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Women’s Parliamentary Representation in Africa: The Impact of Democracy and Corruption on the Number of Female Deputies in National Parliamentspost_897 693..712

Daniel Stockemer University of Ottawa

Although many studies address the representation of women in parliament, few explore gender representation in Africa. Prior research on women’s representation conducted in various areas of the world has emphasized the type of electoral system, quotas and the economic affluence of a country, as well as the state’s political culture. In this evaluation these commonly used indicators are complemented by two factors that are not that frequently employed – a country’s degree of democracy and its level of corruption. Besides quota provisions and the electoral system type of a country, both of these additional variables affect women’s representation. Higher containment of corruption fosters higher percentages of women in parliament. In contrast, democratic states have fewer female members in parliament than non-democratic states.

Keywords: women’s representation; national parliaments; Africa

Freedom cannot be achieved unless women have been emancipated from all forms of oppression. To this end, we have acknowledged that the objectives of our Reconstruction and Development Programme will not be realized unless we see, in visible and practical terms, that the condition of women in our country has radically changed for the better, and that women at every level have been empowered to intervene in all aspects of life as equals with any other member of society.

These words, voiced by the former South African president, Nelson Mandela, in his very first State of the Nation address on 2 May 1994, portray the importance of gender equality for the economic, social and political development of Africa. Fifteen years after Mandela’s statement, women’s rights, as well as their social and political standing, have improved in some African states, while in other parts of Africa inequities between the genders still persist.While disparities in education between the sexes are still widespread in sub-Saharan Africa (Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004) and customary, statutory and religious laws continue to discriminate against women in many East and Central African states (Tripp, 2004), women have pushed for female-friendly policies in education, health care and equal rights in diverse countries including South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda ( Bauer and Britton, 2006; Huggins and Randell, 2007).1 In South Africa, for example, the government not only adopted a free health care program for pregnant women as well as children under six, but also installed an equality commission in parliament (Coustasse and Hilsenrath, 2005). In

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Rwanda, women were successful in introducing gender equality into the 2003 constitution and Uganda has seen the revision of discriminatory laws on rape, domestic violence and domestic relations (Hassim, 2003).

Some of these substantive improvements on the long road toward greater gender equality stem from increases in the descriptive representation of women in parliament (e.g. the share of parliamentary seats held by women in Africa has increased substantially from around 7 per cent in 1990 to around 18 per cent in December 2008). The ‘theory of presence’ (e.g. female politicians are best equipped to represent the interests of women [Phillips, 1995]) and the ‘feminist awareness approach’ (whereby women and men formulate programs that aim explicitly to change society [Young, 2000]) provide theoretical evidence for a link between descriptive and substantive representation.2

Empirical large- and small-N studies confirm that descriptive representation increases legislatures’ responsiveness to women’s policy concerns and also enhances perceptions about the legitimacy of legislators (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005). On average, women legislators are more left wing, they tend to favor post-materialist policies such as environ- mental protection and, most importantly, female parliamentarians are also likely to prioritize issues supported by female voters such as social policy (e.g. on average, women legislators support more permissive abortion policies) and spending (e.g. female deputies are more likely to advocate increased government spending on health care and other social services) (Diaz, 2005; Lovenduski and Norris, 2003; Wängnerud, 2000; 2009). In the African context a survey of male and female Rwandan parliamentarians supports prior analyses. More so than their male colleagues, women deputies consider themselves to be more concerned with grass-roots politics and show greater advocacy for ‘international feminism’ (Devlin and Elgie, 2008).

Because it leads to more governmental and institutional legitimacy as well as a fairer representation of interests and demands, gender equality in office is desirable. As Anne Phillips (1995, p. 47) puts it:‘it is representation ... with a purpose, it aims to subvert or add or transform’. Given this link between descriptive and substantive representation, it is important to determine the factors that impact the number of female deputies. In the African context, comparatively few studies engage in this endeavor. Existing research mainly confirms the importance of party quotas and, more so, country quotas for high parliamen- tary representation. For example, Ali Tripp (2003) and Julie Ballington (2004) contend that quota provisions have increased female representation in a number of African countries including Rwanda, Mozambique and South Africa. Similarly, Manon Tremblay’s (2007) edited volume and Gretchen Bauer’s (2008) article also stress the importance of gender quotas or reserved seats for the representation of women in Southern and Eastern African countries. In addition, there is some evidence that the two other conventional indicators – political culture and the electoral system type – impact women’s representation in Africa. Focusing only on those 24 African countries that held democratic elections between 1990 and 2001, Mi Yoon (2004) finds that a patriarchal culture negatively affects the presence of women in parliament, while a proportional representation system significantly increases the number of women in parliament.

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The three factors – quota provisions, a permissive electoral system in the form of PR and an egalitarian political culture – serve as a base from which to estimate the parliamentary representation of women in Africa. Yet, given that no inclusive study covers all countries on the continent, it is still unclear whether these three factors are all-encompassing. Even more importantly, there are other possible factors such as a country’s level of democracy and its degree of corruption that might affect the number of female deputies in parliament. A permissive regime – a democracy – by definition endows citizens with equal rights; this should guarantee the fair representation of major cohorts of the population including women (Donnelly, 1999). The second indicator, corruption, should prevent women from gaining office, because corrupt political and economic processes often deny them the opportunities to seek and hold public office (Transparency International, 2000).

This article tests the salience of these two new ‘variables’, while controlling for institutional, cultural and socio-economic factors. A quantitative research design through regression analysis is used to test the salience of democracy and corruption on the level of political representation of women in 44 countries on the African continent. Altogether, the encom- passing focus of this study and the inclusion of two ‘new’ variables should lead to a better understanding of women’s parliamentary representation in Africa.

The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the impact of democracy and corruption, respectively, on women’s representation. In the following section, I present the control variables and operationalize the indicators. In the penultimate section, I discuss the results of the article, which hint at a positive impact of corruption control on women’s representation and a negative relationship between democracy and the percentage of female deputies in parliament. The final part summarizes the main findings and offers some avenues for future research.

Democracy and Corruption: Their Link to Women’s Representation

Democracy and Women’s Representation

By definition democratic states should guarantee both free and fair elections, as well as enduring political freedoms, individual civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law (Sartori, 1992). This procedural and constitutional equality ought to include women’s rights to equal involvement in decision-making processes and their right to take a stand on issues. A free state should not only lower formal and informal barriers that deny women access to power, it should also allow multiple channels of information and grant women the right to form pressure groups. These are all features that supposedly allow women to push through procedural gender equality (Molyneux, 2002). In addition, parties in democratic states may be more likely to listen to pressures and demands voiced by female voters and feminist organizations, because if they deny their requests they might face ‘the consequences of non-action’ (e.g. being ousted from office) (Patterson, 2000, p. 4).

While there are multiple theoretical arguments implying increased women’s representation in democracies, the empirical evidence for Africa casts doubt on this thesis.3 On the one hand, some studies provide evidence for the thesis that democracies are better equipped to

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offer women fairer representation For example, Gisela Geisler (2000) and Denise Walsh (2006) discover a positive correlation between the successful struggle of South African women in the liberation movement against apartheid and a firm policy consensus toward gender equality within the African National Congress. Concerning Uganda, Dan Otte- moeller (1999) states that a variety of factors, including the participation of women in feminist movements and Uganda’s turbulent democratization, account for women’s rela- tively high gains in parliamentary representation. In addition, Andrea Brown (2001) notes that the Tanzanian democratization process that began in the 1980s created new opportu- nities for women to access political power.

On the other hand, studies report that democratization has decreased the representation of women in parliament. Yoon (2001), for example, analyzes the effect of democratic transitions on women’s legislative representation in sub-Saharan Africa and finds that overall democ- ratization has decreased women’s representation. In a more nuanced assessment, Tremblay (2007) contends that in countries where democracy has only prevailed for a short time, women have made no gains in accessing office. Instead, Tremblay (2007) contends that women’s representation is mostly affected by the electoral system type, with PR favoring the inclusion of women. Finally, a third array of studies based on comparative evidence (Tripp, 2007) and single cases ( Bauer and Britton, 2006) contend that democratic transitions only translate into gains in women’s representation when women themselves organize to ensure the inclusion of their demands in new constitutions and within new parties. Anne Goetz, Shireen Hassim (2003) and their contributors support this point by identifying four key variables that account for the success of gender equity agendas during a country’s long road to democracy: formal party commitment to gender equity, strong leftist parties as well as, most importantly, the organization of women’s structures within parties, and the continuing presence of women’s movements. Relatedly, based on Cameroon, Uganda and Mozam- bique, Tripp et al. (2008) offer comparative evidence highlighting that women only access power in high numbers if feminist groups mobilize and push women-friendly reforms.

The contradictory empirical evidence sheds some doubt on the thesis that African democ- racies grant women more access to decision-making positions than anocracies or auto- cracies. Whether and to what degree free states are more amenable to the support of women’s inclusion in parliament will be gauged in this article.

Corruption and Women’s Representation

The possible link between corruption and women’s representation has not been explicitly studied in a large-N setting in the African context. Still, there is empirical evidence for a negative correlation between corruption and women’s representation derived from other regions; for example, one multi-regional large-N study by David Dollar et al. (1999) finds a positive association between lower levels of corruption and higher numbers of women in parliament. Dollar et al.’s study is bolstered by plenty of indirect evidence that a system’s degree of fairness and cleanness affects women’s ability to achieve positions of political power. For example, Hung Sung (2003) argues that corruption hampers human rights and increases gender inequalities in society. She further contends that in a system where women

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do not have the same rights and duties as do men and where the former are denied property rights, inheritance and child custody, they lack the important preconditions for seeking public office, namely education, resources and support. Farzana Nawaz (2009) adds that in unequal societies inequities are often reinforced by a corrupt judiciary, which might buttress existing gender discrimination. If a gender-related case is brought before corrupt judges in such a corrupt system, the male status quo can easily win the case because it has the connections and can bribe prosecutors and judges. In addition, women in some regions in Eastern,Western and Southern Africa do not have access to capital due to a lack of collateral (Goetz, 2007).

Equally importantly, corruption greatly restricts the access of the majority of women to political parties and public sector jobs. The under-institutionalized parties in corrupt countries such as Nigeria or Angola are instead organized on the basis of personal connections and lack transparent rules of candidate selection (Randall and Svasand, 2002). In such a situation political seats can be bought and public officials are elected based on often male-dominated clientelistic networks, giving few chances to women to penetrate these networks. This might explain why in various African countries (e.g. Togo or Sierra Leone), women represent only a small group in the apex of party structures (approximately 10 per cent of both party officials and elected representatives are women) and with larger numbers of women serving as voters or for visibility at public protests (Goetz, 2003a).

In corrupt countries (e.g. Ivory Coast or Chad) women face hurdles not only in the political realm but also within the corporate or civil society sector. When promotion to higher office is contingent upon personal connections rather than merit, women must become either patrons or clients in the male-dominated patronage networks (Goetz, 2003a). Yet women are not only excluded from these corrupt networks based on traditions and cultures, they also often lack the aforementioned financial resources to buy themselves into these networks. Finally, there is evidence that corruption is likely to lead to the creation of favorable conditions and opportunities for the creation and existence of organized crime. This may further deter women from political involvement or from running for elected bodies (IDEA, 2008b).

Because corruption perpetuates gender inequalities, reinforces traditional networks and prevents women from gaining human and financial resources, I hypothesize that in highly corrupt African countries there is less chance that women will increase their representation in parliament.

Control Variables

While the main focus of this article is to test the links between both democracy and corruption and the number of female deputies in parliament, this analysis controls for four factors potentially associated with women’s representation: a country’s electoral system, quotas, GDP per capita and political culture.

The Electoral System Type of a Country

In the scholarly milieu there is general agreement that electoral institutions are an important factor affecting the level of women’s representation. With the exception of a few studies

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(e.g. Norris, 2004), multiple cross-national investigations by, among others, Chapman (1993), Rule and Zimmermann (1994), Matland and Studlar (1996), Sawer (1997) and Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005), have consistently shown that women’s representation is higher under proportional representation (PR) than under a plurality system.

The theory states that PR increases the permissiveness of the system. The prospect of electing several representatives should make it easier for party officials to slate female candidates. A female candidate can be seen as a benefit to the list by attracting voters without the significant costs of requiring powerful intra-party interests represented by men to step aside (Henig and Henig 2001, p. 100; Matland and Brown, 1992; Reynolds et al., 2005, p. 145). In contrast, parties in single-constituency majoritarian systems are likely to present male candidates. Because of the zero-sum game – only one candidate is nominated in each district – a candidate is more likely to be chosen if he or she has a national reputation, electoral experience and success, and is likely to be positively identified by most voters. Parties still believe that, in general, men fulfill these conditions better than women (Matland, 1998, p. 112). On the voters’ side, similar dynamics might apply as well. Voters could hesitate to vote for a woman if she is the only candidate. However, electors may be more inclined to support a woman as one of several candidates. Therefore, women should do better under a more proportional than under a less proportional system (Rule, 1987, pp. 478–9).

Quota Provisions

The second institutional factor, quotas, is seen as an efficient method of increasing women’s representation ( Bauer, 2008; Squires and Wickham-Jones, 2001; Tripp and Kang, 2008). There are four countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) that have legally binding quotas of 30 per cent or higher. In Burundi, the 2004 constitution stipulates a 30 per cent quota for women in parliament. If the quota regulations are not met by the parties, a process of co-optation will follow, in which the electoral admin- istration adds more members to the parliament to meet the quota. Rwanda also has an enacted 30 per cent quota provision and in Tanzania and Uganda up to 30 per cent of the seats are reserved for women (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA] and University of Stockholm, 2008). Outside legally binding quotas, a considerable number of African parties have enforced intra-party clauses. For example, in Mozambique and South Africa, the majority parties Frelimo and the African National Congress have implemented party clauses of 33 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively (IDEA and University of Stockholm, 2008). Given the relatively widespread use of quotas, it is expected that they play a major role in determining women’s representation on the African continent (see Appendix 2 for a complete display of all African countries with quota provisions).

The Country’s Material Wealth

There are contradictory findings on whether the wealth of a country is an important factor in determining women’s representation. Gwen Moore and Gene Shakman (1996) and

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Pamela Paxton (1997) have included the variable in their worldwide study, but find no evidence of its relevancy. In contrast, Richard Matland (1998) uncovers an indirect effect, but only for rich countries. He states that development leads to a weakening of traditional values, decreased fertility rates, increased urbanization and attitudinal changes in the per- ception of appropriate roles for women. Even if many states are developing countries, there are considerable differences in GDP per capita, ranging from nearly $13,500 for Mauritius to under $600 for Sudan. This variation justifies an inclusion of this factor in the studies.

A Country’s Political Culture

In the analysis, I also control for the variable political culture. Political culture may be described as the embodiment of the attitudes and values of a society that define the roles an individual may play in the political process (Hill, 1981, p. 160). According to Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2003, pp. 140–1), cultural attitudes and values continue to influence the proportion of women in parliament. Traditional values of gender inequality should remain a major obstacle to the election of women. In traditional cultures, female participation in legislative politics is likely to be discouraged by elite opinion leaders and the public, both of whom want to maintain a male-oriented status quo. The more liberal and egalitarian a culture, the more receptive the public will be to women’s issues and the higher the demand will be for an increase in women’s political participation (Inglehart and Norris, 2001; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). The current applicability of this thesis to Africa will be evaluated in this analysis.

Data

The dependent variable for this study is the percentage of female legislators in the lower house of the African national parliaments as of November 2008. The data were collected from the IPU database (2008). The first independent variable of interest, the degree of democracy, is measured by using the combined score of the two dimensions of the Freedom House Index (2008) – political rights and civil liberties – both of which contain numerical rankings between 1 and 7 for each country. For the first category (political rights) lower scores indicate a higher degree of freedom in electoral processes, greater political partici- pation and a more open government. In contrast, higher scores stress the relative lack of these political rights. For the second category, a low ranking indicates the presence of a higher degree of civil liberties (e.g. concerning freedom of expression and organization as well as socio-economic rights) and a high score signifies a relative lack of these liberties. The index’s consideration of both procedural democracy and substantive democracy is especially fitting for this study, as both the process and the product of democracy are expected to influence women’s access to political power.

The second main independent variable, corruption, is measured using the World Bank Good Governance Corruption Indicator (2009). Constructed by an unobserved compo- nents model based on several individual parameters, the variable control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private

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interests. The indicators measure corruption in units where the average score for the world as a whole is fifty. High numbers indicate a high containment of corruption, whereas low numbers reveal the contrary.

For the first control variable, the electoral system type, two main categories exist in Africa – proportional systems4 and plurality systems.5 The presence of two categories necessitates the creation of one dummy variable. Proportional systems are coded one, whereas majori- tarian and semi-proportional systems are coded zero. The two mixed systems6 (Uganda and Senegal) are clustered with the proportional systems because a considerable number of MPs are elected under PR. Data on electoral systems were collected from the database ‘Electoral System Design’ provided by IDEA (2008a).

Concerning the second variable, quotas, all countries that either have legally imposed quotas of 30 per cent or higher, or in which the majority of parties – calculated by their seat share – have implemented party clauses of 30 per cent or more, are differentiated from countries in which quota rules are non-existent. The majority principle is selected because if more than half of the seats are distributed to parties that guarantee roughly one-third represen- tation to women, other parties face high pressure also to include women in similar numbers on their list. The party clause of 30 per cent is chosen because it is often cited as a normative goal. For example, the United Nations considers a 30 per cent membership in political institutions the critical mass that enables women to exert meaningful influence on politics (UNDP, 1995, p. 41).7 In the regression analysis all countries with quotas are coded one, while all other countries are coded zero. Data on quotas were gathered from the Global Database of Quotas for Women established by IDEA and the University of Stockholm (2008).

The GDP per capita is introduced into the analysis as a measure of wealth. A widely used economic indicator, GDP per capita is the value of all goods and services produced domestically in one year within a particular country divided by the country’s total population. Thus, this measure provides a picture of average individual wealth. The data for the variable were obtained from the International Monetary Fund Database (2007). In order to capture the nebulous concept of political culture, I use two proxy variables which capture different cultural traits of a country. These two proxy variables are religion and the female activity rate. With regard to the first variable, religion, each society’s long-standing religious traditions (Buddhism, Confucianism, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Islam) have a long-lasting and deep impact upon a society’s beliefs and morals; these entrenched values continue to determine the roles of men and women in society (Norris, 2009). Muslim countries are commonly characterized by conservative and traditional values toward the role of women (Norris and Inglehart, 2004) and many studies (e.g. Kang, 2009; Norris and Inglehart, 2003) focus on these religious tenets to explain the lack of gender equality in many Arab or Muslim societies.

Based on this rationale, I assume that the higher the Muslim population, the fewer women’s representatives there are in the country. The data for this variable were collected from the CIA World Factbook database (CIA World Factbook, 2006). Like most data on religion, this indicator may be at risk for mismeasurement error because of the self-reported and

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subjective nature of the data and because adherents may differently interpret or follow Islam. However, in spite of these drawbacks, the indicator – the percentage of Muslims in a country – still provides a good (and best available) measurement of the relative influence of Islamic religion in the various countries.

Pertaining to the second and last cultural proxy variable, the female activity rate, I hypothesize that more egalitarian countries should allow women more equal chances to be represented in the workforce, which should then lead to higher female representation. While some older studies have found labor force participation to be generally unrelated to women’s political representation (Paxton, 1997; Rule, 1987), more recent scholarship claims that labor force participation benefits women (Hughes and Paxton, 2008). If women do not have access to professional opportunities, they will not have the human and financial capital to run for office and it will be less likely that they will be selected as possible representatives by parties (Darcy et al., 1994; Paxton and Kunovich, 2003). Moreover, women who are professionally active and successful might also seek access to political power. Thus, increased levels of women in the workforce might result in demands for more equal representation between the genders ( Welch, 1977; Matland, 1998). Data for the variable women in the workforce were collected from the UNDP Development Indicators.

Methods and Results

This article uses regression analysis to test the correlations between the seven independent variables – democracy, corruption, electoral system type, quotas, GDP per capita, the percentage of the populace that is Muslim, and the female economic activity rate – and the dependent variable, the proportion of women in the lower house of the national parliament. The study covers 44 African states. Ten countries (Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, São Tomé and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia,The Democratic Republic of Congo,Western Sahara and Zimbabwe) are excluded from the model as a result of data unavailability. Despite the missing data, this study covers more than 80 per cent of the African countries and over 85 per cent of the total population of Africa (United Nations Population Division, 2006).

The model for women’s representation in Africa is as follows (see Table 1):8

Women’s Representation + Degree of Democracy Degree o

0 1

= +β β β ff Corruption D_PR

D_Quotas GDP per capita Percent

4 5

+ + + +

β β β β Muslim

Female Economic Activity rate7 +

+β ε

Not only does the regression model show a high predictive value – it accounts for more than 65 per cent of the variance in women’s representation – it also offers clear results with regard to our variables of interest. For the first variable, regime type, the model predicts that democratic states have significantly fewer female deputies than do non-democratic states. Pertaining to the second variable – control of corruption – the indicator is statistically significant and has the expected sign. It appears true that higher containments of corruption positively impact the number of women in parliament. As expected, the two controls – first,

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electoral system type, and second, quotas are positively and significantly related to women’s representation. The third control – the percentage of Muslims in a country – is marginally significant at the 10 per cent level, but the negative correlation between higher percentages of Muslims in a country and fewer women in parliament is substantively minute. The two remaining indicators, the material wealth of a country and the female activity rate, do not appear to play a decisive role in determining women’s representation.

First, this study confirms prior case study evidence (e.g. Bauer, 2006; 2008; Powley and Pearson, 2007; Tamale, 2004) on Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda about the salience of quotas in the African context, highlighting that women’s representation is significantly higher in those countries with binding quota provisions. Holding all other variables constant, the number of women in parliament increases by 15 percentage points in countries with binding quota rules. In contrast, states with no quota provisions have, on average, less than 15 per cent female national MPs. Concerning the electoral system type, this regression model also supports prior studies (e.g. Paxton et al., 2010; Wängnerud, 2009) indicating that female candidates have significantly higher chances of being elected under a list proportional system than under any other system. On average, a PR system increases the representation of women by 6 percentage points when holding all other variables constant. While women occupy more than 21 per cent of the seats in parliaments where members are elected under PR, they constitute less than 15 per cent of the deputies in plurality systems. A PR system is also beneficial to the introduction of quota rules. Except for Uganda, all countries with quota clauses, as defined in this article, operate under PR.

Second, and more importantly, this article offers novel insights with regard to the two indicators, regime type and control of corruption. Pertaining to the first variable of interest – regime type – this study finds that democracies have fewer female deputies than non-democracies. On average, the model predicts that for every one unit increase in a country’s democracy score, its number of female deputies drops by nearly one point when holding all other variables constant. Based on the model’s point estimates the model further portrays that autocracies have, on average, around 10 percentage points more female

Table 1: Model for Women’s Representation in the African National Parliaments

B SE Sig.

Degree of democracy 0.925 0.455 0.049 Containment of corruption 0.160 0.075 0.040 D_PR 6.304 2.214 0.007 D_Quotas 15.174 3.609 0.000 GDP per capita 0.00004 0.00005 0.401 Percent Muslim -0.057 0.033 0.086 Female economic activity 0.058 0.073 0.429 Constant -1.265 8.815 0.887

R2 = 0.653, N = 44.

Note: Data on the dependent and independent variables are presented in Appendix 1.

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deputies than non-democracies. In addition, it seems true that the democratization pro- cesses that swept over various African countries in the 1990s and 2000s have not unani- mously helped women gain access to positions of power.

While the four countries (Benin, Cape Verde, Namibia and South Africa) that became democratic in the early 1990s and have remained free since then have seen an above-average increase in the number of female deputies between 1990 and 2008 (their number of female parliamentarians has improved from 6.2 per cent in 1990 to 22 per cent in 2008), the other democratization processes that swept the continent before 1990 and in the 2000s had no positive impact on the number of female deputies in parliament. Rather, to the contrary, Ghana, Lesotho and Mali, which democratized less than a decade ago, still drag behind the regional average in women’s representation. These three countries average around 15 per cent female deputies. Even less positively, the two rather long-standing African democracies (Botswana and Mauritius) have a mere 14 per cent share of women in parliament, which is 4 percentage points below the regional average.9

In short, there is evidence that democracy and democratic transitions often do not provide better opportunities for the political socialization of women. Rather than hinging solely on whether a country becomes a democracy, other factors, such as the creation of women’s organizations and the implementation of the aforementioned quota provisions and PR might determine whether the implementation and consolidation of democracy have a positive or negative impact on women’s engagement in political positions. In addition, women’s participation in some African democracies such as Mauritius or Mali might be hampered by the persistence of traditional gender roles, a normative gender division of labor in the family or a nostalgia for traditions identified with patriarchal ideas and practices.

The second variable of interest – a country’s degree of corruption – shows the expected relationship. Countries that are more corrupt have fewer women deputies than less corrupt countries. The model predicts that for every 10 per cent increase in control of corruption, the number of female deputies grows by 1.6 per cent. This implies an approximately 10-point difference in female representation between the most and the least corrupt countries on the continent. Although this increase is not extreme, it suggests a considerable augmentation in the number of female parliamentarians if a country embarks on the road toward greater transparency and less corruption. A prime empirical example is Lesotho; the country has improved its control of corruption by 14 per cent and has seen its number of female deputies skyrocket from 4 per cent at the end of the last decade to over 20 per cent at the end of 2009.

Empirically, it is also true that many of the highly corrupt African countries (e.g. Equatorial Guinea and Ivory Coast) display very low levels of women in parliament; below 10 per cent for Equatorial Guinea and Ivory Coast. In contrast, African countries that are frontrunners in their containment of corruption also frequently have above-average numbers of female representatives. South Africa, for example, is the second least corrupt country on the continent and among African states with the most women in parliament. Even more importantly, the impact of higher controls of corruption works regardless of the existence of quota provisions and the electoral system type. For example, among countries with no

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quota provisions, women’s representation is over 11 per cent higher in states with a lower than average corruption score compared to states with above average corruption scores. If we exclude the outlier Angola – a highly corrupt country with nearly 38 per cent women’s representation – then the gap in female parliamentarians between countries with above average corruption scores and those with below average corruption scores widens to more than 20 per cent.10 Finally, if we only consider those countries that operate under a plurality system, we find similar, albeit not as strongly pronounced, patterns. Countries with below average corruption scores have around 6.5 per cent more female deputies than states with above average corruption. All in all, the research offers evidence that containment of corruption is not only beneficial to good governance and sustainable economic and social development; it also fosters a decrease in gender inequalities in representation (Stockemer, 2009).

In contrast to institutional factors, a country’s regime type and corruption, the two cultural proxies, have little to no impact on women’s representation. Out of the two proxy variables only Islam is moderately statistically significant at the 90 per cent level. Substantively, the equation forecasts that for every 10 per cent increase in the Muslim population, the percentage of women in parliament drops by 0.60 per cent. This impact is weak; predomi- nantly Muslim countries only moderately differentiate themselves in terms of women’s representation from populaces that predominantly embrace a different religion. Two factors might account for this tendency: (1) people practice religion to different degrees; and (2) religious tenets lose influence in the daily lives of people in Africa as in the rest of the world.

The last cultural proxy, women’s participation in the workforce, does not impact the number of female deputies in African parliaments. Possibly because clientelistic networks still affect the selection of candidates for office, it appears that an expansion of women in the workforce does not increase the pool of possible candidates from which parties can choose. The aforementioned clientelistic networks, as well as local traditions and customs (e.g. tribal laws) might still prohibit women from gaining office. The final non-significant factor, development, also does not increase the representation of women in parliament. Thus, rather than depending on an increase in wealth and on (more) equality in the social and cultural realm, it is mainly institutional (e.g. quotas and PR) as well as other socio- economic factors (e.g. corruption) that affect the representation of women in Africa.

Conclusion

This analysis fulfills a double purpose. First, by analyzing eight theoretically informed variables, this study provides a fairly comprehensive picture of the current state of women’s representation in 44 African countries. Second, and possibly even more importantly, this article brings to the fore two significant variables that have not been extensively studied either in the African context or more globally. First, this study does not find that democ- racies have more female deputies than non-democracies. Rather, it follows Luciak (2005) and Viterna et al. (2006) who find that transitions to democracy have had a negative impact on women’s representation. Given that some African countries (e.g. Lesotho, Mali) democ- ratized less than ten years ago, it is still too early to say whether these short-term negative

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effects will be reversed in the long run. Paxton and Hughes (2007) suggest that once democratic institutions begin to consolidate, women will benefit from the more open and transparent rules and will gain greater access to true political power. The future will decide whether or not this holds for those recent democracies as well as for countries that democratize in the years to come.

Second, this study supports the growing evidence that corruption inhibits gender equity in representation (see Transparency International, 2000), further highlighting the detrimental nature of corrupt practices for all aspects of development. By reinforcing human rights violations, preventing the institutionalization of party structures and strengthening tradi- tional power networks, high levels of corruption appear to be a major barrier against women’s efforts to gain office.

In a comparative perspective, this research supports previous studies in many ways. First, quota provisions that have been found to be positively related to higher numbers of women deputies in various case studies on African countries (e.g. Bauer, 2008; Tripp, 2004) as well as cross-sectional analyses across the world (e.g. Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005; Paxton et al., 2006; Reynolds, 1999), also have a positive effect on women’s representation in Africa as a whole. The same applies to proportional electoral systems. PR, which is conventionally found to increase women’s parliamentary representation (Norris, 2006; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005), also positively affects the number of female deputies in African parliaments.With regard to the variable Islam, the study provides a rather nuanced picture. While the variable is statistically significant at the 90 per cent level, its substantive impact is rather low. Islamic tenets do not provide as strong a force of resistance against women’s political power in Africa as they do in other regions such as the Middle East (see Karam, 1999; Moghadam, 2003). Finally, this research highlights that development and the cultural proxy – the percentage of women in the workforce – have no impact on the number of women in African parliaments.

Despite the inclusive nature of the study at hand, this evaluation could be further refined. For example, the impact of incumbency on the relationship between the female party membership and the number of women representatives could be included in future studies. Finally, this study calls for an even more nuanced analysis of the factor political culture on women’s representation. This article has employed the best proxy variables for which data are available. Yet local traditions and tribal rules can have an impact on the political empowerment of women as well. As of now, however, these causal relationships can only be examined in a small-N study due to a lack of reliable indicators that capture local or regional customs.

As for the future development of women’s representation in Africa, a further slow but steady increase in female deputies is expected across the national level. More African parties might open up to women and vote or appoint them to positions of power.Women’s organizations and civil society are also likely to exercise pressure on politicians to increase the number of women in positions of political power. However, the only way to boost women’s repre- sentation in the short run is via the massive adoption of quota laws, especially in countries where the number of female deputies is low.

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Appendix 1: Variables Included in the Analysis

Country Women’s

representation Freedom

House Control of corruption Quotas PR

GDP per capita

% Muslim

Women in the workforce

Algeria 7.7 11 41.1 0 1 7,062 99 44 Angola 37.3 11 6.3 0 1 2,335 0 81 Benin 10.8 4 39.6 0 1 1,141 20 63 Botswana 11.1 4 79.7 0 0 12,387 0 67 Burkina 15.3 8 46.9 0 1 1,213 50 87 Burundi 30.5 9 8.7 1 1 699 10 99 Cameroon 13.9 12 15.9 0 0 2,299 20 64 Cape Verde 18.1 2 74.4 0 1 5,803 0 44 Central Africa 10.5 10 17.9 0 0 1,224 15 79 Chad 5.2 13 5.3 0 0 1,427 51 84 Comoros 3 7 29 0 0 1,993 98 66 Djibouti 13.8 10 40.1 0 0 2,178 94 64 Egypt 1.8 11 35.7 0 0 4,337 90 28 Equatorial Guinea 6 14 2.4 0 1 7,874 0 56 Ethiopia 21.9 10 27.5 0 0 1,055 32.8 79 Gabon 16.7 10 20.8 0 0 6,954 1 75 Gambia 9.4 9 22.7 0 0 1,921 90 69 Ghana 11.1 3 56 0 0 2,480 16 94 Guinea 19.3 12 2.9 0 1 2,316 85 90 Guinea-Bissau 14 8 6.8 0 1 827 45 66 Ivory Coast 8.9 11 7.2 0 0 1,648 40 44 Kenya 9.8 7 15.4 0 0 1,240 10 78 Lesotho 25 5 54.6 0 1 3,335 0 64 Madagascar 7.9 7 56.5 0 0 923 7 92 Malawi 13 8 26.1 0 0 667 12.8 95 Mali 10.2 5 45.4 0 0 1,033 90 85 Mauritania 22.1 11 38.2 0 0 2,234 100 65 Mauritius 17.1 3 69.6 0 0 12,715 16.6 53 Morocco 10.8 9 52.7 0 1 4,555 98.7 33 Mozambique 34.8 6 35.3 1 1 1,242 17.8 102 Namibia 26.9 4 62.8 0 1 7,586 0 74 Niger 12.4 7 18.4 0 1 781 80 75 Nigeria 7 9 12.1 0 0 1,128 50 95 Rwanda 56.3 11 58.5 1 1 1,206 4.6 95 Senegal 22 6 37.7 0 1 1,792 94 69 Sierra Leone 14.5 6 11.6 0 0 806 60 60 South Africa 33 4 67.1 1 1 11,100 1.5 59 Sudan 18.1 14 4.8 0 0 2,082 75 33 Swaziland 13.8 12 41.5 0 0 4,824 10 43 Tanzania 30.4 7 43 1 1 744 35 95 Togo 11.1 10 13.5 0 0 1,506 20 56 Tunisia 22.8 12 60.4 0 1 8,371 98 37 Uganda 30.7 9 24.6 1 0 1,454 16 92 Zambia 15.2 6 34.3 0 0 1,023 24 73

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Appendix 2: African Countries with Quota Provisions for the Legislative Elections as of 1 January 2009

Countries with legislative quotas (10% or higher): Reserved Seats (enforced):

Burundi (30%), Djibouti (10%), Niger (10%), Sudan (13%), Rwanda (30%), Tanzania (30%), Uganda (30%) Reserved Seats (not enforced):

Eritrea (30%), Somalia (12%) Voluntary Party Quotas (often not enforced): Algeria: National Liberation Front (2 out of the first 5 people on an electoral list must be women) Botswana: The Congress Party (30%), The National Front (30%) Cameroon: People’s Democratic Movement (25%), Social Democratic Front (25%) Ivory Coast: The Ivorian Public Front (30%) Kenya: Democratic Party (33%) Mali: Alliance for Democracy (30%) Morocco: The Socialist Union of Popular Forces (20%) Mozambique: Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) (33%) South Africa: African National Congress (50%) Tunisia: Democratic Constitutional Rally (25%) Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe African Union Nationalistic Front (30 seats)

Source: Quota Project (Global Database of Quotas for Women), 2010.

(Accepted: 31 August 2010)

About the Author Daniel Stockemer is Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics and Political Methodology in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. His research interests include political participation, elections, social movements and women’s representation. He has previously published in, among others, Comparative European Politics, International Politics and the Social Science Journal.

Daniel Stockemer, School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, 55 Laurier East, Ottawa, ON, K1N6N5, Canada; email: [email protected]

Notes 1 In many states, including Ivory Coast and Zambia, women are marginalized economically and have no right to own land.Women

in Uganda often perform 70 to 80 per cent of all agricultural labor and 90 per cent of all work involving food production, yet they own only a fraction of the land (Tripp, 2004). Under customary law, which is still practiced in parts of Eastern Africa, married women, with no legal protection of their rights, are forced to live as effective minors subject to the authority of a male relative (Menski, 2006, pp. 474–5). In other countries like Botswana, women do not have guardianship of their children, they are not allowed to open a bank account and are prevented by law from obtaining finance credit (Strickland, 2004).

2 In particular ‘the theory of presence’ claims that gender has an influence on the potential to represent women (Young, 2000). According to Celis (2007), this impact stems from different life experiences and women’s structural position in society. Based on their own experiences and those of other female citizens, women have a higher likelihood than men to define and describe women’s interests as well as to bring their topics of interest on to the political agenda. This implies that the presence of female deputies increases the probability that women’s needs and interests will be represented (Phillips, 1998).

3 Evidence on whether democratic states have higher proportions of women in national legislatures in other geographical areas raises doubt as well.While Inglehart et al. (2002) find in their global study that women are more highly represented in democracies than other regime types, regional evidence contradicts these findings. For example, Regulska (1992) and Nechemias (1994) report that Eastern European democratization resulted in a decrease in the number of elected women, the rollback of programs favoring

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women and the adoption of measures increasing the regulation of women by the state. More recently, Saint Germain and Metoyer (2008) claim that during the implementation and consolidation of democracy in Central America women had to struggle for visibility and representation.

4 Under a list proportional representation (List PR) system each party presents a list of candidates for a multi-member electoral district, and the voters vote for a party, which receives seats in proportion to its overall share of the vote. In some (closed list) systems the winning candidates are taken from the lists in order of their positions on the lists. If the lists are ‘open’ or ‘free’ the voters can influence the order of the candidates by marking individual preferences (IDEA, 2008a).

5 In majoritarian electoral systems, winning candidates are those having attracted the most votes in a given electoral district, either by a simple majority of the votes (first past the post) or by an absolute majority in a two-ballot system (IDEA, 2008a).

6 Mixed systems are established as a mixture of two principles of electoral system design: majoritarian systems, which usually have single-seat districts with plurality rule, and proportional systems (IDEA, 2008a)

7 Different thresholds have been suggested in studies on female representation. For example, Grey (2006) suggests that 15 per cent representation may allow politicians to change the political agenda, but 40 per cent is needed for the introduction of women-friendly policies. I have opted for the 30 per cent threshold because it is somewhat in the middle between 15 and 30 per cent and, more importantly, because it is often perceived as a ‘tipping point’, at which the presence of women in parliament becomes meaningful ( Wängnerud, 2009).

8 In a previous iteration of the article, I also included education, measured by the adult literacy rate, as an independent variable in the model. However, education is highly correlated with both the Gender Development Index and GDP per capita. Due to this multicollinearity problem, I have dropped the variable from the model. In addition, even in a bivariate framework education does not impact women’s representation in Africa.

9 Consistent with prior evidence (Paxton et al., 2010; Tremblay, 2007) it appears true that the implementation of democracy under plurality is particularly detrimental for the high representation of women. For example, the three relatively recently formed democracies Botswana, Ghana and Mali that operate under a majoritarian electoral formula all have between 10 and 12 per cent female deputies, which is about 6 to 8 points below the regional average. However, the mere 10.8 per cent women’s representation in Benin reveals that PR is no panacea for the high representation of women.

10 Angola has been governed by the former Communist party,The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), since the country’s independence in 1975. As of 2009, this party holds 82 per cent of the seats. It includes many women on its lists for ideological reasons.

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