Negotiation Discussion and Journal Analysis

ADVANCING DISPUTE RESOLUTION BY

UNDERSTANDING THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT:

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK

JOHN W. BUDD, ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN, AND DIONNE POHLER*

Organizational leaders, public policymakers, dispute resolution pro- fessionals, and scholars have developed diverse methods for resol- ving workplace conflict. But inadequate recognition has been given to the idea that the effectiveness of a dispute resolution method depends on its fit with the source of a particular conflict. Consequently, it is essential to better understand where conflict comes from and how this affects dispute resolution. To these ends, this article uniquely integrates scholarship from multiple disciplines to develop a multidimensional framework to conceptualize the sources of conflict. This framework provides an important founda- tion for theorizing and identifying effective dispute resolution meth- ods. Such methods are increasingly important as the changing world of work raises new issues, conflicts, and institutions.

It isn’t that they can’t see the solution. It is that they can’t see the problem. G. K. Chesterton (1932)

Resolving workplace conflict is both critically important and challenging. Yet in the dynamic 21st-century world of work, dispute resolution has become more complex and conflicts are often not isolated to issues arising only in the workplace. Pinpointing the roots of a conflict can be increasingly difficult, especially when multiple sources are in play. For instance, a recent controversy surrounding the National Football League (NFL) over players kneeling during the US national anthem in social protest against the treat- ment of African Americans by the police involved myriad issues that were difficult to disentangle. The complex nature of the conflicts that led to the NFL players’ decisions to kneel during the anthem—and the responses of

*JOHN W. BUDD ( https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3971-7327) is the Industrial Relations Land Grant Chair at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. ALEXANDER J. S. COLVIN is the Kenneth F. Kahn Dean and Martin F. Scheinman Professor of Conflict Resolution at the ILR School, Cornell University. DIONNE POHLER is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Industrial Relations and Human Resources, University of Toronto. Please address correspondence to [email protected].

KEYWORDs: conflict, conflict management, conflict theory, dispute resolution, sources of conflict

ILR Review, 73(2), March 2020, pp. 254–280 DOI: 10.1177/0019793919866817. � The Author(s) 2019

Journal website: journals.sagepub.com/home/ilr Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions

other athletes, team owners, the public, and even the American president— diverted attention from the players’ interests. This complexity made dis- putes over the rights of players to engage in political expression at work that much more difficult to resolve and led to numerous other conflicts.

Two seminal frameworks have significantly advanced our understanding of types of workplace conflict (Jehn 1997), and the structural nature of workplace disputes and approaches to their resolution (Ury, Brett, and Goldberg 1989). The NFL dispute reveals the limitations of these frame- works: It is not easily categorized as a task, process, or relationship conflict as in Jehn (1997), and it highlights that structural factors such as interests, rights, and power emphasized by Ury et al. (1989) are no more important than factors such as emotion, disposition, identity, and communication. Missing from these frameworks and other important developments in the conflict and workplace dispute resolution literatures (Colvin 2016) is an explicit acknowledgment that effectively resolving a dispute requires three steps.1 First, the parties must recognize that conflict has multiple, varied sources that go beyond structural issues. Second, they must accurately diag- nose the source(s) of different conflicts. Third, dispute resolution methods must be tailored to address the underlying sources.

Suppose a dispute prevents two colleagues from working together for any number of possible reasons. A dispute rooted in competition for scarce resources, such as administrative support or a single opening for a promo- tion, needs to be addressed differently from a miscommunication. A clarify- ing rule could be useful in resolving a conflict over administrative support, but not in the case of miscommunication. Therefore, for a dispute resolu- tion method to be successful, the parties must first understand the sources of the conflict. Adding to the need to carefully diagnose the source(s) of a conflict is the possibility that disputants might differ in their perceptions of the source(s) of their conflict. Finally, a failure to diagnose and resolve the source(s) of a conflict can cause it to persist and become more complicated.

We argue that while significant attention has been devoted to under- standing the effects of conflict and approaches to dispute resolution across academic disciplines and applied fields, the research tends to be splintered. Scholars focus on particular types or sources of conflict. Among these are 1) resource constraints in economics, interests, rights, and other structural issues in industrial relations; 2) power in sociology; 3) framing and social identity in organizational behavior; 4) personality and emotions in psychol- ogy; and 5) miscommunication in communication studies. While the depth that comes from disciplinary focus is highly valuable, we propose that an integrated framework is also needed to better understand, diagnose, and resolve conflict in practice. The best dispute resolution professionals impli- citly diagnose a particular dispute and tailor their interventions to address

1See Kochan and Jick (1978) for an exception in the context of collective bargaining and Arrow et al. (1995) for an exception in the broader conflict resolution literature.

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its diverse root causes. An explicit, integrated framework, however, is impor- tant to educate new dispute resolution professionals and quicken their learn- ing curves, assist managers and others who lack training or experience, and promote reflection among experienced professionals. Such a framework can also provide new insights for academic research, encouraging greater cross- disciplinary pollination of ideas and approaches to studying conflict.

We define conflict as an apparent or latent opposition between two or more parties that results from differences that are either real or imagined. Our objective is to uncover the diverse causes of conflict. Our framework synthesizes the varied sources of conflict into three multidimensional categories—structural, cognitive, and psychogenic (see Table 1). Structural conflicts are those caused by the relationship between the parties’ interests or goals, rights, and sources of power. These types of conflicts frequently appear as contests over scarce resources, but the literature on conflict and dispute resolution often fails to recognize alternative perspectives on the specific nature of interrelated interests. Cognitive functioning over prefer- ences, information, and communication can also cause conflict. Lastly, psy- chogenic conflict arises from the psychology of feelings or emotions: affective reactions to situations and other people including those triggered by individual personality traits or moods. This article describes the dimen- sions of each of these three sources of conflict in more detail. We apply our framework to re-analyze three classic case examples found in the conflict lit- erature to demonstrate our unique contribution. We conclude with a brief discussion of how to manage conflict at its sources.

Structural Sources of Conflict

The interests or goals that potentially underlie a conflict can be diverse. One set of interests might involve economic resources to satisfy material

Table 1. A Multidimensional Framework of the Sources of Conflict

Category Definition and dimensions

Structural The nature of the relationship between the interests or goals of two or more people or organizations, consisting of: � Self-interested exchange with accessible alternatives (egoist) � Lasting interdependence with mutual gains structure (unitarist) � Lasting interdependence with mixed-motive structure (pluralist) � Lasting interdependence with win-lose structure (antagonistic)

Cognitive Individual or group mental maps, assessments, or framing of a situation, consisting of: � Cognitive frames and preferences � (Limited) information processing � (In- and Out-) group perceptions � (Mis)communication

Psychogenic Individual affective reactions to situations and other people, consisting of: � Emotions and moods � Personality

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needs and desires. Other goals might have a value orientation toward achieving certain outcome and procedural standards such as fairness, inclu- sion, or respect. Another set of possible objectives might derive from iden- tity needs for a sense of purpose and meaning in one’s life. Identity needs can be tied to group affiliations such as racial, ethnic, or religious affinities. Particularly difficult conflicts result when group members see their collec- tive needs for recognition, security, and dignity threatened by other groups. For any interest or goal, structural conflicts are those caused by the relation- ship between the interests or goals of two or more people or organizations. We label this category ‘‘structural conflict’’ because the nature of these con- flicts is determined by the rules, institutions, and practices in which this rela- tionship is situated—in other words, by the structural nature of the relationship. To understand the nature of structural conflict, we need to categorize the possible structures of these relationships. We present four possible structures of the relationships between the interests or goals of the parties (Budd and Colvin 2014).

We start with a relationship characterized by autonomous agents pursu- ing their self-interests largely as equals in relationships that are relatively easy to begin and end. A classic example is a worker seeking to trade his or her labor with an organization in a perfectly competitive labor market. When the interests of a worker and an organization coincide, they should contract with each other; if either side can get a better deal with someone else, then they will not (continue to) contract with each other. A relation- ship between two workers might be seen in this same light when, for exam- ple, they can choose to work with each other when it serves their own interests and can otherwise choose not to without harming their careers. Owing to this focus on self-interest, we label this an egoist structure. Conflicts that arise from this structure pertain to the terms of exchange, including following through on what is agreed to.

Alternatively, consider relationships that are expected to be more endur- ing. One possibility is a relationship with strongly interdependent interests in which a long-term partnership provides the greatest returns to both sides when structured appropriately. In employment relations scholarship, an employment relationship in which employers and employees have mutual interests that can be fully satisfied by both parties through well-designed, lasting human resource management policies is known as a unitarist employment relationship. This unitarist perspective can be usefully general- ized to relationships beyond the employer–employee focus of employment relations. That is, any relationship between two or more people or organiza- tions could be characterized by a unitarist structure in which long-term goals and interests are interdependent and not structurally determined to necessarily be incompatible. In this way, endemic or inherent conflicts of interest are de-emphasized or nonexistent, at least in the ideal; rather, the focus is on a belief that the relationship is dominated by mutual interests that can be aligned to everyone’s benefit.

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There can still be conflict in such a situation because of suboptimal poli- cies or practices, but the source of such conflict is then in these policies or practices rather than in the fundamental structure of the relationship. This distinction has important implications for dispute resolution. Moreover, because a unitarist relationship is characterized by features that bind the parties together, trying to maintain rather than end the relationship has value; this also has critical implications for dispute resolution. Note further that unitarist relationships can often involve integrative or win–win negotia- tions, which may be a useful method of problem solving focused on com- mon interests. But integrative negotiations could also occur in other types of relationships, and they are not guaranteed to occur in an underperform- ing unitarist relationship. A unitarist conceptualization should therefore be seen as a means of addressing a more fundamental issue (characterizing the structural nature of a relationship) rather than an approach to charac- terizing a specific negotiation.

A polar alternative to a unitarist structure focused on interest alignment is a relationship structure characterized by sharply antagonistic conflicts of interests. For such a relationship to exist, there needs to be some degree of interdependent interests. At least to some extent, each side needs the other. But because of the win–lose structure of the relationship, gains for one side come at the expense of the other. At its simplest, the classic example is a relationship largely or completely characterized by a contest over scarce resources in which one’s consumption of resources limits another’s ability to consume these resources. But again, because of interdependent interests there needs to be at least some element of accommodation. So the relation- ship can be seen as one with tensions between control or dominance and accommodation.

This tension has been extensively theorized through Marxist and other critical scholarship on the employment relationship. This research further draws attention to the extent to which inequalities in the employment rela- tionship are embedded in diverse elements of the structural context of the employment relationship. In classical Marxism, for example, employment relationship inequality is rooted in the ownership of the means of produc- tion, which is in turn created and furthered not only by economic advan- tages of capital over labor, but also through social, legal, and political advantages. Relatedly, social dominance theory in social psychology draws attention to the ways in which groups seek to maintain their dominance. Conflict between groups, broadly defined, might therefore stem from individ- uals with a high social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle 1994). These insights can be applied to all relationships in diagnos- ing the nature of a conflict over scarce material or non-material resources. For example, a dispute involving a temporary, contract employee and a regu- lar full-time employee, who perhaps has civil service or other protections, might involve complex power differences rooted in diverse rules, institutions, practices, identities, and values. We label relationships characterized primarily

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by conflicts of (broadly defined) interests as antagonistic relationships, and recognize that the degree and sources of inequality in the relation- ship encompass a wide range of options.

The final possibility involves a mixture of unitarist and antagonistic structures. That is, longer-term relationships can have a mixture of interde- pendent interests in which some align with each other (as in unitarist rela- tionships) and others are opposed to each other (as in antagonistic relationships). Conflict is therefore mixed-motive conflict. To hold this rela- tionship together, there needs to be some recognition of the other’s oppos- ing interests as legitimate; otherwise, it is an egoist relationship. As this type of relationship is characterized by a plurality of legitimately recognized interests, we label this a pluralist structure. Unequal bargaining power is a key feature of a pluralist relationship. As also highlighted by the antagonis- tic model, we should fully diagnose the sources of power imbalances to understand the nature of a conflict in a pluralist structure. Mainstream US employment relations scholarship embraces this pluralist structure as the most accurate representation of the contemporary employment relation- ship. Other workplace conflicts, however, could also be situated in a plural- ist structure if characterized by mixed-motive conflict.

The dispute over the NFL anthem protests occurred in the context of a structural relationship among the various actors. Players, owners, and fans have a shared interest in the success of the NFL, which requires motivated players, team cohesion, and a loyal fan base. Within this interdependent relationship, however, are also competing interests, including differing pre- ferences over whether the players should engage in social protests during an NFL game. This situation is therefore best seen as a pluralist relationship with mixed-motive conflict. The importance of the structural context of the player protests is further reflected in debates that emerged over whether the players were protected under labor law as concerted action by employees.

In sum, one key dimension of our integrated framework for understand- ing the sources of conflict is the structural context, and there are four alter- native structural possibilities of a relationship. Making these alternatives explicit provides a way to understand actor interdependencies and conflicts of interest, which helps actors diagnose the structural nature of a conflict and become aware of their own and others’ ideologies regarding conflict. As this last point suggests, the structural nature of a conflict can be real or imagined. That is, we can think of the structural alternatives as either char- acterizing the actual nature of a relationship, or as what the parties imagine it to be. Indeed, it might not be possible to objectively determine the true structural nature of a workplace dispute. In this case, the key is understand- ing how the parties perceive the structural nature of their relationship, while also appreciating alternative ways for thinking about it. This requires a deeper understanding of the cognitive sources of conflict, which we out- line next.

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Cognitive Sources of Conflict

The previous section emphasized the structural causes of conflict, but actual and potential conflicts involve people—whether as individuals, members of groups, or representatives of organizations, countries, or other entities— who act and react cognitively and emotionally. The second part of our framework considers factors that cause or influence conflict related to cog- nitive functioning, including interpretation, perception, information pro- cessing, decision-making, and communication. Individuals may have different preferences for or opinions about how to interact or solve a prob- lem, perhaps influenced by cultural or other differences. Conflicts can arise because individuals have access or pay attention to different information, have differing or limited interpretations of the same information, or fail to communicate effectively. We outline each of these cognitive dimensions of conflict in turn.

Cognitive Frames and Preferences

Inside and outside of the workplace, people confront numerous cognitive stimuli when they witness, experience, read, or hear things. To interpret this information-rich environment and give things meaning, the human brain develops and refines a knowledge structure or interpretative schema that provides a cognitive frame for decision-making and action (Cornelissen and Werner 2014). That is, how individuals perceive and react to things they see, read, or hear depends on their cognitive frame or frame of reference such that ‘‘frames shape how individual actors see the world and perceive their own interests’’ (Kaplan 2008: 732). And since perception can be an important element of conflict, cognitive frames are an important potential source of conflict.

To appreciate the role of cognitive frames in influencing conflict, it is necessary to recognize that each individual’s cognitive frame is a complex by-product of their histories, including their culture, personal interactions, and accumulated experiences. Thus, when organizational members have distinct cognitive frames, conflicts can arise because even the same prob- lem, task, or piece of information can be interpreted differently and engen- der competing reactions and desired courses of action. For example, in response to an unexpected event faced by two or more parties, unique indi- vidual frames can create interpretative uncertainty ‘‘which leads to unex- pected conflict about whether a relevant event occurred, how it is impacting the exchange, and/or how to respond to it’’ (Weber and Mayer 2014: 347). This can lead to further conflict because the parties might mis- interpret the others’ responses, for example, one side might perceive the other as acting opportunistically (Weber and Mayer 2014). At an organiza- tional level, cognitive frames shape the structure of organizations (Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood 1980), so clashing frames can yield conflicts over the desired structural form. We can extend this to the desired structure of

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the employment relationship and other organizational relationships. The four structural relationship possibilities outlined earlier can also be seen as cognitive frames that shape how individuals interpret these relationships, and clashes over the desired relationship can be rooted in the embrace of alternative frames.

Individual frames can differ in many ways. Based on past experiences, some individuals might prefer more conservative and risk-averse behaviors. People might also have differing expectations regarding fairness and ethics. Some might have strong beliefs about distributive justice; others, about pro- cedural justice. Some might expect high ethical standards to be followed; others might prefer a more instrumental approach. Money can also be interpreted through alternative frames. For example, someone who inter- prets their salary as an indication of their self-worth is likely to react differ- ently to pay differences than someone who sees their salary as determined by impersonal market forces.

Cultural differences can also be a source of conflict, and this can be rooted in culturally influenced cognitive frames. The knowledge structure or interpretative schema of an individual develops over time as he or she gathers information and organizes it. And since people experience cogni- tive stimuli through the lens of their culture, important linkages exist between cognitive frames and culture. Indeed, research in cultural psychol- ogy has uncovered significant cultural differences in beliefs over the impor- tance of 1) effort or ability in determining outcomes, 2) self-enhancement motivations and thus the importance of ‘‘face,’’ 3) the actions of others in determining one’s choices, 4) conformity motivations, 5) individual disposi- tions or social roles for attributing behavior, and 6) holistic or analytical approaches to forecasting future events (Heine and Ruby 2010). Each of these can be thought of as a cultural difference in the way one interprets information and action, and each can lead to conflict as individuals from different cultures have their own expectations and interpretations. Culture does not only potentially create conflict; it also influences how individuals react to and handle conflict (Aslani et al. 2016). Gender differences that lead to and/or shape reactions to conflict can be thought of in a similar fashion. There are many ways, then, in which differing worldviews, expecta- tions, and preferences can lead to conflicts in the workplace and beyond.

(Limited) Information Processing

The human brain’s limited capacity to retain information and to process it consistently can also cause or influence conflict. There are ongoing debates over how the mind actually works. Two leading theories are that the mind consists of specialized, domain-specific modules or of two systems of mental processes—a fast, intuitive, heuristic system and a slower, analytical reason- ing system. Complicated debates abound within and across these theories (Eraña 2012), but at a general level, both point toward a human brain that

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is not unitary or always internally consistent. Conflicts can therefore arise because individuals perceive the same problem differently, such as when one uses a heuristic and another approaches it analytically. Individuals can also be motivated to process information in ways that validate pre-existing beliefs, rather than by a search for accuracy (Ledgerwood, Callahan, and Chaiken 2014). Again, differing levels of motivation can cause people to make differing interpretations and thus find themselves in conflict with each other. Indeed, dual process theories of cognition imply that individu- als can even have multiple reactions to the same phenomenon. For example, a worker who says money is not important when considered delib- eratively might instinctively decline to do something that does not contain an extrinsic reward. This makes conflict across individuals more likely because of perceived inconsistencies in behavior. People may also have dif- ferent reactions to an issue depending on whether they view it as affecting themselves or someone else, and these reactions can further be shaped by the amount of mental effort used (Paharia, Vohs, and Deshpandé 2013).

These models of cognitive limitations underlie the behavioral economics principle of bounded rationality. Rather than seeing individuals as exten- sively and carefully evaluating each situation, bounded rationality means that people will use heuristics to overcome cognitive difficulties in fully han- dling information processing, memory, and multitasking. Many of these heuristics are now well-recognized in psychology and behavioral economics, and are often labeled ‘‘cognitive biases’’ because they systematically appear to fall short of the decisions that would result from a careful assessment of each situation. Common types of cognitive bias that result in conflict include loss aversion, anchoring, framing, fixed-pie perception, exaggera- tion of conflict, illusions of transparency, decision fatigue, and overconfi- dence. In sum, conflicts can arise because ‘‘the central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly but that they often act intuitively’’ and because ‘‘the behavior of these agents is not guided by what they are able to compute, but by what they happen to see at a given moment’’ (Kahneman 2003: 1469).

(In- and Out-) Group Perceptions

Cognitive processing does not occur in a social vacuum. Teams, for exam- ple, are mainstays of organizational life and, at a more fundamental level, humans tend to identify with certain groups, whether on the basis of employer, occupation, race, religion, or myriad other dimensions. Social identity theory highlights the importance of group identification because humans ‘‘need to feel positive about themselves (self enhancement), and . . . to feel certain about themselves, their place in the world, and how they relate to other people (uncertainty reduction)’’ (Hogg 2013: 554). To derive these benefits, individuals magnify the differences between their own and alternative groups, emphasizing the positive aspects of their in-groups

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and the negative aspects of out-groups, while also acting to maintain these differences.

This behavior can lead to a variety of intergroup conflicts. Realistic group conflict theory emphasizes conflicts between groups over scarce resources. But social identity theory implies that intergroup conflict does not require a conflict of interest because stereotyping, prejudice, stigmatizing, and impli- cit bias do not require interaction. Cognitive biases can reinforce these intergroup differences by, for instance, attributing undesirable out-group behaviors to negative personal characteristics and negative in-group beha- viors to the necessities of a particular situation. Because of the exaggerated differences and biases that can emerge from in-group and out-group dis- tinctions, resolving intergroup conflict can be challenging (Hogg 2013; Halperin, Gross, and Dweck 2014), so recognizing these sources is important.

(Mis)communication

Communication transmits ideas and information between people, and there are many ways in which this can break down and thereby lead to or exacer- bate conflict. Krauss and Morsella (2014) outlined four paradigms for mod- eling how ideas and information are transferred. In the encoding–decoding paradigm, a message is converted to a code (e.g., words) and transmitted to someone else (e.g., by speaking or writing). Receivers then decode the mes- sage based on their understanding of what they receive (e.g., the meaning of the words they hear). But if the communication channel is noisy (e.g., multiple re-tellings) or the senders and receivers have different meanings for a word (e.g., to ‘‘table’’ a negotiation issue means to put it forward for consideration in British English but to put it aside in American English), then misunderstandings can result, which can lead to conflict.

The intentionalist paradigm focuses on the intended meaning of a message; understanding a message is not simply a matter of decoding the actual words used but also deciphering the sender’s intent. Receivers then infer this intent and filter messages through their own cognitive frame. So if there is a lack of shared understanding, the sender’s intent can be misunderstood.

In the perspective-taking paradigm, the senders of a message should understand the perspective of the receivers and try to phrase the message in a way they will understand. But, similar to the intentionalist paradigm, having dissimilar cognitive frames can make it difficult to understand the other’s perspective, and thus it can be challenging to send a message that will be understood correctly. In short, whether one approaches communica- tion from the perspective of the sender or the receiver, the human ten- dency to see the world through one’s own frames, to lack understanding of alternative frames, and to heighten in-group and out-group differences can lead to miscommunication. When there are multiple audiences for a

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message, which can be common in labor relations and other work-related settings, these communication challenges can be magnified.

In the first three perspectives, meaning lies in the message, the sender’s intent, or the receiver’s perspective. A fourth perspective, what Krauss and Morsella (2014) labeled the dialogic paradigm, identifies meaning through the communication process itself. This approach highlights shared meaning constructed in interactive communication processes, as would be common between coworkers, team members, supervisors–subordinates, and labor-management negotiators. The dialogic perspective highlights the importance of active listening for creating understanding, which implies that a lack of active listening can be problematic. Interactive communica- tion also has the potential to increase the risks of miscommunication pres- ent in the other models if back-and-forth communication magnifies rather than lessens a misunderstanding. Moreover, the interactive dimension of communication allows for the recognition that nonverbal cues and personal demeanor can shape how information is interpreted (Burgoon, Blair, and Strom 2008), which can lead to misunderstanding and conflict. Nonverbal communication that is interpreted as aggressive or that contradicts gender- based or other expectations can also cause or influence conflict (Burgoon, Guerrero, and Floyd 2010).

Numerous cognitive sources of conflict can be observed in the NFL anthem protest case. Identity-based framing of positions that differed along racial, nationalist, and/or partisan lines exacerbated in- and out-group percep- tions and solidly entrenched individuals into various camps. Miscommunication between owners and players occurred because of language used during meet- ings, press conferences, and interviews. Conflicting interpretations of the inten- tion behind certain statements, exacerbated by both the mainstream and social media, often served to fuel this miscommunication.

Psychogenic Sources of Conflict

The last part of our framework considers psychogenic sources of conflict. Psychogenic conflict arises from or is affected by the psychology of feelings: affective reactions to situations and other people that are triggered by moods or individual personality traits. For example, two personalities might clash, or a conflict might occur because someone is having a bad day. Psychogenic conflict should be seen as interacting with the other sources of conflict. This is because conflict may not manifest itself if an individual does not perceive a situation, process, or outcome as threatening enough to his or her well-being or quality of life to elicit an emotional reaction. In other words, psychogenic factors might contribute to a conflict by magnifying other types of differences or by escalating conflicts with structural and/or cognitive roots rather than be a sole, independent source of conflict. In any case, the psychogenic dimension is an important potential source of conflict

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to identify and understand. Resolving other underlying sources of conflict often relies upon first addressing individuals’ emotional reactions.

Emotions and Moods

Emotions and moods are psychological experiences of feeling, or what psy- chologists label affective experiences. Emotions—such as anger, fear, or happiness—are reactions to specific causes and are therefore short-lived. Moods, by contrast, refer more to general positive or negative feelings unre- lated to a particular cause and are slightly more enduring than emotions. The literature on conflict recognizes the importance of affective reactions that result from interpersonal conflict, but we posit that emotions and moods should also be seen as important causes of and influences on con- flict. That is, we focus on a causal arrow that runs from emotions and moods to conflict rather than the reverse.

Emotions can cause conflict through the behaviors they create or by influencing decision-making. Perhaps most intuitively, hard or hostile emo- tions such as anger, frustration, contempt, and jealousy can lead to aggres- sive communication behaviors such as criticism and yelling while decreasing constructive communication behaviors such as active listening (Guerrero 2013). Attribution is also likely to be important; for instance, aggression is a normal response to emotions such as anger when individuals blame some- one else for intentionally causing them harm. Hot emotions such as fear can override self-regulation so that fight-or-flight reactions are automatic and reflexive (Mischel, DeSmet, and Kross 2014). Fight reactions often lead to observable manifestations of conflict while flight reactions allow conflicts to fester. In these ways, emotional reactions might appear involuntary and not mediated by any form of conscious deliberation, leading to conflict. Alternatively, emotional reactions might lead to conflict when conscious deliberation causes an emotional reaction. Moreover, negative emotions that create a bad mood can also lead to displaced aggression whereby beha- viors stemming from, for example, irritability, cause a conflict with someone who was not involved in the initial affective event (Pruitt 2008). Emotional contagion can also cause (lessen) conflict when a person’s negative (posi- tive) mood affects the moods of others (Barsade 2002).

Negative emotions and moods can also cause a conflict to escalate through the behaviors they prompt. For example, when someone finds another’s negative behaviors surprising, overwhelming, and disorienting, emotional flooding can make it difficult to process information and instead focus a person’s attention on reducing their negative emotions by lashing out (Guerrero 2013). Also, annoyance increases the chance of retaliation while aggression commonly creates more aggression (Pruitt 2008). Groups can similarly develop particularly strong emotions, as when fear or anger spreads through a crowd (Hogg 2013), so the emotional impact on conflict should not be seen in purely interpersonal terms.

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In addition to possibly causing or influencing conflict through behavior, emotions and moods can lead to conflict by affecting decision-making. Individuals who are in happy or positive moods have been found to be more confident and optimistic and to make riskier decisions (George and Dane 2016). This effect can clash with someone who is less confident and wants to make safer decisions. The scope for conflict to arise in this way is magnified by incidental emotions that ‘‘pervasively carry over from one situa- tion to the next, affecting decisions that should, from a normative perspec- tive, be unrelated to that emotion’’ (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, and Kassamet 2015: 803). Discrete emotions—that is, emotions linked directly to the issue being addressed—can influence decision-making in additional ways, includ- ing the content and depth of thought, and goal activation. Sometimes emo- tions can improve decision-making, and other times they can have a negative effect. But the main implication for theorizing the roots of conflict is that if decision-making is affected by an individual’s emotional state, then two individuals can assess or approach the same situation in different ways because of contrasting emotional states.

Personality

The second dimension of psychogenic causes or influences on conflict is personality—an individual’s typical way of feeling, thinking, and behaving. One way in which personality can affect conflict is as a longer-term mood. That is, one’s personality can include an overall tendency to have a positive or a negative affect such that positivity or negativity is not just a mood (state) but a more enduring trait. Positivity or negativity as a personality trait can therefore influence conflict in a similar way as a good or a bad mood.

Other aspects of one’s personality can also cause or contribute to a con- flict. A popular way to represent individual differences in personality is the five-factor model consisting of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientious- ness, neuroticism, and openness. While the effect of these traits can be com- plex and context-dependent, individuals with high values of neuroticism and extraversion and/or low values of agreeableness may be more likely to be contentious, antagonistic, irritable, and even want to dominate others, which can lead to behaviors that cause conflict (Bono, Boles, Judge, and Lauver 2002; Sandy, Boardman, and Deutsch 2014). Similarly, those who score low on openness and conscientiousness tend to be inflexible and dis- organized, which can also lead to conflict with others. At the same time, individuals who are conscientious can be more prone to conflict if they are excessively fastidious, while open individuals can be argumentative and not afraid of conflict (Bono et al. 2002). We assert that the potential importance of personality traits for causing conflict is magnified when we appreciate the prospect of personality differences across people. It is not just that a certain personality type might be more prone to conflict than others; different per- sonality types might clash to create conflict. For example, people who are

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low on conscientiousness may interact with those who are high on that same dimension. This assertion is reinforced by research on the relationship between group composition and performance (Mohammed and Angell 2003).

Personality can also affect conflict by affecting an individual’s attributions such that different personality types tend to see a conflict as either task- or relationship-based, and the influence of personality on this tendency is stronger when one accounts for the personality of both people involved (Bono et al. 2002). For example, differences in levels of extraversion lead to more task-based conflict, whereas conscientiousness is associated with relationship-based attributions of the nature of a conflict.

In the NFL anthem protest case, it was common to observe strong emo- tions, including outrage, often amplified and fueled by social media. The president of the United States, known for his quarrelsome disposition, used Twitter to express his own emotional reaction to the situation, even calling for boycotts of the NFL. This action exacerbated psychogenic conflicts among other actors and more directly engaged the broader public. The president’s response also led some team owners to shift their initial posi- tions on the original conflict and/or become more outspoken about their positions. This, in turn, generated support for the kneeling NFL players from other athletes and teams.

Applications of the Framework

An important test of the usefulness of our framework is whether it enhances our ability to analyze episodes of conflict; accurately diagnose the sources of conflict; and, ultimately, tailor interventions and approaches to dispute reso- lution to address the underlying sources. While we have applied our frame- work to understand the complex sources of conflict in a recent high-profile case, in this section we further demonstrate its diagnostic value by re- analyzing classic examples from the conflict resolution literature. Three seminal works describe the examples we draw on. These works are James Kuhn’s 1961 book Bargaining in Grievance Settlement; William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen Goldberg’s 1989 book Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of Conflict; and Karen Jehn’s 1997 article ‘‘A Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and Dimensions in Groups.’’ Each develops a framework and/or provides insight into conflict and dispute res- olution. Our intent is not to criticize these works, each of which we view as an important cornerstone in the conflict literature and field of dispute reso- lution; rather, we highlight how our framework adds value by demonstrat- ing its unique contribution vis-à-vis these other works.

At the heart of Kuhn’s book, which investigated grievance processes, is the classic example of the ‘‘hot tread’’ grievance filed by workers making tires who alleged that they had suffered injuries from having to handle overly hot tire treads, leading to burns and costing them compensation

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under the plant’s piecework pay scheme (Kuhn 1961: 58–77). In arbitra- tion, the union’s grievance was denied. Kuhn showed how a complex set of interactions lay underneath this formal grievance and arbitration process. The roots of this dispute were concerns by the workers that they would not be able to generate their usual earnings from a mixture of piecework and hourly pay. The union representative was unable to negotiate a resolution of these concerns with the supervisor. Because of a combination of the union representative’s lack of experience and political support, and the increasing aggravation of the workers, the conflict intensified and the work- ers decided to exert their power by filing a series of grievances. After a period of heightened conflict, union and management representatives negotiated a resolution that dealt with pay concerns and settled some out- standing grievances. Labor relations on the shop floor then returned to a more cooperative pattern.

Kuhn (1961) used the hot tread case to illustrate the process of fractional bargaining, in which work groups exert their power on the shop floor to negotiate resolution of conflicts by going around the formal grievance pro- cedure. Applying our framework to this case more clearly reveals the under- lying structural, cognitive, and psychogenic elements of the conflict that needed to be recognized to produce an effective resolution.

The structural elements of the hot tread case are the most obvious. The grievance that went to arbitration is a classic example of opposing interests resolved through an adversarial adjudicative system. From either an antago- nistic or pluralist perspective, a structural conflict of interest produced an antagonistic relationship; management tried to maintain production while the employees tried to ensure they received adequate compensation. Yet at the same time, digging into the roots of the hot tread case shows how cogni- tive framing can be an underlying source of conflict. The reason the work- ers were so upset about the problems with the machine was that it interfered with their ability to ‘‘make out’’ their expected earnings—that is, their cognitive frame for understanding the wage–effort bargain included expected daily earnings. The workers believed that the combination of reduced piecework pay and inadequate supplemental hourly pay meant that they would be unable to earn their expected wage. They perceived this as a violation of the normative expectations embedded within their cognitive frame, thereby producing the true conflict of the hot tread case.

In addition to its structural and cognitive elements, the hot tread case illustrates the psychogenic sources of conflict. Although hot treads were a frequent enough occurrence that the plant provided workers with asbestos pads to protect their hands, in this particular case they had been treated at the hospital, producing a shift in emotions and moods. Here is how one of their own union leaders viewed the situation:

After talking to the committeeman and crew, he was not convinced that the men had received any serious burns, though they undoubtedly had been incon- venienced. Explaining his stand later, he said that if the men had not been in

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bad shape when they left for the hospital, ‘‘they sure were convinced of it when they came back. The nurse was pretty dumb and had put Unguentine on and bandaged their hands in yards of gauze. They were pretty worked up after that.’’ (Kuhn 1961: 63, emphasis added)

An important element in the hot tread case is the layering of physical injury and the emotional reaction to it, which produced an intensified psycho- genic conflict apart from the structural issues of compensation rules during periods of machinery failure or conflicts arising from clashing cognitive frames about what was necessary to ‘‘make out’’ a day’s earnings. To fully resolve the conflicts in this case requires an understanding of all of these layers.

Our second case example is taken from Ury, Brett, and Goldberg’s Getting Disputes Resolved, which presented their framing of rights, power, and interests as three approaches to resolving disputes. They illustrated this framework with the classic case of a dispute involving a miner’s stolen boots (Ury et al. 1989: 3–10). The miners, who owned their own safety boots, left their work clothes and boots at the mine between shifts. One night a miner arrived to discover that his boots were gone and complained to the shift boss that they had been stolen. Because the miner could not work without safety boots he would lose a shift’s pay. Ury et al. (1989) described the shift boss’s initial denial of the company’s responsibility to replace the lost boots as an example of a rights-based attempt to resolve the dispute based on the rules. The miner responded to this denial of his complaint by organizing a wildcat strike among his fellow miners. Ury et al. described this as a power- based method of trying to resolve the dispute. Finally, the superintendent of the mine stepped in and proposed replacing the stolen boots so the min- ers could get back to work, the miner who lost his boots would earn his shift pay, and the mine would not suffer the costs of lost production. The authors described this last approach as an interest-based method of resolving a dispute.

The framing of interests, rights, and power is a very valuable way of think- ing about contrasting approaches or processes for resolving disputes. But it is less successful in revealing the underlying sources or nature of the con- flict processes that drive disputes; thus, applying one of these approaches may not actually resolve the underlying sources of the conflict. At the out- set, the mining dispute arose from a conflict in cognitive frames: The min- er’s idea of fairness meant he believed he should not lose a shift’s pay as a result of someone stealing his boots versus the shift boss’s idea that boots were personal property and not the company’s responsibility. Layered on top of this conflict between cognitive frames over what was considered ‘‘fair,’’ however, were psychogenic elements of the emotions expressed in this interaction. Consider how Ury et al. (1989) described the way in which each party communicated their respective positions:

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‘‘Hard luck!’’ the shift boss responded. ‘‘The company isn’t responsible for per- sonal property left on company premises. Read the mine regulations!’’ The miner grumbled to himself, ‘‘I’ll show them! If I can’t work this shift, neither will anyone else!’’ (Ury et al. 1989: 3, emphasis added)

These comments show invective language, exclamations, and a passionate response to having a request denied. As the mood escalates from a discus- sion of a problem to a clash of personalities in the workplace, we see the conflict becoming increasingly psychogenic in nature, leading to the wildcat strike.

Finally, we see the superintendent returning to the structural conflicts underlying this dispute. The different cognitive frames and psychogenic conflicts are important here because of the structural conflict between the mine management’s interest in maintaining its authority and ensuring pro- duction and the workers’ interests in maintaining their earnings. The antag- onistic element of this relationship was resolved in pluralistic fashion. The superintendent recognized the mutual interest involved in having work resume so that production could be maintained and the workers continued to earn their pay. But this structural resolution is quite possibly a temporary solution because the cognitive and psychogenic aspects have not been addressed and thus may keep festering until another flashpoint again brings them to the surface.

Our third illustration is drawn from Jehn’s (1997) seminal article on intragroup conflict. Jehn used qualitative evidence from a study of six work groups to develop a model of the nature and effect of intragroup conflict. At the core of the model is the typology of three types of conflict: task conflict, involving disagreements over ‘‘the content and goals of the work’’; relationship conflict, involving ‘‘interpersonal relationships’’; and process conflict, involving ‘‘how tasks would be accomplished’’ (Jehn 1997: 551).

Our own analysis of three sources of conflict—structural, cognitive, and psychogenic—should not be seen as an alternative schema to Jehn’s (1997) typology, which is a categorization focused on the locus of conflict. Rather, our framework represents an analysis of the underlying sources of conflict that can produce disparate manifestations in the types of conflict Jehn iden- tifies. We illustrate this point by examining some of the examples of con- flicts Jehn used to illustrate her model. For example, she illustrated task conflict with the following interview comments and field notes:

‘‘Sometimes people get irritated at each other about work matters.’’

‘‘We usually fight about work things—interpreting our reports, disagreeing about government regulations.’’

‘‘The pace is so fast. They don’t have time to deliberate so that it’s a constant give and take. It’s very busy and they are all doing ten things at once yet they need to reach agreement on the border decision.’’ (Jehn 1997: 542, emphasis added)

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These are three good examples of situations in which the locus of conflict is the task. They each, however, have a distinct source. The first illustrates psy- chogenic conflict in which a mood or emotion (i.e., irritability) was driving the conflict. The second is an example of cognitive conflict in which the individuals had their own interpretative schema over how to interpret the reports and government regulations. The third shows structural sources of conflict in which the pace of work and the tension between organizational demands and individual work capacity produced conflict.

Jehn described a relationship conflict between an informant and a cowor- ker that included comments—‘‘Her attitude just stinks’’ and ‘‘I just can’t stand her attitude and her voice’’ (Jehn 1997: 542)—suggesting a conflict rooted in the psychogenic reactions of emotion and mood, or personality differences. By contrast, other relationship conflicts might be rooted in cog- nitive elements such as cultural differences or miscommunication. Similarly, the following description of a process conflict suggests structural roots of conflict based on organizational incentives: ‘‘The group was discussing which operations would include Pat. . . . ‘I’m not sure if it’s his responsibility to be included in this. He doesn’t count on our budget’’’ (Jehn 1997: 542). And yet other process conflicts are rooted in different cognitive perceptions of the most efficient way to get things done: ‘‘Jeff suggested that he finish the mail so Joan could go on break but Mary told him that he wouldn’t be fast enough. They were having a big problem figuring out how to utilize their people and schedule breaks efficiently’’ (Jehn 1997: 542).

Note that these examples illustrate not only that Jehn’s (1997) different types of conflict may arise from various sources within each type of conflict (e.g., task conflict could be caused by structural, cognitive, and/or psycho- genic factors) but also that different types of conflict can result from the same sources (e.g., cognitive factors could cause a task, relationship, or pro- cess conflict). This difference is an important one between our framework and Jehn’s. Even though unit members in her study perceived causes of ‘‘process conflict as uniquely and identifiably different from task conflict’’ (1997: 541), our framework identifies the possibility that disputants are una- ware that different types of conflict may be originating from the same source. Thus, by focusing on resolving the underlying source(s) of the con- flicts, unit members may be able to more effectively resolve multiple types of conflict at the same time.

Our point in re-analyzing these examples is to illustrate the need for understanding the underlying structural, cognitive, and psychogenic sources of conflict. We propose that only by analyzing the sources of conflict in work- place disputes can we begin to develop better approaches to resolving them.

Managing Conflict at Its Sources

Disputes can be resolved in various ways (Ury et al. 1989; Coleman, Deutsch, and Marcus 2014; Roche, Teague, and Colvin 2014). But a

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comprehensive framework for the causes of conflict needs to be better inte- grated with the varying approaches to dispute resolution—that is, to man- age conflict at its sources. Conceptually, the dimensions of conflict that different dispute resolution methods are more or less better equipped to address should be identified to set a foundation for future empirical work analyzing these links. Practically, this is important for helping dispute reso- lution professionals determine which interventions and methods are appro- priate and effective for resolving conflict. In this section, we identify ways in which workplace dispute resolution could be more closely tied to an under- standing of the root causes of a conflict. Given the often-complex interac- tions among conflict sources, it is beyond the scope of this article to fully develop all the implications of our framework for effective dispute resolu- tion. However, we make a preliminary effort toward highlighting some of the ways in which our framework can guide us in arriving at the most effec- tive interventions or dispute resolution approaches for each of our three sources.

Resolving Structural Conflict

Resolving structural conflict requires diagnosing whether a particular con- flict is best characterized by the egoist, unitarist, pluralist, or antagonistic mind-sets. If the structure of a relationship is characterized by unitarism, then the structure likely is not the problem. Rather, conflict may stem from failing to recognize the mutual nature of the relationship, which implies that participants’ frames need to change, and/or that the particular policies and practices need revising to reflect the unitarist nature of the relation- ship. By contrast, if the structure of a relationship is better characterized by an egoist structure, then resolving a conflict may require determining whether there are realistic alternatives to the proposed exchange and ensur- ing each side fulfills its side of the bargain. In a pluralist relationship, more attention needs to be paid to the relationship itself and hence the other’s interests. Because there are fewer alternatives, the parties need to live with the consequences to a greater extent than they do in an egoist relationship. Failing to recognize these differences makes it more difficult to effectively address conflict rooted in varying structural contexts.

Recognizing alternative structural forms of conflict is also important for appropriately factoring in issues of power. In an egoist relationship, power is less important than self-interest. If someone gives you a good deal, take it; if not, take your next best alternative. In a unitarist relationship, a focus on power likely interferes with finding interest-aligning policies. By contrast, power differences are likely a significant aspect of an antagonistic relation- ship, and distributive negotiations would be fully consistent in this structure. Integrative bargaining is very difficult in an antagonistic structure. In a plur- alist relationship, both distributive and integrative negotiations are likely. The parties, or third-party dispute resolution actors, will likely need to

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ensure that power is not exercised in an overly aggressive way that under- mines the shared interests and enduring nature of the relationship.

The appropriate roles of rules and third-party interventions for resolving conflict will also vary with the nature of the relationship. In an egoist rela- tionship, the existence of rules governing exchanges should serve to prevent conflict by allowing efficient exchanges to occur. Third-party intervention will only be necessary to resolve conflict to the degree that enforcement of these rules is necessary, including adherence to agreed-upon terms, suggest- ing arbitration-type procedures that allow adjudication of rule violations. In a unitarist relationship, the mutuality of the situation suggests that rules are not necessary to police behaviors, nor is arbitration of conflicts desirable. Rather, mediation-type third-party interventions are most useful in helping the parties recognize their mutual interests and resolving any coordination problems or barriers to achieving the integrative potential inherent in their relationship. If the relationship is antagonistic in structure, however, efforts to mediate in search of common interests risk obscuring the fundamental oppositions of interest that drive conflict in the relationship. Rules and arbitration-type third-party interventions may be useful, but only to the extent that they address the antagonistic structure of the relationship and correct its inherent power imbalances. By contrast, pluralist relationships are most open to a range of dispute resolution responses. These include both establishing governing rules by the parties themselves and engaging in mediation- and arbitration-type third-party interventions, reflecting the diverse nature of distribution and integrative issues inherent in this type of relationship.

Failing to accurately diagnose the structural nature of a conflict can make efforts to resolve the conflict ineffective. Prior to the 2018 season, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell issued a policy directive stating that teams would be fined if players knelt during the anthem. In issuing this top-down directive, the league arguably misdiagnosed or ignored the pluralist struc- ture of the relationship between the players and the owners. This means that certain players’ interests were being ignored and that the structural imbalance of power between the owners and the African American players was being overlooked. Predictably, then, the conflict was not resolved by this directive and was challenged by the players’ union.

Resolving Cognitive Conflict

Diagnosing the factors that cause or influence conflict that relate to cognitive functioning—interpretation, perception, information processing, decision-making, and communication—is also important for applying effec- tive approaches to dispute resolution. Various techniques exist to address a conflict rooted in differing cognitive frames. Frame-alignment processes include frame bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). If one party to a dispute

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recognizes that a conflict is rooted in conflicting frames, that party can try to align the frames (Cornelissen and Werner 2014), and this can also be an important mediator task (Bodtker and Jameson 1997).

One aspect of frame adjustment to resolve a dispute is reframing the structural nature of a conflict. But to recognize the fundamental impor- tance of cognitive frames is to appreciate that they are not simply lenses for viewing the structural nature of a particular conflict; rather, they are poten- tial causes of conflict by shaping how participants interpret information and communication. So, exaggerated differences between in-group and out-group members may be occurring because of a cognitive frame. Interventions can be constructed to change this cognitive frame and thereby open up possibilities for conflict resolution (Halperin et al. 2014).

In the case of conflict that has an aspect of limited information process- ing, people can more easily identify cognitive errors made by others than by themselves. Providing training in decision-making biases and teaching criti- cal thinking and self-awareness can help people identify decision-making blind spots and enable them to work through this type of cognitive conflict. A complementary approach involves considering and shaping individuals’ motives for information processing—especially with regard to enhancing an accuracy motivation, lessening a defense motivation, and managing an impression motivation (Ledgerwood et al. 2014). Rules and choice architec- ture can also be used to guide individuals around undesirable heuristics and cognitive biases. Communication strategies for overcoming misinforma- tion have also been developed (Lewandowsky et al. 2012).

Recognizing when miscommunication causes or contributes to a conflict also points to specific conflict resolution strategies. For example, the four paradigms of communication outlined earlier yield a number of principles. These include avoiding communication channels with low signal-to-noise ratios, listening for the intended meanings of what is being said, communi- cating in ways that help the listener understand your intent and that reflects the listener’s perspective, and establishing conditions that promote effective dialogue (Krauss and Morsella 2014). Using strategies designed to address communication challenges in cross-cultural interactions is challenging but particularly important (van Meurs and Spencer-Oatey 2007).

Last, both negotiation and different forms of third-party assistance to solve cognitive conflict have their strengths and weaknesses. Negotiation may more easily resolve access to information, whereas neutral outside third parties such as mediators may be required to help resolve conflict due to different frames of reference held by the parties or difficulties in communi- cating. The use of rules that structure interactions and arbitration-type third-party interventions that impose a solution on the parties may provide ways of resolving an immediate dispute. These approaches, however, may be less effective in preventing the recurrence of conflict if the roots of the conflict are cognitive, since they do not directly address the key sources.

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Resolving Psychogenic Conflict

Psychogenic conflict is perhaps the most difficult type of conflict to tackle, but much literature exists to draw on (e.g., Shapiro 2017). This aspect of conflict is not easily resolved through negotiation, nor is it likely to be truly resolved by the imposition of a solution by a third party such as a manager or an arbitrator. Rules and choice architecture may prevent stressful situa- tions from resulting in emotional flare-ups (Lerner et al. 2015). But the most effective strategy is to give people tools to work through their own emotions or to control their moods in various situations, either in advance of a conflict or during it. When dealing with hot emotions, cooling strate- gies such as taking a time-out or a break and trying to reorient an individu- al’s attention to be more reflective and self-distanced rather than self- immersed can facilitate problem solving (Mischel et al. 2014; Lerner et al. 2015).

If hot emotions such as anger or humiliation are contributing to a con- flict, facilitators can lessen these emotions by acknowledging them. Some emotions may be helpful in resolving a conflict to the extent that individuals want to feel a sense of belonging and recognition (Lindner 2014). An understanding of how various personality types approach not only conflict, but feeling, thinking, and behavior more generally also can be useful to understand how to engage constructively with others. Dispute resolution professionals who recognize the psychogenic aspects of conflict are better prepared to intervene in productive ways. For instance, for transformative mediation to be successful in empowering the parties to resolve future con- flicts themselves, they must be taught methods for self-regulating their emo- tions and using them strategically during negotiations. Even if not adopting a specific transformative mediation approach, dispute resolution profession- als need to develop some of these skills in addressing psychogenic conflict, as they often apply across various dispute resolution processes and even help resolve structural and cognitive sources of conflict.

The Need for Multipronged Approaches for Multilayered Disputes

Effectively managing conflict at its sources requires recognizing that dispute resolution needs to be tailored to the specifics of each conflict based on a careful diagnosis of the possible overlapping structural, cognitive, and psy- chogenic dimensions. A recent example of the importance of this is the response of Google executives to a leaked internal memo written by an employee, James Damore, who criticized Google’s diversity practices— particularly the company’s attempts to recruit and retain women. The con- flict contained elements of all three of our sources of conflict. Google fired Damore, an action indicative of Google seeing this as an antagonistic struc- tural conflict with incompatible interests between the company and Damore. Damore’s firing caused an outpouring of reactions inside and out- side of Google, with key debates focusing on employee free speech and the

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broader challenges for women within the highly masculine Silicon Valley culture. The conflict eventually faded from public discussion, particularly after the NLRB did not uphold the complaint Damore filed against Google. Thus, on the surface the conflict appeared to have a successful resolution.

More recent events, however, highlight that Google employees are on dif- ferent sides of the debated issues; the memo conflict was symptomatic of much deeper cognitive sources of conflict within the company—specifically, dissimilar cognitive frames and preferences, in-group and out-group percep- tions, and (mis)communication. For instance, less than a year after Damore was fired, Tim Chevalier, a transgender employee with disabilities, filed a lawsuit alleging that Google fired him over his creation of internal memes that defended women of color and other marginalized people, and stated that he would not work with people who shared Damore’s views. HR received a complaint against Chevalier about his posts, and his manager told him he was engaging in too much ‘‘social activism.’’ The strong emo- tional reactions to the Damore and Chevalier cases both within and outside Google, including the expressions of outrage and disgust, also imply that these conflicts have a psychogenic element. All of this suggests that the underlying source of the conflict within Google that led to Damore’s memo was not effectively resolved by the structural solution of firing him.

The Google case illustrates that misdiagnosing the initial source(s) of a conflict and applying an inappropriate dispute resolution approach may be ineffective at resolving the dispute, or worse, compound its complexity by introducing new conflicts and/or new sources (e.g., psychogenic reactions to the dispute resolution tactic). Moreover, the case highlights that there is not necessarily one best way to resolve a dispute, especially a complex one, and there may be multiple aspects of a conflict that require multipronged dispute resolution strategies.

In contrast to the dispute resolution failings of the Google case, Kuhn’s (1961) ‘‘hot tread’’ case provides an example in which managers and union officials were ultimately able to successfully negotiate resolutions to multiple (and sometimes unrelated) issues driven by multilayered sources of conflict. Kuhn’s analysis (1961: 73) focused on how union officials and workers ini- tially exerted their power both within and outside the grievance process, and how different contextual factors limited the ability to adopt more ‘‘peaceful’’ approaches to dispute resolution. Yet, the structural nature of this analysis did not identify the cognitive and psychogenic sources of con- flict that were key reasons the workers chose to adopt more disruptive tac- tics. The workers in this case felt as though they had been mistreated and exhibited psychogenic reactions including anger and hurt feelings. At the same time, workers who had not been injured began to convince themselves that their health and safety was also at risk (Kuhn 1961: 62–63), demonstrat- ing a classic case of the cognitive bias known as groupthink. As a result, a negotiation-based approach to resolving the hot tread dispute based solely

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on a structural understanding of interests and sources of power failed to address the full set of sources of this dispute, and likely exacerbated it.

One of the major reasons the line manager and union official were ulti- mately able to resolve the conflict was because both finally recognized its cognitive and psychogenic sources:

The trouble was largely a shop problem, local and personal, and not a conflict between union and management. The settlement depended first of all upon the personal accommodation that Howard and Buchanan gradually reached and later upon an understanding between the tuber crew and the tuber foremen, but in any case not directly upon any larger solution. (Kuhn 1961: 76, emphasis added)

Perhaps ironically, the case was not fully resolved until it had been taken to arbitration. While arbitration is more often associated with resolving antago- nistic structural sources of conflict, the workers’ perceptions that they had been initially mistreated would not allow them to back down based on prin- ciple, even though they had a weak case. Although the union lost the grie- vance at arbitration, the delay of seven months in getting to arbitration that it introduced into the dispute resolution process produced a cooling-off effect, which allowed the strong psychogenic reactions and cognitive group- think that had been key sources of conflict to subside. With the multilayered structural, cognitive, and psychogenic sources of conflict all addressed, workplace labor relations on the tread-tuber line returned to a more posi- tive, cooperative pattern.

Both the Google and hot tread examples illustrate that conflicts can be dynamic, rather than static, with the potential for the source of the conflict to change during attempts to resolve the initial source(s) of the dispute. This reinforces the need for those trying to resolve disputes to understand the range of possible sources of conflict, so that changes in the nature or sources of a particular dispute can be identified and appropriately addressed rather than inadvertently compound the conflict. Also, by becom- ing more aware of the range of possible sources and being primed to look for them, dispute resolution professionals can be better prepared to recog- nize that disputants may have different perceptions of the sources of a dis- pute. The potential for disputes to have dynamic and/or perceptual elements also implies that organizational dispute resolution systems need to be flexible to allow the dispute resolution method to match the changing nature and/or differing perceptions of the conflict sources. Moreover, the potential for conflict to occur within groups should not be underestimated (e.g., with the separate factions of workers within Google), and should usu- ally be resolved before attempts to address conflicts between groups. Our framework can easily be applied to understand the sources of conflict that occur within groups as well as between groups, and further illustrates the need for dispute resolution professionals to develop multipronged and/or

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multi-method approaches to understanding the sources of conflict and its resolution.

Conclusion

Conflict is an enduring feature of all social life. In the workplace, it often manifests in disputes between coworkers, collective agreement negotiations between managers and employees over wages and workloads, or any one of an infinite number of interactions that may occur between various organiza- tional stakeholders—and even those beyond the organization. Our article both synthesizes and integrates diverse views on conflict to create a unique multidisciplinary framework for understanding major sources of conflict, distilled to three multidimensional categories—structural, cognitive, and psychogenic. Disputes can be multifaceted, with numerous causes that inter- act in complex ways. We assert that conceptually different aspects of the full range of sources of conflict must be distinguished to appreciate the nature of each particular dispute, because what can be considered ‘‘effective’’ dis- pute resolution must be rooted in a comprehensive and accurate under- standing of its origins.

While our comprehensive multidisciplinary framework generates a new approach for identifying the root sources of workplace conflict that trans- cends disciplinary silos, we do not suggest that structural, cognitive, and psy- chogenic sources are independent or can be isolated in practice. But by identifying and synthesizing the separate pieces of a potentially complex puzzle into an integrative framework, researchers and practitioners are bet- ter equipped to understand, analyze, diagnose, and propose solutions to these complex puzzles. Moreover, explicit consideration of the full range of potential causes of a dispute should help practitioners appreciate whether an intervention is likely to have only temporarily resolved the manifestations of a conflict, rather than the underlying sources. Consequently, appropriate and effective dispute resolution methods should be based on a comprehen- sive understanding of the robust range of conflict sources. This charge fur- ther implies that organizational dispute resolution systems, processes, and interventions need to be both tailored and flexible enough to encompass diverse types of disputes.

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