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Empiricism, Positivism and Post-Positivism

In: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Methodology

By: Kerry E. Howell

Pub. Date: 2015

Access Date: June 17, 2022

Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd

City: London

Print ISBN: 9781446202999

Online ISBN: 9781473957633

DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473957633

Print pages: 32-54

This PDF has been generated from SAGE Research Methods. Please note that the pagination of the

online version will vary from the pagination of the print book.

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Empiricism, Positivism and Post-Positivism

Introduction

Research involves understanding the relationship between theory, philosophy (ontology and epistemology),

methodology and methods. Any research project whether this be a dissertation, thesis or research paper

requires some understanding and explanation of the relationships between these areas. This text explains

these relationships through a discussion of rationalist arguments in Chapter 1, theory in Chapter 2 and

empiricist, positivist and phenomenological positions in this and the following chapter. It is useful to have

some knowledge of these positions when undertaking research projects because the paradigms of inquiry

and subsequent methodological approaches and methods of data collection extend what may be considered

valid knowledge generation or accumulation actually entails. Based in empiricism, positivism provided an

important and relevant addition to our conceptualisation of how knowledge may be measured, defined and

accumulated.

In a bid to fully explain the relationship between methodology and the philosophical and scientific

underpinnings of specific paradigms of inquiry, this chapter analyses the differentiations between empiricism,

positivism and post-positivism each of which, it may be argued, exemplifies a certain modernist approach

to knowledge generation. However, this demarcation can become problematic when a close analysis is

undertaken. For instance, as noted above, the falsification process and the distaste for grand theory apparent

in post-positivism in some contexts render it postmodernist.

The modernist/postmodernist debate picks up on a number of issues identified in Chapters 1 and 2 in terms

of ongoing debates regarding the nature of reality, truth, knowledge and theory. That is, whether or not the

world has a real existence beyond human thought? Positivists consider an external reality exists that can

be understood completely whereas post-positivists argue that even though such a reality can be discerned

it may only be understood probabilistically. Empiricists consider that scientific truth and reality are based on

experience and observation and that ‘human consciousness which is subjective is not accessible to science,

and thus not truly knowable’ (Polkinghorne, 1989: 23).

This chapter considers that positivism is based on aspects of empiricism and identifies how this involves an

adherence to natural science perspectives of reality and methodology. In addition, the chapter goes on to

identify how this adherence to empiricism provided a number of problems for positivism when it attempted to

understand social existence. Indeed, initially through the work of Popper (1969, 1994, 2002, 2002a) positivism

was challenged by post-positivism and a more amenable and less entrenched methodological approach

developed. However, post-positivism still adhered to the idea of an external reality and dualist objectivity,

which was questioned by phenomenologist philosophers in terms of the level of interaction between self and

the world and solipsistic positions.

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Chapter 3 deals with these issues in more detail and covers an assessment of empiricism and a short

discussion of thinkers in the empiricist tradition. Positivism is analysed in relation to how it uses ideas initially

devised for empiricism and how these were challenged through post-positivism. Overall, this chapter identifies

the distinction between positivism and post-positivism and considers the implications this has for knowledge

generation and research in general.

Reflection Box: Solipsism

Solipsism comes from the Latin for solus (alone) and ipse (self) and involves the idea that

only the individual mind certainly exists; all else could be a figment of one's imagination.

The world beyond the individual mind cannot be known and there is a chance that it as

well as other people may not exist. Furthermore, even if an independent reality does exist

how may an individual know this reality in an objective fashion? Knowledge is the content

of the individual mind and no necessary link exists between experience and thought.

Methodological solipsism argues that mind and thought is independent of environment or

facts regarding this environment; mind content is determined by facts about the thinking

object.

Consider the following statements in relation to the requirements for your research project

and the notion that objective knowledge can be attained and accumulated.

• Nothing can exist.

• If something does exist nothing can be known about it.

• Even if something does exist and we are able to know something of it

communication of this knowledge is impossible.

Empiricism: Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume

Empiricism considers that knowledge is dependent on the five senses and that through experience knowledge

can be derived and accumulated. Empiricism is based on the belief that we can only know what the world

tells us; through objective or neutral observation true knowledge may be realised and understood. The human

mind is a blank sheet on which sense-based information is transmitted. Sense data is provided or ‘given’

pre-interpretation, then the mind becomes active and manipulates sense data in numerous ways; that is,

through abstraction and synthesised interpretations of sense-data which give understanding and knowledge

as well as building relationships between ideas and providing the basis for further observation. The search

for immutable laws since has been accepted as the norm for scientific inquiry from the 17th to the 21st

centuries. Science carries out controlled experiments and makes measured observations at a designated

point between the known and the unknown. Findings are recorded and published then further reliable data

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accumulated. Eventually general elements emerge and hypotheses are formulated (law-like statements which

fit with the accumulated reliable data and portray causality). Hypotheses are then tested with the intention of

proving these correct. Verification or proof formulates a scientific law and is used to excavate new information

and enhance the stock of human knowledge. Through procedures labelled induction (data accumulation)

and deduction (hypothesis testing), human ignorance is gradually eliminated. Knowledge accumulation is

progressive and benefits humanity. Natural science justified its view of knowledge on the basis of observation

and experiment, that is, an empiricist view of knowledge. Empiricist philosophers return the compliment

and considered that natural science embodied the highest form of genuine knowledge. For example Ayer

(1946) was keen to draw a distinction between genuine knowledge (science) and belief systems like religion,

metaphysics and Marxism. In fact, he labelled these belief systems pseudo-sciences that had little if any

claim to knowledge embodiment. However, the difficulty here was that the reasons for excluding Marxism or

psychoanalysis in many instances ruled out a great deal of established natural science. Overall, the empiricist

view of science can be characterised on the basis of the following doctrine (see Definition Box).

Definition Box: Empiricism

Empiricism incorporates the idea that genuine knowledge can be tested by experience

and that claims of knowledge must be observable. Scientific laws involve statements of

recurring patterns of experience and a scientific explanation is an instance of a scientific

law. Prediction is achievable and science is objective as it separates testable factual

statements from value judgements (Benton and Craib, 2001).

This doctrine incorporated the underpinnings of positivism and is based on the assertion that human science

should be treated as natural science and anything that failed to adhere to such a presupposition and process

was not knowledge.

Definition Box: Immutable Laws

Immutable can be defined in terms of continuation and permanence; an entity is not

susceptible to change. Law derives from the Norse term lagu, which means that something

is fixed; however, laws are linked with legal systems and rights which are subject to

historical and social change. Immutable laws are laws that cannot be challenged; they

have been tested and found to be true. Newton's Law of Gravity was one such law. Such

may also be known as natural laws or laws of nature that are universal (that is they stand

in all contexts).

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Francis Bacon

In Novum Organum (1620), Francis Bacon (1561–1626) outlined his belief in the accumulative creation of

knowledge, which could be derived through divine revelation or sensory experience. Bacon said little about

divine revelation and most knowledge, it would seem, is formulated through the senses. Sensory interaction

with the world allows the development of knowledge, which Bacon divided into three types: knowledge of

humanity; God; and nature. However, Bacon was unhappy with the state of knowledge and considered that

most treatises and texts were repetitions and entailed the same arguments, they may vary in method, which

provides a mirage of plenty, but on closer examination proves to be illusory.

Francis Bacon may be considered as outlining an embryonic interpretation of inductive scientific method

because he argued that inductive procedure rather than deductive reasoning should incorporate the basis of

knowledge generation. He argued that on the basis of observation and experience, logical statements could

be uttered and scientific generalisations made based on the logical ordering of empirical observations and

experiences. However, nowhere does Bacon use the term scientific method but his ideas may be considered

as the basis or starting point for such a perspective of scientific procedure.

Bacon argued that the human mind was prone to weaknesses (idols of the mind) and these required attention

before inductive reasoning could proceed. Indeed, these idols of the mind distorted the truth, so needed to

be eradicated. Idols of the mind included; those of the tribe, mental weaknesses held by humanity in general

and idols of the den or cave that involved a preponderance to assess everything from a subjective standpoint

or through the prioritisation of one's own interest or perspective. The idols of the market incorporate the

misuse and meaninglessness of language and idols of the theatre the misuse of power. The idols formed a

falsity and impinged human capability for seeing things as they truly are; humanity is capable of perceiving

truth but only once these vagaries (idols) were negated. Human potential for knowledge generation and

understanding was beyond question, however, through laziness, avarice or over-confidence in our abilities,

our capabilities and capacities have largely been misused. Through the scientific method humanity may be

liberated from its erroneous ways and mistake free truth or an approximation of true knowledge realised. In his

utopian state called New Atlantis, knowledge is uncovered and nature interpreted in the House of Solomon.

Humanity benefits from the continued development and practical application of science and knowledge;

through inductive reasoning knowledge is developed and the human condition improved. Bacon identified

objectivity and the non-biased accumulation of knowledge; the very basis of all rigorous research.

Thomas Hobbes

In Objections (1641), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) reiterated that philosophy and knowledge accumulation

had remained stunted and advocated that people should ignore pointless attempts at philosophy and

concentrate on daily experience and common sense. For Hobbes, philosophy was more than the knowledge

of cause and effect and sensory experience and was rather the product of rationalisation. Philosophy is

different from knowledge by sense because sensory knowledge is formed through ‘motions’ or events that

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are associated and ordered in the mind. Experience and history provide foresight and prudence; they lead

to the formation of expected outcomes. However, this does not incorporate philosophical knowledge or true

science; sense and memory are common to all living creatures and are a form of knowledge but because

they are simply given and not formed through rationalisation they are not philosophy. For Hobbes knowledge

began with sense-perception, consequently the initial step for developing understanding was to comprehend

what sense-perception actually entailed. Sense-perception involved motions in matter; sensory ideas were

motions in matter. Indeed, everything involved matter in motion. The pressure of objects, for example, sounds,

shapes, colours, are not part of the object but caused by sensations; they are the qualities that emerge

through interaction between thing or the observed and sensations of the mind (they are in motion).

Table 3.1 Empirical knowledge

Francis

Bacon

Unimpressed with the stock of human knowledge and considered the mind and human thought to be weak and

limited.

Thomas

Hobbes

Knowledge is based in sense-perception. Causation involves matter in motion which sees knowledge as either

effects developed through understanding, general causes or causes determined through general effects.

John

Locke

If all things came from experience then how can we deal with generalisation when we may not experience every

occurrence? Understanding not given by experience alone because all wholes or totalities in relation to

generalisation cannot be accounted for by experience alone.

David

Hume

Perceptions of the mind appear twice (as reflections of each other, on the one hand as an impression and on the

other as a corresponding idea of sensation. Consequently, any idea must be associated with some experienced

impression.

Hobbes identified the concept of causes and effects or appearances of things that incorporated their

ordinary observable qualities and causes are broken down into two types; efficient causes which bring about

effects and entire causes which involved a combination of causes and effects. Causation involves matter in

motion which sees knowledge as either effects developed through understanding general causes or causes

determined through general effects. However, philosophical knowledge is not simply based on cause and

effect but the idea of ratiocination (a process of logical thinking and knowledge of phenomenon through

understanding what generated it). Consequently, knowledge is not simply derived through sense but by

sensory images (referred to as external phenomenon) that when repeated through motion become imprinted

on our minds. Indeed, sequence recollection identifies and orders our experiences. History incorporates

a general or social sequence recollection which enables prediction, foresight and prudence. However,

because history depends on sense, and memory is dependent on wide experience and not reached through

ratiocination, it does not encompass philosophy. Knowledge derived through ratiocination is different from

experiential knowledge but both begin with history and this is essential for philosophy. History informed

philosophy but long epic historical accounts were not a necessity for total ratiocination as they can inform the

initiation of the methodology but can be quickly peripherised once one begins to excavate the area studied.

Ratiocination is a form of methodology that understands complexity through simplification or breaking matter

down into constituent parts and determining how these parts fit with each other. Subsequently, causes or

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the observable variables are initially made distinguishable (made known), then through synthesis of these

variables the original effect can be identified. Effects are directly known through nature and in any study

we must begin with effects when we investigate concealed causation. However, even though we initially

experience effects, they actually come second to the concealed causes. Indeed, in Hobbes we have the

basis of discovering theory and incorporated inductive procedures whereas a methodological approach that

begins with identifying causation and consequent effects is more deductive and based in proving hypotheses.

Hobbes labels causation to effect composition or synthesis and effect to causation resolution or analysis.

John Locke

Both Bacon and Hobbes were empiricists in that they recognised the primacy of sensory experience but it is

also evident they saw the need for rational thought and the mind in the formulation of knowledge. Conversely,

in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), John Locke (1632–1704) questioned how the mind

is given ideas and knowledge. Indeed, he resoundingly answers through experience! For Locke the mind

was a blank sheet and all knowledge derived through sensory experience. If all things came from experience

then how do we know that a whole is equal to its parts? How do we deal with generalisation when we may

not experience every occurrence? Locke realised that such is not given by experience alone because all

wholes or totalities in relation to generalisation cannot be accounted for by experience alone. However, he

rejects the very basis of this argument and considered that no dichotomy between experiential and innate

knowledge existed. Indeed, he considered that all knowledge is found through experience or the senses but

it did not necessarily follow that all emanated from this. Experience provided the materials of knowledge

or ideas but once these have been determined we are able to make generalisations and recognise that

wholes are equal to the sum of their parts. Through observation and experience the senses provide the

building blocks of knowledge (ideas). Experience is divided into sensation and reflection which involves the

latter taking into consideration how the mind operates, that is how it thinks, constructs beliefs or perceives

when dealing with sensation. Locke claimed that pre-experience the mind was a blank sheet and all ideas

emanated from this source; experience involves a dual source of ideas ‘void of all characters without any

ideas; how comes it to be furnished? … To this I answer in one word from experience: in that all knowledge

is founded and from that it ultimately derives itself’ (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chap

I, Sec 2). Some ideas emerge through interaction with the external world or sensation while others develop

through reflection or perception (activity or operation of the mind). The mind reflects on ideas reached through

experience; however, no matter how abstract or removed from experience this reflection becomes the source

exists in interaction with the world. Ideas for Locke involved mind-dependent entities and can involve internal

sensations as well as external perceptions. Bottom-line, ideas can be simple or complex; that is ideas clearly

derived from experience incorporate simple ideas and even though complex ideas need not be derived from

experience but constructed through component parts experienced directly. That is not to say that complex

ideas cannot be experienced directly, for example, time, space and infinity, may be experienced directly

and these are not simple ideas. Locke uses the distinction between simple and complex ideas to underpin

his claim that all ideas are found in experience. However, Locke failed to deal with the dichotomy between

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empiricism and rationalism. Indeed a solution to the problem between knowledge derived from experience or

externality and the relationship with mind or thought continues to exist as a difficulty today.

David Hume

In An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), David Hume (1711–1776) reasserts the hypothesis

that all ideas are derived from experience but considers there to be a relationship between perceptions

and ideas. He argued that perceptions of the mind appear twice or are reflections of each other; on the

one hand as an impression and on the other hand as a corresponding idea of sensation. So any idea

must be associated with some experienced impression. However, unlike Locke, for Hume reflection involves

secondary impressions which are determined through pleasure and pain and involve feelings such as anxiety

and expectations.

David Hume concerned himself with extending the realm of science beyond the natural world and developed

a human science or an embryonic social science. He argued that the bedrock of understanding involved

a comprehension of humanity and society; knowledge regarding human nature was a necessary premise

for a clear perception of science in general. The relationship between human nature and science is clearer

when dealing with issues relating to morality, logic or politics than it is when investigating the natural world.

However, even though the natural world is not about humanity, it is studied by it, that is, it is studied by

individuals who display a specific human nature. Indeed in Hume's writing we witness the very basis of social

science and the idea that understanding human nature is central to our comprehension of anything else; he

argued that through explaining human nature we develop the foundations of all human endeavours. He built

on the work of Francis Bacon and proposed that as natural science had been based on experimentation and

observation such should also be the foundation for human science. His text An Enquiry Concerning Human

Understanding was sub-titled An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral

Subjects where he argued for the use of experimental philosophy for developing understanding of human

beings.

Experience and observation were considered the basis of understanding but Hume did not consider that

observations should simply be accumulated and knowledge derived from this, rather he proposed that

because appearances were deceptive hypotheses should be constructed and experimentation undertaken.

Hume develops his argument through perceptions that he breaks down into impressions and ideas; ideas

involve faint images of more vibrant impressions. Impressions involve the feeling of pain or happiness

whereas the idea involves a recollection of these emotions; the difference between the two is one of intensity

or degree rather than kind. In such a way all ideas are derived through experience; they are the faint image

of something experienced. However, certain ideas exist that do not have impressions, for example, a different

life form on another planet or a fourth dimension in which life could be very different. Hume subsequently

distinguishes between the ‘complex’ and ‘simple’ where he accepts that one may have ideas about entities

that have not been experienced completely but these are based in relevant partial experiences. For example,

it is easier to imagine a different planet and life form than to conjure up exactly what a fourth dimension would

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encompass. Our existence on this planet and images of others in our solar system gives experiences that can

be extrapolated to other unseen planets and our ideas of aliens are usually based in life-form seen here on

Earth, for example, insects or reptilian. However, a fourth dimension is difficult because no experience exists

outside of the three dimensions we exist within. Consequently, the correspondence between impressions

and ideas is limited to simple cases; overall to have meaning an idea must be associated with something

experienced. Hume argued that the correspondence between ideas and impressions formed the basis of

human nature and that such would be useful in further investigating matters relating to human existence.

Question: Empiricism

Provide an assessment of the empiricists identified above and compare and contrast their

distinct perspectives. Which thinker's understanding or philosophical position most clearly

describes empiricism?

Positivism: Auguste Comtè

Positivism was initially identified during the mid-19th century and was closely linked with certain perspectives

of empiricism and fitted well with the idea of progress that typified this period. In A General View of Positivism

(1844/1856), Auguste Comtè (1798–1857) developed a hierarchy of knowledge which put human science

at the apex and emphasised the science of humanity or sociology. He argued, that human thought evolved

through three distinct stages; the religious, metaphysical and scientific. The scientific stage was the most

important but both the religious and metaphysical stages had their value and were not to be discarded as

primitive or useless.

Comtè considered it possible to build social science based on the same principles as those in natural

sciences, for example, physics or chemistry. He further argued that if we used the same methods as the

natural sciences a ‘positive science of society’ could be achieved. Consequently, based on empiricism this

attempt to mimic the principles outlined for the natural sciences within the social sciences was coined as

positivism. Through empirical observations immutable laws would illustrate that that humanity was governed

by cause and effect. Based on Hume's empirical position in terms of the theory of regularity, he argued that

the only content of causal laws involved the set of events that have been or will be observed. Events are

identified by their temporal proximity to later occurrences and the probability that events precede specific

types of occurrences. Agency activity or other mechanisms are irrelevant; to indicate causality is simply to

say that an event of a certain type regularly precedes an occurrence of a certain kind.

Through studying case numbers positivism assesses the correlations and confidence levels that events

precede occurrences. Such negates complications involved in the study of individual and collective action

regarding internal processes of institutions. Through causality laws would be as immutable as those displayed

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by the natural sciences. In such a way, Comtè believed that the behaviour of humanity could be measured

in exactly the same way as matter; that human behaviour could be objectively quantified. It was becoming

clear that people (at least as masses) were suitable phenomenon for scientific study, a realisation that led to

humanity being studied through positivist methodologies in developing institutions.

Following Comtè there was less emphasis on the categorisation of human development; the emphasis on

the centrality and all embracing perspective of science remained but metaphysics and religion were denied.

Positivism was both descriptive and normative; it described how human thought had evolved and prescribed

norms for how it should develop. It had an axiological perspective, which argued that human duty was to

further the process that existed, though positivism was more concerned with methodological approaches than

prescribing ethical norms. However, there was an emphasis on furthering the inevitable, a trait which it shared

with Marxism in terms of dialectics and economic determinism.

Positivism became a critical approach to what social science actually was and what it could achieve. Social

science should be based on observation alone, and no appeal should be made to the abstract or invisible.

There should be no recourse to metaphysical debate, all should be simplified and prediction pursued.

Consequently, positivism emphasised observation of human behaviour and argued that things that could

not be observed such as feelings or emotions were unimportant and may undermine or mislead the study.

Emphasis on observation relates to a belief that through causality human behaviour can be explained in the

same way as the behaviour of matter. As with the natural sciences there was little reason to investigate the

meanings and purposes of matter; matter reacts to external stimuli and so did human beings. The task of the

scientist whether social or natural was to observe, measure and explain.

Positivism ‘has been based upon the principle that only reliable knowledge of any field of phenomena reduces

to knowledge of particular instances of patterns of sensation’ (Harre, 1987: 3). Indeed, as noted in Chapter

2, for positivism such patterns are immutable laws, which enabled prediction of future events. Theoretical

frameworks are logically structured amalgamations of laws and used to enable prediction.

Ontologically, positivism considered that an external reality existed, which could be discovered and totally

understood; a comprehension of reality that is sometimes labelled ‘naïve realism’. The positivist

epistemological position is one where the investigator and the external world (or what could be discovered)

are totally separate and objectivity sought through scientific procedure; truth can be found. Methodologically,

this could be achieved by attempts to prove hypotheses through scientific experiments and the manipulation

of confounding conditions. For positivism, theory provides sets of immutable laws, which enable prediction.

However, immutable laws and prediction are difficult enough in the natural sciences, but in the social

sciences, in most instances, almost impossible. This was one of the major criticisms levelled at positivism by

post-positivists who argued that reality or truth existed, however it could only be understood imperfectly or

probabilistically.

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Question

Identify the difficulties for social science when dealing with:

• immutable laws;

• prediction;

• objectivity.

Inductive Procedure and Deductive Inference

Popper (1994) asserted that developing knowledge through inductive procedure is questionable because the

validity of induction and science assumes and accepts clockwork regularity in nature. Only if we assume the

future will be like the past can we accept that natural laws exist. However, how can the future be verified

through observation? Such is impossible as is verification through deduction and rational argument because

we cannot truly establish that future futures will continue to mirror past pasts. David Hume dealt with this

dilemma by accepting that inductive validity is difficult to verify but may be accepted psychologically; we see

them work in practice so accept the logic of induction. However, scientific laws or truth cannot be verified

through induction or deduction so have no secure rational foundations. ‘Deductive inference may be said to

be valid if and only if it invariably transmits truth from premises to the conclusion; that is to say, if and only if all

inferences of the same logical form transmit truth. One can also explain this by saying: a deductive inference

is valid if and only if and no counterexample exists’ (Popper, 1992: 143). Popper argued that deductive

inference is absolute and objective; it is a truth. That said there was a caveat here and even though we

cannot always identify the objectivity or validity of deductive inference there are number we can prove to

be true. However, ‘we cannot have a general criterion of truth’ (Popper, 1992: 144). Such would necessitate

omniscience, which is presently beyond human endeavour.

Popper (1992) further argued that he is not a ‘belief philosopher’; just because some statement or inference

has strong support and is believed in does not mean it is valid. For deduction or a theory of truth, beliefs are

meaningless; truth is not about belief but about fact, argument and critical debate. However, we may question

this position and ask whether Popper is here propagating a belief? Induction bases general statements

about the world or theoretical frameworks on accumulated observation. For many years inductive procedure

in both natural and human science (social science) indicated true scientific endeavour. Observation and

experimentation provided scientific statements based on fact that encompassed truth, knowledge or reality.

However, David Hume raised some disturbing questions regarding this status quo when he argued that

accumulated singular observations can never provide a general statement or prove a theory. Just because

one event follows another on one occasion it does not automatically follow that such will occur again. Indeed,

such would be the case if there had been 10,000 observations; we might expect the same occurrence but this

is not certitude.

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Reflection Box: Recurring Observations

A regularly used example of the uncertainty of recurring observations involves laws of

physics and the rising sun; that is, based on the laws of physics we can predict the sun

will rise tomorrow morning. Hume argued that this prediction may be disputed through two

arguments. First, simply because the laws of physics have in the past been immutable this

does not mean this will be the case tomorrow. Second, as noted the laws of physics are

general statements, which cannot be proved by observations (no matter how many times

an activity occurs).

Consider recurring observations and the implications for natural and social science.

This text recognises the difficulty in giving precise definitions of induction and deduction and the point where

the former begins and the latter ends (and vice versa) and acknowledges the grey area between the two.

Alfred Marshall argued that ‘(y)ou make all your contrasts rather too sharply for me. You talk of the inductive

& deductive methods: whereas I contend that each involves the other & that historians are always deducing,

& that even the most deductive writers are always implicitly at least basing themselves on observed facts’

(Marshall, cited in Coase, 1995: 169). Ultimately, Marshall wished to emphasise the mutual dependency of

induction and deduction; this text recognises the difference and necessary interdependency. Indeed, this is a

good point to develop when dealing with a research project that involves either theory development or theory

testing. In general the former would be considered more deductive whereas the latter inductive; the reality is

that no one is able to enter the field with no pre-conceptions and hypotheses are generated through some

understanding of the subject consequently a continuum exists with variable levels of a synthesis between

deductive and inductive approaches utilised in research projects.

Differentiating Post-Positivist Approaches

Positivists argued that social science should establish laws and as with the natural sciences such laws should

be beyond challenge. Such an approach to knowledge generation and the realisation of truth undermined the

critical aspect of positivism and in many instances became a barrier to scientific discovery. If laws could not be

challenged then progress was restrained; positivism omitted and alienated many approaches to generating

theoretical frameworks that reflected understanding and knowledge and was eventually challenged by post-

positivism. Indeed, the relationships between positivism, post-positivism and critical theory exist on a sliding

scale and there is more of a continuum between them rather than hard and fast demarcations. That said, even

though much criticism of positivism from positions more closely linked with critical theory emerged between

the 1950s and 1970s, one of the first to deliver a broadside was Karl Popper. Later post-positivists include:

Toulmin, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Kuhn and Bhaskar (each of these researchers is covered in greater detail

below).

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Falsification and Karl Popper

Popper (1994) considered that immutable laws led to the stagnation of theory and that theory development

should be open to criticism. Through falsification ‘we can get rid of a badly fitting theory’ before it overrides

investigation and undermines objectivity (Popper, 1994: 4). In Popper (2002a, 2002b) falsification offers a

solution to the problem of immutable laws and rational foundations. He argued that no matter how many times

a white swan is observed we can never universally state that ‘all swans are white’. However, one observation

of a black swan allows the statement ‘not all swans are white’. In such a way even though generalisations

are not verifiable they are falsifiable. Consequently, scientific laws can be tested because even though they

cannot be proved they can be falsified. The methodology for the post-positivist position is about falsifying

standing scientific laws and the ontology concerned with criticising existing reality. If a single case exists that

refutes a given law then as long as the case is reported correctly a scientific law is refuted. However, the

reported case may have been reported incorrectly so we can always doubt the evidence; for instance the

black swan may not have been a swan or because it is black we may decide not to label it a swan. In such a

way all falsifiable evidence could be rejected.

Popper suggested that ‘progress in science … based on a revolutionary use of trial and the elimination of

error by criticism which includes severe examinations or tests – that is, attempts to probe into the possible

weaknesses of theories, attempts to refute them’ (2002: 7). Popper (2002a) argued that because of varied

and divergent human behaviour if we looked for confirmation then verification was easier to realise in the

social sciences. Every test of a theory should be an attempt to falsify it, ‘testability is falsifiability: but there are

degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more exposed to refutation than others they take, as it

were, greater risks’ (Popper, 2002a: 48). However, Popper indicated that complete or conclusive falsification

was also difficult if not impossible to achieve. ‘If you insist on strict proof (or disproof) in the empirical sciences,

you will never benefit from experience and never learn from it how wrong you are’ (2002b: 28).

Definition Box: Theory Falsification

• If confirmation or verification of theory is pursued then the confirmation or

verification of the said theory is simplistic and straightforward.

• Sound theory prohibits certain events and occurrences; the more entities forbidden

then the sounder the theory.

• Scientific theory is refutable; non-refutability is a vice not a virtue.

• Falsification is the only genuine test or refutation of theories.

• Theories display levels of falsifiability or refutation; some theories are more

testable than others.

• Confirmation of theory should only be accepted if it has been subject to an attempt

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to be falsified and continued to retain validity.

• When theory is refuted falsification needs to be accepted. Reinterpretation and

auxiliary assumptions should be avoided.

Falsification uncovers new arguments, perspectives and experiences which should be

taken into consideration even if they bring into question the most relied upon or recent

theoretical explanations. Because conclusive falsification is difficult at the methodological

level, refutation should not be evaded through re-interpretation. Outcomes of refutation

require acceptance and uncomfortable outcomes integrated with our understanding.

However, scientific laws should not be given up lightly and defended stoutly in the face of

competing theoretical frameworks.

A certain level of dogmatism is required for progress to occur. If old theories are not

defended and do not struggle for survival, the newer theories cannot be robustly tested for

levels of truth and explanatory power; an evolutionary survival of the fittest environment

should exist. Intolerant dogmatism, however, is one of the main obstacles to science.

Indeed, ‘we should not only keep alternative theories alive through discussing them, but

we should systematically look for new alternatives. And we should be worried when there

are no alternatives – whenever a dominant theory becomes too exclusive. The danger

to progress in science is much increased if the theory in question obtains something like

monopoly’ (Popper, 1994: 16).

However, Popper (1969) indicated that certain theories were still upheld even when they

were found to be false. Through manipulating confounding variables or re-interpretation

theory may be rescued from refutation, but only at the price of losing its credibility as a

bona fide scientific theory. By making interpretations of the theory vague anything that may

refute the theory can be explained away: if prediction is vague and unclear it becomes

irrefutable. For instance, the ‘Marxist theory of history, in spite of serious efforts of some

of its founders and followers, ultimately adopted this soothsaying practice’ (Popper, 1969:

49). Popper (2002a) argued that Marx historical materialism or dialectics of history that

predicted the dictatorship of the proletariat. Popper (1969) thought highly of Marx idealism

but considers him a false prophet. ‘He was a prophet of the course of history and his

prophecies did not come true; but this is not the main accusation. It is much more

important that he misled scores of intelligent people into believing that historical prophecy

is the scientific way of approaching social problems’ (Popper, 1969: 82). Even though Marx

historicism had been refuted by data or events, Marxists re-interpreted the theory and

empirical data in order to deal with the refutation. ‘In this way they rescued the theory from

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refutation … (but) destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status’ (Popper, 2002a:

49).

Definition Box: Situational Analysis

Situational analysis involves:

• physical entities with elements of properties and states;

• certain social institutions and their properties;

• certain aims;

• certain elements of knowledge.

Positivistic immutable laws hold up scientific inquiry and provide false prophets. Post-

positivism challenges positivism and through Popper identified a critical method of

falsification and refutation. Russell (1980) identified the link between this philosophical

position and methodology when he considered that one begins with a body of knowledge

or data which is complex, vague and confusing. ‘By analysis we reduce them to

propositions which are as nearly as possible simple and precise … These initial

propositions are premises (which) are … quite different from data – they are simpler, more

precise, and less infected with logical redundancy (Russell, 1980: 214).

Popper (1994) argued that because falsification is extremely difficult to achieve,

explanations in the social sciences required the analysis of social situations. This he

labelled ‘situational logic’, which based on ‘situational analysis’ incorporated information or

knowledge that was relevant to the situation. Indeed, ‘situational analysis’ turned the entity

under analysis into a generalised anyone or anything that shared the relevant situation.

It reduced individual aims of personal knowledge to a typical/situational model that in

principle is able to explain a number of structurally similar events. In such a way we

are able to comprehend a social event which is animated through replacing individual

consciousness and situation with abstraction and an assumption that the agent will act,

appropriately or adequately, in accordance with the situation (rational agent).

The situation should attempt to involve all relevant aims, complete relevant knowledge

regarding these aims and the agent should act appropriately or rationally in relation to

the situation. This is sometimes referred to as the ‘rationality principle’, which states that

once the model is constructed it is assumed that agents act within the terms and realms

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of the model. Furthermore, because all variables are not involved in the understanding of

motivations, the situations and agents are explained in ideal terms. Through ‘situational

analysis’ it is possible to discuss, criticise and in some situations test models and if the

test fails then learn from the flaws in the models and comprehend how they are over

simplifications. The ‘rationality principle’ does not assume that human beings will always

adopt a rational attitude. However, it is a methodological device which conjures a minimum

principle ‘which animates all our explanatory situational models, and which, although we

know that it is not true, we have some reason to regard as a good approximation of the

truth’ (Popper, 1994: 181).

Kuhnian Paradigm Shifts

Kuhn (1970) argued that falsification did not actually occur in the research process. Indeed, two types

of research existed; normal research which involved the on-going research within a given paradigm and

research that is brought about through paradigm shifts. Normal science involves ‘the activity in which most

scientists inevitably spend almost all of their time (and) is predicated on the assumption that scientists know

what the world is like’ (Kuhn, 1970: 5). To ensure successful outcomes it is possible that normal science stifles

innovation and remains within the realm of tried and tested techniques.

Normal sciences are based on observation and experiment in different fields, for example, physics, biology,

chemistry, which is identified as a paradigm because they encompass a group of followers or individual

adherents and leave numerous difficulties for following generations of practitioners to deal with (Kuhn, 1970).

That is accepted practice in terms of laws, theories and applications provide the basis of scientific research

(a certain belief system about how research should be conducted and what knowledge entails). Indeed,

required paradigm norms are learned by students in specific scientific areas where they will eventually

become a practitioner and join those who also learned the same required norms prior to full membership.

Consequently, practice within the community seldom invokes dissent with given fundamentals; scientists with

similar backgrounds and rule orientations are unlikely to challenge the paradigm or normal science practice

and procedures.

Table 3.2 Falsification and paradigm shifts

Falsification

If a case exists that refutes a given law then as long as the case is reported correctly the said scientific law is

refuted. However, the reported case may have been reported incorrectly so we can always doubt the

evidence; for instance in the case of the black swan, it may not have been a swan or because it is black we

may decide not to label it a swan. In such a way all falsifiable evidence could be rejected.

Paradigm

shift

Scientific theory does not evolve through the accumulation of facts but through historical process. Change

happens through the emergence of different intellectual circumstance and possibilities (different paradigm).

This involves a range of ideas available at a given time and the discourse and terminology for a given epoch.

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Adherence to the paradigm norms ensures the continuation of normal science procedures and the research

tradition related to this. However, a moment occurs when tried and tested techniques do not provide the

expected results and the normal way of doing things is challenged and a paradigm shift occurs. ‘Led by a new

paradigm scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important during revolutions

they see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before’

(Kuhn, 1970: 111). Kuhn (1970) argued that scientific theory did not evolve through the accumulation of facts

but through historical process. Change occurred through the emergence of different intellectual circumstance

and possibility. Such involved the range of ideas available at a given time and the discourse or terminology

for a given epoch.

Analysis of the history of electricity provides an example of the way science develops. In the early 18th

century there existed many conceptual perspectives regarding electricity but all ‘were partially derived from

one or another version of the mechanic-corpuscular philosophy that guided all scientific research of the day’

(Kuhn, 1970: 13–14). Furthermore, each theoretical perspective was considered scientific because it had

been derived through scientific method in terms of observation and experimentation (Kuhn, 1970). However,

even though researchers in this area would have read each other's results and all experimentation was

electrical the theoretical perspectives that emerged only accorded slight resemblance. It was not until the

work of Franklin and his successors that some unity could be formed that provided ‘a subsequent generation

of “electricians” with a common paradigm for … research’ (Kuhn, 1970: 15). Kuhn (1970) argued that similar

long term disagreements and discourse occurred before a paradigm and ‘somewhat arbitrary’ name emerged

in terms of Aristotle and motion, Newton and gravity, Boyle and chemistry or Hutton and geology. Given this

one can see that the formation of a research paradigm is a long-term and difficult route. Indeed, for example

aspects of biology paradigms, such as heredity, are quite recent and so ‘it remains an open question what

parts of social science have yet acquired such paradigms at all’ (Kuhn, 1970: 15).

Khun thought that paradigms incorporated a specific mode of thinking, provided a certain perspective

regarding the history of science and what these modes of thinking entailed. For example, the existing

positivistic paradigm as the main mode of scientific discovery provided the dominant paradigm or normal

science for many years until it was challenged and usurped by post-positivism. Indeed post-positivism did not

completely fulfil the requirements for social science research and analysis and was consequently challenged

through critical theory and constructivism. Indeed, paradigm shifts can take place in relation to ontology and

epistemology as well as theoretical perspectives. Such then determines a new basis for our comprehension

of knowledge truth and theory as a generic concept. For its continuation a certain consensus within the

research community regarding the core normal science is essential. It is the consensus regarding the core

theories or methodological approaches of normal science that break down and brings about a paradigm

shift. However, what would maintain such a consensus and what would this entail? Khun argued that

on the one hand a paradigm incorporates a universal perspective or ‘shared commitments’ of a scientific

community whereas on the other hand it identifies a particular sub-set of the community with a specific

particular commitment within the more generic community. The initial community is broad and entails a

broader conceptualisation of the theory employed in the philosophy of science. Indeed, in explaining the more

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generic idea of the paradigm, Kuhn uses the term ‘disciplinary matrix’ ‘disciplinary because it refers to the

common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline; matrix because it is composed of ordered

elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification’ (1996: 182). The key elements of a disciplinary

matrix incorporate: symbolic generalisations which involve ‘expressions deployed without question or dissent

by group members … they are formal or the ready formalised components of the disciplinary matrix’ (Kuhn,

1996: 182), for example, general laws of nature and their underpinning definitions. A second part of the

disciplinary matrix involves ‘the shared commitment’ to metaphysical beliefs in specific models that would

include a more heuristic type of model. A heuristic model consists of experiential techniques which enable

discovery and learning, and which provide generic comprehension and rapid means of problem solving, for

example, intuition, common sense, trial and error. Fundamentally, models exist on an ontological/heuristic

continuum and the commitment to these models vary; models provide accepted community discourse and

identify acceptable puzzle solutions and the pecking order of puzzles that require solutions in the designated

area of research. Linked closely to the models and discourse developed in defining problems and solutions is

the idea of values. Though values are apparent at all times their importance becomes explicit when members

of a community are involved in disputed discourse, fissure and eventually incompatibility within the discipline.

Even though commitment to models exist within communities and values are widely and deeply shared by

members, values can be subjective and ‘affected by the features of individual personality and biography that

differentiate the members of the group’ (Kuhn, 1996: 185). So shared values determine group behaviour even

though all members do not hold the values with the same voracity or consistency and this differentiation

identifies distinctions and challenges norms within a community. A further aspect of a paradigm involves the

basic education that students of scientific communities require before full membership is granted; this Kuhn

argued involved the dissemination of exemplars through accepted textbooks, examinations and other forms

of assessment, for example, dissertations and doctoral studies. Indeed, by undertaking a higher degree one

is learning the norms identified in the specific discipline; such will consequently be applied in a practitioner

and theoretical context and the disciplinary matrix reinforced. Modes of normal science are reinforced until

challenged and a paradigm shift realised.

Through ‘research programmes’ Lakatos (1970) attempted to resolve the discrepancy between Popper

and Kuhn. Lakatos argued that theory may be considered as a number of theories strung together in a

succession T1, T2, T3, each of which share some central common idea that he labelled ‘hard core’ and such a

succession of theories may be considered a ‘research programme’. Indeed, through ‘research programmes’,

the theoretical core of the theories may be protected or shielded from falsification by a ‘protective belt’ of

‘auxiliary hypotheses’, that is the scientist may manipulate hypotheses so the core of the theories is not

challenged. The main point propagated by Lakatos involved a judgement regarding the quality of the theory;

what was important was whether one theory was more applicable than another not whether or not it was true

or false.

Toulmin (1953), who pre-dated both Kuhn and Lakatos, argued that rather than tested, theories should be

considered in relation to their usability. Theories can be compared with sets of rules; that a general limited

set of rules may be identified in the context of a domain and entities toward which the rules apply clarified.

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Instances that do not relate to the rules are determined. Consequently, the rules do not need to stand or reflect

every context or in all cases but outline an area where the rules apply (area of application). Normally society

would respect individual liberty but incarcerate someone who had committed a crime. Usually it is wrong to

take a life but this action is accepted when in the name of the state when fighting in a war. Theory relates

to reality through a set of rules some of which correspond and others which do not; the analysis involves

determining which rules apply in a given domain or situation and which are redundant. Overall, on different

levels each of these thinkers existed on an ontological continuum between critical realism and historical

realism in terms of falsification on the one hand and a historical transformation of knowledge and how this is

reflected through theoretical transformation on the other hand. Indeed such a synthesis of ontology may be

perceived in the less naive and more in-depth understanding of critical realism developed by Roy Bhaskar.

Critical Realism: Roy Bhaskar

A post-positivist ontology perceives reality as external to humanity but considers our intellectual capabilities

unable to fully understand opaque and confounding truth. On an ontological level this has been identified as

‘critical realism’ (Bhaskar, 1975; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994, 2000, 2005). Critical realism involves a distinction

between the production of knowledge by human beings (as a social product) which can change in the same

way that any human product may and knowledge that is of things (that is ground within them). The latter

knowledge is not produced by humanity but discovered (it is knowledge that does not depend on human

activity), for example, gravity, light propagation. If humanity ceased to exist, light would continue to travel and

the moon would circle the Earth in exactly the same way; even though there would be no one to know this.

Bhaskar labels the latter ‘the intransitive objects of knowledge’ and the former the ‘transitive objects of

knowledge’, which include facts, theories, paradigms and models. In terms of Darwin's theory of evolution

the transitive objects involved ‘facts of natural variation, the theory of natural selection and Malthus’ theory of

population’ (1975: 21). Indeed he used these to discover and illuminate what had been occurring for eons.

If we imagine a world without humanity but containing similar intransitive objects (in such a situation there

would be no science to explain phenomenon so things would not be explained but still exist). Natural events

and processes would continue to occur whether or not someone was able to understand and or explain them

(osmosis would continue and atoms would still amalgamate). Consequently events are not ‘dependent on

our knowledge nor perception they are the intransitive, science dependent, objects of scientific discovery and

investigation’ (Bhaskar, 1975: 22).

For social science or the social world the situation is a little more problematic. The social world is a

social construction that does not exist completely independent of human theory and discourse so does not

clearly illustrate an intransitive dimension of knowledge. However, this knowledge is likely to be historical or

understandings ground in the past rather than that posed by present day researchers.

Social science could reject the critical realist position and argue that no independent or intransitive knowledge

exists in this domain. Since social science includes theories that are transitive and these have an impact

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on practice, the social world is unable to reflect an intransitive dimension: fundamentally, an independent

knowledge of the social sciences cannot exist. However, if one is to contend that the critical realist position

does exist in the social science some form of distinction between transitive and intransitive knowledge is

required. In addition, with more researchers employing reflexivity this recognition of subject influence makes

it increasingly difficult to test social theory against independent social reality. Reality becomes multi-faceted

with different facets reflecting on each other and confronting themselves in different forms and ways. Indeed,

as with a hall of mirrors they reflect upon themselves and the clear distinction between subject and object

diminishes (ontology becomes epistemology).

Reflection Box: Intransitive and Transitive Knowledge

Intransitive knowledge incorporates the objects of study or science in terms of physical

processes or social phenomenon. Transitive knowledge involves the human dimension in

terms of theories and discourses (however, as elements of the social world they may be

seen as intransitive). Rival theories and discourses are competingtransitive perspectives

whereas intransitive perspectives are continuous.

Consider the possibility of intransitive knowledge for the social sciences.

Reflection Box: Reality

A tree falls in the middle of the desert but no one is there to witness this; does it make a

noise when it hits the ground?

Conversely, one could consider reflexivity as a useful if not necessary element of critical theory in the social

sciences because it provides critical examination of different standpoints and perspectives. Indeed, reflexivity

may guard against levels of projection and selection that could misrepresent the objective reality. Realists are

always in a position that relates to the objective reality; reflexivity enables a critical comprehension of this

position and the extent to which this affects the study. Self exists in relation to history and social existence;

contemporary theory can be considered transitive and historical theory and interpretation intransitive.

Fundamentally, knowledge is always gathered or derived though a selection process and reflexivity uncovers

the mirage of total separation of researcher and researched. Social science involves multi-faceted reflections

where theories both direct and confront perspectives. (For further on Reflexivity see the Methods chapter.)

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Question

• Explain the differences between transitive and intransitive knowledge.

• Identify the difficulties this distinction may have for social science.

Conclusion

Empiricism is an idealised term coined in the 19th century to illustrate distinctions between those thinkers

who considered experience as the route to knowledge and those who considered the mind as the starting

point, that is, rationalists. As noted in Chapter 1, philosophers, such as Kant and Schopenhaur, outlined the

relationship between internal and external worlds and how understanding, truth, reality, theory and knowledge

involved a synthesis of the two. In this chapter we identified a number of empiricists and outlined how each

dealt with the difficult relationship between experience of the external world and thought or rationalisation.

However, the main point for Bacon, Hobbes, Locke and Hume was that experience and observation was the

starting point. This is the premise positivism embraced and provided the basis for social science knowledge

accumulation throughout the 19th century.

The objective of both positivism and post-positivism is explanation, control and prediction; positivism looked

for the verification of hypotheses, facts and laws whereas post-positivism pursued falsification. Consequently

theory, knowledge or truth for the former involves verified laws and the latter non-falsified laws that were

probably true. In this way knowledge is accumulated through law, building and adding to the stock of

knowledge through cause and effect and generalisation. Indeed, knowledge is intrinsically valuable and an

end in itself. Any action relating to the research is minimised; it is limited and highly controlled as involvement

is perceived as subjective and a threat to objectivity and validity. The quality or criteria of knowledge is

measured through internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity; value is denied and scientists

are removed from the research. However, there is a distinction here as the positivist acts as advisor for

policymakers and change agents whereas the post-positivist is involved in policymaking and is a change

agent through activism and advocacy. Both use technical qualitative and quantitative techniques, develop

substantive theories, formulaic text and the researcher is the main voice. That said, for post-positivist critical

theory, reflexivity, may be utilised but for positivists this technique or method impinges on objectivity.

Positivism mimicked methodologies set out for the natural world and wished to form immutable laws that

enabled prediction. If new theory did not adhere to the given immutable laws it was usually discarded.

This had implications for scientific progress and the development of new knowledge. Indeed, it provided

an authoritarian modernist approach to knowledge creation and dissemination. Post-positivist epistemology

abandons the ideal of complete separation between the investigated and investigator, however objectivity

and distance are still pursued. This leads to a methodology that deals with multiple modified scientific

experimentation and hypothesis falsification. Theory is not about the discovery of immutable laws but

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http://methods.sagepub.com/book/an-introduction-to-the-philosophy-of-methodology/n1.xml

approximations of truth. A new theory may deal with some difficulties but will invariably open many new

problems. If the theory provides significant progress then ‘the new problems will differ from the old problems:

the new problems will be on a radically different level of depth’ (Popper, 1994: 4). Theory development is

open to criticism. Consequently, through falsification ‘we can get rid of a badly fitting theory’ before it overrides

investigation and undermines objectivity (Popper, 1994: 4).

Post-positivism gave greater scope for human endeavour. Popper noted that the ‘future is open. It is not

pre-determined and thus cannot be predicted … the possibilities that lie in the future are infinite’ (1994: xiii).

However, the future depends on humanity, we are responsible for our future. ‘It is our duty to remain optimists,

this includes not only the openness of the future but also that which all of us contribute to it by everything

we do: we are all responsible for what the future holds in store. Thus it is our duty, not to prophesy evil

but, rather, to fight for a better world’ (Popper, 1994: xiii). However, the very nature of post-positivism throws

up new problems for research and phenomenology forms criticisms of both positivism and post-positivism.

Indeed, even though phenomenology was defined by Hegel (1977) and more specifically for our purposes by

Husserl in the 19th century, it is not until Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in the 20th century that the

phenomenological approach began to challenge the (by then) dominant position of post-positivism. Chapter

4 explores these different phenomenological perspectives and outlines the main distinctions between the

influential thinkers in this area.