discussion assignment

An_Introduction_to_Islam_in_the_21st_Century_----_Pg_253--267.pdf

Home >Reading homework help >discussion assignment

An Introduction to Islam in the 21st Century, First Edition. Edited by Aminah Beverly McCloud, Scott W. Hibbard, and Laith Saud. © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Outline

Introduction 233 The Colonial Encounter 235 Indonesia in the 20th Century 237

Politics and Economics 237 Culture 239 Indonesia in the 21st Century 241

Malaysia 242 History 242 Women, Islam, and Transnational Movements 244

Conclusion 246 Discussion Questions 247 Suggested Further Reading 248 Sidebar

12.1 Islam in Indonesia 234

Islam in Indonesia and malaysia

Aminah Beverly McCloud

Introduction

Indonesia (see Map 12.1) is the world’s largest Islamic country: almost 90 percent of its 238 million people are officially identified as Muslim. The remaining 10 percent are Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and animist. Indonesian Muslims are almost all Sunni. The country has not, however, been plagued by the

An Introduction to Islam in the 21st Century, edited by Aminah Beverly McCloud, et al., John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uaz/detail.action?docID=1120608. Created from uaz on 2020-11-07 18:45:49.

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

234 Regional Studies

kind of intolerance, extremism, and religious violence that has characterized other parts of the Muslim world. On the contrary, until 1998, the government based its legitimacy on the twin pillars of national unity and religious pluralism. Even if President Suharto, a long-time ruler, relied upon repression and military rule to stay in power, the government’s policies toward religion encouraged an inclusive and tolerant interpretation of the Islamic tradition, which could thus at least sur- vive, if not thrive. Moreover, since Suharto’s resignation in 1998, the country has been governed by democratic institutions, which include a popularly elected president and a parliament, as well as an independent judiciary. Remarkably, though, this open political system has nonetheless provided space for the emer- gence of some anti-democratic groups – such as Laskar Jihad, which has targeted the Christian population with violence. However, the pluralist nature of the general population’s beliefs has secured a strong resistance to these kinds of incursions into a progressive society.

Arab Muslim traders made their first contact with Indonesians in the 8th century. This assertion is based on evidence in the form of gravesites, which have

been preserved over the centuries by genera- tions of indigenous villagers. But the population remained predominantly Hindu, Buddhist, and animist until the end of the 13th century, when accounts of the spread of Islam began to be made. Then came Muslim traders, mostly from Gujarat in India, who helped spread Islam through marriage; they also introduced it into the royal houses of the principal ruling families of the islands’ king- doms. By the end of the 13th century Islam was firmly established in North Sumatra; by the end of the 14th it had spread in northeast Malaya, Brunei, the southwestern Philippines, and some of the countries of East Java; by the fifteenth century it reached Malacca and other areas of the Malay Peninsula. Again, the spread of Islam was not associated with mili- tary conquest; rather it was done mainly through assimilation and marriage. Islam subsequently supplanted Hinduism and Buddhism as the dominant religion; this hap- pened in the 17th century. Bali adopted both Islam and Christianity throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. During this process of acculturation influences from Hinduism and Buddhism were tolerated and some practices were Islamized.

Sidebar 12.1 Islam in Indonesia

8th century The Arabs make initial contact 13–17th centuries

Muslim traders arrive from India and spread Islam across the islands

15th century The Portuguese invade Indonesia 16th century The Spanish Inquisition is

introduced in the Philippines; Indonesia is divided between a Spanish north and a Muslim Malay south

17th century The Dutch displace the Portuguese as principal colonial power

Late 17th century

The British invade Indonesia

Late 19th century

The Dutch re-invade Indonesia

1942 The Japanese invade and occupy Indonesia

August 17, 1945 Indonesia becomes independent 1946 The British withdraw 1948 The Dutch attempt a re-invasion 1950 Indonesia becomes the Federal

Republic of the United States of Indonesia

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 235

There are a few scholarly accounts of conversion narratives and changes in governmental or societal structures from which more details about the engage- ment of Islam can be drawn. From this fragmentary evidence research can conclude that the spread of Islam was slow; the process was still incomplete by the time of European colonization. What really defines Indonesian Islam is its pluralism, its tolerance, and its syncretism. This is due in large measure to its early history and to the extreme diversity of indigenous cultures that inhabit the 16,000 islands comprising modern-day Indonesia. As Islam spread, it merged with these indigenous cultures, beliefs, and practices, often retaining elements of the Hindu tradition it displaced. Although a more orthodox interpretation of Islam came to be more pronounced in the 18th and 19th centuries, the syncre- tistic Islam – along with a strong Sufi tradition – has continued to be influential. This diversity of religious practice, allied to the ethnic makeup of the country, has created the basis for a relatively high degree of religious and political tolerance in the whole society.

The Colonial Encounter

The Portuguese arrived in the region first, capturing and then occupying the commercially important Straits of Malacca in 1512. Local Islamic scholars migrated, along with traders, to other islands, spreading Islam in the places where they landed. Ottoman forces were able to halt much of the Portuguese aggression and created a balance of power between Portugal and the rulers of the region, but only for a short time. The Spanish came next, and they were mil- itarily more powerful than the Portuguese. Magellan arrived in 1521, just around the time when the sultan of Manila accepted Islam. In 1564 the Philippines fell to the Spanish, who then introduced what Malay scholars refer to as an “Inquisition”: there were forced conversions to Catholicism, the alternative being death. The Portuguese and Spanish invasions halted the northern spread of Islam and prevented its spread into Vietnam and Indochina. Political resistance to the Europeans from indigenous populations was wide- spread, and a stalemate was eventually reached in the 16th century when a boundary was drawn between the Spanish possessions in the north and Muslim Malay territories to the south.

In the 17th century the Dutch colonized the region, displacing the Portuguese as the principal colonial power in the Far East. By this time the region was known in the world for its immense natural resources and opportunities for trade. Spices such as nutmeg, pepper, clove, as well as sandalwood, rubber, and teak were highly prized in Europe as items for trade. The aims of the Dutch included creating a monopoly of trading ports; in this way they inadvertently helped facilitate the spread of Islam into rural areas, as Muslim traders were forced to relocate. The Dutch captured and indentured large numbers of Malays, then transported them to other possessions such as South Africa, again, inadvertently

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Aceh

THAILAND

Pacific Ocean

Jakarta

JAVA

BRUNEI

PHILIPPINES

KALIMANTAN

SULAWESI PAPUA

PAPUA NEW

GUINEAWEST TIMOR

EAST TIMOR

AUSTRALIA

MALUKU

BALI

Indian Ocean Timor Sea

Arafura Sea

Molucca Sea

Banda Sea

SU M

ATRA

M A L A Y S I

I N D O N E S I A AmbonJava Sea

0 Miles

Kilometers 500

500

International boundary

Provincial boundary

National capital

Map 12.1 Map of Indonesia.

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 237

introducing and spreading Islam there. The British, after consolidating their holdings in India, proceeded to occupy the Straits of Malacca in 1812. In the sec- ond half of the 19th century the states of the archipelago fell like domino pieces to the Dutch and the British.

In the ensuing struggle for independence, the Malay language provided a common bond for the population, while Islam was a primary vehicle for the expression of their demands for freedom. The struggle for independence gave impetus to the consolidation of Islamic influence. The faith of Islam spread, and by the turn of the 20th century the entire archipelago had become Muslim, except for the Island of Bali and Singapore.

An important part of this history is the migration of Chinese to the region. In pre-Islamic Asia, China had the greater political–military–technological influence on the continent’s eastern civilizations, while India had the greater religious–cultural influence. During the 19th century, however, many Chinese were brought to work on plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia, while others came as merchants and stayed. By the end of the century the Chinese formed a third of the population of Malaysia and a small but extremely influential minority of the population of Indonesia. Most of the Chinese migrants did not become Muslim, as many had converted to Christianity; this reflects the impor- tance of European influence at that time. They also established themselves as economic elites in these areas, in part because of their connections to the Chinese mainland and in part due to the favoritism they enjoyed under European colonial rule. But this would cause considerable problems for them in the post- colonial period, when the nationalist agitation was to take on anti-Christian and anti-Chinese overtones.

Indonesia in the 20th Century

Politics and Economics

In the 20th century the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy, under which farming and limited health and educational services were developed for Indonesia. Railways, roads, and inter-island shipping were expanded. The policy helped create two new social elements: a Western-educated class of Indonesians; and a smaller group of Indonesian entrepreneurs, who began to compete with a predominantly Chinese commercial class. Nevertheless, social movements at the beginning of the 20th century were aimed at ridding the country of foreign occupation.

The first important vehicle for the anti-Dutch nationalist movement was the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) established in 1912. This movement grew from an association designed to protect batik merchants, and it found in Islam a useful language for political mobilization. Six years later the organization had more than 2 million members from all over the archipelago. The Dutch were initially tolerant of nationalist organizations and in 1916 created the People’s Council,

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

238 Regional Studies

where representatives from various groups could debate and advise the government on policy. This policy of inclusion proved to be too little given too late. After World War I, the Dutch government became more repressive in the face of a more assertive nationalist opposition, and the rise of communism was even more problematic. In the 1920s, men whose first priority was not the re- establishment of Islamic states but freedom from oppression headed the Indonesian nationalist movement. The first chief of state of postcolonial Indonesia, President Sukarno, was one of the leaders of this independence movement. Despite repeated arrests by the Dutch administrators, he and his co- conspirators were able to sustain its momentum and the spirit of democracy well into the years preceding World War II.

In 1942 the Japanese invaded and occupied Indonesia. Key Japanese priorities in the war were gaining Indonesian support for their regime and, even more impor- tantly, gaining access to Indonesia’s strategic petroleum reserves. The Japanese gave symbolic political freedom to leaders of the Indonesian Nationalist Party on the one hand, although on the other they forced tens of thousands of Indonesians into conscripted labor. Consequently the Japanese were not welcomed as libera- tors from the Dutch. On August 17, 1945, two days after the Japanese surrendered to the Allies, the Nationalist Party declared an independent Republic of Indonesia. When the British landed to take advantage of the Japanese retreat a month later, a functioning republican administration had been established in Java and Sumatra. Subsequently the British were forced to withdraw in 1946, and the Linggajati Agreement was signed between British, Dutch, and Indonesian authorities: it was designed to give authority to the Republic in Java and Sumatra, which had plans for a federal Indonesia.

The Dutch, reluctant to let go of lucrative holdings, launched missile attacks on Indonesian forces in 1947, claiming that the Indonesians had violated the Linggajati Agreement. They defied a UN cease-fire in December 1948 and attacked the Republic again, undeterred. They immediately arrested the Indonesian leaders and sent them into exile. However, resistance from Indonesians, along with protests from the international community, produced a cease-fire. In 1949 the Dutch finally agreed to relinquish sovereignty to the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia – the formal name of the republic since 1950. At this point the Indonesian government had the incredible task of creating a viable state from the many peo- ples and cultures of the islands and to quell various uprisings and staunch rem- nants of Dutch-led resistance movements on small islands.

Despite an early commitment to democratic rule, President Sukarno sought to reform the party system and to replace liberal democracy with what was referred to as a “guided democracy.” His localization of power and its benefits in the central government, with little attention paid to the smaller islands, led to further uprisings inspired by a group that received covert aid from the US and Taiwan. Meanwhile Sukarno pursued an active foreign policy and a policy of suppressing dissent at home, thus killing hundreds of thousands of citizens. During his regime all elections were tightly controlled, and all enterprises were

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 239

owned by the state. Sukarno did, however, institutionalize a secular vision of national development – one premised upon the so-called Pancasila (“five princi- ples”): (1) a non-sectarian belief in God; (2) an emphasis upon national unity; (3) consensus through deliberation; (4) humanitarianism; and (5) social justice. This understanding of secular nationalism is reflective of the era and of other countries pursuing similar policies (these are described in Chapter 6). Secularism in this sense meant non- discrimination in matters of belief and reflected the religious and ethnic diversity of the country.

When Sukarno was forced out by the Indonesian military in 1968, his successor and a former general, the new President Suharto, followed largely similar policies. Suharto’s two fears were political mobilization on the left, from the Communist Party (which had tried to overthrow Sukarno earlier) and political mobilization on the right, from right-wing Islamic activists. Suharto’s “New Order,” which gov- erned from the mid-1960s until 1998, subsequently used the various institutions of the state to dominate both of these opposition groups, while continuing to pro- mote a depoliticized Islam in the state schools. Atheism was banned (tied as it was to communism), and religion highly regulated by the state. Economically, Suharto used his dominance of the political system to regulate access to resources in the country. By the 1990s a large portion of Indonesia’s wealth was concentrated in the hands of the president’s family and associates.

Culture

Muslim women leaders arose from networks of two central Muslim organizations: Muhammadiyah – founded in 1912, with 20 million followers, and considered modernist – and the more traditional Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) – founded in 1926, with around 30 million followers. These groups have guided and influenced Indonesian Muslims since the beginning of the 20th century. Both have branches for women and offer their female members opportunities to be active religious leaders and teachers. The primary differences between them are in their methods of interpreting the sources of Islam and in their tolerance for local cultural norms.

Modernists/reformists encourage the direct reading of the Qurʾan and of various hadith. Rather than relying on the perceived wisdom of classical scholar- ship, they are in favor of the use of independent reasoning, and thus opinions, in shaping interpretation. They are less tolerant of local cultural idioms and feel that these artifacts must be removed from Islamic belief and practices, wherever they may be found. Traditionalists, on the other hand, rely on the Qurʾan, hadith, and jurisprudence along with classical works for guidance and interpretation. They are much more tolerant of local cultural expressions, as long as these do not contradict Islam.

In Indonesia the predominant branch of Islam is Sunni, and within it the predominant legal school is Shafiʾi. Both Muhammadiyah and NU promote a moderate version of Islam over and against more conservative or politically traditional versions. Muhammadiyah’s ʿAisyiyah was set up in 1917, whereas the

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

240 Regional Studies

NU did not allow its women to start the Muslimat until 1946. In each group there are organizations for girls and young women to guarantee the transmission of knowledge and legacy. Undoubtedly these organizations had to adjust to Dutch colonization and to the struggle for independence along with having discussions on women’s roles in the Muslim world.

Within these networks, women have had to convince male leadership that the issues women raise are serious and that sometimes there is a need for reinterpreta- tion when these issues are not addressed in traditional – or even in modern – scholarship. Women in these organizations consider themselves grassroots organizers and are committed to the education of women. Before the country’s independence many of the women “preachers” were informally educated, but afterwards the government opened state sponsored institutes for Islamic higher learning where men and women could study to become leaders in the Muslim community. From the 1990s on female scholars could be full members of the main male organizations and members of the committees that produce fatwas ( advisories) and interpretations of the Qurʾan and hadith. Indonesia is unique in that it counts large numbers of women who, officially and unofficially, participate in the interpretation of the sources of Islam. Readers should note that this accom- plishment is not without resistance from men, as women still struggle for a piece of the discourse action.

After independence, Muslimat NU women became active in politics by serving their organization and participating in the formation of the governmental system. Five of the 45 seats in parliament were given to them in the 1955 election, along with five seats to women in the Communist Party and three seats to women in the Reformist Party.

In the 20th century, after independence, Indonesia began the difficult process of carving a national ethos and identifying elements of a common identity for the hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups living within the country’s territorial boundaries. A common identity developed largely in opposition to colonialism and the struggle against European imperialism. Although at the end of the 20th century the Republic of Indonesia was only 50 years old, its multicultural experi- ences clocked up at least 16 centuries. Indonesia’s sheer size and ethnic diversity has made national identity problematic and sometimes hotly contested. Scholars of the region assert that identity is defined at many levels: through Indonesian citizenship; through the flag, the national anthem, and certain other songs; through recognition of national holidays; and through an education that includes Indonesia’s history and the five principles on which the nation is based.

For much of the 1950s and 1960s the nation was held together by military force. This was due primarily to the real and potential danger of ethnic and regional separation. As mentioned earlier, the relationships between native Indonesians and migrant Chinese have been greatly influenced by government policies – first Dutch, then Indonesian. While the Chinese only number 4 to 6 million or about 3 percent of the population, they are said to control “as much as 60 percent of the nation’s wealth.”

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 241

Ethnic and religious differences may be related. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, and many ethnic groups are exclusively Muslim. Dutch policy permitted proselytization to Protestants and Catholics among the non- Muslim groups who followed traditional religions; ethnic communities that are exclusively Protestant or Roman Catholic were created. Tensions arise when communities of one religion migrate to a place where a different religion is already established. Political and economic power becomes linked to both ethnicity and religion, as groups favor their own family and ethnic group for jobs and other benefits.

The basic economy revolves around subsistence farming, which produces market crops. Plantations are devoted to oil palm, rubber, sugar, and diesel, which underscore the richness of the region. One important change during Suharto’s “New Order” regime (1968–1998) was the rapid urbanization and industrialization of Java, where the production of goods for domestic import and export expanded exponentially. Though this economic development benefitted most people, it also widened the gap between rich and poor, urban and rural. The severe economic downturn in the nation after 1997 and the political instability that followed the fall of Suharto drastically reduced foreign investment.

Indonesia in the 21st Century

Throughout 2000 Indonesia experienced deep governmental crises, and thus many institutions were redesigned. Since the 1945 Constitution, there are six mandated organs of the state: the People’s Consultative Assembly, the presidency, the People’s Representative Council, the Supreme Advisory Council, the State Audit board, and the Supreme Court. The president is elected every five years by the People’s Consultative Assembly, which has 1,000 members elected from the provinces. Even with all of these stopgap organs, Suharto had managed to make Indonesia his own reserve.

Although the country’s government leaders managed to forgive Suharto’s massacres and the Western support he enjoyed, the region is reeling in the after- math. Researchers report that, after a decade of democracy, secular political parties dominate Muslim-majority Indonesia. New Islamist parties have thus far found that they only receive a fraction of the vote in elections, which minimizes their influence on government, but their numbers have increased their influence among the people. For example, new masajid are being built everywhere, and more women wear the veil. However, this popular influence has not yet made its mark on the political scene.

Elites remain in control of the wealth and, as poverty continues to increase, the gap between rich and poor grows exponentially. According to the World Bank Report (2010), 49 percent of Indonesians survive on less than $2 a day. Post-Suharto Indonesia is now known as Asia’s least well-educated country; it is a supplier of raw materials and an assembly line for multi-national companies. Also, according to the UN Report, in 2006 Indonesia became the world’s most natural disaster-prone nation.

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

242 Regional Studies

Indonesia is experiencing some small-scale religious tensions and intolerance, undoubtedly due to economic conditions and recent climate disasters. Yet according to The Asia Times (2006) Islam maintains a more visible place in a secular Indonesia. The democracy that seems to be in the process of consolidating there is one in which Muslim parties of all kinds – Muslim brotherhood-inspired urban parties, rural patron–client parties, programmatically secular parties with Muslim organizations as their mass bases – have lost support to fully secular parties. The picture in the 21st century thus far is one of a majority Muslim population in a secular Indonesia struggling over its natural resources with multi-nationals supported by the West.

Malaysia

History

Initially the history of Islam in Malaysia is the same as the history of Islam in Indonesia. The differences lie in geography. The spread of Islam is more contin- uous. Lying midway between India and China, Malaysia’s monsoons were instru- mental in the development of commerce and trade, and thus Islam, ironically, followed the monsoons. Adventurers and merchants recount their visits to the country as early as 1292, when Marco Polo sailed through the Strait of Malacca, between Malaya and Sumatra. Malacca, a fishing village, was the initial contact for Islam. From there Islam spread to Malaysia when Muzaffar Shah, an Indian Muslim, converted his people to Islam. This extraordinarily rich island also attracted the Europeans – the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British – and later the Japanese.

After each of the military incursions of these people the wealth of the country was directed to the colonial home; the indigenous populations had little idea of the wealth extracted from their labor and land. Colonizers found themselves in control of unimaginable riches and had few constraints over their actions. Toward the end of the 18th century the Dutch, like the Portuguese before them, were overextended in protecting their land holdings and found themselves subjugated by British military power. The British extended their control (and sovereignty) over the Straits and created an exclusive sphere of influence in most of the Malay Peninsula by 1824. Due to the new industrial innovations in mass production and to the demand for tinned meats and fish during the Civil War in the United States, enterprising Chinese merchants in Malaysia expanded their mines and their commercial activities. They also imported to Malaysia tens of thousands of indentured Chinese workers. This was the major (though inauspicious) beginning of a significant Chinese presence in this country. The British brought prosperity to themselves, and indirectly to Malaysia, along with a large Chinese population and a Western understanding of the rule of law. Malays, of course, survived the occupation

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 243

and usurpation of their wealth but incurred the enduring challenges and racial and class struggles that colonization left in its wake.

The population of indentured Chinese workers remained and grew (currently it represents 23.7 percent of the population), and its wealth increased as the British nurtured and favored it over native Malays. In 1957, the year of independence from British rule, the population of Malaysia was about 12 million. The constitution created a federation of 13 states across two regions – peninsular Malaysia and east Malaysia. The government is set up in such a way that the head of state is the king – a monarch elected every five years, who is chosen from the hereditary rulers of the nine Malay states. The head of government is the prime minister, whose office also rotates among the states. The federal constitution of 1957 made Islam the official religion and affirmed religious freedom, on condition that others should not proselytize Muslims. Citizenship was also regulated. Citizenship is not automatically granted to those born in Malaysia, but it is granted to any child born of two Malaysian parents outside of the country. Dual citizenship is not permitted. All ethnic Malays are considered Muslim by law and obliged to follow the decisions of sharia courts in matters of religion such as marriage, inheritance, divorce, apostasy, religious conversion, or custody. No criminal or civil offences are under the jurisdiction of the sharia courts; civil courts handle such offences.

The Education Act of 1961 sought to restore native Malays to a position of con- trol over their country through a series of initiatives resembling affirmative action. For example, state primary schools could teach in Malay, English, Chinese, or Tamil, but secondary schools could teach only in Malay or English. Native Malays were given tuition, free secondary education, economic privileges, special quotas for land grants, educational grants, and so on. Needless to say, the inter-ethnic tensions caused by this Act were intense. Not only did the educational reforms favor Malays, but there were other reforms and initiatives that put Malays in firm control of their land, often at the expense of the Chinese Christian minority elite. Similarly, in 1965 the government founded the Bank Bumiputra (“Son of Soil”), which offered credit, banking services, and technical assistance to Malay individ- uals and businesses. Companies receiving government assistance were encouraged to hire Malays where their preference had been Chinese. In 1969 the tensions caused by this preferential treatment were boiling, and the elections of that year, which saw a backlash against Malay parties, resulted in race riots in the capital and elsewhere in the country.

As a result, the government began a series of new economic plans. In 1970 a new economic policy was especially designed to implement an economic restruc- turing intended to correct imbalances between Malays and the Chinese workers. This plan stressed national harmony and saw economic growth as key to minimizing ethnic and religious tensions. The second, third, and fourth plans (1971–1985) continued the emphasis on rural development, education, and employment under a constitutional amendment that forbade public discussion of special rights for Malays. The infrastructure of Malaysia is one of the most

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

244 Regional Studies

developed in Asia; its telecommunications are second only to those of Singapore. The country has seven international ports, along with 200 industrial parks. Fresh water is available to over 95 percent of the population. Malaysia has 118 airports, state-run railways, and news systems. These statistics are what keeps the general population relatively moderate in its tastes, politics, and religion. Nevertheless, even though the economic record has been impressive, ethnic tensions remain. Still, these tensions have not yet derailed the economic success.

Women, Islam, and Transnational Movements

In 1987 a group of women lawyers, activists, academics, and journalists began to discern challenges that women were facing in their treatment in sharia courts. In 1990 Sisters in Islam (SIS) was born, a women’s organization aiming to challenge laws and policy made in the name of Islam that discriminate against women. Later their work expanded to include issues emerging around democracy, human rights, and constitutionalism. Like women’s groups in Indonesia, SIS was not without its detractors. Its most ardent attack was on the institution of polygyny and on the government’s defense of it. Islamist groups have consistently attacked the organi- zation, even contesting its use of the word “Islam” in the name. SIS is vigilant about any real or potential breach of women’s rights, regardless of whether the women concerned know their rights or not. This in many ways is a first in the Muslim world – just like the two women’s groups in Indonesia that are promoting the need for the education of women into the ranks of Muslim authority. Added to these internal instances of growth and development are links to the outside Muslim and non-Muslim world.

Non-state Islamist movements that are fluid and dynamic in their organiza- tion, in their innovative techniques, have a wide pool of potential transnational partners. Questions arise as to what to do proactively to prevent chaos. One suggestion is that the Malaysian government could integrate the Islamists’ transnational contracts into the mainstream. They should not be regarded as a challenge. Friendly governments such the United States could assist the government by not associating these Islamists groups with terrorist threats, though there is a rising anti-American sentiment caused by US intrusiveness into government affairs.

Ties between Malaysians and other Muslims in Southeast Asia and in the Arab world have their origins in the 7th and 8th centuries. These links pre-date by far those formed in the 18th century, when Malaysians were already traveling to the Middle East for the obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca and to seek religious educa- tion in places like Egypt. As in Indonesia, Arab and Indian reformist thinkers influenced some of these Malaysian students, both during and immediately after the colonial era. Many of them were part of the Islamist movement and led the ideological fight against colonialism. Later on, these same activists were very influential in shaping a more overt Islamic identity in Malaysia. Global Muslim identity is not a new development, but the connections had previously been

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 245

limited to elites. The current generation of Islamists, like their brethren, want to implement Islamic law in every aspect of life, as in Saudi Arabia. Their ideology, though challenged on many fronts, is making headway regarding outward manifestations of Islam such as dress and gender separation.

There is, however, fierce non-European competition for influence in the region as Iran and Saudi Arabia vie with each other. The 1979 Iranian Revolution caught the attention of many Muslims throughout the world. The admiration for the Iranians, researchers assert, had more to do with the regime’s stance against the West than with any ideological affiliation. Some youth groups adopted the political slogans of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and some of their leaders went to Iran to support the success of the revolution. Youth from some of these groups sought to establish an Islamist state à la Iran in Malaysia. The Iranian government and its rev- olution were of major concern to many Muslim governments in the 1980s, as they feared that they would predispose their people to revolution. Iran’s overtures to the Indonesian people did lead to the emergence of a small Shiʿi community there. Saudi Arabia used other strategies.

Saudi Arabia provided Malaysia with scholarships for Islamic training and learning in its universities and assisted students in the formation of “study groups” whose job was to push the Islamist agenda. As mentioned earlier in the section on Indonesia, not all Malaysian and Indonesian students were influenced by Salafi or brotherhood ideologies. Many of them have supported the government against the onslaught of Islamists in their countries. Yet these Islamist groups did have an impact on thinking in the region.

Wahhabi and brotherhood movements have provided platforms on which Islamists throughout the Muslim world interact and exchange ideas. One infa- mous case, in 1973, was that of Anwar Ibrahim, one of the leaders of an Islamist student group who had become a very influential political leader both at home and abroad. Ibrahim was subsequently brought into the government under Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Muhammad, who sought to use religion as a means of sanctioning authoritarian rule. In the early 1990s, however, Ibrahim and Mahathir had a conflict of interests and agendas. Ibrahim was subsequently jailed by the government on charges that, on the surface, had little to do with his political affiliations but everything to do with defaming him and his ideology. Muslims all over the world protested against his arrest, regardless of whether they agreed with him or not, as they saw here the beginning of Malaysia becoming a repressive state. While Ibrahim is now a free man who continues with his international connections, researchers speculate on whether the ensuing chaos could not have been avoided by simply allowing freedom of speech and thus dissent – a perfectly Islamic thing to do. There are myriad instances where the brotherhood has served a mediating role between Muslims, Muslims and non-Muslims, thus affirming the Islamic obligation of mediation.

When the 1990 war in Kuwait broke out, Islamist parties and groups coordinated their efforts to resolve the conflict. While the mission was unsuccessful, it led to the formation of a formal conference called the International Gathering of Islamic

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

246 Regional Studies

Groups, held in London in 1991. Malaysia was well represented at this conference. Throughout the 1990s the group tackled issues that represented a challenge for Muslims, such as the conflicts in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Chechnya. Malaysia’s government has not prevented Jamaat leaders from coming to Malaysia to hold study trips, so perhaps the government has reconsidered its stance on free speech and dissent.

Conclusion

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent ones in London and Italy, which culminated in a global war on terror, the arbitrariness of military actions caused shock and awe in the entire Muslim world. Most Southeast Asian Muslims considered all of the attacks inhumane and condemned the actions of those involved. But in 2003 they began to see the war on terror as a war against Islam. In Indonesia, surveys conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society in Jakarta (Indonesia) in 2003 found that the majority of those surveyed felt that Indonesia should have an Islamic government based on the Qurʾan and that all Muslims should be required to abide by Islamic law. In 2004 a Malaysian survey that is no longer available, conducted by the Merdeka Center, found that 50 percent of the Muslim respondents believed that the implementation of Islamic criminal laws would lead to a lower crime rate, and 91 percent supported Malaysia as an Islamic state. Yet the geography and pluralist heritage of these countries prevented the Islamists from capitalizing on anti-American sentiments wholesale. In both cases ethnic diversity has fostered a greater degree of political and religious pluralism.

What Islamist groups did was to encourage Muslim activism rather than anti-American sentiments. Nevertheless, the Western obsession with terrorists – treated as actors to be pursued with or without government’s knowledge and to be killed regardless of states’ sovereignty and the rule of law – has led in recent years to a new discourse, which departs from the previous narrative of Malaysia and Indonesia as bedrocks of peaceful and tolerant Islam. These countries continue to “keep the peace” between ethnic and religious groups, but Western military actions against Muslims in South Asia, the Middle East, and the Horn of Africa have fostered a greater degree of anti-Western sentiment. Reports that Malaysia facilitated movements of al-Qaeda operatives and provided a haven for meetings, illegal transfers of funds, and training have put Malaysia near the front in the minds of Western strategists where terrorism is concerned.

The Malaysian government’s response in 2002 was to work on its own anti- terrorist credentials, which it did by allowing the United States to operate the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism. While most Malays see the immediate benefits of such an alliance with the US (since it brings greater security and defense capacity), the back lash in some quarters of the community grows as this “mutual cooperation” progresses. Some Malays fear

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed

Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia 247

that the US will attack without provocation, as it did in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Malay government’s move toward cooperation with a Western power was also an attempt to thwart the ongoing efforts of Islamist groups. Western alliances, however, muddy the water in other ways. Westerners do not distinguish between activists, preachers, and terrorists. There is little discern- ment of legitimate dissent; consequently, the highly intrusive information gathering and surveillance of religious activities extends widely into a variety of communities. The US military and security services have little understanding of a truly multicultural, multi-religious society (particularly one that is an Islamic state); nor are the strategists able to understand the relationship of Muslim lands on the periphery with the Muslim center in the Arab world. There is, in short, little understanding of the diverse ways in which Islam operates in public life.

These highly diverse societies of Malaysia and Indonesia defy superficial stereo- typing. Southeast Asian Muslims have lived in relatively healthy pluralist societies and are at home with their numerical majority, though non-natives control the wealth in both countries. Both countries have invested in their heterogeneity and have absorbed much of the Islamist rhetoric. This rhetoric has predominated not because it threatens the society, but rather because it vacillates dramatically from moderate to radical to quietist. Both countries felt the effects of the Asian economic crash. Malaysia survived better than Indonesia, but, after centuries of colonial exploitation, both countries have limited supplies of resources. Luckily the Suharto reign hardly left any legacy in Malaysia; as for Indonesians, it is fortunate that they survived.

Rulers in both countries have attempted to build a kind of nationalism that tran- scends ethnic and religious differences between peoples. They have done so in a manner that emphasizes a vibrant and tolerant Islam. Consequently the success of these nationalist endeavors is evident in the two countries’ ability to remain cohe- sive in the face of economic crisis and to avoid the pitfalls of religious and ethnic chauvinism. What can be learned is that there are several kinds of political Islam; one kind seeks the homogeneity of ideology, another rules a country that is heterogeneous. Malaysia and Indonesia are prime examples of the diversity of the Muslim experience in the 21st century.

Discussion questions

1 How does the experience of Indonesia and Malaysia differ from that of other regions discussed in this volume? How is it similar?

2 How do historical context, ethnic diversity, and geographical location affect the dominant understanding of the religious tradition? How might a different historical experience produce a different outcome?

3 How do the two cases differ from each other? In what respects are they most similar?

C op

yr ig

ht ©

2 01

3. J

oh n

W ile

y &

S on

s, In

co rp

or at

ed . A

ll rig

ht s

re se

rv ed