Legal writing

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

To: Partner

From:

Re: Sarah LeRoy School District Case

Date: ___, 2018

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether public high school who suspended a public high school student violate her First Amendment free and political speech rights where she was a controversial is anti-Trump, anti-war t-shirt and spoke fluently about political issues and received fake blood on her shirt at a gathering of current events. A group of students shouted booing while others appeared out loud?

SHORT ANSWER

No, speaking aloud at a school event in subjects conflicts with the school's organizing environment and can be prevented by public schools from being facts that may reasonably have led school authorities to predict a major disruption or physical interference in school activities that may be prevented by the public school. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 513, 518 (1969).The courts gave the school administration the authority to control the work of students to protect public order within public schools. The staining of artificial blood on her shirt has always been offensive, and courts have given the right to public school to prevent such acts. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).

FACTS

Our client, Sarah LeRoy, wishes to know whether she has a good claim against the Syracuse School District for suspending her from high school for ostensibly exercising her First Amendment rights over wearing a controversial t-shirt and smearing artificial blood on another shirt during a school-sponsored event on current events during spring, 2017.

Sarah LeRoy wore a t-shirt at her high school to express her political views about her involvement (Anti-Trump t-shirt). On one school occasion, Sarah spoke loudly and waved her hand in the air to emphasize her points. Then she took out a container of red paint and flicked red on the front of her white shirt, and there was no reaction from the students. Afterward, Sarah removed her tinted white shirt, flipped another T-shirt and prints of her own (Anti-War t-shirt) and shouted anti-war statements. She has received some feedback with students of 10 students, about 20 students out of 250 interacting with her, such as yelling at them to stop talking.

The school principal asked Sarah to take this shirt and to not come with this t-shirt again. She came in the next day with the same shirt. The school suspended her.

You have asked that I analyze whether Ms. LeRoy has a good claim against the school district for violating her constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION OF LAW

TS Sarah LeRoy may or may not succeed in her First Amendment claim against the school district.

GEN :The First Amendment of the constitutition, through its applicability to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees free speech rights to citizens. U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV. Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2012) allows claims against states for damages arising from violations of federal civil rights and for injunctive relief.

FACTORS: Public high school students’ free speech rights are not co-extensive with the general public’s. However, courts afford students reasonable protection to free expression, especially for pure political speech that is not substantially disruptive of the school’s educational mission. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 513 (1969). However, lewd or vulgar, inappropriate expressions of speech may be sanctioned. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

APPLY: Here, [apply quickly the legal ideas to our facts—very short!!]

CONCLUSION: Therefore, Sarah LeRoy may or may not succeed in her First Amendment claim against the school district.

A. Lewd, Vulgar or Offensive Speech

TS Sarah’s smearing of artificial blood on her shirt may or may not be santionable as a vulgar, offensive act, even though it was not necessarily disruptive as no student reaction occurred as a result.

GEN A public school may sanction student activity that is lewd, vulgar, obscene or otherwise unreasonably offensive. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685.

FACTORS: This depends on the age and maturity of the students, and whether the regulation or sanction is reasonable. See id.; J.A. v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 2013 WL 4479229 at *8 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 2013).

ILLUSTRATION: For example, one court saw fit to uphold a sanction against a student’s election speech in a school-sponsored assembly that was filled with sexual innuendo in both spoken word and gestures. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. In addition, sexually offensive phrases on clothing, such as “I Love Boobies” is also sanctionable. See J.A., 2013 WL 4479229 at *8. Finally, vulgar or inappropriate speech on t-shirts, such as two sailors kissing with the caption “Read My Lips,” “Coed Naked” t-shirts, “Marijuana—Legalize It!,” “Don’t Be A Dick!,” and “Coed Naked Gerbils” is also sanctionable. Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D.Mass.1994).

These courts reasoned that regulation and sanctions were reasonably administered and framed so as to preserve a stable, appropriate learning environment while balancing and considering the students’ First Amendment protections. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685; J.A., 2013 WL 4479229 at *8; Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 167.

APPLY: Sarah’s smearing of artificial blood on her shirt may or may not be sanctionable as a vulgar, offensive act. Like the speech in Bethel, which was filled with sexual innuendo and presented to the class in an assembly, Sarah’s smearing fake blood on her shirt was certainly offensive, but may not have been as offensive as the acts in Bethel. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685. Also, Sarah’s smearing blood may not be as offensive to some as the “I Love Boobies” T-shirt in J.A., but could be seen as grotesque by some. See J.A., 2013 WL 4479229 at *8. Finally, her smearing of blook is probably more offensive than the t-shirts and messages in Pyle about Co-ed Naked activities and Marijuana. See Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 167.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, it is unclear whether Sarah’s blood smearing was sanctionable by law.

B. Possible Materially Disruptive Speech from the Anti-War T-shirt With Crowd Reaction.

TS:

Sarah’s anti-war t-shirt and statements in the school assembly may be sanctionable as a disruptive speech, even if may be considered as a pure, political speech.

GEN:

Public High School students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the schoolhouse gate. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. In fact, the Supreme Court held in Tinker that public high schools have the right to regulate school speech where there is a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption of the school’s educational purpose or mission. Id. at 513.

FACTORS:

Political speech is entitled to great protection. And symbolic political speech, which is non-verbal speech, is “akin” to pure political speech and entitled to comprehensive First Amendment protections. Id. at 504. Undifferentiated fear of disruption is insufficient to warrant squelching free speech in public high schools and does not merit suspension. Id. at 508.

However, this will depend on whether or not the sanctions are reasonable. However, it is imperative to appreciate the fact that courts gave students reasonable protections to freely express themselves especially for political speech provided they do not disrupt the education mission of the schools. See, Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. Elsewhere, public schools may sanction the actions of the students. However, the school authority must have reasonable evidence to prove that the actions are not related to the purposes of education. See, Guiles ex rel. Lucas v. Marineau, 349 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Vt. 2004).

ILLUS:

Sarah LeRoy has reasonable claims against her school for suspending her because she wore a controversial T-shirt-sponsored events. This is because from the decision of the previous case held that wearing a black armband in protest against the government was quiet and passive and did not disrupt anybody and neither did it infringe on the rights of others. Similarly, by wearing a controversial T-shirt and smearing artificial blood on the other, Sarah LeRoy did not infringe on the rights of others and neither did she disrupt the school activities since her actions were within the confines of the first amendment with regard to the protection of free speech. See, Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). It is evident that the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution asserts that the United States Congress shall not pass any law that prohibits the exercise of freedom of speech, of the press or the right to peacefully assemble and petition the government to address their grievances. The first amendment establishes six important rights to the Americans citizens. These include the right to free exercise of religion, the right to be free from interference from the government with respect to religion, the freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right to petition the government to address people’s grievances.

As well In Tinker, public high school children wore black armbands on their arms to protest the Vietnam War. It was a symbolic silent protest and no substantial disturbances occurred. Nevertheless, the students were suspended. Id. The Supreme Court held that regarding school officers to rationalize expurgating speech, they should be capable of exhibiting that their deed was created due to something above than an exclusive wish to stop the uneasiness and dreadfulness which is inevitably there with an infamous opinion, that the behavior which would, materially and significantly impede with the needs of an adequate regulation/strictness in the running of the school. Tinker, 393 U.S.at 509.

Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, where a public high school student wore an offensive t-shirt that criticized the president of the United States, it was not substantially disruptive under the Tinker standard, and therefore was not an offense for which a student can be suspended. See, Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 2004). The Guiles court followed Tinker’s reasoning. Id. at 330.

APPLY:

Here, the School District may or may not have properly suspended Sarah LeRoy. This is because there may or may not have been a substantial disruption of the school’s education activity. Under Tinker, one must balance the restricted First Amendment rights of public high school students against the school’s educational mission and a substantial interference with it. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at x. Here, LeRoy’s T-shirt was disturbing, but did not by itself cause substantial disruption, only harmless hallway encounters. However, the students standing and cheering and booing in the assembly, where she spoke in loud tones as she exposed her anti-war t-shirt may be been either (1) a substantial disruption, and (2) enough for school administrators to reasonably forecast such. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at x. And, although her speech was symbolic and political, entitled to the highest forms of pure speech according to tinker, tese factors may outweigh their political significance. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at x.

Similarly, the Second Circuit ruled in Guiles that a T-shirt may not be substantially disruptive in and of itself so as to warrant the sanction of suspension. See Guiles, xxx F.2d at xxx. Here, LeRoy’s T-shirt is entitled to the same protection as the T-shirt in Guiles. It was political, symbolic speech, and Guiles followed Tinker’s reasoning in allowing free speech in schools to a certain, reasonable extent. See Guiles, xxx F.2d at xxx. However, the critical difference here, is that Sarah LeRoy displayed her T-shirt while shouting anti-war slogans and riling up a crowd of high school students. This essential difference distinguishes Sarah’s case from Guiles as much as it does from Tinker in that her suspension may well have been permissible due to a reasonable forecast of disruption. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at xxx; Guiles, xxx F2d. at xxx.

Wearing another that is perceived controversial does not amount to materially disruptive speech. See Tinker ,393 U.S. 503 (1969).

Tinkers wearing of armbands may not be confirmed by sanction as a disruptive and disrespectful act despite the fact that they violated school orders. Therefore, in this regard, the school ought to appreciate the fact that it is not entitled to immunity because Sarah LeRoy’s right to wear the controversial T-shirt is clearly established under the first amendment and therefore the school ought to have understood that its actions were unconstitutional. By quoting, Guiles ex rel. Lucas v. Martineau, 349 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Vt. 2004) case, Sarah LeRoy has reasonable grounds in the sense that the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and expression. In Guiles’ case, the Court of Appeal held that in as much as the T-shirt depicted drugs and alcohol, it was still a protected speech on the basis of the first amendment of the federal constitution. Similarly, Sarah LeRoy has reasonable grounds because wearing a controversial T-shirt and smearing artificial blood to the other is protected speech and therefore the school’s action to suspend her is unconstitutional and violates the provisions of the first amendment. Furthermore, her actions do not amount to possible materially disruptive speech since it is unclear whether or not the public was disrupted by her actions.

CONCLUSION: Therefore, it is clear that act was sanctionable by the law.

CONCLUSION:

It is evident that Sarah LeRoy has reasonable claims against the school’s action to suspend her because doing so violates the provisions of the first amendment which guarantees the freedom of speech. Furthermore, the school’s actions are unconstitutional because they work against the provisions of the constitution.