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» Academy of Management Executive. 2005, Vol. 19. No. 2

Actionable feedback: Unlocking the power of learning and performance improvement

Mark D. Cannon and Robert Witherspoon

Executive Overview Delivering critical feedback can be brutal for everyone involved. Most managers hate

giving critical feedback, and most employees detest receiving it. In addition, critical feedback often fails to produce the desired results. We describe how cognitive and emotional dynamics—how we think and feel while giving and receiving feedback—can complicate this process, making it more painful and less useful than it should be. These dynamics often interfere with the ability of recipients to process and respond constructively to feedback. They also interfere with the ability of feedback givers to formulate and deliver feedback that is high quality and does not produce defensiveness. Further complicating matters, both feedback givers and receivers have a difficult time recognizing how their own cognitive and emotional dynamics are hindering their effectiveness in the feedback process. We illustrate how these dynamics hamper the feedback giving and receiving process and how understanding them can help managers produce more actionable feedback on performance (feedback that leads to learning and appropriate results).

Critical Feedback

It's no secret that most people dislike giving criti- cal feedback.' To compound the problem, delivery of critical feedback frequently fails to lead to a desirable change in the recipient's behavior.^ In addition, recipients of critical feedback sometimes retain hostile feelings towards the givers for years after the fact and may even lash out at them.^ Nonetheless, because assimilation of accurate feedback is crucial to employee learning and de- velopment,'* managers are charged with the re- sponsibility of providing it. In an effort to assist managers with this challenging task, we will ex- plore what makes feedback-giving so difficult and what can be done to make it less painful and more useful.

More specifically, we will describe the cognitive and emotional dynamics—how we think and feel—that interfere with the quality of feedback giving and receiving. We will also explore how understanding these dynamics can help managers produce more actionable feedback. By "actionable feedback" we mean feedback that produces both

learning and tangible, appropriate results, such as increasing effectiveness and improving perfor- mance on the job. When we say "managers," we are referring mainly to an employee's direct boss, but also to other key parties (including one's other superiors, peers, and subordinates) who may pro- vide support and feedback to that employee over time.

The Impact of Feedback on Learning and Development

The importance of feedback for learning and im- provement has long been recognized by psycholo- gists.^ A McKinsey & Company survey of over 12,000 managers throughout the world also sup- ports this recognition (see Figure 1).̂ As Figure 1 illustrates, managers consider "candid, insightful feedback" extremely important to their develop- ment, but most do not believe their companies do a good job of providing such feedback. This finding parallels our experience in coaching a wide range of people who commonly complain that they get little guidance or feedback on their work.

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2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 121

100

75

How well company provides

(excellent, good)

50

Job assignments

50 75

Coaching,

feedback

100

Importance to my development (critical, very important)

JOB ASSIGNMENTS 1 Promote high performers quickly

2 Build skills to boost career prospects

3 Fast rotation and advancement

4 Roles with P & L responsibility 5 Special project opportunities

6 On-the-job training

COACHING, FEEDBACK 7 Told my strengths and weaknesses 8 360°feedback

9 Candid, insightful feedback 10 Informal coaching from boss

MENTORING 11 Great mentor 12 Great senior role models 13 Mentoring advice on develop-

ment

TRAINING 14 Traditional classroom training

Soufte: UcKinsey S Company's War lor Talent 2000 Survev

Figure 1 Factors that Drive Development

Talented people depend on others for honest as- sessments of their work in determining what to do better. Without feedback about their performance, they have a hard time figuring out how to im- prove.'' With constructive feedback, they can learn sooner and with much greater specificity. Also, as talented people make efforts to improve them- selves, objective observers can help them under- stand whether their efforts are on track or not and how they might be improved.

Thus, feedback can be highly useful. However,

despite its potential benefits, a review of studies on feedback by Kluger and DeNisi showed only a modest positive relationship between feedback and performance; in fact, in 38 percent of the cases studied, feedback actually had a negative impact on performance.^

Cognitive and Emotional Dynamics

Our focus in this article is on the cognitive and emotional dynamics or challenges that make giv-

122 Academy of Management Executive May

ing and receiving feedback so difficult and that pre- vent feedback interventions from achieving their po- tential benefits. In contrast to many other managerial responsibilities, giving and receiving feedback can be very personal and can be charged with high levels of emotion for both giver and re- ceiver. However, traditional management education has focused more on analytical tools and skills^ that are not well matched to the psychological aspects of giving feedback. Thus, many managers are uncom- fortable with the high levels of emotion that can be involved in the process. In addition, people some- times react to feedback in unpredictable, even vola- tile ways. Recipients have been known to become angry, cry, storm out of the office, lash out verbally, physically attack, and even in very rare instances to kill the manager. 1° Attacking the manager may be unusual, but a common outcome is that delivering feedback, especially critical feedback, produces strong emotional reactions that may hinder learning and development.

In addition to emotion, cognitive processes of both managers and subordinates can contribute to difficulties in giving and receiving feedback. Man- agers and subordinates often have very different ways of evaluating and making sense of behav- ior, ̂ i Thus, they may find themselves in significant disagreement regarding performance ratings and feedback. Given these cognitive and emotional dy- namics, managers who wish to deliver actionable feedback would be wise to understand them and how to deal with them constructively.

As we explain below, the roles of feedback giver and feedback receiver each evoke their own set of cognitive and emotional processes that may inter- fere with learning and development. First, we will examine some of the cognitive and emotional dy- namics associated with the receiving role. This will provide an understanding of the potential dif- ficulties managers face in approaching subordi- nates. Second, we will examine several feedback statements that were given by managers, and we will illustrate their counterproductive characteris- tics. Third, we will describe the cognitive and emo- tional dynamics that affect feedback givers and that lead them to produce such nonactionable feedback. Finally, we will illustrate how under- standing the dynamics associated with feedback giving and receiving can be used to help manag- ers produce more actionable feedback.

Cognitive and Emotional Dynamics Impacting Feedback Receivers

Although it is common knowledge that receiving critical feedback is unpleasant, the potential cog-

nitive and emotional complications associated with receiving feedback transcend mere unpleas- antness.

A lengthy history of psychological research dem- onstrates that people tend not to view themselves accurately, and they are not good at accurately perceiving how others are seeing them.'^ Specifi- cally, they see themselves more positively than others see them; thus, critical feedback is likely to appear inaccurate, and receivers are likely to dis- agree with it.

Attributional biases or errors affect both manag- ers and subordinates and can lead them to form conflicting views. For example, most people have a "self-serving bias,"!^ which means that in assess- ing our own work we tend to see ourselves as responsible for successes, and blame failures on others or external forces. By contrast, managers, who are in the observer role, experience an "actor/ observer bias"''' and are more likely to attribute failures to internal causes (the subordinates them- selves), to discount subordinate successes, and to find subordinate performance lacking.'^

Further complicating matters, inaccurate posi- tive self-perceptions (positive illusions) may be more than just self-indulgent flights of fancy. Shelly Taylor, et al. have argued that positive illu- sions are a hallmark of mental health and are crucial to enabling people to avoid depression and maintain the self-esteem, confidence, and opti- mism that keep them motivated, persistent, and productive.'^ Similarly, Bandura has demonstrated that high perceived self-efficacy enhances perfor- mance on a variety of tasks, and he has argued that seeing yourself as more capable than you really are enhances your performance more than accurate self-perceptions.''̂ Thus, subordinates may resist feedback not only because feedback seems inaccurate, but because accepting criticjues could undermine their self-esteem and self-efficacy.

Furthermore, depending on the content and de- livery of feedback, it may be received as a per- sonal attack, threatening one's ego or identity.'^ This may provoke deeper psychological fears for the receiver around questions such as "Am I worth- while?" "Am I likable?" "Am I capable?" etc. In such cases, receivers can experience a strong "fight or flight" emotional reaction.

In addition, feeling attacked or threatened tends to create stress that hinders learning. Research suggests that a common reaction to stress or the experience of threat is to circle the emotional wag- ons and defend oneself. This response is charac- terized by increased rigidity, a restriction in infor- mation processing, and a constriction of control.*^

2005 Cannon and Wi/herspoon 123

All of these can interfere with a person's ability to learn and respond constructively to feedback.

In sum, a variety of cognitive and emotional dy- namics can interfere with the receiver's ability to process, leam from, and respond constructively to feedback. Thus, managers should consider these complications and craft their feedback carefully in order to avoid inadvertently causing the receiver to feel unfairly attacked or misperceived.

Cognitive and emotional dynamics also influ- ence the feedback-giving role and can lead feed- back givers to produce poor quality feedback that provokes a counterproductive, defensive reaction. Next, we will examine feedback statements that were given by managers in order to illustrate the characteristics that limit their actionability. Fol- lowing that, we will describe the cognitive and emotional dynamics that lead managers to pro- duce such poor quality feedback.

Flawed Feedback

All too often, performance feedback is not useful for its intended purpose. For example, the nonac- tionable feedback statements below were made by senior managers from organizations large and small. Typically, this feedback was provided to the authors (in our capacity as executive coaches) as part of an interview 360-degree process, to then share with our clients as a part of their 360-degree feedback.

• We just can't trust Bill. • Pat does not stand firm. • Jane is not a team player and is contentious. • Phil is a poor manager. • Lane is unprofessional. • Jerry is not committed. • Ted adds no value.

Most of these initial feedback statements were made as we interviewed a full circle of parties (superiors, peers, subordinates, and sometimes customers), in a series of individual key person interviews. We usually started with a common set of questions that addressed areas such as strengths, weaknesses, and suggestions for im- provements, with ample opportunity for other com- ments. We then planned to debrief our clients from these interviews in a facilitated feedback session, designed to help them understand the data and plan the next steps.

Clients could conduct these interviews them- selves, but often choose not to due to the time demands, their lack of skill, or the desire to take advantage of the neutrality that a third party can provide. If threatening issues are involved, a

skilled third party, who has established rapport and assurances that confidences will be main- tained, may create an environment in which less filtering takes place and more valid data is pro- duced. However, although the role of third party may have particular advantages, the insights in this article are designed to help enhance the abil- ity of individuals to function in any of the three roles of feedback giver, feedback receiver, or third party.

When the managers provided the feedback above, they perceived it as accurate and useful. However, we will next illustrate several shared counterproductive features of these feedback statements that limit their usefulness.

1. Attacks the Person Rather Than the Person's Behavior

This feedback is likely to be taken as a personal attack by the receiver because it criticizes the per- son or the person's character rather than address- ing the behavior that is problematic. The feedback giver's attribution appears to be intemal (assign- ing blame to the person rather than the situation) and stable (consistent across situations). Receivers often experience this kind of feedback as sending the message: "You are a fundamentally flawed, bad, or useless person, and that is just your na- ture." Such feedback tends to provoke a strong defensive emotional reaction.^"

In addition to provoking an immediate defensive reaction, feedback that focuses the receiver's at- tention on the "self" rather than the task or task learning tends to have a negative effect on subse- quent performance.21 Furthermore, this kind of in- temal, stable formulation may be experienced by the receivers as suggesting that they are not capa- ble of change, and this can be discouraging to the receiver.

An altemative style of formulating the feedback may be equally if not more accurate and is likely to result in a more productive outcome. A typical feedback formulation might be something like "You are sloppy." Alternatively, the feedback could be formulated along the following line: "I believe an alternative way of handling this situation would lead to better results." By beginning the message with "I" rather than "you," the focus is less on blaming the other and more on helping the receiver understand the perceptions of the feed- back giver. This format also focuses attention on the task and on an opportunity for producing better results. This is also more likely to lead to a con- structive dialogue.

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2. Vague or Abstract Assertions

Although we may get the general picture of the problem, the feedback above is rather vague or abstract and could be interpreted in many different ways. For example, when the statement "We can't trust Bill" is made, we do not know whether it means: 1) that Bill is suspected of stealing from the company; or 2) that he acts on self-interest instead of the interest of the company; or 3) that he is well-intentioned but not sufficiently skilled to de- liver on his commitments. Each of these interpre- tations could have very different implications.

This vagueness makes the feedback difficult to interpret correctly. It also may encourage defen- siveness because the fact that it is difficult to in- terpret may lead the receiver to see it as inaccurate and falsely accusational.

3. Without Illustrations

This feedback is also stated without illustrations or examples of what specific things these individ- uals do that leads the feedback givers to see them this way. Illustrations or examples may be essen- tial for enabling the recipients to make a concrete connection with what the feedback giver is talking about. Illustrations and examples make the feed- back more understandable and may also help to clarify what the implications for action might be.

4. Ill-Defined Range of Application

Another limitation is that the feedback is global, without any clarification about the conditions un- der which the problematic behavior does or does not exhibit itself. We do not know whether this problematic behavior is exhibited almost all the time in almost all situations or whether it is only exhibited under certain conditions. Also, if it is the latter, there is no specificity or clarification as to the conditions under which it is exhibited and those under which it is not exhibited. For example, in the feedback above when Lane is described as "unprofessional," we do know whether the feed- back giver finds Lane unprofessional in virtually everything he says and does, or just in some particular area. The behavior of concern might exhibit itself only when making presentations to new employees, when dealing with a particular member of the office staff, or with how raggedly he dresses on casual Fridays. Without more specificity, the receiver does not get a clear pic- ture of the target area of the feedback or of what needs to be changed and what can be left as it is. These types of global or blanket statements often

produce defensiveness because, if the recipients can think of even one situation to which the feedback does not apply, they may feel justified in seeing the feedback as inaccurate and in see- ing themselves as being unfairly attacked.

5. Unclear Impact and Implications for Action

Not only are we missing specific examples of what the person does, we also have no clarity on what the feedback giver sees as the impact of this be- havior and why it is problematic. Therefore, we have little sense of what allegedly dysfunctional consequences are being produced, why this is im- portant, and what should be done to fix the prob- lem. The feedback is not accompanied by indica- tions of what specific behavioral changes are desired from these recipients. Therefore, the recip- ients may have difficulty inferring from this feed- back what is desired of them and how they can rectify the situation.

In sum, these feedback examples have a number of characteristics that limit their actionability. Ironically, even experienced managers commonly produce feedback that is given with intent of being helpful that has these same general characteris- tics. Each of the feedback givers in the cases above observed the receiver's behavior over a consider- able period of time and had many interactions on which to base their conclusions. Thus, each giver should have been able to give multiple illustra- tions of the behavior that was of concern and that led to their conclusion. Instead, they merely stated their conclusions in a way that was not particu- larly helpful to learning or action. What leads even successful, experienced, highly educated, and highly motivated managers to provide feedback with so many limitations?

Cognitive and Emotional Dynamics Impacting Feedback Givers

Not only do cognitive and emotional dynamics lead people to produce poor quality feedback, they also interfere with our ability to assess the quality of our own feedback. Therefore, managers have a hard time knowing what to do differently to make their feedback more actionable.

J. Inference-Making Limitations

An understanding of human inference-making and sense-making should begin with the recognition that people are constantly flooded with informa-

2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 125

tion from their five senses. Attending to and pro- cessing all the information would be overwhelm- ing. Instead, people have learned to be selective about where they focus their attention. So, without even having consciously to attend to this process, our minds naturally select observations or bits of information on which to focus, and we make inter- pretations of what these mean. This happens so quickly and so automatically that we are usually unaware that we are even doing it. Argyris pro- vided a helpful metaphor for this process, which he calls the ladder of inference.22 Figure 2 depicts Argyris' ladder of inference with a few additional refinements that were made by McArthur, Putnam, and Smith of Action Design.23 In making infer- ences, people start with objective data and obser- vations and then move up the ladder a s they select what data to focus on and how to interpret it. Fig- ure 3 illustrates how very different interpretations can be made from the same data. In this case, Ellen had been conducting performance appraisals; and her boss made the following statement: "Perfor- mance appraisals aren't easy. Giving honest feed- back as a part of performance appraisal is really important. Of course, you still have to be some- what diplomatic with people nowadays." Depend- ing on where she focused her attention and what assumptions she made, she could just as easily come to either of two opposite conclusions ("I need to be more sensitive next time" or "I need to be

tougher next time") that are listed at the top of the ladder.

2. Attributional Biases

When making inferences about other people's be- havior, a number of attributional biases or errors may be in operation.^* As was mentioned above with the "actor/observer bias," managers are typically bi- ased toward making internal (personal vs. situa- tional) attributions, and this increases the likelihood that the feedback will come across as a personal attack.25 Further, if the manager's attributions focus on a stable cause, such as lack of ability or a person- ality trait, the feedback may leave the receiver feel- ing discouraged about the prospects for change. An- other attributional bias, the "false-consensus bias," suggests that people overestimate the likelihood that others will see things the same way they do.̂ ^ Thus, managers are likely both to make overly critical or blaming internal attributions and to fail to recognize that others may not agree with these attributions. Failure to recognize the gap between our conclu- sions and others' conclusions, when combined with the human tendency to be overconfident in the accu- racy of our own conclusions, reduces the feedback giver's ability to see the need to provide more con- crete, useful information to the receiver.

Decide what to do

Explain/evaluate what's happening

Name what's happening

Paraphrase the data

Select data

Available Data Figure 2

Ladder of Inference

126 Academy of Management Executive May

Decide What to Do

I need to be tougher next time. |p«( M ^ I need to be more sensitive next time.

Explain/Evaluate What"s Happening |

The manager is trying to help me give better feedback by encouraging

me to be more direct.

The manager is giving me feedback about the importance of directness

The manager has reservations about the amount of directness in

my feedback.

"Giving honest feedback as a part of performance appraisal is

really important."

Name What's Happening

The manager is trying to help me give better feedback by encouraging me to

be more sensitive.

The manager is giving me feedback about the importance of sensitivity.

The manager has reservations about the amount of sensitivity in

my feedback.

"You still have to be somewhat diplomatic with people nowadays."

Ellen's Manager states: "Performance appraisals aren't easy. Giving honest feedback as a part of performance appraisal is really important. Of course,

you still have to be somewhat diplomatic with people nowadays."

Figure 3 Ladder of Inference Example: Ellen's Feedback

3. Overconfidence Inference-making is a natural process that people use minute-by-minute in their daily lives, and it tends to serve people fairly well—it enables peo- ple quickly to assess situations and decide how to handle them. This might not be so problematic if it were not for human overconfidence. The ob- servation that people tend to be overconfident in the accuracy of their perceptions is a very robust finding in the psychological literature.^'^ Its rele- vance here is that people tend to forget that their conclusions about other people are not cold, hard facts, but are actually inferences made using the imperfect lens of subjectively filtered informa- tion with possible biases and misinterpretations. Instead, people often make little distinction be- tween their own perceptions and reality. Accord-

ingly, we tend to expect others to see things the same way we do. Consistent with the "false- consensus bias" mentioned above, it is as if peo- ple are thinking "If it is obvious to me, it should be obvious to them too."

Because people think that their perceptions of others are obviously correct, they often do not feel the need to explain or illustrate how they arrived at their negative conclusions. Feedback givers tend to forget that they may be missing something as a result of incomplete data, misinterpretation, or relying on a faulty assumption. Thus, the infer- ence making process (as illustrated by the ladder of inference), bias, and overconfidence create gaps in perception that lead feedback givers to produce poor quality feedback and to be unable to see what is wrong with their own feedback.

2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 127

4. Third-Party Perspective Differences

As Chris Argyris has demonstrated, a person's in- volvement in designing feedback influences his or her ability to assess its quality.^s When people design feedback they tend not to see the flaws in the feedback that they personally developed. How- ever, when they are observing the feedback given by someone else, they are able more easily to rec- ognize its limitations. For example, the limitations of the feedback above are not difficult for others to see. In fact, each individual who gave the above feedback might be able to look at the feedback the others gave and recognize its limitations. However, when they look at their own feedback, they tend to have a difficult time seeing those same limita- tions. People see their conclusions as obvious and self-evident, and they expect others to see things the same way. By contrast, a more neutral observer can often view the situation more objectively and can readily identify the limitations in the feedback that the feedback giver is constructing. This diffi- culty in seeing the limitations of our own feedback is a key reason why managers produce poor-qual- ity feedback.

As a result of the inference-making limitations, attributional biases, overconfidence, and third- party perspective differences described above, feedback givers tend to be insufficiently aware of how large a gap may exist between their percep- tions and those of the receiver. Thus, feedback givers tend not to prepare sufficiently to play the role of educator when giving feedback. We tend not to ask the question: "What examples, evidence, or data will the other person need in order to make an informed judgment as to the accuracy of my assertion?" Instead, although managers recognize that the recipient will not want to hear critical feedback, they tend to expect that, once they get past the initial upset, the nature of the problem and the solution should be somewhat self-evident to the recipient.29 By contrast, in many critical feed- back situations, people have sharply different per- ceptions about the status quo, the desirable alter- native, and what should be done to get

5. Strong Emotions Can Impact Ratings and Feedback Formulation and Delivery

Although emotions may be most intense for those receiving feedback, they can also be strong and influential for those giving feedback.3' The feed- back givers' emotions can influence performance ratings, formulation of feedback, and delivery of feedback. Any of these can affect how the receiver responds to the feedback. Emotions that affect the

feedback giving process could potentially come from many possible sources.̂ 2 For example, man- agers have their own unrelated personal problems and stresses. Irritation may be exacerbated by their personal anxieties about giving feedback and the frustration that has built up because they waited too long to address the problem. Managers may be affected by their working relationship and working history with the subordinate,33 their de- pendence on the subordinate, the subordinate's past performance, and their attributions regarding subordinate performance.^*

Interpersonal affect, and to a lesser extent mood, have been shown to affect performance ratings.^^ The way that managers make sense of subordinate shortcomings can also affect feedback. Managers are more likely to be punitive when they make internal (personal vs. situational) attributions as to their subordinates' shortcomings.^^ Manager feed- back can also be influenced by whether they be- lieve the subordinate's behavior has impacted them. Managers who believe both that they have been affected negatively by a subordinate and that the cause was lack of effort provide feedback that is more punitive than it would be otherwise.^''

Occasionally, managers let their emotions get the best of them and spontaneously lash out at a subordinate. Feedback that is delivered merely as a by-product of a manager letting off steam is unlikely to generate a constructive response. Feed- back tends to be most helpful when it is given with the intent of development,^^ and the way feedback is crafted or delivered might affect the way the receiver perceives the giver's intent. When feed- back givers make clear that their intent is to de- velop employees and coaching is provided to sup- port that development, employees are especially likely to use feedback to achieve performance

Other managers are aware that subordinates can react strongly to feedback and may even use that knowledge to provoke a response. For exam- ple, researchers have found that accuracy is not always a primary goal of the appraisal, and some managers have deliberately distorted ratings in a negative direction with the intention of "shocking" the subordinate into better performance or of teaching a subordinate a "lesson."*° Such feedback might make a point, but would not necessarily be constructive.^'

In sum, strong feelings from a variety of causes may be another factor contributing to the poor quality and harshness of the feedback above. Next, we will turn our attention to illustrating how an understanding of these cognitive and emotional

128 Academy of Management Executive May

dynamics can be used to produce feedback that is more actionable.

Producing Actionable Feedback

One useful leverage point for improving feedback involves drawing on the strengths of a third-party described above. Specifically, the perception gaps that inhibit our ability to see the problems with our own feedback tend not to inhibit our ability to see the problems with feedback given by others, pro- vided we are in a dispassionate observer role. A third-party perspective and an understanding of the ladder of inference can be extremely helpful in assisting a feedback giver in designing more ac- tionable feedback.

To illustrate how this works, we draw on data from our own coaching experience. As noted above, we prefer to gather 360-degree feedback through key person interviews. One reason is that we have found that written comments (or "verba- tims") in response to 360-degree survey instru- ments are often not very actionable. Similarly, the initial feedback statement in an interview is often of poor quality as discussed above. However, the interview format enables us to ask questions that help the feedback giver to produce more specific, valid data and thus produce more actionable feed- back for the receiver. In particular, we use our third-party perspective and our understanding of the ladder of inference to help feedback givers recall and clarify the data, observations, exam- ples, or experiences upon which they based their conclusions about the receiver.

The first three feedback statements in bullet- points above ("We just can't trust Bill," "Pat does not stand firm," and "Jane is not a team player and is contentious") are examples of the initial feed- back that was given in key person interviews. Now, we will illustrate how a third-party perspective can be used to assist the feedback giver in moving down the ladder of inference in order to produce more actionable feedback.

In the next section, we share more of the context of each case, the questions that we asked the feed- back givers in order to assist them in giving more actionable feedback, and the eventual feedback that was reported. We have found that a useful way to begin is simply to ask the feedback givers to share some specific examples of what leads them to see the receiver the way they do. This helps the feedback givers to move down the ladder of inference. We also believe that these questions help to reduce the feedback giver's overconfi- dence, attributional bias, and irritation toward the receiver.

Case #1: "We just can't trust Bill"

Context: The owner of an entrepreneurial busi- ness expressed concems about Bill's (Chief Oper- ations Officer) trustworthiness. As the owner was questioned, more clarity emerged about how he perceived Bill as a roadblock to new ventures.

Dialogue

Owner: We just can't trust Bill. Coach: Can you give an example of what Bill

does that leads you to conclude that you can- not trust him?

Owner: He is constantly criticizing. Coach: Can you give me some examples? Owner: In our meeting last week, we discussed

two new ventures. He was overly critical, rais- ing all potential problems he could think of and did not say anything to acknowledge the importance of growing through new ventures.

Coach: Are there other examples of being overly critical other than with new ventures?

Owner: Well, actually he is just fine on the day- to-day operations. It is really just on the new ventures, but the new ventures are really im- portant to our company.

Coach: OK, and can you clarify how you would like him to behave if he believes he sees a legitimate problem with an idea?

Owner: Well, his technical skills are good, and we do want his critiques, but we also want to know what strengths he sees and what it would take for him to put his full support be- hind an idea.

Eventually the feedback was reported as fol- lows: When it comes to new ventures, the owner sees you raising a number of reservations, but not sharing what you see as strengths or clarifying the conditions under which you could fully support a new idea. For example, . . . Therefore, he is not clear whether there are any conditions under which you would support a new idea. In the future, he would like you to share your thoughts on both the assets and the liabilities of new ideas. He would also like you to clarify the conditions under which you would be willing to support a new ven- ture.

The initial feedback was abstract and would likely have been resented by Bill because saying someone cannot be trusted is a very serious charge and may have been experienced as a personal attack on his character. However, asking the owner for specific examples helped to lead him down the

2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 129

ladder of inference and enabled him to make his feedback more actionable.

Case #2: "Pat does not stand firm."

Context: Pat, a Senior Vice President and the director of financial reporting in a Fortune 50 com- pany, had been successful but had not advanced recently, and it did not appear that he was being groomed for further advancement. In short, his ca- reer seemed stalled. Therefore, Pat initiated the 360-degree evaluation in order to explore what might be blocking his advancement and what, if anything, he could do about it. The pivotal key person interview took place with the corporate Vice Chairman, who oversaw the finance and risk management function and served a s Pat's 3-up boss (Pat reported to the comptroller, who reported to the CFO, who reported to the Vice Chairman).

Dialogue

Vice Chairman: Pat does not stand firm. Coach: I get the general idea. What would be an

example of not standing firm? Vice Chairman: Well, that is hard to say, but let

me illustrate. When Pat's boss comes in to review our 4*̂^ quarter earnings release, we may have ideas about how to goose up the numbers a little and make things look a little better for the quarter. Many of these ideas might be perfectly fine, but if any of them were ever to stretch into a grey area, we would have to count on the comptroller to say, "That is going too far, and I will not sign that." I fear that Pat would not stand firm against the ideas of top management the way his boss does.

Coach: What leads you to see him this way? Vice Chairman: Well, he is affable, amiable, and

anxious to please and does not have sharp elbows.

Coach: OK, I can see how you would wonder about him. However, I still am not getting a clear picture. Is this a demonstrated weakness or just an untested skill? Can you think of anything Pat h a s done that leads you to con- clude that this is a demonstrated weakness?

Vice Chairman: (Pauses to contemplate for mo- ment, then shakes his head no.) That is a good distinction. I think it is an untested skill.

Coach: OK, so you believe it is an untested skill. Do you have ideas about how you could test it?

Vice Chairman: No, not for now. Coach: OK, let's continue the interview . . . Vice Chairman: (About five minutes later he in-

terrupts his own train of thought) Wait, I have

an idea how we can test it. We will give Pat a job which demands that he demonstrate those skills!

Coach: Great, what job would that be? Vice Chairman: Well, I'm not sure specifically

now, but we should probably shift Pat to a CFO function for one of our big businesses to create a fair test.

The surprise outcome in this case was that the Vice Chairman, upon further reflection, realized that Pat had never actually been tested, and he decided to give Pat the opportunity to prove him- self. The questions clarified why the Vice Chair- man was concerned about Pat, but also clarified that Pat had never actually exhibited the quality that he was perceived as having. Our goal was not to advocate a point of view. We were only trying to gather valid data. However, this case illustrates what a powerful impact a few questions can have on the feedback giver's overconfidence.

This dialogue was shared with Pat, and a few months later he was offered a new position and accepted it. The expectations for the new position were made clear, and Pat had an opportunity to prove himself. Since then, Pat made a successful transition to the new position, as described else-

Case #3: "Jane is not a team player and is conten- tious."

We will share a final case in summary form to provide one additional illustration of how feed- back can become more actionable as feedback giv- ers are assisted in coming down their ladders of inference.

Context: Jane was an Executive Vice President who was fairly new to a huge privately held firm with strong traditions and cultural expectations for how things should and should not be done. The initial feedback given was that she was not a team player and was contentious. In this case the piv- otal key person interview came with Jane's boss, the president of one of the firm's leading business units.

Dialogue

President: Jane is not a team player and is con- tentious

Coach: Can you give an example of what Jane does that leads you to conclude that she is not a team player and is contentious?

President: She is inappropriately challenging and disruptive.

Coach: Can you give me an example of that?

130 Academy of Management Executive May

President: Well, she publicly shared reserva- tions in my top management meeting about a project that was really already decided on. You see, by the time an issue gets to the top team meeting, it should already be decided on. These meetings are more symbolic and more like just giving a blessing to the plan. Rather than making the effort to work out potential disagreements before the meeting, she waited until it was basically a done deal, and then publicly challenged it.

After asking a few more questions we clarified that the feedback giver was mainly concerned about her behavior within the context of top man- agement team meetings. His request was that she bring her disagreements to him in private to work them out prior to top team meetings. This feedback was much more actionable than his original state- ment. Jane learned that she had misread the cul- ture of this organization and the expectations sur- rounding the top team meetings. Coming from another organization, she had expected that the top team meetings would be problem solving ses- sions to jointly thrash out differences among the President and his key lieutenants on the team. Instead, the President saw these top team meet- ings as blessing sessions, to ratify decisions reached earlier with each of the relevant Executive Vice Presidents. Compounding the problem, Jane's boss had never informed her about his expecta- tions. Similarly, none of her new peers pointed out these unstated expectations either. Thanks to her 360-degree feedback, Jane finally had clarity on what her boss wanted from her.

In sum, we relied on our third-party perspective and knowledge of the ladder of inference and at- tributional bias to help feedback givers retrace their own inference making process to get more concrete, valid data. We also applied our coaching skills by listening first, asking searching ques- tions, and then providing actionable feedback that could be easily assimilated and acted upon. Com- pared to the original feedback statements, the re- crafted feedback was framed less as a personal attack, was less vague, had more specific illustra- tions, a clearer range of application, and more specific implications for action. When it was re- ported, it was received constructively.

In addition, and while difficult to gauge, we be- lieve that this process reduced the intensity of the givers' negative emotions and their overconfi- dence. Whereas some of the initial feedback state- ments were accompanied by a tone of voice, body language, or facial expression that suggested irri- tation with the receiver, these indicators seemed

much more subdued and the givers more reflective after the questioning. Also, some feedback givers have volunteered in the course of interview ses- sions to have arrived at insights (and even an "Epiphany" about one of our clients) during a key person interview. The case with the Vice Chairman is a particularly powerful illustration of reducing overconfidence. Although he started out blaming Pat, he eventually ended up taking personal re- sponsibility for not having tested his attribution about Pat; and he even provided an opportunity for Pat to prove himself.

Putting This Knowledge to Work: Towards an Actionable Feedback Environment

In the cases described above, the third party was hired both to gather and deliver the feedback. However, many organizations may not choose to allocate resources to doing 360-degree feedback with key person interviews; alternatively, manag- ers may need or want to formulate and deliver their own feedback. This final section of the paper illustrates how understanding the cognitive and emotional dynamics described above can be use- ful to managers who need or choose to take the initiative for formulating and delivering feedback themselves.

We believe that understanding these dynamics and their assets and liabilities for each of the three roles of feedback giver, feedback receiver, and third party is important for developing an action- able feedback environment. We will explain the common vulnerabilities associated with each role and how understanding the dynamics can assist a manager in any of these roles to support the devel- opment of actionable feedback.

Feedback Giving Role

As was illustrated above, the feedback that man- agers spontaneously give is often not very action- able and tends to produce defensiveness, hard feelings, and meager learning. Without an aware- ness of the cognitive and emotional dynamics in play, managers have a difficult time knowing why their feedback is not working, and many learn to avoid giving feedback.

By contrast, managers who understand these dy- namics can take a more informed approach to giv- ing feedback.*^ Rather than attribute defensive- ness to the receiver's unwillingness to face the truth, they can see that defensiveness may be pro- voked by the poor quality of their feedback. In addition, they are aware that feedback that is more

2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 131

actionable will produce less defensiveness, more learning, and better results.

With an understanding of these dynamics, they can become aware that they may not be good judges of the quality of their own feedback. They also recognize that subordinates are affected by their own cognitive and emotional dynamics and may have difficulty learning from feedback that is not formulated and delivered effectively. In addi- tion, they also become aware that a third party can be a great asset by being better able to see and point out the limitations in the feedback that the managers are working to refine.

Of course, a skilled coach or human resource professional can be very helpful here. A skilled facilitator can help more quickly to achieve action- able feedback. However, whether the person has training or not, merely having a third-party per- spective in and of itself can be helpful. The observ- ers can at least point out what is not clear, explain how they imagine the feedback would be inter- preted, and describe how it might impact the re- ceiver. In addition, a third party who understands the ladder of inference can help the feedback giver move down the ladder to produce more concrete and specific feedback.

Furthermore, if a third party is not readily avail- able, managers can now have the basic insights necessary to produce better feedback on their own. They are aware that they retrace the steps in their own inference-making process by walking down the ladder of inference while watching for overcon- fidence, attributional biases, and emotional bag- gage. The following are good questions we can ask ourselves to get down the ladder and improve our feedback:

• How did I arrive at this conclusion? • What illustrations, examples, etc. would I need

to share with the other person in order for him or her to understand why I see it this way?

• Under what conditions have I observed this be- havior?

• What do I see as the specific, undesirable con- sequences of this behavior?

• What would be the most constructive way to help this person achieve better results?

• How might my emotions be affecting my evalu- ation and intentions?

If a feedback giver nonetheless experiences a de- fensive reaction, a knowledge of the cognitive and emotional dynamics may enable them to handle it more constructively. Specifically, they understand why the receiver might be skeptical of the feed- back; thus, they are more likely to inquire into what other data or examples the receiver might

find useful in assessing the validity of the feed- back.

In addition, a technique that can be helpful is formulating feedback using an "I" message. Peo- ple tend to formulate feedback starting with "You," such as "You are . . . , " "You did . . . , " or "You caused . . . , " and such feedback tends to be received as an attack. By contrast, formulating feedback using an "I" message helps the feedback giver to "own"— acknowledge and take personal responsibility for—his or her emotional reactions that might af- fect the way they formulate and give the feedback. This can help managers keep focused on the task and task learning while producing feedback that is less harsh and attacking.

To illustrate how an "I" message could make the feedback more constructive, consider the following initial thought that a manager might have and how it can be transformed using an "I" message. Upon observing deficient performance, a manager might have an immediate thought such as: "You would have to be a complete idiot to handle that situation the way you did, or maybe you just don't give a damn about your performance. Either way, you better not do that again." If the manager were to share this thought, it would likely provoke a defensive reaction. Now consider the following ex- ample that illustrates how the feedback could be formulated more constructively using an "I" mes- sage:

/ fee] fiustiated because I perceive that the way this situation was handled may have (fill in the blank. . .damaged my credibility with my own boss, or caused us not to hit our sales target, etc.). I would like to have a discussion in which we clarify what happened, under- stand why, and explore what we can do to keep this from happening in the future.

In sum, understanding the cognitive and emo- tional dynamics associated with giving and re- ceiving feedback puts managers in a better posi- tion to navigate the feedback territory. They know the direction they need to go, what to watch out for, and what resources can help them. Consequently, they are more likely to go into feedback sessions better prepared, with a more open and less conde- scending attitude, and be better able to manage defensive reactions if they occur.

Feedback Receiving Role

Although we have focused primarily on the role for the feedback giver, managers typically have bosses of their own and thus also become feedback recipients. Thus, managers may also be vulnera-

132 Academy of Management Executive May

ble to the same cognitive and emotional dynamics their subordinates face in receiving feedback. However, understanding these dynamics may en- able managers to recognize the importance of striking a balance between maintaining positive self-perceptions and periodically adjusting self- perceptions for the sake of learning.

Another complication is that their bosses may not understand the cognitive and emotional dy- namics that affect feedback givers, and thus may give feedback that is not actionable and that may not even be accurate. The typical receiver might feel unfairly attacked and also might feel stuck, not wanting to seem defensive, but not wanting to accept inaccurate feedback. However, with an un- derstanding of the cognitive and emotional dy- namics, the receiver is more capable of recogniz- ing that the giver may have misperceptions but may also have some helpful observations that should be uncovered. Rather than feel stuck, the receiver can ask questions that will help the giver move down the ladder of inference and provide more actionable feedback. For example, the re- ceiver can ask questions such as:

• Could you give me an example of the behavior that concems you?

• Can you help me understand how you came to that conclusion?

• Can you help me understand the situations in which you have seen the behavior and what you see as the impact?

• Can you clarify what you would like to see me do differently?

One additional common problem is that many managers fear giving critical feedback, so they avoid doing so.̂ "* Under these conditions, receivers will not learn unless they proactively seek feed- back. With an understanding of the dynamics and with a set of questions to ask to help facilitate the development of actionable feedback, the receiver is better positioned to ask for feedback and receive a useful response.

quality feedback by asking the kinds of questions that we illustrated in the three cases above. Such questions help feedback givers come down their ladder of inference and produce feedback that is more actionable. The same kinds of questions as described above can be helpful:

• Could you give me an example of the behavior that concerns you?

• Can you help me understand how you came to that conclusion?

• Can you help me understand the situations in which you have seen the behavior and what you see as the impact?

• Can you clarify what you would like to see this receiver do differently?

In addition to assisting in the formulation of feed- back, third parties can help feedback givers pre- pare by role playing possible reactions that the receiver might have and coaching the giver on how to deal with them constructively. Third parties might ask themselves the follow îng question: "What would I be feeling if I received that feed- back and why would it provoke that reaction?" Reporting their answers to this question could pro- vide an additional valuable source of data for the feedback provider. Furthermore, in cases where troubled communication between the giver and re- ceiver exists, third parties could also sit in on the feedback session and intervene as necessary.

One of the main complications for third parties is that they may not feel knowledgeable or skilled enough to assist. However, the third parties have potential value even if they lack training. In such cases, they can simply empathize with how they would feel if they were receiving the feedback, and respond with statements such as: "If I received that feedback, I would be puzzled as to what you wanted me to do differently. Could you be more specific?" Although this kind of trial-and-error ap- proach may not be elegant, it may still help feed- back givers to be more constructive than they would be otherwise.

Third-Party Role

Given the vulnerabilities associated with both the giver and the receiver role, a third party who does not have strong emotions about the situation can offer a more objective perspective that can be in- valuable to those who are giving and receiving feedback. Third parties can be especially helpful if they understand the cognitive and emotional dy- namics associated with the other roles and if they have some training in how to intervene. Third par- ties can help feedback givers to formulate better

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have explained that critical feed- back delivery often tums out to be more painful and less useful than it should be. This is because cognitive and emotional dynamics lead feedback givers to produce poor quality feedback and lead them to have difficulty seeing the weaknesses of their feedback. At the same time, the cognitive and emotional reactions experienced by receivers can provoke extreme negative reactions even to accu- rate feedback. Through understanding these dy-

2005 Cannon and Witherspoon 133

namics, enlisting third parties, and self-question- ing, managers can deliver more actionable feedback that produces greater learning, less de- fensiveness, and more appropriate action.

Endnotes

' Tesser, A., & Rosen, S, 1975. The reluctance to transmit bad news. In Berkowitz, L. (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (vol. 8). New York: Academic Press; Bond, C , & Anderson, E. 1987. The reluctance to transmit bad news: Private discomfort or public display? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 73(2): 199-207.

^ DeNisi, A., & Kluger, A. 2000. Feedback effectiveness: Can 360-degree appraisals be improved? Academy of Management Executive, 14(1): 129-139; Audia, P., & Locke, E. 2003. Benefiting from negative feedback. Human Resource Management Review, 13(4): 631-646.

^London, M. (1995) Giving feedback: Source-centered ante- cedents and consequences of constructive and destructive feed- back. Human Resource Management Review. 5(3): 159-188; With hindsight, co-workers see warning signs of L.A. killing. San Francisco Chronicle, 31 July 1995.

''Locke and Latham (1990) note that the importance of feed- back for improving performance is "well-established if not one of the best-established findings in the psychological literature" (p. 173) Locke, E., & Latham, G. 1990. A theory of goal setting and task performance. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

^ Michaels, E., Handfield-Jones, H., & Axelrod, B. 2001. The war for talent. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 100.

^ McCall notes that the learning the right lessons from expe- rience is not "automatic." See McCall, M. W. 2004. Leadership development through experience. Academy of Management Ex- ecutive, 18(3): 127-130.

^ Kluger, A., & DeNisi, A. 1996. The effects of feedback inter- ventions on performance: A historical review, a meta-analysis, and a preliminary feedback intervention theory. Psychological Bulletin, 119(2): 254-284.

^ Mintzberg, H. 2004. Managers not MBAs: A hard look at the soft practice of managing and management development. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

'° With hindsight, co-workers see warning signs of L.A. kill- ing. San Francisco Chronicle, 31 July 1995, A17; Jackman, J., & Strober, M. 2003. Fear of feedback. Harvard Business Review. 81(4): 101-107.

" Martinko, M., & Gardner, W. 1987. The leader/member at- tribution process. Academy of Management Review, 12(2): 235- 249.

'̂ Brown, J. D. 1991. Accuracy and bias in self-knowledge. In Snyder, C.R., & Forsyth, D.R. (Eds.), Handbook of social and clinical psychology; 158-178. New York: Pergammon.

'̂ Miller, D., & Ross, M. 1975. Self-serving biases in attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychoiogicai BuiJetin, 82: 213-225.

'" Jones, E., & Nisbett, R. 1972. The actor and the observer: Divergent perceptions of the causes of behavior. In Jones, E., Kanouse, D., Kellye, H., Nisbett, S., Valins, S., & Weiner, B. (Eds.), Attribution; Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

'^Martinko & Gardner, 1987, op. cit. '^Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., &

McDowell, N. K. 2003. Portrait of the self-enhancer: Well ad- justed and well liked or maladjusted and friendless. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(1): 165-176; Mezulis, A. H., Abramson, L. Y., Hyde, J. S., & Hankin, B. L. 2004. Is there a univer-

sal positivity bias in attributions?: A meta-analytic review of in- dividual, developmental, and cultural differences in the self-serv- ing attributional bias. Psychoiogicai Bulletin, 130(5): 711-747.

'̂ Bandura, A. 1990. Reflections on nonability determinants of competence. In Stemberg, R.J., & Kolligan, J. (Eds.), Competence considered: 315-362. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Miller, D. T. 1976. Ego involvement and attributions for success and failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol- ogy, 34: 901-906.

'^Staw, B,, Sandelands, L,, & Dutton, J. 1981. Threat-rigidity effects in organizational behavior: A multilevel analysis. Ad- ministrative Science Quarterly, 26(4): 501-524.

^° Moss, S. E., & Sanchez, J. I. 2004. Are your employees avoid- ing you? Managerial strategies for closing the feedback gap. Academy of Management Executive, 18(1): 32-44,

^' DeNisi & Kluger, 2000, op. cit. ^̂ Argyris, C. 1982. Reasoning, iearning, and action. San Fran-

cisco: Jossey-Bass ^̂ Philip McArthur, Robert Putnam, and Diana McLain Smith

of Action Design made additional refinements in Argyris ladder of inference and provide helpful information regarding how the ladder of inference and other Argyris concepts can be used effectively in practice. See actiondesign.com for further infor- mation.

^̂ Kunda, Z. 1999. Sociai cognition: Making sense of people. Cambridge: MIT Press.

^̂ Ilgen, D., & Davis, C. 2000. Bearing bad news: Reactions to negative performance feedback. Applied Psychology, 49(3): 550- 515; Moss, S., Valenzi, E., & Taggart, W. 2003, Are you hiding from your boss? The development of a taxonomy and instru- ment to assess the feedback management behaviors of good and bad performers. Journal of Management, 29(4): 487-510.

®̂ Ross, L. 1977. The intuitive psychologist and his shortcom- ings: distortions in the attribution process. In Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Psychology (vol. 10); 173-219. New York: Academic Press.

^̂ Juslin, P., Winman, A., & Olsson, H. 2000. Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: A critical examination of the hard-easy effect. Psychoiogy Review, 107(2): 384-396.

^®See Argyris, C. 1982. Reasoning, learning, and action. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Argyris describes the process in this book. In addition, Argyris has taught the XA' case at Harvard Business School for many years, and he uses it to illustrate how observers can readily see the flaws in what the feedback giver is saying. However, when they are in the feedback giving role they are unable to see the flaws in their own feedback.

^̂ Argyris, C. 2004. On organizational learning (2"'' ed.). Mai- den, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

^° London, M. 1997. Job feedback: Giving, seeking, and using feedback for performance improvement. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

'̂ Forgas, J. 2003. Affective influences on attitudes and judg- ments. In Davidson, R., Scherer, K., & Goldsmith, H. (Eds.), Hand- booic of affective sciences; 596-618. New York: Oxford University Press.

^̂ Also see Musch, J., & Klauer, K, (Eds.). 2003. The psychology of evaluation: Affective processes in cognition and emotion. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

^̂ Fedor, D. B. 1989. Investigating supervisor attributions of subordinate performance. Journal of Management 15(3):405-416.

^̂ Moss, S. E., & Martinko, M. J, 1998. The effects of perfor- mance attributions and outcome dependence on leader feed- back behavior following poor subordinate performance. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 19: 259-274; London, M. (Ed). 2001. Howpeopie evaiuate others in organizations. Mahwah, NJ: Law- rence Erlbaum.

*̂ Robbins, T., & DeNisi, A, 1998. Mood vs. interpersonal af-

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feet: Identifying process and rating distortions in performance appraisal. Journal of Business and Psychology, 12(3): 313-325.

^̂ Mitchell, T., & Wood, R. 1980. Supervisor's responses to subordinate's poor performance: A test of an attributional model. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 25, 123-128.

^̂ Moss, S., & Martinko, M. 1998, op, cit. ^̂ DeNisi & Kluger, 2000, op. cit, ^̂ Luthans, F,, & Peterson, S, 2004, 360-degree feedback with

systematic coaching: Empirical analysis suggests a winning combination. Human Resource Management, 42(3): 243-256; Smither, J., London, M., Flautt, R,, Vargas, Y,, & Kucine, 2003, Can working with an executive coach improve multisource feedback ratings over time? A quasi-experimental field study. Personnel Psychology, 56(1): 23-44,

*° Longenecker, C , Sims, H,, & Gioia, D. 1987, Behind the mask: The politics of employee appraisal. Academy of Manage- ment Executive, 1(3): 183-193.

'" Baron, R. 1988. Negative effects of destructive criticism: Impact on conflict, self-efficacy, and task performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 73(2): 199-207.

"̂ See the "CFO Case" in Witherspoon, R, & Cannon, M.D. 2004, Coaching leaders in transition: Lessons from the field. In A. F. Buono (Ed.), Research in management consulting. Vol 4: Innovative perspectives in management consulting, 201-228, Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing,

•̂̂ Wiswell, A., & Lawrence, H, 1994. Intercepting managers' attributional bias through feedback-skills training. Human Re- source Development Quarterly, 5(1): 41-53.

^"Moss, S. E., & Sanchez, J. 1. 2004. Are Your Employees Avoiding You? Managerial Strategies for Closing the Feed- back Gap. Academy of Management Executive, 18(1): 32-44; Lee, F. 1993, Being polite and keeping MUM: How bad news is communicated in organizational hierarchies. Journal of Ap- plied Social Psychology, 23(14): 1124-1149; Longenecker, C , Sims, H,, & Gioia, D, 1987, Behind the mask: The politics of employee appraisal. Academy of Management Executive, 1(3): 183-193.

Mark D. Cannon is an Assistant Professor of Leadership, Policy and Organizations and of Human and Organizational Develop- ment at Vanderbilt University. He investigates barriers to learn- ing in organizational settings such as positive illusions, indi- vidual and organizational defenses, and barriers to learning from failure. He has published recently on executive coaching topics, including coaching leaders in transition. He received his Ph,D. in Organizational Behavior from Harvard, Contact: mark.d.cannon@vanderbilt,edu

Robert Witherspoon is a seasoned executive coach and Presi- dent of Performance & Leadership Development Ltd, in Wash- ington, D,C, As a coach to leaders and their organizations, he helps clients improve their business results by developing key people. He is the lead author of Four Essential Ways that Coach- ing Can Help Executives, a best seller from the Center for Creative Leadership. He holds advanced degrees from Prince- ton and University of Paris. Contact: [email protected]