Teamwork in the Work Place

Unit 5 Social Psychology and Culture Subunit 3 Social Motives and Behavior in Cultural Context

Article 5

12-1-2012

A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity James H. Liu Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Liu, J. H. (2012). A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 5(3). https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1119

A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity

AbstractAbstract Violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually involved cultural groups, but theory and research on the psychology of intergroup relations is largely culture free. The two most prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) and social identity/self-categorization theory (SIT/SCT) provide fundamental insight into basic processes in intergroup relations: (1) that behavior in intergroup situations is qualitatively different than that involved in interpersonal situations (including transformations of the self and relationships with others), (2) competition over material resources is the driver for intergroup conflict, but psychological identification with a group is sufficient to produce ingroup favoritism, and (3) social comparisons between groups provide psychological fuel for intergroup conflict. Social representations of history, encompassing shared knowledge about history and its meaning distributed across different groups, can be used to derive a more culture-specific approach to understanding intergroup relations. Empirical results show that popular history is a story about politics and war, and that historical symbols are part of cultural narratives that can be used to mobilize public opinion and construct national identity. Universal processes of intergroup relations and social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which in turn are responsive to the identity and generational processes involved in collective remembering.

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Introduction

While the most violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually

involved cultural groups, particularly those of ethnicity, nationality, and religion, theory and

research on intergroup relations in psychology is largely culture free. Two of the most

prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) and social identity theory

(Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provide profound insight into some of the universal causes of and

resolutions to intergroup conflict. These theories converge on the conclusion that

interpersonal behavior is qualitatively different from intergroup behavior. As we shall see,

different cognitive, motivational, and social structures govern behavior in intergroup

compared to interpersonal situations.

Mainstream social psychological theory furnishes an overall understanding of the

processes involved in intergroup conflict, but falls short of explaining the psychological

bases of protracted and difficult to resolve conflicts between ethnic and national groups,

like those in Northern Ireland or Israel. In these cases, a “culture of conflict” has emerged

(Bar-Tal, 2000, 2001; Hammack, 2011). To understand such conflict and its resolution,

social and cross-cultural psychologists have developed ways to operationalize the political

culture of a society and apply this to intergroup relations. One such approach is to study

social representations (Moscovici, 1988) of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005), because such

historical representations popularly center around intergroup conflict (Liu et al., 2009,

2012). These representations provide powerful arguments for validating national identities

(Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002), facilitating or preventing intergroup forgiveness

after war (Hanke et al., in press), justifying social movements (Liu & Gastardo-Conaco,

2011), legitimizing the claims of one group against another group for restitution or its denial

(Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008). They limit the

ways in which groups can make favorable social comparisons against one another. They

motivate cultural continuity (Gezentsvey-Lamy, Ward, & Liu, in press; Sani et al., 2007).

The feedback loop between representations of history, social identities, and public

policies and commemorations (Olick & Robbins, 1998) creates a cultural background to

understand intergroup conflict (Liu & Allen, 1999). This incorporates culture into the more

universal approaches that are typical of traditional social psychology. Perhaps the most

fundamental universals about intergroup conflict are expressed by realistic group conflict

theory, so this is the best place to begin.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory emerged in the 1960’s out of an era when a more individual-

level approach, authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, &

Sanford, 1950; see Altemeyer, 1996 for a contemporary approach to right-wing

authoritarianism), was dominant. It carries the classic insight of social psychology, that it is

the structure of the situation, not personal characteristics of the individual (or an aggregate

of individuals) that determines human behavior (Sherif, 1966). According to the theory,

intergroup conflict is caused by an incompatibility of goals regarding material resources. It

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is the struggle over such material resources as land, oil, gold, and labor that is the source

of intergroup conflict, not personal characteristics like a prejudiced personality.

Sherif, Sherif, Harvey, and White's (1961) work at Robber’s Cave was a seminal

demonstration of detailed predictions of the theory. In the first, interpersonal phase of their

field experiment, a small group of about 25 normal 11-12 year old boys interacted with one

another in conditions of normal play. Then, in the second, intragroup group phase of the

experiment, the boys were divided into two groups and allowed freedom to organize their

activities. Within each group a structure emerged, with some boys becoming leaders, and

more central to the social network and decision making of the group than others. Each

group developed its own norms for favored activities and places.

In the third, intergroup phase of the experiment, the two groups of boys were brought

into contact with one another under competitive conditions involving mutually incompatible

goals. The boys were pitted against one another in sporting competitions for prizes, and

were brought into situations like a party where there was food enough only for one group,

and one group was invited before the other one. One can imagine the feelings of the boys

who arrived expecting a party only to find the other group having eaten all the food.

The third phase demonstrated some crucial results for realistic group conflict theory.

It was predicted and found that behavioral structures change as a consequence of shifting

from interpersonal to group to intergroup contact (phases 1-3). Within group solidarity was

at its peak when intergroup hostility was most severe. Friendships formed during the first,

interpersonal phase did not survive the second and third phases of the experiment.

Interpersonal associations with members of the other group were no longer tolerated

under conditions of intergroup conflict. This is reminiscent of what happened during the

breakup of the former Yugoslavia, where even strong interpersonal bonds like friendship

and marriage were often unable to survive the larger conflict.

Furthermore, the sociometric preferences for boys (e.g., friendship choices) changed

between the second and third phases. Tougher, more conflict oriented boys were preferred

as leaders for conflict. One boy previously considered a bully became a hero. Another boy,

who was a leader during the intragroup phase, lost his status when he refused to come out

to confront the rival group of boys during a raid.

These effects showed that group behavior and structure becomes qualitatively

different under conditions of involving intergroup conflict compared to an intragroup

situation. The entire structure of the group, from friendship to activity preferences changed

as a consequence of the demands of the intergroup competition.

In the fourth and final phase of the experiment, it was discovered that only a series

of superordinate goals was able to reduce the intergroup conflict. These are goals that

require the cooperation of both groups to achieve. Sherif and his colleagues engineered a

series of crises that endangered the ability of the camp to continue, such as threatening

the camp’s water supply or having supply truck fall into a ditch. They organized the two

groups of boys to work together to resolve the crises. For example, boys from the two

groups worked together to search for the leak in the water supply, and both groups of were

needed to pull the truck out of the ditch.

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These superordinate goals had the effect of pulling the two groups together, whereas

such strategies as sermons by a priest, negotiations between leaders, and joint social

activities were ineffective. Throughout the experiment, it was the structure of the situation

that dictated behavior rather than personal preferences. A resolution to conflict was

obtained by addressing the conflict situation itself rather than using more interpersonal

avenues like improving relationships between the leaders or other group members.

This solution was revolutionary, since the main theories about resolving interethnic

conflict at the time were the contact hypothesis (see Allport, 1954) and the aforementioned

authoritarian personality theory. In the contact hypothesis, equal status contact, enabling

members of different groups to form friendships, is supposed to reduce intergroup tension.

The mixed results of the school desegregation program in the United States to improve

race relations between blacks and whites (Cook, 1985; Gerard, 1988) showed that in real

life, mere increased contact between groups is not enough to break down stereotypes and

reduce tension. There is something qualitatively different about intergroup behavior that is

more than the sum of individual relationships or personalities.

Social Identity Theory

The powerful insights of realistic group conflict theory were elaborated on by social identity

theory, which emerged in the 1970’s and became by the 1990’s the most important theory

of intergroup relations in psychology. While Sherif demonstrated that mutually incompatible

goals are sufficient to create intergroup conflict, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971)

showed that this was not necessary. In the minimal group paradigm (Brewer, 1979), the

only thing necessary to create prejudice and discrimination between groups is a relevant

and salient self-categorization, or social identity. Just the awareness of belonging to a

group that is different than another group is enough to create prejudice in favor of the in-

group against the out-group.

In the minimal group paradigm, people who do not know one another and who are

not allowed to interact with one another are brought into a lab. They are classified into two

groups invented for the purpose of the experiment, like “dot underestimators and dot

overestimators” or “Klee preferers or Kandinsky preferers”. These “minimal groups” are

fictional. In fact, membership in the group is randomly assigned, but subjects in the

experiment believe they are relevant and valid. This belief alone is sufficient to induce in-

group favoritism when assigning rewards to people who are identified only by their group

membership. Without any history of prior contact, without any knowledge of any other

members of the group, without any meaning of the groups in society, without any

knowledge about competence or relative status, subjects in the minimal group paradigm

tend to allocate rewards in a way that maximizes the difference between the in-group and

the out-group instead of dividing the rewards equally. So a person who believes that he or

she is a “dot underestimator” will give more money to another person whom they have

never met before, but is identified also as a “dot underestimator” compared to someone

who is identified as a “dot overestimator”.

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Subsequent research showed that this in-group favoritism effect (Brewer, 1979)

applies primarily to rewards, and not punishments (or subtracting resources). That is, in

the minimal groups paradigm the subjects favors other in-group members by giving them

more rewards, but do not necessarily mean to derogate or punish out-group members

(Mummendey et al., 1992).

These startling results gave birth to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This

theory details the cognitive-motivational bases to intergroup behavior within persons, just

as realistic group conflict theory details the structural bases for intergroup behavior

surrounding people. According to social identity theory, elaborated in its successor self-

categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), each person has

a range of self-definitions, some of them group memberships. To the extent that a person

identifies with a group (that is, sees the group as a part of himself or herself), they are

motivated to evaluate this group positively. Social comparisons where the in-group is

evaluated as superior to a relevant out-group are necessary to maintain group-based self-

esteem. People favor the in-group over the out-group in the minimal group paradigm in

order to establish a social order where the in-group is superior to the out-group.

Of course, in society, there is inequality between groups and it is not possible for

every group to make positive social comparisons (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For instance,

in the US it would be difficult for Blacks to make favorable social comparisons for their

group on the dimension of wealth. The theory details several ways that group members will

react to unfavorable social comparison. If the negative social comparisons are considered

to be legitimate and stable, and the boundaries between groups are impermeable, then the

person will try social creativity strategies like changing the dimensions of comparison (e.g.,

they may be richer than us, but we are nicer than them) or who is the comparison group

(e.g., we may not be better than other Japanese, but we are better than the Koreans).

These strategies make the person feel better without changing the actual conditions of the

world. Or, if the boundaries are permeable, then the person will try to “pass” into the

advantaged group. This is an individual mobility strategy. The individual tries to become a

member of the advantaged group and leave behind his or her original group. In

multicultural societies, such a strategy is called assimilation. Only when the negative social

comparisons are considered to be both illegitimate and unstable (changeable) will a group

engage in overt conflict to try to overturn the existing social order.

Social identity theory is less optimistic than realistic group conflict theory about the

prospects for world peace. Realistic group conflict theory implies that if there were enough

resources for everyone, there should be no reason for war. But social identity theory

implies that the battle is not only for material resources, but for group-based esteem.

Moreover, the only way to establish group-based esteem is by comparison to other groups.

Social comparisons for intergroup superiority, rather than a struggle for materials

resources, are seen as a second major basis for intergroup conflict.

The primary strategy for reducing intergroup conflict according to identity-based

approaches is to attempt to change the basis for self-categorization to be more inclusive.

Interventions attempt to somehow incorporate out-group members into some level of

identification with the self, be it as a superordinate category (e.g., “We are all Asians”) or

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as two positively related groups under a superordinate (e.g., blacks and whites think of

themselves as Americans while at the same time as acknowledging themselves as

ethnically different) (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993).

Cultures and Conflict

The study of intergroup relations in social psychology is centered in experimental or

survey-based studies that do not conceptualize their prior history. Not surprisingly, the

main attempt by social psychology to intervene in intergroup relations at a societal level

(desegregation between blacks and whites in the U.S. based on the contact hypothesis)

was not a big success. Cook (1985), in his review of the mixed results of school

desegregation, argued that the theoretical conditions required for contact hypothesis to

succeed (equal status contact in a supportive environment) were never met, but critics

have pointed out that these preconditions were not realistic (Gerard, 1988). The historical

experience of African Americans has been different than that of every other ethnic group in

the United States. No other group was brought en masse as slaves, and no other group

has endured the same degree of prejudice and discrimination against them. It is possible

that the contact hypothesis was insufficient to overcome the long history of conflict and the

associated power structures that maintain inequality between whites and blacks in the

United States.

Because so many societal factors impact on real intergroup conflict between ethnic

or national groups, social psychologists have struggled to conceptualize psychological

variables that may intervene in these societal level processes. One promising avenue to

incorporate societal level processes, and hence culture into the psychological study of

intergroup conflict is to study social representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu &

Hilton, 2005). Research on the content of popular representations of history across

cultures (Liu, 1999; Liu et al., 2005, 2009, 2012) has revealed that intergroup conflict is at

the core of how mass publics reconstruct the past.

In a cross-national study involving twelve cultures, Liu et al. (2005) found that World

War II was nominated as the most important event in world history, and that Hitler was

nominated as the most influential (and negatively perceived) person in the last thousand

years. Intergroup conflict constituted between 28-52% (M = 42%) of the total events

nominated in the twelve samples, by far the largest category of events. These basic

findings were replicated in 12 more societies by Liu et al. (2009), with the major change

being that 9-11 (post-2001) replaced events related to the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet block (from data gathered in the 1990s) as the second most important set of conflict

related events after the World Wars. In African countries (Cabecinhas et al., in press),

colonization and independence (frequently involving warfare) formed a second set of

conflict related events after the world wars. So while the specific instances of conflict

varied from time to time and from place to place around the anchor of the World Wars, the

importance of conflict in the narration of national identities appears to be culture-general

(Liu & Laszlo, 2007).

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In the specific histories of nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand,

Philippines, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004; Liu et al., 1999,

2002; Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, 2010), intergroup relations and political events associated

with the founding of the state were dominant themes. But the story within which the conflict

was configured (see Wertsch, 2002) differed somewhat from society to society. In all 4

societies, colonization was important, but New Zealand's historical narrative was

configured as a bicultural relationship between its indigenous people and European

settlers, whereas the other stories moved from colonization to national independence.

Hence, if history is a summary of the wisdom and experience of past generations,

then it is clear that the main lessons from history concern behavioral tendencies of other

groups when it comes to conflict (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

This makes the position of some nations in international relations more difficult than

others. Germany must behave more carefully than other nations when sending troops

abroad, because their role in World War II during the Nazi period is well-remembered (Liu

et al., 2005, 2009). For example, Hilton, Erb, Dermot, and Molian (1996) found that

independent of pocketbook variables, the willingness of British and French to enter into the

European Union depended on how they perceived the causes of Germany’s behavior

during the war. If it was due to character flaws rather than situational causes, they were

less likely to want to join the EU, presumably because they did not trust the Germans. In

general, “collective guilt” is increasingly becoming an important topic in the literature (see

Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, Manstead, 1998).

A more general analysis of the role of history in intergroup relations can be achieved

by examining the structure and content of societal beliefs.

Social Representations of History: From Hegemonic to Emancipated

Social representations are societal belief structures that link people to larger collectives

(Moscovici, 1988). There are three forms of social representations, each relevant for

understanding how culture-specific forms of intergroup relations can emerge. Unlike other

psychological variables, social representations are content-oriented. In the theory of social

representations, content and process are inter-connected. As we shall see, more universal

processes of intergroup relations are constrained and put into culture-specific forms

through representations.

When social representations are hegemonic, or consensual among all groups, they

are treated as though they were a reality. Because there is little variability among

hegemonic social representations, they are not useful as individual difference variables.

However, they can be used to understand how strong consensus allows societies and

peoples to move together as one, and enact culture specific solutions to their problems.

When something that is social is treated as though it were a reality, it has the power to

create new realities through social policies.

For example, in New Zealand, all groups now consider the Treaty of Waitangi,

signed between the British Crown and Maori chieftains in 1840, to be the most important

event in New Zealand history (Liu et al., 1999). This gives Maori (indigenous Polynesians,

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a 16% minority) a special place in New Zealand society. In terms of size and negative

statistics on social indicators, Maori are very similar to blacks in the United States. But

unlike in the United States, the civil rights movement to improve the status of Maori has

continued. Drawing from the status of the Treaty, the idea that New Zealand should

become a bicultural nation has gained momentum. There is a Waitangi Tribunal set up to

handle grievances of Maori against the state, and the impact of a bicultural representation

of the nation can be seen in such institutions as universities and the national museum (Te

Papa). It is reflected in a national psychology where the Maori minority is viewed as

symbolically representative of the nation at both the implicit and explicit levels together

with the NZ European majority (Sibley & Liu, 2007). Such a pattern is unique among

Anglo-settler nations (see for example, Devos & Banaji, 2005 for American data).

But the representational status of the treaty, while important, is less than hegemonic.

While an historical representations serve to legitimize the place of a group in society and

justify its claims for resources, these claims are frequently contested. A counter-discourse

to conceptualizing Maori as having a legitimate historical grievance for a greater share of

national resources as a consequence of the injustices of colonization is prevalent. Sibley

et al. (2008) describe this pattern as symbolic inclusion but resource-based exclusion or

marginalization. Historical negation is an ideology that maintains white material privilege

while including Maori as symbolic of the nation: it acknowledges that past injustices

occurred, but they belong to the past, and should not affect resource allocations today

because this would create a fresh injustice (against the majority). New Zealand's

intergroup relations is thus peaceful but contested (Ward & Liu, 2012).

By contrast, when social representations of history are polemical, or in serious

disagreement across different groups, they indicate the presence of historically rooted

conflict. One group may have an historical grievance against another group, and this may

require special treatment to resolve. Polemical representations indicate “fault lines” in

society where the relationships between groups may become tense or break.

Devine-Wright’s (2001) work on commemorations in Northern Ireland illustrate the

manner in which history can function as a polemic in society. Catholics were found to

evaluate the Orange parades more negatively than Protestants. Those Protestants who

participated in the parades (which commemorate the conquest of Northern Ireland by

British Protestants) were more likely to evaluate the parades positively, to oppose change,

and to regard history as being a more important foundation of their sense of identity

compared to those Protestants who did not to participate.

In Northern Ireland, such a public commemoration of an historical event is used by

one group to legitimize their position and to build in-group solidarity in the face of fierce

opposition from another group. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern

Ireland is centuries old. A system of societal beliefs and practices (e.g., an atmosphere of

collective fear, emphasis on security and delegimization of the opponent), evolves in such

a situation that makes conflict reduction very difficult. A similar case is found in Israel (Bar-

Tal, 1999, 2001), where Palestinian and Jewish narratives of history are polemical with one

another, narrating contrasting tales of calamitous loss versus the joyful fulfillment of a

return to ancestral lands (Hammack, 2011).

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The final type of social representation is emancipated. This means that different

versions co-exist in different groups of society, but they are either generally not in conflict,

or only in conflict under limited circumstances.

The current situation in Taiwan is illustrative of how problems of the past can be

connected to current political situations (Huang et al., 2004). Traditionally, Taiwan was a

part of China, but Japan took over for about 50 years prior to World War II. After the war,

the Kuomingtang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek accepted the surrender of the island from

Japan, and almost immediately silenced local dissent violently. This event is today

consensually recognized as the most important event in Taiwanese history. While all

Taiwanese think of February 28th as a tragedy, where one group of Chinese (not native to

Taiwan) killed and oppressed another group (native to Taiwan), they differ in how they

evaluate Chiang Kai-shek, the author of the tragedy. Native province Chinese evaluate him

badly, whereas outside province Chinese (those who arrived as refugees or as soldiers

with the KMT, or are children of those immigrants) evaluate him somewhat favorably. For

native province Taiwanese, the February 28^th incident symbolizes their need for

independence and their mistrust of governance by mainland Chinese. This is a big

problem because China does not accept Taiwan as a separate nation. Outside province

Chinese are less vociferous in their support for Taiwanese independence, and feel more

connected to traditional Chinese culture.

It is not as though there is often conflict between native province Chinese and

outside province Chinese. Most of the time, they live in harmony, and province of origin is

not an issue. But around election time, there are serious differences of opinion between

the two groups about the future of the relationship with mainland China. Huang et al.

(2004) found that in the 2000 election, the historical evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek was a

significant predictor of the vote for President between a native province and outside

province candidate, even after controlling for demographic group and social identity. This

shows how history is still influential for political decisions today. And it is not just history

itself, but its connection to present day politics that makes the representations a powerful

influence in societal dynamics.

Social representations of history are considered to moderate the relationship

between identities at different levels of inclusiveness (Liu et al., 2002). When the

perception of history is consensual or hegemonic across all sub-groups in a society, then it

is hypothesized that the relationship between national and subgroup identity (e.g.,

ethnicity) will be positive; if there are polemics regarding history, then it is hypothesized

that the relationship between national and subgroup identity will be negative for the

minority group. Emancipated representations are hypothesized to lead to a zero

correlation.

In effect, history functions as a resource that can be used to legitimize the position of

groups in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005). If all groups agree on the representation of history,

then there is no problem. Alternatively, as in New Zealand, one group (Maori) may invoke

historical injustices as a reason why they should receive more resources from society; they

may criticize the current society as unjust or unfair. If the dominant group is unable to

make concessions that satisfy the disadvantaged group, as in Northern Ireland or Israel,

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then intergroup conflict is exacerbated. One group may seek to gain their independence

from the national group, such as the Palestinian search for a state separate from Israel. In

this extreme case, there will be a negative correlation between ethnic identity (Palestinian)

and national identity (Israeli).

The struggle for history is an integral part of intergroup polemics. Who did right and

who did wrong, who has the right to this land and who does not, what is remembered and

what is forgotten, these are issues rooted in history and its representation becomes a

resource to position different groups as they try to justify their claims (Paez & Liu, 2011).

Dynamics between Representations, Collective Remembering, Identity, and Politics

The process through which an event enters into history is only now beginning to be

understood (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997). There appears to be a critical period

between the ages of 15-25 where political events are particularly well remembered by

individuals, but whether other generations share this memory depends on whether the

event can be connected to current political issues relevant to society. Every 20-30 years a

society looks back into the past and engages in the reconstruction of events relevant to its

current political interests (Igartua & Paez, 1997). For example, the Spanish Civil War

(1936-39) was presented from the perspective of the victors for twenty years, but after

General Franco (the victor) died in 1975, there appeared many movies from the

perspective of the losers, questioning how the war affected the nation. As Spain was in the

process of becoming more democratic after the authoritarian Franco regime, its current

politics and identity dictated that it should attempt to reconstruct the past.

Hence, there is a feedback loop between representations of the past and the social

identities of the here and now (Liu & Allen, 1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005). As we have argued,

social representations of history limit the ability of some groups to make positive social

comparisons with others, and facilitate the ability of other groups to make arguments

backed by the legitimacy of history. Political groups and leaders are well aware of this, and

so immediately after an event occurs the dominant group and leaders in power attempt to

present their version of the events as authoritative (Igartua & Paez, 1997; Reicher &

Hopkins, 2001). They may attempt to forget an event entirely (or at least seek historical

closure, see Hanke et al., 2012), or to present themselves positively. Sometimes, an event

is so important as to warrant commemoration (Frijda, 1997; Olick & Robbins, 1998), as it

generates a sufficient level of emotion-driven conversations in society as to create a new

representation (Rimé, 1997). Such collective remembering is an attempt to establish a

consensus about the past, and mark it as a part of present identity.

But not all groups may participate in such commemoration (Devine-Wright, 2001).

Over time, the political agenda of the present may change; different groups could become

dominant, and then an attempt will be made to reconstruct the past. Representations bear

the imprint of these political processes of collective remembering. It will be up to future

research to establish the causal links more clearly.

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Conclusion

The psychological study of collective remembering and social representations of history

has developed significantly over the past decade and a half. Societal belief structures and

generational processes appear to be important tools in developing a cultural perspective

on intergroup relations in psychology. Universal processes of intergroup relations and

social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which in turn are responsive to

the identity and generational processes involved in collective remembering.

At present, it is too early to speculative about whether this approach can bring new

solutions to perennial problems of intergroup relations. Most of the work that has been

done is more descriptive than prescriptive. But the process of constructing and

reconstructing consensus about history appears to be an important tool to locate social

psychological research into the specific contexts where they can be most profitably

applied.

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About the Author

James Hou-fu Liu is Professor of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington, New

Zealand, and Co-Director of its Centre for Applied Cross Cultural Research

(http://cacr.victoria.ac.nz). He obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science from

the University of Illinois and once worked as an aerospace engineer. He then completed a

PhD in social psychology at UCLA, followed by a post-doctoral fellowship on dynamical

social impact theory at Florida Atlantic University. He has been teaching at Victoria

University of Wellington since 1994. His research is in cross-cultural political psychology,

specializing in narratives and representations of history and identity. He has more than 130

publications, with edited volumes including New Zealand Identities: Departures and

Destinations, Restorative Justice and Practices in New Zealand, Ages Ahead: Promoting

intergenerational relationships, and Progress in Asian Social Psychology, Volumes 2 and

6. He was Editor-in-Chief of the Asian Journal of Social Psychology from 2008-2011, and

is currently President-Elect of the Asian Association of Social Psychology. A naturalized

citizen of two countries, he describes himself as a “Chinese-American-New Zealander”.

Discussion Questions

1. What aspects of intergroup conflict would you consider to be universal and what

aspects to be culture specific?

2. How do social representations of knowledge influence the conduct of intergroup

relations?

3. Evaluate the ability of social identity theory/self-categorization theory and realistic

conflict theory to provide a comprehensive account of intergroup dynamics.

4. Describe some differences in intergroup behaviour between a collective and an

individualist group that you know. How can you explain/understand these differences?

5. What do you think are the critical historical events and people in your country? How do

these events/people influence the conduct of intergroup relations in your country?

6. How would you go about studying the processes that people use to construct a

historical narrative about themselves as a group? e.g., Would you examine school

textbooks, national commemorations, family albums, or what?

7. What do historical processes imply about the resolution of intergroup conflict?

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