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Abortion1.docx

Abortion (Part One): 

Today: Some philosophical arguments in favor of abortion.

Next time: some philosophical arguments against abortion.   Three possible stances on abortion in the philosophical literature:

(1) The extreme conservative view (anti-abortionists, pro-life activists): Human personhood begins right at conception.  Abortion is, by definition, homicide.

(2) The extreme liberal view:

Human personhood begins immediately after birth or a bit later (Singer).  Abortions are permissible up until the point when personhood begins.     Singer: 28 days after birth Singer states, “‘the location of a being — inside or outside the  Womb — should not make that much difference to the wrongness of killing it.’” (3) The moderate view:

There is a morally relevant break in the biological process of development – between conception and birth.  A line can be drawn where life begins, and this line is after conception and before birth.  Abortion is o.k. if it occurs before this line.   Of course, our abortion laws are an instance of (3).   The line is drawn often after the second trimester, when a fetus becomes “viable,” i.e., can survive outside of the womb. What view do you think is best?

Let’s start with a couple of extreme positions, just to get a sense of the terrain.

PETER SINGER’S UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT ON DISABLED INFANTS AND ABORTION “When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of the happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the hemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him.”  P. Singer. Practical Ethics (1) It is morally right to maximize happiness and minimize suffering. (Utilitarianism)  

(2) Some disabled infants suffer (and will suffer) more than non-disabled infants.  

(3) Therefore, it is morally right to “abort” a disabled infant to make way for a non-disabled infant.  

What do we make of this argument? By the way, in a 1994 book, Singer advocated aborting children with Down syndrome. I suspect many of us will reject the idea that these infants should be put to death. But what, specifically, is the mistake that Singer is making? What makes him wrong here?

Mary Ann Warren: also argues for the liberal position.   She grants that if a fetus is a person, abortion would be wrong.   But she does not think that a fetus is a person.  

Why? Because there are certain necessary conditions that something must meet to be a person, and a fetus does not meet these conditions. Not just anything is a person…a table is not a person. There must be certain characteristics that a person has that, e.g., a table lacks.

O.K.  What are the characteristics that something must have to be a person, according to Marry Ann Warren?

They are: 1) Consciousness of objects and events external and internal to the being, and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 2) Reasoning -- the capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems; 3) Self-motivated activity; 4) A capacity to communicate; 5) The presence of self-concept and self-awareness. You need these things to be a person, but a fetus doesn’t have them, so a fetus is not a person.  

Do you need all of these to be a person (it doesn’t seem like it)? How many do you need? When do they arise?

If these are not the criteria for personhood, then what are?

These criteria don’t seem correct to some. They seem to eliminate some people from counting as people. They also seem to allow some non-people to count as people. They just seem very problematic to some.

Judith Jarvis Thomson (pro-abortion), in the reading, also argues in favor of abortion, but she is much more of a moderate than Singer or Warren. A little surprisingly (for a pro-abortion person), she thinks that a fetus becomes a human person fairly early on.   She says: “I am inclined to think also that we shall probably have to agree that the fetus has already become a human person well before birth. Indeed, it comes as a surprise when one first learns how early in its life it begins to acquire human characteristics. By the tenth week, for example, it already has a face, arms and less, fingers and toes; it has internal organs, and brain activity is detectable.” She doesn’t think a new fertilized egg is a person though, “no more than an acorn is an oak tree.” But her main point in the article is this: even if we grant that a fetus is a person, abortion can still be o.k. in some cases.   Anti-abortion people often argue that a fetus is a person, therefore, it has a right to life.  She doesn’t buy this argument – it’s too quick she thinks. It is often thought that the main issue in the abortion debate is: when does a fetus become a person? She denies this, holding that it might be permissible to abort a fetus even if it is a person.  

A famous example: a violinist has failing kidneys.

You are kidnapped and hooked up to the violinist so that you can share kidney function. If we disconnect you before 9 months the violinist will die.   We have no moral obligation to stay connected to the violinist. When we wake up, we are morally permitted to leave. Pregnancy is similar.   The fetus would die if disconnected too etc. So we have no moral obligation to preserve the life of the fetus, even if we grant the conservative view and say that the fetus is life.

Is it the same? This is an argument from analogy. These are only as strong as the analogy itself. So, is it a good analogy?

She points out that her case works quite well in the case of rape.  And many who are against abortion do not make an exception for cases of rape.  So if her argument works for rape, the anti-abortion folks should admit it works for all pregnancies.  

She also thinks that in some cases abortion would be wrong (even though there are cases where it would be the right thing to do too).    “And it [i.e., her view] also allows for and supports our sense that in other cases resort to abortion is even positively indecent. It would be indecent in the woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.” Would you be in favor of someone getting an abortion to go on a trip to Europe?   

What are some other considerations in favor of abortion?

Some abortion supporters point to cases in which they think abortion seems clearly justified: Rape. Incest. Dangerous pregnancies.  Potential life should not be valued more than actual life?  Assuming you are against abortion, would you make exceptions for these cases?

In everyday life, moderates about abortion often give different arguments in favor of abortion than the ones given above. They appeal to a woman’s right to chose what happens with her body, etc.

Roe v Wade (1973): Texas law at the time banned all abortions except in cases of rape, incest and medical necessity. “Jane Roe” (her real name was Norma McCorvey) challenged these laws by claiming that they infringed upon her right to decide when or if to have a child, and to choose the direction of her life in general.

The case made its way to the US Supreme Court, who ruled in McCorvey’s favor. There were two key Constitutional Amendments the justices relied on.

The ninth amendment says that simply because a right is not explicitly granted in the Constitution, this does not mean that people do not have that right. (Direct quote of the amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). This opens the door for the Supreme Court to grant new rights not given in the Constitution.

The fourteenth amendment was also an important part of the decision. In concert with some previous court cases (Griswold v Connecticut), the fourteenth amendment was interpreted to imply that there are certain personal matters that the government doesn’t have a right to infringe upon. Ultimately, the decision to allow abortion was justified on the grounds that people have a right to privacy.

Does this reasoning seem correct?