Chapter Five

Nation and States, 1872–1913

THE FINAL YEARS OF SPANISH RULE

We have seen how liberalizing the Philippine economy and attempting to centralize its administrative structure could not reverse Spain's weakening grasp on its colony. Economic growth led to domination by British capital, Chinese distribution networks, and Filipino-led export agriculture. Political reforms were undercut by lack of continuity, uneven tax burdens, and corruption. Socially, the greatest challenges to the state were an impoverished and discontented peasantry and a wealthy but disgruntled elite. The problems of the first could not be addressed without confronting the interests of the religious orders and the new elite itself. The challenge of the second might have been lessened by strategic concessions to demands we will discuss in this chapter.

The profound socioeconomic changes of the century began to find political expression in the 1870s. In this decade, the Philippines felt the mixed results of increased integration into the global marketplace. An economy tied to global trade was vulnerable to trade fluctuations, and during the long global recession of the 1870s and 1880s, declining exports could not always compensate for rising import costs—the Philippines' first modern trade deficit.

The combination of demographic change, rural poverty, new wealth, and the failure (on balance) of liberal reform produced a seminal moment in 1872. An indio mutiny in the Cavite naval arsenal near Manila that flared briefly and was contained quickly nevertheless provided a pretext for the arrest, conviction, and public execution of three Filipino (one criollo and two mestizo) priests: Fathers José Burgos, Jacinto Zamora, and Mariano Gomez. Burgos had written critically about the government, but none of the three was in-

volved in the uprising. They were, however, representative of social groups exerting mounting pressure on peninsulare privilege, especially within the country's most powerful institution.

Conflict within the Church

In the 1770s, a royal decree had ordered the secularization of Philippine parishes. This meant the transfer of parish posts from friars of the religious orders to "secular clergy" of the dioceses (territories under the jurisdiction of bishops, from which the religious orders were autonomous). The lack of Spanish secular clergy in the years after the conquest had given the missionary orders control of the parishes. But by the late eighteenth century, the Jesuits had left the Philippines, and diocesan leaders saw an opportunity to further reduce the influence of the orders by transferring their vacated local parishes to secular jurisdiction. Newly opened seminaries welcomed the sons of indio and mestizo families into the secular priesthood, and liberal governors also attacked friar abuses directly.[1] O. D. Corpuz relates one instance:

> An observer sent from Spain to Filipinas reported in 1842 that "during the last years" officials newly arrived in Manila issued anti-friar measures. One of these forbade the friars' practice of whipping their parishioners for not religiously observing church requirements. The friars petitioned to be allowed to continue the practice, explaining that the lashing would be done in front of the church door. The governor-general not only dismissed the petition but also circulated his decision among the natives. This caused "the greatest grief to the parish priests."[2]

The secularization of the parishes was stalled several times during the nineteenth century by political reaction in Spain, but not before principalia families began to gravitate toward the church for careers more rewarding than service as a cabeza and gobernadorcillo. The priesthood was influential both morally and politically, and secular Filipino priests agitated for appointment to the parishes. Tensions heightened as the bishops renewed their insistence on "visitation" to inspect the state of religious education, always resisted by parish friars but not secular priests.

In the ensuing battle, the seculars were used as pawns, assigned by the bishops to subordinate posts in order-controlled parishes where they became targets of friar anger. Spaniards were accustomed to treating indios and mestizos as inferiors, regarding them as spiritually and intellectually deficient. By the late nineteenth century, however, Filipino priests were among the most intellectually able men of the colony, while Spanish friars in the Philippines were mainly poor provincials of limited education and experience. Working

as subordinates to them gave the Filipinos an opportunity to observe closely, and as a result, "the friars ceased to be the representatives of a ruling race and were seen as they were—men with faults and errors."[3]

Never had the religious orders been so besieged. To friars' eyes, liberal government undermined the foundations of Spanish power in the Philippines—indio impiety increased, attendance at mass declined, subversive literature circulated, and fraternization with non-Spanish foreigners encouraged heretical views. To the secular clergy, liberal policies merely leveled the playing field and gave them evidence to make their own accusations. Filipino priests were incensed by the orders' concern with profits at the expense of spiritual responsibilities—a questioning of the "moral qualifications of the regime itself." Airing their views with their families and parishioners marked them as culprits behind the increasing "anti-Spanish" sentiment in the country. The tide turned against them as the orders wrested back control of many secular parishes. The Jesuits returned to the Philippines in 1859 and were followed by several new orders, which claimed parishes among the growing population.[4] By 1898, the total Catholic population was about 6.5 million, but less than one million were under the pastoral care of secular Filipino priests.[5]

This confrontation was the context for the executions of Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora. Striking out with self-defeating rage, conservative officials also persecuted elite families who had supported Spain's Glorious Revolution in the 1860s. Hundreds were detained and deported to the Visayas and Mindanao, the Marianas Islands (also under the Spanish flag), and Spain. But instead of instilling fear, the executions in particular only galvanized elite opposition under the slowly broadening identity of "Filipino." Fathers Gomez, Burgos, and Zamora became martyrs, and their deaths made the push for social and political change in the colony irresistible.

Struggle against Church and State

Tensions rose simultaneously in other spheres where the interests of the elite and friars met. The higher value of land planted in commercial crops prompted the religious orders to raise land rents and leasehold fees, hurting the income of inquilinos who leased and sublet the estates. Already grumbling about taxes, church contributions, and corruption, they saw the increase as another sign of Spanish parasitism. Conflict over parishes and rents spilled over into social tension when friars derided the talents and intellect of Filipinos.

The principal site of social conflict was higher education, where the orders clung to reactionary curricula and resisted making the Spanish language intrinsic to Philippine learning. From this conflict—and the consequent outflow to Europe for higher education—emerged a group of self-proclaimed *ilustrados* (enlightened ones). The most valuable education they got abroad was not in universities, however, but in seeing the relative backwardness of Spain in relation to its European peers. This added self-confidence to the ilustrados' public stance. Their most illustrious member described it as a class "whose number is gradually increasing, is in constant communication with the rest of the Islands, and if today, it constitutes only the brains of the country, in a few years, it will constitute its whole nervous system and will manifest its existence in all the acts of the country."[6]

Figure 5.1. Garroting: The usual method of public execution in the Spanish Philippines (courtesy of the Philippine National Historical Institute)

Frustration with the Catholic Church in the Philippines and Spain led many ilustrados to abandon it for the anticlerical Freemasons, an international fraternal order that originated in Europe and first appeared in the Philippines in the 1880s. One attraction of Masonry was that its lodges (local branches) did not practice racial discrimination. Another was its tradition of secrecy, so well suited to the need to develop ideas outside the hearing of friars. In Masonry they found a structure to help forge a new "life of association; in the midst of that brotherhood we have communicated to one another our impressions, our thoughts, our aspirations, and we have made ourselves apt to unite our desires and acts."[7] (See box 5.1.)

The ilustrado effort to shape the future was embodied in the Propaganda Movement waged in Manila and Europe by the organization La Solidaridad.

Box 5.1. The Role of Masonic Lodges in the Reform Movement

". . . to study problems of political organization of our country, of economic, of military organization, etc., and especially the better development of the new municipal governments. For Masonry is the brain, called on to think out what people are to do. Suppose Spain should grant us tomorrow the intervention which we have been asking for in the government of the State? What positive and concrete solutions do we have to put into practice? What reforms have we thought out to improve the situation of the country, to develop its sources of wealth, etc., etc.? This is what I would like the lodges to be thinking about; let each one speak out his ideas, let them give conferences on the subjects they have competence in: the businessman on business, the farmer on farming, the military man on military affairs, etc. etc., and that variety of studies will be fruitful for all. Thus will Masonry be useful."

—Marcelo del Pilar, quoted in John N. Schumacher, *The Propaganda Movement, 1880–1895: The Creators of a Filipino Consciousness, The Makers of Revolution* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 180

The movement wrote and lobbied in Spain about the poor condition of the colony and the need for reform. The Propagandist program was comprehensive: "administrative reform, eradication of corruption in the government, recognition of Filipino rights as loyal Spaniards, extension of Spanish laws to the Philippines, curtailment of the excessive power of the friars in the life of the country, and assertion of the dignity of the Filipino." Graciano Lopez-Jaena, a boisterous orator, called for direct taxation to replace tribute and forced labor.[8] This was a call for Filipino self-government as an integral part of Spain, with full representation in the Spanish Cortes. Pedro Sanciangco, one of the first Propagandists, declared:

> If, then, the Philippines is considered part of the Spanish nation and is therefore a Spanish province and not a tributary colony; if her sons are born Spanish just as are those of the Peninsula; if, finally, *recognizing in the peninsulars the rights of citizenship, one must equally recognize it in the Filipinos*; no tribute in the proper sense of the word can be imposed on them, but a tax proportioned to their resources, larger or smaller in amount, according to the larger or smaller services which the State renders them for the security of their persons and interests.[9]

A central leader of the Propagandists was Marcelo del Pilar; he was born in Malolos, Bulacan province, an important commercial town in the network of markets connected by roads and bridges to Manila. Growing rice and sugarcane, Malolos had three steam-powered sugar mills by the late 1880s; processed coconut oil, rice, indigo, and fish; and manufactured baskets, cloth, and candles. By the end of the century, with a population of 13,250, Malolos was an exemplar of export-oriented development. Wealth had made it "a highly urbanized town with its center now, ironically, in the very midst of the Pariancillo [small parián], the place for 'outsiders.'"[10] Malolos was exemplary in another way—as a hub of principalia political and antifriar activity.

Del Pilar studied law at the Universidad de Santo Tomas until 1870, when he withdrew after quarreling with a friar over the fee for a baptism at which he stood as godfather. Del Pilar went back to the university in 1878 and received his licentiate in law in 1880. Soon he joined the staff of the Malolos *Diariong Tagalog* (Tagalog newspaper), the first bilingual newspaper in the Philippines, as editor of the Tagalog section. After the paper folded, del Pilar devoted himself to practicing law and "spreading nationalist and antifriar ideas, both in Manila among the students and in the towns of Bulacan wherever he could gather a crowd, be it a barrio baptismal party or a local cockpit."[11]

In the early 1880s, the Malolos activists outmaneuvered the friars to elect their candidate as gobernadorcillo. The friars tried to enlist government support in 1885 when the Bulacan principalia refused to reconcile their tax list with the parish list, but del Pilar's liberal Spanish allies—the provincial governor and some officers in the Guardia Civil—allowed the antifriar campaign to continue. The climate changed, however, in 1887–1888, when the colony's governor-general was replaced by the conservative Valeriano Weyler, who backed the church, removed liberal Spanish officials, and moved against the antifriar principalia. As one of the most well known, del Pilar was declared "filibustero y anti-español" (subversive and anti-Spanish), and under threat of arrest, he left the country for Spain.[12] In the more repressive conditions that followed, the reform movement pressed on in other ways. When the governor-general visited Malolos, a group of women belonging to the town's "four big mestizo-sangley clans" petitioned Weyler for permission to open a night school to learn Spanish. Their demand drew the attention of Propagandists, who wrote extensively about them and their campaign in Europe. These wealthy "Women of Malolos" were at the center of the town's activism for years, secretly hosting reform meetings and publicly spurning church attendance.[13]

The most famous Propagandist was José Rizal—highly accomplished, well traveled (to Spain, Germany, France, Japan, and America, among other places), and best known for writing two incomparable novels expressing the absurdities of life in the colony (see box 4.6 for an excerpt). As a university student, Rizal witnessed the religious authorities' dogged resistance to modernization. His mestizo family experienced direct conflict with the state and religious bureaucracy when his brother Paciano, a student of Burgos, was caught up in the post–Cavite Mutiny reaction. Afterward, while Rizal was traveling and writing in Europe, the people of his hometown became embroiled in a land dispute that led to the deportation of Paciano and two brothers-in-law and the imprisonment of his mother for two years. (See box 5.2.)

Box 5.2. José Rizal, the First Filipino

"The central figure in the revolutionary generation was José Rizal, poet, novelist, ophthalmologist, historian, doctor, polemical essayist, moralist, and political dreamer. He was born in 1861 into a well-to-do family of mixed Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, and Tagalog descent; five years after Freud, four years after Conrad, one year after Chekov, the same year as Tagore, three years before Max Weber, five before Sun Yat-sen, eight before Gandhi, and nine before Lenin. Thirty-five years later he was arrested on false charges of inciting Andres Bonifacio's uprising of August 1896, and executed by a firing squad composed of native soldiers led by Spanish officers. . . . At the time of Rizal's death, Lenin had just been sentenced to exile in Siberia, Sun Yat-sen had begun organizing for Chinese nationalism outside China, and Gandhi was conducting his early experiments in anticolonial resistance in South Africa.

"Rizal had the best education then available in the colony, provided exclusively by the religious Orders, notably the Dominicans and Jesuits. It was an education that he later satirized mercilessly, but it gave him a command of Latin (and some Hebrew), a solid knowledge of classical antiquity, and an introduction to western philosophy and even to medical science. It is . . . vertiginous to compare what benighted Spain offered with what the enlightened, advanced imperial powers provided in the same Southeast Asian region: no real universities in French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, or British Malaya and Singapore till after World War II. From very early on, Rizal exhibited remarkable literary abilities. At the age of nineteen he entered an open literary competition, and won first prize, defeating Spanish rivals writing in their native tongue."

—Benedict Anderson, "The First Filipino," in *The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World* (London: Verso, 1998), 227–29

Rizal's writings, particularly his novels *Noli Me Tangere* (Touch Me Not) and *El Filibusterismo* (The Subversive), went beyond simply detailing the travails of his own class and became a general indictment of colonial society. They put into words—and the minds of his readers—a vision of the soon-to-arise Filipino nation. Written in Spanish, published in Germany, smuggled into the Philippines, translated and circulated clandestinely, *Noli Me Tangere* was the first of its kind in Asia—an anticolonial novel that imagined a new social entity. A sense of Rizal's accomplishment is conveyed by Benedict Anderson:

> The two most astonishing features of *Noli Me Tangere* are its scale and its style. Its characters come from every stratum of late colonial society. . . . Its pages are crowded with Dominicans, shady lawyers, abused acolytes, corrupt policemen, Jesuits, small-town caciques, mestiza schoolgirls, ignorant peninsular carpetbaggers, hired thugs, despairing intellectuals, social-climbing *dévotes*, dishonest journalists, actresses, nuns, gravediggers, artisans, gamblers, peasants, marketwomen, and so on. . . . Yet the geographical space of the novel is strictly confined to the immediate environs of the colonial capital, Manila. The Spain from which so many of the characters have at one time or another arrived is always off stage. This restriction made it clear to Rizal's first readers that "The Philippines" was a society in itself, even though those who lived in it had as yet no common name. That he was the first to imagine this social whole explains why he is remembered today as the First Filipino.[14]

For his new articulation of the Philippines, Rizal was declared an enemy of the state and the church. But his novels and essays—del Pilar's translation of "The Love of Country," for example—made it possible for fellow Propagandists and organic intellectuals of the urban classes to imagine themselves "subjects of history"—people with a past to learn from, a present to act in, and a future to shape. Rizal's literary, political, and historical writings provided intellectual and ideological validation for the new classes to intervene in political life—to make history.

Despite Rizal's growing fame in the Philippines and in Europe, the Propaganda Movement was unable to sustain itself. Differences over the aims of the movement and its inability to effect change in Madrid led Rizal away from La Solidaridad. The reform movement was thereafter plagued by financial difficulties, defections, and propaganda counterattacks by opponents in Spain. Because the authorities in Madrid ignored ilustrado recommendations, sympathizers in the Philippines also withdrew support. The deaths of both del Pilar and his collaborator Lopez-Jaena in 1896 closed the chapter on the reform movement.[15]

A more radical path was shortly initiated, but the reformists had articulated and circulated the foundational ideas of the dominant stream of Filipino nationalism. Later asked why the Filipinos rose against Spain, Apolinario Mabini explained:

> The reason can be condensed into the following: the popular desire to have a government which will assure the Filipinos the freedom of thought, conscience, and association; the right to life, the inviolability of the home and the freedom of communication; a popular assembly that will make the laws of the country and decide the kinds of taxation; equality of opportunity to hold public offices and equality in the share of public benefits; respect for law and property; and the progressive development of the country by modern methods.[16]

THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST REPUBLIC

The Katipunan

Although written to appeal to Spain, Propagandist writing was enthusiastically read and reinterpreted by unintended audiences—self-made intellectuals and

struggling lower-class students in Manila, peasant leaders disenchanted with friar Catholicism, and minor elites in the provinces. These groups were inspired by the ilustrados but found the reformism of the Propaganda Movement inadequate. So when Rizal returned to Manila in 1892 and established La Liga Filipina to pursue reform at home, urban workers and students joined the organization and formed a militant wing. Rizal was subsequently arrested and sent into exile in Dapitan, in northern Mindanao. His exile stopped La Liga in its tracks, but the radical wing, led by Andres Bonifacio, went on to form the Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (Highest and Most Honorable Society of the Sons of the Country)—Katipunan for short.

The Katipunan (kah-tee-POO-nahn) was a secret society committed to overthrowing Spanish rule. In the change from Rizal's Spanish to Bonifacio's Tagalog, we can see the movement shift from elite reformism to lower-class radicalism. Bonifacio was born to poor parents in Tondo, in metropolitan Manila, received only primary schooling, and was orphaned and left responsible for five younger siblings as a young man. He supported his family as a craftsman (making canes, paper fans, and business posters), as a clerk-messenger, and as a commercial agent. He had real drive and in his spare moments taught himself Spanish, perfected his native Tagalog, and acted in a drama club. He read about the French Revolution, the lives of American presidents, and of course, the works of Rizal, some of which he translated into Tagalog. We should not imagine a complete intellectual divide, therefore, between elite ilustrados and this young urban worker. Bonifacio was also anti-friar and a Mason, for example, and he imported Masonic rituals into the Katipunan, combining the blood compacts familiar to Filipinos with the rhetoric of independence.[17]

The Katipunan was unable to remain underground for long. Spanish knowledge of its existence prompted Bonifacio to launch a preemptive rebellion in the working-class districts of Manila in 1896. The uprising spread to nearby provinces and emboldened communities to form their own chapters of the Katipunan. Tenants and smallholders rallied to the revolution in reaction to persistent friar abuse and economic hardship. If Rizal's class suffered direct persecution and the frustration of blocked advancement, it was precisely because it was benefiting from the new economy. The growing peasantry was taking the brunt of the country's economic transformation, and the Katipunan tapped its social resentments.[18]

Although their interests did not always coincide, the peasantry also "owned" Rizal and interpreted his ideas and the man himself through a peasant worldview heavily infused with a folk interpretation of Spanish Catholicism. When Rizal was accused of instigating the Katipunan revolt and was executed by firing squad in late 1896, he attained a popular status akin to Jesus Christ. Thereafter, his life was frequently integrated into local tellings of the *pasyon*—biblical stories including the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. The ideas of freedom (*kalayaan*) and nation (*bayan*) associated with Rizal were redefined to fit the millenarian peasant quest for salvation and heaven on earth. In this nationalism, Spanish rule was understood as the oppression of a Pharisee-like clergy and the corruption of a Roman-like officialdom; resistance was an attempt to overcome the darkness of false religion, the obstacle to the nation.[19] (See box 5.3.) Rizal himself, a Mason and writer in the Enlightenment tradition, would be elevated into the Trinity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by Rizalista cults throughout the country.[20]

The charismatic Bonifacio was able to combine and embody the ideas of the elite and the aspirations of the masses. Influenced by Rizal, he also articulated the millenarian themes of the peasantry through his facility with poetic Tagalog. The popular imagination was inspired by "religious tracts and metrical romances," of which the most popular was the pasyon, with

Box 5.3. The Pasyon

"[The] masses' experience of Holy Week fundamentally shaped the style of peasant brotherhoods and uprisings during the Spanish and early American periods. Instead of glorifying the ancient rituals of the *babaylanes* (native priests) as evocative of the true native spirit, the fact has to be accepted that the majority of lowland Filipinos were converted to Spanish Catholicism. But like other regions of Southeast Asia which 'domesticated' Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian and Islamic influences, the Philippines, despite the fact that Catholicism was more often than not imposed on it by Spanish missionaries, creatively evolved its own brand of folk Christianity from which was drawn much of the language of anticolonialism in the late nineteenth century. The various rituals of Holy Week, particularly the reading and dramatization of the story of Jesus Christ, had in fact two quite contradictory functions in society. First . . . they were used by the Spanish colonizers to inculcate among the *Indios* loyalty to Spain and Church; moreover, they encouraged resignation to things as they were and instilled preoccupation with morality and the afterlife rather than with conditions in this world. The second function, which probably was not intended by the missionaries, was to provide lowland Philippine society with a language for articulating its own values, ideals, and even hopes of liberation. After the destruction or decline of native epic traditions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Filipinos nevertheless continued to maintain a coherent image of the world and their place in it through their familiarity with the *pasyon*, an epic that appears to be alien in content, but upon closer examination in a historical context, reveals the vitality of the Filipino mind."

—Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840–1910* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 11–12

which Bonifacio closely identified. According to historian Reynaldo Ileto, long after his death he continued to be a symbol of the independence movement, because he understood "the world of awit [sung] poetry."[21]

Spanish military forces easily routed the revolutionaries. Yet outside Manila one community after another declared independence, and military victories could not undo what the Katipunan had done—transform political conditions despite military defeat. But Bonifacio himself became open to challenge. At a meeting in Cavite province, where he had retreated, the local elite denigrated his leadership ability and lack of education and engineered his ouster as supremo in favor of Emilio Aguinaldo. Bonifacio, who refused to acknowledge Aguinaldo's leadership, was arrested on charges of undermining the revolution and secretly executed. Until his own death in 1945, Aguinaldo denied a role in this miscarriage of justice, but with Bonificio's death, leadership of the revolution passed to him.[22] The change at the top more broadly signaled the transfer of power from lower-class leaders to provincial elites and ilustrados. The latter joined the ongoing revolution for reasons ranging from sincere belief in political change to the strategic attempt to protect their wealth.[23] Undeniably, they brought ability to the revolution—Aguinaldo was a skillful general—but their fear of Bonifacio represented a wider gap in interests and ideals within the nation. (See box 5.4.)

Aguinaldo's military could not stop the Spanish counteroffensive and his revolutionary forces were pushed toward the mountains. But most of Spain's military was tied up fighting revolutionaries in Cuba, so the government pursued a truce. With war and negotiation ongoing, Aguinaldo declared the "Biak-na-Bato Republic" on November 1, 1897. The new republic was to

Box 5.4. Two Military Ideals

"As a lower-class radical, Bonifacio had a populist ideal of the army as a brotherhood of patriots that made decisions democratically. When the fighting began, he assembled three hundred troops at a camp near Manila and told them to elect a commanding officer and deputy. After a voice vote, Bonifacio nodded his approval and the troops shouted in unison, 'Long live the newly elected generals!'

"By contrast, his rival, General Aguinaldo, was inspired by the Spanish ideal of the heroic commander to mobilize an army of gentry officers and peasant conscripts. In the revolution's first weeks, he promised local landholders that anyone who 'offered his services together with a hundred or so of his tenants . . . would be appointed a lieutenant or captain.' . . . For these landlord officers, the revolution was a chance for elite males to recover the authority denied them under Spain and its suffocating, emasculating rule."

—Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven , Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 15–16

have a constitution (borrowed from Cuba), supreme council, and centralized government, but instead, the revolutionary leadership accepted a truce and exile in Hong Kong. Whether this retreat was tactical or opportunistic is still debated, but it did not end the resistance. More and more communities rallied to the cause of independence—not only in the Tagalog provinces but also in northern Luzon (excluding the Cordilleras), southern Luzon, the Visayas, and northern Mindanao—and military clashes continued.[24]

The Malolos Republic

On February 15, 1898, the United States declared war on Spain, and the Philippine Revolution became embroiled in the Spanish–American War. Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines with U.S. assistance to reclaim leadership of the revolution, and the U.S. Pacific Fleet soon destroyed the Spanish defenses of Manila. When Spain surrendered to the United States on August 13, neither combatant recognized the legitimacy of the Filipino revolutionaries who had declared independence on June 12. Given their disparate identities and interests—U.S. power rising in an imperialist world and the Philippines staging the first anticolonial revolution in Asia—the "anti-Spanish alliance" between Americans and Filipinos could not last long. In the Treaty of Paris signed in December 1898, the United States "purchased" the colony from Spain for $20 million and the Philippines came under a second colonial power.

U.S. colonization was quite different from Spain's long-ago conquest. "The Philippines" had achieved a measure of corporeality beyond mere geographic description. It existed as a state—despite institutional weakness and less-than-total territorial coverage, the state had shaped society over the centuries in ways ranging from religion, gender norms, and family naming to the spatial definition of civic life and economic livelihood. It also existed as a nation—one that tried to speak to the colonial state through the reform movement but ultimately rejected it in a radical revolution of self-definition. Filipino reaction to the new colonizers was therefore not a continuation of the revolution against Spain. It was the reaction of an emerging nation-state in defense of its imagined community. On January 23, 1899, this community was realized in the Constitutional Republic of the Philippines, commonly called the Malolos Republic, after its capital. Within a month, the republic was at war with the United States. (See box 5.5.)

In retrospect, we can see little chance of Filipino military success once the United States determined to stay in the Philippines. The war is important, however, because it initiated Filipino nationhood and was the context for the revolutionaries to articulate the powers and obligations of the state

Box 5.5. The Malolos Republic

President Emilio Aguinaldo's Proclamation of the Constitutional Republic of the Philippines
January 23, 1899

"Great is this day, glorious this date, and forever memorable this moment in which our beloved people is raised to the apotheosis of Independence. Hereafter, January 23 will be in the Philippines a national holiday, as July 4 is to the American nation; and, as in the past century God helped a weak America when she fought against powerful Albion for the conquest of her liberty and independence, so to-day He will help us also in an identical enterprise for the manifestations of divine justice are immutably the same in rectitude and wisdom."

Excerpts from the Manifesto of President Emilio Aguinaldo Declaring War against the United States
February 5, 1899

"In my edict dated yesterday, I gave public notice of the opening of hostilities between the Filipino and the American forces of occupation in Manila, provoked by the latter in an unexpected and unjust manner. . . .

"I know that war is always productive of great losses. I know that the Filipino people, not yet fully recuperated from sacrifices in the past, are not in the best condition to bear such losses. But I know also from experience how bitter is slavery, and from experience I feel that we should sacrifice our all for the sake of our national honor and integrity so unjustly attacked.

"I have done everything possible to avoid armed conflict, in the hope of securing our independence through peaceful means and without entailing the costliest sacrifice. But all my attempts have proved vain in the face of the unmeasured pride of the American Government and its representatives in these Islands, who have insisted in considering me a rebel because I defend the sacred interests of my country, and I refuse to be a party to their foul intentions.

"Campaigns in the past must have convinced you that a people is always strong when it wills to be strong; without arms we have driven away from our beloved land the old conquerors, and without arms we can repulse the alien invasion, if we so purpose. Providence always has strength and instant aid in readiness for the defense of the weak, that they not be annihilated by the strong, and that they may share the justice and the progress of humanity.

"Do not be discouraged; we have watered our independence with the blood of your martyrs; what blood will be shed in the future will serve to make it blossom anew and become sweeter. Nature is never prodigal of generous sacrifices.

"But you should remember that in order that our efforts may not be in vain, that our counsels may be heard, and our hopes realized, it is indispensable that we harmonize our acts with the principles of right and justice, by learning to triumph over our enemies and yet to still our evil passions."

Quoted in Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (Kawilihan: Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Foundation, 1969), 146, 166–67

they struggled to establish. The newly drafted Malolos Constitution provided for a representative form of government, a detailed Bill of Rights, the separation of church and state, and the dominance of a single-chamber legislative branch over the executive and judiciary. These features, argues historian Cesar Majul, "reflect the aspirations of Filipinos based on their past experiences with oppression from a colonial government."[25] But they also reflect the attempt of that colonial state during the nineteenth century to check executive power through the separation of functions. The revolutionary Philippine government inherited these conflicting goals—protection against abuse by power-holders versus centralized, effective governance. Their dilemma was framed by war, meditated by politics, and filtered through the emerging class structure of a nation born with competing internal interests.

The most important protection against abuse of power was the guarantee of rule of law, applied from the largest landholder to the smallest peasant. Yet the constitution's articles on property rights, consistent with nineteenth-century liberalism, were designed to protect what was owned after a century of land accumulation, not what the dispossessed might claim by moral right. We should note, too, that legislative preeminence was not a democratic gesture. While the constitution did not specify voting rights, the June Decrees of the revolutionary government limited the franchise to men of high social standing and education.[26] Felipe Calderon, whose constitutional draft was adopted by the Revolutionary Congress, later explained single-chamber legislative supremacy as a defense against tyranny by an insurgent army consisting of "the most ignorant classes."

> Being fully convinced, therefore, that in case of obtaining our independence, we were for a long time to have a really oligarchic republic in which the military element, which was ignorant in almost its entirety, would predominate, I preferred to see that oligarchy neutralized by the oligarchy of intelligence, seeing that the Congress would be composed of the most intelligent elements of the nation.[27]

Behind this ilustrado rhetoric lies the reality of social stratification and the fact that many members of Congress had not been among the antifriar principalia, had initially fought with the Spanish against the Katipuñeros, and were already considering conciliatory approaches to the Americans. For these conservative members, even General, then President, Aguinaldo, a rather minor elite, was suspect.

But it is also fair to consider the international context, in which nineteenth-century liberalism was yielding only grudgingly to popular democracy. Britain's franchise of 29 percent of the adult male population (after the Reform

Bill of 1883) was offset by a hereditary upper house. Meiji Japan introduced representation in 1890 that was similarly restricted by property and education. France, Germany, and the United States had ostensibly universal male suffrage, but lower-class and/or racial minority voting was minimized through district gerrymandering, open balloting, and outright intimidation.[28] Despite its obvious limitations, it is well to remember that the Philippines established the first republic in Asia.

Aguinaldo's ilustrado cabinet leader and adviser Apolinario Mabini opposed legislative power over the executive. He argued that the conduct of the war demanded a strong president, even a "politico-military dictator." The Congress rejected Mabini's argument and the contending factions agreed provisionally on a separation of powers and a Bill of Rights. Mabini then proposed amendments to give the president various "emergency" powers to legislate when Congress was not in session, to arrest members who acted against the state, to veto bills approved by even two-thirds of the legislature, and to dissolve Congress in the event of disagreement between the Congress and cabinet. Not surprisingly, a congressional committee headed by Calderon rejected these amendments and called for Mabini's resignation, which shortly followed. Interestingly, the grounds for rejection was that Congress's power was more representative than that of the presidency.[29] This debate remained unresolved, but it prefigured future contests over the most effective way to govern Philippine society, especially at times of crisis when the state was battered by rebellion or imminent invasion.

The debate between executive and legislative dominance also had a dimension of central state versus local power. While the nature of the presidency beyond the revolutionary period remained unclear, the national legislature would represent the interests of the provinces, or those who held power in the provinces. In this dimension, it mirrored political battles in American domestic politics. At the turn of the century in the United States, the state-based, Congress-centered political parties engaged in institutional and electoral combat with the Progressive Movement, whose supporters advocated the power of the federal government over the states. The political parties opposed strengthening the federal government on the grounds of "states' rights" and autonomy; Progressives viewed "sectionalism" and "machine politics" as hampering the implementation of electoral reform and the professionalization of the national military and bureaucracy.[30] This battle, too, ended in a draw, with signs of a "national state" emerging as America embarked on its imperial adventure, but the power of Congress to restrain it still dominant.[31] Parallels would continue in the course of Philippine state formation under the United States.

The Philippine–American War

The United States joined the ranks of colonial powers in Asia with support from American expansionists (including Progressives) and Protestant missionaries, but over the objections of domestic tobacco and sugar producers. Strategic interests proved most decisive in the age of Alfred Thayer Mahan's treatise on the necessity of naval power. The United States was pursuing an "Open Door" policy in China, and the possession of coaling stations was imperative to a would-be Pacific power. Yet imperialism was difficult to square with the country's republican tradition, as the noisy Anti-Imperialist League kept reminding Americans. Finally, U.S. leaders had to contend with the likes of Mabini and other ilustrados, despite the prevailing lens of racism that tended to see Filipinos as "uncivilized" or "savage." (See box 5.6.) This difficult reality compelled the new colonizers to demonstrate that their rule would be better than Spain's or that of any other European power. The result was President William McKinley's policy of "benevolent assimilation"—the American promise to train Filipinos in democratic governance until they were "ready" to govern themselves. But the first order of business was to achieve control over the country.

The Philippine–American War has been described as the United States' first Vietnam War because of its brutality and severity.[32] Historians have cited conflicting figures, but according to the Philippine–American War Centennial Initiative (PAWCI), an organization dedicated to compiling information on the conflict, roughly twenty-two thousand Philippine soldiers and half a million civilians were killed between 1899 and 1902 in Luzon and the Visayan Islands, while one hundred thousand Muslims were killed in Mindanao.[33] The war devastated the Philippines in several ways, and bullets were not the cause of most deaths. Provinces already weakened from famine during the war against Spain were less able to withstand the hardship of a second war.[34] Disease claimed hundreds of thousands of lives; in 1902 alone, a cholera epidemic killed 137,505.[35] While the determined but poorly organized Filipino forces under President Aguinaldo were defeated by superior American military arms, the Filipino people's commitment to national independence was slowly drained by disease and hunger.[36]

To this was added the breakdown of the revolutionary leadership. Once provincial elites understood that the United States was offering them the opportunity to run a state free from friar control—all that many had asked of Spain—there was little to hold them to the goal of independence. President McKinley dispatched a Philippine Commission to Manila in 1900 to meet with educated Filipinos and determine a form of government for the colony. Many "men of substance" testified before the committee on the need for

Box 5.6. Apolinario Mabini Debates William Howard Taft

Apolinario Mabini's account of his meeting with the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft on August 1, 1900

"When the meeting began I said: I have been a prisoner since last December [1899] and I shall not be set free unless I swear allegiance to American sovereignty. The word 'allegiance' in international law has no precise and exact definition. . . . My efforts in behalf of my country have no other object than the institution of an enduring guarantee for the rights and prerogatives of the Filipinos; if, therefore, American sovereignty offers, more or less, the same guarantee as would be offered by a government of our own, I shall have no hesitation to swear allegiance for the sake of peace. I ended saying that I asked for the conference in order to know in what degree American sovereignty would limit what naturally belongs to the Filipino people.

"After listening to the remarks of his companions, Mr. Taft replied: 'American sovereignty has no purpose other than to institute for the Filipinos a good government; the sovereignty which the United States of America will impose is the same as that which Russia and Turkey would impose, if they were to occupy the Philippines, only with the difference that the exercise of that sovereignty will be in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution of the United States. Inspired by that Constitution, the Commission would attempt to establish in the Philippine Islands a popular government, patterned after that which was recently adopted for Porto Rico.'

"To this I replied that the principles upon which the American Constitution rests declare that sovereignty belongs to the nations by natural right; that the American Government, in not remaining contented with limiting the sovereignty of the Filipino people, but annulling it completely, commits an injustice which, sooner or later, will demand retribution; that there can be no popular government when the people are denied real and effective participation in the organization and administration of that government.

"They rejoined, saying that they were not authorized to discuss abstract questions, for they had orders to impose their opinions even through the use of force, after hearing the opinions of the Filipinos. I remarked, therefore, that I presumed the conference terminated as I considered it idle to discuss with force and to express my opinions to one who refuses to listen to the voice of reason.

"Mr. Taft asked me if I would not help them in the study of taxes which they might impose on the people; to which I replied that, considering unjust all taxes imposed without the intervention of those who would have to pay them, I could not help in that study without the representation and mandate of the people."

Quoted in Teodoro M. Kalaw, *The Philippine Revolution* (Kawilihan: Jorge B. Vargas Filipiniana Foundation, 1969), 245–46

"American sovereignty in this country for the good of these ignorant and uncivilized people."[37] This first group of collaborators soon formed a political party that positioned itself as pragmatically nationalist (discussed below).

Emilio Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901, turning the tide against the revolutionaries. Newly inaugurated president Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed the end of the "Philippine insurrection" in July 1902, and although

sporadic guerilla resistance persisted, it was clear that America would stay in the archipelago. By the middle of the decade, the United States was able to cut its forces from 108,800 to 72,000, and by the end of the decade to 13,000. This reduction was due in part to pressure from the U.S. Congress, which was suspicious of maintaining a large standing army, and in part to the success of American-officered Filipino troops, the Philippine Scouts, in counterguerrilla operations. Warfare finally subsided after 1906, and the Philippine Constabulary (discussed below) assumed most "police" functions from the U.S. Army.[38]

THE EARLY YEARS OF AMERICAN RULE

State Building

While still debating whether tutelary government would culminate in autonomy or independence,[39] the new governors of the Philippines continued the rationalization and strengthening of the colonial state begun by the Spanish. They particularly focused on increasing capacity and infrastructure and consolidating control throughout the territory. The United States departed from Spanish practice, however, in quickly expanding Filipino participation in governance and building a universal educational system in the metropolitan language.

The institutional pillars of colonial state building included a professional civil service, public education to unify the country and build capacity, and the formation and training of a Philippine Constabulary to keep the peace. American supervision of these and other key agencies was tight, with few Filipinos in executive positions, though many were recruited onto their staffs. While there was no shortage of Filipino applicants, Americans were quite critical of their quality, especially in public education and municipal-level "public improvements."[40] The Pampango military units that fought with the United States against the Malolos Republic also needed further training to ensure their loyalty to the new regime.[41]

The Bureau of Civil Service was established on November 31, 1900, with the mandate that the "greatest care should be taken in the selection of officials for civil administration." To head the various executive and line agencies, the Philippine Commission preferred American civilians or military men who had been honorably discharged. All recruits, both American and Filipino, were to be "men of the highest character and fitness" who could conduct their duties unaffected by "partisan politics."[42] To attract them, William Howard Taft, the first American governor-general, granted the right to engage in private business while on active service[43]—a surprising echo of

Spanish policy during the conquest! Two goals are discernable in the Commission's attitude toward colonial administration. First was an eagerness to distinguish American rule from that of the Spanish era, when "the bureaucrat groveled in formal self-abasement in introducing his official correspondence [and was] dominated by the bishop's miter and cleric's gown." The Americans promised a new civil service that would be "the product of a daring adventure in ideas."[44]

Second, the Commission was determined that politics not undermine bureaucratic development. Filipino leaders also acknowledged the need for a professional apparatus to implement programs created by the executive and future legislature. Thus in its early phase, the civil service was "a regime of law, and not of men"; while there were cases of abuse of authority, overall this agency of roughly 2,500 Americans, 4,600 Filipinos, and 1,500 Spaniards (in 1906) performed well. O. D. Corpuz calls this phase "a steady but rather plodding process, unmarked by basic structural alteration or dramatic innovation in the service itself."[45]

Free public education at the elementary and secondary levels was aimed at achieving mass literacy, regarded as an important foundation for a democratic polity. Top U.S. officials were contemptuous of the Spanish educational system. Cameron Forbes, Philippine governor-general from 1909 to 1913, wrote that his predecessors "had not encouraged the general learning of Spanish, perhaps from a fear that general education and a common language would give the Filipinos too much cohesion." Forbes also criticized the state of higher education, noting that since 1865 the Jesuits' normal school had "graduated only 1900, of whom less than half had pursued a career of teaching in the public schools."[46]

Although directed to conduct primary schooling in the local vernaculars, the Philippine Commission decreed English as the "common medium of instruction" in order to equip Filipinos with a "common language with which they could communicate readily with each other. This was regarded as an essential step in making them capable of nationality." In neglecting the value of education in what they called "local dialects," the Americans were in tune with the European colonial powers, which also associated higher learning and political advancement with their own languages. But these powers, the British in Malaya and the Dutch in Indonesia, for example, severely restricted such education.

Schooling in English began immediately, with soldiers in the classroom until civilian teachers arrived from the United States. By the end of the first year of civil government (1902), more than two hundred thousand students were enrolled in primary school, with an attendance rate of about 65 percent. An additional twenty-five thousand students were enrolled in night school

Figure 5.2. School for Moro children in Zamboanga: Learning English with an officer-teacher (courtesy of the Lopez Memorial Museum, Philippines)

programs, and almost twenty thousand in secondary schools. Those enrolled at the secondary level were given special attention because they would be the first generation of American-trained Filipino teachers. This rapid expansion of English education outstripped the supply of teachers, so while Forbes and other Americans felt "there were no Filipinos properly trained according to American standards," they were compelled to increase their intake. By the end of 1902, supervision of the student population was in the hands of about four thousand teachers, of whom only 926 were American.[47] Educational policy and overall supervision remained in American hands, however.

As with the civil service, educational policy met with the broad approval of Filipino political leaders. Obviously, the Spanish-trained faced a linguistic transition, but advancement in the civil service was a powerful incentive to learn English. At the same time, other Filipinos were exploring the need for a common language. The press favored Tagalog. According to Andrew Gonzalez's study of language and nationalism, "reviews, weeklies, biweeklies, and newspapers" were predominantly in the language of Manila and environs: "While there was no lack of other vernacular publications . . . those in non-Tagalog languages were significantly fewer, not the multiple titles one finds in the Tagalog area. And where there were trilingual or even quadrilingual editions, Tagalog was always one of the languages."[48] Organizations were formed to discuss a future "national language," with the early emergence of two options, Tagalog or a "fusion." But almost until the end of

colonial rule, Americans retained control of the system of public education and vetoed a switch to vernaculars at the primary level. Nevertheless, Gonzalez and others observe that English education was a popular choice. Because the overwhelming number of teachers were Filipino, "the unescapable conclusion is that it was the Filipinos themselves who were mostly responsible for the dissemination of English in this country."[49]

A third essential institution was the Philippine Constabulary, established in 1901, an insular police force that replaced the irredeemable Guardia Civil. Led by Americans, with some junior Filipino officers, the Constabulary recruited among Christians, Muslims, and northern Philippine "non-Christian groups." The constabulary had the power to regulate the use of firearms, take the lead in health emergencies (typically cholera epidemics), and expand the telegraph and postal systems throughout the archipelago. Regarded as "peace officers," constabulary units were also charged to "prevent and suppress brigandage, insurrection, unlawful assemblies, and breaches of the peace."

The constabulary supervised municipal police forces to improve professionalism and thwart politicization by elected local officials. Here reform-minded central state actors (mostly American) came into contact with local state actors (Filipino). As Forbes put it delicately: "The work of those officers often interfered with practices which local magnates had come to regard as perquisites of high place . . . [so] it was not surprising that abuses of various sorts occurred; the remarkable thing was that these were so few."[50] As we will discuss in chapter 6, some Constabulary officers entered into political alliances with local Filipino politicians.

Not every aspect of state building was successful—two important failures were in land and tax policy. In 1903, the United States announced the purchase of 165,922 hectares (640 square miles) of friar estates for $7.2 million. Planning to sell the land to cultivators, Taft hoped to remove a cause of countless revolts in the Spanish era and also to consolidate his relationship with Filipino elites.[51] He accomplished half his goal. Peasants working village plots within the purchased estates immediately received parcels, but the 80,937 hectares that were still virgin forest were not transferred to landless peasants. Instead, the Department of Interior sold or leased them to American and Filipino business interests. This early "land reform" program was implemented with no support mechanisms to ensure its success—no credit, cooperatives, or technology. Farmers "were given a tantalizing glimpse of freedom and [then] abandoned to find their own way out of the agrarian wilderness."[52] Predictably, many fell back into tenancy, now to wealthy Filipino hacenderos who later purchased or expropriated the land when tenants failed to pay debts.

Efforts to simplify the archaic and complex Spanish tax system were likewise unsuccessful. The Americans removed the clergy's role in tax collection, but did not fulfill the promise of more *equitable* taxation. The head tax (cédula) was retained despite its very regressive nature—one peso being more costly to the poor peasant than thirty-five pesos to the rich landowner—while a proposal to tax inheritances and corporations was withdrawn in 1904 in "an obvious concession to the landed elite." According to Harry Luton, U.S. officials "showed a surprising lack of real commitment to equity in taxation, even in their own terms, especially in view of their professed aim of uplifting the 'whole Filipino people.'"[53]

Parallel State Building in the Special Provinces

Constabulary units joined the army to help govern two military-controlled special provinces—the Moro province and the Mountain province. The classification of regular and special provinces corresponded to the late Spanish-era civil and military provinces. The populations of the latter, only recently and incompletely colonized by the Spanish, were considered backward and "uncivilized" in contrast to the lowland, Christian, "civilized" Filipinos. There was resistance from these communities to the initial American incursion, especially among the Muslims. In two major military encounters in the first decade, American forces killed hundreds of Muslim men, women, and children in actions that were widely condemned in both the United States and the Philippines.[54] These were the only major engagements the U.S. Army faced in Mindanao. Smaller, intermittent revolts occurred during the period of direct army rule, but they were disorganized and easily suppressed. In the Cordilleras, as in the past, conflict between the various communities precluded the emergence of a unified resistance.

Both provinces were soon under effective military control, due in part to the active collaboration of Muslim and Cordilleran elites who saw an opportunity in the new order to shelter their trading activities and local resources from Christian Filipino control.[55] Muslim elites also hoped that through "alliance" with the powerful Americans, they could recover their position in the Southeast Asian trading network. By 1906, Moro province governor General Leonard Wood declared, "There need to be no apprehension of a general Moro uprising or of concerted effort among them," while his colleagues in the Mountain province mentioned no serious threat in their sector.[56]

The military's legacy in these newly bounded peripheries was ambiguous. On the one hand, military power effectively ended the relative autonomy enjoyed through most of the Spanish period. Roads and to a lesser extent railroads made the state's territorial boundaries a reality on the ground and all its inhabitants more accessible to the colonial state.[57] On the other hand,

American racial classification and state structures perpetuated the outsider status of Muslims and other non-Christians.

A new state agency, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, signaled the shift from religious to ethnoracial understandings of human diversity. It accepted the broad population categories of the Spanish state, but grafted onto them the racialized language of "tribes" and contemporary notions of civilizational hierarchy. The census of 1903, for example, portrayed colonial society as "a collection of many tribes speaking different languages" and declared the term *Filipino* to be "properly applicable to the Christian peoples only."[58] It helped consolidate Filipino identity by doing away with "Spanish-Filipino" and "Chinese-Filipino" census categories.[59] This also served to highlight "Chinese" as an ethnic minority.

The Bureau acknowledged the ethnolinguistic diversity of Muslim Mindanao, rejecting the long-standing demonization and homogenization of "Moros." But neither this recognition nor the debunking of other misconceptions rooted in religious prejudice changed the fundamental stance of the state.[60] Muslims and other non-Christians in Mindanao were described as "uncivilized races." Continuing military rule was recommended both to protect them from Filipino abuse *and* to effect their eventual integration with the rest of the colony. Officers in the Cordillera promised their "tribal wards" the same kind of patronizing security and contradictory goals.

Army and constabulary officers accepted their administrative role with alacrity, sharing their wards' antipathy toward Manila. The military distrusted its civilian superiors and their Filipino counterparts and assumed that integration with the regular provinces was at least two generations away. As a consequence, military rule preserved these communities' political distinctiveness from the rest of the Philippines instead of moving rapidly toward similar state structures. For example, there were no elected governments in the special provinces throughout the period of special rule, in contrast to the speedy development of representative institutions in the rest of the colony (see below and chapter 6). In Mindanao, most Muslim datus acquiesced in military rule because the military assured them protection from Filipino inroads. When Manila's civilian officials tried to assert central authority, especially in Mindanao, they were rebuffed by officers who warned that Moro pacification could not be guaranteed if Muslim communities were forced to submit to Filipinos. Army and constabulary officials insisted that cultural difference dictated special rule of long duration because Muslims knew little about "our form of representative government" and saw no reason to unite with Filipinos.[61] In 1908, Muslim leaders and American officers and settlers even called for the separation of Mindanao from the rest of the colony.

Army and constabulary officers were seriously at odds with developments in Manila, where neither American civilian officials nor Filipino politicians intended to allow military rule to continue indefinitely. They interfered with the budget allocation of the Moro province and pushed senior officials to end military rule in the special provinces. Eventually, the army lost this battle because of two internal weaknesses. First, military rotation and promotion prevented the continuity of personnel necessary for state building in the Moro and Mountain provinces. The constabulary could replace the army, but with a regular force of only 150 per province, the additional responsibility of governing would strain its resources. In any case, Filipinos were encroaching on the leadership of the constabulary as well. Second, decision-making authority over these provinces lay ultimately with the U.S. Congress, which distrusted the maintenance of a large standing army. Even during the campaigns against Aguinaldo, this body was committed to reducing troop numbers and replacing the army with police and constabulary forces. At the end of 1913, the army was forced to relinquish power in the special provinces to civilian leaders in Manila.

The relatively short duration of parallel state building should not obscure its legacy—it was under U.S. colonial rule that the Philippine "geo-body" was fully realized. American military power was able to achieve a substance of governance that the Spanish state and the Malolos Republic were not. The modern Philippines, in short, was a colonial state creation as well as a nationalist imagining. But while the insider–outsider *territorial* relationship of the past was settled, it left unresolved problems of *political* exclusion. By the time the U.S. Army withdrew from the special provinces, these populations were more firmly inside, yet now defined more intractably as minority outsiders. This consolidation of the administrative grid in combination with political exclusion would have a paradoxical result. Although outsider sentiments became stronger, the political form they would eventually assume was determined by the grid—the "Bangsa Moro" (Moro Nation) for which armed Islamic movements now fight is based on the map produced by American colonial governance.

Conservative Nationalism

The United States, like Spain, could not draw the best and brightest of its countrymen to the Philippines, because most American leaders were indifferent to the new "possessions."[62] This apathy created problems for colonial officials faced with perpetual shortages of personnel; they were ultimately compelled to set aside racist assumptions about Filipino capability and speed up "tutelage training." Even when guerrilla warfare still raged in many parts

of the archipelago, the Philippine Commission established the election of municipal officials and provincial governments, to be followed by election of representatives to a Philippine Assembly, the legislative arm of the new regime.

This peculiar consolidation of colonial rule through "democratic means" hastened the conversion of Filipino elites to the American side. Once they had judged the war a lost cause, they looked for a way to come out of it with their wealth and status intact. One clear way was to take up the American offer to help govern. Many landowners, merchants, and professionals had had a taste of governance in the late Spanish regime, when, in addition to gobernadorcillo and cabeza, electoral posts included deputy mayor, chief of police, livestock officer, and plantation officer. Furthermore, the electoral system proposed by the new American state would heavily favor them. In 1901, the Philippine Commission created the basic civil law for municipal and provincial government, and posts up to the level of provincial governor became elective as early as 1902.[63] The civil law set the following terms for the franchise:

> It required that qualified electors: (1) be males; (2) be aged 23 years and above; (3) reside in the municipality where they were to vote for a period of six months immediately preceding the elections; and (4) belong to any of the following three classes: individuals who speak, read and write English/Spanish, own real property worth at least P500, or have held local government positions prior to the occupation of the country in 1899.[64]

The first generation of Filipino leaders under the American regime—the established elites who turned away from the revolution—formed the Partido Federal (Federalist party) in 1900. The Federalistas were publicly committed to Philippine autonomy under the American colonial mantle, although most of its leaders privately hoped for the Philippines' annexation to the United States. The prominence they gave publicly to political autonomy showed their sensitivity to the legacy of the Malolos Republic and the fact that many Filipinos still favored independence. By charting a middle road, the Federalistas hoped to show that they remained true to the spirit of the revolution, but realistic in the face of American power—that the only practical route was collaboration with the new colonizers and "tutelage training." This political pragmatism became the foundation of conservative Filipino nationalism.

The Federalistas were the first to outline this political alternative to revolution and resistance, but their opponents ultimately perfected it. When restrictions on nationalist expression were relaxed, a bevy of revolutionary veterans, former Katipuñeros, intellectuals, and members of the urban middle

classes and "lower strata" reentered political life and began to form *nacionalista* (nationalist) parties. In the early years, nacionalistas were weaker than their rivals: They were subject to constant harassment and imprisonment for "seditious" activity and, more importantly, had no access to American patrons. Things began to change when a new generation of elected provincial governors and appointed local judges took on the "nacionalista" label. Some had been well placed in the late Spanish period and switched allegiance as their areas were pacified; others entered politics with American sponsorship.[65] What did these aspiring provincial and municipal leaders have in common with ex-revolutionaries and urban workers? They were all either excluded from or hampered by the Federalistas' emerging monopoly on power and patronage.

These forces joined in coalition for the 1907 elections to the first Philippine Assembly, winning a majority of seats, and soon formed a Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist party), which publicly advocated eventual "independence under the protectorate of the United States of America."[66] Through this slogan and the network of supporters created during their incumbency as provincial governors, the Partido Nacionalista successfully established itself as heir to the 1896 Revolution and the Malolos Republic. While it conceded power to the Americans, it differentiated itself from the Federalistas by its commitment to work for eventual Philippine independence.[67]

Having abandoned armed resistance, the new generation of Filipino leaders mastered the rules of the new colonial game to take advantage of the "rights" and "powers" available under American "tutelage training." This allowed the consolidation of their own political interests and the possibility of broadening Filipino influence in the colonial state. They detached the idea of "Philippine independence" from its radical moorings by accepting American rule and, according to historian Frank Golay, "envisaged independence as a culmination of successive stages of increasing Filipino autonomy, which would convince Americans that the Filipinos were ready for independence and at the same time reduce American interest in retaining the colony to a size the American people would be willing to forfeit."[68]

They had reason to do this quickly—in the countryside, sporadic armed resistance against American colonial rule continued. While these revolts were no military threat to the colonial state, their persistence created a political dilemma for the Americans and their Filipino allies. It suggested that the radicalism of the anti-Spanish revolution and the Philippine–American War remained popular: "Notwithstanding the defeat of the revolutionary armies, the hundreds of thousands of lives lost and the desolation of the countryside, the image of *kalayaan* [independence] continued to pervade the consciousness particularly of the poorer and less-educated classes."[69]

The Continuing Revolutionary Tradition

The defeat of Aguinaldo's army corresponded with an expansion of religio-political groups, an attempt by former General Macario Sakay to revive Bonifacio's Katipunan, and an effort by veterans to form a radical wing of the Partido Nacionalista. Millenarian themes of salvation had rallied the poor to the original Katipunan; these reemerged in Sakay's movement and that of "Pope" Felipe Salvador. In the provinces adjoining and north of Manila, American and Filipino forces had their hands full suppressing the growth of "fanatical sects" and "bandit bands" led by self-proclaimed "popes" promising heaven and national independence.[70] Not all resistance had this religious element; many "were simply ex-Katipuñeros, veterans of the revolution."[71]

What concerned colonial authorities was that the radical invocation of kalayaan was a critique of *both* the Malolos Republic *and* the emerging colonial aspiration of independence. Reynaldo Ileto describes the difference between the radical and elite visions:

> In the Malolos Republic . . . an emphasis on the appearance of unity to attain world recognition as a sovereign state had all but suppressed the Katipunan idea of releasing the potentialities of *loob*—love, compassion, virtue—in the act of participating in the redemption of Mother Filipinas. Independence had come to be defined in a static sense as autonomy, and unity was formalized in the coming together of men of wealth, education and social prominence in the Malolos congress. To the Katipunan, this all gave the appearance of unity, not the experience of unity. As long as the gentry-revolutionaries thought in terms of maintaining vertical relationships with themselves at the top, the power of unity, of "coming together," was weak or absent.[72]

In the context of lower-class mobilization, we can see the value of early elections and a public school system, for these two "popular" instruments could be used by the state to counter and perhaps neutralize radical impulses. In trying to convince Sakay to surrender, Nacionalista leader Dominador Gomez explained that the Philippine Assembly had become the new "gate of kalayaan."[73] The promise to expand the electorate helped channel nationalist sentiment away from the embattled Katipunan to a state-sponsored electoral process, and public education satisfied a popular demand that was strongly felt among the lower classes. These two mechanisms doubtless had the potential to fulfill nationalist aspirations, but they more immediately served the colonial state–Filipino elite alliance, because the electoral process was already dominated by the Nacionalistas and mass education would inculcate the merits of "benevolent assimilation."

Tension between the reality and potential of colonial democracy echoed that between reform and revolution in the recent past. José Rizal and the ilustrados first articulated the distinctiveness of Philippine society to emergent Filipinos and the world; Andres Bonifacio and the Katipunan tried to bring it to fruition by declaring the nation's independence from Spain. The relationship between these facets of nationalism was charged with tension from the moment of Bonifacio's execution/murder. Historians have pointed out that by the time Emilio Aguinaldo returned from Hong Kong, this tension was starkly evident between the lower classes who had begun the revolution and the elites who belatedly joined it. Elite domination of the Malolos Republic, the early surrender of many of its leaders to the Americans, and the continuing pockets of resistance for the remainder of the decade confirmed that the nationalist movement had many faces.[74] The birth of the Filipino nation was not only "aborted" by U.S. colonialism, as many Filipinos feel today; it was already riven with class conflict. Tension between elites and masses would become a defining feature of Philippine political development, lending an "unfinished" quality to the political discourse of the revolution to the present day.[75]

The idiosyncratic nature of American colonial rule—looking forward to granting Filipinos some form of autonomy—nurtured the quest for a "Filipino nation." But its deradicalization aggravated the class divide. As politicians of the next generation explored ways to assert "Filipino interests" within the colonial state, they were haunted by the "fanatical sects" that continued to resist in the name of the Katipunan and Rizal. These groups painted nationalism with a broader pallette, a result of both the class and the conceptual divide between secular and millenarian understanding. There was no longer a single Filipino nationalism, but Filipino *nationalisms*, the meanings of which depended upon the group or individual articulating them.

It is important to recognize that the birth of the Philippines as an idea and a material reality was accomplished through both "reform" and "revolution"—not as mutually exclusive routes but as intertwined streams. Scholars in the Philippines tend to highlight the break between Propagandists and revolutionaries, thereby underlining the armed and radical character of the nationalist revolution against Spain. This tendency, we believe, has to do with postwar debates over the "true" legatees of the revolution—debates informed by the circumstances of the postcolonial republic (see chapter 7) and the Marcos dictatorship (chapter 8). Only by recognizing the simultaneous unity and contradiction of these two streams can we understand the passion and energy with which Filipino political leaders sought to take over the colonial state under the Americans, even if they were largely content to remain within the American embrace.

Millenarian movements began to fade as American colonial rule was consolidated and popular attention drawn toward elections, the Partido Nacionalista, and the ambitions of its leaders, Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña. Yet sentiments of millenarianism and the inspiration of the Katipunan continued in many rural localities, particularly in areas where the struggles against Spain and the United States had been most intense. The Partido Nacionalista itself contained factions advocating "immediate independence"; they were quickly compromised by Quezon's and Osmeña's pragmatism. Such revolutionary residues would eventually find their way into secular organizations in the second decade of colonial rule, its followers finding commonality with trade union organizers, radical peasant leaders, and pre-Marxist socialist intellectuals.

NOTES

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26. Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*, 169–76.
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