Business Law II
Sweetest Honey
AdvancedBusinessLawandtheLegalEnvironment_Chapter5.pdf
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Chapter 5 Administrative Law
L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
After reading this chapter, you should be able to do the following:
1. Understand the purpose served by federal administrative agencies.
2. Know the difference between executive branch agencies and independent
agencies.
3. Understand the political control of agencies by the president and Congress.
4. Describe how agencies make rules and conduct hearings.
5. Describe how courts can be used to challenge administrative rulings.
From the 1930s on, administrative agencies, law, and procedures have virtually remade our government
and much of private life. Every day, business must deal with rules and decisions of state and federal
administrative agencies. Informally, such rules are often called regulations, and they differ (only in their
source) from laws passed by Congress and signed into law by the president. The rules created by agencies
are voluminous: thousands of new regulations pour forth each year. The overarching question of whether
there is too much regulation—or the wrong kind of regulation—of our economic activities is an important
Chapter 5 from Advanced Business Law and the Legal Environment was adapted by The Saylor Foundation under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
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one but well beyond the scope of this chapter, in which we offer an overview of the purpose of
administrative agencies, their structure, and their impact on business.
5.1 Administrative Agencies: Their Structure and Powers
L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
1. Explain the reasons why we have federal administrative agencies.
2. Explain the difference between executive branch agencies and independent
agencies.
3. Describe the constitutional issue that questions whether administrative agencies
could have authority to make enforceable rules that affect business.
Why Have Administrative Agencies? The US Constitution mentions only three branches of government: legislative, executive, and judicial
(Articles I, II, and III). There is no mention of agencies in the Constitution, even though federal agencies
are sometimes referred to as “the fourth branch of government.” The Supreme Court has recognized the
legitimacy of federal administrative agencies to make rules that have the same binding effect as
statutes by Congress.
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Most commentators note that having agencies with rule-making power is a practical necessity: (1)
Congress does not have the expertise or continuity to develop specialized knowledge in various areas (e.g.,
communications, the environment, aviation). (2) Because of this, it makes sense for Congress to set forth
broad statutory guidance to an agency and delegate authority to the agency to propose rules that further
the statutory purposes. (3) As long as Congress makes this delegating guidance sufficiently clear, it is not
delegating improperly. If Congress’s guidelines are too vague or undefined, it is (in essence) giving away
its constitutional power to some other group, and this it cannot do.
Why Regulate the Economy at All? The market often does not work properly, as economists often note. Monopolies, for example, happen in
the natural course of human events but are not always desirable. To fix this, well-conceived and
objectively enforced competition law (what is called antitrust law in the United States) is needed.
Negative externalities must be “fixed,” as well. For example, as we see in tort law (Chapter 7 "Introduction
to Tort Law"), people and business organizations often do things that impose costs (damages) on others,
and the legal system will try—through the award of compensatory damages—to make fair adjustments. In
terms of the ideal conditions for a free market, think of tort law as the legal system’s attempt to
compensate for negative externalities: those costs imposed on people who have not voluntarily consented
to bear those costs.
In terms of freedoms to enter or leave the market, the US constitutional guarantees of equal protection
can prevent local, state, and federal governments from imposing discriminatory rules for commerce that
would keep minorities, women, and gay people from full participation in business. For example, if the
small town of Xenophobia, Colorado, passed a law that required all business owners and their employees
to be Christian, heterosexual, and married, the equal protection clause (as well as numerous state and
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federal equal opportunity employment laws) would empower plaintiffs to go to court and have the law
struck down as unconstitutional.
Knowing that information is power, we will see many laws administered by regulatory agencies that seek
to level the playing field of economic competition by requiring disclosure of the most pertinent
information for consumers (consumer protection laws), investors (securities laws), and citizens (e.g., the
toxics release inventory laws in environmental law).
Ideal Conditions for a Free Market 1. There are many buyers and many sellers, and none of them has a substantial share of the market.
2. All buyers and sellers in the market are free to enter the market or leave it.
3. All buyers and all sellers have full and perfect knowledge of what other buyers and sellers are up
to, including knowledge of prices, quantity, and quality of all goods being bought or sold.
4. The goods being sold in the market are similar enough to each other that participants do not have
strong preferences as to which seller or buyer they deal with.
5. The costs and benefits of making or using the goods that are exchanged in the market are borne
only by those who buy or sell those goods and not by third parties or people “external” to the
market transaction. (That is, there are no “externalities.”)
6. All buyers and sellers are utility maximizers; each participant in the market tries to get as much as
possible for as little as possible.
7. There are no parties, institutions, or governmental units regulating the price, quantity, or quality
of any of the goods being bought and sold in the market.
In short, some forms of legislation and regulation are needed to counter a tendency toward consolidation
of economic power ((Reference mayer_1.0-ch48 not found in Book)) and discriminatory attitudes toward
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certain individuals and groups ((Reference mayer_1.0-ch50 not found in Book)) and to insist that people
and companies clean up their own messes and not hide information that would empower voluntary
choices in the free market.
But there are additional reasons to regulate. For example, in economic systems, it is likely for natural
monopolies to occur. These are where one firm can most efficiently supply all of the good or service.
Having duplicate (or triplicate) systems for supplying electricity, for example, would be inefficient, so
most states have a public utilities commission to determine both price and quality of service. This is direct
regulation.
Sometimes destructive competition can result if there is no regulation. Banking and insurance are good
examples of this. Without government regulation of banks (setting standards and methods), open and
fierce competition would result in widespread bank failures. That would erode public confidence in banks
and business generally. The current situation (circa 2011) of six major banks that are “too big to fail” is,
however, an example of destructive noncompetition.
Other market imperfections can yield a demand for regulation. For example, there is a need to regulate
frequencies for public broadcast on radio, television, and other wireless transmissions (for police, fire,
national defense, etc.). Many economists would also list an adequate supply of public goods as something
that must be created by government. On its own, for example, the market would not provide public goods
such as education, a highway system, lighthouses, a military for defense.
True laissez-faire capitalism—a market free from any regulation—would not try to deal with market
imperfections and would also allow people to freely choose products, services, and other arrangements
that historically have been deemed socially unacceptable. These would include making enforceable
contracts for the sale and purchase of persons (slavery), sexual services, “street drugs” such as heroin or
crack cocaine, votes for public office, grades for this course in business law, and even marriage
partnership.
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Thus the free market in actual terms—and not in theory—consists of commerce legally constrained by
what is economically desirable and by what is socially desirable as well. Public policy objectives in the
social arena include ensuring equal opportunity in employment, protecting employees from unhealthy or
unsafe work environments, preserving environmental quality and resources, and protecting consumers
from unsafe products. Sometimes these objectives are met by giving individuals statutory rights that can
be used in bringing a complaint (e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for employment
discrimination), and sometimes they are met by creating agencies with the right to investigate and
monitor and enforce statutory law and regulations created to enforce such law (e.g., the Environmental
Protection Agency, for bringing a lawsuit against a polluting company).
History of Federal Agencies Through the commerce clause in the US Constitution, Congress has the power to regulate trade between
the states and with foreign nations. The earliest federal agency therefore dealt with trucking and railroads,
to literally set the rules of the road for interstate commerce. The first federal agency, the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC), was created in 1887. Congress delegated to the ICC the power to enforce
federal laws against railroad rate discrimination and other unfair pricing practices. By the early part of
this century, the ICC gained the power to fix rates. From the 1970s through 1995, however, Congress
passed deregulatory measures, and the ICC was formally abolished in 1995, with its powers transferred to
the Surface Transportation Board.
Beginning with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1914, Congress has created numerous other
agencies, many of them familiar actors in American government. Today more than eighty-five federal
agencies have jurisdiction to regulate some form of private activity. Most were created since 1930, and
more than a third since 1960. A similar growth has occurred at the state level. Most states now have
dozens of regulatory agencies, many of them overlapping in function with the federal bodies.
Classification of Agencies
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Independent agencies are different from federal executive departments and other executive agencies by
their structural and functional characteristics. Most executive departments have a single director,
administrator, or secretary appointed by the president of the United States. Independent agencies almost
always have a commission or board consisting of five to seven members who share power over the agency.
The president appoints the commissioners or board subject to Senate confirmation, but they often serve
with staggered terms and often for longer terms than a usual four-year presidential term. They cannot be
removed except for “good cause.” This means that most presidents will not get to appoint all the
commissioners of a given independent agency. Most independent agencies have a statutory requirement
of bipartisan membership on the commission, so the president cannot simply fill vacancies with members
of his own political party.
In addition to the ICC and the FTC, the major independent agencies are the Federal Communications
Commission (1934), Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), National Labor Relations Board (1935),
and Environmental Protection Agency (1970). See Note 5.4 "Ideal Conditions for a Free Market" in the
sidebar.
By contrast, members of executive branch agencies serve at the pleasure of the president and are therefore
far more amenable to political control. One consequence of this distinction is that the rules that
independent agencies promulgate may not be reviewed by the president or his staff—only Congress may
directly overrule them—whereas the White House or officials in the various cabinet departments may
oversee the work of the agencies contained within them (unless specifically denied the power by
Congress).
Powers of Agencies Agencies have a variety of powers. Many of the original statutes that created them, like the Federal
Communications Act, gave them licensing power. No party can enter into the productive activity covered
by the act without prior license from the agency—for example, no utility can start up a nuclear power
plant unless first approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In recent years, the move toward
deregulation of the economy has led to diminution of some licensing power. Many agencies also have the
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authority to set the rates charged by companies subject to the agency’s jurisdiction. Finally, the agencies
can regulate business practices. The FTC has general jurisdiction over all business in interstate commerce
to monitor and root out “unfair acts” and “deceptive practices.” The Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) oversees the issuance of corporate securities and other investments and monitors the practices of
the stock exchanges.
Unlike courts, administrative agencies are charged with the responsibility of carrying out a specific
assignment or reaching a goal or set of goals. They are not to remain neutral on the various issues of the
day; they must act. They have been given legislative powers because in a society growing ever more
complex, Congress does not know how to legislate with the kind of detail that is necessary, nor would it
have the time to approach all the sectors of society even if it tried. Precisely because they are to do what
general legislative bodies cannot do, agencies are specialized bodies. Through years of experience in
dealing with similar problems they accumulate a body of knowledge that they can apply to accomplish
their statutory duties.
All administrative agencies have two different sorts of personnel. The heads, whether a single
administrator or a collegial body of commissioners, are political appointees and serve for relatively
limited terms. Below them is a more or less permanent staff—the bureaucracy. Much policy making
occurs at the staff level, because these employees are in essential control of gathering facts and presenting
data and argument to the commissioners, who wield the ultimate power of the agencies.
The Constitution and Agencies
Congress can establish an agency through legislation. When Congress gives powers to an agency, the
legislation is known as an enabling act. The concept that Congress can delegate power to an agency is
known as the delegation doctrine. Usually, the agency will have all three kinds of power: executive,
legislative, and judicial. (That is, the agency can set the rules that business must comply with, can
investigate and prosecute those businesses, and can hold administrative hearings for violations of those
rules. They are, in effect, rule maker, prosecutor, and judge.) Because agencies have all three types of
governmental powers, important constitutional questions were asked when Congress first created them.
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The most important question was whether Congress was giving away its legislative power. Was the
separation of powers violated if agencies had power to make rules that were equivalent to legislative
statutes?
In 1935, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the National
Industrial Recovery Act on the ground that the congressional delegation of power was too broad. [1] Under
the law, industry trade groups were granted the authority to devise a code of fair competition for the
entire industry, and these codes became law if approved by the president. No administrative body was
created to scrutinize the arguments for a particular code, to develop evidence, or to test one version of a
code against another. Thus it was unconstitutional for the Congress to transfer all of its legislative powers
to an agency. In later decisions, it was made clear that Congress could delegate some of its legislative
powers, but only if the delegation of authority was not overly broad.
Still, some congressional enabling acts are very broad, such as the enabling legislation for the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is given the authority to make rules to
provide for safe and healthful working conditions in US workplaces. Such a broad initiative power gives
OSHA considerable discretion. But, as noted in Section 5.2 "Controlling Administrative Agencies", there
are both executive and judicial controls over administrative agency activities, as well as ongoing control by
Congress through funding and the continuing oversight of agencies, both in hearings and through
subsequent statutory amendments.
K E Y T A K E A W A Y
Congress creates administrative agencies through enabling acts. In these acts, Congress
must delegate authority by giving the agency some direction as to what it wants the
agency to do. Agencies are usually given broad powers to investigate, set standards
(promulgating regulations), and enforce those standards. Most agencies are executive
branch agencies, but some are independent.
E X E R C I S E S
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1. Explain why Congress needs to delegate rule-making authority to a specialized
agency.
2. Explain why there is any need for interference in the market by means of laws or
regulations.
[1] Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US 495 (1935).
5.2 Controlling Administrative Agencies L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
1. Understand how the president controls administrative agencies.
2. Understand how Congress controls administrative agencies.
3. Understand how the courts can control administrative agencies.
During the course of the past seventy years, a substantial debate has been conducted, often in shrill terms,
about the legitimacy of administrative lawmaking. One criticism is that agencies are “captured” by the
industry they are directed to regulate. Another is that they overregulate, stifling individual initiative and
the ability to compete. During the 1960s and 1970s, a massive outpouring of federal law created many new
agencies and greatly strengthened the hands of existing ones. In the late 1970s during the Carter
administration, Congress began to deregulate American society, and deregulation increased under the
Reagan administration. But the accounting frauds of WorldCom, Enron, and others led to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, and the financial meltdown of 2008 has led to reregulation of the financial sector. It
remains to be seen whether the Deepwater Horizon oil blowout of 2010 will lead to more environmental
regulations or a rethinking on how to make agencies more effective regulators.
Administrative agencies are the focal point of controversy because they are policy-making bodies,
incorporating facets of legislative, executive, and judicial power in a hybrid form that fits uneasily at best
in the framework of American government (see Figure 5.1 "Major Administrative Agencies of the United
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States"). They are necessarily at the center of tugging and hauling by the legislature, the executive branch,
and the judiciary, each of which has different means of exercising political control over them. In early
1990, for example, the Bush administration approved a Food and Drug Administration regulation that
limited disease-prevention claims by food packagers, reversing a position by the Reagan administration in
1987 permitting such claims.
Figure 5.1 Major Administrative Agencies of the United States
Legislative Control
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Congress can always pass a law repealing a regulation that an agency promulgates. Because this is a time-
consuming process that runs counter to the reason for creating administrative bodies, it happens rarely.
Another approach to controlling agencies is to reduce or threaten to reduce their appropriations. By
retaining ultimate control of the purse strings, Congress can exercise considerable informal control over
regulatory policy.
Executive Control The president (or a governor, for state agencies) can exercise considerable control over agencies that are
part of his cabinet departments and that are not statutorily defined as independent. Federal agencies,
moreover, are subject to the fiscal scrutiny of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), subject to the
direct control of the president. Agencies are not permitted to go directly to Congress for increases in
budget; these requests must be submitted through the OMB, giving the president indirect leverage over
the continuation of administrators’ programs and policies.
Judicial Review of Agency Actions Administrative agencies are creatures of law and like everyone else must obey the law. The courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims that the agencies have overstepped their legal authority or have acted in some
unlawful manner.
Courts are unlikely to overturn administrative actions, believing in general that the agencies are better
situated to judge their own jurisdiction and are experts in rulemaking for those matters delegated to them
by Congress. Some agency activities are not reviewable, for a number of reasons. However, after a
business (or some other interested party) has exhausted all administrative remedies, it may seek judicial
review of a final agency decision. The reviewing court is often asked to strike down or modify agency
actions on several possible bases (see Section 5.5.2 "Strategies for Obtaining Judicial Review" on
“Strategies for Obtaining Judicial Review”).
K E Y T A K E A W A Y
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Administrative agencies are given unusual powers: to legislate, investigate, and
adjudicate. But these powers are limited by executive and legislative controls and by
judicial review. E X E R C I S E S
1. Find the website of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). Identify from
that site a product that has been banned by the CPSC for sale in the United States.
What reasons were given for its exclusion from the US market?
2. What has Congress told the CPSC to do in its enabling act? Is this a clear enough
mandate to guide the agency? What could Congress do if the CPSC does something
that may be outside of the scope of its powers? What can an affected business do?
5.3 The Administrative Procedure Act
L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
1. Understand why the Administrative Procedure Act was needed.
2. Understand how hearings are conducted under the act.
3. Understand how the act affects rulemaking by agencies.
In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This fundamental statute
detailed for all federal administrative agencies how they must function when they are deciding cases or
issuing regulations, the two basic tasks of administration. At the state level, the Model State
Administrative Procedure Act, issued in 1946 and revised in 1961, has been adopted in twenty-eight states
and the District of Columbia; three states have adopted the 1981 revision. The other states have statutes
that resemble the model state act to some degree.
Trial-Type Hearings Deciding cases is a major task of many agencies. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is
empowered to charge a company with having violated the Federal Trade Commission Act. Perhaps a seller
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is accused of making deceptive claims in its advertising. Proceeding in a manner similar to a court, staff
counsel will prepare a case against the company, which can defend itself through its lawyers. The case is
tried before an administrative law judge (ALJ), formerly known as an administrative hearing
examiner. The change in nomenclature was made in 1972 to enhance the prestige of ALJs and more
accurately reflect their duties. Although not appointed for life as federal judges are, the ALJ must be free
of assignments inconsistent with the judicial function and is not subject to supervision by anyone in the
agency who carries on an investigative or prosecutorial function.
The accused parties are entitled to receive notice of the issues to be raised, to present evidence, to argue,
to cross-examine, and to appear with their lawyers. Ex parte (eks PAR-tay) communications—contacts
between the ALJ and outsiders or one party when both parties are not present—are prohibited. However,
the usual burden-of-proof standard followed in a civil proceeding in court does not apply: the ALJ is not
bound to decide in favor of that party producing the more persuasive evidence. The rule in most
administrative proceedings is “substantial evidence,” evidence that is not flimsy or weak, but is not
necessarily overwhelming evidence, either. The ALJ in most cases will write an opinion. That opinion is
not the decision of the agency, which can be made only by the commissioners or agency head. In effect,
the ALJ’s opinion is appealed to the commission itself.
Certain types of agency actions that have a direct impact on individuals need not be filtered through a full-
scale hearing. Safety and quality inspections (grading of food, inspection of airplanes) can be made on the
spot by skilled inspectors. Certain licenses can be administered through tests without a hearing (a test for
a driver’s license), and some decisions can be made by election of those affected (labor union elections).
Rulemaking Trial-type hearings generally impose on particular parties liabilities based on past or present facts.
Because these cases will serve as precedents, they are a partial guide to future conduct by others. But they
do not directly apply to nonparties, who may argue in a subsequent case that their conduct does not fit
within the holding announced in the case. Agencies can affect future conduct far more directly by
announcing rules that apply to all who come within the agency’s jurisdiction.
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The acts creating most of the major federal agencies expressly grant them authority to engage in
rulemaking. This means, in essence, authority to legislate. The outpouring of federal regulations has been
immense. The APA directs agencies about to engage in rulemaking to give notice in
the Federal Register of their intent to do so. The Federal Register is published daily, Monday through
Friday, in Washington, DC, and contains notice of various actions, including announcements of proposed
rulemaking and regulations as adopted. The notice must specify the time, place, and nature of the
rulemaking and offer a description of the proposed rule or the issues involved. Any interested person or
organization is entitled to participate by submitting written “data, views or arguments.” Agencies are not
legally required to air debate over proposed rules, though they often do so.
The procedure just described is known as “informal” rulemaking. A different procedure is required for
“formal” rulemaking, defined as those instances in which the enabling legislation directs an agency to
make rules “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” When engaging in formal rulemaking,
agencies must hold an adversary hearing.
Administrative regulations are not legally binding unless they are published. Agencies must publish in
the Federal Register the text of final regulations, which ordinarily do not become effective until thirty
days later. Every year the annual output of regulations is collected and reprinted in
the Code of Federal Regulations, a multivolume paperback series containing all federal rules and
regulations keyed to the fifty titles of the US Code (the compilation ofall federal statutes enacted by
Congress and grouped according to subject).
K E Y T A K E A W A Y
Agencies make rules that have the same effect as laws passed by Congress and the
president. But such rules (regulations) must allow for full participation by
interested parties. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs both
rulemaking and the agency enforcement of regulations, and it provides a process
for fair hearings.
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E X E R C I S E S
1. Go to http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#home. Browse
the site. Find a topic that interests you, and then find a proposed regulation.
Notice how comments on the proposed rule are invited.
2. Why would there be a trial by an administrative agency? Describe the process.
5.4 Administrative Burdens on Business Operations
L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
1. Describe the paperwork burden imposed by administrative agencies.
2. Explain why agencies have the power of investigation, and what limits there
are to that power.
3. Explain the need for the Freedom of Information Act and how it works in the
US legal system.
The Paperwork Burden The administrative process is not frictionless. The interplay between government agency and private
enterprise can burden business operations in a number of ways. Several of these are noted in this section.
Deciding whether and how to act are not decisions that government agencies reach out of the blue. They
rely heavily on information garnered from business itself. Dozens of federal agencies require corporations
to keep hundreds of types of records and to file numerous periodic reports. The Commission on Federal
Paperwork, established during the Ford administration to consider ways of reducing the paperwork
burden, estimated in its final report in 1977 that the total annual cost of federal paperwork amounted to
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$50 billion and that the 10,000 largest business enterprises spent $10 billion annually on paperwork
alone. The paperwork involved in licensing a single nuclear power plant, the commission said, costs
upward of $15 million.
Not surprisingly, therefore, businesses have sought ways of avoiding requests for data. Since the 1940s,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has collected economic data on corporate performance from
individual companies for statistical purposes. As long as each company engages in a single line of
business, data are comparable. When the era of conglomerates began in the 1970s, with widely divergent
types of businesses brought together under the roof of a single corporate parent, the data became useless
for purposes of examining the competitive behavior of different industries. So the FTC ordered dozens of
large companies to break out their economic information according to each line of business that they
carried on. The companies resisted, but the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
where much of the litigation over federal administrative action is decided, directed the companies to
comply with the commission’s order, holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act clearly permits the
agency to collect information for investigatory purposes. [1]
In 1980, responding to cries that businesses, individuals, and state and local governments were being
swamped by federal demands for paperwork, Congress enacted the Paperwork Reduction Act. It gives
power to the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop uniform policies for
coordinating the gathering, storage, and transmission of all the millions of reports flowing in each year to
the scores of federal departments and agencies requesting information. These reports include tax and
Medicare forms, financial loan and job applications, questionnaires of all sorts, compliance reports, and
tax and business records. The OMB was given the power also to determine whether new kinds of
information are needed. In effect, any agency that wants to collect new information from outside must
obtain the OMB’s approval.
Inspections No one likes surprise inspections. A section of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 empowers
agents of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to search work areas for safety
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hazards and for violations of OSHA regulations. The act does not specify whether inspectors are required
to obtain search warrants, required under the Fourth Amendment in criminal cases. For many years, the
government insisted that surprise inspections are not unreasonable and that the time required to obtain a
warrant would defeat the surprise element. The Supreme Court finally ruled squarely on the issue in 1978.
In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the court held that no less than private individuals, businesses are entitled
to refuse police demands to search the premises unless a court has issued a search warrant. [2]
But where a certain type of business is closely regulated, surprise inspections are the norm, and no
warrant is required. For example, businesses with liquor licenses that might sell to minors are subject to
both overt and covert inspections (e.g., an undercover officer may “search” a liquor store by sending an
underage patron to the store). Or a junkyard that specializes in automobiles and automobile parts may
also be subject to surprise inspections, on the rationale that junkyards are highly likely to be active in the
resale of stolen autos or stolen auto parts. [3]
It is also possible for inspections to take place without a search warrant and without the permission of the
business. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) wished to inspect parts of the Dow
Chemical facility in Midland, Michigan, without the benefit of warrant. When they were refused, agents of
the EPA obtained a fairly advanced aerial mapping camera and rented an airplane to fly over the Dow
facility. Dow went to court for a restraining order against the EPA and a request to have the EPA turn over
all photographs taken. But the Supreme Court ruled that the areas photographed were “open fields” and
not subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. [4]
Access to Business Information in Government Files In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), opening up to the citizenry many of
the files of the government. (The act was amended in 1974 and again in 1976 to overcome a tendency of
many agencies to stall or refuse access to their files.) Under the FOIA, any person has a legally enforceable
right of access to all government documents, with nine specific exceptions, such as classified military
intelligence, medical files, and trade secrets and commercial or financial information if “obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential.” Without the trade-secret and financial-information exemptions,
business competitors could, merely by requesting it, obtain highly sensitive competitive information
sitting in government files.
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A federal agency is required under the FOIA to respond to a document request within ten days. But in
practice, months or even years may pass before the government actually responds to an FOIA request.
Requesters must also pay the cost of locating and copying the records. Moreover, not all documents are
available for public inspection. Along with the trade-secret and financial-information exemptions, the
FOIA specifically exempts the following:
records required by executive order of the president to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or public policy
records related solely to the internal personnel rules and practice of an agency
records exempted from disclosure by another statute
interagency memos or decisions reflecting the deliberative process
personnel files and other files that if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy
information compiled for law enforcement purposes
geological information concerning wells
Note that the government may provide such information but is not required to provide such information;
it retains discretion to provide information or not.
Regulated companies are often required to submit confidential information to the government. For these
companies, submitting such information presents a danger under the FOIA of disclosure to competitors.
To protect information from disclosure, the company is well advised to mark each document as privileged
and confidential so that government officials reviewing it for a FOIA request will not automatically
disclose it. Most agencies notify a company whose data they are about to disclose. But these practices are
not legally required under the FOIA.
K E Y T A K E A W A Y
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Government agencies, in order to do their jobs, collect a great deal of information
from businesses. This can range from routine paperwork (often burdensome) to
inspections, those with warrants and those without. Surprise inspections are
allowed for closely regulated industries but are subject to Fourth Amendment
requirements in general. Some information collected by agencies can be accessed
using the Freedom of Information Act.
E X E R C I S E S
1. Give two examples of a closely regulated industry. Explain why some
warrantless searches would be allowed.
2. Find out why FOIA requests often take months or years to accomplish.
[1] In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
[2] Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 US 307 (1978).
[3] New York v. Burger, 482 US 691 (1987).
[4] Dow Chemical Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 476 US 227 (1986).
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5.5 The Scope of Judicial Review
L E A R N I N G O B J E C T I V E S
1. Describe the “exhaustion of remedies” requirement.
2. Detail various strategies for obtaining judicial review of agency rules.
3. Explain under what circumstances it is possible to sue the government.
Neither an administrative agency’s adjudication nor its issuance of a regulation is necessarily final. Most
federal agency decisions are appealable to the federal circuit courts. To get to court, the appellant must
overcome numerous complex hurdles. He or she must have standing—that is, be in some sense directly
affected by the decision or regulation. The case must be ripe for review; administrative remedies such as
further appeal within the agency must have been exhausted.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Before you can complain to court about an agency’s action, you must first try to get the agency to
reconsider its action. Generally, you must have asked for a hearing at the hearing examiner level, there
must have been a decision reached that was unfavorable to you, and you must have appealed the decision
to the full board. The full board must rule against you, and only then will you be heard by a court. The
broadest exception to this exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is if the agency had no
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authority to issue the rule or regulation in the first place, if exhaustion of remedies would be impractical
or futile, or if great harm would happen should the rule or regulation continue to apply. Also, if the agency
is not acting in good faith, the courts will hear an appeal without exhaustion.
Strategies for Obtaining Judicial Review Once these obstacles are cleared, the court may look at one of a series of claims. The appellant might
assert that the agency’s action was ultra vires (UL-truh VI-reez)—beyond the scope of its authority as set
down in the statute. This attack is rarely successful. A somewhat more successful claim is that the agency
did not abide by its own procedures or those imposed upon it by the Administrative Procedure Act.
In formal rulemaking, the appellant also might insist that the agency lacked substantial evidence for the
determination that it made. If there is virtually no evidence to support the agency’s findings, the court
may reverse. But findings of fact are not often overturned by the courts.
Likewise, there has long been a presumption that when an agency issues a regulation, it has the authority
to do so: those opposing the regulation must bear a heavy burden in court to upset it. This is not a
surprising rule, for otherwise courts, not administrators, would be the authors of regulations.
Nevertheless, regulations cannot exceed the scope of the authority conferred by Congress on the agency.
In an important 1981 case before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the secretary of labor, acting
through the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA), could lawfully issue a standard
limiting exposure to cotton dust in the workplace without first undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. A
dozen cotton textile manufacturers and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute, representing 175
companies, asserted that the cotton dust standard was unlawful because it did not rationally relate the
benefits to be derived from the standard to the costs that the standard would impose. See Section 5.6
"Cases", American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan.
In summary, then, an individual or a company may (after exhaustion of administrative remedies)
challenge agency action where such action is the following:
not in accordance with the agency’s scope of authority
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not in accordance with the US Constitution or the Administrative Procedure Act
not in accordance with the substantial evidence test
unwarranted by the facts
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord with the law
Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act sets out those standards. While it is difficult to show that
an agency’s action is arbitrary and capricious, there are cases that have so held. For example, after the
Reagan administration set aside a Carter administration rule from the National Highway Traffic and
Safety Administration on passive restraints in automobiles, State Farm and other insurance companies
challenged the reversal as arbitrary and capricious. Examining the record, the Supreme Court found that
the agency had failed to state enough reasons for its reversal and required the agency to review the record
and the rule and provide adequate reasons for its reversal. State Farm and other insurance companies
thus gained a legal benefit by keeping an agency rule that placed costs on automakers for increased
passenger safety and potentially reducing the number of injury claims from those it had insured. [1]
Suing the Government In the modern administrative state, the range of government activity is immense, and administrative
agencies frequently get in the way of business enterprise. Often, bureaucratic involvement is wholly
legitimate, compelled by law; sometimes, however, agencies or government officials may overstep their
bounds, in a fit of zeal or spite. What recourse does the private individual or company have?
Mainly for historical reasons, it has always been more difficult to sue the government than to sue private
individuals or corporations. For one thing, the government has long had recourse to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as a shield against lawsuits. Yet in 1976, Congress amended the Administrative
Procedure Act to waive any federal claim to sovereign immunity in cases of injunctive or other
nonmonetary relief. Earlier, in 1946, in the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress had waived sovereign
immunity of the federal government for most tort claims for money damages, although the act contains
several exceptions for specific agencies (e.g., one cannot sue for injuries resulting from fiscal operations of
the Treasury Department or for injuries stemming from activities of the military in wartime). The act also
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contains a major exception for claims “based upon [an official’s] exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty.” This exception prevents suits against parole boards
for paroling dangerous criminals who then kill or maim in the course of another crime and suits against
officials whose decision to ship explosive materials by public carrier leads to mass deaths and injuries
following an explosion en route. [2]
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been stripping away the traditional immunity enjoyed by many
government officials against personal suits. Some government employees—judges, prosecutors,
legislators, and the president, for example—have absolute immunity against suit for official actions. But
many public administrators and government employees have at best a qualified immunity. Under a
provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (so-called Section 1983 actions), state officials can be sued in
federal court for money damages whenever “under color of any state law” they deprive anyone of his
rights under the Constitution or federal law. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, the
Supreme Court held that federal agents may be sued for violating the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights
against an unlawful search of his home. [3] Subsequent cases have followed this logic to permit suits for
violations of other constitutional provisions. This area of the law is in a state of flux, and it is likely to
continue to evolve.
Sometimes damage is done to an individual or business because the government has given out erroneous
information. For example, suppose that Charles, a bewildered, disabled navy employee, is receiving a
federal disability annuity. Under the regulations, he would lose his pension if he took a job that paid him
in each of two succeeding years more than 80 percent of what he earned in his old navy job. A few years
later, Congress changed the law, making him ineligible if he earned more than 80 percent in anyone year.
For many years, Charles earned considerably less than the ceiling amount. But then one year he got the
opportunity to make some extra money. Not wishing to lose his pension, he called an employee relations
specialist in the US Navy and asked how much he could earn and still keep his pension. The specialist
gave him erroneous information over the telephone and then sent him an out-of-date form that said
Charles could safely take on the extra work. Unfortunately, as it turned out, Charles did exceed the salary
limit, and so the government cut off his pension during the time he earned too much. Charles sues to
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recover his lost pension. He argues that he relied to his detriment on false information supplied by the
navy and that in fairness the government should be estopped from denying his claim.
Unfortunately for Charles, he will lose his case. In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, the
Supreme Court reasoned that it would be unconstitutional to permit recovery. [4] The appropriations
clause of Article I says that federal money can be paid out only through an appropriation made by law.
The law prevented this particular payment to be made. If the court were to make an exception, it would
permit executive officials in effect to make binding payments, even though unauthorized, simply by
misrepresenting the facts. The harsh reality, therefore, is that mistakes of the government are generally
held against the individual, not the government, unless the law specifically provides for recompense (as,
for example, in the Federal Tort Claims Act just discussed).
K E Y T A K E A W A Y
After exhausting administrative remedies, there are numerous grounds for seeking
judicial review of an agency’s order or of a final rule. While courts defer to agencies to
some degree, an agency must follow its own rules, comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act, act within the scope of its delegated authority, avoid acting in an
arbitrary manner, and make final rules that are supported by substantial evidence.
E X E R C I S E S
1. Why would US courts require that someone seeking judicial review of an agency
order first exhaust administrative remedies?
2. On the Internet, find a case where someone has successfully sued the US
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. What kind of case was it? Did the
government argue sovereign immunity? Does sovereign immunity even make sense
to you?
[1] Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Assn. v. State Farm Mutual Ins., 463 US 29 (1983).
[2] Dalehite v. United States, 346 US 15 (1953).
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[3] Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 US 388 (1971).
[4] Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 110 S. Ct. 2465 (1990).
5.6 Cases
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.
436 U.S. 307 (U.S. Supreme Court 1978)
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA or Act) empowers agents of the
Secretary of Labor (Secretary) to search the work area of any employment facility within the Act’s
jurisdiction. The purpose of the search is to inspect for safety hazards and violations of OSHA regulations.
No search warrant or other process is expressly required under the Act.
On the morning of September 11, 1975, an OSHA inspector entered the customer service area of Barlow’s,
Inc., an electrical and plumbing installation business located in Pocatello, Idaho. The president and
general manager, Ferrol G. “Bill” Barlow, was on hand; and the OSHA inspector, after showing his
credentials, informed Mr. Barlow that he wished to conduct a search of the working areas of the business.
Mr. Barlow inquired whether any complaint had been received about his company. The inspector
answered no, but that Barlow’s, Inc., had simply turned up in the agency’s selection process. The inspector
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again asked to enter the nonpublic area of the business; Mr. Barlow’s response was to inquire whether the
inspector had a search warrant.
The inspector had none. Thereupon, Mr. Barlow refused the inspector admission to the employee area of
his business. He said he was relying on his rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
Three months later, the Secretary petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to
issue an order compelling Mr. Barlow to admit the inspector. The requested order was issued on
December 30, 1975, and was presented to Mr. Barlow on January 5, 1976. Mr. Barlow again refused
admission, and he sought his own injunctive relief against the warrantless searches assertedly permitted
by OSHA.…The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as
private homes. To hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial
experience.
An important forerunner of the first 10 Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Virginia Bill of
Rights, specifically opposed “general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed.” The general warrant was a recurring point
of contention in the Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution. The particular offensiveness it
engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose premises and products were
inspected for compliance with the several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the
colonists.…
* * *
This Court has already held that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, and that this rule
applies to commercial premises as well as homes. In Camara v. Municipal Court, we held:
[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent
is ‘unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.
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On the same day, we also ruled: As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively
unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a
constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private
commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and
inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without
official authority evidenced by a warrant. These same cases also held that the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches protects against warrantless intrusions during civil as well as
criminal investigations. The reason is found in the “basic purpose of this Amendment…[which] is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” If
the government intrudes on a person’s property, the privacy interest suffers whether the government’s
motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory
standards.…
[A]n exception from the search warrant requirement has been recognized for “pervasively regulated
business[es],” United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), and for “closely regulated” industries
“long subject to close supervision and inspection,” Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72, 74, 77 (1970). These cases are indeed exceptions, but they represent responses to relatively unique
circumstances. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable
expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor
(Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a
business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation.
* * *
The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type involved
in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the rule. Invoking the Walsh-
Healey Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq., the Secretary attempts to support a conclusion that all
businesses involved in interstate commerce have long been subjected to close supervision of employee
safety and health conditions. But…it is quite unconvincing to argue that the imposition of minimum
wages and maximum hours on employers who contracted with the Government under the Walsh-Healey
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Act prepared the entirety of American interstate commerce for regulation of working conditions to the
minutest detail. Nor can any but the most fictional sense of voluntary consent to later searches be found in
the single fact that one conducts a business affecting interstate commerce. Under current practice and
law, few businesses can be conducted without having some effect on interstate commerce.
* * *
The critical fact in this case is that entry over Mr. Barlow’s objection is being sought by a Government
agent. Employees are not being prohibited from reporting OSHA violations. What they observe in their
daily functions is undoubtedly beyond the employer’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The Government
inspector, however, is not an employee. Without a warrant he stands in no better position than a member
of the public. What is observable by the public is observable, without a warrant, by the Government
inspector as well. The owner of a business has not, by the necessary utilization of employees in his
operation, thrown open the areas where employees alone are permitted to the warrantless scrutiny of
Government agents. That an employee is free to report, and the Government is free to use, any evidence of
noncompliance with OSHA that the employee observes furnishes no justification for federal agents to
enter a place of business from which the public is restricted and to conduct their own warrantless search.
* * *
[The District Court judgment is affirmed.]
C A S E Q U E S T I O N S
1. State, as briefly and clearly as possible, the argument that Barlow’s is making
in this case.
2. Why would some industries or businesses be “closely regulated”? What are
some of those businesses?
3. The Fourth Amendment speaks of “people” being secure in their “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” Why would the Fourth Amendment apply to a
business, which is not in a “house”?
4. If the Fourth Amendment does not distinguish between closely regulated
industries and those that are not, why does the court do so?
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American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan
452 U.S. 490 (1981)
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) “to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.…“The Act authorizes the
Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide
standards governing health and safety in the workplace. In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), promulgated a standard limiting occupational
exposure to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton
products, exposure to which produces a “constellation of respiratory effects” known as “byssinosis.” This
disease was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the Act.
Petitioners in these consolidated cases representing the interests of the cotton industry, challenged the
validity of the “Cotton Dust Standard” in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
pursuant to § 6 (f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (f). They contend in this Court, as they did below, that the
Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs
and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the Secretary of Labor and two labor
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organizations, counter that Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, and that the Act
should therefore be construed not to require OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating that
OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health
impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility.
The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits.
We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 817 (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but
not decided in last Term’sIndustrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980),
and to decide other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard.
* * *
Not until the early 1960’s was byssinosis recognized in the United States as a distinct occupational hazard
associated with cotton mills. In 1966, the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH), a private organization, recommended that exposure to total cotton dust be limited to a
“threshold limit value” of 1,000 micrograms per cubic meter of air (1,000 g/m3.) averaged over an 8-hour
workday. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27351, col. 1 (1978). The United States Government first regulated exposure to
cotton dust in 1968, when the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. 35 (e),
promulgated airborne contaminant threshold limit values, applicable to public contractors, that included
the 1,000 g/m3 limit for total cotton dust. 34 Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969). Following passage of the Act in 1970,
the 1,000 g/m3. standard was adopted as an “established Federal standard” under 6 (a) of the Act, 84 Stat.
1593, 29 U.S.C. 655 (a), a provision designed to guarantee immediate protection of workers for the period
between enactment of the statute and promulgation of permanent standards.
That same year, the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
pursuant to the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 669(a)(3), 671 (d)(2), submitted to the Secretary of Labor a
recommendation for a cotton dust standard with a permissible exposure limit (PEL) that “should be set at
the lowest level feasible, but in no case at an environmental concentration as high as 0.2 mg lint-free
cotton dust/cu m,” or 200 g/m3. of lint-free respirable dust. Several months later, OSHA published an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 Fed.Reg. 44769 (1974), requesting comments from
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interested parties on the NIOSH recommendation and other related matters. Soon thereafter, the Textile
Worker’s Union of America, joined by the North Carolina Public Interest Research Group, petitioned the
Secretary, urging a more stringent PEL of 100 g/m3.
On December 28, 1976, OSHA published a proposal to replace the existing federal standard on cotton dust
with a new permanent standard, pursuant to § 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). 41 Fed.Reg.
56498. The proposed standard contained a PEL of 200 g/m3of vertical elutriated lint-free respirable
cotton dust for all segments of the cotton industry. Ibid. It also suggested an implementation strategy for
achieving the PEL that relied on respirators for the short term and engineering controls for the long-term.
OSHA invited interested parties to submit written comments within a 90-day period.
* * *
The starting point of our analysis is the language of the statute itself. Section 6(b)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b)(5) (emphasis added), provides:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under
this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard
for the period of his working life. Although their interpretations differ, all parties agree that the phrase “to
the extent feasible” contains the critical language in § 6(b)(5) for purposes of these cases.
The plain meaning of the word “feasible” supports respondents’ interpretation of the statute. According to
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 831 (1976), “feasible” means
“capable of being done, executed, or effected.” In accord, the Oxford English Dictionary 116 (1933)
(“Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out”); Funk & Wagnalls New “Standard” Dictionary of
the English Language 903 (1957) (“That may be done, performed or effected”). Thus, § 6(b)(5) directs the
Secretary to issue the standard that “most adequately assures…that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health,” limited only by the extent to which this is “capable of being done.” In effect then,
as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by
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placing the “benefit” of worker health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this
“benefit” unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that
strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth
in § 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis
is.
When Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such
intent on the face of the statute. One early example is the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701:
[T]he Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their
tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever
they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people
are otherwise adversely affected. (emphasis added)
A more recent example is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, providing that
offshore drilling operations shall use the best available and safest technologies which the Secretary
determines to be economically feasible, wherever failure of equipment would have a significant effect on
safety, health, or the environment, except where the Secretary determines that the incremental benefits
are clearly insufficient to justify the incremental costs of using such technologies.
These and other statutes demonstrate that Congress uses specific language when intending that an agency
engage in cost-benefit analysis. Certainly in light of its ordinary meaning, the word “feasible” cannot be
construed to articulate such congressional intent. We therefore reject the argument that Congress
required cost-benefit analysis in § 6(b)(5).
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C A S E Q U E S T I O N S
1. What is byssinosis? Why should byssinosis be anything that the textile
companies are responsible for, ethically or legally? If it is well-known that
textile workers get cotton dust in their systems and develop brown lung, don’t
they nevertheless choose to work there and assume the risk of all injuries?
2. By imposing costs on the textile industry, what will be the net effect on US
textile manufacturing jobs?
3. How is byssinosis a “negative externality” that is not paid for by either the
manufacturer or the consumer of textile products? How should the market, to
be fair and efficient, adjust for these negative externalities other than by
setting a reasonable standard that shares the burden between manufacturers
and their employees? Should all the burden be on the manufacturer?
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5.7 Summary and Exercises
Summary Administrative rules and regulations constitute the largest body of laws that directly affect business.
These regulations are issued by dozens of federal and state agencies that regulate virtually every aspect of
modern business life, including the natural environment, corporate finance, transportation,
telecommunications, energy, labor relations, and trade practices. The administrative agencies derive their
power to promulgate regulations from statutes passed by Congress or state legislatures.
The agencies have a variety of powers. They can license companies to carry on certain activities or prohibit
them from doing so, lay down codes of conduct, set rates that companies may charge for their services,
and supervise various aspects of business.
E X E R C I S E S
1. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission seeks data about the racial
composition of Terrific Textiles’ labor force. Terrific refuses on the grounds that
inadvertent disclosure of the numbers might cause certain “elements” to picket its
factories. The EEOC takes Terrific to court to get the data. What is the result?
2. In order to police the profession, the state legislature has just passed a law
permitting the State Plumbers’ Association the power to hold hearings to determine
whether a particular plumber has violated the plumbing code of ethics, written by
the association. Sam, a plumber, objects to the convening of a hearing when he is
accused by Roger, a fellow plumber, of acting unethically by soliciting business from
Roger’s customers. Sam goes to court, seeking to enjoin the association’s
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disciplinary committee from holding the hearing. What is the result? How would you
argue Sam’s case? The association’s case?
3. Assume that the new president of the United States was elected overwhelmingly by
pledging in his campaign to “do away with bureaucrats who interfere in your lives.”
The day he takes the oath of office he determines to carry out his pledge. Discuss
which of the following courses he may lawfully follow: (a) Fire all incumbent
commissioners of federal agencies in order to install new appointees. (b) Demand
that all pending regulations being considered by federal agencies be submitted to
the White House for review and redrafting, if necessary. (c) Interview potential
nominees for agency positions to determine whether their regulatory philosophy is
consistent with his.
4. Dewey owned a mine in Wisconsin. He refused to allow Department of Labor agents
into the mine to conduct warrantless searches to determine whether previously
found safety violations had been corrected. The Federal Mine Safety and Health
Amendments Act of 1977 authorizes four warrantless inspections per year. Is the
provision for warrantless inspections by this agency constitutional? [1]
5. In determining the licensing requirements for nuclear reactors, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted a zero-release assumption: that the
permanent storage of certain nuclear waste would have no significant
environmental impact and that potential storage leakages should not be a factor
discussed in the appropriate environmental impact statement (EIS) required before
permitting construction of a nuclear power plant. This assumption is based on the
NRC’s belief that technology would be developed to isolate the wastes from the
environment, and it was clear from the record that the NRC had “digested a massive
material and disclosed all substantial risks” and had considered that the zero-release
assumption was uncertain. There was a remote possibility of contamination by
water leakage into the storage facility. An environmental NGO sued, asserting that
the NRC had violated the regulations governing the EIS by arbitrarily and capriciously
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ignoring the potential contamination. The court of appeals agreed, and the power
plant appealed. Had the NRC acted arbitrarily and capriciously? [2]
S E L F - T E S T Q U E S T I O N S
1. Most federal administrative agencies are created by
a. an executive order by the president
b. a Supreme Court decision
c. the passage of enabling legislation by Congress, signed by the president
d. a and c
The Federal Trade Commission, like most administrative agencies of the federal
government, is part of
a. the executive branch of government
b. the legislative branch of government
c. the judicial branch of government
d. the administrative branch of government
In the Clean Water Act, Congress sets broad guidelines, but it is the
Environmental Protection Agency that proposes rules to regulate industrial
discharges. Where do proposed rules originally appear?
a. in the Congressional record
b. in the Federal Register
c. in the Code of Federal Regulations
d. in the United States code service
The legal basis for all administrative law, including regulations of the Federal
Trade Commission, is found in
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a. the Administrative Procedure Act
b. the US Constitution
c. the commerce clause
d. none of the above
The Federal Trade Commission, like other administrative agencies, has the
power to
a. issue proposed rules
b. undertake investigations of firms that may have violated FTC regulations
c. prosecute firms that have violated FTC regulations
d. none of the above
e. all of the above
S E L F - T E S T A N S W E R S
1. c
2. a
3. b
4. b
5. e
[1] Donovan v. Dewey, 452 US 594 (1981).
[2] Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 462 US 87 (1983).
