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Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring Five Years On

ABOUT GFDRR The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) helps

high-risk, low-income developing countries adapt to climate change and better understand

and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Working with over 400 community-

level, national, and international partners, GFDRR provides grant financing, on-the-ground

technical assistance helping mainstream disaster-mitigation policies into country-level

strategies, and thought leadership on disaster- and climate-resilience issues through a range

of knowledge-sharing activities. GFDRR is managed by the World Bank and funded by 25

donor partners.

The preparation of this report was supported by the Global Facility for Disaster

Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The report provides a practical example of the

importance of understanding and monitoring the social impacts of a natural disaster on

affected communities and highlights critical issues that may otherwise remain hidden.

Complementing the PDNA methodology, social-impacts analysis deepens post-disaster

recovery frameworks and programs. It also guides aid providers in allocating resources to

the evolving needs and priorities of affected communities and in choosing implementation

modalities that take into account local realities.

October 2008 June 2013

Photo Credits:

Photographs courtesy of Markus Kostner and Patrick Barron.

The photos on the inside covers were taken in a highly affected village in Bogale township, in October 2008 (left) and June 2013 (right). The

top photos depicts the footbridge connecting two sections of the village that makes crossing the creek still a precarious undertaking five

years after Nargis.

The bottom photos depict the primary school of the village which was destroyed by Nargis and newly constructed as a combined cyclone

shelter within two years of the cyclone.

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Social Relations and Institutions ///Social relations remained strong …///

In about three-quarters of villages, social relations were considered good or fair, including in two- thirds of the highly affected villages. Where social relations were good, the community was organized and villagers undertook collective activities, mostly socio-religious tasks and regular community works such as road renovation and pond cleaning. Where social relations were poor, villagers were divided into different groups, and communal activities occurred only within these groups. In most cases, poor social relations were a remnant of the aid effort in one way or another.

///… but the bonds were getting weaker …///

At the same time, however, villagers felt that relations were worse than before Nargis in about half of the villages, including in two-thirds of the highly affected villages. Socioeconomic challenges had a negative impact on social cohesion. Better- off families that used to sponsor religious activities before Nargis were no longer able to afford them, depriving villagers of an important venue in which to strengthen social cohesion between community members. Increased migration among villagers of working age and the need to work longer hours also left villagers with less time to socialize with their neighbors.

///… especially in heterogeneous villages///

The passing away of religious leaders during Nargis contributed to strained social relations five years on, especially in villages with both Muslims and Buddhists. This was accentuated by the fact that aid had sometimes been provided along religious lines in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone. Villagers indicated that they were dealing with each other carefully and were no longer as comfortable in engaging with each other. On the whole, however,

villagers maintained social bonds across religious groups in spite of the deterioration of relationships elsewhere in the country. Leadership played a critical role in maintaining good relations.

///The role of women and youth continued

to evolve///

With aid having largely ceased, momentum toward women’s empowerment had evolved along new tracks. While after Nargis, women had been involved in aid committees, five years on, most former female committee members had once again assumed traditional gender roles, working for the family business or farm and/or undertaking household tasks. In some cases, however, women were making inroads in broader village affairs. In two villages women were elected as ten household leaders in 2013, the first time this had happened. At the same time, SIM 4 saw a resurgence of youth engagement. There were more youth-led activities in many villages, which may have been a reflection of the recent leadership changes, which brought younger leaders to power. In addition, many previous formal and informal leaders associated with the former regime withdrew from village affairs.

///Leadership dynamics had a positive effect on

social relations in many villages///

For the most part, people responded positively to changes in formal leadership that had taken place since Nargis. Political reforms and the shift to a new government in 2011 led to village tract administrator elections in early 2013. Villagers in 26 out of the 40 sample villages chose new formal leaders, while 13 reelected their former leaders. New leaders were noticeably younger, better educated and better off economically than the old leaders. In three-quarters of the villages, people were largely satisfied with the performance of the current formal leaders; the relations between villagers and their leaders were good and neutral in 21 and 9 villages, respectively. Villagers’ perceptions of their leaders did not depend on the latter’s age.

opportunities during the rest of the year. Secondary

income sources on which laborers relied to

supplement their earnings also declined, particularly

visible with small-scale fishing but also in weaving

nipa and collecting firewood. As a result, more

laborers were migrating than had been the case prior

to or in the immediate aftermath of Nargis.

///The debt burden intensified further …///

Indebtedness was directly related to the degree of

cyclone affectedness. Villagers in over one-third of

the villages were caught in a debt trap, unable to

repay even the debts that they had owed from before

Nargis. Of the 30 highly and moderately affected

villages in the sample, only 3 moderately affected

ones did not have repayment problems. Small

farmers experienced the sharpest increase in average

indebtedness, by a factor of three. Laborers had the

least capacity to repay debt; they needed to borrow

for consumption, and were, therefore, also affected

by increases in the prices of basic necessities.

Interest rates had remained largely unchanged,

ranging from 0.75 percent to 30 percent per month.

Villagers continued to rely on different credit

sources, but their relative importance had evolved.

Loans from the Myanmar Agricultural Development

Bank (MADB) brought much-needed capital into the

Delta; they were highly desirable because of their

low interest rates. MADB loans were insufficient to

meet demand, however, and private moneylenders

and traders remained important credit sources,

including for fishermen.

///… eventually affecting the distribution of land///

Within the first two years after Nargis, many

villagers depleted their assets to manage their debt.

Over the next three years, low yields and continuing

indebtedness led to an increasing number of land

transactions. All but one of the eleven villages

with a high level of land transactions were highly

or moderately affected by Nargis, implying the

transactions were related to economic distress. Even 8 of the 18 moderately affected villages saw high or moderate levels of land transactions. Many of these transactions occurred between 2010 and 2011. With many poorer farmers selling land and a few better-off farmers buying it, a highly unequal distribution of land developed in 15 percent of the sample villages. Villagers felt that the Farmland Law would enable them to use their land as collateral or sell it at a higher price. At the same time, the law intensified existing land conflicts in several villages.

///Oftentimes, outmigration was the only viable

coping mechanism, and it has increased///

Coping strategies had not changed over the previous three years but were being used more intensively. Migration continued to increase as a coping mechanism and as a way to escape job scarcity. In 40 percent of the villages, two-thirds or more of the households had at least one member who migrated. Many migrants were between the ages of 17 and 25. Many more of them had been migrating since 2010, with nearly half of village youth migrating in some instances. They ended up in big cities like Yangon and Pathein and worked mostly in factories.

Other forms of coping had potentially negative social and health consequences, such as working even longer hours to survive and thus having less time for social interaction, reducing social expenditures, and reducing the number of meals. A crucial strategy for small and medium farmers to reduce expenditure in over three-quarters of the villages was to reduce investment in fertilizer and other farming inputs, which in turn reduced yields and even led to crop failures.

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///Tensions related to the aid effort still

lingered on///

Previously observed social tension between villagers resulting from real or perceived unequal aid distribution had largely been reversed. However, tensions were noted in 16 sample villages, half of which were highly affected villages. Since highly affected villages received more aid, they were also more prone to aid-related tension: two-thirds of all highly affected villages suffered from such tension, while less than 40 percent of moderately affected villages did. Over two-thirds of the villages with aid tension had newly elected leaders. However, the presence of tensions did not automatically translate into negative perceptions of village leaders. Villagers had negative perceptions of their leaders owing to aid in only five villages. At the same time, villagers recognized the positive effects the aid effort had had on capacity building and participation.

Recommendations and Reflections Much as was the post-Nargis aid effort, the

monitoring of social impacts in Myanmar was

undertaken at a unique time in the country’s history.

As such, SIM provided insights into village life at

a time when little was known about state-society

relations at the local level. To some degree, the

unique political circumstances determined its

particular usefulness. Then again, the social impacts

of natural disasters have rarely been studied as

thoroughly as after Nargis, and important lessons

can be drawn from such analysis.

Previous rounds of SIM assessed the post-Nargis aid

effort and the path to post-disaster recovery over

time through the eyes of affected villagers. These

SIM rounds found that, while tremendously helpful to beneficiaries, aid was not always targeted to the needs of the disaster-affected populations, often did not take a longer-term sector perspective into account, and did not focus adequately on critical actors in the value chain because they were not considered poor but were equally affected by the cyclone. SIM also pointed out that communities were not much involved in decision making about aid and that the emergency committees that aid providers set up tended to negatively affect relations between villagers and their leaders, even far beyond the period of aid delivery.

Beyond being a monitoring tool, SIM also helped enhance understanding of the dynamics that play out in disaster-affected villages over the longer term. SIM showed that major natural disasters can severely damage a community’s immune system and its ability to recover on its own, making it more prone to the negative effects of subsequent external events, whether natural, economic, or political. It found that the capacity of the survivors to recover from a major disaster depended more on how many assets they had lost to the disaster than the number of people who had died in their village. SIM pointed out that multiple factors determine recovery and that the importance of these may evolve over time and vary by location. While major disasters such as cyclones affect everyone in their path equally, they also create a new tapestry in the affected area as different communities and groups within a community recover differently. Furthermore, even when social capital is strong and contributes to recovery in the short-term, it is not immune to the effects of continuing economic deprivation. Above all, SIM underlined the fact that recovery takes a long time, and it is never linear.

As a result, SIM demonstrated that qualitative social analysis can help institutions involved in a post- disaster recovery effort understand cross-cutting issues, such as governance and social accountability;

community perceptions, including those on aid effectiveness, vulnerability, and social exclusion; and process tracing, such as on the social dynamics within communities or on how aid plays out at the village level. Social analysis, therefore, enables the aid effort to be more responsive to local realities and helps to ensure that it does not contribute to social fracture.

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01

Context

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The success of any post-disaster aid effort depends

on how programs respond to and reflect such

changing needs and dynamics. After Cyclone Nargis,

therefore, the TCG developed a comprehensive

monitoring system that aimed to inform aid

responses. One component of this was Post-Nargis

Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM). SIM aimed to

understand the changing needs and priorities of

villagers, how social relations and socioeconomic

life were evolving, and the impacts of the aid

efforts. It focused on 40 villages spread across the

Delta. By focusing on a limited set of villages, it

provided in-depth information on how village life

was changing post-Nargis and insights into how aid

responses could best help Delta communities. It

complemented the ongoing quantitative Periodic

Review assessment, which measured progress

against recovery indicators in a wider set of

affected villages.

The TCG oversaw the implementation of three

rounds of post-Nargis social impacts monitoring.

The first SIM (SIM 1) was conducted in November

2008 and assessed how the disaster and aid

responses had affected Delta communities in the

first six months after Nargis. The second SIM (SIM

2) was undertaken from May to June 2009, i.e., one

year after the cyclone. The third SIM (SIM 3) was

carried out between March and April 2010. The TCG

came to an end in July 2010.

Myanmar has been undergoing a fundamental social,

political, and economic transformation since 2010.

The dissolution of the State Peace and Development

Council in March 2011 following parliamentary

elections in November 2010, parliamentary by-

elections in April 2012, and a range of economic

reforms have not only signaled a transition to

democratic governance and a market-oriented

economy but have also profoundly affected life in

rural Myanmar. In addition, while Nargis was the

most destructive natural disaster in the country’s

recorded history, the Delta and other parts of the

country have been suffering from other natural events with adverse impacts.

The longer-term effects of major natural disasters on the daily lives of those who survived them are often not well understood. How have villages affected by Nargis recovered economically in the longer run? Has village social life returned to what it had been before the cyclone? Have villages struck by the cyclone regained their capacity to withstand the compound effects of subsequent natural shocks? What other factors have shaped a village’s path to recovery? Finding answers to these questions became the purpose of the fourth round of SIM (SIM 4) that was conducted between April and May 2013, i.e., five years after Nargis. SIM 4 revisited the same 40 villages across the eight most affected Delta townships (Annex 1) and relied primarily on in-depth qualitative fieldwork.2 It focused on taking stock of the social and economic situation in the sample villages, allowing villagers to reflect on their experiences over the five years since Nargis within a rapidly changing environment. 3

a Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to coordinate this

aid effort.

After disasters, the needs of affected communities

evolve. As immediate survival priorities recede,

disaster survivors start focusing on how to rebuild

their lives and communities. Communities develop

coping mechanisms to help them deal with the

disaster and aid effort, which can have wide-ranging

impacts on local socioeconomic structures and

social relations. At the same time, new obstacles

to recovery can emerge as different individuals

and institutions adjust their behavior in the post-

disaster environment. Resource scarcity can increase

competition or promote cooperation.

Natural disasters have profound immediate impacts.

Lives are lost; shelters are destroyed; assets are

damaged or destroyed. Those who survive may

face acute health or sanitation problems and food

or water shortages. When Cyclone Nargis hit the

Ayeyarwady Delta and southern Yangon Division

in Myanmar on 2 May 2008, it brought devastation

in its wake. An estimated 140,000 people died,

and damages and losses were estimated at around

US$ 4 billion.1 In its aftermath, scores of domestic

and international actors launched a wide-ranging

humanitarian aid effort to address immediate

emergency needs. The Government of the Union of

Myanmar, ASEAN, and the United Nations formed

Section 01

Introduction

SECTION

01 Post-Nargis Recovery as Seen through Social Impacts Monitoring

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struggling to recover. This affected those at every

point in the value chain. Moreover, Cyclone Nargis

drastically reduced the opportunities for paid work

for laborers, who faced reduced demand for their

labor from the bigger farmers and fishermen who

would normally employ them. Laborers received

food aid but less livelihood support compared to

other groups. As a result, many were facing immense

difficulties in getting by. The most recurrent theme

was an increasing debt burden. In every village

studied, villagers were worried about being able

to meet their loan repayments and having enough

money for consumption in the following year.

Cyclone Nargis had a major impact on

socioeconomic life in Delta villages. However,

despite its immense shock, social relations and

local capacity remained strong. Villagers worked

together to overcome immediate challenges,

which strengthened social relations. Communities

remained resilient and functioning. The report

concluded that if people’s livelihoods and village

economies did not begin to recover soon, there

would likely be profound longer-term impacts, such

as migration out of Delta villages and a tearing of

the social fabric. If people could not break out of

the Nargis debt trap, there was a risk of longer-term

redistribution of assets from many to a few.

///Still a mixed picture: SIM 2///

Cyclone survivors continued to prioritize aid for

livelihoods. However, a year after the cyclone, the

needs of affected communities had evolved, with

villagers also prioritizing health, education, and

small-scale community infrastructure. This reflected

a shift from emergency to longer-term recovery

priorities. As in SIM 1, aid in the form of cash or

affordable credit appeared to be more effective—and

was preferred by villagers—than in-kind assistance.

However, aid levels dropped sharply and were

too low to enable cyclone survivors to adequately

recover their livelihoods. Furthermore, aid providers

continued to make aid-related decisions, with

aid distribution more formalized through official

leaders and village emergency committees. Villagers

often lacked clear information about aid, which led

to cases of perceptions of misuse and conflict about

aid.

Socioeconomic conditions remained challenging

rand were exacerbated by the wider economic

environment. There was little overall progress with

livelihoods recovery. Farmers were unable to afford

adequate farming inputs and cultivated their land

less intensively. At the same time, there appeared

to be some progress with restarting fishing, though

less progress in the returns of fishing as a source of

livelihood. Most fishing aid provided was small-

scale fishing gear that enabled fishermen to earn a

subsistence income, rather than the kind of larger-

scale aid and capital necessary to revive the fishing

value chain. Casual laborers also continued to

struggle. The inability of big farmers to recover their

livelihood and cultivate their land as intensely as

before further reduced job opportunities for casual

labor. Furthermore, some farmers and fishermen

themselves became casual laborers, so competition

increased for the jobs that did exist. Debt levels were

still rising, and interest rates remained high. Farmers

began to lose land to moneylenders as they failed to

meet their debt payments.

Social capital was still strong overall. Young people

continued to play an active role in relief and

recovery activities, such as repairing and renovating

schools and pathways. Formal leaders played a

strong role in aid-related affairs, though the roles of

village elders in aid affairs had decreased somewhat

since SIM 1. Similarly, the role of religious leaders

had evolved, with only Christian and Muslim

religious leaders engaged in day-to-day recovery

activities. There was an increasing number of

instances where aid-related tensions weakened

social relations.

The path toward recovery has evolved over time and

differed not only by degree of cyclone affectedness,

but also by both location and type of livelihood. This

section summarizes salient findings from the initial

post-disaster social impacts analysis and the first

three rounds of SIM to provide an inter temporal

snapshot of the situation in the 40 sample villages.4

///Setting the stage: the Post-Nargis

Joint Assessment///

The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) was

the first post-disaster assessment that included

specific analysis of the social impacts of the disaster.

Undertaken within six weeks of the cyclone, the

analysis was necessarily preliminary and tentative.

It developed a set of hypotheses on forms of social

impact that might play out in the post-Nargis

period. SIM tracked these issues over time. Field

visits during the PONJA observed a high level of

unity and social cohesion among survivors, who had

no doubt been brought together by their common

efforts to survive and rebuild. It also identified

the risks of redistributing land awayy from small-

scale farmers to those with larger holdings and

of loan-based responses that further indebting

affected villagers. Furthermore, the analysis

underlined the importance of working with informal

local institutions and local leaders. Based on this

analysis, PONJA included in its guiding principles

the need to: involve communities at all stages

in the management of relief, including decision-

making and feedback on the quality of the relief and

recovery efforts; maximize the use of local initiative,

resources, and capacities; and build the capacity of

local communities to participate in every stage of

the relief and recovery effort.

///Dashed hopes of a speedy recovery: SIM 1///

SIM 1 noted that relief and recovery assistance had

reached even the most remote villages, with levels

of aid varying between and within villages. Aid

appeared to be helping villages recover: there was

a link between the amount of aid received and the

speed of recovery. However, the level of impact was

a larger determinant of recovery. Even where aid

was relatively large in amount, many moderately

or highly affected villages were not recovering

quickly. This suggested that the scale of aid and/

or its effectiveness was still insufficient. Although

relief assistance had reached all villages, much more

assistance was needed for communities to recover,

particularly in the form of cash grants. Moreover,

villagers had so far had little real say in the aid

effort. This led to the provision of some kinds of aid

that were not adapted to local needs in the Delta.

Farming productivity and crop yields decreased

significantly, owing to Nargis. Reductions in harvests

were increasing the debt burden of farmers, who

could not repay old loans and also had to borrow

for consumption. Fishing was severely affected too,

as fishermen who had lost their fishing gear were

SECTION

01 Findings from Social Impacts Monitoring in a Broader Context

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///Deceptive indications of a recovery: SIM 3///

The steady decline in aid since the immediate

aftermath of the cyclone was accompanied by a

significant change in the priorities of aid providers.

Over the previous year, the decline in credit

provision and fishing inputs was particularly

noteworthy. Support for small and medium farmers

was widespread, but there were concerns that the

level of aid was insufficient to make a real impact

on livelihood restoration. Overall, SIM 3 noted a

significant disjuncture between aid provision and

the needs of different groups in the community. Aid

providers also continued to be the main decision-

makers when it came to determining both the type

of project and the process of implementation.

Local committees were involved to some degree

in delivery. However, relations of accountability

between aid providers and the villagers remained

limited, and there was little evidence of

transparency measures working effectively at the

community level.

There were signs of a recovery in the farming sector.

Farmers in almost half the villages had grown both

monsoon and summer paddy during the second year

after Nargis, compared to only one-fifth during the

first year. Furthermore, yields had rebounded since

the disaster across the 40 villages by over 15 percent

on average. Simultaneously, intensive investments

in the fishing sector during the previous year led to

overfishing and a drastic reduction in output and

employment. As a result, it was estimated that many

fishermen had lost their traditional livelihood over

the previous year, forcing many of them to become

casual laborers at a time when farmers reduced their

demand for labor even further. In almost half of

the villages, laborers became significantly worse off

than other villagers. Debt continued to undermine

the prospects for recovery. Across all occupational

groups, the average maximum debt across villages

two years after Nargis was higher than before the

cyclone. Farmers went to great lengths to remain

current on at least their interest payments and were selling assets other than land in order to do so. The story of debt in the Delta two years after Nargis was thus one of continued asset depletion but not yet of widespread default.

Due to a strong social fabric, Delta communities stayed resilient despite the continu challenges they faced. In most aspects of village life, there was little change over the previous year, and social relations were good. Gender relations were good, and women were becoming more empowered through their increased involvement in aid-related committees. At the same time, the role of youth in the aid effort decreased. Religious leaders had largely withdrawn from the aid effort and other secular affairs, and they have taken their traditional place in village life focusing on spiritual matters. Some signs of tensions between villagers and their leaders were reported, most of which related to aid provision. However, in only six villages were relations considered poor.

Building on SIM, Qualitative Social and Economic Monitoring (QSEM) was developed in 2011. It uses the same methodology and similar themes of inquiry as SIM in 54 villages in 6 Regions and States. QSEM included nine villages in the Ayeyarwady Delta, none of which were covered by SIM. QSEM aims to monitor and understand rural livelihoods in Myanmar. It examines the different livelihood strategies and activities of people in rural Myanmar, the wider factors that shape these strategies, and how the broader social and institutional features of

community life affect people’s livelihoods choices and outcomes. QSEM has also been implemented by Enlightened Myanmar Research (formerly Myanmar Development Research) and the World Bank. By the time of SIM 4, three rounds of QSEM had been completed.5 In two inserts, this report presents main findings from QSEM on socioeconomic conditions and social relations that are relevant to SIM. This comparison sheds light on the veracity of SIM findings regarding recovery in the cyclone-affected villages.

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Livelihoods Five Years After Nargis

Section 02

Socioeconomic Conditions

Figure 1 Economic conditions by degree of affectedness

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Most of the 40 sample villages were struggling and had yet to recover socioeconomically. Sixteen villages, most of them highly affected by Nargis, were in socioeconomic crisis, while eighteen others were recuperating, but only slowly. Only six lightly and moderately affected villages were in good economic standing. The recovery in the farming sector that SIM 3 had identified was short lived, eroded by a series of external events that again reduced yields and output, especially of small and medium farmers.

Signs of a recovery in the fishing sector, which had been seen soon after the cyclone, had long faded. The situation had already deteriorated by the time of SIM 3, but fish catches had further decreased since, forcing many more small fishermen to become laborers and/or migrate. Fish collectors were also struggling, and many had to exit the business. The situation of day laborers continued to deteriorate as well. In the months after Nargis, many received food aid and decided to work less or demand higher wages. By the time food aid was reduced, and eventually phased out, farmers had already

started to hire laborers from other villages or use hand tractors, reducing demand for labor. At the same time, labor supply kept increasing steadily as many small farmers and small fishermen became laborers. This trend continued further, forcing laborers to apply more drastic coping mechanisms, especially migration.

While farming and fishing experienced both ups and downs in the five years after Nargis, the debt situation developed only in one direction. The level of indebtedness in the farming sector was markedly higher in 2013 than in 2010, which indicates that farmers still had access to credit, while fishermen and laborers lost creditworthiness and hence access to credit because of their dire economic prospects. Land transactions also increased and, as a result, so did inequality in land ownership. The increase in the loan amounts per acre by the Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB) as well as the Farmland Law, which was enacted in 2012, added a degree of formality to the mostly informal local credit and land markets, but they did not ease the debt situation.

Several of these villages suffered from frequent

flooding, as Nargis had destroyed embankments and

spillways. None of the highly affected villages were

in good economic standing, while two-thirds were

in poor condition. These are the villages that were

affected the most by subsequent natural events and

where the distribution of land became more unequal

over time. Box 1 captures the essence of daily life in

these villages concisely.

An Economic Predicament

///Five years after Nargis, Delta villages

still found themselves in a dire economic

situation./// The economic situation cannot be

attributed to the cyclone alone, as multiple other

factors influenced the path to recovery (see below).

It is striking to note, however, that only 15 percent

of the sample villages were considered in good

economic standing (Figure 1).7 Even seven out of

ten lightly affected villages were doing only fairly.

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Table 2 Farming conditions across townships

Box 1 Another Nargis strikes every day

A family in a highly affected village in Dedaye township lost their 16 year old

son to Nargis. Without his reliable help, his father had to work even harder

doing small-scale fishing to make ends meet. He had a stroke in 2012 and

could no longer work. As a result, the family’s two daughters had to quit school

and, together with their mother, started to work as day laborers to put food on

the table and pay the medical fees for the father. Earning only enough wages

to eke out a meager living, the mother would describe her daily tribulations as

“another Nargis strikes every day”.

Farming ///By the time of SIM 3 in mid-2010, the farming

sector had started to recover; however, the

recovery was not sustained///. Yields and prices had increased right after Nargis, but this trend did not continue. Combined with the loss of villagers’ safety nets, the end of the aid effort, and subsequent negative external events, this prevented many farmers across the sample villages from rebuilding the assets they had lost during Nargis. In many instances, farmers in the Delta could not overcome this massive shock to their way of life.

///SIM 4 found that farming was considered in

poor condition in almost half of the villages

(17), fair in 14, and good in only 9///. None of the highly affected villages showed good farming conditions (Table 1). Nearly half of the villages considered poor were highly affected, and most of the rest were moderately affected. The villages with good farming conditions were moderately and lightly affected by Nargis. Only four highly affected villages found themselves with fair farming condition.

///Farming conditions differed by township///. Good conditions could only be found in Kyaiklat, Mawlamyinegyun, and Ngapudaw (Table 2). The worst-hit townships were those along the southern coast: Labutta, Bogale, Pyapon and Dedaye, as well as Kungyangon.

///The state of farming was directly connected

to the degree of affectedness///. Villages with poor farming had never regained pre-Nargis yield levels. Compared to villages with good and fair farming, they had also faced more frequent external shocks, such as pests, climatic irregularities, and floods. About two-thirds of farmers found themselves in a debt trap in these villages, and up to half the villagers had had land transactions in the past four years. The situation was slightly better in villages in which farming was considered fair.

Farmers could partially repay their debts after each harvest season, but they also had to borrow again at the beginning of the next farming season. In contrast, the villages where farming conditions were good were achieving regular yields at good prices. The yield in these villages had declined right after Nargis but had almost recovered since. Farmers had low indebtedness and could settle debts after every agricultural season.

///Villages that were able to grow more diverse

crops and have two rice harvests a year

had better farming conditions///. Seven of the nine villages with good farming conditions grew two crops per year. Of the seven, three (in Mawlamyinegyun, as well as one in Bogale) started to grow two crops after SIM 3. Before Nargis, farmers in these villages grew beans in addition to monsoon paddy, but they experienced price fluctuations. Since 2010/11, many farmers replaced beans with summer paddy. By contrast, in 22 villages farmers grew only one crop (paddy); of these, 13 experienced poor farming conditions. Only 4 of the 18 villages with two crops had poor farming conditions.

**Farming conditions varied by locality and

could also be independent of Nargis**

///Elephant trespassing into farmland was a

problem in one village in Ngapudaw, in an

area located near the forest of the western

ranges///. Up to 30 elephants roam the area regularly during harvest season. They can eat up to 10 acres

of paddy land within a matter of hours. This was a

problem before Nargis but had since occurred more

frequently because the forest was progressively

depleted: commercial companies had started to

grow rubber, and the forests were providing less

food for the animals. During harvest time villagers

had to watch the farmlands around the clock but

could not always drive away the elephants. Forest

depletion also meant that villagers could no longer

gather as much firewood as they used to.

**External events had significant

compound effects**

///Nargis may have been a one-off, cataclysmic

event but the Ayeyarwady Delta has been

suffering from other significant external

shocks since then; these have further

weakened farmers’ resilience and ability to

cope and recover///. SIM 4 investigated the external

events with adverse impact that occurred in the

sample villages in the five-year period since Nargis.

The researchers recorded those events that villagers

identified as having an impact on farming. The most

common natural events affecting yield included

infestations by pests, crabs, rats, fish and weeds;

climatic irregularities (changing weather patterns);

floods; and changes in soil salinity because of tidal

changes. Table 3 shows the types of events and the

number of villages suffering from these events each

year since 2008.

Table 1 Farming conditions by degree of affectedness

AFFECTEDNESS GOOD FAIR POOR TOTAL

Highly affected 0 4 8 12

Moderately affected 4 6 8 18

Lightly affected 5 4 1 10

Total 9 14 17 40

TOWNSHIPS GOOD FAIR POOR TOTAL

Bogale 5 4 9

Dedaye 3 3 6

Kungyangon 1 2 3

Kyaiklat 3 1 4

Labutta 2 3 5

Mawlamyinegyun 4 4

Ngapudaw 2 1 1 4

Pyapon 2 3 5

Total 9 14 17 40

Table 3 Types of natural events experienced by villages from 2008 to 2013

TYPES OF EVENTS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Pest, crab, fish, rat, weed problems 10 12 11 9 16 2

Climatic irregularities* 6 10 12 33 6

Flooding 4 9 8 6 5 4

Changes in soil salinity 3 2 2 1 3

* Most of the climatic irregularities occurred toward the end of the monsoon season at harvest time. SIM 4 took place prior to

the harvest.

SECTION

02

4.o

3.o

2.0

1.0

0.0

Highly Aff ected Moderately Aff ected Lightly Aff ected

Soil Salinity Flooding Climatic Variation

N um

be r

of E

xt er

na l E

ve nt

s

Pest, Crabs, Fish, Rat,

Weeds

Figure 2 Average frequency of external events per village from 2008 to 2013 by level of

affectedness

24

25

rain had reduced salinity enough for them to start sowing. In addition, another tide now arrived in early June. Similarly, farmers in Pyapon reported that the tides used to arrive in December and January, but now reached their fields in September and October, a time of harvest for monsoon paddy; this led to crop losses in about 15 percent of the villages. These tidal changes may be the result of the erosion that was brought about by Nargis. In the low altitude areas of the Delta, even small changes to the shoreline would have an impact on the flow of water and result in inundation of the fields closer to the water.

///Most of the villages experienced one or more

natural events each year, but highly affected

villages were more exposed than the other

villages///. The frequency of negative external events within five years after Nargis was over two times higher in villages with poor farming conditions as compared to villages with good farming conditions,

and over 1.5 times higher in comparison with villages with fair farming conditions. Figure 2 shows the average frequency of various external events (from 2008–2013) faced by villages with different level of affectedness.

///All villages regardless of cyclone-

affectedness, have suffered climatic

variations, such as a change in rainfall

patterns; however, pest problems are by far

the most severe in highly affected villages///. All but seven of the sample villages are located along rivers or streams. Highly affected villages also suffered more from soil salinity and floods, though of the latter not as often as moderately affected villages. It can thus be surmised that Nargis affected the agro-economic potential in the highly affected villages to such an extent that, absent significant aid, they were unable to withstand later natural events with adverse impact, even if these were of significantly smaller proportions.

///The external events that took place in

the affected villages since Nargis were

connected to the cyclone, which changed the

ecosystem of the Delta///. SIM research highlights the relationships between these events, the degree of affectedness by Nargis, and the pace of recovery of the farming sector. Pest, crab, and rat problems occurred in around one-third of the sample villages, with insects being the most frequent event. These infestations happened more frequently in two heavily cyclone-affected areas: Dedaye and Bogale.8

According to farmers in Dedaye, the pest problems occurred particularly in areas with lower altitude, which frequently suffered from seawater intrusion. The duration of daily and monthly tides has become longer in the post-Nargis period, making the fields more saline and more prone to pest infestation. At the same time, in one village in Ngapudaw, fields at a higher location were less regularly covered by the tide. This also led to a decline in agricultural yields, because the high tide would sweep away the crabs. By the time of SIM 4, crabs would stay longer in the paddy fields and destroy more crops.

///Irregular rains had become a common

problem in the Delta since Nargis///. There were two variants of the problem, both affecting agricultural yields: (a) unusually heavy and unusually long rains during both growing and harvest times, which affected over three-quarters of the villages and (b) a lack of rain in over one-third of the villages, with higher than normal temperatures, at a time when the crops needed rain the most. Heavy rains often washed away sown seeds. In over one-third of the villages, many farmers whose farmlands were located at a lower altitude reported having to sow their seeds two to three times almost every year because of heavy rains.

///Flooding occurred mainly for three reasons:

heavy rains, silted streams, and destroyed

embankments///. The streams are a quintessential element of the Delta’s farming system, as they channel water to the fields and carry off rainwater.

In several of the villages, the streams had become shallower because of silt and could no longer carry out their regulatory function. This resulted in more frequent flooding of the farmlands. Villagers in the townships of Kungyangon, Labutta, Pyapon, and Dedaye felt that the silting had worsened since Nargis because the cyclone eroded the land, which led to the accumulation of more silt in the streams. Before Nargis, villagers used to desilt the streams every 2-3 years. Since Nargis, the higher amount of silt required the use of equipment that only the government could supply.

Farmers experienced the impact of climatic changes in different ways. Unusual weather patterns affected small and medium farmers the most. Lacking labor and machinery, they took longer to finish the harvest and were, therefore, at greater risk of heavy rains washing away their mature crop. In contrast, larger farmers could afford to hire labor and rent machines, and often worked shifts until midnight in order to finish the harvest before the rains arrived.

///Several villages reported daily, monthly, and

seasonal tidal changes///. In Labutta, Bogale, and Dedaye townships, one village each reported a longer daily tide, while other villages reported higher tide levels and a longer duration of monthly and seasonal tides. Villagers indicated that the daily and monthly tides used to be based on the lunar calendar. They now felt that the first daily tide remained longer than it used to before Nargis, with some amount of water remaining in the fields until the second tide arrived. As a result, the soil turned more saline than before, which led to a decline in yield and paddy of poorer quality.

///Farmers in Labutta and Pyapon observed

changes in the seasonal tide///. The seasonal tide in some areas of Labutta used to arrive in July and August, and farmers could start sowing only when the rainwater had sufficiently reduced soil salinity in the fields. After Nargis, farmers felt that the tides were longer, higher, and more saline. They experienced a delay of about 10 days before the

SECTION

02

40

30

20

10

0

Highly Aff ected Moderately Aff ected Lightly Aff ected

2007 2008 2009

B as

ke ts

o f

P ad

dy

50

2010 2011 2012

Figure 3 Yield per acre by level of affectedness

26

27

**Yields are the key to recovery but were still below their pre-Nargis levels**

///The degree of cyclone-affectedness had a

direct impact on the capacity of the farming

sector to recover///. The yield immediately after Nargis dropped for two main reasons:

1. the decline in productive capacity; and,

2. soil contamination caused by seawater intrusion.

Lacking farming input, investment capital, and human resources, many farmers in highly affected villages could not resume their agricultural activities right after Nargis. Most of the farmland was left fallow. In contrast, most of the lightly affected villages were able to fully resume farming soon after Nargis, though most of them experienced a temporary decline in yield, owing to increased soil salinity.

///The yield for monsoon paddy across SIM

villages had yet to reach its pre-Nargis level///. The yield decline of the first harvest after Nargis was three an two times greater in highly and moderately affected villages, respectively, than in lightly affected villages (see Figure 3). Thereafter, villages experienced an increase in yields until 2011. In 2012, however, yield dropped in 20 villages because of crop failures caused by irregular rains during the harvest season.9

///Most of the highly and moderately affected

villages could resume their farming after

Nargis thanks to livelihood assistance, such

as farming inputs, fertilizer, and seeds///. This led to a noticeable but temporary rebound in yields. External assistance, though effective, proved insufficient to help these villages regain their resilience in the face of continued negative external events.

**Farmers also faced increased production

costs …**

///SIM 4 found the cost of production to be

higher than before Nargis in three-quarters of

the sample villages///. Four reasons contributed to

this: additional costs for seeds; mechanized farming;

higher wages; and increased costs of fertilizer, and

pesticides. Farmers in over half of the villages had

to buy more seeds because they were forced to

sow seeds two to three times owing to higher soil

salinity and irregular rains. Farmers spent roughly

an additional 12–24,000 kyat per acre for these

reasons.10

///The use of power tillers started in the

majority of villages immediately after Nargis

to replace the water buffaloes that had

perished during the cyclone///. Initially, many

villagers received tillers as part of the post-Nargis

aid effort. Later, larger farmers also purchased

tillers, sometimes to replace scarce labor. Tillers

were often shared or rented. Such mechanized

farming has contributed significantly to the cost of

production. Fuel costs11 amounted to 12,000 kyat per

acre, and renting a hand tractor cost 10–18,000 kyat

per acre, depending on the skills of the farmer. In

addition, there were maintenance and repair costs.

Farmers reported that the hand tractors had been

breaking down more frequently, owing to heavy use

over the past several years.

///Other inputs, notably labor, fertilizer, and

pesticides, also had become more expensive///.

The daily wage increased by 32 percent and 38

percent for female and male laborers, respectively.

The cost for pesticides increased by nearly 67

percent from before Nargis, not only because of

price increases but also because farmers had to use

more pesticides.12 Table 4 compares the production

costs of 2008 (before Nargis) with 2012–2013,

the last farming season covered by SIM. On the

whole, the costs of production was on average 53

percent higher for the 2012 monsoon paddy than

before Nargis (68 percent for small farmers) and

41 percent higher for the 2013 summer paddy than

before Nargis (33 percent for small farmers). At the

same time, crop prices and yields in the post-Nargis

period remained below their pre-Nargis levels.

**… while prices remained depressed**

///Paddy prices had gradually recovered since

2009 but remained below their pre-Nargis

levels///. In 2008, the decline in paddy prices because

of the loss in quality from Nargis was compounded

by the decline in the export market price as a

result of the global financial crisis. Nominal prices

recovered steadily until 2011 for both common

paddy varieties, Bay Gyar and Achon; by 2012,

however, they were still below their pre-Nargis

levels in about two-thirds of the villages (Figure 4).14

Table 4 Average cost of production by type of farmer

TYPES OF FARMERS

MONSON PADDY (IN LAKH13) SUMMER PADDY (IN LAKH)

Before Nargis 2012 Before Nargis 2012–2013

Large 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.6

Medium 0.7 1 1.2 1.4

Small 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.6

SECTION

02

4

3

2

1

0

Large Farmers Medium Farmers Small Farmers

2007 2008 2009

La kh

k ya

t fo

r 10

0 B

as ke

ts

5

2010 2011 2012

6

4

3

2

1

0

Achon Bay Gyar

2007 2008 2009

La kh

k ya

t fo

r 10

0 B

as ke

ts

5

2010 2011 2012

6

Figure 4 Average farm gate price of monsoon paddy 2007 to 2012

Figure 5 Farm gate prices of Bay Gyar variety in 2007 to 2012 by type of farmer

28

29

Five years after Nargis, the paddy price was barely above 4 lakh per 100 baskets and the yield for farmers in the majority of villages was far shy of 40 baskets per acre. Farmers were also deeply indebted, with one-third of small and medium farmers reporting having to give up part of their farmland to creditors. As a result, the majority of the small and medium farmers in the villages with poor and fair farming conditions had made no profit since Nargis. The cyclone largely undermined the capacity and resilience of many a farmer in the path of the storm. This loss in production capacity and resilience was detrimental to the livelihood outcomes of villagers in the Delta. Box 2 reflects on the long-term impact of Nargis on farming communities in the Delta.

**Why highly affected farming villages failed

to recover**

///The plight of highly affected farming villages

revolved around two detrimental cycles///. Firstly, Nargis disrupted the debt-harvest-repayment cycle that has been a central feature of farming in

the Delta. Farmers would borrow funds to plant and harvest and with the sale of the crop repay their creditors. Nargis struck the Delta around the time of the summer paddy harvest, with crops destroyed either in the fields or in storage. Lower yields meant less income for farmers who could not repay their debt. Even though aid provided agricultural inputs, farmers had to use fewer inputs, which in turn reduced yields. Secondly, Nargis damaged embankments and streams that are central to the ecology of farming villages. With few funds available for repair either during the post-Nargis aid effort or thereafter, the farmlands became more prone to flooding, salinity, and pest infestations, which also reduced yields and income. Figure 6 captures this predicament, which combines both direct impacts of Nargis, and indirect effects that played out over the longer term.

///Villagers attributed the low rice prices to two

primary reasons: the poor quality of paddy

and the need to sell paddy right after the

harvest///. According to many farmers, the quality

of paddy had declined since 2008 because of soil

salinity, climatic irregularities, and pest problems.

For example, the average price for Bay Gyar dropped

by over 10 percent in 2012, mainly owing to poor

product quality caused by irregular rains at harvest

time.

///Before Nargis, farmers could sell at least part

of their product some time after the harvest,

once the market price had gone up; now

many farmers could no longer afford to do

so///. Famers in two-thirds of the villages (including

lightly affected ones) reported that they had to sell

their product right after the harvest, as they were

in dire need of cash. For example, about one-third

of small and medium farmers in villages with poor

farming conditions had to sell their paddy well in

advance of the harvest (right around the time the

buyers could assume the fields would produce a

yield), usually at half the expected harvest price.

They used the money to cover the cost of harvesting

and to repay the debt they had incurred during the

planting season. This pressure to sell was reflected

in farm gate prices: larger farmers, who did not have

to sell in distress, consistently received a higher

price than small farmers (Figure 5). “If the paddy

is in the hands of farmers, the price is always low,

and when the paddy is in the hands of traders, the

price goes up” was a sentiment frequently heard in

the villages.

///“The problem of farmers in the Delta is lack

of profitability,”/// said a medium farmer. Before

Nargis, the price for monsoon paddy was close to

5 lakh per 100 baskets, with a yield well over 40

baskets per acre. Farmers were also less indebted.

SECTION

02

Debt Harvest

Repayment

Before Nargis

Cyclone Nargis

No funds for repair

Lower yields

Fewer inputs

More debt

Less income

More prone to external events

Damage to embankments and streams

Figure 6 Why highly affected farming villages failed to recover

31

30

from 2009 to 2010. The decline in fishing had a

much broader impact on the village economy in the

Delta, since many laborers and small farmers had

entered the sector when farming returns were low.

As of 2010, across the sample, fishing remained a

reliable income source only in Mawlamyinegyun

township, but in all but one village there farming

was the predominant livelihood.

///Fishermen found it difficult to explain the

reduction in fish stocks./// The primary causes were

likely to be, as SIM 3 pointed out, overfishing in

many Delta townships; environmental degradation

owing to Nargis (especially the destruction of

mangrove forests where fish used to spawn); the

use of unsustainable fishing methods (for instance,

using electric shocks or nets from aid providers that

were too tight); and the loss of knowledge owing to

loss of lives during Nargis.

///The challenges facing the fishing sector were

so drastic in several townships that small-

scale fishing may cease as a livelihood in

the most severely affected villages./// Reflecting

on four rounds of SIM, researchers considered

it possible that fishing may disappear in the near

future in 4 out of the 21 SIM villages where fishing

was practiced (Box 3). In fact, one-third to one-half

of small and medium fishermen in these villages

had already given up fishing and become migrant

workers on deep-sea fishing boats. In other fishing

villages, small and medium fishermen continued

their businesses, hoping that fish catch would

improve. In the meantime, they were making most

of their living as laborers.

///Fishermen were no longer able to benefit

from favorable fish prices./// Over the period

2008–2012, reported prices for prawn and shrimp

had remained largely constant while the price for

Box 2 How compound effects of natural disasters affected

struggling farmers

///Case 1: Livelihood outcomes affected by Nargis, and other external events///

A large farmer who owned 30 acres of farmland in Labutta township resumed

his work right after Nargis, even though he had lost some of his savings and

investment capital. That season, seeds cost 4,500 kyat per basket compared

to no more than 3,000 kyat per basket before Nargis. To cover the cost

increase, he had to borrow 20 lakh for farming inputs, four times the amount

he used to borrow, at an interest rate of 15 percent per month. Unfortunately,

the yield declined from a minimum of 40 baskets per acre before Nargis down

to a meager 18 baskets per acre. He reasoned that the decline in yield was due

to his inability to plow as much land; he had shared his draught cattle with

other farmers, whose cattle had died during Nargis.

In 2009, he experienced pest problems at the beginning of the farming season

and had to do a second sowing. Since then, two to three sowings every year

were common, owing to soil salinity. He also hired a hand tractor because

the longer duration of the tide after Nargis had made the soil softer, and his

draught cattle no longer sufficed. In addition, he had to use more pesticides

and fertilizer in order to combat soil degradation. With all this investment, his

yield eventually recovered to 30 baskets per acre, but his cost of production

also increased by 50 percent since before Nargis.

Worse still, the price of paddy now rarely reached 2 lakh for 100 baskets. This

was because he, as did most other farmers in his village, only received half of

the harvest farm gate price when they sold their paddy before harvest time.

He incurred a loss in the 2010 farming season and since then became highly

indebted. That year, he had to sell 8 acres of his farmland for 3 lakh per acre.

In 2012, his crops failed again owing to irregular rains at the time of harvest.

At the time of SIM 4 research, he was waiting for increased loans from the

Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (in the amount of 1 lakh per acre) and

the Farmland Law (which permits the sale of land); he was planning to borrow

more money and sell part of his remaining 22 acres, expecting higher prices for

his land as a result of the law.

///Case 2: The impact of the loss of a breadwinner///

Before Nargis, a family in Kungyangon township earned a living by cultivating

the 12 acres of land inherited from the husband’s parents. When the husband

died during Nargis, his relatives took back the land, as there was no one left

in the family who could work on the farm. The wife made a legal claim against

her in-laws for the land and was able to reclaim 6 of the 12 acres. However,

since no one in the household could work the land, their income declined.

They also became indebted from the legal expenses incurred during the land

dispute. The family eventually had to sell their house and compound to the

in-laws of one of their daughters. They managed to rent out their farmland to

earn a meager living.

Fishing Right after Nargis, fishing provided the best chance

for many villagers to earn an income, whether or

not they had been fishermen prior to the cyclone.

Fishermen reported that fish stocks had increased

right after the cyclone for some types of catches,

especially shrimp. However, as they had lost their

fishing gear in the cyclone, they were not able to

profit from this increase. In addition, the demand

for fish declined after Nargis, because people

believed that fish from Nargis-affected areas was

contaminated by the dead bodies that had floated

in the rivers. By 2009, because of the abundance

in fish stocks, a fairly steady yield, and the aid

effort, small fishermen and laborers were able to

make a living from fishing. Many borrowed money

from fish collectors as fishing was considered

profitable by both borrowers and lenders, even more

profitable than farming at the time. Simultaneously,

many villagers received fishing equipment from

aid providers, even in villages where fishing had

not been an important livelihood before Nargis.

Medium-size fishermen, who require more

expensive gear, did not receive any assistance but

were able to finance investments in motorboats and

stronger nets with credit from fish collectors.

**Fishing yields collapsed …**

The fishing sector in the eleven predominantly

fishing villages in the sample deteriorated sharply

from 2010 onwards, especially in the townships of

Pyapon, Dedaye, and Bogale. Fishermen considered

the drastic reduction in fish stocks and yield as

the primary factor for lower profitability. Figure

7 provides reported yield in five of the fishing

villages for which time series data are available. By

2012, yields for prawn and shrimp had decreased

drastically by c. 80 percent and for Hilsa fish by 60

percent from pre-Nargis levels. Particularly severe

was the decline in shrimp yield of over two-thirds

SECTION

02

200

150

100

50

0

Prawn Shrimp Hisla

Before Nargis 2008 2009

V is

s

250

2010 2011 2012

300

350

400

Figure 7 Average annual fishing yield in five fishing villages

32

33

Box 3 A fisherman’s predicament five years after Nargis

Before Nargis, a fisherman in Dedaye township caught mainly Hilsa and earned

7 to 8 lakh annually. He used to borrow only from the fish collector and repay

his debt with his catch. Unfortunately, the fisherman lost his nets and his boat

during Nargis, and did not receive any fishing gear from aid providers. In 2009,

in an attempt to start fishing again, he borrowed 10 lakh at a monthly interest

rate of 10 percent from a moneylender and some money from the fish collector

in the township. The catch was good and he earned 6 lakh—nearly as much as

before Nargis.

However, as the Hilsa catch increased and farming was not creating any work

in his village, many laborers borrowed money from the fish collector and

started fishing, too. With an increase in fishing, fish stocks began declining in

2010. Fortunately, the fish price more than doubled and he still earned 6 lakh in

2011, even though the catch was only half of what he had caught before Nargis.

Still, he could not repay the debt he owed to the moneylender. The hardest

time came in 2012 when the fish catch declined even further, and he earned

only 3 lakh that whole year. At the time of SIM research, he was worried that

he would have to sell his boat and nets in order to pay his debt, which would

deprive him of his livelihood.

Box 4 Governance of the fishing sector

Pyapon district in Ayeyarwady Region, which covers the townships of Pyapon,

Bogale, Kyaiklat, and Dedaye, is the only district in Ayeyarwady Region where

the licensed, commercial fishermen are allowed to fish year-round. In the other

five districts, licensed fishermen are allowed to fish only during the monsoon

season while non-commercial fishermen fish during the dry season. This rule

has been in force in Pyapon since 1991.

Before 2011, the licenses were distributed via an auction system, but the floor

price of the fishing plots being auctioned was not openly announced to the

public; only those affiliated with the District/Regional authorities were made

aware of it, so they were the only ones who would participate in the auction.

Since 2011, the auctions have gradually become more transparent, with the

floor price issued in advance to the public. Yet the auction became highly

competitive among businessmen rather than fishermen, which increased

the price. The real fishermen then had to repurchase the licenses from the

businessmen at more than double the price. In order to make up for higher

fees, fishermen used damaging fishing methods. It was only in 2013 that

the rules changed again: each person could purchase licenses for only up to

five fishing plots, and the size of the fishing plots was reduced to allow more

people to purchase licenses at the auction. The price of licenses had since

decreased, reducing the pressure to overfish.

By 2013, freshwater fishing in Pyapon district was under the jurisdiction of

the regional government. However, the rule in Pyapon District that allows the

license owners to fish year-round had yet to change. The significant decline

in fish catches in Pyapon, Dedaye, and Bogale townships can be mostly

attributed to this rule.

and Ngapudaw reported during SIM 4 that their fishing business were going reasonably well, all while fishermen in the other three townships had days when they had no catch due to the significant decline in fish stock.

///Governance of the fishing sector has played

an important role in reducing the ability

of fishermen to recover their livelihood./// Governance issues in the fishing sector, especially with regard to the distribution of fishing licenses, predated Nargis (Box 4). However, the limitations they set on fishing became more evident after the cyclone, when the fishing sector failed to recover. Pyapon and Dedaye had significantly fewer common fishing plots than the other townships, because most of the plots were sold to big fishermen by means of competitive auctions and a ballot system, making fishing licenses about ten times more expensive than elsewhere. In order to make up for higher fees, fishermen fished all season long, including during the spawning season, which severely affects fish stocks in the longer run. Fishermen also used damaging fishing methods, such as battery shocks, poison, or very tight nets. The result was overfishing and ecological damage. Moreover, bigger fishermen prevented small fishermen, among whom were many laborers, from engaging in subsistence fishing.

Hilsa, which was exported, increased by 77 percent

(Table 5). Even for Hilsa, however, the good price

could not offset the decline in yield, and profitability

declined significantly. Fishermen reported that they

now frequently experienced 2–3 days during each

two-week fishing cycle without catching a single

fish, even during the fishing season.15 They had

rarely experienced such low catch in years prior to

Nargis. Moreover, many small fishermen had to take

advance payments from fish collectors against their

future catch at a discount.

///The decline in fishing was not homogenous

across Delta townships, however./// Fishing

villages in the townships of Mawlamyinegyun,

Labutta, and Ngapudaw had been faring better

than villages in Pyapon, Bogale, and Dedaye.

Although they also experienced a decline in fish

stocks, the fishermen in Mawlamyinegyun, Labutta,

Table 5 Annual average fish prices in five fishing villages (in kyat per viss)

TYPES OF FISH BEFORE NARGIS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Prawn 1,533 1,600 1,750 1,600 1,533 1,567

Shrimp 750 900 900 867 933 1,000

Hilsa 16,700 17,200 20,250 24,650 25,900 30,400

SECTION

0234

35

Box 5 Laborers faced fewer opportunities in their villages

Before Nargis, a family of farm laborers in Bogale township used to earn

a secondary income of about 4,000 kyat daily from fishing and firewood

collection on a nearby island. After Nargis, the family survived on aid and did

not work regularly for a while. However, the laborers started facing hardship

in 2010 when food aid ceased. They learned that work opportunities in the

village had declined partly because of mechanized farming and partly because

farmers had hired laborers from other villages when they had been reluctant

to work. As a result, the family had to rely more on illegally collecting forest

products and fishing. They often had to pay 5,000 kyat to the police when they

were caught fishing around the island. Furthermore, the government started

banning resource extraction from the island in 2012 because of the rapid forest

depletion. By the time of SIM research, the family was living on 800-1,000 kyat

per day from fishing and was facing its hardest time yet.

Labor

///With farming and fishing sectors struggling

to recover, day laborers, who depend on

these livelihoods, found themselves in a dire

socioeconomic situation./// SIM 4 found laborers

in 27 villages doing poorly, with the situation of

laborers in 7 and 6 (moderately and lightly affected)

villages considered fair and good, respectively. Right

after Nargis, laborers received different types of

aid, especially food aid. “They have seen a whole

bag of rice in their homes thanks to aid providers,”

was a frequently heard statement by villagers about

laborers when recalling the aftermath of the cyclone.

Moreover, laborers from most villages benefited

from infrastructure rehabilitation projects funded

by aid providers. In some of the villages, they also

became assets-holders, as they received houses and

livelihood tools, particularly small-scale fishing

gear. Aid could not provide more than temporary

employment and partial relief, however. And when

external aid ceased in 2010, the laborers’ normal

livelihood sources in the Delta were no longer

robust enough to offer sufficient work for all.

///Wages at peak season had risen significantly

since Nargis but had not led to higher

living standards./// In the first two years after

Nargis, laborers could afford demanding a higher

reservation wage because they were receiving aid.

Between 2007 and the 2012–2013 paddy season,

daily wages rose by 32 percent and 38 percent for

female and male laborers, respectively (Table 6).

However, higher wages had not translated into

higher earnings. First, many farmers switching

to mechanized farming after Nargis reduced

employment opportunities for laborers in the long

run, compounding the effects of a sluggish recovery

in the farming sector. Second, higher wages are

paid at harvest time when the demand for labor is

at its peak. During the rest of the year there is an

oversupply of labor in all villages. Third, few laborers

have regular, full-timejobs, and most have to accept

low-paid odd jobs during the agricultural off-season.

Consequently, most laborers had to take an advance

from farmers before the harvest season at half the

wage rate they would earn at harvest time.

///A decline in secondary income sources put

a further strain on the livelihood of laborers./// Laborers in four villages used to depend on nipa weaving, which was traditionally used for roofing, especially during the rainy season, when there were few opportunities in farming. The nipa market declined after Nargis because many nipa weavers died and many nipa trees were destroyed in the cyclone. Later, villagers started to use more durable zinc, even though they did not like it as much because of the resulting heat; this was both a result of the aid effort and the scarcity of nipa. Subsistence fishing, an important income source for laborers in all townships and almost all villages, was affected by the decline in fish stocks. Laborers and other small fishermen in Pyapon and Dedaye townships were particularly affected, as big fishermen forbade them to engage in subsistence fishing in the rivers and creeks for which they had purchased expensive fishing licenses. In four villages, laborers depended on the forest to collect firewood and bamboo. This income source was affected by the depletion of the forest and a government regulation limiting the extraction of forest products (Box 5).

///The better the economic condition in and

around villages, the better the employment

situation for laborers./// Villages where farming had recovered and those most connected to urban centers offered the most opportunities. For instance, farmers in Mawlamyinegyun had been growing two crops since 2010 and had been creating more work opportunities as a result. Laborers in three villages in Labutta were doing well because of the construction of a nearby satellite town, which created jobs in construction, fish factories, and government offices. There, laborers could also increase their earnings by selling food and providing cycle-taxi services at the newly developed ferry jetty. Moreover, laborers in five villages (two in Kyaiklat and three in Labutta) were faring better socioeconomically, owing in part to better transportation networks developed after Nargis, such as new inter-village and inter-township roads and more regular boat services.

Table 6 Average wages at peak season 2007 and 2012–2013 (in kyat)

MALE LABOR WAGES FEMALE LABOR WAGES

2007 2012-2013 2007 2012-2013

Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly Daily Monthly

1,947 58,500 2,693 76,429 1,383 n.a. 1,832 n.a.

SECTION

0236

37

Box 6 The impact of Nargis on fish collectors

///Case 1:/// A fish collector in Ngapudaw could purchase 14 kits (big containers) of

different types of fish and shrimp 3–4 days per week before Nargis. Until 2011,

he was able to purchase 4–5 kits per week, but in 2013 he could only purchase

2 kits per week.

///Case 2:/// A fish collector in Dedaye township who had lent 2-3 lakhs each to

around 25 fishermen reported that he defaulted on nearly 100 lakh to the

license owners in town, as most of the fishermen were not able to repay their

debt in 2012.

///Case 3:/// One of the crab collectors in Mawlamyinegyun noted that the size

and weight of the crabs were smaller than they used to be. Before 2009, the

crabs weighed 7–8 Tikal (kyat Thar in Myanmar language) each, which earned

600–1,000 kyat per crab. With 7-8 crabs caught per day, villagers could earn

7,000–8,000 kyat. By 2013, the crabs caught were a lot smaller, weighing

3–4 Tikal each and earning much lower prices. Villagers who managed to

collect 60–70 crabs per day only earned 2,000–3,000 kyat. The crab collector

attributed the decline in the quantity and weight of the crabs to the fact that

struggling villagers would catch anything they could find rather than waiting

until the young crabs had matured.

Box 7 The return of a fish-mill owner

A fish-mill owner in the village in Labutta township restarted his business

in 2011 by pawning his gold. At the time, he saw an opportunity to make a

profit by entering the less competitive market in his village. He noticed that

the fishermen in his village were not able to sell Myin, a type of fish good for

fish-paste, because other mill owners were not coming to the village. He then

provided advance funds to eleven fishermen to return to the sea in smaller

boats and collect Myin. The fishermen were able to catch 13,000 viss of Myin

in 2011 (compared to 15,000 viss before Nargis). The fish-mill owner bought

the fish and made fish-paste, which he sold in other parts of Myanmar. Myin

catch declined in 2012 but not significantly, and his business continued to be

profitable. In addition to the eleven fishermen who were fishing Myin at sea,

there were now ten fishermen who fished Myin for him in nearby rivers.

///There were fish-paste makers in two of the

sample villages, one in Labutta and another

one in Pyapon./// Overall, fish-mills were struggling, but for different reasons. There had been four fish-mills in a village in Labutta before Nargis, along with 30 big fishermen and 10–12 smaller fishermen. The big fishermen went to sea with big boats that could carry 2,500 tons of fish. The smaller fishermen only fished in the river with small boats. They were catching Myin, a type of fish good for making fish-paste. During Nargis, the fish-mills lost laborers, equipment, and capital. After Nargis, small fishermen could resume fishing with boats supplied by aid providers, but the nets they received were not suitable for Myin fishing. With less fish supply, only one of the fish-mills was able to restart business. At the same time, the market for fish-paste shrank, as buyers from upper Myanmar preferred not to purchase fish-paste from the Delta in the aftermath of the cyclone. The price of fish-paste declined from over 5,000 kyat before Nargis to 3,500–4,000 kyat per ten viss after the cyclone. To keep his business afloat, the only remaining fish miller started to use dye that the Myanmar Food and Drug Administration determined was contaminated, and his business plummeted. However, a decline in supply had also created opportunities for new businesses to emerge in this market, and by 2013 there were two other fish-mills in the village in Labutta (Box 7). 18

///There were salt makers in only one sample

village in Ngapudaw township./// Salt making, which was the village’s main livelihood, declined significantly because of a decline in the salt price. Prior to Nargis, salt would fetch 70–80 kyat per viss. Right after Nargis, salt makers produced hardly any salt because of the damages incurred from the cyclone, and the price of salt increased to 300 kyat. Since 2009, however, the price of salt had been declining, reaching only 30–40 kyat per viss in 2010 and 2011. Over one-half of the 200 salt makers in the village tract exited the business when the price reached 20 kyat per viss in 2012–2013, leaving

Small Enterprises ///The livelihood of small entrepreneurs is a

reflection of the villages’ socioeconomic

conditions./// SIM 4 studied the socioeconomic situation for the following small enterprises: shopkeepers, rice millers, fish collectors, fish-paste makers, salt farmers, charcoal makers, and thatch makers.

///The number of shopkeepers had increased

since 2010 in all sample villages./// In two-thirds of the villages, the number increased two to five times. However, there were few larger shops in the villages. Larger shopkeepers, who sell food in large quantities as well as various household goods, reduced sales on credit significantly from 2010 onwards as buyers, especially laborers, defaulted. As a result, their sales declined significantly. Larger shopkeepers who could earn 80–100,000 kyat per day prior to Nargis saw sales drop to 30–50,000 kyat per day. They started to sell other goods, such as diesel and spare parts for hand tractors and vehicles, in order to diversify. At the same time, other villagers, especially farmers, opened small shops in most of the villages as their economic situation declined and they, too, tried to diversify. In addition, families of laborers who received remittances and those who borrowed from microfinance projects opened small shops as well. Most of them sold on credit to enter the business, but this was unstable, as customers continued to default. In those villages with better connectivity to urban areas, shopkeepers of all sizes struggled, as their customers were able to buy goods at lower prices in the cities, thanks to their lower transportation costs.

///All rice millers in the sample villages faced

increasing competition from larger rice mills

in the towns./// There were 8 larger rice mills and 9 smaller rice mills in 16 of the 40 SIM villages. The larger mills ran all season long, while the small mills ran only when farmers needed to grind paddy for family consumption. Twelve of these 17 mills (6 larger and 6 smaller ones) were struggling for two

main reasons. First, owing to better transportation, farmers could grind rice at the more modern mills in the towns that had better technology and more capacity at lower prices. Second, farmers could not save paddy after harvesting. Before Nargis, farmers saved paddy and ground it later when the price was higher. In 2013, farmers had to sell their paddy right after the harvest, which also hurt the rice millers. Only five millers who offered additional services, such as collecting the paddy free of charge or grinding on credit, were doing better. One of these rice millers explained that he was in a position to offer these services because he himself was financially strong (being a large farmer) and had access to low-interest credit.

///Most of the fish collectors interviewed in SIM

4 were struggling because of the increased

cost of fishing licenses and the decline in

fish catches./// There were 1–2 fish collectors in each fishing village. Fish collectors in all townships commonly purchase fishing rights for certain plots informally, and often on credit, from big fishermen and businessmen who in turn buy them via auctions. While fishermen have been suffering since 2010, fish collectors have been experiencing a worse economic situation only since 2012. Historically, most of the fishermen borrowed from the collectors and repaid with their catch. Until 2009, the catch was large enough for them to repay all their debt, owing also to steady or increasing prices. By 2012, the decline in fish stock had become so severe that fishermen could no longer afford to repay their debt. Consequently, the fish collectors also defaulted on the loans they had received from the big fishermen (Box 6).16 Crab collectors in Bogale, Dedaye, Pyapon, Mawlamyinegyun, and Ngapudaw townships found themselves in a similar predicament because of the decline in catches, as well as a reduction in the size and weight (and hence price) of the crabs. Only collectors dealing in eel as well as those who were able to supplement their business with other income sources, such as farming and shopkeeping, were faring better. 17

SECTION

02 Debt and Credit

8

6

4

2

0

Highly Aff ected Moderately Aff ected Lightly Aff ected

Villages able to settle their

loans regularly

Villages unable to repay

loans regularly

Villages in a

debt trap

N um

be r

of V

ill ag

es

Figure 8 Indebtedness by degree of affectedness

38

39

were struggling, they were able to repay only part

of their debt every harvest season. They rarely had

debts that were outstanding for long, settling them

by selling their assets. They hoped to repay all their

debt and start investing once they had a year with a

good yield and price. In the remaining eight villages

there was no severe problem of indebtedness;

villagers generally had access to loans, which they

were able to settle after every farming season.

///Indebtedness was closely related to the

severity of the cyclone’s impact./// Of the 30

moderately and highly affected villages in the

sample, only three moderately affected ones did not

face debt problems. Overall, in only one-quarter

of villages were villagers able to settle their loans

regularly (Figure 8). Villagers were struggling to

repay debts in all of the highly affected villages.

**Indebtedness plagued recovery in

Delta villages**

///Debt continued to plague recovery in the

majority of villages./// Thirty to forty percent of

households in 14 sample villages, especially small

and medium farmers, were deeply indebted. Thirty

to forty percent of households in 18 other villagers

were struggling to repay their debt. Only in 8 villages

were villagers able to repay their debt regularly. In

the 14 highly indebted villages, villagers have not

been able to repay even the debts they had owed

since before Nargis. Some repaid part of their debt

by selling or pawning their assets, especially their

land and farming tools. Yet because of their inability

to increase their productivity, owing to a lack of

capital and repeated negative external events, they

remained indebted and had only a slim hope of being

free from debt. In the 18 villages where villagers

only about 90 salt makers. According to the salt

makers, the price declined because of the product’s

low quality compared to imported salt from

India and China; the poor technology used in salt

production in Myanmar rendered local salt makers

uncompetitive.

///Salt makers diversified their business./// Some

of them opened shops or started trading, while

three-quarters of salt makers started to convert part

of their land to farming as early as 2011. Their land

was highly saline, however, and their yields were low

as a result. Still, they kept growing paddy with the

expectation that the yield would gradually increase

as the soil quality improved. The laborers on salt

farms were much more dependent on salt makers

than the farming laborers. As a consequence, many

former salt workers also became farm laborers. Salt

makers indicated that they would have to gradually

convert all their land to paddy farming if the latter

was more profitable. Even so, the remaining salt

makers had to cut their labor force by about one-

third, owing to declining profits.

///Charcoal and thatch making were declining

businesses in the sample villages./// In the forests in Ngapudaw and Labutta where the villagers used to collect wood to make charcoal, the government gave licenses to companies in 2010–2011 to log wood and grow rubber. At the same time, the market demand for charcoal in cities like Yangon and Pathein, where the charcoal was sold, was declining as consumers were switching to (cleaner and cheaper) gas and electricity. As a result, charcoal makers in two villages of Ngapudaw and Labutta had almost disappeared. Only one charcoal maker in the village in Labutta continued to sell charcoal made by small charcoal makers from other villages, but sales were declining. Thatch making also suffered from the shift to zinc as a more durable and stronger roofing material. Businesses in two villages in Bogale and Dedaye had almost ceased to exist, while one in Ngapudaw continued to operate. In all these cases, the decline of these businesses had an impact on the laborers (especially female laborers), for whom charcoal and thatch making were a primary income source during the agricultural off-season.

SECTION

02

20

15

10

5

0

Large Farmers Medium Farmers Small Farmers

Before Nargis One Year

aft er Nargis

Two Years

aft er Nargis

La kh

k ya

t

Five Years

aft er Nargis

Medium Fishermen Small Fishermen Laborers

Figure 9 Average debt by borrower before and after Nargis by type of livelihood

40

41

villages with poor farming conditions had to pawn

assets and/or rent out or sell their land, and many

creditors seized their collateral, particularly land;

the majority of land transactions in the SIM villages

took place that year.

///Fishermen experienced a significant drop in

debt within the first year after Nargis, only

to witness a dramatic increase by 2010.///

In the case of small fishermen by over 10 times

before decreasing again. In 2009, fish catches were

reasonably good, and the prices showed an upward

trend. This encouraged fishermen to invest more in

the business and to replace the equipment they had

lost during Nargis. Simultaneously, middlemen were

encouraged by the promising prospects in the sector

and lent more. As catches started to decline by 2010,

fishermen struggled to repay their loans. While

they were able to settle part of their debt to fish

collectors in fish, around one-half of the fishermen

eventually defaulted on their debts to private

moneylenders. Five years after Nargis, catching not

a single fish for several days even during the fishing

season, there were more fishermen than not who

were on the brink of pawning or selling their boats

and nets not only to repay their debts but also for

their own survival. 19

///Many laborers were stuck in a debt trap./// Laborers have the least capacity to repay debt. They need to borrow for consumption and are thus more affected by increases in prices of basic necessities. Their ability to repay is also a direct function of the economic situation of farmers and fishermen. Laborers’ average level of debt increased by 80 percent within two years of Nargis. This may reflect not only their need to rebuild their livelihoods after the cyclone but also a greater supply of credit, including from microfinance schemes that existed in 40 percent of the villages. In addition, sales on credit became more prevalent in at least eight villages with good economic prospects. By 2013, average debt had decreased by almost 20 percent, given laborers’ lack of creditworthiness. The average amount of 1.5 lakh in debt, five years after Nargis, was equivalent to about two months’ wages. In an area suffering from a protracted economic crisis, this amount posed severe challenges to people surviving at the bare minimum. Laborers in about two-thirds of the villages had to take an advance on their wages from farmers for their daily consumption. Once they performed the work, they received only a portion of the remaining wage in order to repay their debt, leaving them little to survive on. This was a debt cycle that laborers in many villages could not

escape from.

**The debt burden was significantly higher than before Nargis … **

///The average amount of debt was significantly

higher for all types of livelihoods as

compared to before Nargis./// The average debt was 1.3–1.6 times higher for medium and small farmers and fishermen as well as for laborers. At the same time, the average debt of large farmers was over 3 times higher (Figure 9). These increases were not steady, however, and masked significant variations. Furthermore, Nargis impacted the availability of credit in two important ways. First, many credit suppliers were facing economic hardship themselves and were unable to resume lending at pre-Nargis levels. Second, in many villages, creditors had been increasingly seizing collateral 2–3 years after Nargis. As a result, some small farmers, fishermen, and laborers could no longer access credit because they had no more

collateral.

**… but the absolute amount of debt masked

severe deprivation**

///The level of indebtedness of farmers varied

significantly after Nargis./// Within one year of

the cyclone, the average outstanding debt of large

farmers more than doubled, while that of medium

and small farmers showed a significant drop by

over 20 percent and 50 percent, respectively.

Between 2009 and 2013, small farmers experienced

the sharpest increase in average indebtedness, by

a factor of 3. Immediately after Nargis, credit was

scarce, and farmers were forced to sell or pawn

assets to repay their debt. Two years after Nargis,

when yield and prices had rebounded, many farmers

were able to repay their debts, which allowed them

to borrow more to reinvest in their farmland.

However, the farming sector declined again, owing

to external events, and with it farmers’ ability to

repay. By 2011, one-fifth to one-half of farmers in

SECTION

0242

43

DEBT HELD BY * FREQUENCY

Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank 64

Private moneylenders 59

Large farmers 35

Microfinance providers 33

Traders (crop traders) 32

Relatives/friends 29

Shopkeepers 14

Fish collectors 10

Rice millers 9

Gold/pawn shops 8

Input suppliers (fertilizer, and diesel) 5

**Delta villagers continued to rely on multiple

credit sources …**

///Sources of credit in the Delta remained

unchanged during the five years following

Nargis, but their relative importance

evolved./// Until the time of SIM 3 in 2010, informal

moneylenders— including large farmers, relatives,

friends,r and private moneylenders— were the

primary sources of credit. By 2012, however, the

Myanmar Agricultural Development Bank (MADB)

had overtaken private moneylenders as the most

important source of credit (Table 7). Microfinance

providers and traders also gained prominence,

while fish collectors and shopkeepers lost ground

compared to SIM 3. Villagers viewed microloans

favorably, as their terms were better than those of

their traditional sources. However, microfinance did

not necessarily reduce indebtedness. Laborers and

small farmers in about one-quarter of the villages

relied primarily on private moneylenders to repay

microloans in order to remain eligible for borrowing

in the future.

**… but their relative importance changed …**

///The growing popularity of MADB was a direct

result of a change in its lending policy./// Before

Nargis, MADB provided loans only in the amount

of 7,000 kyat per acre. Since Nargis, the loan size

had increased sevenfold: from 8,000 kyat (2008)

to 10,000 kyat (2009), 20,000 kyat (2010), 40,000

kyat (2011) and 50,000 kyat (2012). In the initial

years after Nargis, farmers preferred informal

moneylenders over MADB. This was due to the

fact that the procedure to access and repay the

money borrowed from MADB was not considered

worthwhile, given the small amount that was

accessible. Because of the increases since then, the

increases since then, by 2013, farmers were looking

forward to receiving loans from MADB. Many

farmers, especially medium and some large farmers,

reported that they would no longer borrow money

from private moneylenders if MADB increased its

loan size to 100,000 kyat per acre, as MADB did

starting with the 2013 monsoon season.

///The impact of MADB loans on the availability

of credit and indebtedness varied across

villages./// On the one hand, in one-quarter of the

villages, the anticipation of increased MADB loan

amounts prompted informal moneylenders to lend

more money to farmers, since substantial MADB

loans were expected to make it easier for farmers to

repay the informal loans. On the other hand, small

farmers actually had difficulties repaying MADB

loans. Because yield was lower than expected,

50,000 kyat per acre proved too high a burden for

farmers to repay in over one-quarter of the villages.

This was aggravated by the fact that some farmers

were using MADB loans to pay education expenses

for their children (especially for high school and

university attendance) rather than for productive

purposes. In order to not default on their MADB

loans and thus be prevented from borrowing

again for the next season, the farmers resorted to

borrowing from informal lenders at higher interest

rates to repay MADB.

///Villagers in the Delta continued to rely on

a multitude of credit sources./// The number of

sources ranged from five for medium fishermen

to nine for medium farmers. Small farmers and

laborers had eight credit sources each (Table 8). At

the same time, creditors diversified their borrowers

as well. Private moneylenders and microfinance

providers lent to all seven types of borrowers, and

traders, relatives, and friends lent to six types. The

table confirms MADB’s importance, especially for

medium and small farmers.

///The relative importance of informal

moneylenders was also changing over time.///

Within one year of Nargis, both borrowers and

lenders reported a crunch in credit for farmers.

Borrowers’ traditional sources—rice millers;

rice traders; input suppliers (especially fertilizer

shops); and large farmers (for medium and small

farmers)—faced financial difficulties themselves

and were not able to supply credit; they also did not

trust the farmers’ ability to repay. Starting in 2010,

credit supply from these sources increased again,

Table 7 Sources of credit

* For farmers, fishermen, small businesses, and laborers.

Note: Number of times mentioned by respondents in focus group discussions and key informant interviews.

CREDITORS LARGE

FARMERS MEDIUM

FARMERS SMALL

FARMERS LARGE

FISHERMEN MEDIUM

FISHERMEN SMALL

FISHERMEN LABORERS

Myanmar Agricultural Development

Bank 15 27 22

Private moneylenders 4 12 11 6 5 7 14

Large farmers 7 8 1 2 17

Microfinance providers 3 6 5 1 6 4 14

Traders 13 7 12 3 2

Relatives/friends 8 4 3 2 4 8

Shopkeepers 2 12

Fish collectors 2 3 6 2

Rice millers 3 3 3

Gold/pawn shops 2 1 1 1 3

Input suppliers 2 1 1

Table 8 Credit sources by type of borrower

Note: Number of times mentioned by respondents in focus group discussions and key informant interviews.

SECTION

0244

45

decreased over time, however, since they had been

hiring fewer laborers. With fewer jobs and less

income, laborers faced even greater challenges

in repaying loans—a critical reason for why

shopkeepers had also reduced their lending to

this group.

**… leading to more favorable credit

terms overall**

///The popularity of MADB and microfinance

loans was explained by the low-interest

rates these creditors were charging./// MADB

loans carried an interest rate of 0.75 percent per

month, while microfinance providers charged 2–3

percent. These rates were significantly lower than

those demanded by informal moneylenders, which

commonly reached 20–30 percent per month.

///The interest rates charged by other creditors

remained largely unchanged./// Farmers in 30

villages reported that interest rates remained

unchanged since before the cyclone. In five villages,

interest rates increased from around 6–7 percent

per month to over 10 percent, while in five other

villages interest rates decreased from 10 percent per

month to 6–7 percent. The villages with increased

rates suffered from high levels of indebtedness;

four of the five were also highly affected by Nargis.

The villages with lower interest rates were only

lightly affected by Nargis, were easily accessible,

and had recovered from the cyclone. The informal

credit market in those villages had become more

competitive in 2011–2012, as some of the villagers

were able to obtain credit in the nearby towns at

a low-interest rate, which they on-lent to other

villagers at lower than the prevailing interest rates.

///Fishermen and laborers faced the

highest interest rates, a reflection of their

deteriorating economic condition./// Two years

after Nargis, these groups faced rates ranging from

5–20 percent per month. Three years later, rates

from several sources had surpassed 20 percent

and reached up to 30 percent per month for small fishermen. A telling sign of the crisis in the fishing sector was the fact that by 2013, private moneylenders became a more important source of credit for small and medium fishermen than fish collectors. Many of those lenders who knew the fishing sector best had stopped investing in it.

///The relationship between formal and informal

credit suppliers was complex./// Higher-risk borrowers were charged higher rates, a sign of a functioning informal credit market. Low-interest loans, especially from MADB, have been able to increasingly crowd out more expensive informal moneylenders, but not in sufficient quantity to fully replace them. At the same time, these informal lenders served an important bridging function for borrowers who risked defaulting on MADB loans, which would lead to future ineligibility. This phenomenon reflected the broader socioeconomic predicament of Delta villages; high interest rates restrained recovery, but they were high because many villagers had yet to recover economically and were, therefore, at risk of defaulting on their debt. A massive injection of low-interest credit provided breathing space, especially for small and medium farmers, but it could not enhance their socioeconomic prospects. The cumulative effects of Nargis still cast their shadows over all livelihood groups in the Delta.

especially from rice traders. However, it was mostly

large farmers who benefited from this increase in

credit from traditional suppliers, and it was they

who were able to regularly settle their debts. Lacking

assets that could be used as collateral, small farmers

across villages regardless of the level of affectedness

found their access to credit still constrained

despite their use of multiple sources. Furthermore,

many large farmers, particularly in highly affected

villages, were still unable to resume their lending to

smaller farmers and laborers because of their own

economic situations.

///Traditionally, fishermen had access to

comparatively fewer credit sources than

farmers and laborers./// Private moneylenders

and fish collectors used to be their main sources of

credit. However, because of the decline in the fishing

industry, these sources had less incentive to lend, a

gap that microfinance providers could not fill.

///The main sources of credit for laborers

remained unchanged, but the availability

of credit had declined./// Laborers had four

sources of almost equal importance: large farmers,

private moneylenders, microfinance providers,

and shopkeepers. The importance of large farmers

SECTION

02

4

3

2

1

0

Highly Aff ected Moderately Aff ected Lightly Aff ected

High Level Moderate Level Low Level

N um

be r

of V

ill ag

es

5

No Transactions

6

7

8

Figure 10 Level of land transactions since 2010 by degree of cyclone-affectedness

46

47

///Half of the highly affected villages had a

high number of land transactions./// This did

not necessarily mean, however, that the situation

regarding land was better in the other highly

affected villages. Farmers in these villages reported

that they wanted to sell their land if there were

people willing to purchase it. The lack of demand

for land resulted from the fact that much of the

farmland was at a high risk of flooding and soil

degradation since Nargis.

**… leading to an increasingly unequal

distribution of land**

///A highly unequal distribution of land was

reported in six of the eleven villages with

a high number of transactions./// In five of

these, most of the land owned by small farmers

had been acquired by their creditors. Four of

these villages were highly affected by Nargis, and

villagers reported that a handful of people now

owned between one-quarter and one-half of the

total landholdings. The two remaining villages were

moderately affected. There, too, most of the small

farmers had lost their land (Box 8).

**Debt, land transactions, and the

Farmland Law**

///The Farmland Law affected village life

in various ways./// Villagers reported that the

government was collecting lists of farmers who were

actually engaged in farming. The farmers believed

that this information would be used to provide them

with title to the farmland they were cultivating.

This process was not without complications.

Disputes had erupted in over half of the villages,

involving farmers who had engaged in informal land

transactions or used informally acquired land as

collateral. In about one-fifth of the villages, there

were around ten cases of disputes per village. In

many instances, those farming or ‘owning’ the land

were not the ones who held the original land user

rights, leading to competing claims. Farmers felt that

resolving these claims and establishing accurate lists

would be a time-consuming process which would

delay the formal registration and land titling process

for everyone. Village leaders perceived many cases

as politically instigated, in the sense that some of the

political parties and people affiliated with political

parties in the village were seen as instigating farmers

to reclaim their land.

///At least ten percent of farmers in nearly one

third of the sample villages indicated that

they would sell or pawn their land once the

Farmland Law was fully enforced and their

land was properly registered./// This occurred

especially in Dedaye and Kungyangon townships,

where farmers grew two crops. They expected these

transactions to be more profitable than selling or

pawning land informally. In several villages with

a strong farming sector, the price of farmland had

increased from 5–6 lakh per acre to 10–15 lakh in

2012, which farmers attributed to the Farmland Law.

repay their debt, farmers had to increasingly rely on

selling, pawning, or renting out their land.

///Over one-quarter of sample villages saw a high

level of land transactions since 2010.///

20 All but

one of these villages were highly or moderately

affected by Nargis (Figure 10). Only twelve

villages saw no land transactions, none of them

highly affected. The most common type of land

transaction, in about half of the villages, was

pawning (“le pyan ngwe pyan”, or “money return-

land return”). The price of land varied from as low

as 2 lakh per acre to as much as 15 lakh per acre.

Most of the villages without land transactions

were lightly affected, located in the townships of

Kyaiklat and Ngapudaw, as well as three fishing

villages where farming was less important to the

local economy.

Land **Continued economic strain led to an

increasing number of land transactions …**

///Low yield and continuing indebtedness had

resulted in an increasing number of land

transactions./// Six months after Nargis, during

SIM 1, farmers believed that, in case of difficulty

in repaying their debt, creditors would extend the

repayment period of outstanding loans because of

their long-term relations. Many did not expect their

economic woes to last for a protracted period. One

year after Nargis, farmers reluctantly acknowledged

that they would have to repay their debt by selling

land if creditors lost their patience; and they soon

did. With the farming crisis continuing and creditors

in distress as well, land transactions started in

2009–2010 and intensified in 2011–2012. Unable to

Box 8 Significant changes in landholdings

///Case 1:/// One of the highly affected villages in Dedaye township had 32 farmers and a total landholding size of 426 acres. Of these, about 120 acres were now in the

hands of three people —two paddy traders and a large farmer from the village.

///Case 2:/// One of the highly affected villages in Bogale township had 98 farmers and a total landholding size of about 1,270 acres. A large farmer who also owned the

village’s licensed pawn shop now owned over 400 acres.

///Case 3:/// In another highly affected village in Dedaye township with 43 farmers, 21 farmers from a nearby village came to own over 500 acres, which was half of the

total landholding of the village.

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49

Box 9 More people working longer hours in the Delta

A farmer reported that his family had been having dinner increasingly late over the last two years. His wife used to stay at home and cook and bring lunch to the

farm at around 10:00 am. They used to have dinner when they came back from the farm, before it was fully dark. Now, all family members including his wife had to

work outside the home. His three-year old grandchild had to be taken to the fields, as everyone at home had to work. His wife and daughters cooked only when they

came back from the farm. They also had to wake up early in the morning at around 4.00 am to cook, in order to get to work on time. Now the family ate dinner late

and altogether had less time to rest and to spend with each other.

migrating since 2010, with nearly half of village

youth migrating in some instances. They ended up

in big cities like Yangon and Pathein and worked

mostly in factories. Some also worked in restaurants,

homes, and shops. In one-third of the villages, one

or two young people from a village would migrate

to a big city and establish a network that other

youngsters could tap into. Villagers reported that

young people, including the children of farmers,

were less interested on working on the family

farms—the push of a village in crisis was amplified

by the perceived attractions of life in the city.

///Better transportation led to a new form of

migration—daily commuting./// Local seasonal

migration is a long-established practice, especially

during the growing and harvesting seasons of

summer paddy. Since 2010, 6–7 villages had become

better connected to growing urban centers (e.g.,

through daily boat schedules). For instance, villages

in Kyaiklat benefited from the development of three

universities in nearby Maubin district. Labutta had

also grown because of development in its new town

and subsequent road construction. Mawlamyinegyun

now had a better road connection to Maubin and

hence Yangon. Villagers took advantage of these

improved connections by boat or bus and commuted

daily to nearby towns, where many of them worked

in rice mills and fish factories.

///Fishermen found a coping mechanism of

their own./// After several years of declining catch,

about half of the fishing families, particularly the

younger generation, in eight villages that used to rely

on streams and rivers to fish (especially in Pyapon,

but also in Bogale and Dedaye) found themselves

working on big fishing boats in the Indian Ocean,

staying away from home for months at a time. They

were concerned about the risks on the high seas

and their prolonged absences. But they migrated

nonetheless for want of a better alternative.

Changing agricultural practices

///Farmers in four villages, three in

Mawlamyinegyun and one in Bogale, started

to grow two paddy crops since 2010./// Two

of them had grown beans during the summer

before Nargis. However, the price for beans had

been fluctuating a lot after Nargis, and farmers

had incurred significant losses. All these villages

had suffered from reduced yields during the main

(monsoon) season. By growing a second paddy

crop during the summer season, many farmers had

been able to supplement their income. However,

many small and medium farmers could not afford

the necessary investment to grow the second paddy

crop. This coping mechanism also did not work in all

agroecological areas of the Delta.

Selling assets and changing livelihoods

///Farmers and fishermen had been increasingly

relying on selling assets that sustained their

livelihoods./// Changes in livelihoods remained an

important strategy to adapt to continuous economic

distress. In addition to selling or pawning land,

farmers had sold their farming tools, and fishermen

sold their boats and fishing gears. This strategy

Coping Mechanisms ///Many villagers had been employing various

mechanisms to cope with the protracted

economic crisis in their villages, and their

resilience was wearing thin./// As in previous

rounds of SIM, coping strategies were of two kinds:

increasing income and reducing expenditure.

However, the intensity with which they were used

had grown since 2010.

Strategies to increase income Villagers of different livelihoods sought to increase

income through five important ways: working longer

hours, migrating, changing agricultural practices,

selling assets, and changing livelihoods.

Working longer hours

///People in all sample villages reported that

they had to work longer hours in order to

make ends meet./// Small and medium farmers who

could not produce enough on their own land needed

to work as laborers on other villagers’ lands during

the growing and harvesting seasons. Their family

members also had to work. Whereas before and

right after Nargis the wives of farmers mostly stayed

at home, cooked, looked after the children, and

undertook other household chores, nowadays they

had to work in the fields as well. Villagers noted that

many house doors were closed during the daytime

because all household members were out working—

consequently reducing social interaction, an

essential element of village life. Villagers generally

found less time to rest these days, but women even

less so (Box 9).

///Villagers were supplementing their income

through opening small grocery shops./// SIM

researchers found many more shops selling goods

like betel, snacks, cooking oil, and rice than in 2010,

especially in villages that were more accessible to

towns. These shops were mostly owned by small and

medium farmers who used remittances provided

by family members who had migrated. Most of

these shops were not sustainable for more than

a few months. However, as the villagers to whom

they sold on credit often were not in a position to

repay. Moreover, shop owners frequently ended up

consuming their stock as well.

Migrating

///The most common coping strategy for

laborers to escape from their hardship was

migration./// In 40 percent of the villages, two-thirds

or more of the households had at least one member

who had migrated. Migration was one of the most

common coping methods used by Delta villagers

of all livelihoods: farmers, fishermen and laborers.

Immediately after the cyclone, villagers, especially

laborers, migrated to escape job scarcity and the

trauma left by Nargis. Many of these migrants

returned to their villages a year or two later, as they

found the working conditions in the towns and cities

harsh and the wages low. Furthermore, farming

in most of the villages seemed to have recovered.

However, five years after Nargis, the Delta economy

was still struggling, leaving migration as a last resort

for many laborers.

///Delta villagers did not migrate for economic

reasons alone./// Many migrants were between the

ages of 17 and 25. Many more of them had been

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51

Insert 1 How findings from SIM compare with findings from QSEM on livelihoods

Most of QSEM’s findings until 2013 were consistent with those of SIM. QSEM found similar weather-related distress, low agricultural returns, and low profit margins

across regions. This resulted in a high level of risk aversion among farmers to try new seeds and fertilizer, even if they were supplied by a nongovernmental

organization. QSEM also found that in the Delta, small and medium farmers who lacked reliable fertilizer suppliers were often cheated with fake fertilizer, making

them more reluctant to switch brands.

Mechanization also took place in QSEM villages. QSEM found that many farmers in the Delta had jointly rented power tillers, ploughs, and draught cattle since Nargis,

often from large farmers, to replace the animals and equipment lost in the cyclone. The level of mechanization was not, however, on a large-enough scale to reduce

work opportunities for laborers. Rather, among the most consistent findings across regions and QSEM rounds, including in the Delta, was increasing labor scarcity,

owing to migration.

Among the challenges mentioned by fishermen in QSEM was the opacity in obtaining licenses, though this was beginning to change. There was a wide variation

in the processes and costs for obtaining licenses across villages, and no receipts were ever provided. QSEM found in 2013 that the Department of Fisheries

in Ayeyarwady had increased transparency in the fishing license auctions by moving the location from the region to the township level, which eliminated the

middlemen, but most interviewed villagers were not aware of this change.

Consistent with SIM, QSEM also found higher levels of indebtedness, land disputes, and migration as signs of distress in all regions. In Mawlamyinegyun township,

QSEM found a significant increase in the number of small-scale land disputes in 2013. In one village tract alone, there were 70 new land dispute cases in a year

across six villages. The main drivers of the disputes appeared to be indebtedness and rising land prices. Most cases that emerged were connected to debt; many

smallholder farmers who had informally lost their land through debt had begun, with the advent of the farmers’ union and land registration, to reclaim their original

farmland. The larger landholders, however, did not want to return this land. Meanwhile, there was an increase in the number of out-migrants in all QSEM villages in

the Delta.

enabled families to maintain a minimum level of

consumption. It also, however, deprived them of the

means to regain their income. Between 2010 and

2013, between 20 and 50 percent of medium and

small farmers became laborers in about half of the villages with poor farming conditions. This was even more common in the six villages with the highest number of land transactions, where small farmers lost their land to creditors or sold their land in order to repay their debt. Young people in about half of these farmers-turned-laborers families migrated to the big towns and cities, while the parents remained in their native villages and earned livings as laborers. At the same time, the trend of small fishermen becoming laborers continued in eight villages.

Strategies to

reduce expenditure

///In order to cope with economic hardship,

people in the Delta also continued to apply a

range of mechanisms to reduce expenditure,///

such as reducing the number of meals, social

expenditure, and investment in farming input.

Education and health expenditure had never been a

high priority for villagers, and there were no official

fees for primary education in Myanmar. However,

there were instances where parents sold or pawned

their land to send their children to high school or

university.

///Reducing the number of meals remained

an important way to reduce expenditure in

about one-third of the villages, regardless

of affectedness./// Laborers were the worst- affected livelihood group. In 5–6 villages, about 10 percent of laborers, especially men, had started to skip their lunch and consume betel, cigars, and coffee and tea mix instead, which cost them only 100–200 kyat. This strategy may keep the balance in their households’ books in the short-term, but, if continued for a prolonged period of time, may have adverse effects on their ability to work or require higher health expenses.

///Reducing social expenditure was one of the

most significant forms of reducing household

expenditure./// Of particular relevance were the costs for weddings and funerals. Small and medium farmers and laborers in almost three-quarters of the villages reported that they used to attend weddings and funerals of extended families even if they did not know them very well. Nowadays, they only

went to weddings and funerals of relatives or close friends, as they could no longer afford the cost of wedding presents or funeral-fund contributions. This may in turn weaken the social bonds within and between villages.

///A crucial strategy for small and medium

farmers to reduce expenditure in over

three-quarters of the villages was to reduce

investment in farming input,/// especially fertilizer, and labor. Over half of the farmers in these villages reduced their use of fertilizer by one-half to three- quarters. They commonly previously used two bags of fertilizer per acre but reduced the use of fertilizer to half a bag to one bag per acre. In addition, farmers in over three-quarters of the villages were no longer able to mobilize the resources needed to renovate the embankments, which had resulted in more frequent flooding of their farmland and required more frequent sowing (2–3 times). Inevitably, both these coping mechanisms had reduced yields and even led to crop failures.

SECTION

03 Section 03

Social Relations

53

Intra-Village Relations SIM studied the social relations of the sample

villages from different aspects: the relations

between villagers, inter-ethnic and inter-religious

groups, inter-generational groups, village leaders

and villagers, and genders. Intra-village relations

encountered ups and downs, owing to a number of

factors: direct and indirect impacts of Nargis, the

aid effort, socioeconomic challenges, and political

changes. Many villages in the Delta had tackled these

challenges successfully and maintained strong social

bonds. However, in several cases social relations

five years after Nargis were noticeably weaker than

before the disaster.

Social cohesion and relations between villagers **Social relations were generally good …**

///Social relations between villagers were

considered good or fair in about three-

quarters of the research villages./// Where social

relations were good, the community was organized

and villagers undertook collective activities, mostly

socioreligious tasks, and regular community work

such as road renovation and pond cleaning. Where

social relations were poor, villagers were divided

into different groups, and communal activities

occurred only within these groups. Where relations

were fair, villagers did not undertake many collective

activities but also did not have conflicts or tension.

Table 9 shows intra-village social relations in villages

according to their degree of cyclone affectedness.

About half of the villages with poor social relations

were highly affected by Nargis, and one-third of

highly affected villages had poor relations. Relations

in moderately and lightly affected villages were

noticeably better; over 80 percent of these villages

had good or fair relations.

**… and the aid effort strengthened

local capacity**

///The aid effort had a positive impact on social

relations in several villages, with villages

more cohesive than before Nargis./// Villagers

who had been involved in aid committees applied

their newly acquired organizational skills, were

taking more initiative, and participated more in

activities organized by the community (Box 10).

With the end of the post-Nargis recovery phase,

however, emergency aid committees were dissolved

in sample villages.

As a longitudinal study, SIM witnessed the changes in social capital of Delta villages, both positive and negative, that resulted from Nargis and subsequent local and national events, such as the aid effort, the socioeconomic impact of the cyclone, leadership changes, shifts in intergroup relations, and the introduction of new laws.

SIM 1 noted the remarkable social strength of Delta villages as they responded to the emergency by helping each other—sharing food, shelter, and labor, building homes— and contributing to rebuild village infrastructure such as water ponds, roads, and bridges. SIM 2 recorded the damage to social relations because of the real or perceived unequal distribution of aid among different socioeconomic, ethnic, and religious groups in many villages. By the time of SIM 3, less aid had noticeably reduced aid- related tensions, yet by SIM 4 some still lingered on. Overall, villages considered social relations mostly good or fair. At the same time, the economic decline in most of the villages resulted in fewer social activities, which had commonly helped cement social bonds within and between communities. Conversely, leadership and socioeconomic dynamics had a positive effect on social relations in many villages.

SIM 2 and 3 indicated that women were more empowered largely because of the aid effort. With aid having largely ceased, momentum toward women’s empowerment has evolved along different tracks. While women were no longer members of newly formed development committees in the sample villages, women were elected as ten household leaders in two villages. Overall, however, women were again expected to abide by traditional gender norms. At the same time, SIM 4 saw more youth-led activities in many villages related to recent leadership changes. Relations between ethnic and religious groups in the SIM villages remained good overall, although communities with Buddhist and Muslim members were challenged by recent tensions in other parts of the country.

Political changes at the national level (elections in 2010, formation of a new government in 2011) and the local level (elections of village tract administrators in 2013) had a significant impact on the relationship between villagers and their formal leaders, mostly for the better. New leaders were elected in almost three-quarters of villages. Overall, villagers found the performance of leaders to be satisfactory. SIM 4 also observed a shift to a younger and more educated generation of local leaders.

AFFECTEDNESS GOOD FAIR POOR TOTAL

Highly 3 5 4 12

Moderately 8 7 3 18

Lightly 5 3 2 10

Total 16 15 9 40

Table 9 Intra-village relations by degree of cyclone affectedness

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03

4

3

2

1

0

Highly Aff ected Moderately Aff ected Lightly Aff ected

Better than

before Nargis

Same as

before Nargis

Worse than

before Nargis

N um

be r

of V

ill ag

es

5

6

7

8

54

55

**… and social relations were no longer as

strong as before Nargis**

///Social relations weakened in the longer

run./// In six villages social relations were better than before Nargis, in two villages owing to an improved socioeconomic situation and in four other villages owing to leadership changes. Three of the six villages with better social relations had good economic conditions. In half of the sample villages, however, relations were considered worse five years after Nargis compared to before the cyclone (Figure 11). In eleven of these villages, improvements were observed right after Nargis, but the situation had deteriorated since then. By 2013, intra-village relations were especially worse in highly affected villages. Two-thirds of these villages showed worse relations than before Nargis, compared to less than half of the moderately and lightly affected ones.

**Villages responded to socioeconomic

challenges differently**

///The socioeconomic challenges villagers

faced had some positive impact./// In three villages where laborers constituted the majority of the population, family members of small and even medium farmers became laborers on others’ farms and in factories in order to cope with the lack of profitability in farming. These villagers benefited from their interactions in a range of social and development activities (Box 11).

///More often, however, socioeconomic

challenges had a negative impact on social

cohesion./// Many villagers reported that they had had more extensive religious activities before Nargis sponsored by better-off families (especially large farmers), with the rest of the villagers contributing small donations and labor. Now those better-off families were struggling financially and were no

**However, in the long run, aid also weakened

social capital**

///Previously observed social tension between

villagers resulting from real or perceived

unequal aid distribution had largely been

reversed./// Within a year of Nargis, aid was targeted

by aid providers to specific socioeconomic groups

in most villages, with types of aid frequently

inconsistent with needs. 21 Since 2010, many highly

affected villages experienced greater social tension

since they had received more aid than lightly

affected villages. Little aid reached villages affected

by Nargis, which in several instances contributed to

improvements in social relations.

///Five years after Nargis, social relations were

poor in about one-quarter of the villages,

in most cases, this was a result of the aid

effort./// In these villages, there was a noticeable lack

of social cohesion. The participation of villagers in

activities that had been traditionally communal,

such as religious and village development activities,

declined. While these activities continued, they

were undertaken by smaller groups rather than the

community as a whole. Table 10 summarizes the

cases of poor social relations between villagers.

Box 10 How aid contributed to social cohesion

In one village two organizations emerged in 2011: a funeral organization and a social welfare organization. Both were initiated and led by middle aged and younger

villagers, some of whom had been involved in the local aid committee right after Nargis. The funeral organization provided free funeral services to all households

regardless of their economic status. The social welfare organization provided sick, poor elders with funds for healthcare using donations from the young members

who contributed 1,000 kyat per month per person. Villagers remarked that the youth in their village became capable of undertaking such activities because of their

exposure to and capacities gained from working in aid activities initiated by nongovernmental organizations.

Villagers in another highly affected village indicated that they enjoyed stronger community relations after a housing project by an aid provider. Before Nargis, the

houses of their village had been scattered in small hamlets and villagers would meet only on religious or social occasions, rarely helping each other. After Nargis,

everyone in the village received a house by a donor based on a community plan. Each house had a garden, and roads and ponds were also built. As villagers were

now living next to each other they had come to know each other better, understand common challenges, and had started helping each other. For example, they

shared reusable diapers and food and took care of each other’s children. The villagers reported that they now enjoyed village life much better.

Table 10 Villages with poor social relations

CASES NUMBER OF

VILLAGES

Division between those who were involved in beneficiary selection and aid delivery, and those who

were not involved and considered these decisions nontransparent and corrupt. 4

Villagers divided into two groups owing to competition between two leaders, one the formal leader,

the other one the leader of an aid committee. 1

In the initial years after Nargis, farmers had to hire laborers from other villages, as laborers from

the local village did not want to work or demanded higher wages while they were receiving aid.

Relations between farmers and laborers remained strained because farmers did not give work to

many laborers in the village nor lent them money when they needed it.

2

Villagers divided into two groups that had differing views on the best location for a bridge to

connect the two sides of the village. 1

Relations between inter-religious groups declined initially because of identity-based aid, which was

provided to Muslims only, and recently because of the broader tensions between Buddhist and

Muslim communities occurring in different parts of the country.

1

Figure 11 Changes in intra-village relations by degree of cyclone affectedness

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03

57

56 ///Relations between religious leaders played

an important part in shaping relations

between religious groups./// For instance, in

one village, a Buddhist leader remarked that the

relations between Muslim and Buddhist villagers

had declined after the death of the older generation

of leaders in Nargis. The elders from the Muslim

community in their village had been friends with

the elders from the Buddhist community; a Muslim

elder was even considered among the respected

informal village leaders. With the passing of the

Muslim elders during Nargis, the younger generation

of Muslim leaders rarely interacted with Buddhist

elders, and relations had suffered since then. A

similar case was found in a village with Christian

Karens and Buddhist Bamars. Relations between

the two communities had been good before the

death of a Karen village leader in 2011 who had

paid attention to both Karen and Bamar interests.

Relations between the two different communities

had declined since.

///On the whole, villagers maintained social

bonds across religious groups in spite of the

deterioration of relationships elsewhere in the

country./// For instance, Buddhist leaders and elders

in one village where nearly half of the population

is Muslim stated that the relationship between the

two groups worsened owing to the “identity-based

donation of twenty houses to Muslim villagers”.

However, they also indicated that village leaders

were still supporting all villagers who were in need

of help. They pointed to a village health fund as a

good model for the provision of aid across religious

boundaries in the community, as both Muslims

and Buddhists participated in its management and

villagers from both faiths benefited from it. SIM 4

researchers found Muslim and Buddhist villagers

working together collegially as members of the

committee for the management of the revolving

fund.

Gender relations

///Most women who used to participate in aid

committees were no longer part of village

development committees./// During SIM 2 and 3,

women were actively engaged in local committees

established by aid providers. Five years after Nargis,

there were development support committees

formed by the government in early 2013; in a few

villages these new committees were based on the

post-Nargis emergency committees but without

the female members. Instead, most former female

committee members had once again assumed

traditional gender role, working for the family

business or farm and/or undertaking household

tasks.

///Instead, the momentum toward women’s

empowerment had evolved along new tracks.///

Rather than maintaining their role in development

committees, women were making inroads in broader

village affairs. In two villages, women were elected

as ten household leaders in 2013, the first time this

had happened. Prior to this, formal village leadership

was firmly in the grasp of men. The villagers who

elected the women considered them capable

because they had gained experience as members of

post-Nargis aid committees. Several other women

in other villages indicated that they would have

stood for elections if they had known that they were

eligible to do so. Nevertheless, traditional gender

roles continued to limit women’s potential to

participate in formal village leadership. Researchers

encountered a case of a woman who decided to

enter the elections for village tract administrator

and retreated because male village elders, family

members, and even her husband were unsupportive.

While gender relations were considered good in all

villages, access to formal leadership roles for women

in Delta villages continued to remain severely

limited (Box 12).

Box 11 How economic hardship strengthened the social fabric

In one village, young people from both farming and landless households

worked in factories in Yangon in order to earn a living. They had come to know

each other better in Yangon and were looking after each other in an unfamiliar

city. The families they left in the village also became closer because the

remittances, information, and other items the migrants sent home were often

delivered together. The young migrants returned to the village on holidays and

contributed money and labor for religious occasions. The villagers reported

feeling more united now, regardless of their economic status.

In another village, several farmers had become laborers to continue providing

a living for their families. They respected the established laborers in the

village because these laborers were better skilled and had good networks.

At the same time, as the group grew in size, laborers became more powerful

and were able to negotiate higher wages. At the time of SIM 4 research, the

group was led by a youth group leader, who decided to be more flexible with

rules ever since former farmers joined the group. For example, he permitted

smoking during working hours. With most of the village youth taking part

in the group of laborers, it was also easier to organize human resources for

social events. Between 2010 and 2011, the laborers gave financial and labor

contributions to renovate roads and bridges and rebuild a classroom in the

village school.

longer able to afford large donations. In some cases

they had moved to towns in order to find new

economic opportunities, as farming alone was no

longer profitable. Without these donors, villagers

could not muster enough resources to organize the

religious activities that used to be an important

venue in which to strengthen social cohesion

between community members. Another reason

for the decline in such activities was increased

migration among their main participants, the

villagers of working age. Moreover, with villagers

having to work longer hours, they found less time to

socialize with their neighbors.

Relations between ethnic

and religious groups

///While relations between ethnic and religious

groups had deteriorated right after Nargis

in five of the nine heterogeneous sample

villages because of identity-based aid, they

had normalized as aid activities ceased.///

Five years after the cyclone, however, relations

between religious groups were considered weaker

in these five villages compared to before Nargis.

Social relations were strained especially in villages

with Muslims and Buddhists because of the recent

tensions between these two groups in other parts

of the country. Villagers indicated that they were

dealing with each other carefully and were no longer

as comfortable in engaging with each other. For

instance, Muslim villagers in one village reported

that social interactions between the two groups

had diminished because of a ban on celebrating Eid

in 2011. Eid used to be the occasion when the two

communities interacted most closely with each

other.

Box 12 Failing to break the glass ceiling

One woman in Kyaiklat township came from a well-off farming household.

Before Nargis, she did not participate much in village affairs, except in

supporting roles, and focused on working on the family farmland and doing

household chores. After Nargis, she took up a leading role in an aid committee

for about three years and became influential in the village. During that time,

she helped resolve a number of important issues in the village. Nevertheless,

the village tract administrator, informal leaders, and village elders criticized

her repeatedly for trying to transcend traditional gender roles. As a result,

her mother and husband pressured her to stop being involved in any village

affairs, as they thought her contributions were not only under-acknowledged

but also undeservingly castigated. Finally, she complied and stopped taking

part in village affairs. And thus a village lost an active and well-meaning leader

because traditions dictated that women should not lead.

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03

59

58

Box 13 Competition for power between villages

Villagers from a tract village (village A) remarked that their relations with

one of the villages under the tract (village B) had been poor because of the

competition for power. According to the villagers, this competition started in

the village tract administrator election, in which a candidate from village B

was elected. The villagers from village A perceived that it was the wealth of

the other village that helped him come into power. They did not like it when

the villagers from village B no longer sent their children to the middle school

located in their village. Instead villagers from village B hired more teachers

for their primary school and started a middle school in their own village. The

villagers from village A thought that villagers from village B acted like this

because they now felt more powerful.

Intergenerational relations ///The younger generation was again taking a

more active part in village affairs./// Right after Nargis, young people became engaged in the aid effort and assumed greater prominence in village affairs. This role, however, diminished over time with the decline in aid. Five years after Nargis, they once again asserted a greater presence, a development linked to the broader political changes in Myanmar since 2012. The village administrators who were elected or selected in 2013 in most of the villages were middle-aged, and villagers felt that they were better at working with youth than leaders in the old regime.

///At the same time, previous leaders had

withdrawn from village affairs./// Many former informal leaders (village elders and respected persons) in the sample villages had supported the National Unity Party (NUP) in the 2010 general election. When the NUP failed to win more than a few seats in the upper and lower houses of parliament, these once actively engaged and influential elders became discouraged and progressively withdrew from village affairs. This generational change in village leadership did not have an adverse effect on the relationship between younger and elder villagers.

Inter-Village Relations ///Inter-village relations in the sample villages

were good overall, but the frequency of

interactions had diminished./// In one-quarter of

the villages, villagers from different villages worked

together to, for example, renovate ponds, roads,

and monasteries. Villagers in three-quarters of the

villages, however, reported participating less in

social and religious activities in neighboring villages

because of economic hardship.

///Activities initiated by local and international

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

since 2010 had become an important

venue in which to strengthen inter-village

relations./// These activities were not related to

the post-Nargis aid effort, and may have been

linked to other concrete projects. Villagers often

identified themselves as belonging to a particular

network (Table 11). According to the villagers,

they were familiar with other villages because

of villagers involved in the same network. For

example, villagers may not know the name of a

village but called it “the village of Maung Maung”

since a villager called Maung Maung represented

this village in the network. A case in point were

villages in Mawlamyinegyun and Bogale townships

where different nongovernmental organizations

established a network of health workers. The

organizations trained the health workers together,

and now the health workers were looking after

the health of the villagers. The township health

department also took part in this effort. Village

health workers came together at monthly meetings

held at the township where they met with

government health workers. They also reported

emergency health situations in their village to the

government health department.

SIM 4 found a few cases of new inter-village

rivalry. It was common for some competition to

exist between the tract village and some larger

villages in the same tract. However, the village tract

administrator election intensified this rivalry in

three sample villages during the election period

(Box 13). This rivalry was observed in three sample

villages.

NETWORKS NUMBER OF

VILLAGES REMARKS

Health-care

extension 13

2 villages in Pyapon, 4 villages

in Labutta, 4 villages in

Mawlamyinegyun, and 3 villages in

Dedaye. Different NGOs provided

financial and technical support in

different townships.

Human trafficking 33 In Kungyangon township.

Youth 3 1 Pyapon, 2 in Mawlamyinegyun.

Fishery

development 71

2 networks covering many villages

each, 1 in Pyapon and 1 in Dedaye.

This network started in 2009 with 26

villages.

Table 11 Inter-village networks

Insert 2 How findings from SIM compare with findings from QSEM on social relations

Consistent with SIM, QSEM found that social cohesion across regions was strong, though several villages faced tension over the election

for village tract administrators. By mid-2013, every QSEM village except six in Shan State had held elections for their village tract

administrators. These elections became an important locus of competition. In Ayeyarwady, Rakhine, and Magway, strong competition

or social tension around the electoral process arose in one-third of the sample villages, though the competition also became a means

for villagers to select better leaders. QSEM also noted that the lack of reference in the law to the role of the 100 household leader at the

village level led to ambiguity and, in some villages, a leadership vacuum. In some townships, such as in Labutta and Mawlamyinegyun

in Ayeyarwady, the newly elected village administrators appointed de facto 100 household leaders in their villages. In other townships,

however, such as in Bogale, the role of the 100 household leader effectively disappeared from villages, which caused confusion and a

leadership gap at the village level. Unlike in SIM, there was less mention of lingering tensions owing to aid delivery.

QSEM’s findings on the consistent lack of women in leadership roles did not differ much from SIM’s. QSEM found that public institutions

in which women participated most were traditionally and specifically set up for women, such as women’s groups for religious functions

and village development committees. In all of these groups, women rarely made the key decisions, even to the extent of what curries to

make; they would provide comments and ideas, but men would make the actual decisions.

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Box 14 How are formal leaders selected?

Before 2011, the Village Tract Peace and Development Councils (VTPDC)

and Village Peace and Development Councils (VPDC) had been the official

administrative entities at the village tract and village level, respectively. The

method of choosing members of VTPDC and VPDC varied from place to

place, but the most common ones were direct appointment by higher-level

authorities and nomination by village elders. However, with the demise of

the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 2011, VTPDCs and VPDCs

also ceased to exist. The current way of choosing formal leaders at the village

and village tract level changed drastically with the Ward or Village Tract

Administration Law of 2012.

Now village households select ‘10 household leaders’ through informal

elections. Then, these 10 household leaders elect the village tract administrator

through voting. Five Yat Mi Yat Pha are also elected at the same time. Because

a village tract can be comprised of many villages, not every village can have

a Yat Mi Yat Pha. For these villages, the village tract administrator commonly

designates an administrative official from among the 10 household leaders

(commonly called by villagers ‘100 household leaders’) in consultation with

village elders and respected persons. In most of the sample villages, the

preselected candidate was then confirmed by consensus at a village meeting.

Fifteen of the sample villages were home to a village tract administrator. The

other villages were led by 100 household leaders, village elders and respected

persons, and 10 household leaders as follows:

HIGHEST FORMAL LEADER POSITION NO. OF VILLAGES

Village tract administrator 15

100 household leader 19

Yat Mi Yat Pha * 2

10 household leader 3

No formal leader 1

* Village elders and respected persons.

///The degree of cyclone affectedness did not

appear to correlate with differences in leader

characteristics./// Roughly two-thirds of villages,

regardless of affectedness, chose new leaders (Table

13). The age structure of leaders was also similar,

with leaders over 45 years old slightly outnumbering

younger leaders. Highly affected villages had a lower

proportion of highly educated leaders, however: one-

half compared to an overall average of two-thirds.

**The majority of villagers were satisfied with

their leaders**

///In three-quarters of the villages, people

were largely satisfied with the performance

of their current formal leaders./// During the

first two years after the cyclone, aid and recovery

activities created more responsibilities for formal

leaders, more important roles for informal and

religious leaders, and new spaces of participation

for villagers. Five years after Nargis, the relations

between villagers and their leaders were good and

neutral in 21 and 9 villages, respectively (Figure

12). 23 The most common reasons villagers cited for

their satisfaction included financial contributions

to and active participation in social, religious,

or development affairs of the village; good

interpersonal skills; integrity; and prior experience

in village administrative activities (Box 15).

**Villagers’ perceptions of their leaders did

not depend on age**

///Regardless of age, villagers had a positive or

neutral perception of four out of every five

leaders./// Slightly less than half of the leaders were

between the ages of 18 and 45. SIM 4 researchers

found that in most cases, younger formal leaders

were able to develop collaborative and mutually

respectful relationships with older informal leaders

in the village. Villagers liked young leaders; they

Leadership and Institutions

**National political reforms had an immediate

local impact**

///There were some important changes in

formal leadership at the village level./// Political

reforms and the shift to a new government in 2011

led to changes in administrative policies at the

village tract and village levels. In the village tract

administrator elections in early 2013, villagers in

twenty-six villages chose new formal leaders, in

thirteen villages former leaders were reelected, and

in one village no formal leader was elected. Owing

to a more open and participatory way of selecting

formal leaders compared to the previous regime

(Box 14), villagers were able to choose those whom

they felt were best suited for leadership positions.

**The profiles of new and old leaders differed

quite considerably**

///There were some noticeable differences

between old and new leaders./// New leaders were

noticeably younger; over half were between the ages

of 18 and 45, compared to fewer than one-third of

the former leaders (Table 12). Newly elected leaders

were also more educated, with almost three-quarters

having completed higher education compared to

just over half of the old leaders. As during SIM 3,

economic status continued to play an important role

in the selection of formal leader. Half of the formal

leaders chosen were considered well-off, with newly

elected leaders somewhat better off than old

leaders. 22

Table 12 Characteristics of old and new leaders

CHARACTERISTICS REELECTED FORMER

LEADERS NEWLY ELECTED

LEADERS TOTAL

Total 13 26 39

Age 18–45 4 14 18

Good economic standing 6 14 20

Education (University or high-school graduate) 7 19 26

Table 13 Leadership and cyclone affectedness

AFFECTEDNESS NEW LEADER LEADER AGE

18–45 EDUCATION* TOTAL

Highly 8 5 6 12

Moderately 12 9 14 18

Lightly 6 4 6 10

Total 26 18 26 40

*University or high school graduate.

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8

6

4

2

0

Newly elected leaders Reelected former leaders

Better than

before Nargis

Same as

before Nargis

Worse than

before Nargis

N um

be r

of V

ill ag

es

10

12

14

16

Worse than

before Nargis

Figure 12 Villagers’ perception of their formal leaders

62

63

Box 16 Leadership matters for social cohesion

In one village, many villagers, regardless of age and gender, reported that their

village had become more united and organized for village development and

religious activities under the leader who took office in early 2013. Until then,

the village had been led for over 15 years by a 100 household leader24 above

the age of 55. Villagers did not like the former leader because he cared more

about his relations with his superiors than about the interests of the village.

Even worse, most of the villagers believed that he had misused a lot of the aid

that the village had received after Nargis.

After the village tract election in January 2013, the newly elected village tract

administrator initially asked the old 100 household leader to continue to lead

the village. But villagers, including several elderly and respected persons and

members of male and female youth groups, went to the newly elected tract

administrator and asked that a new village leader be appointed. They proposed

that the 44-year-old village healthcare worker who had received training from

a nongovernmental organization to be the new village leader; he was also the

leader of the male youth group. In response to the request of the villagers, the

village tract administrator visited the village, consulted with the village elders

and other villagers, held a village meeting, and appointed the proposed 100

household leader with the approval of the villagers.

Since his appointment, the new 100 household leader would discuss the

needs of the village with different groups but especially with young people

as the ones who would implement the activities. He would also acquire

the endorsement of the village elders. Within a few months of him taking

office, the village road was upgraded, the village drinking-water pond was

fenced, and the two village bridges were renovated. The villagers willingly

provided monetary and labor contributions. Poor elders and the disabled were

exempted from contributions, and the gap was filled by village youth and by

fines imposed on those who violated village rules, such as villagers who were

violent to others when they were drunk. Villagers mentioned that the former

village leader did not pay attention to the needs of the village. The youth also

mentioned that the villagers had been following the village rules introduced

by the new leader, such as restrictions on the hours to fetch water in order to

save water during the summer. If the rules had been in place under the former

leader they distrusted, the villagers would not have followed them.

Box 15 Poor social relations turned around by good leadership

In a village in Labutta, there had been tension between villagers since 2011, when the community jetty and bridge were built. The tension

had started between two different livelihood groups: fishermen in the lower part of the village and farmers in the upper part. At the time,

the village tract administrator appointed a 100 household leader who lived in the upper part of the village. The villagers in the lower

part thought that the 100 household leader was biased in favor of the upper part in every dispute that arose between the two groups

regarding the provision of external assistance. At the 2013 election, a new village tract administrator was elected from another village.

As the number of households was over 170, he assigned a 100 household leader each to both the upper and the lower parts. The new

village tract administrator was a university graduate, and the villagers felt that he had the right approach to addressing village needs

and discussing them with the township. Consequently, the whole village supported his decision. Since he was a rich man who owned

over 100 acres of farmland, he also contributed to projects in cooperation with the township, for example, to the renovation of the

village health center and to land registration of the whole village. Because of his efforts, the village gradually became united again.

were considered as having good social relations,

being more educated than the older generation,

having more exposure to donors because of the

training they had received from aid providers

and international organizations, having better

connections with authorities and officials in the

township, having better initiative in collective work

in the villages, and being more willing to provide

villagers with monetary and labor support (Box 16).

///Although the legitimacy of the formal leaders

was rarely questioned, they were not always

the most influential in the village./// As during

previous rounds of SIM, the lines between formal

and informal leaders were often blurred. In many

villages, village elders and religious leaders had

the power to challenge the decisions of the formal

leaders, and therefore, provided an important check

on their authority. In eight sample villages, five of

which had new leaders, informal leaders had more

say than formal leaders in making decisions for the

village. In five villages, religious leaders appeared

to be the most influential because villagers were

more willing to listen to them than to formal and/

or informal leaders. In all but six villages, the core

group of village leaders (including formal, informal,

and, in some cases, religious leaders) was found to

be working together effectively.

**A minority of leaders was perceived

negatively by villagers**

///Villagers had a negative perception of their

leaders in one-fifth of the sample villages./// Particularly noticeable was the fact that seven of these eight villages had newly elected leaders (see Figure 12). Highly and moderately affected villages accounted for all these cases (Table 14). In relative terms, one-third of all highly affected villages were considered to have poor leadership, but only less than one-quarter of the moderately affected villages did.

Table 14 Leadership perceptions and cyclone affectedness

AFFECTEDNESS POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE N.A. TOTAL

Highly affected 4 4 4 0 12

Moderately affected 10 3 4 1 18

Lightly affected 7 2 0 1 10

Total 21 9 8 2 40

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8

6

4

2

0

Positive Neutral

Tensions

N um

be r

of V

ill ag

es

10

12

14

16

No Tensions

Negative

Figure 13 Aid-related tensions and the perception of leaders

64

65

Box 17 Elected, but ineffective

In a village in Kungyangon township, villagers were dissatisfied with the performance of the new village tract administrator. The

waterways beside their farmlands had become too shallow and the village required support from the government to repair them.

The villagers asked the village administrator to request help from the township and he mentioned the problem to the township

administrator. The township administrator replied that he would provide machines with the villagers covering the cost of fuel. But the

monsoon paddy season arrived and no machine ever came. Therefore, the villagers asked the village administrator to contact the

township administrator again, but he did not do so.

Moreover, compared to the former village tract administrator, he did not actively try to address village needs. The former administrator

had paid attention to the needs of the village after Nargis and had requested assistance from the township authorities. This was how

the village road, bridge and ponds had been rebuilt. Comparing the current and former village administrators, the villagers were not

satisfied with the current leader.

village: one village was divided into two between the rich and the poor, and two villages were divided into three groups, owing to social tension and distrust that had arisen from a perceived inequality in the distribution of aid. These divided groups had their own formal or informal leaders, who did not collaborate well with each other. In the two other villages, there were Karen and Burmese villagers. Although the relations between these two ethnic groups were good and no explicit social tension was reported, it was hard for the formal leader from one group to have an influence on the other group.

///In three cases, villagers simply considered the

performance of new leaders to be inadequate

and ineffective./// In other villages they were perceived as incapable of solving problems, and lacking experience and influence in the village (Box 17). They were seen as relying too much on the police to resolve more complex issues, such as fights between neighbors and gambling.

**The shadows of ineffective aid could still be

seen five years after Nargis**

///SIM 4 found vestiges of tensions between

villagers and their leaders that had resulted

from the aid effort./// Previous rounds of SIM found that real or perceived inequalities in aid distribution sometimes became the primary cause of complaints against village leaders. SIM 3 research reported signs of tension between villagers and their leaders in 21 villages. In SIM 4, tension was still encountered in 16 villages (Table 15). Highly affected villages

accounted for half of all cases, and two-thirds of all highly affected villages suffered from aid-related tension. In comparison, less than 40 percent of moderately affected villages showed tension.

///Over two-thirds (11) of the villages with aid

tension had newly elected leaders./// This may indicate that villagers elected new leaders in order to resolve long-standing conflicts. Given the short timespan between the local elections and SIM 4, these leaders might not yet have been able to resolve the conflicts.

///However, the presence of aid-related tension

did not automatically translate into negative

perceptions of village leaders./// Villagers had negative perceptions of their leaders, owing to aid issues in only five villages (Figure 13), down from six villages during SIM 3. Four of these villages had newly elected leaders. In three villages, there was a clear division between leaders or groups in the

Table 15 Aid-related tensions by level of cyclone affectedness

AFFECTEDNESS TENSION NO TENSION N.A. TOTAL

Highly 8 4 0 12

Moderately 7 10 1 18

Lightly 1 8 1 10

Total 16 22 2 40

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67

Recommendations for Post-Disaster Aid Aid was critically important in the aftermath of the cyclone. It not only helped save lives when there were severe concerns about the outbreak of diseases among the survivors. 26 It also provided the affected people with a sense that they did not have to face the enormous challenges of recovering from the disaster all on their own. Much of the initial aid was local and civil society driven and was highly beneficial to the affected villages. Although the government at the time initially restricted outside aid to the affected region, it quite quickly opened up the Delta to the international aid effort. Post-disaster aid may have ended by 2010, but its direct and indirect impacts continued for a long time thereafter.

Three broad themes can be discerned from SIM regarding the aid effort: what aid was provided, how it was provided, and how it linked to the broader policy context— all of which could inform the design of future post-disaster assessments and aid efforts. These recommendations, while largely drawn from of SIM 4 research, confirm the salient findings of previous rounds of SIM.

**What aid was provided, and how much?**

///It may seem obvious, but it is worth stating

that aid should to be targeted according to

the needs of disaster-affected populations./// SIM showed that the aid provided was highly valued by the villagers. However, it was not always what the villagers needed most, and it did not adjust to changing needs during the recovery period. 27

In addition, in many instances aid providers used preconceived criteria for targeting (for instance,

those who had been the poorest in a village prior to the cyclone), even if these were not consistent with village social norms or the post-disaster reality. Aid during the post-Nargis period from 2008–2010 was provided in a very constrained political context, and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) paid close attention to the involvement of both external and internal donors. This in itself did not, however, explain why the goods that donors provided were not always among the villagers’ own priorities.

///Even in the unique context of Myanmar at the

time, opportunities existed to solicit the views

of the population for targeting the relief and

recovery effort and to anticipate changing

needs, as SIM itself demonstrated./// Indeed, in some ways, the special context of Myanmar should have made this easier: although the government lifted restrictions on travel and aid to the Delta, some of its regulations in other areas (such as with visas) meant that it was mostly nongovernmental organizations with long-standing operations in Myanmar that delivered assistance. This implied that the overall aid effort was more coordinated than in many other post-disaster settings and conducted by organizations with a deeper contextual knowledge than most.

///Recovery aid also needs to consider

cumulative impacts that may evolve over

time, including those that result from aid

interventions./// A particular case in point was the focus on providing fishing boats and gear to villagers, even in villages where fishing had not been an important livelihood. Moreover, the nets

Much as was the post-Nargis aid effort, the

monitoring of social impacts in Myanmar was

undertaken at a unique time in the country’s history.

As such, it provided insights into village life at a time

when research about state-society relations at the

local level was otherwise restricted. These insights

proved valuable when political developments

allowed deeper engagement with and support

to the local population, for instance, through

the multi-donor Livelihood and Food Security

Trust Fund and the National Community Driven

Development Project.

To some degree, the unique political circumstances

determined the particular usefulness of SIM. Rarely

would a major disaster and relief effort happen in

a country with so little understanding among the

international community. Consequently, some

lessons from SIM are specific to the place and time

in which it was undertaken. Then again, the social

impacts of natural disasters have rarely been studied

as thoroughly as after Nargis, and therein lie many

lessons that are applicable in other contexts as well.

This recognition led to the development of the

social impacts analysis methodology by the Global

Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 25 and

the use of this methodology in several post-disaster

assessments since, such as in the Philippines,

Thailand, Pakistan, and Bolivia.

The report’s final section has three parts. It first

provides some recommendations on what the aid

effort could have done differently, as seen by SIM.

It then continues with some insights regarding

the relevance of qualitative post-disaster social

monitoring. It ends with reflections on broader

lessons learned from SIM’s longitudinal effort. The

discussion recognizes the political and logistical

complexities of operating in a country that was

facing international sanctions. Nevertheless, SIM

assessed the aid effort and path to post-disaster

recovery over time through the eyes of affected

villagers. It thus offers important lessons for future

post-disaster assessments and aid efforts.

Section 04

Recommendations and Reflections

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69

were often not suitable to catch the local fish. This aid, therefore, contributed to overfishing in several areas and to the eventual decline of fishing as a viable livelihood option in many villages. Similarly, a fuller understanding of the direct and indirect effects of Nargis in highly affected farming villages could have guided aid providers to invest more in rebuilding embankments and desilting streams to make communities more resilient to the impacts of subsequent natural events. Equally important would have been a concerted effort to recover yield levels as the cornerstone of sustainable farming livelihoods in the Delta. Consequently, the relevance of aid interventions ought to be monitored and interventions adapted when they no longer address people’s needs.

///Aid that focuses solely on the poor may miss

other occupations in the value chain that

are critical to long-term recovery./// Large and medium farmers are among the most important providers of work and credit in the Ayeyarwady Delta. Small fishermen depend significantly on fish collectors to provide loans and purchase the catch. Prior to Nargis, large and medium farmers as well as fish collectors had clearly been better off than small farmers and fishermen. But, although they were equally affected by the cyclone, they received little assistance from aid providers. Not having been able to recover on their own, many were increasingly unable to provide work and loans.

///Cash transfers can empower the survivors of

a natural disaster./// A few donors provided cash assistance in the aftermath of the cyclone. However, the political situation at the time precluded the provision of cash on a larger scale. On all accounts, villagers appreciated this type of aid the most, since they could use it to cover the needs that were most important to them. 28 According to villagers throughout the four rounds of SIM, those who had no, or who had lost their, informal safety net (for instance, those who lost the breadwinner or elderly survivors without a family) found themselves in

the direst predicament. The risk of dependency

notwithstanding, targeted cash transfers, whether

conditional or unconditional, could have helped ease

their severe livelihood concerns.

///In most post-disaster situations, the aid

provided is insufficient to meet everyone’s

needs, and Myanmar proved to be no

exception./// The largest portion of post-Nargis aid was provided within the first year of the cyclone, even though the Tripartite Core Group remained in place for another year. Four years would pass after Nargis before political developments allowed for a deeper engagement of the international community. The Ayeyarwady Region and the Delta area have never been among the poorest areas of Myanmar, and development assistance after the political opening in 2012 focused on other parts of the country. Aid to the Delta was no longer seen in a post-disaster context, even though the socioeconomic situation in highly affected areas in the Delta would still justify targeted recovery assistance.

**How was aid provided?**

///The disconnect between needs and aid

indicated that communities were not much

involved in making decisions about their

own aid./// SIM 1–3 noted that aid decisions—which type of aid to provide and who should receive it— were mostly made by aid providers. For the most part, villagers were only involved in identifying the beneficiaries in the community. SIM has documented that this approach created tensions between villagers and between villagers and their leaders from early on. It noted instances where villagers refused to become involved unless the targeting mechanism changed or where they decided to redistribute aid according to their own priority. Some nongovernmental organizations demonstrated that post-disaster response speed and community participation were not mutually exclusive; rather, they could reinforce each other and enhance aid

effectiveness. By and large, however, communities were treated as passive recipients of aid.

///Traditional aid providers (external donors and

nongovernmental organizations) frequently

set up local committees to assist with the

distribution of aid./// They expressly included

women and young villagers in these committees

in deviation from customary rules. They also

provided training to committee members so that

they could properly undertake their responsibilities.

This investment in human resources transcended

the post-Nargis recovery period, as many former

committee members continued to use their skills

for the benefit of their communities, a fact much

appreciated by the generality of villagers. For

women, this involvement in local decision-making

was also an important driver toward greater gender

equality, even if traditional norms were frequently

reasserted once the aid effort had ceased.

///SIM research indicated that aid was delivered

most effectively when local formal leaders

were part of the decision-making process.<sup>

29 </

sup>/// Given the specific political context at the time of

the disaster, however—Village and Village Tract

Peace and Development Committees were an

extension of the State at the lowest level—external

aid providers found it difficult to involve local

formal leaders. Many attempted to bypass the

leaders by setting up single-purpose committees to

distribute their aid, oftentimes regardless of other

committees that other aid providers may have

established. In setting up parallel structures, they

created tensions between villagers and their leaders

in many villages, exacerbated by the lack of solid

communication and grievance redress functions.

These tensions weakened social cohesion and in

many instances continued long after the aid itself

had ended. In addition, local committees established

by aid providers ended when the aid ended, while

formal local institutions continued to exist. In the

specific case of Myanmar, these institutions also

underwent an enormous transformation toward a

more representative form of governance. By altering

the relationship between villagers and their formal

leaders, the aid effort contributed to a certain

institutional disorientation that did not always serve

the communities’ longer-term cohesion.

**Post-disaster aid and sector policies**

///The post-Nargis recovery effort was

hampered by a set of policies governing

rural development in Myanmar./// Policies of

particular importance included those regarding

land tenure (all land belonged to the State even

though informal transactions were frequent);

agricultural production (rice quotas were set and

instructions were given for which crops to grow);

fishing licenses and formal credit (vastly insufficient

funding from formal sources), among others.

Adjustments to these policies would have facilitated

recovery tremendously but were impossible for

external donors to pursue with the State Peace and

Development Council.

///Depending on the stage of recovery, sector

policy reforms had different impacts./// The

government that came to office in 2011 introduced

many policy reforms, for instance, the Land Law,

which introduced individual title to land. Many

villagers viewed it as a blessing that would help them

mobilize more resources to increase agricultural

production. But there may be unforeseen negative

consequences. SIM 4 indicated that the number of

land transactions was likely to increase once titles

are issued. Especially in those villages that still

found themselves in dire economic straits, small and

even medium farmers may be forced to sell under

duress in order to settle their outstanding debt. Such

distress sales would do little to increase agricultural

production, since the proceeds of the sale would not

be invested. Rather, they may lead to ever increasing

land concentration, landlessness, and migration.