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10 Conclusion On the possibility of a non- W estem international relations theory

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan

In the conclusion, we first offer some thoughts addressing the main question posed in this volume: the absence ofa non-Western IRT and possible explanations behind it. We then reflect on whether the question of a non-Western IRT is a meaning­ ful one, and whether the way it is approached in this collection could result in a productive debate that would advance the discipline of IR. Although our empir­ ical focus is on Asia, we suggest some insights that have more general relevance for non-Western IRT. To this end, we incorporate and compare insights from the Islamic world and reflections on the importance of world historical perspectives in advancing the prospects for non-Western IRT.

Why the absence of non-Western IRT?

The question why there is no non-Western IRT required us to look at a number of areas. First, what is meant by international relations theory in the different countries and regions? Second, what is the extent of Western dominance in these areas: are some countries under more such dominance than others? A related issue was to ascertain where there were Western-inspired theories which are more popular in a given country than in another. A third question is to compare the main non-Western sources ofIRT following our four-fold source matrix: classical ideas, the thinking of modem leaders and elites, attempts by IR scholars to apply Western theory to the local context (looking outside-in) and similar attempts by scholars to general­ ize from the local experience for an wider audience, but on its own terms (looking inside-out). In this section , we offer some generalizations about the reasons for the absence of non-Western IRT , in accordance with our five hypotheses:

1. Western IRT has discovered the right path to understanding IR. 2. Western IRT has acquired hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense. 3. Non-Western IR theories do exist, but are hidden. 4. Local conditions discriminate against the production ofIR theory. 5. The West has a big head start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up.

Perhaps the first point to make is that our driving question seems to be justified. There is not much current IR T to be found in Asia, even when using the broad

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definitions of IR and theory set out in our introduction. There is an abundance of pre-theoretical resources , but not all that much has been made of them and in some cases they have been largely forgotten or marginalized. We find Western domin­ ance to be a uniform factor in all cases; although it is difficult to rank countries or subregions in this way (South Korea does , however , seem to be an extreme case , where 'most IR theories have been imported from the West , especially the US' (Chun , Chapter 4). The real distinction seems to be degree of interest in theoret­ ical work per se, or the distinction between theoretical and atheoretical work. It is reasonable to assume that a great deal of work on international relations in Asia falls into the latter category , although this is changing , as economic and institu­ tional conditions in Asian countries develop. This , however , does not automatically translate into great appeal and room for non-Western IRT; indeed , the reverse may be the case. Scholars are more likely to tum to Western IRT first before they dis­ cover the possibility and sources of non-Western IRT. So it is reasonable to look to our five causal hypotheses to see what the case studies reveal.

There is no suggestion in any of the chapters that W estem IR T is unchallenge­ able because it has found the right path to understanding IR. Again , Korea comes close to invalidating our hypothesis; here Western IR theories , 'especially realism and security studies ... have been very helpful in explaining the reality of Korean international relations' (Chun , Chapter 4). But generally , IRT does not have the same standing as the natural sciences developed in the West. For them , their weight of authority broadly derives from an acceptance of method , agreement on epistemology and acceptance of the knowledge produced as either true , or able to deliver on explanations and predictions , or at least as the best approach available. At least some of the dissatisfaction and/or disinterest in IRT in Asia arises from the perception that Western IRT does not adequately capture the needs and conditions to be found in Asia . We sense growing realization and dissatisfaction about the lack of fit between W estem IR T and the local milieu , and this in tum suggests a clear link to the arguments of Badie (1992) about the highly imperfect way in which the Western state system was imposed on the Third World. Moreover , there is a real­ ization that the narrowness of Western IRT contributes to the marginalization not just of Asian scholars , but also of their countries. Interestingly , one manifestation of this is a sense of 'alienation' ( Acharya 2000), evident in the lack of interest in IRT in Asia. Arguably , this is part of the explanation for the atheoretical nature of work on international relations pertaining to Asia , because of the widespread view that IRT as it stands now has very limited applicability to Asia. Whether this is a matter of perception or reality can be debated , and to some extent , this is certainly a matter of perception (and a perfect excuse for not doing the hard work of mastering the IRT literature , especially in classrooms). But it is also a genuine concern in all the countries studied. The sense that IRT , not only as employed by Western scholars in their study of Asia , but also as used by local scholars in study­ ing their home country , contributes to the marginalization oflocal scholarship and the country itself is perhaps more acute in India , although a similar sense is evident in South Korea , Southeast Asia and China.

The case studies suggest that a much more powerful explanation for why there

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is no non-Western IRT in Asia is the hegemonic standing of Western IRT. Indeed, with the possible exception of China , this hegemony means that the expanding discipline of IR in Asia may generate more and not less Western dominance. The exception in China is qualified however , because of the peculiar dominance , at least in terms of the four cases studied here , of Marxist and Maoist ideology and worldview. But once China began its process ofreform and opened up to the world, its IR community almost naturally and quickly turned to Western theories and texts. It is only when the Chinese became increasingly aware and convinced of their emerging and 'unstoppable' status as a world power that they started looking to the possibility of a Chinese IRT , or at least at IRT with 'Chinese characteristics'. This may suggest the link between power and ideas applies as much to China as to the West , although we do not foresee a Chinese dominance of Asian IRT , in the way Western IRT has shaped global IRT. Apart from the fact , as will be seen later, that national approaches to the development ofIRT (including IRT in China , as Qin's essay shows) remain important , Chinese ideational dominance in East Asia, past and future , can be overstated , especially by those who imagine Asia's return to the benign power configurations of a tributary system (Kang 2003; Acharya 2004). More on the link between power and IRT later , except for an observation that in Southeast Asia, which has no aspiration to great power status , and where IRT has had less appeal (or where writings on IR tend to be more atheoretical than in Northeast Asia) , there too is a growing realization among the academic community that Western IRT inadequately captures regional dynamics that centre around efforts by a group of weaker states to construct a regional order binding the great powers of the current international system. This challenges the top-down conception of both power politics and multilateralism that has dominated Western IRT. Moreover , this disjuncture between the power bias of Western IRT and the regional dynamics of Southeast Asia cannot be appreciated by the 'modernization' perspective , which , as Alan Chong's essay shows , is commonly found in post-war theoretical framings of Southeast Asia's politics and international relations.

The conjecture that non-Western theories exist but are hidden from the public eye (in this case the global community ofIR scholars) is only marginally relevant to our overall question. Unless they are very well hidden indeed , even from the eyes of the locally based case-study authors , it is not the case that an undiscovered horde ofIR theoretical riches lies unrecognized in Asia. Language is no doubt a barrier , as much within Asia as between it and the West. The experience of Europe , where IR discourses in French and German (and to a lesser extent other languages) is not well integrated with the English-language mainstream (Friedrichs 2004) , suggests the language barrier problem will be difficult to overcome. Since in Asia , as in Europe , there is no local lingua franca , English is the most likely language to serve as common ground , but also one that reinforces Western hegemony. !RT-relevant material could also still lurk in places where the hegemonic form of IRT would not suggest that one look. But we suspect that while there are no doubt significant cultural barriers to entry from outside into the Western IR discourse , most of what is hidden is pre-theoretical resources rather than fully fledged 'Asian' conceptions of international relations.

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Our fourth hypothesis about local conditions discriminating against the develop­ ment ofIRT also seems powerful , though very varied in form from place to place. The paucity of institutions , journals , research cultures , career incentives , research resources and training facilities is especially acute in Southeast Asia ( other than Singapore), and is also a major problem in India. It would have been true of China until recently , but now the institutional side ofIR is developing rapidly there. The impact of how IR came to develop in particular countries is also influential , particu­ larly in terms of what discipline (e.g. political science , history , law, sociology , area studies) acted as the carrier for IR. Japan offers a quite different take on local condi­ tions , where there is an IR discourse , but it is quite inward-looking. The impact of local conditions extends to the economic predicament ofIR scholars, which often leads them to the path of policy-oriented research and writing. Indonesia offers a particularly stark example. Here , IR scholars not just shun theoretical studies for policy work or media appearances , but also enter politics.

The evidence from the Islamic Middle East only adds weight to our foregoing observations about why is there no non-Western IRT. Here too one finds the appar­ ently paradoxical situation in which no one seems to think Western IRT has found the right path , yet it has acquired hegemonic status. But unlike the Chinese case, the Islamic world , weak and divided as it is, cannot yet imagine overcoming this hege­ mony. One exception to the general observation that local conditions discriminate against the development of non-Western IRT is where local responses to external challenges prompt conceptual innovation and ideational shifts. Examples of this can be found in the codification ofrelations between Muslims and non-Muslims at the time of the Muslim conquests , and the revival and reinterpretation of classical sources that has been prompted by globalization.

The fifth hypothesis that the West has a head start is also powerful. Perhaps the main test here will be the challenge hypothesized in the China paper about the imminent rise ofa 'Chinese school' ofIR. Playing catch-up does not and need not mean that Asia is in a mere copying mode , whether it comes to developing theories of international relations or practices from which such theories can be derived. Copying may be part of the process , especially in its early phases , but there is room for divergent development. More on this in the next section.

One final point here concerns our assertion at the very outset that there is a grow­ ing recognition and dissatisfaction over the relevance of existing IR Ts in capturing and explaining the experience of the non-Western states and societies. Although this is no longer debatable , at least in terms of the findings of this project , there are differences on this question among the various IR theories. To be sure, this is not a project about the relative merits of realism , liberalism , constructivism or analytic eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001), but there are some insights of interest to those interested in the so-called great debates in IRT. No evidence emerges of the demise of realism. Even though constructivism has not replaced realism , there is evidence that it is increasingly being perceived as more relevant to theorizing non-Western realities and practices. In the case oflslam , there is a clear argument about constructivism's fit, especially in capturing the role of reli­ gion , culture and identity that are critical to developing theoretical discourses and

Conclusion 225

concepts from Islamic states and societies (Tadjbakhsh , Chapter 8). And for all the seeming incompatibility between Chinese and Western IR thought , it is still possible to find parallels between the two. Thus , the Confucian way of govern­ ance , consisting of five core relationships (father-son , emperor-minister , elder brother-younger brother, husband-wife , friend-friend) and of four social bonds (propriety , righteousness , honesty , a sense of shame) can be likened to the 'logic of appropriateness' (Qin, Chapter 2). In the case of Japan , the contributions of Nishida , Tabata and Hirano could be used to identify what Inoguchi (Chapter 3) calls a 'constructivist theory with Japanese characteristics'. In the case of South Korea , although concepts such as the 'balance of power system and security com­ petition , theories about balance of power , hegemony , security dilemma and power transition have been especially helpful' , in explaining its security environment and behaviour , Chun still finds an important role for constructivism when it comes to explaining the conflict with North Korea , where questions about 'multiple identit­ ies, overlapping identities and multiple organizing principles' that are germane to constructivism assume special significance. Similarly , the case oflndonesia attests to the relevance if not of constructivism exclusively on its own terms , then at least of constructivism as part of an analytic eclecticism , whereby social constructivist variables like identity, symbols , values , institutions and norms are seen to inform and condition 'culturally motivated realpolitik practice' (Sebastian and Lanti , Chapter 7).

Sources of non-Western IRT

In the introduction , we hypothesized a number of possible sources of non-Western IRT , including classical traditions and thinking ofreligious , military , political and military figures (e.g. Sun Tzu, Kautilya), thinking and foreign policy approach of leaders , the work of non-Western scholars who have taken up Western IRT, and the policies and praxis of non-Western countries. There is plenty of evidence that these could be useful sources of non-Western IRT in different national settings. Thus , historical tradition and philosophy come up as powerful sources ofIRT in China. In Japan's case, the staatslehre tradition , especially when conducted by government-related think tanks of historical-institutional backgrounds and describ­ ing events and personalities , and the writings of Western-influenced local scholars such as Nishida Kitaro , Tabata Shigejiro and Hirano Yoshitaro, have a similar potential as a source ofIRT. The classical tradition and the thinking of nationalist leaders are important in the Indian context , while for Southeast Asia as a whole, precolonial forms of polity and writings of contemporary scholars influenced by the West, but clearly finding distinctive patterns and anomalies , are identified as rich potential sources ofIRT. Indonesia comes up with its distinctive but not entirely homogenous cultural traditions and nationalist thought influenced by both Western and Eastern - Indian and Chinese - ideas. And in the Arab-Persian Islamic world , classical jurisprudence /scriptures/ tradition , modernist yearning, revivalist impulse and syncretism reconciliation between tradition and modernity are presented as possible sources of non-Western IRT.

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Japan's case shows both Western influence and local innovation. In Japan , the influence of Western or imported theories is very much evident , in both main­ stream American and critical Marxist traditions , the latter even predating the former and enjoying a long-term influence. Yet , Nishida's attempt to problematize and conceptualize , if not construct , Japanese 'identity' in international relations (between East and West) , constituted an authentic departure and can claim to be a precursor to later discourse on identity in international relations. A more contro­ versial Japanese contribution , which speaks not so much to the identity question but to the communitarian element of modem constructivism , could be traced in Hirano's work on regional integration which lent justification to the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area 'by noting that instead of the struggle among imperialist sovereign powers , his cherished goal ofupholding a communitarian principle might be materialized at long last' (Inoguchi , Chapter 3). Even more controversial was the Kyoto School's thinking about 'post-White power' and how Japan could take the lead in rebalancing world politics away from Western hegemony (Williams 2004). Although now politically incorrect in terms of its racial framing , in its underlying conceptualization , this line of thinking is not all that far removed from those such as Buzan and Little (2000) who argue that the current rise of non-Western pow­ ers suggests a return , after the few-centuries aberation of Western dominance , to a more multicultural world like that of the ancient and classical era, with several powerful centres of civilization. Somewhere in between was the work of others like Tabata who adapted Western concepts to suit the local context. In contrast to Hirano , Tabata's work on popular sovereignty and the concept of equality of states was used to argue against the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Area (the core of which was the inequality of states). At the very least , all these attest to the diversity , if not puritanical originality , of Japanese international thought. Japanese contributions both presaged Western theories and adapted from it.

China's case is interesting because it is in clear juxtaposition to many central Western concepts ofIRT. The Confucian Tianxia worldview (an inward-looking perspective emphasizing harmony , in contrast to the West's extroversive outlook emphasizing competition) and the Chinese tributary system (which institutional­ ized and rationalized that worldview) , clearly challenge the modem Westphalian and European-derived principle of sovereign equality of states. Tianxia does not correspond to the Hobbesian state ofnature , where relationships are 'equal and hos­ tile', nor to Lockean society's equality and competition , nor to Kantian notions of equality and friendship. Instead , it posits a hierarchical but orderly relationship , as with the relationship between the father and sons in the Confucian family , 'unequal but benign' (Qin , Chapter 2. See also Song 2001: 70; Yan 2001: 37- 8; Zhao 2006; Callahan 2004 , 2008 ; Li 2008: 292).

Compared with Japan's modernist tum and China's emphasis on the classical tradition , the sources ofIRT in India combine both. Kautilya's notion of mandala has been used by historians to describe traditional Southeast Asian polities , sug­ gesting the universalization and broader applicability of classical Indian concepts. At the same time , the modernist critique of Western conceptions ofnationalism by Indian nationalist leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi , Rabindranath Tagore , Bankim

Conclusion 227

Chandra Chatterjee and Sri Aurobindo Ghosh is notable because of their adoption of a non-territorial and non-rationalist/instrumental conception of nationalism , imbued with the notion of spiritual power. According to these writers , Indian culture , which accommodates social , ethnic and tribal diversity transcending the territorial boundaries of nation-states , can be a powerful alternative to the univer­ salized model of the Westphalian state (Behera , Chapter 5).

The very fact that Japan , China and India are seen as possible sites of Non­ Western International Relations Theory cannot but be of significance to those who inevitably draw a close link between power and theory. As Inoguchi (Chapter 3) puts it, 'Great powers often produce theories of international relations.' If this is true in the case of the West , why cannot it be true of the non-West? Qin (Chapter 2) goes as far as to suggest the development of a Chinese school of IRT , if it is to happen at all, cannot be delinked from a certain degree of Sinocentrism. Crudely put , Chinese IR scholars may well respond to Western ethnocentrism by putting forth an ethnocentric paradigm of their own making. This tendency might be reinforced by China's recent economic and strategic (if not political) transforma­ tions , massive and multidimensional as they are. It is indeed tempting to believe that since the development ofIR theory tends to follow real world developments , the larger the shift in the status quo , the greater the possibility of the emergence ofan indigenous IRT. And the more powerful the said indigenous tradition and its bearer is, the greater the possibility that it will offer the basis for a new IRT. This view is further supported by Islam's expansion in an earlier historical stage , which led to the codification ofrelations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Islamic jurisprudence , itself a possible source oflslamic IR T.

This perspective also resonates with the view noted above that the world is returning to a culturally and politically polycentric form reminiscent , though cer­ tainly not a mere re-creation , of the several centres of civilization during ancient and classical times. Now , of course , all these civilizations are much more sharply aware of each other than they were before the expansion of the West , though it is fair to say that the non-Western societies are still much more aware of the West than the West is of them. The powerful , sustained and often deeply intrusive Western penetration of the non-West also means that 'non-Western' societies are no longer pristine. All have been deeply changed by the encounter with the West , and to a lesser extent by the encounter with each other mediated through the West. Not the least significant of the ideas universalized by the West has been nationalism, a doctrine that encourages cultures to draw identity from their history , and to use history and identity for political purposes. As just suggested , this may well have profound significance for the type ofIRT that gets developed in the non-West. It can be argued that much of Western IRT is fundamentally Eurocentric in the way it uses history , though for the most part this ethnocentrism is unacknowledged and hidden underneath assumptions of universality (Buzan and Little 2001). Partly in reaction against this , and partly because non-Western IRT is likely to be developed in response to particular policy needs, we might expect it to take a self-consciously nationalist form. It is, for example , not difficult to encounter in China a rather Coxian (1986: 207) discourse that 'theory is always/or someone

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and/or some purpose'. In this view neorealism and neoliberalism are for the US and about keeping it as number one. The English School is for the UK and is about using institutions to enable a declining power to punch above its weight. A Chinese school would be for China and be about how to facilitate its peaceful rise . One could see Latin American dependencia theory and Mao's 'three-worlds' theory in a similar light. This suggests two ways in which the nationalist impulse might affect the development of non-Western IRT. One way would be an attempt to recover the civilizational histories before the encounter with the West , and look to them for alternatives to the Eurocentric Westphalian model. Another would be more consciously and more politically to construct history to serve the purposes of current policy. Probably both will happen. And both will constitute , in different ways , attacks on the universalist assumptions of Western IRT.

Yet , our studies also indicate that IR theory, whether Western or non-Western , need not be the exclusive preserve of the powerful. Just as the Scandinavian coun­ tries have made themselves significant and distinctive players in Western IRT , so Southeast Asia , a region of weak states and a 'region of revolt' in Western representation , can also be seen as a fertile source for non-Western IRT. Southeast Asia's traditional polity , conceptualized by some historians (whose essential role here testifies to the need for going beyond political science in the development of alternatives to Western IRT) as a mandala system (Sanskrit for concentric circle , connoting polities without formal territorial sovereignty and known for their sym­ bolic and ritualistic exercise of authority) 'offers a radical potential for imagining international relations without Westphalian sovereignty' (Chong , Chapter 6). A noted historian of Southeast Asia , 0. W. Wolters , even claims rather controver­ sially , that the mandala system in Southeast Asia was more peaceful than Europe's nation-state model , with its history of extensive internecine warfare. Similar con­ structs by anthropologists Clifford Geertz (the 'theatre state') in Bali and Stanley Thambiah ('Galactic polity') in mainland Southeast Asia , present interesting contrasts with the European conceptions of territorial sovereignty and its close corollary , the balance of power system of order management (Acharya 2000).

Hence , we argue that the attempt to think of an indigenous IRT in terms of traditional historical-cultural concepts need not be unique to the major powers or classical centres of civilizations , such as China and India. The Indonesia chapter in this volume supports this view. It demonstrates how traditional Javanese thought and statecraft associated with past kingdoms offer a platform for developing indi­ genous IRT in Indonesia. Moreover , in Indonesia , traditional Javanese culture also becomes a source of the political behaviour of the indigenous elite (such as the Suharto regime that ruled Indonesia from 1967 to 1989), itself another potential source of non-Western IR theory.

The case oflslam is interesting in this context. Once powerful , it's now almost universally seen, including by those who would like to look for possibilities of developing international theories out of its doctrines and practices , as a declining system. But decline can be as interesting as ascent in creating the potential for inter­ national relations theory. For example , within Islam there exists several potential sources ofIRT: the Qur'an , the Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet) , the Sunnah (the

Conclusion 229

conduct of the Prophet) and ijtihad (interpretation). Other sources ofIRT in Islam include the ideas of nationalist intellectuals and leaders , not just those in positions of power, but also those inspired by struggles against Western colonialism and postcolonial dominance , and the intellectual ideas of non-Western scholars based in the West , such as those engaged in the Islamization of knowledge project in the United States (Tadjbakhsh , Chapter 8). What is especially interesting about these potential sources ofIRT is that several of these are responses to the decline , actual or perceived , oflslam's place in world order.

To be sure, it is difficult to take a uniform view of these potential sources of challenge to the Western orthodoxy in IRT. Kautilya is often regarded , including in India , as an authentic forerunner of 'Western style' realism , while Tagore or Ghosh stand as challengers to Wes tern concepts of nationalism. Somewhat in between them will be people like Nehru , who are localizers of Western ideas and concepts such as sovereignty and non-intervention. Similarly , classical Southeast Asian pol­ ities may be regarded as challengers to the modem nation state, but perhaps less so (and this needs further investigation) to the pre-Westphalian polities in Europe.

Is non-Western IRT possible?

Our project throws up a number of important issues concerning the possibility of a non-Western IRT in a situation where Western IRT has seemingly hegemonic status. In the sections below , we discuss a number of conceptual and practical issues that must be addressed if one is to talk meaningfully about the possibility of non-Western IRT generalizing from the Asian or the Islamic experience. For reasons that will become clear below , we are not, repeat not, concerned with identi­ fying or advocating an Asian school of international relations. This would link us to constructs (and debates surrounding them) such as Asian values, Asian democracy, Asian way etc. We want to stay clear of such reifications , which , while they may have their usefulness in building non-Western IRT , are also hugely problematic because of the extent of generalizations they involve , and the suspicions they evoke as an elite-driven and politically motivated exercise. Our main concern here is: can one use Asia or Islam (including Islam in Asia) as the basis for generalization that could meaningfully address the disjuncture between international relations theory and the universality of human experience?

The first issue has to do with the fact that the West/non-West distinction may cause some unease as being old-fashioned and confrontational and misleading given the diversity that undoubtedly exists within both camps. It is not possible to give any concrete or precise definition to what constitutes non-Western , not the least because it would involve making judgements about what is 'West'. Moreover , it can be argued that there exists now a single global conversation ( or confrontation in some views) , which is impossible to unpick into West/non-West. In acknowledging this reservation , we still believe a critical review of IRT that highlights the marginal place of non-Western experience , discourses and up to a point , persons , is defensible and important not just because different histories exist , but also because very substantial North-South differences in the ideational

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and practical world of international relations continue to exist. These differences are not just political (the very unevenly realized transplant of the European state to the rest of the world) and economic (position in the centre-periphery structures of the liberal international economic order) , but also cultural (ways of thinking , different conceptions of inside/outside).

Just because international relations is an increasingly globalized subject of aca­ demic teaching and research today , in terms of courses on IR being taught in more countries and in more universities within countries ( as is borne out in the China paper in Chapter 2), does not mean it is being universalized. The latter would require greater incorporation of ideas from the non-West and contributions by non-Western scholars from local vantage points. This clearly has not happened in any general way, though as the paper on Japan suggests , there are some enclaves oflocalism. Ifwe mean by 'a single global conversation' that people are no longer thinking along the lines of West versus the rest or North-South , then this is far from an accomplished project. Contributions like postcolonialism in IR, Indian subaltemism (e.g. Spivak 1988) and Mohammed Ayoob's (1998) notion of 'sub­ altern realism' attest to a continuing effort to represent the South as a distinctive political and intellectual space.

Moreover , we see evidence that far from becoming a single global conversation , IRT is developing along regional or subregional lines: hence , we have a distinct­ ive ideational and constructivist tum in continental Europe, which challenges US dominance of the field. In this context , our focus on Asia suggests we are not assuming the non-West to be a homogenous category. Recent debates about Asian regionalism contrasting its trajectory from European regional institutions under­ score the importance of the regional focus as a subset of non-Western IRT. Peter Katzenstein's (2005) recent book A World of Regions , which compares European and Asian regional orders under the assumption that these are the two most 'important' regions of the world today , is a good example of such 'regionalised' West/non-West differences in thinking and praxis about IR. So too is Buzan and Wrever's Regions and Powers (2003) , which shows how different the conditions of international security are in different regions. And as noted in our introductory paper , studies of Western IR also show significant patterns of differentiation bet­ ween the US and Europe (see, for example , Buzan and Hansen 2009). On this basis we should not have high expectations of an Asian or non-Western approach to IR emerging. The injection of Asian experience and thinking into the global debates about IR seems much more likely to come in more fragmented, possibly nationalist , forms, the nature of which is suggested by the papers on China and Japan.

It is also possible to view (and dismiss) the West/non-West framing ofIRT as a matter of simple disjuncture between the modem and the premodem. In this sense, Western IRT reflects a modernist enterprise , while that of the non-West remains mired in premodem discourses and practices. We are deeply uncomfortable with such dichotomization. As Alan Chong's essay in this collection shows, the tend­ ency in the West to see Southeast Asia as a premodem entity , and as a poor and sometimes laggard student in the process of modernization is highly overstated. International relations in the region, as elsewhere in the developing world , is much

Conclusion 231

more complex and multifaceted than these simplistic and outdated labels would imply. What , for example , is 'premodem' about the non-alignment doctrine , dis­ cussed in Behera's essay in this collection , so popular in India during the Cold War? Can China's uncompromising adherence to Westphalian sovereignty , which Qin discusses in his essay here, be considered 'premodem '? Perhaps we are dealing with the disjuncture between modem and postmodern here , but even these distinc­ tions are problematic: how is the US approach to state sovereignty , especially when it comes to outside role in its own domestic affairs , postmodern? (Spiro 2000)

Following Ayoob (1995) , we do not question that there may be a certain element of 'time lag' between the international relations of the non-W estem world and that of the West , especially in terms of experience in state formation . But in our view, this does not mean that Asian or developing countries are simply in a 'catch-up' mode. We allow for the possibility, as raised in all of the case study papers , that the latter could move in entirely different trajectories towards outcomes that are constitutively distinct from the West , or at least could 'localize' the pattern of international relations established in the West in ways that inject substantially distinctive local elements which would require a significant broadening ofIRT , if it is to become a truly universal discipline.

We would also agree to a certain extent with the view (most strongly developed by Qin and Chun in this collection) that Asian states have been cut off from their own classical intellectual resources and need to rediscover them and reconnect. This means a certain amount of look back or rediscovery of one's past. The same applies to the prospect for Islamic IRT. This is why we have identified classical ideas and experiences as one possible source of non-Western IRT. But this is hardly unique to Asia or to non-Western approaches to IRT. IRT as developed in the West drew heavily , and continues to do so, from the thinking of classical figures , dating back to the Greco-Roman era , and patterns of interstate relations in the premodem periods of Western history. Why cannot the same happen in the non-West ? At the dawn of the postcolonial era in Asia, for example , there was a growing awareness in the region that Asia needs to rediscover its past. More recently , the re-emergence of China and India as world powers has led to a tend­ ency among academics to reassert their historical identities and practices as the basis for thinking about contemporary international relations. Some of it may seem rather controversial and self-serving , for example: attempts to justify India's claim to be a nuclear power from the Vedic notion of the ultimate weapon Brahmastra (Kamad 2002) , or efforts by some Chinese scholars to evoke the 'peaceful' voyages of the famous fifteenth-century Ming dynasty Admiral Zheng He as a metaphor for the peaceful rise of China. But such efforts , which have their own parallels in the West , do also underscore the existence of a classical tradition of statecraft in Asia that can be used as the basis for IRT , in support of both power politics and cooperative /communitarian politics.

Another possible objection to our concern with non-Western IRT concerns the fact that many of the leaders we cite as sources of pre-theory were Western edu­ cated or heavily influenced by Western ideas. Hence , their contributions cannot be legitimately be regarded as non-Western. This is true to some extent , but does

232 A . Acharya and B . Buzan

not invalidate our approach and interest. We recognize that non-Western IRT can develop in opposition not only to Western ideas and approaches espoused by Western agents, but also non-Western agents who are educated in and influenced by the West. Hence , we allow for the possibility that sources of non-Western IRT must also include resistance to Western ideologies espoused by local elites and governments in the non-West. Moreover , we have looked at the ideas and approach of anti-colonial and more contemporary leaders in the non-West as but one of a range of possible sources of non-Western IRT , the above generalization does not apply to all the nationalist leaders. Myanmar's Aung San went to Japan. Sometimes , being in a Western environment could trigger a greater yearning for returning to one's local intellectual roots; a fact illustrated somewhat perversely in the case of some Muslim extremists in the West today.

More importantly, those who did not accept or adopt Western ideas about governance or international relations uncritically might , in most cases, engineer considerable adaptations to ideas learnt abroad. One example here is Mahatma Gandhi's concept of non-violence , an idea he initially borrowed from the Western notion of 'passive resistance' , but which became the basis of his approach to anti-colonial resistance and international relations only after being reshaped as satyagraha . In so doing, Gandhi married 'passive resistance' with the 'traditions of nonviolent resistance and of saints offering political advice , in his native region of Kathiawar', in Gujurat , India (Green 1998).1 So abstract Western ideas learnt by nationalist non-Western leaders or intellectuals are not important in their own right: it is how these are 'localized' (Acharya 2004) and developed in practice that constitutes a more authentic source of non-Western IRT.

This leads us to reflect on a possible pathway to the development of non-Western IRT, one that directly concerns our reservations about pushing the West versus the rest dichotomy. The case oflslam in Indonesia provides a graphic example of Acharya's notion of 'constitutive localization' (Acharya 2004 , 2009). Constitutive localization is defined as 'as the active construction (through discourse , framing , grafting , and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the latter developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices' (Acharya 2009). Localization leaves idea-takers in the driver's seat in the development of IRT, as agents who selectively borrow and contextualize outside ideas for their own context and need. As Sebastian and Lanti (Chapter 7) observe ,

in the interior of Java Islamic practices were mixed with the existing Hindu cultural attributes. In many cases, Hindu practices were more dominant than the Islamic rituals. From time to time , the Javanese would engage in Hindu ceremonies glossed over by some Arabic words said to be derived from the Qur'an. However , most Javanese would claim that they were Muslims , even though they would rarely execute the Islamic rituals ...

This suggests that the development of non-Western IR T need not be a matter of projecting pure indigenous ideas, nor should it be a matter of wholesale adoption/ borrowing of foreign ones, but that it can proceed through mutual adaptations and

Conclusion 233

localizations between the two that leave the local component dominant , at least in the initial stages.

In her chapter on Islam , Tadjbakhsh talks about 'hybridity' in a similar vein. The aim of the Modernization of Islam project is 'to seek synthesis of modem knowledge and Islamic legacy' , and it 'deploys deconstruction to resurrect the authority of religious knowledge' (Tadjbakhsh , Chapter 8). This is localization , as the primacy of local is affirmed and a foreign idea, deconstruction , is borrowed and deployed to resurrect pre-existing religious knowledge. And Southeast Asia provides yet another example of constitutive localization ; consider , for example , the thoughts ofnationalist leaders such as Sukarno and Aung San which are 'prom­ ising in originality in terms of interpreting modernization through specifically local perspectives' (Chong , Chapter 6).

The contextualization of W estem ideas and the importance of pra x is are strik­ ingly evident in the case of Marxist IRT. Some argue that much of the first-round response of the non-West to Western hegemony was framed in variations of Marxism , taking a basically oppositional stance using Western intellectual resources against the West. 2 But although Marxism did exercise a considerable appeal in some places , local variations in Marxist ideology were undoubtedly important , as in Mao's formulations on peasant struggle and the broader three-worlds theory that in some ways developed from it. The same applies to nationalism , another Western idea around which not only the first round of the Third World's response to Western hegemony , but the initial foundations of the non-West's approach to international relations (such as non-alignment) was framed. Nationalism (without Marxist connotations , although the two could be fused in cases such as Vietnam) was a more popular response to Western dominance because it could be more easily grafted onto local historical traditions and even polities , including histor­ ical memories of the struggle against foreign invaders and occupiers of all sorts. The ultimate triumph of nationalism over Marxism in places such as India and Indonesia was due to the fact that nationalism had more grafting potential onto the indigenous consciousness , and would ultimately prevail not only over imperial­ ism , but also over Marxism itself. Moreover , the defeat of Marxist approaches to resistance to W estem hegemony offers another reason why Wes tern IR theory has found little appeal in Asia and why there is now a search for alternatives drawing upon local histories , experiences and needs. In a very important sense , the Third World , including much of Asia , thus suffered a double defeat/humiliation: not just the crushing of its own premodem traditions and cultural/political legitimacy , but also the defeat of its first choice of ideas (Marxism) around which to build inde­ pendent postcolonial resistance and legitimacy. This double defeat and weakening in confronting the hegemony of Western ideas is a powerful factor that underlines the growing discomfort with Western IRT in the non-West , including in Japan where , as Inoguchi's chapter in our collection demonstrates , Marxism had been a popular element in Japanese IRT in the post-war period.

So is a non-Western IRT possible given not just the headstart and pervasive influence of Western IRT , but also the global imposition of the European state and its distinctive form of inside/outside relationships? Yes and no. The case studies

234 A . Acha rya and B . Buzan

certainly suggest there are significant non-Western intellectual and historical resources to feed such a development. They also suggest ample motive for such development in the different positions , needs and cultures of countries outside the Western core. Although the case studies here are mainly from Asia , their content suggests similar resources and motives will exist in other parts of the non-West than East and South Asia. Since there is no suggestion in these studies that Western IRT has found all the answers, it should also be possible to envisage the erosion of both the West's intellectual hegemony in this field and the effects of its headstart lead. As Japanese industrialization has shown , there is no reason to believe that the initiator in any field of human endeavour either possesses all of the answers or can hold their lead indefinitely. So in principle there is room for non-Western IRT as well as need and sources for it.

In considering the possibility ofa non-Western IRT , the relationship between the universal and the particular assumes considerable significance. The question , simply put , is this: should theory be developed for each region , or for non-West or West , but should it have universal applicability? Just because sources of non­ Western IRT exist does not mean that there would be a national school ofIRT. The two are different things. We tend to see little likelihood of an 'Asian school' ofIRT emerging , although we do see greater scope for national perspectives. But even here , the prospect is not a straightforward one. We have already seen that the possibility of an Indian school ofIR is scarce (Behera, Chapter 5). A Chinese school is more likely , at least the discourse on its emergence within China is more advanced than elsewhere in Asia , but even here there is a debate between the pro­ ponents of a Chinese school , to which Qin belongs , and those who argue that IR theory should be universally applicable (Acharya 2008). Even subregional unity is not feasible. In the case of Northeast Asia ,

conversations among academia in Northeast Asian countries are rather lacking. IR scholars in Korea , China and Japan , have different approaches , different conception about the usefulness of Western theories and different normative concerns. Without systemic conversation among scholars in the same region , it would be very hard to have regionally coherent IR theories.

(Chun , Chapter 4)

The question of an Asian school is not one of where there can be , but whether there should be. Chun argues that

It will not be easy to have a theory that has a comprehensive dimension , both geographically and historically , to deal with the most advanced world and the least developed world. However , those worlds are connected and influenced by the other , making partial theorizing inevitably incomplete ... The challenge for the non-Western academia is to contribute to the making of postmodern IR theory , or postmodern global political theory.

(Chun , Chapter 4)

Conclusion 235

Many of the varied challenges to developing a non-Western IRT come together in the case of Islam. Islam deserves a special note in considering the prospect for a non-Western IRT, not only because it allows us to test and extend our find­ ings beyond East Asia or South Asia , but also because of its sheer reach in terms of numbers (its share is growing in the world's population and the number of countries that are Islamic) , but also because it is seen by many today as the chief challenger to Western dominance of contemporary world order (China being the other candidate). In this book , we have given particular emphasis to Islam as a source of non-Western IRT. But several caveats emerge from the analysis of Islam as a source of theorizing. The first and most obvious is that Islam as a sys­ tem of thought and practice is not monolithic. Islam itself becomes the basis for conflicting perspectives on international relations both within and between states, especially when it interacts , as it must , with pre-existing traditional local cultures and practices. One example is Indonesia , where significant differences exist bet­ ween the Javanese and Sebarang cultures , which are not only different from each other, but neither can claim total autonomy from previous religious and cultural traditions , including Indian Hindu beliefs and practices. The fragmented nature of Islamic thinking in the Arab-Persian world challenges the development of an Islamic IRT. While an Islamic worldview does provide the basis for non-Western IRT , this is challenged by both divisions within Islam and the consequent inabil­ ity to apply Islamic theories into practice . Moreover , it might be argued that the very core ideas oflslam negate the possibility ofIRT , in the sense that it is 'inter­ national' relations, since for Islam there can be no state as a permanent condition. Furthermore , and perhaps negating the above , Islam has not been an unchanging phenomenon. Hence, noteworthy is the historical shift from classical jurisprudence , the Qur'an , the Sunnah (traditions) , the Hadith (Sayings of the Prophet) and the Sharia (Islamic law) to a secular-oriented modernism 'in which power replaced righteousness' (Tadjbakhsh , Chapter 8) and which rejected any oppositional rela­ tionship between Islam and rationality. This challenges the West's claim to be the sole repository of rationality in response to Western colonization , to Islamism and revivalism (Qutb, Islamic Brotherhood , Jamaat Islami and Ayatollah Khomeini) in response to liberation (from colonial rule) , and finally a reconciliatory path to Islamize modernity. While taking note of such wide historical shifts and variations poses powerful challenges to the simplistic Huntingtonian view of Islamic civil­ ization and ideology as a monolith , especially when conceived as an enemy of the West , it unfortunately renders an Islamic IRT even less plausible.

These insights from Islam are applicable to other regions and cultures around the world that may aspire to develop their own 'schools' ofIRT. Added to these, one must not underestimate the advantages of the first mover or the difficulties of overcoming them. Western IRT has not only built the stage and written the play , but also defined and institutionalized the audience for IR and IRT. Latecomers face not only the brute fact of the postcolonial international political economy , but also the embedded construction ofIRT. Most of them will already have been penetrated heavily by both the brute fact and the construction. They do not start with a clean slate. Like second and third phase industrializers , new entrants to IRT

236 A . Acha rya and B . Buzan

thus face a range of choices. As suggested above , they can simply join in to the existing game seeking to add local colour and cases to existing theory. This is per­ haps so far the main response in Asia. A bit more ambitiously , they could strive for localist exceptionalism ala' Asian values' and 'ASEAN way' of diplomacy. Here the main driver would be the relationship between distinctive local praxis within international society and the local development (or not) of IRT as a distinctive way of thinking about this. Yet more ambitiously , they can construct themselves as rebellions against prevailing orthodoxies (most obviously realism and liberal­ ism) as dependen cia theory once sought to do. Doing this would mean increasing the diversity of what is already a very diverse field. Western IRT is not a static target. It already contains many critical strands against its mainstream orthodoxies. Perhaps this is where the emerging 'Chinese school' or any other theory driven by the Coxian imperative to be for some purpose and for some interest group , might find their place.

Most ambitious of all, latecomers could seek to replace Western IRT by offer­ ing some alternative way of conceptualizing the world political economy. This seems unlikely. Western IRT almost certainly does not have all the answers , but it does contain a very wide range of approaches , which makes it quite difficult to outflank with something wholly new , especially so long as the brute fact of the Western style of international political economy continues to dominate real exist­ ing international relations. The internal dynamism of Western IRT also counts here. There are already many powerful challenges to realist and liberal orthodoxies. The globalization perspective , as noted in our introduction paper , posits a rising tension between territorialist and de-territorializing dynamics in the world political eco­ nomy , looking forward to a fundamental transformation in the whole inside/ outside construction of the world political economy. This perspective might be a natural home for those seeking to bring into IRT the historical resources of Asian models that took a less divided view of domestic and international than that underpinning much Western IRT. If there is to be a wholesale transformation ofIRT , it is more likely to come about from a combination of the internal dynamics of the Western debates with the impact on non-Western inputs than from the victory of a wholly outside new construction.

Western IRT does not, in our view , need to be replaced (though some might think that it does). It needs more voices and a wider rooting not just in world history but also in informed representations of both core and peripheral perspectives within the ever-evolving global political economy. To resort to the oldest IR theory of them all, the likely role of non-Western IRT is to change the balance of power within the debates , and in so doing change the priorities , perspective and interests that those debates embody. Mainstream IRT may have been for the West and for its interests , and there is no doubt that this skewing needs to be rectified by the inclusion of a wider range of voices. But there is also no doubt that ifIRT is to fulfil its founding mission of clarifying the causes of war and peace , it needs to for all ofus and for our common interest in a progress that is peaceful and prosperous all round.

Conclusion 23 7

References

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Notes

Gandhi's own description of this locali zation is revealing : None ofus knew what name to give to our movement. I then used the term 'passive resistance ' in describing it. I did not quite und erstand the implications of ' passive resistance' as I called it. I only knew that some new principle had come into being . As the struggle advanced , the phrase ' passive resistance' gave rise to confusion and it appeared shameful to permit this great struggle to be known only by an English name . Again , that foreign phrase could hardly pass as a current coin among the community . A small prize was therefore announced in Indian Opinion to be awarded to the reader who invented the best designation for our struggle . We thus received a number of sug­ gestions . The meaning of the struggle had been then fully discussed in Indian Opinion and the competitors for the prize had fairly sufficient material to serve as a basis for their exploration . Shri Maganlal Gandhi was one of the competitors and he suggested the word ' Sadagraha ', meaning firmness in a good cause . I liked the word , but it did not fully represent the whole idea I wished it to connote . I therefore corrected it to ' Satyagraha .' Truth (Satya) implies love , and firmness (agraha) engenders and therefore serves as a synonym for force . I thus began to call the Indian movement ' Satyagraha,' that is to say the Force which is born of Truth and Love or non -violence , and gave up the use of the phrase 'passive resistance' , in connection with it, so much so that even in English writing we often avoided it and used instead the word 'Satyagraha ' itself or some other equivalent English phrase . This then was the genesis of the movement which came to be known as Satyagraha , and of the word used as a designation for it. Before we proceed any further with our history we shall do well to grasp the differenc es between passive resistance and Satyagraha . . . M . K. Gandhi (2003) , Satyag raha in South Afri ca, trans . Valji Govindji Desai , Navajivan Publishing House , Ahmedabad , p . 102.

2 Indeed , it is not difficult in parts of East Asia to find Marxists who interpret Marx ' s opposition to liberalism ( capitalism) as placing him outside the West. The idea that a thinker so deeply embedded in Western philosophy and sociology as Marx could be seen as non -Western comes as a big surprise to Westerners who encounter it, and und erlin es the difficulties of making the West /non-West distinction .

Index

Africa 2, 13, 96 , 159, 180, 204- 5, 207 , 209 , 212- 13

A SEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 3, 121, 128- 9, 133--40, 159, 166, 168; Declaration of Concord 162; Free Trade Area (AFTA) 133, 138; Regional Forum (ARF) 80 , 133, 138

Asia: conversation among scholars in 85 ; IRT in 229 , 234 , 236 ; nature of states in 5; power and wealth of 2 ; as premodern 230- 1; Southeast 14, 22, 117- 18, 120- 8, 132, 136- 8, 141- 3, 166, 203 , 223- 5, 228 , 230 , 233 ; unity of 13, 179

Asr al Nahda see modernity , and Islam Aung San 11- 13, 119, 140, 232 - 3

balance of power : politics of7 ; systems 76, 86, 225 , 228 ; theory of 17; usefulness of concept 197- 8

behaviouralism 8, 72, 166 Buddhism 118, 154

Cambodia 117, 124, 137, 139, 141, 162 capitalism : and colonialism 119; and

history 200 ; in Korea 73 China : and Asian regionalism 80- 1;

attitude to IR 3; imperial system of 75- 6; influence on Southeast Asia 124- 6, 128- 9, 133; intellectual tradition of 26 , 33 , 35- 7, 41 , 231 ; IRT in 26- 8, 32---6, 33--4, 40 , 223- 7, 234 ; modernization in 37- 8, 43--4; national identity of 45 ; and realism 7; relations with Europe 205- 6, 208 ; relations with Indonesia 160, 168; relations with international society 46 ; relations with Japan 64, 77; relations with Korea 79 ; sovereignty of 86 ; theory in 27 ; translation of Western thought in 29- 32 ,

30-1 , 38- 9; universities in 28 China National Association for

International Studies (CNAIS) 28- 9 Chinese-learning School 38 Chinese World Order 5, 14 Cold War 126- 7, 148 colonialism 13, 63 , 76, 104, 106, 118- 20 ,

122--4, 127, 161, 209- 11 communism 8, 13, 61 , 71 , 119, 122,

125- 7, 136, 160 Confucianism 5, 10--11, 37- 8, 41 - 2, 70,

124, 139, 225- 6 constructivism : in China 29 , 32 , 34 ; and

history 207 ; in Indonesia 166- 7, 225 ; and Islamic thought 187- 9, 224- 5; in Japan 52- 3, 58- 9, 62, 74, 226; and realism 224 ; roots of 9- 1 0 ; in Southeast Asia 139, 142- 3; in Western IRT 197

critical theory 3, 9, 73--4, 85 , 98 , 103, 188 CSIS (Centre for Strategic and

International Studies), Indonesia 164 cultural studies 106, 134

datong 40 , 42 - 3 decolonization 9, 17, 19, 119, 212 deconstructivism 27 democracy , and liberalism 7 democratization 73, 80--1, 86, 139, 142,

149 Deng Xiaoping 28 , 44 dependency theory 15, 73--4, 228 , 236 diversity 15, 54 , 110, 226 , 229 , 236

East Timor 150, 161- 2 ecology 93, 106 empiricism 100, 174, 183--4, 192 English School 3, 5, 8- 9, 27 , 32 , 40 , 199,

207 , 209 , 211- 13, 228 Enlightenment 35, 38 , 40 - 1, 43 , 105