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Abstract The sharing of homeland security information is a crucial aspect of modern policing in the United States. This article outlines

some of the obstacles to information sharing at the state and local levels, including interagency and intra-agency issues that

arise for police agencies. It explores the complexities of information sharing across a highly decentralized policing system.

Many police departments lack a formal intelligence function that limits their ability to share information. This article o�ers an

organizational change model using John Kotter’s Leading Change principles that police agencies of any size can follow. It

outlines Kotter’s eight-stage process from establishing a sense of urgency through anchoring new approaches in the culture

to create a framework for police departments to integrate homeland security information sharing. Its intent is to provide a

Journal indexing and metrics

Criminal Justice Policy Review

Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing in American Policing: Using Kotter’s Leading Change Model

David E. Lambert  View all authors and a�liations

 Available access Research article First published online July 18, 2018

Volume 30, Issue 8 https://doi-org.ezproxy2.apus.edu/10.1177/0887403418786555

framework for police agencies to incrementally implement some of the recommendations of the various strategic documents

that guide information sharing.

Introduction After the 9/11 attacks, it became a rallying cry that police and intelligence agencies would work together to connect the dots

to prevent and interdict future terrorist acts (Business Executives for National Security [BENS], 2016; Gilmore, 2003; Kruger &

Haggerty, 2006; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, 2005). There is an expectation among many that the �eld of American

policing is fully engaged in homeland security and counterterrorism including information sharing and intelligence gathering

(BENS, 2016; D. Carter, 2004; Cillu�o, Clark, & Downing, 2011; Henry, 2002; Holden, 2003; O�ce of Justice Programs, 2004;

Randol, 2013; White, 2004). Although there is a serious need to utilize all our law enforcement resources to detect and

prevent future terrorist attacks, it is far less certain whether state and local agencies are invested in this counterterrorism

activity in a signi�cant way (Jenkins, Liepman, & Willis, 2014; Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007; Randol, 2013). To e�ectively

connect the dots, �eld-based information sharing entities at all levels need to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate

intelligence to federal, state, and local police departments, a mission that is not a component of traditional policing. The

challenge to information sharing in American policing is considerable.

Statement of the Problem There has been substantial criticism of the current state of homeland security information sharing (D. Carter, 2004; Chermak,

Carter, Carter, McGarrell, & Drew, 2013; Government Acountability O�ce (GAO), 2013; O�ces of the Inspectors General,

2017; Taylor & Russell, 2012); yet, most of these examinations have analyzed issues from a national perspective. Few have

analyzed the challenges of information sharing and intelligence collection from the ground level, state and local policing

(Carter, 2016; J. G. Carter, Phillips, & Gayadeen, 2014; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015). Much has been written regarding fusion

centers as information and intelligence sharing hubs (J. G. Carter, Carter, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2017; J. G. Carter,

Lewandowski, & May, 2016; Lewandowski, Carter, & Campbell, 2017a; Lewandowski, Carter, & Campbell, 2017b; Taylor &

Russell, 2012). This article speci�cally examines barriers at the state and local police agency unit of analysis.

This article focuses on law enforcement and homeland security information, which are demarcated somewhat di�erently.

Law enforcement information is de�ned in the Information Sharing Environment Guidelines (O�ce of the Director of National

Intelligence [ODNI], 2006) as any information obtained by or of interest to a law enforcement agency or o�cial that is both

• related to terrorism or the security of our homeland and

• relevant to a law enforcement mission, including but not limited to

◦ information pertaining to an actual or potential criminal, civil, or administrative investigation or a foreign intelligence,

counterintelligence, or counterterrorism investigation;

◦ assessment of, or response to, criminal threats and vulnerabilities;

◦ the existence, organization, capabilities, plans, intention, vulnerabilities, means, method, or activities of individuals or

groups involved or suspected of involvement in criminal or unlawful conduct or assisting or associated with criminal or

unlawful conduct;

◦ the existence, identi�cation, detection, prevention, interdiction, or disruption of, or response to criminal acts and

violations of the law;

◦ identi�cation, apprehension, prosecution, release, detention, adjudication, supervision, or rehabilitation of accused

persons or criminal o�enders; and

◦ victim/witness assistance.

Homeland security information is speci�cally de�ned in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. s482 [f] (1)) as any

information possessed by a state, local, tribal, or federal agency that

• relates to a threat of terrorist activity;

• relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity;

• would improve the identi�cation or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or

• would improve the response to a terrorist act.

Intelligence and information sharing is di�cult and complex because it involves the coordination of multiple agencies and

disciplines in the homeland security �eld. Information sharing success will require �eld-based information sharing entities

such as intelligence or fusion centers to overcome a number of hurdles present in the criminal justice environment. This

article will discuss the barriers to information sharing at the state and local law enforcement levels as well as some best

practices that can lead to successful information sharing. Although much of this discussion has taken place regarding

information sharing and fusion centers as the information brokers, this work will focus on state and local police agencies, the

actual information collectors. Ground-level organizations are vital to successful homeland security intelligence analysis and

threat assessment.

National Law Enforcement Environment

Many of the impediments associated with e�ective information sharing in homeland security result from the current

structure of the American criminal justice system. American policing alone is a decentralized system of about 18,000 loosely

connected police agencies with more than 750,000 police o�cers (Banks, Hendrix, Hickman, & Kycklehahn, 2016; J. G. Carter

et al., 2014; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Cillu�o et al., 2011). It presents a number of challenges when attempting to harness

the resources of these agencies for homeland security purposes (Chermak et al., 2013; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Osborne,

2006; Taylor & Russell, 2012).

Each of these law enforcement entities has a traditional mission that includes reducing crime and disorder, responding to

calls for service, and solving a variety of problems in their jurisdictions that are not addressed by other government

organizations. The relatively new concept of homeland security and the activities that it entails, speci�cally information and

intelligence sharing, have not been a routine part of the police mission. J. G. Carter and Phillips (2015) point out that new

policing philosophies are di�cult to di�use in a decentralized justice system.

To overcome this fragmented law enforcement system, there was a need for a unifying vision and strategy to encourage

police organizations to expand their mission to incorporate homeland security functions such as intelligence collection and

information sharing (Randol, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP)

was created in the wake of 9/11 to establish such a strategic vision (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003). It was designed to

provide a blueprint for police agencies of all sizes to develop an intelligence and information sharing capacity, with requisite

policy guidance, sta�ng, training, and technology to support this e�ort. It was broad enough to include not only terrorism-

related intelligence but also criminal intelligence that aligns with the core mission of police agencies everywhere. The NCISP

was designed to balance the need to collect and share intelligence while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of its

citizens. The NCISP is a guide for implementation of intelligence-led policing at the state and local levels (J. G. Carter et al.,

2014).

Follow-up strategic documents such as the Fusion Center Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice, 2005), the Baseline Capabilities

for State and Urban Area Fusion Centers (U.S. Department of Justice, 2008), the 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing

(Executive O�ce of the President, 2007), and the 2012 National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (Executive

O�ce of the President, 2012) reinforced the framework for information sharing across the law enforcement spectrum. The

evolution of intelligence fusion centers and other preexisting �eld-based information sharing entities such as the Regional

Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and the High Intensity Drug Tra�cking Area (HIDTA) program has bolstered the

foundation for information sharing across law enforcement. In addition, the creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) and it’s O�ce of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) expanded the homeland security intelligence capacity. One of

its initiatives was the development of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) to enhance information sharing

across public safety disciplines. HSIN along with other collaborative information systems such as the Regional Information

Sharing Systems network (RISSNET) and the Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP) have provided law enforcement with

the technological capacity to share homeland security information across agencies. Despite these e�orts, this strategic vision

of the collection, analysis, and sharing of homeland security information and intelligence is still a work in progress in police

agencies.

There are a number of barriers to homeland security information sharing within policing. Sharing information across these

organizations requires collaborative leadership and coordination in an environment known for its decentralized nature

(Crowther, 2014; Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, 2005). Information

sharing within the policing environment has been an abstract term, open to various interpretations. Crowther (2014) de�nes

information sharing as

By highlighting the need to partner, collaborate, and fuse information, Crowther has pointed to some of the di�culties that

confront police departments that operate autonomously. Some of these barriers relate to police leadership and

organizational culture that will be discussed below.

Information Sharing Leadership Uncertainty

The information sharing challenge requires innovative leadership at all levels with a shared vision for the future (Darroch &

Mazerolle, 2013; Lewandowski et al., 2017; O�ces of the Inspectors General, 2017; Ratcli�e, 2008). Unlike the United

Kingdom or Canada, there is not a national intelligence strategy for the whole of law enforcement (J. G. Carter & Phillips,

2015; Walsh, 2015). The two versions of the NCISP, the National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, the

Fusion Center Core Operational Capabilities, and the DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) (U.S. DHS, 2007) are prescriptive, rather

than mandatory, for information sharing entities and police agencies.

Because many of these strategic documents are developed from a federal perspective, they do not always �lter down to a

critical mass of state and local police agencies. Survey research by J. G. Carter, Carter, and Chermak (2013) found that 34% of

The common stewardship of information through the acts of partnering, dissemination, and fusion, with the

objectives of shared understanding, consistent decision-making, and coordinated action to achieve collaborative

goals. (p. 136)

police agencies and 28% of fusion centers surveyed were unfamiliar with the NCISP and a smaller percentage, 29% of

agencies and 16% of fusion centers, were less versed about the philosophy of intelligence-led policing. Even if these

documents were widely read by the law enforcement community, federal entities have little leverage to incentivize police

departments to adopt the voluminous set of objectives set in these strategies.

Complicating this landscape are multiple, often competing information sharing leadership organizations. Prior to 9/11, there

existed an array of �eld-based information sharing entities that provided federal, state, and local law enforcement with

shared intelligence capacities (Taylor & Russell, 2012). The RISS, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice and the HIDTA

program funded by the O�ce of National Drug Control and Prevention, support the sharing of criminal- as well as terrorism-

related information. In other cases, large police departments had their own intelligence units of varying size and complexity.

Other federal agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives (ATF) have speci�c intelligence centers for drug and �rearms intelligence. Special issue intelligence centers are

sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice in the case of the National Gang Center and the FBI’s National Gang Intelligence

Center (Bureau of Justice Assistance [BJA], 2016). These entities were developed along speci�c mission areas such as street

crime, drug enforcement, or �rearms crime. These various e�orts created information stovepipes.

As a step toward developing a more coordinated information sharing e�ort, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council

(CICC) was formed (O�ce of Justice Programs & U.S. Department of Justice, 2016). The CICC is a working group under the U.S.

Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) that was established to represent all law

enforcement organizations in the development of a more intelligence-led strategy (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). It

serves as an advisory body to the U.S. Attorney General and has had a strong voice in addressing concerns of police

executives at all levels of government particularly with developing information sharing policy that a�ects state and local

policing.

As mentioned, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks led to the creation of the U.S. DHS and its O�ce of I&A to support

intelligence and information sharing capability and operations across policing and public safety. DHS I&A has become a

major champion of building the fusion center network through policy development, sta�ng, technical assistance, technology,

and resource funding. The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) advises the DHS secretary and includes leaders from

state and local government as well as the private sector.

In addition, professional associations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Major Cities Chiefs

Association (MCCA), the National Sheri�s Association (NSA), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) have played a

role in developing a strategic response to information and intelligence sharing (MCCA, 2010), which a�ects e�orts at the state

and local levels.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) outline how institutional pressure from outside entities in�uence organizations such as the

police department as they adopt new philosophies, programs, and practices. Environmental in�uences from professional

associations such as the IACP or PERF, federal and state agencies like the U.S. DHS and the FBI, and peer agencies such as

nearby police departments and fusion centers exert pressure on police organizations to adopt new practices such as

community policing or intelligence-led policing.

DiMaggio and Powell (1983) labeled these institutional pressures as isomorphism or the “constraining process that forces

one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set if environmental conditions” (p. 49). They argue that

three processes can result in isomorphism, coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures. Coercive isomorphism involves the

adoption of new policies or practices as a result of legal, regulatory, or funding mandates. For instance, fusion centers were

required to develop privacy policies among other mandates as a grant-funding requirement. Mimetic isomorphism occurs

when organizations adopt practices that mirror similar ones in other agencies. Many police agencies and fusion centers hired

analysts, purchased analytical software, and produced intelligence products as they built intelligence and information

sharing capacities after 9/11 (J. G. Carter et al., 2014). Through site visits and the implementation of the Law Enforcement

Intelligence Unit (2002) standards, police departments and fusion centers replicated organizational structures, policies, and

business practices used in other agencies. Third, normative isomorphism entails adopting best practices and specialized

knowledge through the interaction of organizational actors at conferences, joint training sessions, and by following

guidelines such as the NCISP.

Furthermore, as a result of the 9/11 Commission report (Kean & Hamilton, 2004), federal e�orts through the evolution of the

FBI’s intelligence capabilities along with the creation of the DHS and later the Project Manager–Information Sharing

Environment (PM-ISE) and ODNI have enhanced information sharing. Another coordinating entity, the Information Sharing

Council (ISC) advises the President and the PM-ISE regarding the development of standards, policies, and procedures to

implement information sharing.

The problem is that these numerous stakeholders have not spoken with a common vision or voice to state and local policing.

Entities such as the Department of Justice, DHS, FBI, PM-ISE, and the National Fusion Center Association among others have

similar but distinct agendas when interacting with state and local policing. The PM-ISE was granted authority by Congress to

plan, oversee, and manage the Information Sharing Environment, which would include all federal, state, and local law

enforcement agencies, but it has no authority to mitigate siloed information sharing projects from speci�c agencies. For

example, the FBI and DHS are involved with critical infrastructure information sharing through InfraGard and the DHS O�ce

of Infrastructure Protection, respectively, but these e�orts are not necessarily aligned, causing police agencies to collaborate

with these parallel e�orts.

This is further evidenced by the lack of an actual common law enforcement network for homeland security. Instead, HSIN,

RISSNET, IP Gateway, eGuardian, and LEEP have sprouted up separately, leaving local policing to decide which networks to

utilize for homeland security missions. Although these federal entities have made great organizational progress in

determining the path to coordinating information sharing e�orts, there remains a signi�cant disconnect between the

national intelligence infrastructure and local, state, and tribal policing (BENS, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2014; Randol, 2013).

Multiple information sharing systems confuse, not clarify, the information sharing process.

State and Local Barriers

Related to that lack of strategic information sharing clarity at the national level are associated state and local issues. State

and local police lack a clear information sharing mission (Randol, 2013). Randol summarized this challenge noted by other

authors stating that American police departments have

. . . been resistant to sharing information, many local police agencies lack the intelligence capacity necessary to

prevent terrorism, and intelligence surveillance activities pose a potential threat to civil liberties, which makes some

It has been a di�cult task to expand the role of local and state police agencies to include homeland security functions

including information sharing. D. Carter and Carter (2009) explain that information gathering and sharing involves the

reengineering of an agency intelligence function or, in many cases, the development of a new intelligence function. The wider

philosophical shift to an intelligence-led policing (ILP) is, consequentially, a major departure from traditional reactive policing.

It is far from clear whether the majority of police agencies have integrated homeland security activities into their mission.

Although empirical evidence of homeland security mission adoption in policing is sparse (Carter, 2016), the 2007 Law

Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (U.S. Department of Justice, O�ce of Justice

Programs, & Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011) found that 94.5% of police departments reported not having a nonsworn sta�

and 75.4% not having a sworn o�cer with primary duties related to terrorism intelligence.

There was one question on the 2013 LEMAS survey (U.S. Department of Justice, OJP, & BJS, 2015) of police departments

across the country that provides a hint of the integration of homeland security into traditional police roles. The LEMAS survey

question was, “How did your agency address the following issues, problems or tasks—terrorism/homeland security?” The

results of this query were that 62.7% of responding departments indicated that they either had no dedicated personnel or

have not formally addressed this issue. Police departments have not incorporated some of the necessary tasks such as

suspicious activity reporting (SAR), critical infrastructure protection, threat assessment, and intelligence functions in general

as recommended by the NCISP guidelines.

Turning speci�cally to information sharing activities, departments are often reluctant to support robust intelligence functions

for the reasons listed above, as well as an awareness of past abuses committed by police intelligence units in the past (D.

Carter & Carter, 2009). For instance, Thacher (2005) discusses the Dearborn, Michigan Police Department’s e�orts to assist

the U.S. Department of Justice following 9/11 with mass interviewing recently immigrated Middle Eastern males in their

community. In addition, the Denver Police Department was the subject of a lawsuit in 2003 as a result of their intelligence

collection activities targeting peace protesters (American Civil Liberties Union, 2003). These cases typically occur when police

agencies fail to have procedures and standards in place to monitor intelligence activities.

law enforcement o�cials reluctant to undergo surveillance e�orts (D. Carter & Carter, 2009; Shernock, 2009;

Thacher, 2005). (p. 162)

The NCISP Version 2.0 (NCISP2; 2013) proposes that all law enforcement agencies have an intelligence function or access to

resources through some type of �eld-based information sharing entity. Although there is evidence that police agencies are

making progress in building intelligence capacity, the majority of departments do not have a structured intelligence or crime

analysis function (Carter, 2016; Chermak et al., 2013; Osborne, 2006). This puts police organizations behind the curve in a

data-driven criminal and homeland security environment. Many police agencies have been unable to identify emerging

trends such as the opioid epidemic or increases in gang-related violence due to the lack of an intelligence or crime analysis

capacity.

It should be noted that the NCISP is built as a scalable strategy that can be adapted to any police agency size (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2003). In larger agencies, there may be a highly structured intelligence unit or real-time crime center.

These agencies may have adopted ILP as a department-wide philosophy. In other agencies, a formalized ILP strategy or

analytical unit is not feasible, yet can still contribute to the law enforcement information sharing mission. The NCISP

promotes the concept of information sharing in smaller agencies where their role might be to simply collect and submit

information to a �eld-based information sharing entity. Information sharing capabilities should conform to the unique

circumstances of police agencies.

Chermak and his associates surveyed police agency and fusion center sta� in 2007 and 2008, �nding that only 13.3% had the

capacity to identify threats and 9.3% believed they had su�cient intelligence capacity in general. Therefore, despite the

signi�cant e�orts of the national leadership groups mentioned above, the authors concluded that more work needs to be

done to ful�ll the vision of a comprehensive information sharing capacity across state and local law enforcement. Homeland

security threats as well as emerging crime problems such as cybercrime will only accentuate the need for a more

intelligence-driven crime prevention system. The following section discusses the organizational and cultural obstacles to

information sharing across state and local law enforcement.

Traditional Policing Versus the Homeland Security Mission

Police executives develop their law enforcement priorities in conjunction with their communities’ needs and desires (Darroch

& Mazerolle, 2015). Despite the continuance of homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States, crime and disorder issues

still are high concerns for citizens, state and local policy makers, and most police departments (Cillu�o et al., 2011). Police

chiefs confront frequent property crime, various levels of violent crime, tra�c issues, drug abuse, and a host of disorder

issues. Allocating resources to counterterrorism functions such as intelligence and information sharing often will a�ect

traditional patrol and investigative functions given current resource limitations (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008).

At the line level, police o�cers, the actual information collectors, need to be convinced of the e�cacy of information sharing,

which includes the acceptance of homeland security as an agency priority (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). The lack of buy-in has

limited the ability of fusion centers, for example, from receiving information from external agencies as well as internal units

in agencies that sponsor these information sharing entities (Lewandowski et al., 2017a). There needs to be clear direction

and incentives for police departments to expand their mission. Agencies can embrace information sharing in the areas such

as SAR if they receive adequate training to identify preoperational terrorism planning as outlined in the federal guideline, TCL

(U.S. DHS, 2007). J. G. Carter et al. (2014) found that organizations that adopted the recommendations of the NCISP were

more likely to integrate intelligence into decision making, reward information sharing, and create intelligence products. They

illustrate the adoption of intelligence-led policing through a series of actions consistent with NCISP.

Fully engaged police agencies should gather homeland security information during routine day-to-day activities. They should

inventory and regularly communicate with critical infrastructure and other potentially high-risk locations and key assets. Yet,

police practitioners often lack expertise in conducting threat or vulnerability assessments. O�cers also should be cognizant

of privacy guidelines such as Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies (Institute for Intergovernmental Research,

2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013) commonly called 28 Code of Federal Regulations Part 23 (28 CFR Part 23) and

technology systems available to collect and analyze intelligence. There is some evidence that police departments are

implementing intelligence-led policing and are incorporating privacy guidelines in their organizations (Carter, 2016). Fusion

centers were mandated to develop privacy policies as part of their funding requirements.

Organizational Culture Barriers and Information Sharing

Beyond the strategic issues discussed above, police organizational culture presents other information sharing challenges

(Chermak et al., 2013; Desai, 2005; Joyal, 2012; Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcli�e, 2007; Sanders & Henderson, 2013;

Sheptycki, 2004; Walker & Katz, 2001; Walsh, 2015). Traditional, functionally structured police departments often create

information silos where information in one division or unit is not shared with another division or unit (Ratcli�e, 2007;

Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). For example, gang units often gather information and intelligence that is not accessible to

narcotics units. In some cases, investigative units have not shared information with fusion centers within their own

organization.

Sheptycki (2004) labels institutional friction, where various commands within a police agency withhold information from

other units, as a factor in stunting two-way communication. In some agencies, internal rivalries exist where detectives still do

not share information with patrol o�cers. Sanders and Henderson (2013) explain that some agencies in Canada view their

organization as an empire where working collaboratively to share information is both an issue horizontally and vertically.

Part of this reluctance to share information traces back to o�cers’ hesitance to share any information they have gleaned for

their own investigations. Information hoarding is often the result of organizational cultures that value keeping information

within small circles (Kelley, 2003; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Osborne, 2006; Ratcli�e, 2007; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008;

Sheptycki, 2004). In other circumstances, there are cultural barriers between investigators and intelligence analysts who are

relatively new to police subcultures, as witnessed by the author working in a fusion center. Other agencies have realigned

analysts to work directly with investigators and managers to resolve this hurdle (Ratcli�e, 2007; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008).

Lewandowski et al. (2017a), using interviews of fusion center sta�, explain the cultural disconnect between civilian analysts

and sworn o�cers. Ratcli�e (2008) expands on this point by arguing that civilian analysts are considered to have lower status

than sworn o�cers do in a police department, therefore justifying restricted access to speci�c types of information and

intelligence. This civilian/sworn divide intensi�es the silos of information that exist within and across police agencies.

Police o�cers often share information informally with their peers in other agencies, and in some cases regional task forces

assist in the sharing of cross-jurisdictional information but these are the exceptions. In other circumstances, criminal

information is not shared among neighboring agencies or among local, state, and federal agencies (Joyal, 2012; Lewandowski

et al., 2017b; Randol, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004). O�cers are reluctant to cede control to other agencies for the same reasons

noted above as well as believing that other agencies are less competent or lack a need to know (Taylor & Russell, 2012; U.S.

Senate, 2013). A smaller survey (Cillu�o et al., 2011) found that police agencies did share information, but were more inclined

to share locally, than regionally and federally.

Information sharing across police agencies and, more problematically, across homeland security organizations and the

private sector is a re�ection of di�ering organizational cultures. Interagency collaboration is also not institutionalized across

policing (J. G. Carter, 2015; Joyal, 2012; Kelley, 2003; Kruger & Haggerty, 2006; Randol, 2013; Sanders & Henderson, 2013;

Sheptycki, 2004; Taylor & Russell, 2012; Walker & Katz, 2001). Chermak and their colleagues (2013) found that most agencies

responded on their survey that they were not satis�ed with their current relationship with federal. state, other local law

enforcement, fusion centers, and the private sector. However, J. G. Carter and his colleagues (2014) learned that police

agencies that adopted the principles of the NCISP were 3 times more likely to have information sharing relationships with

other departments and 4 times more likely to provide intelligence to them. Building better collaboration is a key element for

homeland security information sharing.

The presence of complex information and intelligence sharing guidelines in and of itself creates another barrier to

information sharing. For example, under the Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies standard 28 CFR Part 23, only

information on persons and organizations that rise to the level of reasonable suspicion of a de�nable criminal activity or

enterprise can be entered into a criminal intelligence system (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2017). It requires that

this information meet both source reliability and content validity criteria to be entered in a system and, therefore, eligible for

sharing. Sharing that information with other internal or external entities further requires that this information is relatively

current and that an audit trail is established to ascertain dissemination. Other privacy and civil liberties guidelines exist for

terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement information promulgated under the PM-ISE that limit information

sharing that includes Personally Identi�able Information (PII) or data on U.S. persons (Information Sharing Environment,

2015). Police agencies that want to participate in the Information Sharing Environment that includes members of the

intelligence community arguably will have to comply with privacy and civil liberties guidelines that protect individuals from

invasions of privacy or constitutional protections such as free speech. There are a number of criteria that must be met to

submit or receive terrorism or homeland security information, making it highly unlikely that most police organizations can

put in place these safeguards. These guidelines are appropriate but do complicate the process of information sharing.

J. G. Carter et al. (2014), however, surveyed organizations, and found that larger agencies reported greater working

relationships with other departments as well as provided more intelligence to external agencies. This may re�ect the more

evolved intelligence capacities of larger agencies in the policing system.

Information Sharing Implementation Complications

The implementation of an information sharing and intelligence function within police organizations is an area where most

agencies have little experience. The collection of criminal intelligence is not a new idea in policing; it has been used for

organized crime, gang, and drug investigations for decades. Despite that, many agencies have no formal intelligence function

to handle routine criminal information, not to mention terrorist-related intelligence (Osborne, 2006; Randol, 2013). The

LEMAS 2007 survey (U.S. Department of Justice, OJP, & BJS, 2011) found that reporting departments employed an average of

1 sworn and 0.5 nonsworn sta� for intelligence analysis. Smaller agencies can use regional fusion or intelligence centers but

larger agencies would have the need for their own analytical sta�.

Intelligence is an underutilized function in policing due to a number of factors. First, there is a perceived lack of utility to

everyday police work (Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Walsh, 2015). Collecting information and intelligence that bene�ts

homeland security is not a normal part of maintaining order or conducting police investigations. Second, police departments

have a less de�ned role in the collection of homeland security intelligence (Holden, 2003; White, 2004). The lack of an

accepted national strategy to plan, collect, analyze, and distribute information and intelligence from local and state �rst

responders to federal agencies and the jurisdictional issues mentioned previously creates uncertainty for police agencies. For

instance, in the Chermak et al. (2013) survey, only between 3.5% and 15.4% of state, local, and tribal police sta� reported that

their agencies were aligned with the NCISP and only 3.5% to 6.7% were aligned with the TCL as it referred to intelligence and

information sharing. J. G. Carter et al. (2014) report that “agencies mostly follow the NCISP, somewhat align their intelligence

capacity with the TCL” (p. 438).

Third, traditional police agencies are less analytically oriented and focus on more reactive, intuitive decision making, which

Cope (2004) describes as a lack of understanding how analytics can a�ect policy. A fourth factor is that standard information

sharing business processes and protocols have not been formalized at the state and local levels to submit this information to

a central intelligence analysis entity. For instance, the TCL (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007) recommends that

law enforcement and appropriate agencies have plans, processes, and technologies in place to receive reports about

suspicious activities from criminal or terrorist entities. Currently, the FBI, DHS, state fusion centers, and many local agencies

collect suspicious activity reports from citizens and police o�cers. Some police departments can report directly to eGuardian

or to the urban area or state fusion center. Terror-related SARs are passed to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) for

investigative follow-up, but it is di�cult to �nd evidence that police departments have written directives and training in place

to guide that information gathering process at the local level.

Although there has not been a substantial amount of empirical research examining information sharing and intelligence

implementation in police agencies, the literature cited above leads one to conclude that progress has been made by the �eld

in general but has not reached maturity yet (J. G. Carter, 2015; J. G. Carter et al., 2014; Chermak et al., 2013). The NCISP2 (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2013) and the TCL outline steps American law enforcement agencies can take to build their

information sharing and intelligence capacities, but the scope of organizational change can be overwhelming without a

roadmap to guide agencies.

One substantial limitation to the cited works of Chermak, Joyal, Carter, and Lewandowski has been the reliance on survey

and case study methods to assess information sharing capabilities with fusion center and other intelligence center sta�.

Some of this survey work was conducted at a DHS-sponsored intelligence training; therefore, these survey respondents may

be more proactively developing information sharing practices than the average police department. In addition, some of this

survey work was conducted approximately 10 years prior during the early stages of a broader ILP implementation e�ort and

may not re�ect current trends that show agencies trending more toward information sharing practices.

However, in more recent assessments, Lewandowski et al. (2017a) found that although strides were toward more

information sharing methods, they are not institutionalized and remain more dependent on personal relationships built

across agencies. Others (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015) conclude that the adoption of intelligence-led policing requires

signi�cant organizational capacity.

The next section highlights an organizational change process that can assist state, local, and tribal police departments to buy

into, build, and institutionalize a homeland security information sharing mission.

A Path Forward to Police Enterprise-Wide Information Sharing Police agencies across the United States have been tasked with participation in a counterterrorism and homeland security in

a post-9/11 environment (BENS, 2016; Chermak et al., 2013; Donnermeyer, 2002; Schafer, Burruss, & Giblin, 2009; U.S. DHS,

2007, 2013). These traditional agencies have to pivot to address homegrown terrorism in a fashion that is unfamiliar and

complex.

Police agencies are notoriously resistant to change as illustrated in attempts to adopt community policing, problem-oriented

policing, and more recently homeland security functions (Braga & Weisburd, 2007; Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Guyot, 1979;

Schaefer Morabito, 2010; Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1990; Zhao, Thurman, & Lovrich, 1995). As an example, Schaefer

Morabito (2010) outlines how community policing was adopted unevenly across the country. Although the rhetoric of

community policing was widespread during the period when federal funding was available, the implementation of core

principles such as partnerships, problem solving, and organizational change was often lacking. Many traditional policing

methods were simply rebranded as community policing activities. Similar rhetorical pronouncements have been made with

regard to information sharing.

Organization-wide change such as the integration of the homeland security mission into policing is more challenging than

past e�orts. The paradigm shifts listed above had a strong crime-�ghting element. Homeland security and counterterrorism

functions are much less crime driven and more preparedness and intelligence driven. People do not always end up in

handcu�s at the conclusion of information sharing e�orts. This organizational evolution will require a more sustained and

comprehensive change management focus by police leaders. In a related shift, Ratcli�e (2007, 2008) states that the

implementation of ILP as an organizational paradigm requires a change in how agencies make decisions, speci�cally using

intelligence to support strategic and tactical decisions. He proposes a comprehensive integrated intelligence model that

brings together traditional crime analysis and intelligence analysis resources within police departments. This represents a

substantial organizational and cultural shift in operating methods in policing that is beyond the scope of this article.

John Kotter (2012) in his book, Leading Change, has articulated some of the common problems inherent in achieving

organizational change. He proposed an eight-stage process for leading change in agencies such as American police

departments. Outlined below are the eight stages of sustained organizational transformation as they would apply to the

institutionalization of information sharing and intelligence analysis in police agencies across the country:

1. Establishing a sense of urgency,

2. Creating the guiding coalition,

3. Developing a vision and strategy,

4. Communicating the change vision,

5. Empowering broad-based action,

6. Generating short-term wins,

7. Consolidating gains and producing more change, and

8. Anchoring new approaches in the culture.

The next section will examine each of these steps as they pertain to police information sharing in a homeland security

context.

Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Kotter begins the discussion of leading change by stating that establishing a sense of urgency is necessary in gaining buy-in

across an organization and, in this case, across the policing landscape. The 9/11 attacks were a wake-up call to American

police executives that the world had changed. Great progress has been made to expand the reach of the intelligence

community. Large agencies such as the New York and Los Angeles police departments have established robust homeland

security divisions, but these departments may be the exception.

Having moved 16 years away from the 9/11 attacks, it can be argued that complacency regarding the homeland security

mission in general has set in throughout many parts of policing. It is a consequence of the absence of a major attack in their

jurisdictions, as well as a level of denial that “It can happen here” for many police departments that are already

overburdened and underresourced, similar circumstances that Kotter (2012) discusses in other organizations.

With the continuing threats of locally derived terrorist attacks in Boston, San Bernardino, Orlando, and Ohio State, as well as

international incidents in London, Paris, Brussels, and Barcelona, police leadership at all levels need to reemphasize that

there is a continued sense of urgency (Lewandowski et al., 2017a; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). There remain a wide variety of

potential soft targets such as shopping malls, information systems, government buildings, and sports and entertainment

venues within each jurisdiction. For police agencies to e�ectively address these continuing and dynamic homeland security

threats, organizational goals must shift.

The organizational hurdles that sti�e change are narrow functional goals and internal measurement systems (Kotter, 2012)

that do not capture information sharing accomplishments such as collecting suspicious activity reports and counterterrorism

awareness training. Emphasizing some of the tenets of the NCISP2 such as establishing an intelligence capacity, accessing the

HSIN and the RISS can incorporate police objectives to share information. Integrating information sharing metrics can

reiterate the urgency of homeland security missions.

Creating the Guiding Coalition

The next stage of leading change entails creating a guiding coalition of change agents across the law enforcement discipline

that has enough key players with high levels of credibility and leadership skills to drive permanent change. Although that is

di�cult in one police agency, it is exponentially more complex in a multilevel, decentralized policing system. The example of

community policing adoption illustrates that real organizational change can occur in traditionally focused departments. For

information sharing, in particular, to become woven into the police mission, national leaders need to integrate the views of

police executives, down through line o�cers and sta�. Police agencies operate as part of a large community and political

system and, therefore, other stakeholders such as elected o�cials, community leaders, and the private sector must be part

of that guiding coalition. These stakeholders have substantial in�uence on the mission of police agencies (Crank, 2003;

Ratcli�e, 2007) and the subsequent allocation of resources.

Although many police leaders may be aware of these information sharing challenges, there has not been enough emphasis

on achieving organizational buy-in from state and local o�cers in the �eld. With ILP, in general, and information sharing, in

particular, leaders have to maintain commitment to implementation goals (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; Lewandowski et al.,

2017b; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). In many jurisdictions, political and community leaders are unaware of homeland security

information sharing e�orts. The authors experience has been that many law enforcement homeland security e�orts are

created and implemented with little input from political o�cials or the community. Attempts to engage private sector entities

in these e�orts have largely been mixed (McNeill, 2010). Building advisory boards or private sector communities of interest

would improve the level of partnership needed to sustain information sharing endeavors.

The NCISP2, the CICC, and elements of the National Response Framework (U.S. DHS, 2013) lay out a direction to achieve

improved law enforcement information sharing. This vision must take hold at the ground level in state and local policing. One

of the core concepts of the NCISP2 is to develop partnerships with other police agencies, the private sector, public safety and

homeland security organizations, community groups, and privacy advocates. Partnering with existing �eld-based information

sharing entities such as RISS, HIDTA, fusion centers, and crime analysis centers will change the police culture to one that

fosters information sharing (MCCA, 2010). Greater participation from police organizations across the country will contribute

to a collaboration and information sharing mind-set among law enforcement.

More regionally focused state and local information sharing coalitions are closer to the problem and will be able to translate

national strategies into realistic change outcomes. Lewandowski et al. (2017b) report that intelligence recipients are most

interested in products that address local law enforcement concerns. Coalitions that incorporate fusion centers, regional

HIDTA and RISS sites, police agencies, as well as regional FBI, DHS, and other federal law enforcement entities will provide a

more robust set of stakeholders (U.S. DHS, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). One such entity is the Northeast Regional

Intelligence Group, which does include the abovementioned organizations, but other regional groups across the United

States are less robust. This e�ort came about in the aftermath of several terrorist attacks such as the Boston Marathon

Bombing and the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass shooting, where it became clear that primary fusion centers were

overwhelmed during the crisis state, but could accept assistance from other information sharing entities if protocols were in

place (Northeast Regional Intelligence Group, and Project Manager—Information Sharing Environment, 2016). These guiding

coalitions should include public o�cials with oversight responsibilities for police organizations. Developing supportive

partnerships at this level enables local input for establishing homeland security and criminal intelligence policy.

Developing a Vision and Strategy

Kotter (2012) argues that strategic visions should be grounded in a clear and rational understanding of the organization and

its capabilities. Visions should be imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused, �exible, and communicable. Imaginable, in that,

they are grounded in the reality of services that can be provided, and desirable, in that, it appeals to professionals in these

entities. Strategic shared visions should stretch but not overwhelm organizational resources, and therefore, should be

focused on speci�c objectives. Ratcli�e (2008) states that developing an analytical vision for the department signi�es the

importance of this concept for the organizational mission. An assessment of organized crime policing strategy describes the

lack of a shared vision and con�icting priorities across various levels of government as a detriment to successful

implementation (Ratcli�e, Strang, & Taylor, 2014). They argue that analysts and commanders at the local level often have a

di�erent perception of the crime problem than do those experts at the state and national levels. This applies to homeland

security information sharing in the United States as well.

A lack of a coordinated homeland security information sharing vision appears in other settings as well. Complaints from

intelligence sta� in at least one study (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015) support the author’s experience in a fusion center where

commanders and policy makers expected these units to be all things to all people, re�ecting a lack of strategic vision as well

as the multiple demands placed on analytical units by local, state, and national stakeholders.

Communicating the Change Vision

Although failure to adequately communicate a change vision is a common problem in many organizations in transition, it is

surmountable across an entire profession. Kotter advises that communicating the vision should be simple, leaving out

complex jargon. In the �rst iteration of law enforcement information sharing post 9/11, there was an abundance of

terminology unfamiliar to police professionals. Concepts such as the intelligence cycle, situational awareness reports, priority

intelligence needs, national information exchange model (NIEM; 2016a), and other language more aligned with national

security business processes did not resonate with state and local policing, based on the author’s experience providing

technical assistance to police agencies.

The change message should be consistent with national strategies but broadcast in a variety of ways to reach police

practitioners. Police leadership organizations such as the IACP, PERF, and Major City Chiefs Association should champion

information sharing messaging in conjunction with their regional, state, and local counterparts. Unions and professional

associations such as the International Association of Intelligence Analysts (IALEA) and the International Association of Crime

Analysts (IACA) are natural partners to spread the vision among analytical sta�.

Information sharing 2.0 needs to be based on two-way communication (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015). Initial national and state

e�orts toward building shared networks and processes across law enforcement often took a top-down approach. Breaking

down resistance to sharing requires a high level of input from �rst responders to show how these initiatives help them on an

everyday basis. Police o�cers and analysts can enhance existing investigations, increase situational awareness, and have the

ability to identify emerging trends if they collect and share police information broadly (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). Highlighting

the bene�ts of having more information to support investigations and community problem solving will increase buy-in

(Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013).

Reducing information silos bene�ts routine police work. Bringing widespread information sharing to policing will require buy-

in from not only leaders but also the street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980) who carry out new initiatives and policies.

Darroch and Mazerolle (2013) state that their examination of successful ILP implementation was driven by leadership

reinforcement and commitment to the philosophy resulting in a positive subculture. Other authors (Lewandowski et al.,

2017a; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008) have argued that leadership commitment to ILP and information sharing is critical to

institutionalization of these concepts. This includes educating other government o�cials about the bene�ts of cross-agency

information sharing (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013).

Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

Kotter’s �fth stage for leading organizational change involves empowering employees for what he terms “broad-based

action.” Leadership’s role is to set up proactive sta� for success by supporting them and removing any organizational

barriers to change activities (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). Leaders in many police agencies provided sta� to fusion centers,

HIDTAs, and regional JTTFs. In another agency, leaders made information sharing and intelligence a priority that changed the

culture (Joyal, 2012). Ratcli�e and Guidetti (2008) outline a case study where leadership in a large traditional law and order

style police agency adopted intelligence-led policing as an organizational strategy, enabling sworn and analytical sta� to

innovate in a way that led to one of the most robust fusion centers in the country.

Sending future police leaders to the FBI National Executive Leaderships Institute or the Naval Postgraduate School, Center

for Homeland Defense is another tangible e�ort to enhance information sharing in organizations (U.S. Department of Justice,

2013). Another key component of empowering change among information sharing professionals is to provide adequate

training (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015). Information sharing and intelligence production require an array of professional

development activities at all levels from analytic standards training through the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training

(SLATT) and the Criminal Intelligence Systems 28 CFR Part 23 programs for rank and �le o�cers (D. Carter, 2004, J. G. Carter,

2016; Ratcli�e, 2008; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Online information sharing training

programs can supplement professional development opportunities for practitioners. At least one assessment (J. G. Carter et

al., 2014) reported that police departments that educate their o�cers and sta� in intelligence training are more likely to use

intelligence-driven decisions.

Having written directives that support these new mission objectives to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate homeland

security information is another avenue to empower o�cers to collect and share information (U.S. Department of Justice,

2013). It also protects the department from potential backlash from civil liberties critics. One study (Chermak et al., 2013)

reported that police departments at the state, local, and tribal levels, in addition to fusion centers, were familiar with

intelligence and information guidelines but have not fully developed policy and procedure that institutionalize those

guidelines in their own organizations. This re�ects a gap in policy development that can be addressed by leaders.

The Privacy, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Justice Entities (U.S. Department of

Justice, 2012) or simply the Privacy Guide is another avenue to empower intelligence personnel to develop department

guidelines to decrease resistance to intelligence sharing. For instance, analysts and o�cers will have a greater understanding

of what data can be entered into an intelligence database as a result of completing the Criminal Intelligence Systems 28 CFR

Part 23 online training (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2017). Carter and his associates (2014) found that the

creation of intelligence policies, including privacy guidelines, increased the likelihood of developing intelligence products.

Aligning current performance systems to the information sharing vision is another method to encourage adoption of

homeland security objectives. For an intelligence-led framework to become part of the standard for 21st-century policing,

o�cers and analysts must be rewarded for these e�orts (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013). The present state of policing does not

give credit to o�cers for collecting, submitting, or sharing �eld interview or intelligence reports on criminal activity or

suspicious activity reports for homeland security. Police performance measures do not always re�ect this type of information

sharing activity, but could be seamlessly incorporated.

Police leaders who adopt an intelligence-led philosophy and use information and intelligence to support policy choices

empower their subordinates to adopt this new mission. In many police departments, there are change resisters that have to

be convinced of the bene�ts of homeland security information sharing. Leaders who model information sharing practices

can in�uence traditional managers who may not buy-in initially (Lewandowski & Carter, 2017; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008).

Creative employees will �nd ways to collect data, use information systems, and produce intelligence products for their

departments and surrounding agencies once they are convinced that they have the backing of management.

Generating Short-Term Wins

Developing an intelligence-led police culture will be incremental and based on illustrating e�ectiveness in the �eld. Weiss

(1997) found that police departments mimic successful practices in other agencies. What can assist in clarifying the utility of

homeland security information sharing is a set of short-term wins for organizational champions pursing this change vision.

Using the National Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative (NSI) as an example, police agencies can provide the Line O�cer

SAR Training program o�cers, design a coherent SAR submission policy to fusion centers, and then share disseminated

intelligence products in the department. Adoption of intelligence practices di�uses across neighboring agencies as they

observe the utility of these ideas, which creates more short-term wins (Carter, 2016).

Enrolling signi�cant portions of o�cers and analytical sta� in national information sharing systems such as RISS, HIDTA,

LEEP, and HSIN are other cost-e�ective short-term wins that support day-to-day police activities. Formalizing reporting

relationships with fusion centers, DHS, and FBI entities is another example of collaboration across the �eld. Creating

statewide or regional information requirements and intelligence production plans as illustrated by the National Capital

Region Fusion Centers’ Concept of Operations (National Capital Region Fusion Centers, 2016) is a major milestone for sharing

across organizations.

Many information sharing entities such as fusion centers have provided short-term wins by collocating detectives and

analysts as well as analysts from di�erent police agencies together (U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, Ratcli�e, 2007). This has

allowed the development of informal as well as formal interactions between personnel to create a more analytical culture.

Within agencies, the development of information planning, collection, and analysis strategies is another way to achieve

acceptance for the street-level bureaucrats in police organizations who are critical to information sharing goals (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2013). Building a criminal intelligence capacity in a police agency is likely to take hold if it prioritizes “all

crimes” as well as homeland security information sharing (Carter, 2016; Lewandowski & Carter, 2017). In smaller agencies,

this may mean outsourcing their information sharing to a fusion or intelligence center. Changing the culture will occur if the

information sharing and intelligence function is concentrated on what police o�cers, analysts, and their leaders confront

every day.

Producing routine information and intelligence bulletins for o�cers is another concrete step for information sharing

progress (Lewandowski & Carter, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). This has been successfully accomplished in policing

when fusion centers and other intelligence centers have analyzed serial burglary, metals theft, and gang violence. Convening

regular brie�ngs based on information collected in these situations is another example of e�ective change e�orts. Many

departments have established online portals or email lists to disseminate intelligence products to patrol o�cers and

detectives. O�cers are more likely to collect data if they receive feedback in the form of analytical products that are relevant

to their work.

Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Police departments such as other traditional organizations not only are initially change resistant but also harbor latent

resistance even after changes have begun (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Guyot, 1979; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). Kotter (2012)

points out that certain managers or units in an organization may withhold their criticism until an opportunity presents itself.

This was certainly the case with policing and homeland security where many law enforcement policy makers are critical of

fusion centers, particularly when it siphons funding from other activities. In some cases, policy makers would rather procure

a command post than hire an intelligence analyst.

The evolution of short-term wins to Stage 7, consolidating gains and producing more change, occurs when change leaders

leverage those small successes to illustrate to those in the department that information sharing in this case can improve

agency performance (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008). Although the establishment of an intelligence function may occur at Stage 6,

generating short-term wins, a more robust capacity might involve the hiring of full-time analysts and expanding analytical

software such as mapping and social media tools (Carter, 2016). This may involve incorporating event, subject, and target

decon�iction processes when dealing with multijurisdictional cases (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). It could include

providing more training opportunities to midmanagers, o�cers, and analysts; creating intelligence policies; or the

development of a permanent intelligence unit (J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008; U.S. Department of

Justice, 2015).

Consolidating gains in organizational change e�orts is critical for traditional organizations in a stable environment, which

tend to minimize internal interdependence (Kotter, 2012). This occurs in policing to a large degree due to organizational

structures that are functionally di�erentiated. Police patrol divisions often operate separately from investigative units and

administrative support entities within a department (Sanders, Weston, & Schott, 2015). Developing an information sharing

process that supports investigators will reinforce the e�cacy of intelligence analysis (Lewandowski, et al., 2017a; Randol,

2013; Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008).

As the criminal and homeland security threat environment shifts rapidly, the need for information sharing should be

apparent as should the interdependence of police functions within both an agency and externally (Joyal, 2012). For instance,

patrol o�cers may very well have critical information that can enhance not only criminal investigations (Greenwood, 1979)

but also terrorism intelligence gathering and analysis. Incorporating an SAR collection process into daily police operations

would be a substantial benchmark for police agencies pursuing a homeland security information sharing vision (U.S.

Department of Justice, 2013; Wormeli, 2014).

Aligning police information systems to the agency’s goals of information sharing also illustrates a commitment to the mission

change. Updating police information systems that enable sharing and basic analysis for analysts and o�cers is a major level

of progress from the traditional technologies that lock down and silo information across the agency (U.S. Department of

Justice, 2013).

Initial information sharing wins will highlight the utility of this vision across departments. Darroch and Mazerolle (2013) found

that leadership e�orts to build bottom-up support and celebrate the successes of ILP were critical to its successful rollout.

Patrol commanders who can use intelligence generated from SARs and �eld interview reports will ensure that further

information collection by their subordinate units is conducted in a timely manner. Middle managers can add more change by

expanding homeland security and intelligence-led policing concepts into other areas such as critical infrastructure protection

and the use of the DHS’ IP Gateway vulnerability assessment tool. O�cers will �nd innovative ways to use the information

now available to address street crime as well as homeland security threats.

Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

Interagency homeland security information sharing failures re�ect, in part, the lack of buy-in from individual police agencies

(D. Carter & Carter, 2009; Randol, 2013). Most police departments and their information sharing goals are internally focused

(Chermak et al., 2013), more concerned with using information to address their routine police business. Information sharing

across the broader police and homeland security environment is more of a concern for police leaders than o�cers.

Police organizational culture has a strong in�uence on shaping the department’s everyday mission (Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008;

Sanders & Henderson, 2013; Sheptycki, 2004). This is particularly an impediment when attempting to integrate homeland

security and information sharing into a culture that has focused on the narrow mission of crime �ghting without relating how

it can assist that mission (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015; Nagin, Solow, & Lum, 2015; Randol, 2013). Carter’s (2016) and Darroch

and Mazerolles’ (2013) research found that the crime control bene�ts had a substantial impact on the adoption of

intelligence-led policing, as an example.

Kotter’s �nal stage of organizational change involves anchoring new approaches in the culture. Police agencies have long

been resistant to change as have many bureaucratic agencies, which directly a�ect the ability of those agencies to adapt and

innovate (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Guyot, 1979; Skolnick & Bayley, 1986; Sparrow et al., 1990; Weisburd & Braga, 2007).

Police departments are traditional organizations with strong internal cultures and often change resistant labor unions

(Darroch & Mazerolle, 2015; Kadleck, 2003).

Some paradigm change attempts such as team policing, community policing, and arguably intelligence-led policing have not

taken hold due to the inability of leaders and stakeholders to change the culture over the long term (Lurigio & Skogan, 1994).

It can be argued that the homeland security enterprise, in general, has failed to energize a large segment of policing, partly

due to an underestimation of the power of organizational culture within the profession (Ratcli�e, 2008). In many instances,

police o�cers do not see their role as the �rst line of defense against terrorism. But information sharing as an element of

homeland security strategy will be more acceptable to line o�cers if it also assists with their traditional roles of crime

reduction, order maintenance, and problem solving. Ratcli�e and Guidetti (2008) re�ect on the ways to change traditional

investigative culture through changing the organizational structure, enhanced training, and redesigning the reward

structures to include information sharing as an operational objective. Rather than focus on traditional measures such as

arrests or drug seizures, they highlight improved metrics including the quality and quantity of intelligence entries and

products.

Constant communication about the importance of sharing information across police departments will buttress commitment

to the vision (Kotter, 2012). Leaders who stay on message and continue to reward those individuals and units that were early

adopters of homeland security information sharing underline the importance of the vision to the rest of the department

(Ratcli�e & Guidetti, 2008).

The information sharing change vision has to not only be constantly communicated but also be e�ective as a policing

strategy. Enabling patrol o�cers to have access to intelligence systems such as RISSNET to identify serial burglars or using

intelligence analysts to produce threat assessments using police data for special events provides a more data-driven

approach to deployment decisions. Viewing maps of hot spots for violent crime or locations where various critical

infrastructure facilities intersect have tactical and strategic bene�ts for police agencies (U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). The

�nal element of the intelligence cycle, receiving feedback on intelligence products, will improve two-way communication and

provide analysts with better direction to ful�ll intelligence gaps (Lewandowski et al., 2017a).

Conclusion The threat of terrorism both at home and abroad has not abated (Applegate, 2016; Clapper, 2016; Coats, 2017). State and

local police agencies should feel the sense of urgency and begin the process of developing lawful information sharing and

intelligence capacities (Jenkins et al., 2014).

Kotter has outlined an eight-step process that creates a roadmap for the adoption of a robust information sharing vision

within American policing. Building a coalition of police leaders that can transform the vision outlined in the NCISP2 and other

strategic documents into actual practice is a signi�cant step. Empowering individual police agencies to take speci�c steps

toward expanding information sharing and all crimes analysis, such as allowing access to existing networks, can address the

cultural obstacles that exist. Initiatives by �eld-based information sharing entities to tackle issues such as burglaries,

suspicious activity reports, and opioid overdoses are examples of short-term wins. These e�orts illustrate the utility of

information sharing regionally and nationally to line o�cers and investigators who are the principal information collectors.

Formalizing information sharing e�orts through assignment of sta� to fusion centers and creating policies and procedures

that encourage and guide o�cers in this role can achieve more buy-in from o�cers. Moving incrementally toward more

expansive homeland security goals such as conducting threat assessments of critical infrastructure sites can build on initial

buy-in. Providing o�cers and analysts with necessary technology to collect and analyze data reinforces the vision. As these

small e�orts accumulate, police o�cers will see the utility of information sharing, which will break down some of the cultural

barriers present and lead to more change.

Moving through the stages of Kotter’s organizational change model provides a roadmap to a homeland security information

sharing structure that can meet both current and emerging threats. Police leaders have a responsibility to take on this

challenge that will not only bene�t homeland security goals but also address policing goals such as crime and disorder

reduction and community collaboration. American policing is on the doorstep of the information age with signi�cant

potential to prevent, respond, and investigate terrorism incidents as well as crime and disorder issues, what are we waiting

for?

Declaration of Con�icting Interests The author(s) declared no potential con�icts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this

article.

Funding The author(s) received no �nancial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Biographies David E. Lambert is Assistant Dean/Director of the Justice Systems Training and Research Institute at Roger Williams Univerty and former Assistant Professor at the University of New Haven. He is a former sergeant with the Massachusetts State Police where he served as a supervisor in the Commonwealth Fusion Center.

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