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The Veil and Muslim Women in France: Religious and Political

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Anthropology of the Middle East, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 2006: 89–107 © Berghahn Journals

The Veil and Muslim Women in France Religious and Political Aspects

Aref Abu-Rabia

Abstract: The right of Muslim schoolgirls in France to wear the veil (hijab) raises questions concerning the meaning of the veil for Muslim women. The debate about Muslim dress codes and whether Islam belongs in Europe has become a critical issue. The debate that began about the veil in Islam has evolved into a large discussion about Islam itself: as a religion, the Islamic movement in France and the relationship between Islam and fundamentalism. The purpose of this article is to examine some definitions of the hijab and its meaning in the context of the Qur’an, and to analyse some of the understandings of the hijab, as articulated in the late twentieth century by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. It also explores the nature of Muslim reactions in France as well as their tensions with the surrounding soci- ety, as a result of the French ban on wearing the veil in public schools.

Keywords: France, hijab, Muslim, politics, religion, secularism, veil

Introduction

This article is part of a large study conducted during the last four years about Muslims in Western Europe, focusing on the U.K. and France. It deals with their adaptation in the West, institutions, education, employment, identity, as well as integration in European society. In this article I am focusing on the veil in French public schools.

Being a male Muslim-Palestinian anthropologist helped me in my field- work. My studies in England over the course of two years and short visits to France, mainly Paris and the surrounding suburbs, have helped me formu- late my arguments. Practicing my religion, praying and fasting, facilitated my study. My students and friends together with local leaders, translators, teachers and preachers also contributed significantly. This work is based on primary and secondary sources, books and scientific journals, archival and documen-

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tary material, as well as reviews of published and unpublished materials and newspapers. Participant observations and interviews were carried out in order to address the many questions and issues related to the veil.

Arab intellectuals must wear spotless white gloves:

If they are against the Gulf war, they must constantly distance themselves from Saddam. If they are Muslim, intellectuals they must prove that their Islam is not Khomeini’s. If favoring the Palestinians [or if they are Palestinians], they must show that they are not anti-Semites. If they are against excluding head-scarf schoolgirls, they must appear as if they are in favor of the veil. (Jasser 1999: 39–40)

This is the feeling of the author of this article, for better or worse.

Definitions of the Veil

Hijab from the verb hajaba, means ‘to hide from view or to conceal’ (Ibn Man- zur 1955: 298). Hijab literally means ‘veil, barrier, curtain, amulet, protection or cover’. The word hijab is used to describe any veil placed in front of a person in order to conceal themselves from view or to isolate themselves (Encyclope- dia of Islam 1971: 359–61). The veil includes all-encompassing outer garments like the ankle-length ‘abaya from the Arabian Gulf states, the chador in Iran and the burqu’ in Afghanistan (Sa’diyya Shaikh 2003: 152). The veil is a face covering yaŝmak among the Ottoman women, and a dupatta among Muslim in the Indian sub-continent.

The term ‘veil’ does not have a universal meaning and is represented dif- ferently in several cultural contexts. It refers to a face-covering known as a niqab, as well as to a simple headscarf, known as a hijab. Another related term is litham, which means covering the lower part of the face up to the eyes. The semantic association of domestic segregation (hijab) with garments to be worn in public (jilbab, ximar, that is a veil or head covering; see Ibn Manzur 1995: 256–8) resulted in the use of the term hijab for concealing garments, which women wear outside their houses in keeping with Islamic notions of modesty. These garments are for the body, whereas ximar, niqab, burqu’, qina’, migna’a are garments for the head and neck (Stowasser 1997: 95).

The term hijab appears seven times in the Qur’an, in chronological sequence of revelation (19: 17, 38: 32, 17: 45, 41: 5, 42: 51, 7: 46, 33: 53); the term ‘veil’, in a general meaning, appears seventeen times in the Qur’an. One meaning of hijab in the Qur’an is a separation, which initially was imposed only on the wives of the Prophet and later was extended to his daughters and to Mus- lim women—they were commanded to draw their cloaks (jalabib, singular jilbab) close around themselves (33: 53, 59; ‘Ashmawi 1995) and to draw their veils (ximar) over their bosoms (24: 31; Hamdi 1991; Ibn Sa’d 1990: 141). The Qur’an states that on the Day of Judgment, the dwellers of the Garden will be

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separated from the disbelievers by a veil (7: 46); this veil is intended to protect the believers from the brightness of the Divine face.

Anthropological interests in the human body may best be summed up in the idea put forward by Mary Douglas that we have two bodies: the physical and the social body, whereby the body may be considered as a single entity, or serve many functions in the symbolic realm (1970: 93). The human body in Islam is a source of shame and therefore it should be concealed and covered (Khuri 2001: 35). This sense of shame goes back to Adam and Eve, when, upon the insistence of Satan, they tasted the tree of life (Qur’an 7: 22). The interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith has always engaged Muslim schol- ars of the four orthodox Sunni schools of law (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali)—madhahib. Some Muslim reformers argue that the Qur’an, as a living document, should constantly be interpreted according to the social, political and economic realities of the era (An-Na’im 1990; Engineer 1999). Islam is an open-minded religion that permits free exchange of opinions and debate about principles. Opposing views exist, even among jurists belonging to the same school (Weigert 1997: 402), including questions concerning the hijab.

Historical Background

The first reference to veiling goes back to an Assyrian legal text from the thir- teenth century BC, which restricted the practise to ‘respectable’ women and forbade prostitutes from veiling (Keddie and Beck 1978; Keddie and Baron 1991: 3). Historically, veiling was a sign of status and was practised by the elite in the ancient Greco-Roman, pre-Islamic Iranian and Byzantine empires. Thus, wearing the veil had already been observed before the time of Moham- mad and the veil became the prerogative of women of a certain rank, who used nasif or sitr for this purpose. The term sitr wahid (single curtain) was developed in early Islam (Ibn Manzur 1955: 343–5). Muslims subsequently adopted the veil and seclusion, and today it is widely recognised, by Muslims and non-Muslims, as an Islamic phenomenon, presumably sanctioned by the Qur’an (Hoodfar 2003: 6).

In medieval Europe, noblewomen covered their hair with bonnets and veils, especially in light of the fact that the Church issued an edict that women should keep their hair covered. New life was given to the veil following Queen Victoria’s introduction of the wedding gown setting a very popular trend for future brides. In the nineteenth century, due to major renovations and con- struction taking place in Paris, doctors strongly recommended that women wear veiled bonnets to protect themselves from dust and different airborne diseases. In fact it became fashionable to the extent that women perceived the veil as a symbol of high-class and social status (Irfan 2004).

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Review of Literature

Islamic law (sharia) enshrines numerous injunctions and exhortations related to the status of Muslim women. The subject of the hijab has continued to be one of the central issues related to the status of women in Islamic Middle East- ern societies (Roded 1999: 28–31). The idea of a specific dress code for women (often calling for long, loose and dark dresses, negligee or long, trailing robe) with emphasis on the hijab, has found a consensus among Muslim commu- nities in Europe and North America only within the last twenty years (Alvi, Hoodfar and McDonough 2003: xiii).

For most Europeans veiling, as presented in the press and media, has been associated with religious fundamentalism. The West’s position towards veiled women goes back to colonial times when Western imperialists saw the veil as a symbol of inferiority, and believed their mission was to civilise the primitive and oppressed people of the colonies from South Asia to North Africa. This attitude was inherited and enforced by the early nationalist leaders in the Mid- dle East who wanted to modernise their countries and believed the veil to be an obstacle to that goal. Some of these leaders were: Ataturk1 in Turkey, Jin- nah2 in Pakistan, the Shah3 of Iran and President Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia (Anderson 1971: 16–31; Rossi 1967).

In order to understand those who oppose wearing the hijab, we must go back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Under the influence of the reformist ideas of Khdeivi Ismail4, who founded the first school for girls in Cairo in 1873, were some Egyptian women who abandoned the hijab. How- ever the real champion of women’s rights in Islam was Kasim Amin, who lived from 1856 until 1905 (1899, 1900) and who was apparently under the influ- ence of Sheikh Mohammad ‘Abduh’s liberal interpretation of the Qur’an. He denounced the keeping of women in a state of subjection and promoted their right to education. Many women supported Kasim Amin. Abduh (1849–1905) attempted to reinterpret the primary sources of Islam in order to address Egypt’s social problems. He ‘favored a liberal interpretation of the scripts and preached inclusiveness and intercultural dialogue. His conception of theologi- cal reform, aimed at adapting Islam to modernity, also involved opposition to the guardians of the traditions of the past—the “ulama” (religious scholars)’ (Hatina 2005: 1; see also Uthman 1953). Other Arabs who advocated women’s rights were Malak Hifni Nasif,5 Mayy Ziyada,6 ‘Aisha al-Taymuriyya,7 Fatima Aliye Hanim8 and Huda Sha’rawi.9 Huda Sha’rawi formally abandoned the veil in 1926, and her gesture has been increasingly imitated by other Muslim women (Meshal 2003: 97–8).

In the last twenty to thirty years, many middle- and upper-class married and single women in Egypt are re-veiling, adopting new versions of Islamic dress, including head to toe coverings (El Guindi 1981: 465–87). Today, young educated girls and Muslim women across the social class structure are returning to wear- ing the veil. This applies not only to contemporary Egypt but also to France

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and suggests that similar forces are at work among Muslims women in France. Many young women find in the veil a symbol, a positive identity and a source of esteem sanctioned by Islam. In recent years, many working class women in Cairo have embraced veiling, in a kind of voluntary women’s movement to abandon Western clothes in favour of Arab-Islamic dress. This is an expression of a con- tradictory message of both protest and accommodation (MacLeod 1992: 536).

In contrast, for Muslim and non-Muslim feminists, the veil is a symbol of women’s oppression, patriarchal hegemony, slavery, violence and victimisa- tion. Giving up the veil became the most visible symbol of their rejection of patriarchy and their assertion of their rights as full participants in society (Mule and Barthel 1992: 323; Sa’dawi 1982). The veil represents the rejection of a mixed society and the fixing of inequality in difference (Jasser 1995).

The veil may be worn for multiple reasons. The veil helps women to pre- serve a degree of modesty and sense of dignity (Mernissi 1987). It is a pathway to social and economic status. Such practical advantages exist within a cultural context. Veiled women accept the roles of wife and mother, and see family roles as primary. Zenie-Ziegler found an interesting tension among veiled students in Cairo: What stands out from their contradictory statements, with some students arguing for the maintenance of Muslim tradition and others welcoming the influences from Western tradition on Muslim societies, is ‘their anxiety to find a solution, other than traditional subservience or the aping of Western trends’ (1988: 81–5). The hijab is one important marker of identity for many Muslim women who choose either to wear or not to wear it. It is also an important marker of social regulations when many Muslim women are forced to wear it (Safi 2003: 11). The Bedouin of Awlad ‘Ali in Egypt, consider veil- ing synonymous with modesty (hašm) and respect for conventional values. Symbolising sexual shame by veiling constitutes the most visible act of modest deference. The most compelling piece of evidence is the timing of veiling in the life cycle: Girls start veiling only at marriage, when they become sexually active, and women gradually abandon the practise as they pass menopause (Abu-Lughod 1988: 159–61).

The Veil in France or Veiled France?

A review of French political history can shed light on the background of the law banning the veil in public schools. From the Enlightenment and espe- cially from the French Revolution, French history was paved with abundant examples of struggle between religion and secularism, rationalist movements upholding the principle of separation between spiritual and secular matters. France’s history and political culture, combined with the presence on its ter- ritory of a strong and powerful Catholic Church, resulted in the country’s response to the dilemma in the form of the ‘Law on the Separation between State and Church of 1905’ (Salton 2005: 6).

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Since the French Revolution schools in France have been central to the creation of a society free from domination by religious leaders (McDonough 2003: 127). The tradition of secular education is very strong in France because the French Revolution explicitly opposed the dominance of the clergy together with the power of the monarchy. The Revolution executed the King and denied political power to the Church.

Today, Muslims are the second largest religious community in France. France expects all its citizens to accept the principles that were established by the French Revolution. The opposition to the wearing of the hijab in French public schools uses a rhetoric claiming that education must integrate children into society, and this means that citizens must accept the equality of men and women as a principle of the state. The prohibition of wearing the hijab is argu- ably based on the theory that ‘ostentations religious symbols’ represent a denial of the principle of the equality of men and women (McDonough 2003: 124). It should be noted that teachers’ unions and governments both in Europe and Canada have used some of the same rhetorical symbols as those in France in their protests against the hijab (Reiss 2003: 1–3).

Throughout the twentieth century, Europe has witnessed important changes in its economic, religious and ethnic composition. Masses of Muslim immigrants from Turkey, the Middle East, North Africa and the Indian sub-continent have settled in different European countries. These radical changes have compelled both European countries and the Muslim immigrants to adapt themselves to the new reality.

France has welcomed Muslims since the colonisation of Algeria in the 1830s. Most Muslims living in France are either North African immigrants or their offspring. Their presence in France results directly from French colonial rule over the three Maghreb countries (Gurfinkiel 1997). It should be noted that a large part of the African migration in France comes from the ancient territories of the Afrique Occidentale Française (today Mali, Senegal, Maurita- nia). Even if Islam is not the dominant religion in these West African countries immigration was encouraged during and after World War II as combatants and for reconstruction after the war (Boubakeur 2003). These communities hoped Europe would accommodate them. Today, these communities are assertive, culturally versatile, second- and third-generation European, and aware of their rights as European Union citizens. They insist on the right to keep both Euro- pean and Muslim identities.

In 1999 there were over four million immigrants in France, of which 30.2 per cent where from Maghreb countries.10 Due to the fact that the birth-rate of Muslims is three to four times higher than that of non-Muslims, the proportion of children, teenagers and young adults in urban France is an overwhelming 33 per cent among the Muslim population (Gurfinkiel 1997). There are about 12–15 million Muslims residing in Western Europe, roughly half of them in France, making it the largest Muslim community in Europe. This is merely an estimate, because any census of religious conviction is against French law.

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However, Michèle Tribalat, a demographer of the INED (Institut National d’Etudes de Démographie) has assessed that the number of Muslims living in France is 3.7 million. This includes 1.7 million immigrants, as many children and a little less than 300,000 grandchildren of immigrants, 3 million coming from the Maghreb and 700,000 from sub-Saharan Africa. Algerians and their descendants, who comprise 1.6 million, are fewer than the Italians and equal to the number of Spaniards who are 1.5 million (L’Express 2003).

Over the past twenty years in Europe, various riots, murders and other ethnic-based conflicts have interrupted the integration of Muslim immigrants. This interruption, however, is also due to the changing economic situation since the late 1970s. In an economic expansive phase (from the 1960s to the 1970s) the availability of employment also for migrants and a more advanta- geous situation of the working class, pushed a greater integration of these migrants (often as a part of the working class). From the 1980s and further in the 1990s, the economic crisis and restructuring and rising unemployment, together with the shift towards a liberal model threatening the Welfare State, have lead to a worsening of the general conditions of migrants and their off- spring and have affected their integration in French society.11

There has been an increasing Western antagonism towards the Islamic world, while at the same time Muslim countries have made immense efforts to increase their participation in world affairs (Bloul 2001). France has declined to recognise any ethnic, racial or religious distinctions among citizens whose privilege and duty it is to take an active part in the French language and the country’s republican values and historical culture. Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart (1995) traced the history of ethnicity models and underlined that even in the social sciences the concept of ‘ethnicity’ for a long time has been ‘taboo’ in the French context—in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon context, for example. This might be linked to the ‘universalist’ tradition of French thought, dating back to the nineteenth century and the French Revolution, with its ideal of universal human rights and a theoretical base that pushed in the direction of the integra- tion model for migrants minimising the racial/ethnic determination.

The French anthropologist Emmanuel Todd, for example, expresses his universal French attitude as follows: ‘If you [the Muslim veiled girls] behave in a fashion similar to ours [the French], well then, you are welcome’ (Todd 1994). Todd is not quite that universalistic as he apparently invites these young veiled girls to become French rather than to become free women. However, these young girls should rather be enabled to choose appropriate universal values (Jasser 1995). The problem posed by contemporary Islamic immigra- tion to Western Europe is seen most explicitly in France, in particular in the crises of the veil (Goody 2004: 101). Today, ‘there are Western Muslims, both veiled and unveiled, that work together in several organisations respectful of each other’s personal choices: this development is very important because it is a step toward acceptance of the opinions of the other and the promotion of a much needed internal dialogue’ (Ramadan 2005: 142).

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The community organisations for which the headscarves issue was the cen- tral symbol was spearheaded by young, educated Muslims, who speak French fluently and most of whom are of French nationality. The Islamic movements, which provided the ideological mobilisation at the time and supported many media appearances of the Muslim girls thrust into the centre of the dispute, saw an opportunity to place Islam on the centre stage and create a common identification for Muslim youth among all the confusion. This move is akin to the events in 1992 when an ‘Islamic University’ was founded in the Nievre department by the Union des Organisations Islamiques des France, a campaign- ing organisation which lead the headscarves campaign from the beginning (Kepel 1995).

Gaspard and Khosrokhavar (1995) pose the problem of the veil in all its complexity, identifying three meanings: the traditional veil of the immigrant woman; the veil imposed; and the veil reclaimed. They insist on the danger of complicating the choice of veiled girls by identifying them with Islamists. The French debate illustrates the heightened veil related differences occur- ring across Europe. Today, most of the Muslims in France live in the clusters of unattractive apartment buildings that circle prosperous cities, relegated to neighbourhoods that have become notorious for severe poverty and crime rates. The unemployment rate among the Muslims is the highest in France.12 The development of ‘Return to the Faith’ [resurgent Islam] is attracting the young, the unemployed and those who have not yet merged into French soci- ety, and is giving them a strong sense of Islamic identity (Lee 2003).

In France, both French and Maghrebi men compared the right of veiled Muslim women with the right of Muslim schoolgirls to cover their head. Some Maghrebi men insisted on the need to protect Muslim interests, while some French men manipulated the same image in order to arouse fear and intimi- dation of the Muslim community (Bloul 1996: 234–8). It should be noted that there are different opinions in France about wearing the veil in public schools. Those in favour of the veil claim that secularity is a matter of ensur- ing that everyone is entitled to their own opinion, and to express it freely and safely. This right is limited only by the respect of the right of the other. Those opposing the veil in public schools claim that secularity means the deliberate avoidance of any particularistic, symbolic inscription of institutional republi- can space, understood to be the only way to assure tolerance and individual freedom. Most daughters of Maghrebi immigrants who are the second genera- tion (beurs/beurettes13) defending the veil, do so in the name of a particular understanding of secularity and individual rights as a respect of differences, while older Maghrebis oppose it in the name of discretion. The Maghrebi men defend their right to cultural difference, and often make Islam part of their eth- nic Muslim identity in the name of their ‘God-given’ rights as equal individuals (Bloul 1996: 234–46).

The beurettes agree that a deep sense of inferiority undermines their con- fidence and turns them, ever so frequently, into mysterious, silent figures

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hovering in the background of the stage on which life unfolds. Not only are they exposed to gender discrimination but they also have to struggle with the demands of a constant balancing act between two extremely different cultures. Furthermore, they are increasingly being discriminated against by mainstream French society, which has come to regard them as an undesirable, ethnically separated ‘other’, although many of them hold French citizenship. One con- sequence of the misrepresentation of France’s Muslims is the formation of a siege mentality among many Muslims. There are growing Muslim communi- ties in France, many of whom are culturally Western, while keeping religiously Muslim (Boyce 1997: 610–4; Roy 1994). The riots and violence that burst out in 2005 in Paris and spread all over France are clear evidence that they are not yet fully integrated into French society.

It is worth noting that some of the young women defend veiling, though they themselves do not veil. They suggest that much of the fuss in non-Muslim society over veiling stems from anti-Muslim sentiments. Questions of identity and the demonising of Islam and Muslims in the West do play a role in the decision of some women to take up the veil (Hoodfar 2003: 25–6, 30). Veils and dividers could give a relative advantage to the women behind them, since they could look at a person looking at them without being seen themselves (Melman 1995), or to hide the wearer’s identity (Fernea 1965). The most bla- tant example of the fear of the ‘other’ and the associated fantasy of penetration is French colonialism’s obsession with the veil in Algeria (Yegenoglu 1998: 39). As we learn from Fanon, the Algerian woman, in the eyes of the observer, is unmistakably ‘she who hides behind a veil’ (1965: 36–8). This enabled the colonial administration to define a precise political doctrine: ‘If we want to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance, we must first of all conquer the women: we must go and find them behind the veil where they hide themselves and in the houses where the men keep them out of sight’ (1965: 37). Movements towards the traditional values of communities are not limited to the Muslim world and can be observed in many different cultures, including those of the West. The veils of Muslim Frenchwomen tend to be less austere in their use of colour and material. According to Killian in North Africa and the Middle East, the veil became a symbol of national iden- tity and opposition to the West during independence and nationalist move- ments (2003: 570).

Some women wear the veil for class reasons, as the hijab is economical and concealing one’s class, which Western clothes expose. Older women some- times wear the veil simply to hide their greying hair. Of course, others are compelled to wear the veil by their spouses and fathers, though this group seems to be in the minority. The motivations for veiling are varied, ranging from personal safety to religious conservatism, but seldom do they stem from political extremism. Rather than outlawing all religions’ symbols as a means of excluding the Muslim clothing, a much wiser policy would be to include the hijab among acceptable symbols. This would result in more than merging

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Muslims into French society and reducing everyone’s sense of siege (Shore 2004: 1–2).

Defenders of the French prohibition of the veil in public schools perceive it as a beginning to free the women from social pressures and obligations, just as those who oppose this view find an excuse to consider it a violation of free- dom. In both cases, the veil is an issue of culture and civilisation. Therefore, a society that expels young girls from schools merely because of their modest dress code is simply harming itself. The same headscarf revered as a sign of ‘holiness’ when worn by Catholic nuns, is reviled as a sign of ‘oppression’ when worn for the purpose of protection by Muslim women (Abdel Azim 2000: 3). The veil’s purpose is not to symbolise being a Muslim, but is an Islamic prac- tise. It seems that forbidding the public school girls to wear the veil is forcing them to cease practicing their religion, and is a direct violation of the right of freedom of religion, which is protected by the European Human Rights con- vention (Abou Jahjah 2000: 3).

The French people’s attitude towards the Muslim veil in schools was expressed through a poll in Le Monde (30 November 1989): 75 per cent of the French population was against the veil in public schools, 17 per cent were indifferent and only 6 per cent supported it. Only 32 per cent of the French people opposed wearing the headscarf in the street. There are differences of opinion within various Muslim groups in France about wearing the veil: older people (67 per cent) were more opposed to the veil than younger people (44 per cent), and women (49 per cent) were more opposed to it than men (43 per cent). Only 30 per cent supported veiling in school and 22 per cent were indif- ferent. The Maghrebi women in Paris and the surrounding area who rejected the veil because they believe the purpose of school is integration are thus agreeing with French public opinion. Those who support the veil because they believe girls should have the freedom to express themselves are well versed in the Western discourse of rights and freedom (Killian 2003: 588).

It seems that the future of Muslims in France as well as in Europe remains an open and critical issue. The alternative for the near future, and maybe the distant future, isn’t between dictatorial secularism and fundamentalist Islam, but between democratic secularism and Islam. Many Muslims are aware of the reality that they are on a European continent of Christian civilisation, and that once European civilisation feels threatened, its attitude towards foreigners will become more xenophobic. Wearing the hijab within the republican space induces radical criticism by modern Western culture, whereas wearing ‘alter- native’ clothing, punk hairdos, tattooing, piercings, etc. are tolerated. French female students go to school wearing clothing exposing their midriff, ample amounts of the thigh and breast, while Muslim students are not allowed to cover their heads. It seems that there have different rules for different groups. The association of the hijab and terror, or Islam and terror, is misleading as terrorism and extremism are not dependent on ethnicity or religion.

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Banning the Veil in Public Schools in France

The hijab debate has been underway in France for years. Since 1989, French authorities have left it up to individual schools to decide whether Muslim girls could cover their heads, and the result has been a patchwork of regulations. Suspensions or expulsions have accelerated, however, and more Muslim girls appear to be taking up the hijab. It is worth noting that from 1994 to 2003 about one hundred female students have been suspended or expelled from middle and high schools for wearing the veil in class. In nearly half of these cases, their exclusions were annulled by the French courts (Salton 2005: 1–28).

In July 2003, President Jacques Chirac set up a commission of twenty mem- bers headed by Bernard Stasi, to investigate the issue and to re-examine the republic’s concept of secularity.14 Chirac went a step further, saying that private businesses should be allowed to ban such symbols among employees, and that patients at public hospitals would not be allowed to refuse treatment from doc- tors of the opposite sex.15 In October 2003, a court upheld the expulsion of the Muslim sisters Lila and Alma16 from a state school in Aubervilliers. Lila and Alma were expelled from school because of their clothing, whereas no Chris- tian or Jewish schoolboy or schoolgirl has been expelled for similar reasons by a French school. The problem is the Islamic headscarf (Salton 2005: 21–2).

On 17 December 2003, President Jacques Chirac called for a law that would ban Muslim head scarves (hijab) and all other overt religious symbols from public schools. The Islamic veil (hijab), the kippa (the Jewish skullcap) and the Christian cross don’t have a place within the walls of public schools. Despite such rhetoric of universality, the target of the interdiction clearly seems to be the hijab. The law appears to call into question the legitimacy of Islam in the French public sphere and has been interpreted by many in the Islamic world as a direct attack on Islam and Islamic civilisation. Debate in the French press has mostly referred to the ‘law against the hijab’. The Jewish kippa is a rarity in public schools, as the orthodox Jewish community has a thriving private school network (Silverstein 2004).

On 30 December 200317, Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, Sheikh of al-Azhar mosque in Cairo, declared that France had the right to pass a law banning all ‘conspicuous’ religious symbols in state schools and institutions. He declared this in a joint press conference with Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s Inte- rior Minister. It is worth noting that Tantawi justified his attitudes saying that a Muslim woman who lives in a non-Muslim country whose rules contradict Islam may take off the hijab under obligation in accordance with sharia. ‘Mus- lims who do not allow anybody to interfere in their affairs should, likewise, not interfere in the affairs of non-Muslims’, he added. The French Interior Minister praised Tantawi’s statements and urged all Muslims living in France to comply with the French laws. He referred to Tantawi as a respected leader calling for peaceful dialogue among cultures. Tantawi received popular support in France

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but was greeted with great anger and dismay throughout the Islamic world.18 Noura JadAllah, head of the League of Muslim Women in France declared: the girls feel that this ban of the hijab in schools is unjust and discriminatory. Dalil Boubakeur, French-born president of the French Council of Muslims and director of the Great Mosque in Paris, warned that banning the hijab in schools could lead to stigmatisation.

In this connection it should be noted that classical Islamic jurist thoughts make a central distinction between two spheres or territories, the dar al-islam and the dar al-harb. The former is that region within which Islam holds sway and where submission to God is observed; as a result, the dar al-islam is a terri- tory/house/abode of Islam and peace. The world outside Islam is by definition one in which the divine is not observed, it is called dar al-harb, literally the ‘territory/house/abode of war’ (Johnson 1997: 48–52; Khadduri 1966: 10–4, 130–41; Khadduri 1955; Peters 1979: 11–2, 1996). Dalil Boubakeur clarifies in his commentary that ‘according to the sharia a non-Muslim country is not to be seen any more as dar al-harb but rather as dar al-’ahd, and the platform is an expression of such a covenant’ (Gurfinkiel 1997; Weigert 1997: 402; cf. Qur’an 2: 40, 80).

There were demonstrations by women in Paris, Lille, Marseille, Mulhouse and other French cities. The demonstrators shouted: ‘Not our fathers, not our husbands, we chose the headscarf—Ni père, ni mari, le foulard on l’a choisi’, or ‘Neither forced nor downtrodden—Ni dupes ni soumises’ (Silverstein 2004: 1–9). It is worth noting that leading French women’s rights activists (including prominent women such as the actresses Isabelle Adjani and Nathalie Baye, the write Catherine Millet and the fashion designer Sonia Rykiel) sent an open letter to Chirac, calling for an outright ban of the veil, declaring that the veil sends all Muslims and non-Muslims back to an intolerable discrimination against women. Some feminists like Fadela Amara and Khalida Messaoudi supported the law banning the hijab. On the other hand, some prominent French feminists, including Christine Delphy and Françoise Gaspard, were against banning the veil (Nordmann 2004). The feminist collective ‘Les Bledar- des’ perceived the controversy over the veil as a manifestation of colonialist sentiments. Finally, a notable minority of French non-Muslims supported the right to wear the veil in public schools (Nordman 2004). In any case feminists remain divided on the question of the veil debate in France.

On 10 February 2004, the French National Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favour of a ban against the Islamic hijab in state schools; the bill was passed by 494 votes to 36, and 276 to 20 in the Senate. The law came into force in September 2004 (Henley 2004; Le Monde 19 December 2004). Lhaj-Thami Breze, head of the fundamentalist Union of French Islamic Organisations, declared that the majority of devout Muslims in France wanted to practise their religion in peace and in total respect of the law. Dounia Bouzar, an anthropologist and member of the French Council of the Muslim Faith declared that wearing the hijab was a way for girls to stay close to their families

The Veil and Muslim Women in France → 101

while challenging other traditions such as arranged marriages. The major French teachers’ union fears that this law will stigmatise French Muslims and exacerbate already fragile relations between religious and ethnic communities; however, the majority (79 per cent) of teachers consider the veil incompatible with public service and education.19

Greville Janner, vice-president of the World Jewish Congress, said that French legislators had ‘disgracefully punished the entire Muslim population and other religious communities’. In addition the ban has drawn much criti- cism from abroad, including the Pope, the Catholic Church, the French Arch- bishop, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Ken Livingstone, the Mayor of London (Henley 2004; Silverstein 2004). The International Helsinki Federa- tion for Human Rights has also warned the French government against the ban, as has the U.S.-based advisory group, the Commission on International Religious Freedom.20

In 2004, a year after the law had been passed, 806 veiled Muslim students were affected by this law; of these students about 533 have accepted the law and no longer wear the veil in class; 67 have pursued their studies abroad; 73 were suspended or expelled and have chosen to take government-run CNED correspondence courses in order to finish their studies (Nordman 2004).

Conclusion

The term veil does not have a universal meaning and is represented in several cultural contexts. Veiling is associated with socio-cultural background, reli- gious orders, medical purposes and socio-economic status. Historically, veil- ing was conceived as a symbol of social status, and was practised by the elite, a prerogative of women of a certain rank. The hijab, which Muslim women wear outside of their houses in keeping with Islamic notions of modesty (hašm) and dignity is widely recognised by Muslims and non-Muslims as an Islamic phenomenon, presumably sanctioned by the Qur’an.

The dispute over the veil in schools in France may seem trivial, but for the school-age girls in France veiling may be conditional for access to education, as their parents may forbid them to attend mixed gender classes should they go to school unveiled. Thus, France’s policy may potentially prevent Muslim girls from getting a proper education and inhibit their integration into French society. French Muslim women declare that they are ‘Proud to be French and Muslim; we defend the republic, liberties and laicite; one headscarf equal one vote’. These voices need to be respected and integration should mean exposure to their own history and culture offering them the opportunity to identify positively with their religion and civilisation that helped save Europe from stagnation during the Middle Ages.

Those who cover their heads can be accommodated in a secular context with many others who want to be part of a secular republic for the benefit of

102 ← Aref Abu-Rabia

the whole French society. The ban on head covering in public schools can con- stitute a threat to the foundation of civic and democratic society and the right to fully express oneself. Therefore, it can disenfranchise those in the Muslim community that want to maintain this practise as they become disgruntled with the French Republic. The veil has encountered more opposition in France than in other parts of Europe. Those who measure one culture or civilisation against another consequently neglect the fact that we are dealing with dignity, liberty and democracy for all human beings. Neither humanism nor feminism is an appendage of a single culture. The affair of the hijab in France finds itself embedded in the context of French political debate.

Conversion to Islam and the corresponding development of Western indigenous Muslim communities has been a relatively recent trend, affected strongly by the migration patterns of African, Arab and Asian Muslims into Europe, America and Australia. Moreover, the existence of growing numbers of Muslims with Celtic, Anglo-Saxon or American ethnic backgrounds contra- dicts the belief that Islam belongs outside of the West and threatens Western civilisation.

Acknowledgements

My thanks go to Benjamin Okyere for proof-reading and editing the manu- script, Asmini Bwebwe for translations from French into English and to Pro- fessor Barbara Casciarri (Paris 8 Universite Vincennes–Saint-Denis) for her reading and useful comments on the manuscript. My thanks also go to Pro- fessor Becky Cook, Dr Lauren Basson and Dr Mohammad al-‘Atawneh from Ben-Gurion University; to the two anonymous reviewers and Dr Birgit Reinel for their useful comments, advice and suggestions. Finally, I thank all those who assisted me in compiling the manuscript whom I cannot mention all in person but remain forever grateful for their assistance.

Aref Abu-Rabia is a native anthropologist and Chair of the Department of Mid- dle East Studies at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel. He has written four books and numerous scholarly publications on traditional medicine, family customs, holy saints, education, violence, abuse of children and cosmo- politanism. His research interests include anthropology, education, public health, Islamic medicine, ethno-botany, folk medicine and violence. His areas of interest are in particular the Middle East, North Africa and Islamic communities in the West. One of his current projects is the establishment of a garden for medicinal, aromatic and food plants in the Negev.

The Veil and Muslim Women in France → 103

Notes

1. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938), founder and President of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The state led the way in an unveiling campaign and in 1926 enacted the Civil Code, a totally secular code of law regulating the family. In 1937 he declared that Tur- key is a secular state. For more details, see Naim 1992.

2. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the leader and first governor-general of Pakistan. For more details, see Wolpert 1984.

3. Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944), Iranian monarch and founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (1919–80), last ruling monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran. Crown Prince Mohammad was elevated to Shah in 1941 until 1979. During the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi wearing the veil was prohibited in 1936. Iran was the only country that actually made veiling illegal and used the police to enforce the law. As an expression of women’s opposition to his repressive regime, women who supported the 1979 Islamic Revolution marched in the street clothed in chadors. For more details, see Hoodfar 2003; Milani 1992; Nadjmabadi 1993.

4. Mohammad Ali established a dynasty of Albanian-Ottoman origin that reigned in Egypt from 1805–1952. The ruler bore the title pasha and wali (governor) until 1867; his descendants were called khdeive (viceroy) until 1914, sultan until 1922 and, finally, king until 1952. Khdeivi Ismail (reigned 1863–79) is the son of Ibrahim (reigned 1848), son of Mohammad ‘Ali (reigned 1805–48). For more details, see Esposito 1955: 166–7.

5. Malak Hifni Nasif (Nassef) (1886–1918) poet and writer, known as Bahithat al-Badiya (see Hifni 1962).

6. Mayy Ziyada (1886–1941), pen name of Mari Ilyas Ziyada (The Encyclopedia of Islam 1991: 927–28).

7. ‘Aisha al-Taymuriya, daughter of an Egyptian-Turkish upper class family. 8. Fatima Aliye Hanim, daughter of a prominent Ottoman reformist. She published a

book on Muslim Women in 1891, which deals with Muslim women in Romanised Ottoman Turkish.

9. Huda Sha’rawi (1879–1947). 10. Statistics are taken from Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques

(INSEE), 1999. 11. Thanks to Professor Barbara Casciarri for this comment, 12 May 2006. 12. The statistics about employment and unemployment do not report the reference to

the religious affiliation. However, the newspaper Libération (10 November 2005) pub- lished an article during the riots of November 2005 in the banlieues (quarters of popu- lar housing), which made a link between the riots and the situation of employment in the banlieues. Of course, it is not possible to assume that all French Muslims live in the banlieues, however it is perceived that most of the Muslims in France live there. The source reported by the newspaper was the Observatoire National des ZUS (National Observatory of the ZUS = Zones Urbains Sensibles, or ‘Urban Sensitive Zones’, a kind of euphemism for banlieues).

13. The offspring of immigrants from North African countries, mostly second generation, are referred to and refer to themselves as beurs or beurettes. The standard dictionaryThe standard dictionary Le nouveau petit Robert gives the following definition: ‘BEUR: [1980] verlan, avec apocope, de Arabe. Jeune Maghrébin né en France de parents immigrés’ (1995: 216). Beur is a slang expression in French for Arab (see also Cesari 2002, footnote 15: 51; Hargreaves 1995: 104–8).

104 ← Aref Abu-Rabia

14. France broke with the Roman Catholic Church after the French Revolution and enshrined the separation of church and state in its constitution in 1905.

15. Some French Muslim men reportedly refuse to allow male doctors to treat their wives. 16. Lila (18) and her sister Alma (16) Levy-Omari are daughters of a Muslim mother and

a Jewish father originally from Algeria. 17. See islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2003-12/30/article 11. 18. See islamonline.net/Arabic/news/2003-12/30/article 11. 19. http://www.csa-tmo.frdataset/data2004/opi2004012c.htm 20. BBC News, 10 February 2004.

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