Does life have meaning? What can we know? (Philosophy)

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Adama’s True Lie

Earth and the Problem of Knowledge

Eric J. Silverman

Summary

What is the nature of knowledge? This chapter examines the science fiction narrative of Battlestar Galactica to address puzzles and problems in epistemology. For example, knowledge has traditionally been defined as a true justified belief. However, this definition actually accepts accidentally true justified beliefs as knowledge. In Battlestar Galactica we see an excellent example of such a belief. Captain Adama claims he is searching for Earth, but does not even believe it exists. Anyone who believes in Earth’s existence based on his testimony would have an accidentally true justified belief. Can such a belief be knowledge?

Battlestar Galactica begins with the ravaging of the known world. The survivors are demoralized, vastly outnumbered by the enemy, and homeless. Against this backdrop Commander Adama offers the promise of a new home where they’ll be safe from the Cylons: Earth. But he lies. Yet, in a surprising twist of fate – though not to us who live here – it’s later revealed that Adama told a “true lie.” Earth does exist and the Colonials’ search for it isn’t in vain. Undertaking the journey to this “mythical” home of the Thirteenth Tribe is momentous and filled with religious significance for the Colonial survivors. Faith in Earth’s existence gives meaning to an otherwise hopeless situation and shapes the choices they make along the way.

“You’re Right. There’s No Earth. It’s All a Legend”

There’s a sharp distinction between “true belief ” and knowledge. President Roslin illustrates this when she asks, “How many people know the Cylons look human?” Colonel Tigh responds, “The rumor mill’s been working overtime. Half the ship’s talking about it.” But Roslin retorts, “There’ll always be rumors. For most people, that’s all they’ll ever be. I’m asking how many people actually know?” (“Water”).

Irwin, W., & Johnson, D. K. (Eds.). (2010). Introducing philosophy through pop culture : From socrates to south park, hume to house. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from utsa on 2019-11-29 10:30:30.

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58 Eric J. Silverman

A belief based on an unverifiable rumor isn’t knowledge, even if it happens to be true. Knowledge involves a belief in which one has reason for confidence.

A common view claims that knowledge is true belief accompanied by a con- vincing account justifying the belief. As Plato explains in the Theaetetus:

Now when a man gets a true judgment about something without an account, his soul is in a state of truth as regards that thing, but he does not know it; for someone who cannot give and take an account of a thing is ignorant about it. But when he has also got an account of it, he is capable of all this and is made perfect in knowledge.1

According to Plato, it’s possible to attain truth without knowledge. Knowledge is more certain than mere true belief since the knower possesses a compelling justification for the belief ’s truthfulness. Someone holding a true belief based on a rumor or a lucky guess doesn’t have knowledge because she doesn’t have a reason for confidence in the belief.

The contemporary philosopher Edmund Gettier demonstrates the inadequacy of this view of knowledge by providing counterexamples in which a person’s justification for a true belief turns out to be false.2 Say that Helo is walking down Galactica’s corridors and sees his wife, Athena. Helo calls out to her, “Sharon!” because he has a compelling justification for believing that’s her name. So he believes:

(a) The woman in front of me is my wife, Athena.

If Helo’s justified in believing (a), knows his wife’s name, and understands basic rules of reasoning, then he’s also justified in believing:

(b) The woman in front of me is named “Sharon.”

The truthfulness of (a) logically entails the truthfulness of (b). But let’s suppose Helo’s mistaken, for it’s actually Boomer – who looks identical

to Athena – who’s in front of him. (Let’s say that she has infiltrated Galactica for some nefarious purpose.) But Boomer is also named “Sharon.” Helo’s belief (b) turns out to be true, but his justification for believing (b), belief (a), is false. Gettier claims that a counterexample like this shows a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge since its justification is false. And this has become known as “the Gettier problem.”

Beliefs based on Adama’s true lie about Earth are similar to Helo’s true belief based on a false justification. Starbuck believes:

1 Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, trans. M. J. Levett (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1990), 202c. 2 Edmund Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121–3.

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Earth and the Problem of Knowledge 59

This belief obviously implies:

(d) Earth exists.

It’s arguable that Adama’s public testimony that he knows the location of Earth, as well as his private assurances to Starbuck in “Kobol’s Last Gleaming, Part 1,” would be a proper justification for belief (c). It’s reasonable to believe, as Adama claims, that he has access to privileged classified information as a “senior commander” in the Colonial Fleet. Hence, Starbuck is justified in believing that Earth exists based on his lie.

Even though Adama lies about knowing Earth’s location and doesn’t believe in its existence, it later becomes evident that Earth does exist. Starbuck discovers this for herself in the Tomb of Athena and after apparently journeying to Earth (“Home, Part 2”; “Crossroads, Part 2”). But Gettier would be quick to point out that, before these events, Starbuck holds a true belief (d) based on a false justification (c). Therefore, her true justified belief in Earth isn’t really knowledge, until Adama’s lie is no longer the primary justification for her belief.

“I’m Not a Cylon! . . . Maybe, But We Just Can’t Take That Chance”

The Gettier problem is one of many puzzles in epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature of knowledge. It’s difficult to tell not only when one has knowledge, but also when one’s beliefs are justified. The contemporary philosopher Alvin Goldman offers a theory of justification known as reliabilism, which proposes that a belief is justified when it’s produced by a reliable process.3

Sense experiences, memories, deduction, and induction are typical examples of generally reliable belief-forming processes. Each of these processes, however, has a different level of reliability. Induction, for example, is less reliable than deduction. And the reliability of a belief-forming process can vary based on one’s situation. Sight is a reliable belief-forming process, yet beliefs based on sight are more reliable for close objects observed in well-lit conditions than for distant objects observed in poorly lit conditions.

One interesting aspect of reliabilism is that it doesn’t require a person to know she’s using a reliable process to be justified in her beliefs. If a young non-philosopher forms her beliefs based on the five senses, she’s justified in those beliefs even if she never reflects upon the reliability of the senses. This has the desirable consequence of classifying many beliefs held by children, animals, and epistemically unreflective persons as justified.

3 See Alvin Goldman, “What Is Justified Belief ?” in Justification and Knowledge, ed. G. S. Pappas (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 1–23.

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60 Eric J. Silverman

In BSG, some typical belief-forming processes aren’t as reliable as they are for us. Sight sometimes leads people to believe they’re seeing a human being when they’re actually seeing a Cylon. While people are usually correct when they believe they see a human, most would believe they see a human regardless of whether it’s actually a Cylon. So sight isn’t a reliable process for judging between humans and Cylons, even though it’s a reliable process for forming other types of beliefs.4

Memory is another less dependable belief-forming process. Boomer can’t remember that she sabotaged Galactica’s water tanks (“Water”) and, until her Cylon nature is revealed to her, her memories thoroughly convince her that she’s human, her parents are Katherine and Abraham Valerii, and her family died on Troy. Yet these beliefs couldn’t be further from the truth. She doesn’t give up these beliefs until confronted by numerous copies of herself aboard a Cylon baseship, and even then her initial reaction is disbelief (“Kobol’s Last Gleaming, Part 2”). Similarly, Baltar wonders whether he might be a Cylon, and thus doubts whether he can trust his memories (“Torn”). Colonel Tigh, Sam Anders, Chief Tyrol, and Tory Foster are also deceived by their memories and are unaware of their actual Cylon nature (“Crossroads, Part 2”). The revelation, in particular, of Tigh and Anders’ Cylon identity is truly shocking, as they’re among the most adamantly anti-Cylon members of the fleet.

On the other hand, some unusual belief-forming processes are reliable in BSG, such as Baltar’s visions of Number Six. While Six’s advice is often cloaked in manipulative games and sarcasm, it frequently turns out to be a reliable way to form beliefs and accomplish desirable goals. Six draws Baltar’s attention to a strange device on the Dradis console, and this leads him to “identify” Aaron Doral as a Cylon. But Baltar hasn’t yet created his “mystic Cylon detector” and just makes up some techno-babble to convince Tigh that Doral’s a Cylon so he can have an excuse to bring up the “odd device.” It’s disturbing when Tigh abandons Doral on Ragnar Station until it’s revealed that Baltar was right all along (“Miniseries”). Six also encourages Baltar to test Boomer to see if she’s a Cylon (“Flesh and Bone”); tells him to choose a target for the assault on a Cylon tylium refinery by faith, which turns out to be accurate (“The Hand of God”); helps him attain both the vice presidency and the presidency (“Colonial Day”; “Lay Down Your Burdens”); and reveals Hera’s identity to him (“Exodus, Part 2”).

Visions resulting from chamalla extract are also a reliable process for belief formation. Roslin’s visions foresee her encounter with Leoben (“Flesh and Bone”) and her leadership role in bringing the Colonials to Earth (“The Hand of God”). A chamalla-tripping oracle tells D’Anna/Three that she’ll hold the Cylon-human hybrid Hera and experience love for the first time (“Exodus”); another oracle knows about Starbuck’s upbringing and that Leoben – or at least a vision of him – will be coming for her (“Maelstrom”).

Returning to epistemology, does reliabilism suggest that Adama’s testimony is an appropriate justification for believing in Earth? Enlightenment era philosophers, such as David Hume (1711–76), are critical of justifications based on testimony for

4 See Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 771–9.

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Earth and the Problem of Knowledge 61

this kind of issue. Hume claims testimony is only as reliable as experience suggests, and there are true claims that would be difficult to justify based on testimony:

The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connection, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very same principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavor to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.5

Hume believes that the ultimate basis for belief in anything is our own sensory experiences. We should trust other people’s testimony only because experience sug- gests that testimony is typically accurate. Yet, even in everyday situations, testimony falls considerably short of absolute accuracy. It’s sometimes unreliable because people are dishonest, as when Felix Gaeta claims he saw Baltar voluntarily sign the execution order for over two hundred innocent Colonists (“Crossroads, Part 2”); or because people are simply incorrect in their testimony, as when Tyrol sincerely tells Tigh that he’s not a Cylon (“Resistance”).

When someone testifies to something completely outside of our own experiences, we should be skeptical. Hume claims that someone who has never seen water freeze because he’s spent his entire life in a tropical climate should be slow to accept testimony that water freezes at a cold temperature. Adama’s claim to know Earth’s location is similar, since the Colonials have no personal experience of Earth. This claim has no continuity with their personal experiences, though it doesn’t actually conflict with these experiences. Hume contends we should be even more skeptical when testimony is used to justify beliefs that contradict our everyday experiences.

The contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga claims that testimony plays a more foundational role in our beliefs than Hume, and his predecessor John Locke (1632–1704), acknowledge:

The Enlightenment looked askance at testimony and tradition; Locke saw them as a preeminent source of error. The Enlightenment idea is that perhaps we start by learning from others – our parents, for example. Properly mature and independent adults, however, will have passed beyond all that and believe what they do on the basis of the evidence. But this is a mistake; you can’t know so much as your name or what city you live in without relying on testimony. (Will you produce your birth certificate for the first, or consult a handy map for the second? In each case you are of course relying on testimony.)6

5 David Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998), 110. 6 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 147.

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62 Eric J. Silverman

Plantinga identifies a number of important beliefs that can be justified based only upon testimony. No one knows her name, age, or location without using testimony to justify such beliefs. The Enlightenment ideal of the radically independent thinker who weighs all claims against evidence from her own individual experiences is unrealistic and artificial. While testimony is far from infallible, it plays a more important epistemic role than Locke and Hume allow.

In either case, testimony-based justifications for believing in Earth need to be closely scrutinized. How trustworthy is the individual providing the testimony? How unlikely is his claim about Earth? Is the individual an appropriate authority concerning Earth? As the highest ranking military officer surviving the destruction of the Colonies and the author of their escape, Adama and his testimony seem naturally trustworthy. Starbuck certainly trusts Adama when she’s confronted with the truth by Roslin:

starbuck: The old man is our last chance to find Earth. He knows where it is. He said so. You were there. The location is a secret. But he is going to take us there.

roslin: Commander Adama has no idea where Earth is. He never did. He made it up in order to give people hope.

starbuck: You’re lying. roslin: Go ask him. (“Kobol’s Last Gleaming, Part 1”)

When Starbuck does ask him, Adama tries to avoid her questions, but she’s forced to conclude that Adama’s patriotism and proficiency in fulfilling military duties don’t make him an expert concerning Earth. As commander of a soon to be retired battlestar, Adama simply doesn’t have access to Earth’s location. The Gettier prob- lem demonstrates that the Colonials’ beliefs about Earth fall short of knowledge, and reliabilism suggests there’s reason to doubt whether beliefs based on Adama’s testimony are even justified.

“You Have to Have Something to Live For. Let it be Earth”

How should beliefs be chosen in an uncertain world? W. K. Clifford (1845 –79) says it’s unethical to believe anything without sufficient evidence. This view, known as evidentialism, claims that if there isn’t enough evidence to support a belief, one mustn’t consent to its truth. One premise supporting evidentialism is that incorrect beliefs can have a damaging effect on society:

And no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone. Our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes. Our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit

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Earth and the Problem of Knowledge 63

and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork.7

It’s not merely mistaken, imprudent, or foolish to believe something without adequate evidence, it’s outright immoral, a violation of our ethical duties to one another. If Roslin believes it’s the will of the gods to lead the Colonials to Earth without sufficient evidence, this belief could have damaging effects on the entire fleet. Even if a less influential person like Starbuck believes in Earth without enough evidence, her beliefs don’t only affect herself, but others as well who may be inclined to agree with her. Clifford offers this sweeping conclusion: “To sum it up: it is wrong always, every- where, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (518).

Clifford, however, doesn’t recognize that in some situations knowledge is elusive and reliable justification uncertain; yet, believing nothing is a deeply damaging option. William James (1842–1910) claims that when definitive knowledge is impossible on a momentous and forced issue, it’s reasonable to choose beliefs based on their practical consequences. He considers marriage and religious faith as two such decisions. In both cases a choice must be made in less than certain circumstances. Yet, these choices are forced: to withhold belief is effectively a choice against it, and necessarily results in the loss of potential desirable consequences. Marriage and faith are also momentous in their potential for positive results. James illustrates the negative consequences experienced by the man who inadvertently falls into lifelong bachelorhood because he insists upon certainty before fully committing to a romantic relationship.

It is as if a man should hesitate indefinitely to ask a certain woman to marry him because he was not perfectly sure that she would prove an angel after he brought her home. Would he not cut himself off from that particular angel-possibility as decisively as if he went and married some one else?8

If there are desirable results from a specific committed relationship, they’re inevit- ably lost if the relationship isn’t embraced. It may be impossible for Apollo to know whether Anastasia Dualla would be a good wife; but the benefits offered by a com- mitted relationship with her can’t be gained without commitment. The choice can’t be avoided, for avoiding it is an effective choice against the relationship. Lifelong bachelorhood isn’t irrational or unjustifiable; but it’s guaranteed to prevent Apollo from the benefits unique to a committed relationship with Dualla.

Or consider Apollo’s unwillingness to see the conflict brewing between the fleet’s military and civilian leadership. When his father chastises him for “siding” with Roslin, Apollo retorts, “I didn’t know we were picking sides.” Adama muses, “That’s why you haven’t picked one yet.” Later, Apollo does choose his side – that of democracy (“Bastille Day”; “Kobol’s Last Gleaming, Part 2”). Due to Apollo’s important position in the fleet and his personal relationships with both Adama and

7 W. K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief,” in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thompson, 2003), 516 –17. Further references will be given in the text. 8 William James, “The Will to Believe,” in The Theory of Knowledge, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/ Thompson, 2003), 524. Further references will be given in the text.

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64 Eric J. Silverman

Roslin, it’s inevitable that he’s forced to choose between the military and civilian factions. When given orders to arrest Roslin, he has no choice but to choose a side. His choice was also momentous. By siding with Roslin, he stands up for democracy at the cost of his own freedom.

James views religious faith as a similarly momentous decision. He claims no argument proves the truthfulness of religious faith with certainty. Even so, at some point a decision must be made. The choice is forced. To put off the choice indefinitely is effectively to reject religion. Furthermore, the question of religion is momentously important. Many religious thinkers claim it offers a life filled with greater meaning and purpose, along with eternal happiness after death. Agnosticism cuts one off from any good attainable by embracing religion. Gaining the benefits of religious faith, for this life or the afterlife, may require a choice here and now (524). An agnostic has no chance for the benefits of religion, just as the lifelong bachelor has no chance for the goods of marriage (520). Similarly, the agnostic cuts himself off from any advantages from atheism. If religion is false and all genuine goods are located in the here and now, then withholding consent from atheism is also a damaging choice. It’s wiser to embrace atheism rather than agnosticism, since it frees one to pursue the goods of life wholeheartedly.

Faith that Earth awaits at the end of the Colonial fleet’s journey mirrors James’s other momentous and forced choices. When comfortable life was possible on the Twelve Colonies, the question of Earth’s existence was an abstract issue with little consequence stemming from belief or unbelief. The issue was neither momentous nor forced. But once the Colonies were destroyed, the issue became momentous: either there’s a home where the survivors will be welcomed as brothers and sisters, or they’re homeless and alone. The choice also becomes forced. Agnosticism concerning Earth is no longer a practical option. They can embrace the search for Earth or reject the hope of Earth by settling on the first safely habitable planet they encounter, but to do neither is ridiculous.

The importance of this issue is seen when the Colonials elect Baltar to the presidency based on his promise to settle on New Caprica and cease the search for Earth (“Lay Down Your Burdens, Part 2”). By abandoning the search, the Colonials cut themselves off from hope for a better life than what they can make for themselves on this less-than-inviting world. Yet, either choice is better than no choice. Most of the Colonials don’t have access to compelling evidence that Earth exists. It’s reasonable for them to believe that rebuilding civilization on New Caprica is their only hope for a permanent home. By settling on New Caprica, they have the opportunity for some benefits: breathing fresh air and growing food instead of living in tin boxes and eating rations. Clifford’s advice would allow them neither option. There isn’t enough evidence to support the belief in and search for Earth, but there’s also insufficient evidence that settling on New Caprica is the wisest option. If they continually wander without settling on a planet, and cease pursuing Earth, they cut themselves off from the benefits of both.

Even apart from any potential benefits of a successful search for Earth, there are benefits gained simply from possessing an overarching life-quest. Adama’s lie isn’t

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Earth and the Problem of Knowledge 65

motivated by a desire to find Earth, but by a more subtle rationale. He understands that humans need purpose, especially in difficult circumstances. Without purpose, we wither, give up hope, and die. He lies because he wants the survivors to hope and avoid despair in the hardest of times.

Some philosophers advocate skepticism since virtually every belief can be questioned based on an argument for the conflicting view. But James shows us that a truly skeptical approach to life can be detrimental since it requires rejecting potentially rewarding opportunities. And a truly skeptical life is perhaps impossible since so many decisions are unavoidably forced. Whether to embrace life and mean- ing amidst uncertainty is a forced and momentous decision. Blind leaps of faith are dangerous and cynical skepticism concerning everything is unrewarding. The confidence of certainty evades many of us, but choices must be made. Avoiding the central choices of life in an attempt to risk nothing, hope for nothing, love nothing, and believe in nothing beyond the indubitable is both impractical and impossible. So say we all.9

9 Thanks to Jason Eberl, John Greco, and Rob Arp for their comments on earlier versions of this chapter.

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