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Comparative Strategy

ISSN: 0149-5933 (Print) 1521-0448 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ucst20

Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies

Alex S. Wilner

To cite this article: Alex S. Wilner (2012) Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies, Comparative Strategy, 31:1, 18-40, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2012.647539

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2012.647539

Published online: 17 Feb 2012.

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Apocalypse Soon? Deterring Nuclear Iran and its Terrorist Proxies

ALEX S. WILNER Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Switzerland

The arguments presented here are based on a future scenario in which Iran has succeeded in developing nuclear weapons. Employing the logic and theory of deterrence, the article suggests ways in which the United States and its allies might counter, contain, and coerce nuclear Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and nonstate militant groups. Four strategic concerns are explored in particular: nuclear Iran may blackmail rival and neighboring states; shield an especially assertive foreign policy; protect its nonstate proxies and protégés; and facilitate nuclear terrorism. Deterrence theory is applied to each scenario.

Dinner in Damascus

In February 2010, Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Hezbollah, made a rare public appearance in Damascus, Syria. Living a bunkered life since his organization fought Israel to a bloody stalemate in 2006, Nasrallah ventured out to join Syrian President Bashar al- Assad and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for dinner and a high-profile photo- op. Coming on the heels of an official U.S. visit to Damascus by Undersecretary of State William Burns and following the nomination of career diplomat Robert Ford as the first new U.S. ambassador to Syria in half a decade, the public display of affection between the three men was a direct challenge to U.S. policy initiatives. Nasrallah’s attendance also reiterated to others—namely Israel—Hezbollah’s continued role in Syrian and Iranian strategic planning. “If the Zionist regime decides to repeat its past mistakes,” President Ahmadinejad warned, “the region will finish it off.”1 Given widespread suspicion that Iran has developed a clandestine nuclear weapons program, Tehran’s historical ties with Hezbollah and various other militant groups is troubling. For Western decision makers and international relations theorists alike, pressing questions remain: How will nuclear proliferation influence Iran’s relationship to terrorism, political violence, and political subversion? What are the prospects that Iran will facilitate nuclear terrorism? And what role does deterrence have in countering, coercing, and containing nuclear Iran?

By all accounts, Iran does not yet have the technological means to construct and use nuclear weapons. International efforts focused on frustrating Iran’s nuclear program are ongoing, uncertain, and often unknown. Multilateral economic sanctions, diplomatic pres- sure, domestic and regional ferment, military coercion, and clandestine sabotage (including the elimination of Iranian scientists and the borrowing of the Stuxnet computer worm), may eventually provide cumulative counterproliferation results.2 Gauging Iran’s nuclear capa- bility is, as a result, inherently problematic. In fact, security and intelligence agencies continuously modify their best estimates and it often appears as though Iran is perpetually between one and five years away from developing nuclear capabilities. In January 2011, for instance, the outgoing director of the Israeli Mossad, Meir Dagan, suggested that “if

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Comparative Strategy, 31:18–40, 2012 Copyright © 2012 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

0149-5933 print / 1521-0448 online DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2012.647539

Deterring Nuclear Iran 19

the world stands by and does nothing, the soonest Iran will have a nuclear device is 2015, if that.”3 It is also unclear whether Iran intends to develop a functioning nuclear weapon or is rather seeking a nuclear breakout capability—reaching a technological threshold with which it can quickly construct a weapon if and when one is needed.

But if there is uncertainty as to when Iran might develop a nuclear weapons capability, there is much less doubt that Iran will do so, eventually. This article uses that eventuality as its backdrop. The argument presented here is based on an exploration of an alternative, possible, and future scenario in which Iran has succeeded in its enrichment efforts and has developed the ability to deploy, launch, and utilize nuclear weapons.

A nuclear-capable Iran will represent a complex security challenge. Generally, six concerns have been raised. A nuclear Iran might: (1) limit US, European, and Israeli military mobility in Iran’s strategic backyard and coerce neighboring Arab states; (2) become emboldened, increasingly ambitious, and more risk accepting in its foreign policy; (3) better protect and defend its militant nonstate proxies; (4) increase its support for terrorism (up to and including nuclear terrorism); (5) confront Israel directly (up to and including launching a nuclear first strike);4 and (6) undermine the nonproliferation regime by compelling other states to seek their own nuclear capabilities. Of these concerns, the first four—coercion, assertiveness, protection, and nuclear terrorism—are explored in further detail. Employing the logic and theory of deterrence, the article suggests ways in which the United States and its allies might contend with, contain, and coerce nuclear Iran in its relationship with terrorism and nonstate proxies.

This article assumes that a nuclear Iran will be a rational actor, that Tehran will weigh the costs and benefits of taking particular actions (especially when nuclear escalation is possible), and that despite the role ideology and religion has on informing regime decisions, the desire to survive as a functioning political entity is paramount.5 Accordingly, I posit that while a nuclear Iran will present a serious threat to the United States and its allies, the logic of deterrence can be applied to influence nuclear Iran’s relationship with terrorism, insurgency, subversion, and political violence.

Iran and the Sponsorship of Terrorism

For over thirty years Iran has supported international and regional terrorism and is today, by U.S. Government accounts, “the most active state sponsor of terrorism.”6 Iran has sponsored a variety of nonstate militant groups, ranging from Lebanon’s Shia militia, Hezbollah, to various Sunni Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and from radical secular groups, like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP–GC) to regional secessionist groups like the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). Following Wikileaks’ 2010 global dump of U.S. diplomatic and military exchanges, Iran has also been publicly linked to militias fighting coalition forces in Iraq, including the Mahdi Army, and to Sunni groups active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including those associated with the Taliban. And in February 2011, Senegal officially severed ties with Iran after accusing it of arming rebels in West Africa.7

Hezbollah

It is Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah that gets the most notice, and for good reason. “Their close relationship,” Daniel Byman explains, “is perhaps the strongest and most effective relationship between a state sponsor and a terrorist group in history.”8 Following the 1979 establishment of the Islamic Republic and as a response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in

20 A. S. Wilner

1982, Iran organized, equipped, and trained Hezbollah. Tehran deployed 1,500 personnel from its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)—a semi-autonomous vanguard of Iran’s military used to foment regional disorder and support terrorist organizations—to Lebanon. The IRGC patched Hezbollah together from various smaller Lebanese Shia organizations, and with consistent, direct, and reliable assistance, eventually turned it into a formidable organization. Today, Hezbollah operates both as an international (and widely proscribed) terrorist group and as a regional sociopolitical movement. Besides its activities in the Middle East, Hezbollah is known to be active in the United States, Canada, the UK, Europe more broadly, Latin America, Uganda, Nigeria, the Balkans, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan.9

Hezbollah has been responsible for and associated with a number of terrorist attacks. In 1983, Hezbollah used suicide bombers in Lebanon against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, a U.S. Marines’ barrack, a French peacekeepers’ compound, and Israel’s military headquar- ters in Tyre. Its onslaught prompted the United States to withdraw its forces the following year and precipitated a bloody phase of Lebanon’s civil war. Hezbollah also took Western citizens hostage to coerce concessions from various governments, was involved in the sky- jacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, and assisted Iran in assassinating dozens of dissidents, including various Kurdish leaders. In 1992 and 1994, Hezbollah and Iran carried out two attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in South America, striking the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires. The 1994 double car bombing attack on Israel’s UK embassy and a British Jewish community building in London, England and the failed car bombing attack on Israel’s embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, are both believed to have been orchestrated by Hezbollah. Finally, the 1996 Khobar Towers attack in Dharan, Saudi Arabia is also thought to have been carried out with the assistance of Hezbollah.

In 2000, Hezbollah (and Iran) took credit for driving the Israelis out of Lebanon. “Despite a huge imbalance of forces,” explains Fawaz Gerges, “Hizballah delivered heavy blows to Israel’s military apparatus and forced it into a protracted war of attrition whose consequences reverberated within Israeli society.”10 With Iran’s urging, Hezbollah used its “triumph of wills” against Israel in Lebanon to promote its model of “resistance” among Sunni Palestinian militants. During the 2000 al Aqsa Intifada, Hezbollah and Iran trained and equipped Hamas, the PIJ, and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, among others. It is believed that Iran assigned Imad Mughniyeh—a prominent Hezbollah commander Israel is thought to have killed in Damascus in 2008—to direct those efforts.11 Iran’s support for Palestinian terrorism was exemplified by the 2002 Karine-A incident. The Israeli Navy seized the freighter as it was travelling to Gaza from Iran’s Kish Island. The vessel was the stocked with over 50 tons of sophisticated military hardware worth over $2 million, and included 107 and 122 mm rockets and antipersonnel mines. Some of the weapons still retained their Iranian serial number markings. Matthew Levitt writes that “while carried out by Hezbollah, the entire [Karine-A] operation was financed by Iran.”12 Indeed, it is thought that the Karine-A incident prompted U.S. President George W. Bush in his 2002 State of the Union Address, given three weeks later, to make explicit reference to the “axis of evil.”13

With Iran’s and Hezobllah’s help, Palestinian terrorists orchestrated roughly 150 suicide attacks against Israelis between 2000 and 2007.14

Al Qaeda

On the surface it seems doubtful that Iran, which adheres to radical interpretations of Shia Islam, would have anything to do with al Qaeda, radical Sunnis who hold militant Salafi/Wahhabi beliefs. While both radical movements are hostile to the United States, Israel, and various Arab regimes; carry out attacks (including suicide bombings) against

Deterring Nuclear Iran 21

common adversaries; and strive for similar political goals, they are nonetheless “more foes than friends.”15 Indeed, the bloody internecine warfare that has gripped parts of Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan over the past decade suggests the two militant movements are mortal enemies. Al Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), for instance, introduced its January 2011 issue of its English-language propaganda magazine, Inspire, with a diatribe targeting Shia Muslims, labeling them—alongside “Zionist-Crusaders” and “apostate regimes”—as the “third side of the triangle of evil.”16

And yet, Iran is known to have had some exchanges with al Qaeda both before and after 9/11. The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission Report) outlines Iran’s relationship with al Qaeda in the years and months leading up to the 2001 attacks. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Commission found that discussions in Sudan between al Qaeda and Iranian operatives “led to an informal agreement to cooperate in providing support . . . for actions carried out primarily against Israel and the United States.” Soon thereafter, “senior al Qaeda operatives and trainers” traveled to Iran and to Lebanon “to receive training in explosives as well as in intelligence and security.” Bin Laden was especially interested in Hezbollah’s use of suicide truck bombs.17 He apparently put those lessons to use in 1998 with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. While al Qaeda acted alone in the embassy attacks, 10 percent of bin Laden’s satellite phone calls in the period leading up to the bombings were made to Iran.18

As for 9/11, the commission clearly states that there is “no evidence that Iran or Hezbol- lah was aware of the planning for what later became the 9/11 attack.” Iran was, however, at least complicit in its facilitation by passively assisting al Qaeda operatives, including at least eight of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers, traveling into and out of Afghanistan. The com- mission explains that “Iranian border inspectors would be told not to place telltale stamps in the passports of [particular] travelers. Such arrangements were particularly beneficial to Saudi members of al Qaeda” who needed to traverse the region clandestinely.19 After 9/11, Iran’s passive relationship with al Qaeda continued; with the removal of the Taliban regime, some al Qaeda affiliates were given safe haven.20 And between his stints fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan and later, in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, future leader of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), lived openly in Tehran “with the full knowledge of the regime.”21 In that time, Zarqawi worked with other organizations, including Hezbollah, to find ways to infiltrate Israel.

While Iran’s (and Hezbollah’s) relationship with al Qaeda remains murky and while there are practical, political, and theological reasons for why Shia and Sunni extremists may shy away from supporting one another, when circumstance demands it, collusion has occurred. This is especially evident in the case of Sunni Palestinian extremists and is at times evident with al Qaeda. As Bruce Riedel explains, Iran’s tolerance of al Qaeda’s regional activities are “a relatively low-risk method to keep the United States bogged down in two wars and therefore less likely to focus its attention on Iran.”22 If Iran were to face increased international pressure it may find other compelling reasons to amend its relationship with Sunni extremists.

Why Iran Sponsors Terrorism

Iran’s rationale for supporting terrorism can be broken down into three categories. First, it has supported insurgent and terrorist groups for strategic reasons. Terrorism, in this sense, is an extension of Iran’s foreign policy, augmenting what the regime lacks in more traditional military capabilities. In essence, the sponsorship of terrorists has allowed Iran to

22 A. S. Wilner

project power well beyond its conventional military abilities and immediate neighborhood. Louise Richardson explains that “as an instrument of foreign policy,” terrorism provides a “creative” way for a weak state like Iran to oppose a stronger one “and avoid a head-on clash it would inevitably lose.” And because it is difficult to conclusively prove that a state is directly involved in terrorism, support is a low-risk and ultimately deniable strategy.23

Terrorism gives Iran a cheap and effective way to influence international affairs without having to rely on more conventional means of projecting power. Iran is militarily weak; the war it fought with Iraq (1980–88) reduced its land force capability by nearly half, and embargos have limited its ability to recoup its losses.24 Terrorism has offered Tehran a way out. By supporting Hezbollah’s efforts in Lebanon in the 1980s, Iran was able to challenge (and eventually reduce) Washington’s (and Paris’s) regional role. Iran could not possibly have done so by means of the conventional battlefield, but Hezbollah allowed it to coerce far more powerful states unconventionally. Iran repeated this coercive model vis-à-vis Israel in Lebanon, first by forcing it back to its “security zone” in 1985 and then compelling it to fully withdraw in 2000. The model was again exported to the Palestinian territories, where a coordinated terrorism offensive compelled Israel to leave Gaza in 2005. Iran considered these developments unprecedented strategic victories. And most recently, Iran has offered support to Iraq’s Shia community, including elements who utilize terrorism, in hopes of influencing Iraq’s political future. These episodes illustrate how terrorism has allowed Iran to achieve some of its strategic objectives.

Second, Iran has supported terrorism for ideological reasons. Herein, sponsorship is based on its desire to empower, project, and export the Iranian Revolution by supporting groups that share its ideological goals. By destabilizing the political status quo, Iran es- tablishes a foothold for its ideological and political infiltration. The exportation of Iran’s Islamic worldview has historically been accomplished by supporting Shia communities living in Iraq, the Gulf States, Lebanon, and elsewhere and by fostering revolutionary senti- ments meant to subvert, topple, and replace existing political systems. As Jennifer Knepper explains:

The most unique aspect of Iran’s strategic culture is its all-encompassing ad- herence to Shi’ism, a millenarian and minority sect of Islam that believes in the political and religious leadership of Muhammad’s bloodline and upholds the tradition of martyrdom and sacrifice in the face of opposition and attack . . . [S]ince the Khomeini-led Revolution of 1979, Shi’ism has provided the con- stitutional justification for the regime’s political decisions, religious structures, and military doctrine . . . Shia Islam shapes the worldview of Iran’s decision makers; thus it is nearly impossible to separate the government’s policy choices from its religious precepts.”25

Nurturing Islamic revolutions by supporting insurgent and terrorist groups has been part and parcel of revolutionary Iran’s political and ideological identity. “The goals of Iran’s terror- ism,” writes Gregory Giles, “are to advance Tehran’s influence . . . in the hopes of creating like-minded theocracies in the region.”26 Consider that Iran not only supports Hezbollah militarily but actively influences its ideology as well by sending clerics to Lebanon, ac- tively engaging in indoctrination, and championing “a revolutionary spirit” among Shia communities.27 Importantly, challenging the regional political status quo also serves Iran’s strategic goals. By bolstering Shia militias and by working toward the construction of like-minded regimes, Iran has sought to end its regional isolation by strengthening allies.

Deterring Nuclear Iran 23

Third, Iran has used terrorism to spoil the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Facilitating terrorism against Israel is Tehran’s way of exerting influence on an issue that dominates Arab politics. Furthermore, the continued existence of the state of Israel is inimical to current Iranian interests and terrorism is a way for the regime to punish, target, and hopefully remove what Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called a “cancerous tumor” in the Middle East.28 That Israel and Iran, under the Shah, had relatively warm relations suggests that Iran’s venomous hostility is ideologically driven. As Amir Taheri writes, for “the Khomeinists . . . Israel is a foe, which cannot be placated or accommodated, let alone turned into a friend.”29 But as a military dwarf vis-à-vis Israel, Iran’s only recourse has been to support anti-Israel movements, by coordinating the al Aqsa Intifada and paving the way for the rocket wars of 2006 and 2008/9, for instance. Doing so has given Iran an avenue to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war with Israel. By picking up the anti-Israel mantel, Tehran has also found a way to resonate with Arab and Sunni audiences; hating Israel has helped Iran—the Middle East’s only Persian and Shia state—shed regional suspicion.

In sum, Iran’s motivation for supporting terrorism has ranged from the strategic and tactical to the ideological. And yet this list is neither exhaustive, nor so easily clear-cut.30

Iran has, for instance, used terrorism to acquire prestige among radical Islamists and to quell internal dissent. And while spoiling the peace process, for example, might be an end in itself, it also serves Iran’s strategic objectives—isolating Israel, humiliating the United States, and “emancipating” the Palestinians. Likewise, Iran’s appetite for terrorism has proven context specific. Depending on the circumstance, Iran’s support for terrorism, and the nature of that support, has waxed and waned. Importantly, Iran repeatedly alters the nature and scope of its support for terrorism to suit its needs. This suggests, explains Gary Sick, that “at a minimum” Iran has a “capacity to modify its policies in the face of persistent pressure and experience.”31

Consider that Iran is currently fashioning a rudimentary deterrent based on the threat of terrorism. Relying on the logic of deterrence by punishment, Iran is threatening terrorism to deter a preemptive military strike against it. Byman, for instance, notes that Iran has “cased” U.S. diplomatic offices “to ensure that it can strike back should the United States attack.”32

Given Iran’s history, the threat seems credible. Tehran has also signaled that its proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan could be used to punish the West. Speaking, in 2004, of Western forces then stationed in Iraq, an Iranian official warned that “we have 140,000 potential hostages.”33 In 2006, Iran threatened the West directly with an army of 40,000 suicide bombers ready to die overseas. “We are ready to attack American and British sensitive points,” an official explained “if they attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.”34 And Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, is thought to have stocked its missile cache with as many as 50,000 projectiles (roughly 35,000 more than it had during the 2006 conflict with Israel).35 The threat is that Iran will use Hezbollah to open a front against Israel. Taken together, it appears Iran continues to recognize the strategic utility of sponsoring terrorism, offering lessons for how best to manage a future, nuclear-capable Iran. What follows is an exploration of how Iran’s historical support for terrorism, insurgency, and subversion might be affected by its development of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Iran: The Bad, the Bold, and the Ugly

It is generally accepted that having the capability to use nuclear weapons against adversaries will greatly strengthen Iran’s strategic position. For starters, an Iran capable of retaliating with nuclear weapons will no longer need to fear external, existential threats. Nuclear

24 A. S. Wilner

weapons are the guarantors of regime survival. Iran’s adversaries, fearful of nuclear esca- lation, are likely to avoid threatening it directly and might think twice before carrying out more limited retaliatory strikes. Kenneth Waltz explains: “If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests.”36 What is less understood, however, are the ways in which nuclear weapons might alter Iran’s behavior concerning its neighbors, adversaries, and terrorist proxies. Several arguments have been put forward: nuclear Iran might blackmail its adversaries, shield an assertive for- eign policy, protect its nonstate proxies, and/or facilitate nuclear terrorism. Each potential scenario is explored below.

Nuclear Blackmail

The first argument posits that besides curtailing military threats against it directly, nuclear weapons will give Iran leverage over how (and where) military force can be used in the Middle East more broadly. Western military adventurism in Iran’s strategic backyard, it is suggested, will be placed in check by Iran’s strategic interests and its ability to guarantee those interests. Writing of NATO, Bruno Tertrais explains that Iranian nukes might be “a strong disincentive for some NATO countries to participate . . . in any new operation in the broader Middle East that might be judged by Tehran as contrary to its own strategic interests.”37 The implication is that nuclear Iran (however weak, conventionally) will compel the United States, its European allies, and Israel to rethink how they use military force in the region. Drawing parallels to the Yalta Conference of 1945, in which the United States, United Kingdom, and USSR mapped out divergent spheres of influence, Emanuele Ottolenghi suggests that a nuclear Iran will force the West to “negotiate a Middle Eastern Yalta with Tehran—one that may entail a retreat of U.S. forces from the region and an unpleasant bargain for the Gulf states and Israel.”38 And speaking of Israel, Michael Oren, before taking up his post as Israeli Ambassador to the United States, wrote that a nuclear Iran will “deny Israel the ability to respond to terrorist attacks.” In reaction to an “Israeli retaliation against Hezbollah,” Oren warns, “Iran would go on nuclear alert, causing widespread panic in Israel and the collapse of its economy.”39 Asserting its hegemonic role in the Gulf, nuclear Iran might also blackmail its weaker Arab neighbors by forcing them to avoid behavior it considers provocative and compelling them to bandwagon with it. Bret Stephen explains that “Iran could easily apply some combination of inducements and pressure to persuade Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain to shut down their U.S. military bases.”40 Or, it might coerce oil-rich Arab states into diminishing their production levels, simultaneously strangling the global flow of crude while filling its own coffers. In sum, Iran might use its nuclear clout to generate political, economic, and strategic effects that go well beyond the mere protection of its sovereignty and security.

Nuclear Shields

Second, a derivative of nuclear blackmail suggests that a nuclear Iran will be an emboldened Iran. Herein, it is assumed that Iran might not only coerce Western and Arab behavior but will be galvanized by its nuclear power to pursue other, potentially risky, goals. This argument is especially relevant to Iran’s support for terrorism. Under cover of its absolute deterrent, nuclear Iran might decide that it can continue and even expand its support for terrorism because it could safely assume that it would not directly suffer any retaliation. This scenario channels the logic of the “stability-instability paradox.” Scott Sagan explains the paradox as such: “a situation of stability between two countries who both have nuclear

Deterring Nuclear Iran 25

weapons that can lead one country to think that it can be more aggressive conventionally because it is protected from a nuclear retaliation by its nuclear shield.”41 In practice this means that a nuclear Iran capable of deterring attacks on its territory might be encouraged to pursue conventional aggression as a result. And because nuclear Iran will unlikely possess the conventional military means it will need to advance its interests, it will once again turn to political subversion and terrorism to get what it wants.

These propositions are oft-repeated. Tertrais writes that “nuclear Iran would feel em- boldened to project its power and influence in the region.” Specifically, he argues that Iran’s “new status” would “incite” it to increase support for Hamas, “making the peace process even more complex.”42 Michael Eisenstadt cautions that nuclear weapons will “embolden Tehran to behave more aggressively, to more frequently resort to coercive diplomacy, to ramp up its support for terrorism, or to undertake military adventures.”43 Sagan envisions a scenario in which members of the IRGC “feel that it is safer for them . . . to attack Ameri- cans in Iraq, to attack military bases in the region, to support terrorist attacks elsewhere.”44

Kenneth Pollack writes that Iran may calculate that its “nuclear shield” allows it to support “subversion, nonnuclear terrorism, [and] insurgencies” because its adversaries would be hard pressed to retaliate given “the risk of escalation to a nuclear exchange.”45 And Eric Edelman and colleagues write that at the very least, nuclear Iran will become “increasingly aggressive.”46 These and other authors often turn to Pakistan, circa 1999, and Iraq, circa 1990, for illustration. In the first case, a year after testing a nuclear weapon and flush with its newfound power, Pakistan sent paramilitary forces into India-controlled Kashmir. The conflict, pitting two nuclear rivals, escalated rather spectacularly. The result was the Kargil War, in which over 1000 soldiers died. Sagan explains that the episode “occurred not despite Pakistan developing nuclear weapons but rather because Pakistan got the bomb.”47

It mistakenly believed that it could use its nuclear shield to send proxies into India without triggering a war. In the second case, Iraq’s adventurism in 1990 was perhaps a result of its unconventional weapons program, used successfully in spring 1988 to force the Iranians to the bargaining table. Eisenstadt suggests that Iraq may have been emboldened by its “maturing chemical and biological weapons programs” to reassert itself. It invaded Kuwait believing that its WMD shield would deter others from intervening.48 It is possible that nuclear Iran might likewise misinterpret the value of its nuclear shield and stumble into a costly conflict as a result.

Nuclear Umbrellas

Third, nuclear Iran might use its arsenal to protect its nonstate and state allies. The concept of an Iranian nuclear umbrella is closely related to that of Iran’s nuclear shield, but instead of protecting its own vital interests, Iran flexes its muscles to protect the integrity of others. In practice, nuclear Iran will not only be emboldened to increase its support for terrorism, the argument suggests, but will also be better able to protect its investment. This scenario is premised on the logic and theory of extended deterrence. As opposed to deterring attacks on one’s own territory and/or interests (“central deterrence”), extended deterrence involves protecting an ally, third party, or protégé by way of one’s own conventional and nuclear capabilities.49 As in the case of deterrence more generally, Paul Huth suggests a further two distinctions, between “extended-immediate deterrence” (in which an overt threat is made against a defender’s allies and an immediate counterthreat is established) and “extended- general deterrence” (in which threats against an ally exist more broadly but a challenger is not actively preparing to use force).50 In the case of nuclear Iran and its terrorist proxies, both concepts are in play. Ottolenghi tells us that “[u]nder an Iranian nuclear umbrella,

26 A. S. Wilner

terrorists will be able to act with impunity” and “Hezbollah . . . would be able to cement its dominance in Lebanese politics.”51 Barry Rubin agrees, writing that Iran will use its “nuclear umbrella” to protect its regional “clients” in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. He even suggests that “Islamist movements everywhere, including in Europe”—notwithstanding their current relationship with Tehran—“would likely become more violent and reckless” as a result of Iran’s nuclear capability.52 In a related argument, Chuck Freilich suggests that rather than extend its deterrent, Iran might supply Hamas and/or Hezbollah with control over their own nuclear weapons, giving them each their own absolute deterrent against Israel. He explains: “Even a minimal nuclear capability would enable Hizballah and Hamas to conduct ongoing low-level attacks . . . in the confidence that Israel would be deterred from massive retaliation.”53 In all cases, the suggestion is that Iran’s nuclear capability will extend itself to the services of third parties, protecting their interests and survival by deterring retaliation and curtailing counterterrorism operations. As a result, terrorist groups will be free to act as they please, knowing that their victims will be kept in check by Iran’s nuclear capability.

Nuclear Terrorism

Finally, a number of authors warn that a nuclear Iran will greatly increase the risk and probability of nuclear terrorism. The argument is built on two separate but related rationales. The first argues that given Iran’s historical support for terrorist groups, the logical next step for a nuclear-capable Iran is to distribute nuclear weapons to its nonstate proxies. “No one can guarantee,” a Jerusalem Post editorial warns, “that fundamentalist Tehran would not slip a crude bomb or material to Hamas, Hizbollah, or an al-Qaida-inspired terror network.”54 The risk (and for some, the expectation) is that Iran—or a rogue element within Iran’s ruling elite, the military, or the IRGC—might transfer nuclear weapons to a proxy. For instance, not only does the IRGC provide security for Iran’s nuclear facilities, but it is also the primary outfit with which Iran finances and arms terrorists. Sagan warns: “to have your nuclear guardians and your terrorist supporter organizations be one and the same is a recipe for disaster.”55 Even if a majority of nuclear Iran’s elites are reliable nuclear custodians, there may nonetheless remain a faction keen to facilitate nuclear terrorism.

The second circumstance envisions that a nuclear Iran at risk of political upheaval might lose control over its weapons and technology. Under periods of volatility, Iranian nuclear weapons might fall into terrorist hands, who either purchase them from disgruntled military men or profiteers (à la A. Q. Khan), or manage to steal them outright. At issue is that it will take time for nuclear Iran to build the protective measures needed to ensure that its weapons cannot be stolen or used without authority. Mature nuclear states have security systems that protect against theft and unlawful use. As Edelman and colleagues explain, established nuclear powers have taken a variety of protective measures, “from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed.”56 A nuclear Iran unable or unwilling to build these protective measures will be a target for individuals and groups seeking nuclear weapons, materials, and technology.

The fear of nuclear terrorism resonates widely. Only two months after 9/11, President George W. Bush, at a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, remarked that “Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve . . . Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”57 Ten years later, on the eve of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, President Barack Obama reiterated: “The single biggest threat to U.S. security . . . [is] a terrorist organization obtaining a

Deterring Nuclear Iran 27

nuclear weapon.”58 Other U.S. political figures, like George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, and military leaders like Colin Powell, have used the threat of nuclear terrorism to endorse a “world without nuclear weapons.” “The likelihood that . . . terrorists will get their hands on nuclear weaponry,” explained Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn in a now-famous 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “is increasing . . . And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy.”59 It has become standard fare for academics to begin their explorations of nuclear terrorism with a refrain that “it isn’t a matter of if, but when,” followed with a summary of al Qaeda’s historical interest in nuclear weapons, followed next with a dreadful illustration of what a nuclear terrorist attack on Times Square or the National Mall will entail. The webpage promoting Graham Allison’s 2004 book on the subject, for instance, even includes an interactive “blast map” where readers can plug in their hometown and “imagine the consequences of a 10-kiloton weapon” going off in their backyard.60 Dire warnings are the norm. In 2006, one author projected that there was a 29 percent probability that a nuclear terrorist attack would occur before 2016. And in 2008, a blue-ribbon U.S. commission suggested that “it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”61

Nuclear Iran: The Good, the Meek, and the Tolerable

The problem with these four scenarios—that nuclear Iran will blackmail others, shield an assertive foreign policy, protect its proxies, and facilitate nuclear terrorism—is that they each fail to complete the causal circle. Advocates of these scenarios only superficially consider Iran’s strategic considerations and they do not account for the coercive actions Iran’s adversaries might take to mitigate and deter certain developments. As Colin Gray argues, “The general theory of deterrence should apply eternally and universally.”62 Deterrence matters in dealing with nuclear Iran. Surely, it is true that nuclear weapons will influence the behavior of states contemplating attacks against Iran. This is, after all, the weapon’s greatest utility. What is much less clear, though, is how exactly Iran will translate its nuclear capability into anything other than a central deterrent. Assertions that Iran can and will use its nuclear arsenal beyond self-defense are based on muddled thinking. Nuclear blackmail and extended deterrence are exceptionally difficult to accomplish and an emboldened Iran facilitating nuclear terrorism will risk running unbearable costs. These pitfalls must be taken into account when thinking about coercing and containing nuclear Iran. Four criticisms are explored below.

Defeating Iran’s Nuclear Blackmail

The assertion that nuclear Iran will have more leeway in its relations with others and an ability to more easily coerce adversaries is a compelling one. But the problem with nuclear blackmail is that the strategy is inherently weak and rarely credible. Nuclear Iran will gain a degree of leverage over states contemplating an invasion, but it will fall short in efforts beyond that. Waltz explains:

No one has discovered how to use nuclear weapons other than for deterrence . . . when most people say “nuclear blackmail,” they think of one country saying, “We have nuclear weapons, and unless you do this—whatever this is—we’ll drop one on you.” That’s simply not plausible. Nobody has tried it, and if anyone does, it won’t work . . . How is a relatively backward, dinky nuclear country [i.e. Iran] going to manage to use its nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence?”63

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Using nuclear weapons to realize offensive, rather than defensive, strategic objectives has rarely been accomplished. As James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh write, “regime security and power projection are two very different propositions.”64 Nuclear extortion is difficult to do. Threatening the U.S. or NATO with a nuclear strike in order to compel them to curtail their current efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya or to deter future regional operations is fanciful at best. The same holds for Israel. Why should any of these nuclear powers believe Iran’s bluster? By ignoring Iran’s coercive efforts, they force Tehran to either back down or carry out its deterrent/compellent threat. If the latter, Iran suffers devastating nuclear retaliation. Iran knows this; as do the others. Former French President Jacques Chirac, in a 2007 New York Times interview he thought was “off the record,” asked candidly: “Where will [Iran] drop it, this bomb? On Israel?” Answering his own question, he suggested that the bomb “would not have gone 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed.”65 Given the stakes, it is difficult to imagine the coercive goals Iran might consider worthy of risking annihilation at the hands of a nuclear rival. Herein, thwarting Iran’s nuclear blackmail rests on the logic of traditional nuclear deterrence.

But even small, non-nuclear Arab states would have reason to question Iran’s resolve to carry out a coercive nuclear threat against them. Again, the risks are high and any nuclear threat may well backfire, alienating Sunni Arabs, driving them together under a collective security arrangement, and further isolating Iran. There may also be ideological, cultural, and theological reasons for why Sunni Arab states would be vociferously against ingratiating themselves with an assertive Shia state, whether or not it held nuclear weapons. And if they do acquiesce to Iran and prove its coercive strategy effective, what guarantee would they have that Iran would not demand further, costlier concessions in the future? In sum, Sunni Arab states may inherently have greater resolve to defy Iran’s coercive demands than it does to see them through. Finally, in anticipation of Iranian blackmail, the United States can take measures to frustrate its coercive attempts. It can bolster ties with threatened Gulf States, for instance, through a deepening of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, and if called upon, it could even offer security guarantees.66 Given the likely asymmetry that will mark U.S. and Iranian nuclear forces, explains Barry Posen, Washington would run fewer risks in establishing regional security assurances in the Middle East than it did during the Cold War in Europe and Asia.67 In exploring the intricacies involved in carrying out offensive nuclear coercion, Iran’s gambit to blackmail others seems increasing incredible.

Piercing Iran’s Nuclear Shield

If nuclear blackmail proves difficult, what are the prospects a nuclear shield will protect a resurgent Iran? While there are reasons to question the stability-instability paradox, let us assume for the purpose of this article that nuclear Iran does act more aggressively.68 What then? There are three primary ways in which a nuclear Iran might assert itself: through conventional military force, political subversion, and/or terrorism. Though each strategy is plausible, there are strong arguments suggesting why nuclear Iran may find them difficult to apply. The first two strategies are explored below; Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism is discussed in the next section.

In the first case, Iran’s conventional military capabilities are limited. Iran’s military was weakened in the 1980s and has not greatly improved since. Huge investments are needed, though none seem forthcoming. And because a nuclear Iran is likely to have triggered a more robust, multilateral sanctions regime on its way to successful proliferation, it is conceivable that even if it had the economic means to rebuild and rearm it would have trouble doing so. Nuclear Iran, as a result, is unlikely to be able to effectively mount a conventional

Deterring Nuclear Iran 29

military campaign against any regional state, except perhaps the smallest Gulf sheikdoms. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and maybe even Kuwait are likely to be able to fend off a conventional Iranian invasion with some timely assistance from the U.S. And weaker Arab states, with a promise of rapid deployment of U.S. reinforcements, might be able to sufficiently forestall a conventional Iranian engagement and deny Tehran its immediate objects. Furthermore, the United States is likely to retain a presence in the Gulf, both on land and at sea, for the foreseeable future. As Posen explains, “even if Iran’s leaders somehow feel safe at home, the forces they dispatch abroad would surely be destroyed.”69 Evidently, allaying the threat of an emboldened nuclear Iran can be accomplished by relying on the threat of superior conventional force. A resurgent Iran sans the conventional tools of war is not a great threat. Security guarantees coupled with the tactful placement of U.S. military personnel in likely hotspots will send a signal that, first, nuclear Iran cannot easily acquire what it wants by conventional force, and second, even if it tries, it risks killing Americans in the process and triggering greater U.S. engagement. American soldiers have already been used as tripwires to dissuade Soviet aggression. The same principle can be applied to nuclear Iran.70 The upshot is that even under a nuclear shield, Iran faces few good options for launching a conventional attack, is likely to be denied its goals if it tries, and risks having to bear substantial costs.

In the second case of political subversion, a similar argument can be made. Countering nuclear Iran’s attempts to undermine Arab regimes will require denying it the ability to do so. Instead of threatening to punish Iran for fomenting instability, the United States and its allies can threaten it with failure. In counter-subversion, punishment lacks credibility: Will the United States attack nuclear Iran for its support of revolutionary movements in Lebanon, for instance? And subversion is difficult to identify: What redline would trigger a punishment and how would we know when it was crossed? A more prudent strategy would be to deny Iranian subversion in the Middle East in the same way the West fought Soviet and communist subversion during the Cold War.71 “The provision of weapons, money, advice, and training are the tools of subversion,” explains Posen, “intelligence collection, covert interdiction, and overt police work are the countermeasures.”72 Countering nuclear Iran’s subversive activities should be done head-on, within the countries and regions where it takes place. Strengthening regional countermeasures will deny nuclear Iran the ability to easily achieve its goals of fomenting revolution. And if Iran suspects it will fail, it may be less willing to try.

Undermining Iran’s Nuclear Umbrella

Given Iran’s history of supporting terrorism, there is a legitimate concern that it will do so more openly and more aggressively once it goes nuclear. And by extending its nuclear deterrent to proxies, it will safeguard their survival by curtailing retaliatory actions taken against them. What is less clear, however, is how exactly Iran will credibly extend its deterrent beyond its borders to protect its terrorist protégés against U.S., NATO, and Israeli challenges. To clarify, under this scenario, Iran functions as the defender, its terrorist proxy take the role of protégé, and Western countries function as challengers. As in eras past, a successful strategy of extended deterrence will depend on a complex interchange between credibility, capability, and resolve.73 Paul Huth and Bruce Russett explain that success in (immediate) extended deterrence “is very much more than just a matter of having a favourable military balance, and very much a matter of the nature and extent of ties between the defender state and the state it wishes to protect.” They suggest that success, at least in interstate extended deterrence, is associated with close economic and military ties

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between a defender and protégé. They also find that “local military superiority” favoring the defender/protégé further bolsters deterrence, but that their possession of nuclear weapons only very marginally contributes to deterrent success.74 Janice Gross Stein finds similarly that “nuclear capabilities were largely irrelevant” in explaining American successes and failures in extending its deterrent to its Cold War allies in the Middle East.75 A defender’s willingness to carry out its threat might also be tied to the “regional salience” of the area in which extended deterrence is being tested.76 And finally, the deterrent objectives of the defender, the context within which a defender’s threats are issued, and the relative “balance of interests” between shareholders all matter in determining whether a strategy of extended deterrence will succeed. The oft-repeated assertion that nuclear Iran will better protect its terrorist proxies fails to take these factors into consideration.

Extending a nuclear deterrent has proven difficult. The question asked in the Cold War was whether Washington would stand firm in a contest with the Soviet Union over Europe (or Asia), even if the costs required trading New York or Chicago for Paris or Antwerp. In thinking about nuclear Iran’s extended deterrence of its proxies, the trade is even starker. The question now is whether Iran, in a confrontation with Israel, for instance, over its support for terrorism, would be willing to trade Tehran or Mashhad for various small villages in Lebanon or Gaza. Under the threat of nuclear exchange, explains Vesna Danilovic, “the inherent value of a protégé for the deterrer’s national interests becomes a secondary question as this value could not possibly compensate for the costs the deterrer would have to sustain if the threat were carried out.”77 Tehran, like Washington and Moscow in eras past, will have to credibly communicate a willingness to absorb costs highly disproportionate to the issues (and risks) at hand. Nuclear Iran could, of course, signal its intention to stand firmly before its proxies by tying itself to their fates or constructing its own tripwires in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iraq, but doing so carries costs not evident in interstate deterrent relations. Signaling its intent and resolve by openly stationing Iranian troops alongside Hamas and Hezbollah, for instance, would require that Tehran explicitly communicate its ties to widely proscribed terrorist groups. In doing so, Iran would terminate its policy of deniability and incur greater pariah status.

Ultimately, Iranian success in extending a nuclear deterrent to Hezbollah, Hamas, and others is going to be complicated, unpredictable, and uncertain. While Iran has close ties with various proxies and a stake in their survival, the conventional military balance between it and its rivals will invariably favor the challengers (Israel, in the case of Hezbollah and Hamas, and the U.S./NATO in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere). “Extension of deterrence,” explains Stein, “is in all probability ill-advised against a local challenger who is vulnerable, highly motivated, and can dispose of multiple and flexible options.”78 This is critical because Iranian nuclear capabilities are unlikely to change its power asymmetry vis-à-vis the West; nuclear use in a limited war between Israel and Hamas, for instance, is not credible. As Keith Payne explains, in extended deterrence “the need is for a broad spectrum of capabilities to deter a broad spectrum of opponents and threats in a variety of plausible threat contingences.” “Resilience and flexibility” are crucial.79 Overall, it is unclear how nuclear Iran will credibly extend its deterrent to its nonstate proxies.

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism

Finally, can deterrence be used to manipulate Iran’s willingness to facilitate nuclear ter- rorism? Herein, it is worth reiterating that terrorists are unable to develop their own fissile materials. At some point states enter into the equation, either by supplying materials to ter- rorists or by passively and/or negligently allowing materials to reach them.80 This suggests

Deterring Nuclear Iran 31

that deterring nuclear terrorism is truly about deterring the active and/or passive state fa- cilitation of nuclear terrorism. Influencing Iran’s willingness to facilitate nuclear terrorism can be accomplished in three ways: by punishment, denial, or delegitimization.

Punishing Active Facilitation There are three main reasons Iran might actively transfer nuclear weapons to nonstate proxies: for coercive diplomacy; for immediate use; or for second strike/strategic purposes. In each case, the threat of nuclear retaliation might have a deterrent effect on Iran.81 First, nuclear coercion, as discussed, will likely prove ineffective. If nuclear Iran finds it difficult to coerce an adversary by its own hand, it should expect much the same when using a proxy instead. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy will require that Iran clearly communicate to others what it wants, thereby eliminating prospects of denying its involvement in nuclear terrorism and leaving itself vulnerable to retaliation in the event a proxy does detonate a bomb.

In the case of nuclear sponsorship for immediate use, the very same logic of punishment holds. The United States, NATO, and Israel can communicate to Iran that using a nonstate proxy as a nuclear delivery mechanism is paramount to using the nuclear device itself. The goal is to deter terrorist acquisition by associating the clandestine sponsorship of nuclear terrorism as one wholly directed by the facilitating state. The day North Korea detonated a nuclear device, President Bush responded by warning President Kim Jong–il that North Korea would be held “fully accountable” in the event of nuclear terrorism.82 The same might be communicated to nuclear Iran. While some authors suggest that strengthening attribution capabilities that use forensic science to trace materials to their sources of origin will help convince potential state sponsors that they cannot anonymously transfer nuclear weapons, the argument is generally overdone.83 A clandestine nuclear detonation in Israel or the United States will so clearly change the parameters of interstate relations that a blind retaliatory threat devoid of scientific attribution can be made to be believed. The day after a nuclear terrorist attack takes place there would be little reason for nuclear Iran not to assume that it is rightly or wrongly at the top of a very short list of plausible perpetrators. It could well suffer the retaliatory consequence, regardless of whether or not it actually carried out the attack or simply behaved as if it might have wanted to carry out the attack. Freilich explains that Israel (though not the United States) should adopt a “shoot first, no questions asked” policy to deter nuclear terrorism that would put both “those clearly responsible . . . and those reasonably suspected of involvement” within its retaliatory sights.84 While it would be prudent for the United States to build expertise in attribution science, it can simultaneously threaten Iran as if the science did not exist. Nuclear Iran, as a result, might not only be deterred from sharing its weapons with proxies, but it might also be compelled to ameliorate its vitriolic language lest it inadvertently suffer the consequences of someone else’s clandestine nuclear attack.

The third case of strategic nuclear transfer poses unique challenges. On the surface, an Iranian attempt to fashion a second-strike capability by way of a nonstate proxy channels the logic of deterrence and mutual assured destruction. While unconventional, Iran’s use of strategic nuclear terrorism would reveal, at the very least, that Tehran was using its capability for defensive, rather than offensive, purposes. And because this strategy would require Iran to once again communicate its intentions, it would have little choice but to make itself a retaliatory target. While exceptionally dangerous, the fact that nuclear Iran would be adopting a deterrent posture would at least signify that it was adhering to everybody else’s rules of nuclear engagement. And from there, the U.S.—through China and/or Russia—might be able to quietly illustrate to Tehran that its use of proxies to secure a second-strike capability was an inherently risky gamble. The danger is that Iran would

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have few absolute guarantees that its proxies would use nuclear weapons as it intended them to. As Giles explains, giving nukes to terrorists “who maintain their own agendas and degree of independence, could potentially give such groups greater political leverage over Tehran.”85 Iran’s proxies could, for instance, detonate their bombs without direct orders, or target third parties, or sell their weapons. Given time (and some luck), Iran might be convinced to find a more suitable way to secure its deterrent.

Denying Passive Facilitation Deterring nuclear terrorism by targeting active state transfer neglects the role nonstate intermediaries, criminal networks, rogue government elements, and individuals, such as A. Q. Khan, have in facilitating nuclear terrorism. Dealing with the threat of nuclear terrorism by targeting these actors will rest on the logic of deterrence by denial. The goal is to deny nuclear profiteers both access to nuclear materials and profits from there sale. For starters, manipulating the nuclear black market can provide deterrent results. The best thing about criminal markets is that they can be destabilized. Their weakest point, Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling explained at a conference in Zurich, Switzerland, is the seller-buyer relationship: each has to trust that the other will produce the goods to be exchanged.86 States can disrupt this system of trust by introducing uncertainty into the relationship. For instance, the United States can clandestinely enter the black market as either a buyer or a seller. As a buyer, it can locate those selling materials, track them down and eliminate them, or buy the material and destroy it. As a seller, the United States can make contact with potential buyers, trade them shoddy goods, and/or capture and eliminate them. By doing both, the United States destroys mutual trust, disrupts market forces, and adds uncertainty to the process. In the end, neither peddlers nor purchasers of nuclear materials would know who to trust and they might hesitate before entering a risky relationship.

Furthermore, criminal actors are usually motivated by profit. They focus on easier targets—like underdefended and unsecured nuclear stockpiles—in hopes of acquiring nu- clear material to trade for wealth. This suggests that their behavior is informed by a calculus that takes into consideration the odds of success versus failure and the extent of the benefit versus the severity of the punishment. Most criminals are risk-averse as a result and will respond both to the costs of plying their trade and the benefits of doing so.87 By making it difficult for criminals to trade in nuclear materials—by honing intelligence gathering capabilities, using police forces in sting operations, intercepting weapons shipments,88 and compelling states like nuclear Iran to better safeguard their stocks—the facilitation of nu- clear terrorism by substate actors can be curtailed. In 2004, Allison put forward his doctrine of the “Three No’s” for denying nuclear terrorism: “no loose nukes, no new nascent nukes, and no new nuclear states.”89 His premise is that diminishing the threat of nuclear terrorism will require denying terrorists access to nuclear materials. It appears that the U.S. govern- ment, in promoting the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, has made deterrence by denial a pillar of its counterstrategy. With respect to President Obama’s broader Global Zero initia- tive, the Summit was mostly about denying nuclear terrorism by reaching an agreement on safeguarding state-based nuclear materials. When terrorists believe that the acquisition of nuclear materials by theft or purchase is too high, they may be deterred from running the costs of trying.

Delegitimizing Nuclear Use Finally, the logic of deterrence can be used to manipulate the political, ideological, and religious rationale that informs terrorist behavior.90 Most terrorists base their activities on a set of principles; ideological and socioreligious beliefs inform both their behavior and goals.91 The objective, then, is to reduce a terrorists’ probability of achieving his goals by targeting the legitimacy of the beliefs that inform his behavior.

Deterring Nuclear Iran 33

Al Qaeda’s use of suicide terrorism, for example, is legitimized by relying on religious decrees that justify and sanitize the taking of one’s own life. These same decrees help shape al Qaeda’s sociopolitical goals. Of importance, however, is that suicide is an otherwise blasphemous act under Islamic law and al Qaeda’s objectives are refuted by a vast majority of those who share its faith. Applying the logic of deterrence to these divisions suggests that specific leverages might be developed that delegitimize and even ridicule the rationales and goals informing terrorist violence. Strengthening and disseminating opinions that contradict the legitimization of terrorism might deter or compel individuals contemplating and/or taking part in violence. To be sure, delegitimizing terrorism is far removed from traditional deterrence but its purpose and practical application share common theoretical and logical themes. Like deterrence, delegitimization attempts to change an adversary’s behavior but it does so by manipulating the rationales and justifications that inform its preferences. The objective is to compel an adversary to alter or abandon its preferred behavior, not by threatening punishment or denying goals but by degrading the rationales that motivate and guide its actions. Delegitimization raises the costs of participating in terrorism by challenging the normative, religious, and sociopolitical rationales individuals and groups rely upon when facilitating violence.

By manipulating terrorists’ “self-restraints,” states can shape the nature and ferocity of the violence they employ. Terrorist organizations regularly refrain from certain actions. This is especially evident when it comes to using WMD materials.92 John Parachini suggests that religious beliefs instruct the degree to which some militant Islamists are willing to go in acquiring and using unconventional capabilities. He cites Hamas’ Abu Shannab specifically, who explained that “the use of poison was contrary to Islamic teachings.”93

Consider further 2003 revelations by George Tenet, former director of the CIA, that al Qaeda cancelled a cyanide attack in New York City because Ayman al-Zawahiri feared the attack “was not sufficiently inspiring to serve Al Qaeda’s ambitions” and might humiliate the organization.94 Under certain conditions, normative guidelines delimit terrorist activity. Herein, the compellent objective is to expand the scope of the existing WMD norm, reinforce adherence to it, and induce others not yet bound by its guidelines to accept its rationale.

In the specific case of nuclear Iran, delegitimization might be tailored against both Tehran and its proxies. It is telling, for starters, that though it retains chemical and biological weapons, Iran has never shared these unconventional capabilities with its proxies. It may have refrained from doing so out of fear of incurring U.S. or Israeli wrath or because it stood to gain little strategic advantage, but it is also possible that Iran’s restraint was based on ideological, normative, or religious rationales. There are accounts, for instance, that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a secret religious fatwa citing “Koranic principles that constrain the use” of nuclear weapons.95 Byman adds that Iran is unlikely to provide nuclear weapons to terrorists because “these weapons are widely seen as heinous, potentially de-legitimating both the group and its state sponsor.”96 Their use in terrorism will not only invite retaliation against Iran, but also widespread scorn against Iran’s mullahs, the wider Shia community, and Islam more broadly. Defenders might also manipulate self- restraints by communicating how certain actions contradict religious tenets and social expectations. Lewis Dunn contends that nuclear terrorism “does have the potential of provoking revulsion”—instead of praise—“among the very communities that Osama bin Laden is seeking to rally.” If so, finding ways to “heighten concerns” among terrorist leaders that WMD attacks will “provoke a backlash” among Muslims, might influence their decision to acquire and use such weapons.97 That a nuclear terrorist attack on Israel or the U.S. is likely to kill scores of innocent Muslims might give some perpetrators reason

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to pause. The global outrage following a nuclear terrorist strike is likely to be palpable among all religious communities. And as Colin Gray explains, “terrorists lose when their outrages delegitimze their political causes.”98 Nuclear self-restraints and taboos exist in interstate relations. In thinking about deterring nuclear Iran and nuclear terrorism, it is worth exploring whether or not a similar set of self-restraints might also be established among state sponsors of terrorism and their nonstate proxies.

Conclusion

Iran does not yet have a nuclear weapons capability. In fact, there are reasons to suggest that it may never have one. But in scanning the horizon it makes sense to think about the possibility of a nuclear Iran and about the prospects for influencing, deterring, and compelling its behavior vis-à-vis nonstate terrorist organizations. This article suggests that while nuclear Iran will surely represent a daunting strategic problem, there are myriad ways in which the logic of deterrence can be applied.

Further research is needed in four areas. First, we need to investigate the promises and pitfalls of conceptually distinguishing between Iran’s development of nuclear weapons and Iran’s support for terrorism, subversion, and insurgency. In efforts to compel Iran from building nuclear weapons, the West simultaneously calls on Iran to also forgo its support of terrorism. Counterproliferation is intrinsically entwined with counterterrorism. Andrew Parasiliti captures the West’s sentiment perfectly: “Emphasis should . . . be on sustained and intensive diplomacy, supported by sanctions, to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons and supporting terrorism.”99 The latest round of U.S. sanctions, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, stipulates that sanctions against Iran will terminate only if and when Tehran ends its support for terrorism, ceases its efforts to develop nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and ceases developing ballistic missiles and related technology.100 Conflating all of these compellent goals is problematic, however. Compellence works best when demands are concise, simple, and clearly earmarked. Getting Iran to forgo both WMD proliferation and the sponsorship of terrorism are overwhelming strategic priorities, but the two processes, counterproliferation and counterterrorism, should not be unduly intertwined. Success in one area may require placing less emphasis on the other. And in the case of Iran specifically, all states—if they had to choose—would prefer ending its nuclear proliferation over curbing its support for terrorism. Demanding too much of Iran by excessively raising the bar complicates compellent efforts. It is conceivable that a piecemeal approach that prioritizes and distinguishes between various Western demands might provide better results. The same logic might hold when thinking about deterring nuclear Iran: What priorities should be the focus of Western demands and how should they be communicated?

Second, constructing a stable deterrent relationship with nuclear Iran will require that we further explore deterrent bargains and tradeoffs. In practice, deterrence requires that acquiescence, on the part of the challenger, will be rewarded with inaction, on the part of the defender. If a challenger expects to be punished even after it complies with a deterrent threat, the costs of inaction and action are one and the same and deterrence will fail. What matters is a defender’s restraint (refraining from unwarranted retaliation) and assurance (guaranteeing inaction). In thinking about deterring nuclear Iran, the United States, Israel, and others will have to think about how to reassure it as well.101 If Iran acquiesces to Western demands, what will the United States trade in exchange? The question is not an academic one. Pollack, among others, suggests that Western sanctions should be coupled with clandestine action targeting Iran’s weapons program and support for anticlerical movements threatening

Deterring Nuclear Iran 35

the regime’s survival.102 But these sorts of activities undermine deterrent bargains. If the Iranian regime believes its survival will be threatened whether or not it acquiesces to Western demands, it will have no incentive to comply. Will the West stop undermining Tehran if it complies with its demands? What security guarantee does Iran have and why should it believe Western assurances? Furthermore, Iran already interprets nongovernmental movements, human rights activists, and democracy advocates as being part and parcel of a covert Western conspiracy to destroy the Islamic Republic, even when these groups are truly independent from governments.103 Is there anything the West can realistically do—short of actively and vocally stifling civil-society movements—that will reassure Tehran? Is this a bargain the West could even consider?

Third, deterring Iran will require that the United States and its partners gain a better appreciation for Iranian wills, fears, and expectations. While deterrence in theory may be applicable to all sociopolitical settings and environments, deterrence in practice will require an exceptionally high degree of nuance. Adversaries must understand each other sufficiently such that costs and gains are properly and mutually appreciated. Writing of the post–Cold War era, Payne rightly notes that “some [state] leaders—in contrast to Western-democratic thought—may not believe that peace is the dominant or desirable norm in foreign relations. Instead war may be viewed as a positive and normal condition . . . [ E]stablishing a mutually understood deterrence relationship may be very difficult because of the lack of familiarity concerning will and goals.”104 Stein, among others, has called this deterrent prerequisite common knowledge: “the shared understandings of the world and common interpretation of the meaning of action.”105 Without common knowledge, neither the U.S. nor nuclear Iran will have the means to properly and continuously gauge the other’s intentions. The risk is an inherently unstable deterrent bargain, in which U.S. actions and Iranian reactions are either misinformed or misinterpreted (or both). Deterring nuclear Iran will require greater U.S. efforts to understand nuclear Iran.

Finally, there is the problem of U.S. coercive credibility. Why would nuclear Iran believe the West (and especially the United States) in any future attempt to influence its behavior and contain its power? A nuclear Iran will have successfully crossed and circumvented every single red line the international community was willing to put in its tracks over a period of decades. It will have done so without suffering meaningful reprisal. After calling Western bluffs, why would nuclear Iran assume that the West would not continue capitulating in the face of Iranian intransience?

Notes

1. BBC News, “Hezbollah Chief Nasrallah Meets Ahmadinejad in Syria,” February 26, 2010; David Schenker and Matthew Levitt, “Dinner in Damascus: What Did Iran Ask of Hizballah?” Policy Watch, no. 1637 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 2010.

2. For a comparative overview of various tactical and strategic options for dealing with Iran, see Masoud Kazemzadeh, “U.S.–Iran Confrontation in the Post–NIE World: An Analysis of Alternative Policy Options,” Comparative Studies vol. 28, no. 1 (2009): 37–59.

3. Charles Levinson, “Israelis Push Back Iran Bomb Timeline,” Wall Street Journal, January 7, 2011. For an historical assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, see Anthony Cordesman and Khalid al-Rodhan, Iran’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Real and Potential Threat (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2006), esp. Chapters 5 and 8.

4. U.S. Israeli ambassador Michael Oren wrote as a private citizen that a nuclear Iran poses an “existential threat” to Israel, suggesting that “some Israeli experts predict that the Iranian leadership would be willing to sacrifice 50 percent of their countrymen in order to eradicate Israel.” Michael Oren, “Seven Existential Threats,” Commentary Magazine, May, 2009: 18.

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5. Some authors vociferously disagree. Bernard Lewis has stated, for instance, that “for Ah- madinejad and his group, with their apocalyptic mindset, MAD [mutual assured destruction] is not a deterrent, but an inducement. They believe that the end of time has come and the sooner the better” (Lewis, 2009). An important and lively debate exists, but I suggest it tilts favorably towards the “rational” camp. For arguments exploring Iran’s rational mindset, see Jennifer Knepper, “Nuclear Weapons and Iranian Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy vol 27, no. 5 (2008): 451–468; An- drew Grotto, “Is Iran a Martyr State?” Brown Journal of World Affairs vol 16, no. 1 (2009): 45–58; Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005); James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 2 (2010): 33–49; Bruce Riedel, “If Israel Attacks,” The National Interest (September/October 2010): 6–14; Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran, Policy Focus, no. 72 (Washington Institute for Near East Studies), 2007; Jim Walsh, “Iran and the Nuclear Issue: Ne- gotiated Settlement or Escalation?” Testimony before the U.S. Senate, July 20, 2006. For competing views, see Bernard Lewis, “Are There Prospects for Peace with Islam?” 2009 Jerusalem Conference (Transcript), www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/130017 (accessed March 2011); Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution (New York: Encounter Books, 2009); Amitai Etzioni, “Can a Nuclear-Armed Iran be Deterred,” Military Review (May/June 2010): 117–125; Bret Stephens, “Iran Cannot Be Contained,” Commentary Magazine (July/August 2010); Barry Rubin, “The Right Kind of Containment,” Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 4 (2010): 163–166.

6. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009, August 5, 2010, 192. 7. Iran has also supported the Colombian FARC, extreme rightist, leftist, and Marxist groups in

Europe and Latin America, Algeria’s Front for Islamic Salvation, Sunni extremists in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Pakistan’s Jaafari Movement. See Taheri, Persian Night, 97–103; Michael Gordon and Andrew Lehren, “Leaked Reports Detail Iran’s Aid for Iraqi Militias,” The New York Times, October 22, 2010; Associated Press, “Senegal Severs Ties with Iran over Arms Cache,” February 24, 2011.

8. Byman is the foremost expert on state-sponsored terrorism. See Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 80; Byman, “Passive Sponsors of Terrorism,” Survival, vol. 47, no. 2 (2005): 117–144; Byman, “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism,” Analysis Paper no. 16 2008, (The Saban Center): 1–43; Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism vol. 31 (2008): 169–181.

9. For further insight, see, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2003), 223–266; Gary Sick, “Iran: Confronting Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4 (2003); 84–8; Byman, Deadly Connections, chapter 4; and Matthew Levitt, “Iranian State Sponsorship of Terror,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, February 16, 2005, available at http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=228

10. Fawaz Gerges, “Israel’s Retreat from South Lebanon: Internal and External Implications,” Middle East Policy, vol. 8, no. 1 (2001): 106.

11. See Levitt, Testimony, 3. 12. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New

Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 176. 13. See Sick, “Iran,” 90–1. 14. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Terror since 2000,” www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism

(accessed March 2011). 15. Fawaz Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (New York: Harcourt,

2006), 188–9. 16. Al Qaeda of the Arab Peninsula, Inspire, no. 4 (January 2011): 5. 17. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission

Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 61. 18. Levitt, Testimony, 15. 19. 9/11 Commission, 240–1.

Deterring Nuclear Iran 37

20. Gregory Giles, “A Framework for Assessing the Threat of Iranian WMD Terror- ism against the United States,” Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives (Sub- committee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack), September 8, 2005, available at http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/WMD Terrorism and Proliferant States 9-8-05.pdf? =1318483610

21. Levitt, Testimony, 14–15. 22. Bruce Riedel, “The Mysterious Relationship between Al-Qa’ida and Iran,” CTC Sentinel,

vol. 3, no.7 (2010): 2. 23. Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat

(New York: Random House, 2006), 51. 24. Anthony Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran’s Military Forces and Warfighting Capabili-

ties: The Threat in the Northern Gulf (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007), 30; Meghan O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and States Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003), 76–9.

25. Knepper, “Nuclear Weapons,” 452. 26. Giles, “A Framework,” 1. 27. Byman, Deadly Connections, 92; Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and WMD,” 170–1. 28. Quoted in Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 52. 29. Taheri, Persian Night, 154. Italics in original. 30. Byman offers other specific rationales: weakening neighbors, projecting power, top-

pling regimes, shaping opposition, and supporting ethnic/kin groups. Byman, Deadly Connections, Chapter 2.

31. Sick, “Iran,” 93. 32. Byman, “Changing Nature,” 11–12; Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and WMD,” 170–1. 33. International Crisis Group, “Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?” Middle East Report vol.

38 (2005): 11. 34. Marie Colvin, Michael Smith, and Sarah Baxter, “Iran Suicide Bombers ‘Ready to Hit

Britain,”’ The Times, April 16, 2006. 35. David Schapiro and Katherine Zimmerman, “Estimates for Hezbollah’s Arsenal,”

(June 2010) American Enterprise Institute, available at http://www.irantracker.org/military- activities/estimates-hezbollahs-arsenal#intro

36. Kenneth Waltz, Scott Sagan, and Richard Betts, “A Nuclear Iran: Promoting Stability or Courting Disaster?” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 60, no. 2 (2007): 137.

37. Bruno Tertrais, “A Nuclear Iran and NATO,” Survival, vol. 52, no. 6 (2010/11): 55. 38. Emanuele Ottolenghi, “The High Price of Deterring Iran,” Wall Street Journal, May 18,

2009. See also Emanuele Ottolenghi, Under a Mushroom Cloud: Europe, Iran and the Bomb (London: Profile Books, 2009).

39. Oren, “Existential Threats,” 18. 40. Stephens, “Iran.” 41. Waltz, Sagan, and Betts, “Nuclear Iran,” 139. See also Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of

Power and the Balance of Terror,” in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 185–201. For a critique of the concept, see S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2007), esp. chapter 3.

42. Tertrais, “Nuclear Iran,” 46, 54. 43. Michael Eisenstadt, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran: Problems with Iranian Risk Taking and

Behavior,” in Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs, 5–6. Elsewhere, Eisenstadt writes that nuclear Iran may be “tempted to resume efforts to export the revolution” because the “possession of ‘the bomb’ would protect them from retaliation.” Eisenstadt, “Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran,” in Sokolski and Clawson, eds., Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran, 231–2.

44. Waltz, Sagan, and Betts, “Nuclear Iran,” 141. 45. Kenneth Pollack, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran: The Devil in the Details,” Council on Foreign

Relations Working Paper, May 2010, 2.

38 A. S. Wilner

46. Eric Edelman, Andrew Krepinevich, and Evan Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs vol. 90, no. 1 (2011): 66, 68.

47. Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?” The National Interest, issue 109 (2010). Italics in original.

48. Eisenstadt, “Deter and Contain,” 231. Others suggest Saddam Hussein suffered from a degree of “over-confidence born of a flawed assessment of the implications of the Iraq-Iran War.” See Kevin Woods and Mark Stout, “Saddam’s Perceptions and Misperceptions: The Case of ‘Desert Storm,”’ Journal of Strategic Studies vol. 33, no. 1 (2010): 14.

49. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 34–6. 50. Paul Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science

Review vol. 82, no. 2 (1988): 424. See also Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1990 to 1980,” World Politics vol. 36, no. 4 (1984): 496–526.

51. Emanuele Ottolenghi, “Life after the ‘Game-Changer,”’ Standpoint, April 2009; Ottolenghi, “The High Price”; Ottolenghi, interview with The Israel Project, March 18, 2009, 4–5.

52. Barry Rubin, “The Right Kind of Containment,” Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 4 (2010): 163. 53. Chuck Freilich, “The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,”

Mideast Security and Policy Studies, no. 84 (2010): 12–3. 54. Jerusalem Post, “No to Containment” (editorial), March 30, 2010. See also, Etzioni, “Can

a Nuclear-Armed Iran be Deterred,” 122; Giles, “Framework,” 4; Gregory Giles, “Command-and- Control Challenges of an Iranian Nuclear Force,” in Clawson and Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs, 14; Kathleen McInnis, “Extended Deterrence: The U.S. Credibility Gap in the Middle East,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3 (2005): 172; Rubin, “Right Kind of Containment,” 164.

55. Waltz, Sagan, and Betts, “Nuclear Iran,” 141. 56. Edelman, Krepinevich, and Montgomery, “Dangers,” 66–81; see also, Waltz, Sagan, and

Betts, “Nuclear Iran,” 139–40. 57. “President Announces Reduction in Nuclear Arsenal: Press Conference by President Bush

and Russian President Vladimir Putin,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC, November 13, 2001.

58. BBC News, “US President Barack Obama Warns of Nuclear Terrorism,” April 12, 2011. 59. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear

Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent,” Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2010; Sam Nunn, William Perry, and Eugene Habiger, “Still Missing: A Nuclear Strategy,” Washington Post, May 21, 2002; Sam Nunn, “The Race Between Cooperation and Catastrophe: Reducing the Global Nuclear Threat,” The Annals vol. 607, no. 1 (2006), 43–50. For an extended video compilation of their views that includes cameos by Arnold Schwarzenegger, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Colin Powell, see Nuclear Security Project, “Nuclear Tipping Point,” (accessed January 25, 2012). www.nucleartippingpoint.org/home.html.

60. See “Blast Map” at http://www.nuclearterror.org/blastmaps.html (accessed January 25, 2012) and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Times Book, 2004), introduction.

61. Matthew Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” The Annals, vol. 607, no. 1 (2006): 103–20; Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, World at Risk (New York City: Vintage Books, 2008), xv.

62. Colin Gray “Gaining Compliance: The Theory of Deterrence and its Modern Application,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 29, no. 3 (2010): 281. Italics in original.

63. Waltz, Sagan, and Betts, “A Nuclear Iran,” 144–5. 64. Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” 35–6. 65. Elaine Sciolino and Katrin Benhold, “Chirac Unfazed by Nuclear Iran, Then Backtracks,”

New York Times (February 1, 2007). 66. Tertrais, “Nuclear Iran,” 49–51; Pollack, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran,” 2–3. Lindsay and

Takeyh argue otherwise, suggesting that U.S. security guarantees would be problematic for the U.S. and might even undermine deterrent efforts. Instead, they support the formation of a formal, regional alliance between threatened Arab states. Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” 47–9.

Deterring Nuclear Iran 39

67. Barry Posen, “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy Dilemma,” Century Foundation Report (2006), 13.

68. Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”, Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (1981): 1–32; and Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

69. Posen, “Nuclear-Armed Iran,” 12. 70. Pollack, “Deterring a Nuclear Iran,” 3–4. Lindsay and Takeyh suggest the U.S. should also

deploy soldiers to Israel, confirming its commitment to Israelis while signaling that any attack on them would result in American deaths, forcing a response. Others note, however, that increasing U.S. troop levels in the Middle East may backfire. They propose instead a U.S. strategy of “offshore balancing” that lowers “America’s politico-military profile” in the Middle East while providing deterrent results against nuclear Iran. See Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” 43–3.; Christopher Layne, “America’s Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing Has Arrived,” Review of International Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (2009), 9–13, 15–17.

71. Stephen Walt, “How Not to Contain Iran,” Foreign Policy Blog, March 5, 2010. 72. Barry Posen, “Overkill,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 4 (2010): 162. 73. For an overview, see Paul Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings

and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 2 (1999): 31–42; Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988).

74. Huth and Russett, “What Makes Deterrence Work?” 497, 523. 75. Janice Gross Stein, “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Recon-

sidered,” World Politics, vol. 39, no. 3 (1987): 348. 76. If a geographic area, and not just the specific protégé, is of great importance to a defender,

it may be more willing to stand firm in the context of a crisis. Vasna Danilovic, “The Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 45, no. 3 (2001): 349, 365–6.

77. Ibid., 342. 78. Stein, “Extended Deterrence,” 350. 79. Keith Payne, “Future of Deterrence: The Art of Defining How Much is Enough,” Compar-

ative Strategy, vol. 29, no. 3 (2010): 220. 80. Brian Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008), chapters

1, 3, and 14. 81. See, among various others, Caitlin Talmadge, “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,” Washington

Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2 (2007); Elbridge Colby, “Expanded Deterrence: Broadening the Threat of Retaliation,” Policy Review, vol. 149 (2008); Eisenstadt, “Deter and Contain,” 235–9; Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb,” 36–8; Daniel Whiteneck, “Deterring Terrorists: Thoughts on a Framework,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3 (2005); Paul Kapur, “Deterring Nuclear Terrorists,” in T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz, eds., Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

82. David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Debates Deterrence for Nuclear Terrorism,” New York Times, May 8, 2007.

83. See, among others, William Dunlop and Harold Smith, “Who Did It?,” Arms Control Today, vol. 36 (Oct. 2006); Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, and Program Needs, American Physical Society & American Association for Advancement of Science, 2005; Lewis Dunn, “Attribution and Deterring a Nuclear-Armed Iran,” in Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs: Complications in Applying Cold War Strategy to Iran, Policy Focus no. 72 (Washington Institute for Near East Studies), May 2007, 8–11; Michael Levi, “Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report no. 39, (September 2008).

84. Freilich adds that Israel should privately communicate its intention to retaliate against other targets, too, including “sites . . . of major symbolic importance for the Muslim world.” Freilich, “Armageddon Scenario,” 26.

85. See Giles, “Framework,” 5; Welsh, “Iran,” 13.

40 A. S. Wilner

86. Dr. Schelling gave these comments during the conference Deterring Terrorism: The- ory and Practice, held at the ETH Zurich in Switzerland (November 2009) and organized by the author.

87. See Jenkins, Will Terrorists go Nuclear? 148–154. For deterring criminal networks, see David Auerswald, “Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 121, no. 4 (2006): 555–9.

88. On deploying sea-based sensors able to detect illicit shipments of nuclear materials, see James Goodby, Timothy Coffey, and Cheryl Loeb, “Deploying Nuclear Detection Systems: A Pro- posed Strategy for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2007).

89. Graham Allison, “How to Stop Nuclear Terror,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004): 65.

90. These arguments draw on Alex Wilner, “Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 34, no. 1 (2011): 26–31.

91. See Jerry Mark Long, “Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency (2006), 21–4; and James Smith, “Strategic Analysis, WMD Terrorism, and Deterrence by Denial,” in Andreas Wenger and Alex Wilner, eds., Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2012).

92. See Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? chapter 4; and Nancy Kay Hayden, Terrifying Landscapes: A Study of Scientific Research into Understanding Motivations of Non-State Actors to Acquire and/or Use Weapons of Mass Destructions, (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, June 2007), 18–21.

93. John Parachini, “Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective,” Washington Quarterly vol. 26, no. 4 (2003): 45.

94. Quoted in Schmitt and Shanker, “US Adapts,” 2008. 95. Walsh, “Iran and the Nuclear Issue,” 6. 96. Byman, “Iran, Terrorism, and WMD,” 179. 97. See Lewis Dunn, “Can al Qaeda Be Deterred from Using Nuclear Weapons?” Occasional

Paper 3, Center for the Study of WMD (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2005), 11; and Dunn, “Influencing Terrorists’ WMD Acquisition and Use Calculus,” in Next Generation WMD and WME Terrorism (U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, January 2008), 13.

98. Colin Gray, “Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror,” Parameters vol. 32, no. 1 (2002): 7.

99. Andrew Parasiliti, “After Sanctions, Deter and Engage Iran,” Survival, vol. 52, no. 5 (2010): 13.

100. Government of the United States of America, Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Account- ability and Divestment Act of 2010 (H.R. 2194), 39. Robert Hunter adds a variety of other compellent goals. Iran should: stop interfering in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli peace process; seek pos- itive relations with its Gulf neighbors; and halt defamatory comments about the Holocaust. Robert Hunter, “Rethinking Iran,” Survival, vol. 52, no. 5 (2010): 148.

101. Jeffrey Lewis, “Assumptions Underlying the Debate on Deterring Emerging Nuclear States,” in Clawson and Eisenstadt, eds., Deterring the Ayatollahs, 22.

102. Kenneth Pollack “Pariahs in Tehran,” The National Interest (October 20, 2010). 103. Patrick Clawson, “Deterrence and Regime Change,” in Clawson and Eisenstadt, eds.,

Deterring the Ayatollahs, 24–6. 104. Keith Payne, “Post–Cold War Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Policy,” Com-

parative Strategy, vol. 17 (1998): 235. 105. Janice Gross Stein, “Deterring Terrorism, Not Terrorists,” in Andreas Wenger and Alex

Wilner, eds., Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2012).