

sches Großreich zu bilden, sowie auf die Machtrivalität zwischen Ägypten und Irak ein. „Für Großbritannien und Frankreich hatte sich der strategische Stellenwert des Suezkanals sichtlich erhöht. Beide Mächte betrachteten ihn als neuralgischen Punkt beim Bemühen, die erlittenen Kriegsschäden zu beseitigen und ihre angeschlagenen Weltreiche wieder aufzurichten. Der Suezkanal fiel hier sowohl als Bindeglied und Schaltstelle für überseeische Kommunikations- und Versorgungslinien als auch zusätzliche Quelle von Einkünften erheblich ins Gewicht.“

Die sowjetische Position beschrieb K. Jaschinsky wie folgt: „In Moskau verstieg man sich, wenn auch nur kurzzeitig, darauf, die praktizierte Verwaltung und Sicherung des Suezkanals mit als Vorwand zu nutzen, um gegenüber der Türkei in der Meerengenfrage ähnliche Privilegien zu extortieren.“ Weitere Einzelheiten schlossen sich an: die Bemühungen der ägyptischen Führung, einen rein arabischen Gegenpakt zum Bagdadpakt zu gründen; das Waffengeschäft 'Abd al-Nāṣir mit der ČSSR, der Gaza-Zwischenfall vom 28. Mai 1955 und der von Schah Mohammed Reza Pahlawi während der Suezkrise vorgebrachte Anspruch auf den Inselstaat Bahrain. Die Drohung Moskaus, gegen London Atomwaffen einzusetzen, verwies der Referent in das Reich der Legendenbildung.

Schnittpunkt Suez — eine israelische Sichtweise — war das Leitmotiv von Sabine Hofmanns (Berlin) Aufsatz, der sich mit den aktuellsten wirtschaftspolitischen Entwicklungen im Nahen Osten und den Perspektiven der wirtschaftlichen Kooperation der Staaten des Nahen Ostens befaßte. „Symbolisiert der Suez-Kanal eine ‚Öffnung‘ des Nahen Ostens in Nord-Süd-Richtung, so implizierte der Alleingang des damaligen Präsidenten Sadat den Ausgangspunkt für die politische (Wieder-)Eröffnung des Nahen Ostens in West-Ost-Richtung via Israel, erst allmählich und wirtschaftlich quantitativ gering, aber perspektivisch mit Wachstumstendenz.“

Am folgenden Tag erläuterte Cornelia Köster (Berlin) den Werdegang von Lehnert/Landrocks Orient-Kunstverlag und der gleichnamigen Kairoer Buchhandlung. Sie schilderte die vielfältigen publizistischen und buchhändlerischen Bemühungen von Rudolf Lehnert und Ernst Landrock in Leipzig und Kairo und die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Turbulenzen der heute in der Scherif-Pascha-Str. 44 gelegenen „deutschen“ Buchhandlung. Eine Bewertung des künstlerischen Schaffens von R. Lehnert fehlte ebenso wenig wie die Schilderung der Trennung beider Geschäftspartner und die Überführung des Geschäfts in französisch-schweizerische Hände infolge der Weltkriege. „Wie die vor 150 Jahren einsetzende Konjunktur der Orientfotografie, so gibt es seit ungefähr 15 Jahren eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Orientfotografie. ... Kritik und Bilderfreude halten sich dabei die Waage, und natürlich wird auch der Aspekt des Orientalisierens per Bild nicht unterschlagen.“

Siegfried Tzschentke schilderte die Rettung des Tempels von Abū Simbel beim Bau des Aswān-Staudammes durch die Hilfe der UNESCO. Er skizzierte mit Hilfe von Video-beispielen die riesigen technischen und organisatorischen Probleme, die mit der Verlegung des Tempels verbunden waren.

Im Anschluß daran erläuterte Gerlinde Michaelis (Lauchhammer) vom Freundeskreis Kunstguß Lauchhammer e.V. Ziele, Aufgaben und Pläne des Vereins bei der Erhaltung der technischen Denkmäler der Region, der Gestaltung des Kunstgußmuseums und der geplanten Errichtung eines Denkmals in einem Tagebaurestloch bei Lauchhammer.

Den Vorträgen schloß sich eine Besichtigung der Kunstgießerei Lauchhammer und ein Schaugießen an.

Uwe Pfullmann

Aufsätze und Hintergrundberichte

Kenrick Abbott

Âyatullâh Khomeynî's quest for a just society¹

At the end of the 1970s the Shâh of Iran was overthrown by the concerted action of a combination of revolutionary groups. In the power struggle following the revolution, a segment of the *Ithnâ 'Asharî Shî'î 'ulamâ'* eventually formed a theocratic authoritarian state. The most influential and the most famous member of which was Rûḥullâh Mûsavî Khomeynî (1902-1989). Âyatullâh Khomeynî's rise to international fame which was due to the visible effects of his ideas and his overwhelming popularity among Iranians began in the early 1960s. His prominence rests not so much on his religious learning as a *mujtahid* as it does on his effective politicization of Islam and his success in shaping Iran following the revolution. While in religion as in politics each individual is a party of one, Khomeynî can be seen as representative of the aspirations of many different fundamentalists.

In seeking to understand the teachings of Khomeynî it is necessary to weigh not only his overtly political ideas but it is also necessary to go beyond those ideas. At the core of Khomeynî's ideology is his understanding of „man“ and how to perfect mankind in order that men and society could be made just and moral. For Khomeynî these two objectives were inseparable. Two main works; *Kashf al-Asrâr* („Revealing the Secrets“) and *Vilâyat-i Faqîh* („The Guardianship of the Jurist“; also published in Arabic as *al-Hukûma al-Islâmîya* or „Islamic Government“) are of central importance in considering Khomeynî's political ideas and his notions about humanity and human rights. Additionally, comments made after the revolution illuminate Khomeynî's beliefs and how they relate to his political views.

Early political career

In the 1940s, Iranian modernist writers started to publish works that opposed the nature and structure of the *Shî'î* religious hierarchy; that is, of the *mujtahids*. Khomeynî took up the challenge of the anti-*'ulamâ'* modernists in 1943 and published *Kashf al-Asrâr*.² This work was virtually ignored until over thirty years later.

¹ This paper was prepared for a course entitled „Dialogue About Rights: Islam's Challenge to Liberalism“ taught at the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law by Professor H. Bielefeldt. Special thanks to Professor Bielefeldt for his encouragement and assistance in preparing this paper for publication.

² S.A. Arjomand, „Traditionalism in Twentieth Century Iran,“ in: From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. S.A. Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 204-205.

Khumaynî defends the *Shi'î* traditions, the hierarchy within the '*ulamâ*', and the need for *taqlid* [emulation of the *mujtahids* by the general population who are *muqallid*]. Furthermore, he attacks the reformers for blindly wanting to imitate the *Wahhabîs* who were called the savages of the Najd and the Camel Herders of Riyadh.³ When it was appropriate to the flow of the book Khumaynî expanded the scope of his attacks to include Rizâ Shâh.⁴ These references were not actually an attack on the ruling Shâh as Rizâ Shâh had been forced, following the 1941 British and Soviet invasion, to abdicate in favour of his son, and to leave the country. Khumaynî was especially critical of the ex-Shâh for his government's religious policies and his treatment of the '*ulamâ*'.

Khumaynî linked the honour of Islam, therefore the honour of the '*ulamâ*', to that of the people; thus any attack on Islam or the '*ulamâ*' was said to be an attack on the people (and vice versa).⁵ The work contained an attack on westernization and its ill effects on the people of Iran. These effects were caused even by European dress: „The unveiling of women has been the ruin of female honour, the destruction of the family, and the cause of untold corruption and prostitution.“⁶ Not only western clothing — for both sexes — but also mixed schools, wine shops, liquor manufacturers, and music were all specified as causes of corruption, moral decay, and the decline in the strength of Islamic society in general and Iran in particular. Moreover, all, Khumaynî pointed out, are forbidden under Islamic Law.

The answer provided for the resolution of these problems was, not surprisingly, a return to the pristine Islam of the time of the Prophet as seen by Khumaynî, a time when the *Hudûd* (divine legal punishments) were enforced in their entirety, the thief's hand was cut off, anarchistic and seditious elements were executed, and things foreign and alien to Islam were rejected outright.⁷ In this area the criticism was extended to Rizâ Shâh's government which ignored the perfect laws given to man by God — the only legitimate legislator — and turned instead to alien western legal codes which were man-made — and, therefore, necessarily faulty.

Khumaynî had not come to his later position that monarchy was inherently anti-Islamic. In fact there was actually a mild defense of the Pahlavî monarchy based on the argument that bad government is better than no government and the anarchy that results from this situation.⁸ Furthermore, in this book Khumaynî wrote: „We have not said that the king should be a *faqih*; the king should be a military officer, but should not violate the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) which are the official laws of the country.“⁹ There is, accordingly, no blueprint for Islamic government, an idea that was put forward later. Rather he called for the implementation of Clause Two of the Supplementary Fundamental Law (1907) which had in theory established a council of five *mujtahids* to review all legislation in order to guarantee its compatibility with Islam.¹⁰

3 Ibid., 205.

4 M.M.J. Fischer, „Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Understanding,“ in: Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. J.L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 152.

5 Arjomand, „Traditionalism,“ 206.

6 Khumaynî, *Kashf al-Asrâr*, 292-295. Quote taken from Arjomand, „Traditionalism,“ 206.

7 Arjomand, „Traditionalism,“ 207.

8 S. Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 163.

9 From: F. Rajaei, *Islamic Values and World View*, Vol. 8, Khomeini on Man, the State and International Politics (Lanham, New York, and London: University Press of America, 1983), 58.

10 E. Mortimer, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 325.

We do not say that government must be in the hands of the *faqih*; rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the country and the people demand this, and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders. In fact this principle has been approved and ratified in the Constitution (Khumaynî, *Kashf al-Asrâr*).¹¹

This demand, though it is not a call for the abolition of the monarchy, is a very clear call for greater involvement in, and control over, the politics of the nation by the '*ulamâ*'.

When, in 1947, Âyatullâh Burûjirdî achieved the rank of sole *Marja'i Taqlid* [Source of Emulation, the senior Grand Âyatullâh], he urged disengagement from politics for all members of the '*ulamâ*'. Consequently, Khumaynî removed himself from the political arena, if he can, in fact, be said ever to have entered it with his limited criticism of the government. Burûjirdî's death heralded Khumaynî's re-entry into the political field and his frank criticism of the government. His first round with the government, in 1962, concerned the proposed Local Council Elections Law. The concerns voiced by Khumaynî, and many other members of the '*ulamâ*', specifically dealt with the suggested enfranchisement of women and the replacement of the term „Holy Qur'an“ with „Holy Book“ in the oath of office. Both of these ideas were seen as attacks on Islam itself. Khumaynî expressed his concerns in a telegram to Prime Minister 'Alâm, a copy of which was also sent to the Shâh. It read, in part: „The ulama made it public that women's franchise and the abrogations of the conditions to be a Muslim to be allowed to elect or to be elected is contrary to Islam and the constitution.“¹² There was to this point still no implied criticism of the Shâh for these policies; rather his Prime Minister was held publicly accountable for the government's policies.¹³

In 1963, The Shâh put his five point „White Revolution“ to popular referendum. Khumaynî's outspoken criticism of the reforms again thrust him forward as a spokesman for Bazaar and '*ulamâ*' against the Shâh.¹⁴ Rather than concentrating on land reform and female suffrage, Khumaynî differed from most of his class by focusing on issues that generated mass support. He denounced the régime for living on the profits of corruption; rigging elections; controlling the press; suppressing political parties; neglecting the economic needs of the workers, merchants, and peasants; undermining Islam; expansion of the bureaucracy; encouraging unlimited „west-toxication“; dependence on the United States; „capitulations“ to the U.S. - for \$200 Million Dollars in military aid; and relations with Israel.¹⁵ While, Âyatullâh Khumaynî had, by this time, broadened the scope of his criticism to include the Shâh, he was still relatively moderate. Khumaynî still said that the government could make itself acceptable by implementing the Constitution.¹⁶

Khumaynî's vehement attacks on the government led to his arrest in 1963, he was then released on the government's understanding that he would refrain from political criticism. However, he resumed his forthright assault on the Shâh's régime which led to another arrest. It was only extensive protest by the '*ulamâ*', led by Âyatullâh Shar'at-madârî, that prevented the régime from executing him. Instead, in 1964, Khumaynî was exiled — first to Turkey, then to Iraq, and finally to France — an exile from which he

11 From a short section of *Kashf al-Asrâr* in: Âyatullâh R. Khumaynî, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. and ed. H. Algar (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981; 169-173), 170.

12 W.M. Floor, „The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality,“ *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 12 (1980), 510.

13 S. Bakhash, *The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution*, New edition (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1986), 25.

14 H. Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982* (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 59.

15 Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 425.

16 Bakhash, 32.

would not return until 1978. It was during this exile, when he enjoyed free speech, that Khomeyni became truly radical in his protest and attained even greater popularity. Furthermore, it was during this period that he rethought his ideas on the relationship between politics and religion and arrived at a position favouring direct rule by the religious elite as espoused in *Vilâyat-i Faqih*.¹⁷

Khomeyni on Islamic government

Âyatullâh Khomeyni first put forth his ideas on Islamic government in a series of lectures given in Najaf, in the late 1960s. The books (*Vilâyat-i Faqih* and *al-Hukûma al-Islâmiya*) were published later. The concept was based on a significant extension of the concept of *vilâyat*, through the application of *ijtihad* [independent reasoning], to eliminate the acceptance of dual (i.e. political and religious) authority in society.¹⁸ Previously, there had been three accepted areas of *vilâyat*. These areas were guardianship over those unable to protect themselves; guardianship over lands on which the religious life of the community depended; and guardianship of the Muslim community's general welfare by propagating Islamic values.¹⁹ Khomeyni added a fourth area that, while mentioned before, had never been widely accepted. This idea was that the *vilâyat* of the 'ulamâ' extended to control over all the political affairs of the Muslims.

It has been argued that, in *Vilâyat-i Faqih*, or „Islamic Government“, Âyatullâh Khomeyni took the concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist to its logical conclusion.²⁰ In order to do this Khomeyni — based on his reason and *hadith* — created a complex argument for just government led by legal experts. In the introduction to the work Khomeyni started by discussing his fundamentalist view of what true Islam is. He says: „Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism“ (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 28).²¹ This is also how Khomeyni sees the Imams — all were soldiers; even if „[t]he later Imams did not have the opportunity to go into battle, even though Imam Baqir ... was also a warrior by nature“ (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 35).

Furthermore, he talks about the political nature of Islam as he sees it. When discussing this aspect, Khomeyni argues that Islam is clearly more than just a religion given the sheer weight of political, economic, legal, and social injunctions it contains as compared with its dictates for ritual observance. Islam must include more than ritual as:

The ratio of Qur'anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater than a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections of the corpus of the *hadith* containing all the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 29).

¹⁷ Bashiriyeh, 61.

¹⁸ S.A. Arjomand, „Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism,“ in: *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism*, ed. S.A. Arjomand (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 190 and 194.

¹⁹ G. Rose, „Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini,“ in: *Religion and Politics in Iran: Shi'ism from Quietism to Revolution*, ed. N. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 169.

²⁰ Abrahamian, 476.

²¹ This quote, and all further references, to this source are taken from: Âyatullâh R. Khomeyni, „Islamic Government,“ in: *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. and ed. H. Algar, 25-166.

Moreover, for Khomeyni, as for many other Muslim fundamentalist writers, Islam is a complete system of life since it has laws regarding man's life from „even before the embryo is formed“ until „he is placed in the tomb“.²²

The second chapter of the work is entitled „The Necessity for Islamic Government“. Not surprisingly this section deals with the need for Islamic government, both for upholding Divine Law and for protecting mankind. It is contended that divine law was not meant to be ignored after the Prophet's death, or the beginning of the Occultation, but it was always to be enforced. Divine Law must, then, be brought back into effect. Khomeyni asks:

From the time of the Lesser Occultation down to the present (a period of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundreds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imam to manifest himself), is it proper that the laws of Islam be cast aside. ... Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 42).

Khomeyni again asserted that the *Qur'ân* and *Sunna* contain all laws needed for man's happiness and the establishment of a perfect state.²³

Having shown the need for a state to implement law, Khomeyni then moves on to argue that monarchy is an anti-Islamic form of government. This position is a break with his pre-exile idea that the Shâh could remain as monarch if he implemented the Constitution. Khomeyni now argued that „The form of government of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, and the political and administrative policies they pursued were anti-Islamic“ (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 47-48).

There follows a discussion as to why men need to be governed by an individual or power that can ensure the laws which permit men to live in a civil society. This government is portrayed as a protective one that guarantees the rights, and moral correctness of the people. Khomeyni echoed the *Sunni* notion of the need for government, but gave it a *Shi'i* character by emphasising man's need for guidance. For Khomeyni, „It is not permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom, that God should leave men, His creatures, without a leader and a guide, for He knows well that they depend on the existence of such a person for their own survival and perpetuation“ (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 52).

The trustee and protector of the people has duties other than merely providing for the public welfare.

Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as a trustee and maintains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity — a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God's Creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 53).

He must maintain and spread religion, and its laws. As well as perpetuating true religion, he must protect it from its „enemies“. Here, Khomeyni touches on a theme that pervaded

²² Ibid., 30. However, in an interview granted to S.A. Arjomand, on 2 January 1979, shortly before Khomeyni's return to Iran, he expanded on the role of temporal officials in post-revolutionary Iran. Khomeyni said: „There are certain matters which are executive affairs such as urban planning and traffic legislations. These are not related to [sacred] law, and it is beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with them.“ S.A. Arjomand, „The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order,“ *Iranian Studies*, 13 (1980), 156.

²³ Ibid., 44.

his work, and that of many other fundamentalists, from the beginning of his political career until his death — the corrupting influence of the West on *Dār al-Islām*. It was the lack of proper leadership, he argued, that allowed the western imperialists to penetrate the area and pollute Islam. This penetration is presented as part of an overall scheme by the imperialists to further their own „evil purposes“.²⁴

Having shown that government is needed, Khumaynī then moves on, in his third and longest chapter, to discuss „The Form of Islamic Government“. Islamic government is, to Khumaynī, not tyrannical nor is it absolutist. Instead, it is constitutional. However, Khumaynī points out that it is not constitutional in the sense that westerners understand the word but in the sense that the rulers are subject to a higher law, this higher law being the *Qur'ān* and the *Ḥadīth*.²⁵ This idea, too, seems to be a change from his earlier work in which he called for the implementation of the 1906/1907 Constitution. Yet, there is consistency as the emphasis is still on the implementation of God's law. Islamic government, therefore, is the rule of Divine Law over men.²⁶ All members of society are to be equal before the law and all are to be free within the limits prescribed by the law. Indeed, „Law is actually the ruler: the security of all is guaranteed by the law, and law is their refuge“ (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 79).

In a continuation of his ideas from the 1940s it is restated that there is no need for legislation in Islam as „legislative power and competence to establish laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty.“ Thus „in an Islamic government, a simple planning body takes the place of the legislative assembly. ... This body draws up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam“ (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 55-56). The *Sharī'a* is the only legitimate law; all humans can do is strive to implement it.

If Islamic government is one in which Divine Law is to be applied, then it follows that:

The qualifications essential for the ruler derive directly from the nature and form of Islamic government. In addition to general qualifications like intelligence and administrative ability, there are two other essential qualifications: knowledge of the law and justice (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 59).

It is not sufficient merely to have a legally knowledgeable ruler; he must be the most learned, and — by Khumaynī's definition — just, of the legal experts.

Having established the need for the leader to be learned in the law, Khumaynī adds to the strength of his argument by a consideration of the principle that rulers not learned in law should defer legal questions to the jurists as a result of the *mujtahid/muqallid* relationship between the religious elite and the rest of society. Thus he says:

It is an established principle that „the *faqih* has authority over the ruler.“ If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily submit to the *faqih*, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true rulers are the *fuqaha* themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 60).

While, the *fuqahā'* should rule, it is not necessary that all officials in an Islamic state be of the *fuqahā'*. Government officials need know only the law pertaining to their functions

and duties in order to be employable;²⁷ yet they must still have some knowledge of the law.

Khumaynī held that the ruler will have the same rights to authority and loyalty as the Prophet and the *Imāms*. „If a worthy individual possessing these two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the Most Noble Messenger ... and it will be the duty of all people to obey him“ (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 62). This view means that the possibility exists — indeed, it is the preferred circumstance — of one specially qualified leader emerging and creating an Islamic government and having absolute authority over it. This idea breaks entirely with the classical tradition by rejecting the idea of the illegitimacy of all government other than that of the *Imām*. Instead it proposes the selection of the leader from among the *mujtahids*.²⁸

The *fuqahā'*, then, are the heirs of the *Imāms*, with the exception of the *Imāms'* infallibility; just as the *Imāms* were the heirs of the Prophet with the exception of the bringing of revelation.

When we say that after the Occultation, the just *faqih* has the same authority that the most noble messenger and the *Imams* had, do not imagine that the status of the *faqih* is identical with that of the *Imams* and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking of status but rather of function (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 62).

Since the beginning of the Lesser Occultation the jurist, who has the special qualities needed, has had the right to rule.²⁹ Thus, a single member of the *fuqahā'* — who are collectively the heirs of the *Imāms* — has the task of implementing the government, administering it, and executing the law.

However, the *fuqahā'* do not hold all of the authority of the *Imāms*. For although:

The authority that the Prophet and the *Imam* had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering affairs exists also for the *faqih*. But the *fuqaha* do not have absolute authority over all other *fuqaha* of their own time. ... There is no hierarchy ranking one *faqih* higher than another and endowing one with more authority than another (Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 64).

Thus, while political leadership of the people is the prerogative of the *fuqahā'*, they have no authority over one another. This idea seems to contradict the idea of the possibility of coherent Islamic government under a supreme leader. Khumaynī resolves this tension by dividing the commands of the ruler into two types: one dealing with matters of established religious doctrine that do not require the faithful to do anything that they have not done in the past, the other are orders based on personal discretion and an understanding of what is expedient for Muslims. The first of these types of command would not be binding on other members of the *fuqahā'* while the second type would be binding at all times.³⁰ However, their power over the general populace would be almost absolute. This is the system that has been put into practice in post-revolutionary Iran.

27 Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 60.

28 S. Akhavi, „Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taligani and Ali Shariati“, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 24, 4 (1980), 414.

29 H. Enayat, „Iran: Khumaynī's Concept of the 'Guardianship of the Jurisconsult'“ in: *Islam and the Political Process*, ed. J.P. Piscatori (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 165.

30 Ibid., 173.

24 Ibid., 54.

25 This alteration of the generally accepted meanings of modern political terminology is common not only to Khumaynī but to Islamic fundamentalists in general.

26 Khumaynī, „Islamic Government“, 55.

The prerogative of government, Khumaynî makes a point of stating, is an onerous duty and nothing but „pain and trouble“ for the just *Faqîh*.³¹ Furthermore, to ensure honest rule the political authority must be separated from economic power as this linkage is at the root of corruption. Any member of the ‘*ulamâ*’ who wishes to accumulate wealth is corrupted and cannot, therefore, be a trustee of the Prophet.³² Moreover, anyone who wishes to „assume such a weighty responsibility“ as just rulership must be an ascetic as:

... such a person must be totally disinterested in the world and devoid of worldly ambition. Anyone whose efforts are oriented to this world — even in matters that are inherently legitimate — cannot be the trustee of God and is not worthy of our trust (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 143.)

The just *Faqîh* who rules must, according to this point of view, live humbly, piously, and austere.

Khumaynî included a criticism of his own class. He enjoined them to be active in the defense of religion and denied any excuse for not taking action.

The meaning of the statement of the Imam that the *fuqaha* are the fortresses of Islam is that they have a duty to protect Islam and that they must do whatever is necessary to fulfill that duty. It is one of their most important duties and, moreover, an absolute duty not a conditional one (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 74).

After Khumaynî has proved the *mujtahid*’s right to authority, he says that: „The traditions are perfectly clear. ... No one can doubt that the Imam ... designated the *fuqaha* to exercise the functions of both government and judgeship“ (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 96). He says this despite candid admissions as to the weakness of the *isnâds* in the *hadîth* cited; however these traditions, his view of Islam and his reason create and sustain his arguments.³³ Having demonstrated the authority of the *fuqahâ*, Khumaynî then moves on to describe their role in „true“ Islamic society. Theirs are the tasks of „establishing belief in the face of external opposition“; promoting the rights of the oppressed; fighting the oppressors; ensuring correct distribution of public wealth; and ensuring correct collection and expenditure of religious taxes.³⁴ In addition, the *fuqahâ*’s duty encompasses:

... the expression of opposition and the expounding of God’s teachings and ordinances that stand in contradiction to innovation, oppression, and sin are also useful in themselves for they make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrong doing of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then rise up in revolt and refuse to cooperate any longer with the tyrants or to obey corrupt and treacherous ruling powers (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 114).

To achieve these goals, the religious class must create a means to counteract government propaganda against them, organize a coherent alternative program, and develop a means to disseminate it.³⁵ By speaking out the *fuqahâ*’ can raise public awareness and lead the people to resist tyrants and corrupt governments which impose anti-Islamic laws. It is then incumbent on the unjust ruler to heed the wishes of this popular opposition and

31 Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 66.

32 Ibid., 78.

33 Fischer, „Imam Khomeini,” 157.

34 Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 109.

35 Ibid., 115.

return to the straight path. If the ruler fails to reform himself, and attempts to control the people by force, the people may wage defensive *jihâd* against the government as it will have become an active enemy of Islam.³⁶

There is no systematic plan given for the removal of illegitimate tyrannical government, but there are hints that this change, when it comes, will be abrupt and violent.³⁷ Khumaynî came to this conclusion based on a tradition of Husayn. He inferred that „the *fuqaha*, by means of *jihad* and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow tyrannical rulers and rouse the people so that the universal movement of all alert Muslims can establish Islamic government“ (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 108-109). This uprising, when it comes, is to be one of mass proportions instigated by those who have the right, and the ability, to rule justly.

Khumaynî places great faith in the ordinances of *Shi‘i* Islam to provide all the solutions to Iran’s problems. If only Islam was properly implemented by the appropriately qualified class, all of Iran’s problems would be solved. The failings of modern Iran are, therefore, laid squarely at the feet of the non-Islamic government.

Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it at the very top of the program: „*Sadaqat* is for the poor.“ Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the poor must be remedied, the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. But they do not allow the plans of Islam to be implemented (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 120).

It would seem, based on this quote, that the solution to poverty is seen as *sadaqat* [alms, charity] and the redistribution of wealth rather than the creation of work and other social programs.

If the ‘*ulama*, who are the trustees of God’s decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden and who possess the two characteristics of knowledge and justice ... were to implement God’s ordinances, to execute the penal provisions of the law, and generally to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would no longer be hungry and wretched (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 123).

The final chapter of *Vilâyat-i Faqîh*, entitled „Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government“, contains a plea to the other members of the religious class to join Khumaynî’s campaign for the establishment of Islamic Government. He charges that:

We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, to take shape as an organized Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government (Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 127).

Popular rebellion, though possible, needs the leadership that only the ‘*ulamâ*’ can provide.³⁸ Just as there are no detailed specifics for revolutionary activity, neither does Khumaynî lay down a time-table for the overthrow of corrupt government. Indeed, he says that the overall plan will take time and may not come to fruition for several generations.³⁹

36 Ibid., 114-115.

37 J. Ismael and Y.L. Ismael, *Government and Politics in Islam* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 90.

38 Ibid., 90.

39 Khumaynî, „Islamic Government,” 128.

What is made clear is that Khomeyni desired a renewed and renovated infrastructure for *Ithnâ 'Ashari Shi'î* Islam that would allow the propagation of his revolutionary brand of Islam. As far as Khomeyni was concerned, Islam had a structure that was designed for political involvement and that could be used to spread Islamic revolution.⁴⁰ It was necessary that religious ceremonies take on political overtones to induct the people into revolutionary Islam.⁴¹ Foreign influence had to be eradicated, and the „court affiliated *akhunds*“ had to be purged from the religious class and religious teaching institutions to meet Khomeyni's needs.⁴² Also to be purged were the foreign influenced members of the *'ulamâ* who were accused of removing Islam from the political sphere as a result of their acceptance of the imperialists' propaganda.

By virtue of its inclusion in the Iranian Constitution, Khomeyni's concept of Islamic government was stamped onto Iran following the revolution. Iran was clearly labelled as an „Islamic Republic“. All laws were to conform to Islam and all rights enshrined in the Constitution were qualified by Islamic criteria. Moreover, this document not only incorporated the extended notion of *Vilâyat-i Faqih* but also mentioned Khomeyni himself, by name or title, no less than nine times as leader of the revolutionary movement. Seven of these references are in the „Introduction“; the other two were in the body of the constitution itself.⁴³ The Constitution recognised that:

The plan of Islamic government, based upon the governance of the *faqih*, as set forth by Imam Khomeini ... created a new, distinct, and consistent motive for the people, opening up before them the authentic path of Islamic ideological struggle („Introduction“, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16).

He was, furthermore, promoted to the rank of *Marja'i Taqlid* by this document, an advancement that guaranteed his ascendancy in post-revolutionary politics as it made him the senior religious figure in the country.

Article 5 of the Constitution directly borrowed from *Vilâyat-i Faqih* and paraphrased Khomeyni's qualification for the leader. It stated, in part:

... the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious *faqih* who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people (Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 5, 29).

This was also a good description of Khomeyni, insuring his position as leader in the final version of the new Constitution which was, evidentially, written to enshrine it.

On the perfection of man

Khomeyni dealt with the function and nature of the just government, which belongs to the *mujtahids*. The central value of such a system, however, is the formation of a just society in which all individuals can grow to their full spiritual potential. It is the creation of perfect men that lies at the heart of Khomeyni's philosophy.

40 Ibid., 130.

41 Ismael and Ismael, 90.

42 Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 136.

43 H. Algar (trans.), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980), see: „Introduction“ pages 14 (three times), 15, 16 (twice), and 18; Chapter 1, Article 1, p. 26; and Chapter 8, Article 107, p. 66.

Islam, and the Islamic government, is a Divine phenomenon through implementations of which Islam guarantees the felicity of its children here and hereafter, in the best way possible, and has the power to draw the red line on tyrants, plunderers, corruptions, and transgressors and lead human beings to their (ultimate) desired perfection. It is a school of thought that, unlike all other non-monotheist schools of thought, takes part and supervises all individual, social, material, spiritual, cultural, political and economic dimensions of life.⁴⁴

His goal was the creation of a society with high Islamic morality, ethics, and culture. Khomeyni's success in making these ideas into a widely popular ideology marks a drastic change in Iranian politics as previous popular political movements had concentrated on modernization. However, for Khomeyni the ultimate purpose was the creation of a moral order which in many ways entailed a complete turning away from previous modernization movements.⁴⁵

Central to the creation of a just and moral society was the need for the creation of Muslims who were by definition just and moral. In Khomeyni's view, similar to that of Plato, man is the microcosm of the macrocosm; that is, man is at the basic order of the universe.⁴⁶ Yet, man lives in a state of „bestiality“ and can reach perfection only after being guided to travel along the right path.⁴⁷ Man, however, has no independence although he does have the potential to be the noblest of all creatures. This perfection can be achieved only through merging with God.⁴⁸ For Khomeyni then „Islam has a thesis. It is to make a complete human being out of man. It has come to upgrade man from his current status“ (Khomeyni, Sermon, 14 October 1978).⁴⁹ Islam, as a comprehensive system, provides laws and instructions „to produce integrated and virtuous human beings“.⁵⁰ These laws make the Islamic nations morally and spiritually superior to the West, with its man-made laws. The West despite technological advancement „will still be deprived of true happiness, moral virtue, and spiritual advancement and be unable to solve their own social problems“.⁵¹

Despite this concern with metaphysics, Khomeyni felt that government is clearly needed as:

... men would not be able to keep to their ordained path and to enact God's laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stepping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the right of others (Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 52).

Earthly government, under the guardianship of the *fuqahâ*, is therefore needed to lead men to goodness. Moreover, such a government, in addition to leading the people to goodness, would work to prevent the negative influence of atheists and the „enemies of religion“. In Khomeyni's view, indulgence in worldly life was to be avoided as „so far as the heart is lost to the world and immersed in the love of the world, the path to reforming the heart is blocked and man is deprived of all salvation“ (Khomeyni, *Asrâr al-Şalât*). Again the concern is with reforming man and bringing him to the correct path. Despite

44 Khomeyni, Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament (Washington: Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, n.d.), 19.

45 Najmabadi, „Iran's Turn to Islam: From Modernization to Moral Order“, Middle East Journal, 41 (1987), 203-204.

46 Rajaei, 35.

47 Ibid., 38.

48 Akhavi, „Islam, Politics and Society“, 404.

49 Rajaei, 47.

50 Khomeyni, „Islamic Government“, 43-44.

51 Ibid., 36.

the failings of man including lust for power, man remains capable of perfection, and has an infinite appetite for it. In essence man has a dual nature with animal and divine aspects but is in essence good.⁵²

For Khomeini, man can never be free from restraints; he has only two options. Man can live within the restraints and rules provided by God or by a non-divine order.⁵³ Man is utterly dependent on God and therefore has no natural rights. There are no beings that possess independence.

Who is man to claim independence and power. [sic] Not only man, but even arch angels and the exalted prophets possess no power. No one possesses anything on his own. All there is stems from God. It is because of him that we are victorious [in the revolution]. (Khomeini, Sermon, 29 September 1979).⁵⁴

Khomeini argues that theories of the natural rights of man rest on the assumption that men are born independent and free, for Khomeini this proposition is the source of all problems faced by man.⁵⁵

Man is, therefore, dependent on external guidance, for Khomeini this meant total dependency on God for his perfection. Moreover, in keeping with the classical Islamic beliefs, any notions of man having natural rights is an infringement on the omnipotence of God. Nevertheless, man does have a limited free will in the sense of a right to choose; that is the right to choose the right path or the wrong one. But even in this limited choice, a rejection is seen as leading to the most terrible slavery and most painful prison — eternal hell-fire and damnation.⁵⁶ Therefore, attempts to bring man to the correct path are justified as being for man's ultimate good.

Any political order helping man to follow the correct path is an accepted political order. The true end of life and the reason for man's existence is to follow the right path.⁵⁷ Additionally, without the aid of the Prophet man is doomed to follow the wrong path. Led by the forces of his divine aspect and with the guidance of the Prophet man can find and follow the right path.⁵⁸ In keeping with the *Ithnā 'Asharī Shī'ī* notion that all believers are either *muqallid* or *mujtahid*, those who are *muqallid* need guidance to come to perfection. Therefore, the '*ulamā*' who are the representatives of the Imāns who are the inheritors of the Prophet are to lead man to the correct path.

In order to bring men to this correct path, *Sharī'a* must be implemented. From the beginning of his career, Khomeini expressed only contempt for secular administration of justice which was too slow, often ineffectual and often corrupt. He argued that:

If the Islamic law of *qisas* [retribution], *diyyat* [blood money], and *Hudud* [punishment] were put into practice for a single year; the seeds of injustice, theft, and unchasteness would be eliminated from the country" (Khomeini, *Kashf al-Asrār*).⁵⁹

Moreover, when discussing criticisms of the harshness of *Sharī'a*,

They are not aware that the penal provisions of Islam are intended to keep great nations from being destroyed by corruption. ... Why should it be regarded as harsh if Islam stipulates that

52 Rajaei, 40-41.

53 Ibid., 42-43.

54 Ibid., 43.

55 Ibid., 43.

56 Ibid., 43-44.

57 Ibid., 45.

58 Ibid., 48.

59 Enayat, 176.

an offender should be publicly flogged in order to protect the younger generation from corruption? (Khomeini, "Islamic Government," 33-34).

The means was forcing conformation with the law, this would in the end create good individuals. Moreover, *Sharī'a* punishments were designed to protect the '*umma*' as a whole.

Khomeini held that leaders must be willing to subordinate themselves and others, possibly even whole groups, for the greater good of the Muslim community. Based on the example of the Prophet's treatment of the Jewish Banī Qurayza, at Madīna, Khomeini says:

Anyone who rules over the Muslims, or over human society in general, must always take into consideration the public welfare and interest, and ignore personal feelings and interests. For this reason, Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interests of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society (Khomeini, "Islamic Government," 89).

It is the needs of the '*umma*' as a whole that are of primary importance. Everything else, including those lives seen as corrupting the '*umma*', is subordinate to the needs and good of the community. As has been seen since the revolution, such 'threats' to the 'purity' of the nation have been destroyed by whatever means necessary.

Post-revolutionary political developments

This need to sacrifice for the greater good has been given impetus by the blending of religion and politics. Politics are related to a higher law; as such political participation has been urged as a religious obligation in post-revolutionary elections and referendums. Moreover, on being asked if obeying minor laws such as traffic regulations was a religious duty Khomeini answered: "Obeying the rules and regulations of the Islamic government ... is a religious obligation ... and their violation is a sin."⁶⁰

Given the religious nature of political beliefs opponents have come to be seen as beasts. Criticism of the régime — rather than being debate — is reduced to a struggle between good and evil; harsh measures are legitimized as actions in the battle between the 'legions of decency arrayed against the troops of the blasphemers'.⁶¹ Thus even liberal Iranians, whose ideas were anathema to Khomeini, were labelled as 'anti-Islamic', 'enemies of God and the Prophet Muḥammad', 'Satanic', and 'heretical'.⁶² In response to international criticisms of the Islamic Republic of Iran over its human rights record in the immediate post-revolutionary period, Khomeini said;

It is reported that they [the Islamic Republic of Iran] kill people. People imagine that Iran executes human beings. To this day Iran has not killed even one human being. Iran only deals with those beasts who attack Islam, the nation and humanity (Khomeini, Sermon, 2 November 1979).⁶³

The victims of the régime are denied their humanity and ultimately their freedom or life in the name of the 'greater good.' Criticism of the régime results in those arguing

60 Rajaei, 53-54.

61 R. Savory, "Ex Oriente Nebula: An Inquiry into the Nature of Khomeini's Ideology," in: Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honour of George Lenczowski, P.J. Chelkowski and R.J. Pranger (eds.) (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988), 345.

62 A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 83.

63 Rajaei, 103.

against its policies being cast as enemies of the people whom the régime is in the process of perfecting.

Human rights norms, as understood in the West simply have no place in post-revolutionary Iran. Along with the loss of individual rights there has been a suspension of all „objective moral judgement“ on the part of the régime, this has enabled it to conduct a „reign to terror“ against non-*Shi'a* Muslims, non-Muslims, and against anyone accused of causing corruption in the land; in short against anyone whose views deviated from „the Imam's line.“⁶⁴ In particular the Bahá'í have been singled out as apostates; as such they have been pressured to return to the fold of „true Islam.“ Bahá'ís have been subjected to criminal and espionage charges which are dropped if they recant. Additionally, as apostates they are treated as having incurred „civil death;“ thus, for example, marriages have been declared invalid with the result that intercourse between former spouses becomes fornication which is punishable by death in post-revolutionary Iran and the children of the marriage are treated as illegitimate.⁶⁵

Those Iranian women who had been emancipated in particular suffered at the hands of the revolutionary régime. Khomeyni, like other fundamentalists, believed that Islam prescribed a very specific place for women in society. From the 1940s onward he was critical of westernization of women in Iran. Khomeyni had opposed right to vote as contrary to *Shari'a* and Islamic practice. Part of his platform after the revolution was support for the „Islamic“ notion of the family.

A woman who has entered into a permanent marriage is not allowed to leave the house without her husband's permission. She must submit herself to any pleasure he desires. She may not refuse herself on any grounds other than religiously accepted ones.

If a woman does not obey her husband according to the manner set out in the previous problem she is then sinful and not entitled to food, clothes, housing or intercourse. But she is entitled to her *Mahr* [dower].⁶⁶

Khomeyni also supported the *Shi'i* practice of temporary marriage and mandatory *hijab*. Also, family law reforms were rejected, divorce was seen as a male prerogative limited only by the last date of sexual intercourse and menstruation. For Khomeyni, there was no need for limits on divorce in the case of menopausal women and 9 year old girls.⁶⁷ A consequence of the revolution for women was a stripping away of rights gained under the Pahlavi régime.

It is no surprise that western human rights notions have little currency in Khomeyni's political outlook. To criticisms of it human rights record the Iranian government's response has been to argue that human rights are a western concept and, therefore, by definition un-Islamic.⁶⁸ In addition, western criticisms are seen as further proof of hypocrisy due to the disparity of governmental responses to the human rights abuses of the Sháh when compared to those of the Islamic Republic.⁶⁹ This is in fact a partial answer to the question about Khomeyni's beliefs in human rights. He was quite simply not interested in such things as an end. Khomeyni argued: „What they call human rights

64 Savory, 349.

65 Mayer, 178.

66 Khomeyni, Rasaleh Tawzih al-Masa'il, quoted in Mahdavi, 23.

67 Mahdavi, 23.

68 Savory, 355.

69 Mayer, 6.

is nothing but a collection of corrupt rules worked out by Zionists to destroy all true religions.“⁷⁰

Conclusion

Just as Robespierre came to doubt that innate goodness and purity would lead the Republic of Virtue and so turned to coercion and bribery, so too did Khomeyni after the revolution.⁷¹ The ultimate goal was the creation of (good, perfected) Muslims whose place in the world was entirely dependent of submission to God and adherence to *Shari'a*. If individuals had to be pushed down the path for their ultimate good that was acceptable. Those who could not be saved for the next life had to be thrown from the path lest they corrupt others. The way of corruption led to eternal suffering and damnation making harsh measures designed to bring man to salvation in this life and the next reasonable.

Khomeyni's importance cannot be denied. In the course of his political career, he rose to the position of absolute theocratic leader of Iran. His criticism of the government started in 1943 when he was among the first to see the cumulative threat to Islam from numerous small changes imposed by the government.⁷² He grew more politically significant from 1963 onward when he again attacked the government's policies; but on this occasion his tirade was directly aimed at the Sháh. Ayatullah Khomeyni came to dominate Iranian politics by using his charisma and political acumen to spread his ideas. Together these two factors elevated him to the position of spokesman for the poor and down-trodden with whom he aligned himself.⁷³ Khomeyni's ideas appealed to a widespread sense of „alienation, frustration and rage“ among the populace which resulted from rapid socio-economic change during the 1970s as well as imperialist aggressions.⁷⁴

Ayatullah Khomeyni's goal was a new and revitalized Islam; this he attained with the Islamic Republic. Khomeyni's rejected *taqiya* [dissimulation] when Islam itself is threatened, as by the imperialists and the Sháh. Rather, he attempted to make action obligatory for all members of the religious class, though *taqiya* was to be permitted for those who are *muqallid*. This factor, according to Bayat, has put an end to '*Ithnâ 'Ashari Shi'i*' Islam which had used *taqiya* as a central part of its belief system to allow accommodation with the temporal state.⁷⁵ For Khomeyni, the *fuqahâ* were the leaders of the only legitimate temporal state, pending the return of the Imâm. Bayat may have overstated his case but Khomeyni has certainly added a new dimension to the question of *taqiya* and its use in essentially political matters.

What is beyond doubt is that while a „doctrine of potential resistance is not a doctrine of revolution“,⁷⁶ Khomeyni has been largely, if not solely, responsible for making the potential resistance of the *Ithnâ 'Ashari Shi'a* into a very militant and popular revolutionary doctrine aimed at the creation of a theocratic state. While the concept of Shi'ism

70 Ibid., 34.

71 Savory, 349.

72 Najmabadi, 210.

73 Akhavi, Religion and Politics, 101.

74 M. Zonis and D. Brumberg, „Shi'ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: an Ideology of Revolutionary Violence,“ in: Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, ed. M. Kramer (Boulder: Westview Press; London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1987), 48.

75 M. Bayat, „The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?“, Middle East Journal, 37 (1983), 41.

76 N. Calder, „Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khomeyni and the Classical tradition,“ Middle Eastern Studies, 18, 1 (1982), 3.

as revolutionary doctrine has precedents its widespread acceptance is unprecedented. These ideas radically changed *Ithnâ 'Ashari Shi'i* Islam possibly for all time.

Yet, ultimately, the core of Khomeyni's system was the creation of perfect man through adherence to *Shari'a* which would throw off the yoke of corruption and foreign influence. The emphasis on the cultural and moral cleansing of society was not accidental rather it was political. All things western were seen as an embodiment of corrupt moral values; the aim was the removal of these corrupting manifestations of western society. The execution of prostitutes, adulterers, drug smugglers, and drug addicts were (are) an attempt to cleanse society of corruption. Likewise the emphasis on new educational curricula and the retraining of teachers was part of the construction of a new moral order.⁷⁷ A moral order that would lead to just society on earth and prepare „men“ for the next life. Again, it fell to the *fuqahâ* to bring man to this perfected state. Although the potential was within every individual, it required an external influence, sometimes through forced means to fulfill that potential.

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⁷⁷ Najmabadi, 215.

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