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136 Islam and the Modern World

Introduction

In this chapter we will look at examples of modern governments that are defined by a close association between Islam and the state. The chapter will begin by examining the basic argument that Islam, properly understood, is both a religion and a state (din wa dawla). Those who make this claim argue for the creation of a form of government where religious authority and political authority are closely intertwined and where the state actively promotes a particular vision of religious orthodoxy in public life. Examples of such states include the current government of Iran – which is defined by clerical rule – or that of Saudi Arabia, which has a long-standing connection to the Wahhabist vision of Islam. As noted in the previous chapter, the distinction between “Islamic states” (or what we will refer to as “traditionalist states”) and “secular states” is not always sharp or clearly defined, particularly for secular governments that invoke religion as a basis of support. Nonetheless, the distinction remains a useful means of differentiating between categories of states and their varying relationship with Islam and religious authority. The chapter will also examine the claims of religious opposition groups that have argued for a more central role for Islam in government. In either instance – whether religion is tied to a particular regime or to the political opposition – the arguments for a traditionalist state are similar: God is the ultimate source of sover- eignty, and Islam ought to provide the basis for legislation, law, and governance.

As will be discussed below, the idea of an Islamic or traditionalist state is commonly argued to be a more authentic rendering of the Islamic political tradition. The model for this form of rule is the early Muslim community, where the Prophet and his immediate successors were considered to be both the political and religious leaders of the ummah (community of believers). Consequently, religious authority and political authority were closely intertwined in the early Muslim community. Islamist thinkers of recent years call for a return to a similar model of governance and demand that state leaders rule in accordance with Islamic teachings. They also refuse to recognize the legitimacy of states that do not fully implement their interpretation of Islamic law (sharia). The Islamists (or Salafists) throughout the 20th century believed that it was precisely the failure of political leaders to abide by such practices, together with the effort of Arab and Muslim political leaders to emulate Western styles of governance, that led to the weakness and subjugation of Muslims worldwide. Hence contemporary Islamists continue to argue that only by returning to a political order where Islam is central can the Muslim community once again find its strength in this world. The “return” to Islam, in short, is seen as essential to the political reassertion and revitalization of the Muslim community.

In addition to a discussion of these ideas in their historical context, this chapter will examine several governments that are defined by their efforts to construct an explicitly religious or traditionalist state. These governments are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. In each instance, government leaders have

An Introduction to Islam in the 21st Century, edited by Aminah Beverly McCloud, et al., John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/uaz/detail.action?docID=1120608. Created from uaz on 2020-11-07 18:43:40.

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Islam and the State: Part II 137

sought to address the challenge of applying traditional conceptions of Islamic law to a contemporary setting. In doing so they have offered a variety of visions of what an Islamic state ought to look like. These societies have continued, however, to be plagued by various ills, including autocratic governance, sectarian division, and poor human rights records. As these contemporary examples illustrate, the close association of religion with the state does not necessarily produce just, let alone wise, rule.

The Theoretical and Historical Context

Many look at the history of Islam and see not a tradition of activism, but one of “political quietism.” This was evident in both the Sunni and the Shiʿi traditions during the medieval period. Faced with rulers who were tyrannical and often changing, the ulamā of the Sunni tradition and the clerics of Shiʿi Islam commonly argued for obedience to political authority. Their argument was based on the fear that the alternative to tyranny was worse. The great concern for many early Islamic scholars was civil war and fitnah (anarchy or strife), both of which weaken the community of believers and undermine the integrity of the Islamic tradition. There were also outside threats, such as the crusader armies of Europe and, later, the Mongol invasion discussed in Chapter 2. These foreign interventions endangered the lands of Islam and fostered the perception that Islam needed a ruler who should be able to defend the religion and the community. Such fears formed the basis for a religious obligation to obey political authority regardless of its nature. During times of political uncertainty, it was argued, the need for a strong governing authority superseded the need for a just authority (Brown 2001).

This tradition of political quietism came to an end with the rise of European predominance and Europe’s intrusion into the Islamic world. As noted in the previous chapter, the advent of European colonial rule sparked a process of internal reform and reflection. Why, it was asked, were Muslim societies dominated by the Christian West, and how does one explain the relative decline of Islamic civilization? What, in short, had gone wrong? While the last chapter looked at two answers to this question – the liberal reformers and the secular alternative – the following section will examine the Islamist perspective. Unlike the liberal thinkers of the reform movement in the early 20th century and unlike secularists such as Ataturk, Islamists argued that the source of Muslim decline was its loss of religion. By seeking to emulate the West, Islamic governments and society as a whole had lost touch with their heritage, and this would explain their subsequent weakness. It followed, then, that by “returning to Islam” the political community would be redeemed. Moreover, unlike the liberal reformers, Islamists did not seek to recon- cile religion with Western ideas. Rather the Islamist – or Salafist – perspective argued for a return to religious literalism and sought to create an Islamic order modeled on the example of the Prophet and on what they saw as the golden age of Islamic rule.

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138 Islam and the Modern World

Some of the earliest examples of Islamic revivalism included the Mahdist revolt in Sudan, the 18th-century Wahhabist movement in Saudi Arabia, and the Sanusi movement in Libya. In each instance, indigenous groups responded to internal decline or foreign intervention by calling for a return to the basic tenets of the Islamic tradition. Many of these activists – the Wahhabists in particular – were concerned with what they perceived as un-Islamic practices that had crept into the tradition, such as Sufi mysticism, the veneration of saints, and simple differences over doctrine. Although the emphasis was on religious reform, the goal was ulti- mately political. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the 18th-century religious leader Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab promoted a strict and literalist reading of the Islamic tradition and joined forces with the al-Saʿud family to promote both religious and political change. Two defining features of this movement were the religious zeal with which it pursued its ends and the military capability of the al-Saʿud family. Combined, they were able – temporarily – to throw off Ottoman rule and to establish the first Saudi state in the Arabian Peninsula.

Similarly, in Sudan, the Mahdist forces were able to unite the indigenous tribes in opposition to the Anglo-Egyptian rule. The leader of this movement, Muhammad Ahmad (1840–1885), came to be known as the mahdi (literally, the Messiah), and was able to mobilize the Sudanese tribes through a mixture of reli- gious and political appeals. Though short-lived, Mahdist rule in Sudan sought to replicate the experience of the Prophet and to establish a society based on Islamic

teachings. Similarly, the Sanusi movement in Libya was able to unite politically different tribal factions under a banner of Islam. As in the other movements of this era, ridding Islamic tradition of cultural accretions was part of a broader effort to revitalize both the political and the religious life of the community. In a manner similar to that of the Mahdist movement in Sudan, the Sanusi movement had for its goal the creation of a traditionalist state and the expansion of Islam beyond Libya’s borders. Much of the impetus, more- over, was to check the growing encroachment of European colonialism (see Sidebar 7.1).

The Islamist (or “fundamentalist”) movement of the early 20th century echoed the basic themes of these premodern revival- ists. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and other funda- mentalist groups were responding both to a perceived sense of internal decay and to the external intervention of European powers. They also worked to promote political reform

Sidebar 7.1 The Mahdist revolt in the Sudan

The Mahdist revolt in Sudan took place in the late 19th century and temporarily ended foreign rule in that country. The revolt is named after its leader, Muham- mad Ahmad, believed to be the Mahdi (“Redeemer”), who invoked Islam as a means of uniting the various northern Sudanese tribes and communities by way of creating an opposition to Egyptian and European rule. The early successes of the Mahdi appeared to validate his message and quickly garnered widespread support for his cause. The final victory came in 1885, when Khartoum fell to the Mahdist forces and its then governor, Charles Gordon, was captured and put to death. The Mahdist government remained in power until 1899, when British forces under the command of Lord Kitchener were sent up the Nile, ended the Mahdist state (the Mahadiyya), and established British colonial rule over Sudan. This rule would last until 1956.

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Islam and the State: Part II 139

through religious revivalism. The term “fun- damentalism,” though a source of conten- tion, is relevant because it refers to the reaffirmation of certain fundamental or foun- dational beliefs and to the corresponding effort of religio-political groups to transform society in light of these foundational princi- ples.1 In this sense, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami are good examples. The Brotherhood, which was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt, is noteworthy because its influence extended throughout the larger Middle East. In its early stages the organization had an extensive grassroots net- work, an active political party, and a military wing; however, it was the ideology and the combination of religious message and political activism that defined the group. For the Brotherhood it was important to capture, or influence, state power and to use the mech- anisms of modern government to reform civil society along Islamist lines. The close association of Islam and the state was thus a central feature of the organization’s goals.

As noted in the previous chapter, the heart of the Brotherhood’s message was a belief that the social ills of Muslim society were attribut- able to the irreligious or secular nature of government leaders. The problem, from this point of view, was that the effort to emulate the West had led to internal fragmentation and to external weakness. Al-Banna was conse- quently very much concerned with the influence of European ideas and with what he referred to as the process of “mental coloniza- tion.” By emulating Western patterns of thinking, governance, and lifestyle, Muslims were validating and perpetuating their own subjugation. This position put al-Banna and other Islamists distinctly at odds with the secular and liberal reformers, who sought to accommodate European ideas and to adopt Western models of law and gover- nance. Al-Banna was particularly concerned about the corrupting influence of Western liberal education, “which cast doubt and heresy into the souls [of our sons]” (Abu-Rabi 1996: 80). It was this type of cultural intrusion – linked to the

Sidebar 7.2 Hasan al-Banna

Hasan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. By doing so he helped to create the orga- nizational structure and the ideology that would shape the Islamist movement for the rest of the 20th century. His primary concerns were the intrusion of Western ideas and political power into his native Egypt and the corresponding willingness of his fellow countrymen to embrace Western culture. Al-Banna’s work conse- quently focused on education, political action, and grassroots mobilization, all with the intended goal of making Islam the organizing principle of society. In reaction to the decline of society under colonial rule, al-Banna believed that only a “return to religion” could be a viable basis for political unity and cohesion in Mus- lim society. In short, the source of Muslim weakness was a perceived loss of religion; hence the return to religion would be a source of newfound strength:

After the last war [World War I] and during the period I spent in Cairo, there was an increase in spiritual and ideological disintegration, in the name of intellectual freedom. There was also a deterioration of behavior, morals and deeds in the name of individual freedom […] I saw that the social life of the beloved Egyptian nation was oscillating between her dear and precious Islamism which she had inherited, defended, lived with and become accustomed to […] and this severe Western invasion which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and degenera- tive influence of money, wealth, prestige, osten- tation, material enjoyment, power and means of propaganda. (Hasan al-Banna, cited in Abu-Rabi 1996: 65)

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140 Islam and the Modern World

secular patterns of social order promulgated by indigenous, secular elites – that the early Islamists saw as a primary threat to Islam.

The political program of the early Islamists consequently sought to counter these trends by calling for a return to Islam as the organizing principle of society. In practical terms, this entailed the creation of an “Islamic order” (al-nizām al-Islāmī), defined above all by the application of Islamic law (sharia). The close

association of religion and political authority was central to this vision. Since the absence of religion (or what was perceived as true reli- gious values) was the source of Muslim decline, a recommitment to the fundamentals of Islam was required. These basic themes were similarly articulated by Mawlana Mawdudi, an influential activist and writer from South Asia and the founder of the Jamaat- i-Islami, a political party in Pakistan. Mawdudi’s influence derived in part from his effort to sys- tematize and clarify the Islamist message. In doing so, he defined the “Islamic state” as “an ideological state that should be run only by those who believe in the ideology on which it is based [the Qurʾan and the sunna] and in the divine law which it is assigned to administer” (Mawdudi, cited in Ayubi 1993: 128). Central to this was the claim that sovereignty lay not with the people or with the state, but with God alone. Moreover, the Jamaat called all true believers to action, arguing that it was not enough to accept Islam; there was a similar obligation to “command good and forbid evil,” and this required political action.

During the postcolonial period the primary opponents of the Islamists vision changed, but the basic message did not. As noted in the previous chapter, secular Arab nationalists came to power in a variety of countries – including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Algeria – in the immediate postcolonial period. These secular governments posed a serious threat to the Arab monarchies that were supportive of the Islamist vision. More to the point, from the Islamist perspective, the secular leadership of this era seemed to be moving precisely in the wrong direction. Its representatives were

Sidebar 7.3 Mawlana Mawdudi

Mawdudi helped to define the concept of an Islamic (or traditionalist) state in the mid-20th century. Writing first in colonial India and later in Pakistan, he helped to systematize Islamist thought. His ideas about the Islamic state were particularly influential. He argued that God alone – and not the population or the monarch – is the source of sovereignty and that the only source of law and legislation is God’s word. More to the point, he argued that Islam is an all-encompassing tradition, therefore an Islamic form of government has jurisdic- tion over all aspects of human existence. An Islamic form of government, then, needs to serve as an instru- ment of reform, to shape society in a manner consis- tent with Islamic teaching. As Mawdudi wrote,

A state of this sort cannot evidently restrict the scope of its activities. Its approach is universal and all embracing. Its sphere of activity is co- extensive with the whole of human life. It seeks to mould every aspect of life and activity in con- sonance with its moral norms and programme of social reform. In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this aspect [sic] the Islamic state bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communists states. But you will find later on that, despite its all- inclusiveness, it is something vastly and basically different from the modern totalitarian and authoritarian states. Individual liberty is not suppressed under it nor is there any trace of dictatorship in it. It presents the middle course and embodies the best that human society has ever evolved. (Abu-L-Ala Mawdudi, cited in Donohue and Esposito 1982: 256)

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Islam and the State: Part II 141

charting a path for their societies that was inimical to the Islamist vision. In a nutshell, the Islamists’ enemies were no longer the Europeans – the external threat – but rather the indigenous inheritors of the secular alternative. In the ideo- logical cauldron of the Cold War, Islamists sought to offer an alternative to liberal democratic capitalism on the one hand and to Soviet-style socialism or commu- nism on the other. In this context the Islamist vision was meant to be both cultur- ally authentic and consistent with the Islamic tradition. Islam was consequently viewed as an “organic ideology of unity,” which was, at least theoretically, outside of the ideological battles that pitted East against West during the Cold War.

The Traditionalist State

The idea of an Islamic or traditionalist state is ultimately rooted in the tradition of the caliphate. While there are differences (particularly between the caliphate of the Abbasid or Ottoman period and the modern Islamic state), the underlying commonality is the merging of religious authority and political authority. From this perspective, the Islamist call for a traditionalist state is rooted in the perceived historicity of a religious tradition that rightfully extends its influence into all realms of social (and individual) life. This conception of Islamic rule is based on the assumption that Islam will – and ought to – regulate all aspects of human existence. The state within an “Islamic order,” then, serves as the enforcer of Islamic law and actively promotes and regulates religious belief among members of the community. This understanding of the proper relationship between Islam and the state is significant partly because it rejects the basic premise of the secular tradition, which not only removes religion from the purview of government authority, but also differentiates between various social realms: public and private, religious and secular. In the secular tradition governments cannot rightfully interfere in matters of personal conscience, religion, or belief. This is clearly not the case for those who advocate an Islamist understanding of a traditionalist state.

The question remains, however, as to what exactly a traditionalist state would look like. While interpretations differ (as we will see below), the basic elements of such a state include the application of Islamic law and the corresponding enforce- ment of religious orthodoxy by state actors. Significantly, the ruler is not above the law within this idealized vision of an Islamic state. On the contrary, those who control the state ought to be subject to Islam’s commandments, not least to the tenet of doing good and forbidding evil. Failure to abide by this rule warrants rebellion among the population. It follows, then, that an Islamic state would be a constitutional one insofar as there are foundational principals that restrain the governor and hold rulers accountable to the population (ummah). The underlying assumption – which is also found in liberal conceptions of constitutional gover- nance – is that, without some constraint on state leaders, there will be no justice, but only oppression. Where this Islamic ideal differs, however, from the Western tradition is in the source of its foundational principles; rather than emerging from

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