). SUM officials very skillfully identified other regions in the US with significant foreign populations and were able to capitalize on those demograph- ics by organizing highly successful friendly matches involving El Tri.

The foundation of SUM was vital for MLS. It distributed its annual event-man- agement and sponsorship sales to MLS’s owner-operators. It should be highlighted that MLS has been losing money since the league began operations in 1996; it was reported that the league had lost close to $300 million before Garber was appointed as commissioner. Therefore, SUM’s cash flow probably became one of the decisive factors in keeping the league afloat. SUM’s role was also essential for the revival of the US–Mexico rivalry and for shifting the balance of Mexican domination. After decades of losing consistently to Mexico, the US national team finally began to challenge Mexico’s pre-eminence in the CONCACAF region.

Conclusion

Until recently, US soccer was not a common topic among historians. It was not a common topic among soccer fans, either. It would have never occurred to a soccer fan to include the United States among the world’s leading powers of the game. ‘What do Americans know about soccer?’ would have been the question asked by most soccer aficionados. Mexican soccer was not affected by the same stereotypes, nor did it have the same pattern of development as the sport did north of the border. Soccer fans, even from far-flung locations, have always considered El Tri as a prominent national soccer team. However, despite less participation in the World

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Cup, the US has been more successful statistically speaking – a semifinal reached in 1930 as well as a quarterfinal in 2002.

Contrary to popular belief, the USA vs. Mexico rivalry is among the oldest in the world. Originally, it was dominated by the ‘gringos’. The balance shifted in the mid 1930s, and Mexico dominated for almost five decades. After the World Cup finally came to the United States, the balance started to shift again in favour of the United States. The revival of the USA vs. Mexico rivalry can be attributed largely to the rising of CONCACAF from obscurity. Two men contributed to that process by transforming the confederation from above and from below. There seems to be little doubt that Warner and Blazer were involved in a lot of alleged wrongdoing. Without them, however, the USA–Mexico rivalry could have remained in obscurity, just like the confederation from which both rivals evolved. Blazer created the Gold Cup and the CONCACAF’s Champions League. During his tenure, CONCACAF was allo- cated three qualifying spots for the World Cup. The Gold Cup, created by Blazer, quickly became one of the major revenue generators for CONCACAF. Thanks to Blazer, television broadcasting of the World Cup in the United States became a pros- perous business with the most expensive rights package in the world. That also affected broadcasting of the Gold Cup: CONCACAF was able to sign vital contracts with TV companies. Ironically, modern broadcasting of the World Cup in the United States was initiated by SUM, MLS’s marketing branch, and it quickly became a

Figure 3. Brazil vs. Mexico, Foxboro, Massachusetts, 12 September 2007. Source: Steven Apostolov.

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lucrative business. Bypassed by FIFA which dealt directly with the TV companies, SUM had to find alternative activities and revenue. It is debatable if owning the rights to the US and Mexican national-team broadcasts and venue management was as lucrative as selling the commercial spots for the World Cups in 2002 and 2006. However, managing the national-team broadcasts of Mexico and the US not only rejuvenated the old rivalry but also provided vital funds to MLS, which is still strug- gling to find an equal place among the other major leagues in the United States.

Acknowledgements The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Dr Paul Dietschy and Dr Albrecht Sonntag for inviting him to present an earlier version of this paper at the conference ‘From America to Europe: Football on a Continental Scale’, which took place at ESSCA Ecole de Management, Campus d’Angers, France, on April 22, 2016.

Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes 1. Goldblatt, The Ball is Round, 40. 2. CONCACAF is the governing body for soccer in North America, Central America and

the Caribbean. Just like UEFA, which also counts members on another continent, nota- bly Asia Minor and the Middle East (e.g. Israel and Kazakhstan, just to name a few), CONCACAF also has members that are located beyond its geographic location. The fol- lowing South American countries and French overseas departments are members of CONCACAF: Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana.

3. Allaway, Jose and Litterer. The Encyclopedia of American Soccer; Cirino, US vs. the World.

4. Apostolov, America’s Forgotten Sport. Chapters 4 and 5 follow with details of team USA during the World Cups in 1930 and 1934.

5. Blake and Clavert, The Ugly Game; Bensinger. ‘Mr. Ten Percent’. 6. National Soccer Hall of Fame Archives, Robert Millar Papers, 1930, USFA Official

World Cup Report, Financial Statement, 16. 7. National Soccer Hall of Fame Archives, Robert Millar Papers, Farewell Dinner and

Sports Program, SS Munargo, Munson Steamship Lines, 1–8. 8. National Soccer Hall of Fame Archives, Robert Millar Papers, 1930 USFA Official

World Cup Report, 1. 9. L’Auto, July 14 and 15, 1930. ‘Les Etats-Unis battent la Belgique … le deuxième match

de la journée fut une surprise car on s’attendait plutôt à une victoire des Belges. Les Américains du Nord remportèrent finalement la victoire par 3-0’, [The United States defeat Belgium … Today’s second match was a surprise since we were rather expecting the Belgians to win. Finally, the US won 3-0].

10. National Soccer Hall of Fame Archives, Robert Millar Papers, 1930 USFA Official World Cup Report, 4.

11. Ibid., 5. 12. Cirino, US vs. the World, 66. 13. The Fall River Herald, June 1, 1940. 14. John Souza (former US international and semi-professional soccer player from Fall

River, Massachusetts) in discussion with the author, May 12, 2008. Souza was 88 years-old at the time of the interview. He was in exceptional physical and mental condition.

15. Allaway, Jose and Litterer. The Encyclopedia of American Soccer, 56–7. 16. Apostolov, ‘Everywhere and Nowhere’, 513–4.

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17. Goldblatt, The Ball is Round, 514–5. 18. Ibid., 516. 19. Dietschy, Histoire du Football, 325. 20. Blake and Calvert. The Ugly Game, 57–8. 21. Bensinger, ‘Mr. Ten Percent’. 22. Ibid. 23. Mickle, ‘Trail Blazer’. 24. Street & Smith’s Sport Business Daily, July 28, 2015. 25. Gardner, ‘Latino Crowds Make Copa a Big Draw in the US’. 26. The Guardian, June 20, 2016. 27. Arrighi, ‘From America to Europe’. Arrighi is a specialist on Uruguayan and South

American soccer (in discussion with the author). 28. Dreier, ‘Gold Cup Numbers Shine as Predicted’, 6. 29. Botta, ‘Univision Deportes Signs 10-year Deal with CONCACAF’, 6. 30. Bensinger, ‘Mr. Ten Percent’. 31. Dreier, ‘CONCACAF Expects Attendance, TV Gains for Gold Cup’, 6. 32. Toye, A Kick in the Grass, 44. 33. Genzale, ‘Cup TV Deal’. 34. Hugo Sanchez (former player of Real Madrid and coach of the Mexican National

Team) in discussion with the author, September 12, 2007.

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