philosophy homework questions
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Anselms_Ontological_Argument.pptxONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Anselm vs. Gaunilo
Anselm’s argument in a nutshell
Anselm made two claims in his version of the ontological argument:
1. There is a contradiction in the states of mind of an atheist: believing that God does not exist and understanding that God is that being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
2. God necessarily exists.
Anselm’s argument Part 1
P1. The atheist believes that there is no God.
P2. She understands the term “God” as “a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
P3. Existence in reality is greater than non-existence in reality.
P4. If God does not exist in reality, then a being greater than God can be conceived, namely the one who actually exists in reality.
P5. If a being greater than God can be conceived, then God is not that being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
P6. Therefore, in order for God to be that being than which nothing greater can be conceived, God must exist in reality and in the understanding.
C. Hence, the belief that there is no God and the understanding that God is that being than which nothing greater can be conceived are contradictory states of mind.
Anselm’s argument Part 2
P7. A thing that necessarily exists is greater than a thing that contingently exists.
P8. If God contingently exists, then a being greater than God can be conceived, namely the one who necessarily exists.
P9. If a being greater than God can be conceived, then God is not that being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
C. Therefore, in order for God to be that being than which nothing greater can be conceived, God must necessarily exist.
Gaunilo’s response
P1. One can understand the descriptions of the most excellent island [X hereafter].
P2. An existent island is more excellent than a non-existent island.
P3. So, X must exist, in order to be considered as the most excellent of all islands.
P4. However, the fact that one can understand the descriptions of X does not entail the actual existence of X.
P5. If such a fact does not entail the actual existence of X, then Anselm fails to prove that the conceivability of God as that being than which nothing greater can be conceived [G hereafter] entails the actual existence of G.
C. Therefore, Anselm fails to prove that the conceivability of G entails the actual existence of G.
Anselm’s Rejoinder
P1. If there is a categorical difference between X and G, then what is true about X is not necessarily true about G. [For example, the fact that the conceivability of X fails to entail the actual existence of X does not necessarily mean that the conceivability of G fails to entail the actual existence of G.]
P2. Whereas there is no contradiction in the idea of a non-existent X, there is a contradiction in the idea of a non-existent G.
P3. So, there is a categorical difference between X and G.
P4. So, what is true about X is not necessarily true about G.
P5. If there is a contradiction in the idea of a non-existent G, then the conceivability of G entails the actual existence of G.
C. Therefore, the conceivability of G entails the actual existence of G.
