American political thought

Fourth Edition

litical Thought "

lll mer1ca Conversations and Debates

Philip Abbott Wayne State Uniucrsiiy

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1hc

Pri ntcd in the LT ni.tcd States of 1\n1erica

To

Megan E. Abbott

_ .. like some green laurel -W.B. Yeats

Joshua D. Abbott

Hosanna the Home Run! -Gregory Corso

Contents

Preface.:: xi

Chronological Liscing of Major Political Speeches and \Vriting 1630~2009 XY

Biblicai Though1

Republicanism

Liberalism 3

Conservarism and Radicalism 4

Common l'vfoorings 5 American Crises 6

Bibliographic Essay 11

1 Inventing l\lew Communities Introduction 15 Massachusetts: The .. City Upon a Hill'. :21

Pennsylvania: The "Holy Experiment·· 29

Virginia: A "Pious and Christian Plantation" 32

Summary and Comment 35 Bibiiogrnphic Essay 36 Major \\/orks 39

Z Revoh1tion Introduction 41

The Americanization of Republicanism 46

Varieties of American Republicanism 52

Yii

viii Contents

The American Republican Synthesis 55

Loyalist Critique 61

Sumrnary and Comment 66 Bibiiogrnphc Essay 67 Ivlajor \Vorks 69

3 rounding In troductiori 7 I The First Founding and Its Critics 74

The Second Founding and Its Critics 80

Summary and Comment 93 Bibliographic Essay 94 :V!ajor Works 97

Introduction 99

Federalists }03 Republicans l l. i

Den1ocrats t 18 \Vhigs 127

Srn11rntry and Comment L32 Bibliographic Lsay ! 33 \fajor \Vork, 136

5 CivH War Introduction 137

Abolitionists 140

The Southern "Reactionary Eniightenment" 145

Lincol;i"s Resolution 150

The Dilemma of Reconstruction

Summary and Comment 164 Bibliographic Essay 165 \fa,iur \Vurks 169

Introduction J 71

The Prcrnisc of Socia} I)ar\vinis1n.

158

-rhe ;\rn{::rlca.nization of Spencerlsrn t-\p11licd Social I)c1r\vinl.sn1 179

176

71

99

137

Contents 1x

Three Challenges 180 Populism 181 Progressivism 191 Socialism 199

Summarv and Comment 205 Biblioiraphic Essay 207 Major \Vorks 211

'1 Depression Introduction 213 Hoover, Service Individuaiism, and the American System 215

The Challenge of the Depression 221

FDR, the New Social Contract, and the New Deal 229

New Deal Critics 234

Summary and Comment 240 Bibliographic Essay 242 Major Works 244

Cold War Introduction 247

Cold Warriors 250

Cold War Critics 266

The Reagan Revolution and the End of the Coid War

Summary and Comment 284 Bibliographic Essay 285 Major Viiorks 290

Discrimination Introduction 29]

Black Protest 296

Obama and the Raciai Stalemate

Feminist Protest 310

Gay and Lesbian Protest 3 l 8

Summary and Comment Bibliographic Essay 324 Major \Vorks 328

9/11 and the War on Terror Introduction 331

Interregnum: Clinton and 1990s

Individualism and Empire 342

307

213

241

331

X Contents

Three Ivlodels of Patriotism 346

Just \Var Doctrine and Terrorism 350

Summary and Comment 353 Bibliographic Essay 3.53 IVLljor \Vorks 355

i 1 Tile !llext Crisis: Giob:a!izaticm and the End of American Exceptiona!ism? Two Global Perspectives 359

A Global America' 362 1\vo Vievvs on Immigration 365

Summary and Comment 367 Bibliographic Essay 367 !'viajor \V orks 369

Index 371

357 Preface

In John Bro,1:n-s Body. Stephen Vincent Benet offered this (tdmontsh• ment to those \vho \vould \\Tire about this nation:

J-\merican Iv1usc, whose strong and diverse hectrt So many men have uicd to understand Bm only made it smaller ,.vith their an, Because you are as various as your land.

I have taken Benet's \varning seriously. Rather than present any particular approach m American thought_ l have attempted to place theorizing in the context of rhe conversations and de hates of men and \vomen \vho have strug- gled to extricate: themselves and the nation from crisis. Frequemly these American political theorists, too, have failed to grasp the complexity and greatness of the nation as they have engaged in those difficult tasks. There have been moments in these crises, hmvever_ \Vhen the American muse ha~ been captured and political understanding has been enlarged. I have piaced special emphasis on those moments and those writers who have conveyed clarity and vision to the American political experience. This identification itself constitutes a conversation and a debate in which J hope the readers (,ii this volume will engage.

In the second edition of Political Thoughr in ,,4.merica, I retained the for- mat of presenting American political thought through the examination oi nine crises. When I \vrote the first edition. hovvevcr, the Cold \Var was just ending. The second edition gave more attention to the paramerers of this extended crisis. Since the Depression, America had never existed without the Cold VVar as the central feature of its political thought, in terms of both inter- national and domestic issues. On these terms, the collection of political thinkers that helped create what has often been called the "Reagan Revolu- tion" is especially significant. These men and \Vomen. including Reagan him- seif, self-consciously attempted not only rn rethink the Cold \Var abroad bu.I also to re-evaluate the consensus on economic policy that had been forged. by

xi

xii Preface

Franklin n Roc:scveit. '.i\ discussi.°n of this ·'revolution·· \Vas added to chap- ter 9, with spenal emphasis on H1e conversations and debates that Ronald Reagan and others led regarding Roosevelt and Y\-ew Deal liberalism.

In the firsl edition, Poli!ica! Thought in America ended ·with discrimina- tion as a topic. Needless to say. this c·risis has not been resoived. However. there since h;.ivc been significant attempts to reassess the strategv and goals of the civii rights and feminist movements. In the second editio;- I revi;wed recent feminist and African 1\merican political thought of v--riters who con- t:nue t?_s'.ruggle v,;ith the alternatives of assimilation and separatism. In the tl1ird _~d1t1on a new section examines gay and lesbian protest. . \v'.1en the second edition of Political Thought in America appeared in l 999,

tt1e Cold \Var had ended and America seemed to be entering an era of national confidence not unlike the l 920s. Some economists argue:l that a new eco- nomic system driven by technological advances bad emc7·ged. Prnsperitv could ~~~ exten_dcd indefinitely without the usual recessions of the past. Th~ Cold 1,v,ll" policy cf "containment'' \vas replaced with ·'enlargement.'' The ascen- dancy of m,,rket democracies \.vould uitimately produce a \vorid composed only of democra_cies. \Va_r '-'-iOUJd be a policy option of the past. In domestic pol- itJCs, partisan rn:a!ry or course continued, and there were concerns about health care, but the great contested issues of the past decades had subsided or were taken off the agenda: tllc national debt ,ve/fare, homeiessness, environ- mental pollurio,1. This optimism was shattered by the events of 9/ 11. ·

A chapk:r '<vas been added for the third edition that examines how i\mericans \vere s1ruggling to find ,vays to respond to this crisis. The shock clDcl anger follmving the events of 9/1 1 posed major challenges to the three American "languages'· of no!itical thouoht Fo1· i1·t1e,··,J,. tb~·· 'u~ccss"'ul e.nd .._, ._... ~ ~ C" •.. -~.::,,~- -~\_..;·, :_. ~~£ (,J'th'e·("nirjY,'a,·,'ai~,•f;cd·' 11 ~·· 'I'I' ' d" .. , .·,,,\.. " , .. 1" , "· u.t. lnumpn 01 rreeuorn an · human r12:!1ts. But the events of l represent a challenge to beiiefs abom the role of ;eason in the ivor!d: 1Icn could a group such as a! Qaeda emerge that is so oblivious to not on.Jy the ~i\'CS of innocents but a]so to thei.r (nvn survival? A]so. ho½.: c()uid America respond to the terrorist threat and preserve civil liberties at tome and yet avoid :he formation of an empire abroad? For those who hoid to republican sentiments, the events of 9/11 highfo::hted the need for a rcnev.:ed sense of patriotism in America. But hc;,v c:,uid one reformulate patriotic tenets in a nation that is so individuaiistic? And could a new oatrio- tism under these conditions be s,vallo°'''ed up by an unreflective nation,alism? Americans vic,ving oolitics in rcliuious terms l·1'r'\'e' S''""i' •]1e C'\'C''1'·s ~f 0 .. -l .1 "S

~- J" '- · i-~ •- • • '- •.V"- 0 l {. - J.,"'" \.I~ 'Ji > ,~

evidence of the need for citizens to reexarnine their beliefs. Indeed~ h,ono:r~ ing the victims of the terrorist attacks led many Americans to upon their

~~:/,:~c:~(~]~;l~l~-C~t~~,~~~~~~~l~;~,:~~~~i·:::~:s(:i~~~;::~;l~~ :~!:;::s~~(~'i\'.,et;~t~,1~1:~ 1~:::~ ::~~,'',~,!: /:)!i~i/·;~i;, ., _,,: __ n'. Am_:'t:i\a. As ~1f the_ writin~ o_f '.he fr,urt,h cdi_tion. SL;\..• l, ~enls (J.c -~-; 1 l.01.,uLu.e tJ c11a.l,cnge /\:rne.ncan l.1el1et:-; in the rute of la\v.

Poiiticai theorist~ are reluctant to discuss recent events. It is nut clear hO\"-"' ne\v zL::\ .. e}oprnents \Vii! alter the past. l~he to predict the

Preface xiii

course of change. even bv the most able political theorists, is limited. In the last year, howe:er, mom;ntous changes have suddenly occurred in America. The entire financiai structure of the nation nearly collap::,,ed; ,m African American has been elected president of the United States. Both events may dramatically alter basic features of American political thought. Will the effort to restore economic stability require measures rareiy or never employed in America? Will an African American president be abk to bred: what Barack Obama has called the "racial stalemate"? These developments are discussed in this edition along \vith a broader set of changes that may produce yet another crisis in American political thought. Globalization. the process of economic, cultural, technological and political integration, may test the durability of one of our core beliefs, American exceptional ism. Each of these developments is reviewed in the fourth edition. \Ve have already learned that some attempts to predict their impact are errant, hut others may be prophetic. In either case, efforts to identify and resolve impending crises have been a major feature of American political thought in the past and hopefully will continue. There is also nrnv a section on gay and lesbian protest thought ,vith a focus on the issue of same sex marriage.

Finally, scholarship that focuses on these crises has expanded consider- ably, Thus, each bibliographic essay contains new material.

I benefited greatly from the counsel of Leo Wiegman, the editor of the first edition. Gayie Zawilla, ,vho edited subsequent editions, ha~ been an invaluable advisor. Acknowledgement is also due to William D. Richardson of Georgia State University and Richard C. Sinopoii of the University of California at Davis, who offered both spirited advice and thoughtful ques- tions. Conversations with my wife, Patricia, were especially valuable, since it is her generosity and patience that made this project possible.

I am delighted to receive comments from both instructors and students. Please contactme via e-mail at aa2393(ifwayne.edu with suggestions or queries.

Three American °'Languagesj,

The central premise of this book is that the history of American political thought can be understood as a series of conversations and debates. Every American is a participant in this process. Every American can quote por- tions of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution amL in vary- ing degrees, apply the precepts of bm:h documents to a problem in currenr pHblic policy. In nearly every contemporary debate, whether it be over abor- tion, the causes of unemployment, or the nature and remedies for raciai dis- crimination, arguments are anchored in these or other major expressions of i\merican political thought.

What every American might not realize is that these debates are based upon the resolutions of fierce and often disorderly controversies of previous generations. The Declaration of Independence, for example, represents the culmination of many potemiaJly discordant rhen,es in early American politi- cal thought_ The Constitution represents a second attempt to provide a grounding for American poiitical practice. Thus, the current American con~ sensus can be seen as the result of a series of crises that have been thus far successfully resolved~that is, if one takes the preservation of an evolving national identity as a goal.

But the history of American political thought as a series of debares and crises overcome only begins to convey the character of our national experi- ence. For success or failure, resolution or indeterminacy are evaluations derived in part from the language of political discourse chat is employed. From one perspective, the Constitution of J787 is a . from dnothcr perspective a defeat. U) cite another instance, the .t-'\n1ericans D~iade to the ernergenc-:::: be regarded as a national success; fr()Il1 anc)ther regarded as a process of subjugmiorL

2 Introduction

Brnuctu .. THOUGHT There have been three major "languages" or traditions of discourse that

i-\m~ricans_ have employed to interpret the nationai experience. One, which has its ongrns in the first settlements in the New \Vorld. cornmehends Amer- ica as part of a divine experin1rn!. The Judeo-Christian tradition in American poli:icai_ thou~ht explains politicai events in terms of an overarching plan, par1iy ?1scer~1?lc by humans, which projects the nation at any point in time on a discermbie path toward fulfillment or corruption. Most participants in U11s language acknowledge that America as a nation continuallv faces a choice. Wili it continue to follow the path of righteousness and r;ceive the favor of ?od, _ or will it reject biblical injunction and follov,· the path of so many nat10ns rn the course of human history-a path which eniovs a period of asct,ndance follo,ved by decline? · ,

The definition in the Judea-Christian language of the nature of success <~nd fail_ure as_ a divinely appointed nation varies_ From the conceptions of t!1e early Puntans to the religious communities of our day, it includes a moral assessment of current political practice and attempts to connect per- sonal experience to divine imperatives. The Judea-Christian tradition in :\meric,~ ~,as itself rn_1_?'::rgone its o:vn series of crises. Various attempts to wr1: a city ,ui~or'. a hnL " a community organized according to Christian pre- cepts, have falled or required drastic reformation. But the scrutinv of nublic policy by those committed to a fodeo-Christian perspective ha; inf~rmed .American debate over independence, slavery, industrialization, the Cold \Var, and discrimination. ·

REPUBUCAl'tHSM

\ d ' - I - j- _ . :econ . ?nguage m Amencan political thought is republicanism_

~epul,iican po1_it1cal thought has existed as an interpretation of politics since the ongm of city-states in ancient Greece. Although it contains numerous versio?s, republicanism is best defined as a commit~ent to the principle that ther~ _,s a res publica (public thing) that can only be legitimately interpreted by citizefls ~t large_ R~pubiicans arc distrustful of definitions of the pubiic °C',O(l '!S def1•1'1Mc1 -~x·c·!,,s·,·e'-· 10 \" -11c1·1"-rh" tl 1-· ' ' -"' "• '-· .... , , ... · '--· ,v ·-1y u" 1. , , ct, \A 1es or o ·,1er c Jtcs and arc uevoted to the project of developing political structures based on the common partici-

~ + J_' • , •

pa,'10n .c1_1 citrz~ns_ ,~t large. But republicans do not accept any form of politi- caJ act1v1ty as l.eg1t1matc. 1·-J1c central feature of their rn.odcJ is that oo1itical ---~r- 7 ;,.1~··,/ ~17U'-t b•-:. cr•--}~c1 (" : •.. .,_j ' , '; .c . •. . ·~· . ! (n:>i.~ l,, LJ '" c. dJ i .. c , 1n iu u1e sp1rJL CH re1Jubltcan vu1ue. C.:J.Uzens rnust be \VJ~ling: often to undertake action on the b.~.i.sis of a com- rnitn1ent to the con1mon 200d. Nations in \\.,.hich nolitical ic; flascd np

dass. c::, 1.~iti.:m_d s,?::r:t\'.·c~-t ~~r_c __ doo~1:d ,10 ~e~c~t:rate, to tyra~~1y~.. . , _, l~--),,_,"c,.n pouL .... dl L.,ougU was 11k comm ant 1deo102v of t11c A men-

can Re·;/Olution. ?v12ny ..:\rne.ricans~ hO\VC"FCf, carne to the co7iu~lusion tha.t the

Three American "Languages" 3

tradition of republicanism was hopelessly utopian and needed major revi- sion. The Constitution itself is a document that in fundamental v.ays repre- sents an attempt to recognize the fact that virtue does not govern poiitical activity_ Despite this departure, the language of republicanism continues to be part of American political thought. It forms a significant part of the debate over slavery and industrialization_ \Vhenever an American raises the question that current political practice must be evaluated not by self-inter- ested compromise but by the patriotic reflections of committed citizens, he or she is speaking tbe language of republicanism.

The third major language of American political thought is liberalism_ The fundamental premises of this tradition are sometimes difficult for stu- dents to understand, since liberalism is also used as a partisan symbol of con- temporary discourse_ But the "L-word" is only one recent manifestation of American political ideology, and it represents a more inclusive language than the latest political debate. In more general terms, a liberal perspective, at least as it has been articulated in the American context, takes the individ- ual as the basic unit of politics and sees the individual's development as the central criterion for the success or failure of any politicai system,

The dominant speaker of this liberal language is John Locke (1632- 1704). Indeed, many scholars regard this English philosopher as the single most important figure in the history of American political thought. Louis Hartz, for example, contends that very fev,' Americans have escaped com- pletely what he calls the "tyranny" of Locke's ideas. In his 1ivo Treatises on Civil Government Locke challenged the politicaily dominant notion that authority \:vas absolute, indivisible, and derived from patriarchal rule ordained by God and extending from Adam to the present_ Locke insisted that authority was limited and divisible, arguing that others had failed to establish the differences among "the ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley." While Locke reserved a place for the divine in politics (he contended that all political disputes ultimately rested upon an "appeal to Heaven," and that parental authority was derived from an obligation imposed by God to "preserve, nourish and educate'' chiidren), he offered a justification of authority that rested primarily on individual con- sent. He insisted that the nature of political authority could only be under~ stood by positing a condition in which individuals find themselves without government. In a "state of nature"-w-hich Locke defined as a "state of per- fect freedom" in vvhich individuals can "order their actions, and dispose of their possessions, and persons as they think fit .. _ \vithout depending upon the \vill of any other man"-there arise certain "inconveniences." Locke repeatediy contended that the state of nature was not a ''state ohvar." Nev- ertheless, he noted that property is insecure in the state of nature, and that

4 Introduction

individuals who must punish those who violate others' rights must do so on an ad hoc and hence inefficient basis. (Locke also suggested that the absence of an "indifferent judge" in the state of nature leads to only a rough system of justice, since individuals are often driven by revenge.) Thus governments are created by the individual consent of human beings to protect their natu- ral rtghts of "life, liberty and property." Locke was careful to limit the scope and adminisiration of government to the defense of these rights, arguing that "wherever law ends, tyranny begins."

I--iistorically, liberals have defined the individual very differently. Indeed, in Locke's own writings it is sometimes unclear as to whether personhood is connected \Vith the ownership of property (the world was made for the use of the "industrious and rational"), the capacity to reason, or a biblical injunc- tion. Thus a major aspect of American political thought, as debate and con- versation, has centered on vvhat constitutes the true nature of a person. Is an individual best understood (for better or worse) as one who maximizes his or her seif-interest? Or is an individual an evolving entity that is capable of new heights of moral and creative expression? In liberal political thought the cen- tral problem rests on the extent to which political structures advance ( or at least do not inhibit) individual pursuits, and hov,' political institutions can accommodate different conceptions of individualism.

From the perspective of a liberal language, American political thought can be seen as a series of debates that focus on what appropriate political institutions and practices foster particular conceptions of individualism under new conditions. The Constitution can be supported, for example, as a framev.-ork under which people with very different individual perspectives can function. On the other hand, are some conceptions of individualism too narrrnv!y conceived, or is it necessary to pass laws requiring some individuals to constrict their life plans in order to advance the individualism of others? These are questions that liberals have faced as they have attempted to define what it means to be an individual in the face of racial discrimination or eco- nomic change.

CONSERVATISM AND RADICALISM

These three languages-biblical thought, republicanism, and liberal- ism-do not exhaust the parameters of American political theory. At least t\Cvo other languages have been spoken_ One is the language of conse1vatism, the other the language of radicalism. The existence of these two traditions should not presuppose that the three primary traditions do not contain either conservative or radical elements. American conservatism has attempted to employ certain features of the basic languages of the American political tradition. But in its essence it has questioned the central tenets of a free society, hO\vever interpreted. Are men and women free to pursue their own objectives independent of social and political hierarchy? ls there not

Three American "Languages" 5

sornc underlying order in hu.man relationships that cannot be chaHeru2:ed without risking anarchv? Those who clissenr,0 --c·l frr)m i"i,,, P,0 vnlur1·,·Jn r;,,:,-v,'

...,.. _, ••• ,..,._. • ._ -.~_._.._ -••-- ~"\.....-1• •. _J., .. ~~ .. •--••,-Y-....•

this question, as did the Southern critics on the eve of the Civi! \Var. ·The language of conservatisrn has often merged \-Vith the n1ajor tradi-

tions of American political discourse, but it has also set om on its own. often in what it regarded as splendid isolation, to critique the curr-ent consensus. Simiiarly, the Left has employed terms of political discourse that have often puzzled or even angered Americans. In attempting to translate the Euro- pean categories of political thought to the American experience, radicals have sometimes highlighted inconsistencies in rhe biblical. republican, and liberal traditions that were incomprehensible to Americ~ns.' More often. however, radical political theorists have :foiled to appredate the unique!v American character of political debate and thus have been forced w ·coi{- verse only with themselves. \Vhen radicals have found a national audience in a crisis, such as during the Grear Depression, thev have found i:hat rhev must translate their mvn political theorv into a nation,;! idiom. ,

If one then att~mpts to umle;.stand American political rhought in terms of a series of debates and conversations, it is a rro~1bling but important fact that these debates have been undertaken bv people who have spoken differ- ent ianguages. Most persons rea!ize how diff'icuit argumentati(;n is in itse1f. But imagine_ hm.v pro~k:".1atic debate is when participants speak in different languages. For exampie, in a recem pol! Arriericans preferred freedom over equalitv bv a 72 to 20 oercent man,j,1 Bni· \·,,J,,,i- 0-ioc~~ fr";."·1 0· m ,,v-,,,·n i''o- 7 _, .I f - ,... 1 " 1 ... 0 ·· • ....... _..:·L..,. _,. ... v ..... ~ .. -1.~ t •• v,._.,_ __ 1 those Americans who responded to the question? ls ir the freedom of the biblically indined American who measures time in mi!knnial terms and defines liberty as freedom from sin? Or is it the freedom of rhe American committed to republican principles who exp1ains liberty as devotion to the common good? Or is it the freedom of the liberal American who wishes to be left alone w make money or define himself or herself? These three basic interpretations leave aside those of the conservatives and radicals who define liberty even more differently.

COMMON MOORINGS

These cacophonous strains rn American political thought should not obscure a basic and often unintentional consensus in the three basic lan- guages. Each of these languages partakes of a common id16m and, as such. can be seen as dialecrs of the same lan;tuage. Each sees America as a uni en ,e society in the course of world history, ;nd--Americans as a chosen people: ;Jr as the repository of republican hopes, or as an American Dream of material success or spiritual fulfillment. American exceprionalism as a political doc- trine that asserts that America is a unique phenomenon in world historv is rarely chalienged in American political thought, except by some conservative and radical dissidents. Moreover, the economic system that gives meaning to

G Introduction

the various conceptions of freedom is invariably one which might be cailed capi1a!istic. The belief that the struggle for existence is best und;rtaken indi- viduaily is a fundamental tenet of American political culture. The biblical heritage in America is predominantly a Protestant one. \'/hile the connec- tion between economic success and religious piety is a complicated historical phenomenon, the emphasis on personal salvation in a religious sense and on economic success has had a dose psychological if not a logical connection. For republicans, a free-enterprise system is the exemplary manifestation of the independent citizen. Hovv else can a person freely criticize the state except from a position of economic independence? The liberal commitment to free enterprise has been vulnerable to some critiques from the Left. Nev- ertheless. in the liberal ethos the answer to the question of ,vhat economic system best exemplifies personal autonomv has almost invariab!v been capi- taiism. Finally, the common philosophic;] thread that unites ~ach -of the three languages of American politicai thought is individuaiism. In the bibli- cal tradition, individualism is interpreted in~terms of salvation and 2:race; in the repubiican tradition in terms of the independent citizen: and in~ the lib- eral tradition in terms of a free-thinking person.

These 1hree political traditions or languages of discourse have not been static. Nor should American political thought be conceived abstractly as an ongoing debating society. ·voices are not equally heard and participants do not politely wait their turn to speak. Americans historicaliy have been con- fronted by a series of crises that have threatened to make the interpretation of political life by one or more of these langua£es obsolete. Tbe stakes can be high during these periods of crisis. IndividmJ careers are oiaced in ieop- ardy, lives and livelihoods arc threatened, and the future of the nation °itself is in doubt. Many of these national emergencies are those that any political system eventually faces: revolution, founding, economic collapse, and civil war. Others reflect A .. merica's own particular historv. such as the nation's ori- gins in invented curnmunities. In all cases the res~lution of these crise~ can only be understood in terms of attempts bv \VOmen and men to applv their understanding of the nature of politic~, de;ived from their o-wn expe1:iences in their own lives and through the languages in which thev have been accus- tomed to speak. to current probiems, ,

\Vint are the major crises in American political thought'_! The newness cf /\n1erica stiH rcrnains a central tenet of our political. cutturc.. aJthou2:h the exaltation of the, origins of /\rnerlca as a nation has h.idd;n the

that re.f1cc1cd this early crisis. For the orjgins of /\.rncrica as nation Lie in the beiief that it is po.ssib!;. to ~'in\ .. enf: nev~,; Cl;~11n1_un!tics l.;ased on com~ mon accept2nce of a ne"v way of iife. The coloniai political experience is complicated bv the fact that there exjsted i;ot a s1:1ale crj,j, ~-,111- l"""ult 1·1,.,1p. r.-11·_ ~ __. --. &, '""~b ,._., .. -\.a.._,_~_ii~ _ _.i....., ....

Three American "Languages" 7

ses derived from the nature and purpose of settlements in the British Empire during the seventeenth century. In New England the idea of a homogeneous religious community, a city on a hilL came under challenge. In Pennsylvania

. the dominant religious community was faced with the question of how it could continue to govern in a pluralistic society and stili remain true to its commitments. Virginians were confronted with, and persistently refused to recognize, the contradiction between their goals as a colony of country squi;es and the realities of slavery and tobacco economics. The debates among Roger Williams, Anne Hutchinson, John Winthrop, and John Cotton in Ne\v England and the Quaker oligarchy and its challengers in Pennsylva- nia were debates over the soul and future of these newly invented communi- ties. In Virginia debate took the form of a short-lived rebellion.

The re;olution of these various colonial crises was barely complete when the question of independence emerged. In fact, one could argue that the struggle for independence represented an extension of the individual colo- nial crises. In any case, the most intriguing aspect of the American Revolu- tion as a crisis is that in the quest for a new society independent of British rule, America did not undergo the same sort of revolutionary process that most other nations have traversed. Most violent changes in political author- ity seem to initiate a process of increasing fragmentation and violence, fol- lowed by an extreme centralization of power and often a reign of terror. V1Then a society appears to become exhausted from numerous attempts to create a new order, another form of dictatorship, often cailed by political sci- entists and historians a Thermidor (after July in the French calendar, the month in which Maximilien Robespierre was overthrown in the French Rev- olution), seems to arise. The Thermi.dorian revolutionary stage is a particu- larlv traaic one. since ideals of liberation are abandoned in favor of est~blishii1g orde.r. Whiie the generalization is disputabie, there was no reign of terror or Thermidor in the American Revolution. One reason America escaped this tragedy may have been the application and reformulation of a particular kind of political thought by American revolutionaries. Repubiican- ism, as redefined in the American context, served successfully as a cohesive anticoloniai ideology as ,vell as a check on the temptations to politicaliy cen- tralize and systematically use terror to subdue opponents of the Revolution.

Everv revolution must effectivelv lead to the creation of a new order to replace the old. Despite the ingenuit;, of American republicans, the founding of a new reilime \Vas not a simple task. American revolutionaries, whiie they escaped the~carnage that characterized the English, French, and Russian rev- oiutionary efforts, could not establish a founding on their first try. 1l1e period between the late 1770s and 1780s \vas a crisis manifested in two foundings-- the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Paralleling this national instabiiitv were numerous state crises in which various state constitutions \.Vere for;1ed and re-formed in attempts to found durable institutions. The debates between supporters and critics of the first founding and supporters and critics of the second were framed primarily in the language of repubii-

8 Introduction

canism. But now the debate centered on different and competing tenets of repubiican thoughL Republicanism, which had been a language of national solidarity, was now a language of contention and discord. The political theo- rists of the second founding, writing under the collective name of "Publius," did not totally abandon republicanism. but in attempting to provide "republi- can remedies for republican defects" they introduced a new kind of dis- course, one rhat contained elements of liberalism. Thus, Publius argued in support of the Constiturion then no political system could rely on enlightened statesmen or patriotic r:nmives to guide the country and remain stable. Rec- ognition of the power of individual desire must be a central part of the sys- tem. Was the Constitution, the second founding, the outcome of a theoretical refinemenr of republicanism or its practical abandonmem, a Thermidor (albeit a mild one)? This question is still part of our national debate.

No sooner had the government of the second founding been set in place than another crisis developed. The supporters of the Constitution had insisted that by recognizing the contentious nature of human beings in their new framework, political conflict could be contained and routinized. But "facrions" emerged in the new republic. Political issues were defined and debated along the lines that had long existed in Great Britain. What in essence was a ·'court party" led by Alexander Hamilton struggled with a "coumry party" led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The conflict between these two factions reached such an intensity in Washington's second term that rwo opposing political parties, the Federaiists and the Republi- cans, ,vere formed to contest elections and ,vin control of national and state governments. Both parties regarded a victory by the other as paramount to the end of a free society. Republicans depicted Federalists as "monocrats" who had designs to introduce aristocracy and monarchy to America. Feder- alists regarded Republicans as part of an international conspiracy to extend the French Revolution to America and inaugurate a reign of terror here. The confiicr bet1,veen these two parties led to the victory by Republicans, often called the Revolution of 1800. Follmving a period of relative decline in factional competition, however, a new set of forces emerged. Led by Andrew Jackson, the Democratic Party charged that the nation was again slipping into the grip of aristocracy and piedged itself to policies of national reform in rhe name of Jefferson. Democrats were challenged by the Whigs, ,vho claimed that the Jacksonians had no idea of Arnerica as a single nation and were incapable of governing.

The conflicts of these two-party systems eventuaily produced a consen- sus thm resolved the crisis over the existence of factions: organized opposi- tion through party competition ,vas an essential pan of the preservation of a republic. In the course of this long crisis over the legitimacy of an organized opposition, the four political parties of the early period of the republic (the Federa[ists, Republicans, Democrats, and Whigs) also managed to present for debate four identifiable philosophies of government that were mixtures of the three languages of American political theory.

Three J--\merican ;~L.,anguages~~ 9

l-::):Ve~c:::·(~U[:ni~e:,:~1d+ rel~tivel):'_ pea~:fui poiiti~ai debate bec~lme by the n11cldk ,,, che nmuccnth century, p,)!H1cal parties and their ieadets couid not contain and resolve one moral and polittcal problem: the contin- ued existence of slavery. Civil ,var, one of rhc rnos[ calamitous cvcnrs rhat can befall a nation:- \Vas l--\rne.rica~s next crisis. 'T'he severe disintegrarjon of consensus in che 1850s is reflected i P tw·,, cfrfF,0 n"nt r•"''"',n'""" ;() tf-,,, s+••\""l"" ~ ~ ...... ·---<-'sr~------ ~-...,,,)~.,,... ._],'l_.•,_"J {.. ¥~-~ - -~ -v f question. Abolitionists contended tha1 the continued ex.istence of the institL;- tion constituted a moral crisis for aH Americans and argued over mornllv acceptable courses of political action. Somhern oo[itical theorists such a·~ George Fitzhugh searched through the history of\Vestern political thouQh.t for defenses of slavery. In this atmosphere of division. Abraham Linc;ln brilliantly fashioned a political theory combining e!emems of the biblical language thm critics of s!avery spoke ,vith elements from the republican trn- dition, Lincoln's resolution, however, took on more problem at re: proportions once the war was won by the North. In the Reconstruction Era. issues of srates' rights and the legitimate scope of government were again raised as Americans addressed the question of how :far Southern socierv shouid be changed in order ro protect the riQhrs of former slaves. ·

_ The indusu-ializmion of Ame;ica created another crisis that posed com- plex challenges to American political thought. On the one hand, great con- centrations of wealih and power were inconsistent with the tenets of both republicanism and iiberalism. On the other hand, Ihe promise of abundance had been part of the American erhos since the days of Benjamin Franklin, and Locke had argued rhm "different degrees of industrv were apt to give men possessions in different forms.'' Social Darwinism. ,;n elaborate id;oi- og:y that claimed to address economic and political problems on a scientific ?asis, bro~ght these contradictions in balance by redefining both republican- ism and liberalism. Three significant alternate interpretations of indusrrial- ization attempted to compete ,vith the ne,v Darn,ir;ist language. Populism. probably America's on!y indigenous radicdism, presented~ an-imag; of an agrarian republic imperiled by rapacious industria! "robber barons.'' Pro- gressivism attempted to offer another version of scientific discourse bv defining political and economic problems as capable of resolution throwdl1 reform by professionals. Socialism offered its O\\'.n remedies ro industriaiiz~1- tion based partly on models derived from European theorv and Partlv on an interpretation of Judco-Christian and · traditiun::. · ,

These ideologies of indusrrial protest produced some arnelioration in the conditions of a new economic order. Bur in i 930 thi::: A.rne:·ican s:ystem \vas descending to\vard econornic coHap:•~C. IJ.erbert I-100\,.ccr nroduced \vhat for many .Americans \vas an i1npress:fv(: defense of liberali.;111 u:nclcr modern conditions, But the Depression shatrcred his svnthesi,: aw,' up a debare over the nature of the American cconomv, \.;,k in.l' .. hicl1. the core polilical beliefs of the nation \Vere questioned. For r~anv American ·

:~~ ~:~:~sb~;n:'.~i:~ ~·~1;~;~) ~' -~~st i ~ r: :~,i /~:;n~:~~: \'~ !_i ~~t1r i1;~ ~~~;11 ~::t, t: :1 ~:1~\';~~1, ~;~;~~

rn Introducticn

?·_Roosevelt borrmving innovatively from Jeffersonian political theory, rnsimmed a "new social contract" for liberalism. But the New Deal synthesis \vas never fuliy accepted by ail Americans. Roosevelt was forced to debate his reformulation viith \\Titers from both the Left and the Ri£ht.

America's involvement in ,vorld affairs had historical!v l;een intense but sporadic until the post-\Vorld War U period. Even before-Allied victorv was compiete, a new war, the Cold Win-, began. The Cold \Var si,mifi~antlv altered American -society in that the republic ,vas now committed to intern;- tional int:.:Tvcntion and a ,vartime economy without a foreseeable conclusion. Various American political theorists have attempted to justify this commit- m~nt and show hmv it was an unavoidabic one. Others have argued that par- t1c1panon m the Cold War led to the sacrifice of central American values.

The next crisis discussed in this book involves what has been called the second reconstruction-the crisis over the dismantlement of racial segrega- tion and challenges to gender discrimination. ID an important sense.-bi;ck and feminist protest in the l 960s and 1970s represents· the continuation of the struggles of previous generations of thinkers to engage in a debate over the justice of race- and gender-based limitations on equ;litv of opportunitv

. h .} _., an_d t.,~ appropriate means for overcoming such practices. These protest the- orists race a number of difficult problems in confronting discrimination. for they must make crnciai decisions over v;.:hat language to f;ame their chall~nge in. l'vfartin Luther King, Jr., for example, left a legacy that based protest on ;n interpretation of biblical and repubiican traditions. Bettv Fried.an grounded her feminist critique in the liberai tradition. Other \vriters. howe:er. have Sp•s,· 0 1-,~c· fo•· "e\·· ,)r ,.,1.ffe-e ··; , , " l · 1 • ·1d ·h · · •- .,,., ~"" ' .. , ,, • v '" , . ·, .nL ,ai,gu,1ges rrom w 11ci1 to l,m t eu arguments.

/\mencans remember few dates in their nation's hiswrv. but certainiv September l l wiil not be forgotten. The terrorist attacks -on the United States and the nation's response pose serious cha!Ienges to each of Amer- ica's poiiticai ianguages. How many individual ri2:hts should be curtailed dur- in~y_1e \Var on terrorism? Can the new sense of patriotism that emerged after 9 U be sustan1cd, and -,;vhat form should it take? Can the biblicai tradition of political thought guide the feelings of grief, anger, and desire for retribution that Americans experienced after 9/l 1?

As the Coid War challenged American reso]ve abroad and democracy at home, so too v,-iil the war on terror. In fact, international terrorism mm; be only one of many new cha!ienges. G!obaiization, a term used to des:ribe political, technoiogical, and cultural changes that have made the world much more interconnected. mav oosc a threat to the Jona- held Anv'ri'"'P h~libf that \VC are exceptio.naL ~, l ' '' b ,,, ..... ,',-c(i. -' l,, '-'- .,__

·rt1ese ek:ven crises (represented here as irrventing comn1urdties~ the Re\'- . ri- ___ er .. d-~ .. ,..., t~ {- .. ~- --=; -·. _:- ~~ • ....... · ~- . •

. ci,c. ,~,)un 1"_';'' ,c~Cc'.0,1,,, .. me C,vil \Var, ;ndustrrn.;,zatwn. the Depres- ~-'l'" n-"' rc1'c1 c· sc··· ~ .. "., - (_, i, . • . . ! I ,. . . C ;,_ "' col, ~· , • ·L .J lli1/JlduOii, ,_. l Land g,o,,a.l1zat1onJ are not 8 comolete representation of Am(:Tican po!iiicai thought. But these crises. includin~ the conversations and debates of 1\n1ericans \;\'ho have addressed t,I"ierrL are i·uus- trative of the political thought of -,vhar is in many ways a unique nati~m. ·

Three American "Languages" 11

Bibliographic Essay In Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life

(Berkeley: University of Caiifornia Press, 1985) Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, \Villiam M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Stephen M. Tipton have col- laborated to present a study that employs the metaphor of languages as a model for the study of American political culture. The authors describe the existence of two languages, biblical and republican, which, they comend, have become "second" or partially lost languages, overwhelmed by the dom- inance of the first language of individualism. Comm1mi~y in America, Charies H. Reynolds and Ralph V Norman, eds. (Berkeley: University of California, 1988), contains searching critiques of Habits of the Heart on both method- ological and theoretical grounds. Rogers Smith presents a different list of "languages" in his "Beyond Tocquevilie, Myrdal and Hartz: The I'vlultip1e Tradition in America," American Political Science Review 87 (September, 1993), pp. 549-66. He argues that an "ascriptive" discourse that justifies rac- ism and other forms of discrimination competes with liberalism and republi- canism. Robert Booth Fowler ably reviews recent discussions and debates over the identification of these different forms of political discourse in Enduring Liberals: American Political Thought Since the Sixties (Lnvrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).

Unarguably, the most influential study of American political thought, and one which emphasizes the dominance of tbe libera1 idea, is Louis Hartz's The Liberai Tradition in America (New '{ork: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1955). Richard Hofstadter's The Amelican Political J1·adition and the /vlen f¥ho Made It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948) employs a dif- ferent focus and methodology as weli as a slightly different definition of lib- eralism, but his conclusions are very similar to Hartz·s. See David Ericson and Louisa Bertch Green, eds., The Liberal Tradition in American Politics (Nev,' York: Routledge, 1999) for assessments of Hartz, and Ann Norton's The Republic of Signs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) for a delightfully presented treatment of the interaction between liberalism and popular culture. Philip Abbott defends portions of the Hartz thesis in "Stili Louis Hartz After All These Years: A Defense of the Liberal Society The- sis," Perspectives on Politics (March, 2005), pp. 93-109.

Part of the argument over tbe nature and importance of the '·language of liberalism" in America extends to arguments over what John Locke l1irn- self said. Hartz emphasized the transformation of Locke's ideas as they ,vere applied to a ne\V cuiture. Nevertheless, a quest for the "real" Locke is still a central task for an understanding of American poiitical thought. Peter Las- lett's introduction to John Locke: li,;o Ji-eatises of Governn1ent (Nev, '{ork: Mentor, 1965) is a valuable review of Locke's general theory and hisloricai context. John Dunn's The Political Thou,ght of.John Locke (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, l 969) emphasizes the theological base of hi~, politi- cal theory. On the other hand, Richard Ashcraft in his RerolutionwY Politics

12 Introduction

and Locke's 1}vO Treatises of Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) argues for an interpretation of Locke that places him within the republican tradition. Compare both to C. B. Macpherson's The Political The- 01y of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), which makes Locke the central figure in the development of liberalism and capitalism. For more recent applications of Locke to the American context, see Jerome Huyler, Locke in Anzerica: The lvloral Phiiosophy of the Founding (Lawrence: U rriversity Press of Kansas, 1995); Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of lVlodern Republicanisn,: The },;fora! Vision of the Anierican Founders and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); and Joshua Foa Dienstag, "Serving God and Mammon: The Lockean Sympathy in Early American Political Thought," American Political Science Review, 90 (September, 1996): 497-51 l. Mark Hulliung explores the power of sociai contract theory irr America, especially in periods of crisis and even as it came into disuse in Europe, in The Social Conu·act in America: Fmm the Revolution w the Present A.ge (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2007).

Wilson Carey McWilliams's The Idea of Fratemity in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973) focuses on what he calis American vari- ants of "the ancient imperatives of fraternity" (both in biblical and republi- can forms) in the history of American political thought. Also sec John H. Schaar's "The Case for Patriotism," New American Review (May 1973), for a similar approach. John Diggins, in The Lost Soul of Arnerican Politics (Chi- cago: Urriversity of Chicago Press, 1984), criticizes interpretations that he regards as overemphasizing republicarr themes in American political thought. Although phrased in different terms from the contemporary debate over the nature and relative importance of different American languages, Vernon L. Parrington's classic three-volume lolfain Currents in American Thought (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1927, 1930) explores the conflict between what he calls an agrarian Jeffersonianism and capitalist Hamiltonianism in American history, concepts that roughly correspond to the languages of republicanism and liberalism.

Analyses of American political thought that inform us about the nature and importance of biblical language include William G. McLaughlin, "Pietism and the American Character," in Hennig Cohen, ed., The American fa:perience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), pp. 39-63, which emphasizes the individuaiist elements in this American language, and his Revival, Awak- enings and Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), which dis- cusses the communitarian potential of American religious movements; \Vinthrop Hudson, Religion in Arnerica (Ne\v York: Scribrrer's, 1981); and Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American Hist01y (New York: Scribner's, i 952), \vhich anempts to show how religion can add a needed sense of the tragic to American culture. Barry Alan Shain, The ;vfyth of American Individ- ualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Ilwught (Princeton: Prin- ceton University Press, 1996), emphasizes the dominance of religious accounts of politics over republicanism and individualism in the revoiution-

13

ary and founding periods. Richard John Neuhaus, The ~\lakecl J)u.b!ir_: St;tuure:

f ;~:~~ti~~;~~1I:~~i~::.~~~~:~:F:'.; ;;:;J~f ;:,;,I~~:;;;;:;; in /\n1erica,'· in Philip i\.bbott and fv1ichael B. L.,cvv~ eds~ ·rtie L.iberal Fluure

~s;~~i\(;t~~t.:~;~~~:;:~f J;};1(~~;;i; Ii~i:);j; gious ~1overr1.ents and argues that they ha~./e been crucial in expanc.Hng the ro!e ol the state in our lives in his f-!eiff'ire Ncuion: 171e Politics of'Sin in Amer" ican History (Nevv I-iaven, Cl: Yale University Press, 2003). ~

The tensions bet\'.veen the language of conserv'atism LUld l\n1erlca '.'s dominant languages are explored in Clinton Rossiter\ Cunsen-utisn, in A1nerica: The nwnk!ess Persuasion (New York: Alfred A Knopf ,-,•v ed ::,:it:!;n~~~~:e~-o~~:c~;sh;:isc~~~l~;~i:;~~ <:1~0<~1tc~;~~eet~~::1~~L~{i~r::~:~~~~~:~~~ much !ess sympathetic manner, see Daniel Bell's collection, The Radical Righi (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963). W1Hiam E Bucklev. in his intro- ductory essay ("Did You Ever See a DrCarn Walking?'') in, Buckley and

?~"~tr:es. ~:. K:s!,~,~'- ~~!s-, :Y:o;ie;~-;;, _,:J~:1ericl;n Consen•:ui,·e _ Poiirica!_ Thougli! \_Nev, r01k. I·lcupc:1 &: Row, 190'.);, vie,vec conservattve discourse in Amer- - • . l -1ca as m a penoa of ascendance. A.lso see George H. Nash's thorough pre-- sentation of recent conservative theorv, The Consen'i!lii-e Mm,en~eni in .-'lmerica (New York: Basic Books, 1979), ·for a similar argmncnt.

radi~:I~~~~s:~ ~~:~:~:~-i~;ntl~:;~!~:.~~[ ~:it['.,~~~.i~~,1~::!::~s,~~~'.~1;c!Ec~r{~~i;;; 1--J'ont (Ne\v ~{ork: :F~irr.ar and Rinehart~ l 935)~ chap. L Richard Rorty re for•• mulates Samson's arguments in Achiei'ina Our Cnu;-ur·· ! efri<:r T/i()liaht ,-,, ,t,,,-

;:~~:~;,:''~~t~~~:~:;;~r~ ~1;; :~::,;,~i1:~~~~ f i:,',~;~~~-~ti,: 0 1 rnssc11t rn Tiw (,rear 1)1ssemers (New 'tork: \v. \V. Nonon. 1961). A,!so see

~,'.:::o~;r;~~!1:~sl.l~::i~(;;(:ti!~~~:-·t:;·;_ ::1h;:t:l,~:;~;,j:~~'.{:,~~-~;,i~l[l/;:'l,;t:\:n~!::·~~ sis on chts question.

Inventing New Communities

INTRODUCTION

It is certainly correct to say that America as a nation-state was created in the crisis of revolution. But American political culture and thought were formed over the course of the century before the open conflict with Great Brit- ain. It is tempting to view this colonial period before 1760 in genetic terms. Revolution represented the "birth" of the American republic, and the forma- tion of colonial settlements represented its gestation. There is a sense in \Vhich this creation narrative is correct for, as we shall see, the ideology of the Ameri- can revolutionaries v.-as very much dependent on their colonial experience. But from another perspective, the history of colonial settlements is a story of sepa- rate crises and resolutions, a story, if you will, that lies beneath another story of the Revolution. Space does not permit us to examine ali these stories, for there are thirteen of them. Instead, we ,Nill concentrate on three stories that are rele- vant to the revolutionary crisis and continue to attract the contemporary imag- ination: the settlements in Massachusetts, Pennsyivania, and Virginia.

The first five generations of Americans are a narrative of the conscious attempt to invent nev>' communities. This image of colonial settlements as utopian efforts is partially hidden by the projection of a conservative ethos filtered through the experiences of subsequent history. The Puritan settle- ments in Iviassachusetts evoke impressions of a dour and intolerant peopie: the eighteenth-century Quaker is immortalized as the archaic figure on a cereai box; and the Virginian plantation owner is remembered as an elegant Leslie Howard dancing to a Mozart minuet. Without a doubt these images in popular culture do capture elements of the traditional orthodoxy of the American colonial mind, but they also obscure the novelty of colonial com- munity building. A vision of an entirely nc\v form of community defines each of these settlements. T,vo are religious ( emphatically so in inspiration). and another secular but no less utopian.

15

FOUNDING

INTRODUCTION

However complex the revoktionary process may be, the esrab!ishmcnt of new poiiticaL economic, and social institutions is often even more elusive than the preconditions for rebellion itself. Despite the execution of Charles l in 1649, the English revotutiorwries \vere unable m establish a srnb!e 11ew regime in the 1650s. The monarchy was restored in 1660. The Jacobin regime in France, despite its Reign of Terror, could nor construct a ne,v soci- ety. Indeed, the Directorate that foHowed was al:-;o an unstable political structure. The Soviet Revolution did not seem capable of esrnbiishing new, permanent institutional structures, despite the efforts of Lenin, until Stalin consolidated power in the 1920s. This difficulty in creating ne,v instimtions after destroying the old is a major force in propelling revolutions across the stages described by Crane Brinton. In fact, rhe con,mon resort to dictator- ship as a solution to revolutionaries· inability to found a new regime is the central jndictment that conservatives make against revolution in general. Thus, Edmund Burke, who knew \vel! the brmaiilics and injustices that exis,- ing governments can foster. still concluded in his critique of rhe French Rev- olution that to "rudely'' tear apan the fabric of society involved a deadly risk of generations of chaos.

The founding-that is, the successful establishment of new instirntional structures (economic and social as welt as political) cifter revoimion-is a precious moment in human hisrory. Niccolo rviachiavelit, the sixreentb-cen- tury Italian political theorist admired by the Arnerican revolutionaries, declared in his Discourses (1531) that those who possess the talent and will to found new republics are among the most admired people in history (and those ,vho found tyrannies are among the most despised). The American patriots, steeped as they were in the history of the failures of republican gov- ernments, were we!! aware of the delicacy of foundings.

71

72 Chapter Three

Blessed as it was by the conditions described in the !ast chapter, Amer- iG1 still had difficulty in creating a successfui founding. In fact. there were t~~,..o foundi ngs as a result of the ;\merican Revolution. \\/hen the Continen- 1 ai Congress adopted the Declaration of lndcpcndence in 1776, it also resolved that each ne,v state draw up a constitution, and that a constitution be created for a new national government. Both charges were executed. Some states si mp:y dcieted co ion ial references in their c~~Tcnt constitutions, while others experimented with a variety of new constitutional structures. \\--lic.thcr state officials ;:.Jttcn1pted to sin1piy· modify an exi.sting docun1ent or to create an entirely ne,v constituiion, the process of constitution making went rather smoothiy. Oniy \lassachusctts submitted its new governing doc- ument to the voters at large: the other state constitutions w;rc adopted bv Ihe c,xisting legdalLircs. · ,

The process was anything but effortless in regard to a national constitu- tion. An cntireiy new cons1itution (the Articles of Confederation) was offered ro each of the states in 1777. \-Iany of the nev,c states, despite the pressures of engaging in a revolutionary struggle, responded cautiously. There were complaints about details as \vc)l as concerns about the method of disposition of new lands. Each state seemed to have claims against another. By l T!9 Maryland stili refused 10 accept the ne',v constitution and was onlv persuaded to join \\1 hcn \/irg3nia rnade. a concession vv"hich left the land ques--- tion open to the decisions of the nev. legislature. By February 178 I the new natjon bad a national constitution~ although for over three years it fought a revolution ;_.vithout one.

·rhc first founding \, .. c11.lld on h: last eight \'C,ars. ~fhe nation had to stru~;;de with such problems ;.s the war ~iebt. ec:'ln~mic dislocations created bv~tl,e Revolutio,;, admitting new states, adopting a procedure for incorpo(ating nt\\-- settlerncnts:- and efforts to find a DC\'-·- ro.lc as a tradlng partner \\.'ith European countries nov; that i'.\merica \vas outside the British ~E-:;1pirc. l\fany forn1er revolutionriries be2:an to Iosc faith in the founding itself SeveraJ efforts to amend the con~titution were d,::cfeated. Despite these problems. Forrest f'vkDom:1cL in his assessment of the period, deciarcci the fii:st decade in th.e history of the lTnited States a "\vhopping success." Independence \Vas achieved; C:{ peace treaty· \\-'·ith I3rita1n \Vas successfully negotatcd; and despite important economic problems. the col.rntr/ as a ·whole was prospering. "The vast majority of " he "wouid probably have agreed they had no need for a stronger un~on. Tb be sure: there \vere assorted cornpiainLs. but not enough to shake n1<.)Sl fron1 the COil\,0 iction tl.1at states \vere adequate to all the necessary· functions of governrnc:11t. ... '.-~

But the group of ~nflucntial leaders that in.eluded republicani:;rn~ \\/ashington~ f'v1adison, F'rankiin,

nati.unaJ cons1itution. tutions \ve,,-e of n1c.ctl ng challenges.

C\ ery State which ,1

of \:arieties and John

\VfOIC

set fire

Founding 73

to .... Good God! 10/ho besides a Tory, could have foreseen, or a Briton pre- dicted them?" Hamilton ,vorried about the ultimate ability of America to function as a nation:

There is something ... diminutive and contcmotibie in the prosocct of a number of petty States. with the appearance 0;1ly of union, jarring. jeai- ous and perverse, wi.thout any determined direction. fluctuating and unhappy at home. ·weak and in;ignificant bv their disse~sions in th~ eves of other nations. , ,

Adams concluded that Americans, in their propensity for faction and sclf- intercsL '\vere like all other people, and shali do like other nations." In other words, a founding crisis emerged during the 1780s. Some leaders regarded the new constitution (and the state constitutions) as incapable of preserving the principles of the Revolution, while others insisted that both were adequate.

The A,rticles of Confederation might have survived these doubts (unquestionably with major amendments) had not a tax revolt in Massachu- setts created the specter of armed insurrection in 1786. The newiv created Massachusetts legislature, unlike those in other states, had adoptdct a strict pay-as-you-go budget policy after the Revoiution. This sense of fiscal resnon- sibility \vas financed in large part by a regressive poll tax. Dislocatio~s in agricultural markets as a result of the Revolution ieft farmers without outlets for their produce. Mortgage foreclosures and imprisonment for debts were results. The farmers themselves began to interpret these policies as a plot on the part of eastern merchants to buy up the land and make the free farmers peasants. I'v1any of the tactics formerly employed by the revolutionaries, such as committees of correspondence and the forcibie prevention of court pro- ceedings, were now being used by the farmers. Hoping for a more sympa- thetic legislature, the protesters insisted in the fall of 1786 that no courts should meet until after new elections, which were scheduled for the soring_ When the governor issued a prociamation forbidding unlawful ass;mbl:;_ Daniel Shay, a former captain in the revolutionary ;.~my, formed two c;r three thousand men into a militia. A subsequently collected volunteer force then routed Shay's contingent. The Massachusetts legislature treated the defeated insurgents leniently, pardoning or reducing sentences and permi1- ting hard-pressed farmers to meet tax bills from unpaid soldiers' receipts. But Shay's Rebellion, as it became known, was regarded as proof of doubt, felt about the viability of the existing founding. Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time, attempted to aHay these fears by contending that "a little rebellion TIO\\.-' and then is a good thing.~~ In late Februarv· I 737 ~ hovve·-JeL c--=cn1uress authorized a meeting in Philadelphia to "render tl1e federal constitution,~tdc- quate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of the Union."

The delegates to the Constitutional Convention in PhiladelDhia immedi- ately decided not to amend the Articles of Confederation b1;t to write an entirely ne,v document. After a spirited ratification controversy :n which

74 Chapter Three

supporters of the second founding took the name Federalists, the old Con- federation Congress declared the new Constitution in effect and arranged for elections; i\farcb 4, 1789, was set as the date for the irnmgurarion of the firs[ American president. This seconcl founding \vas much more successful than the first. The new Constitution did not degenerate into demands for another. \Vith the great exception of the Civil War, this document has gener- ally provided an arena for the peaceful settlcment of our political disputes.

\Vas Shay's Rebeliion possibly the beginning of a revolutionary stage in v..-hich rad1cals would capture power from the revolutionary moderates, thus Iumbling the nation into civil war and a reign of terror? Or was the Constitu- tional Convention, our second founding, a bloodless Thermidorean coup in which the course of the Revolution \Vas halted? Neither of rhese scenarios quite fit the American case. The goals of the Massachusetts farmers were limited, and no other state experienced anything like a Shay's Rebellion. Nor did the farmers of the second founding, with some exceptions, fully repudi- ate rhe republican theory of the Revolution. Madison •.vas careful to insisr repeatedly that the nevi Constitution was designed to remedy republican defects with republican solutions. Still, there \Vas an important ideological shift in /\merica in the l 780s, one which reexamined the viability of republi- can political theory. This debate, which raged throughom the decade and reached its acme in the ratification of the new Constitution, produced the most significant political thought in the history of the republic.

THE FrnsT FOUNDING AND ITS CRITICS

Often overlooked in the history of American political thought arc rhe vitality and experimentation in constitutional theory in the period before the adopiion of rhe Constitution. Thomas Jefferson tried to convey this mood of excitement when he wrote in 1776 that the work ahead was of such "an inter- esting nature" that "every individual \Vould wish to have his voice" in the proceedings. Bm as Donald Lutz concludes in his study of early revolution- ary constitution making (Popular Consem and Popular Comrol), these inno- vators have been "consigned to distant \.\1ings, trotted out only occasionally to play the role of short-sighted, obstructionist opposition to the Federal- ists." In failing ro examine these innovations, Lutz remarks:

[Wje have nDt only lost the earlier ,rndition of American political thtO!")' ... we have also lost the roots of federalist thinking, and thus ironically, Ihe full measure of Federalist brilliance and originality.

The best way to attempt to correct this faiiing is to briefly examine represcn- rntive models of state constitutions as ,vel! as to reviev,· the basic principles implici, in the Articles of Confederation.

In basic terms, the states created three ,ypes of constitutions after 1776: the Virginia model of legislative supremacy; the Pennsylvania experiment

1--, , •

. t~ouncing

76 Chapter Three

\:'hether the legislative and executive branches of government have per- J-orrned their duty as guardians of the people ... to enquire whether the pub- lic taxes have been justly laid .... " ·

The Council of Censors was desiened to be a a-rand iurv. a leoislative investigating committee, and a blue-ril,bon study c<~mis;io~-all i;; t~ne. It could pass public censures and order impeachments, and \Vith a two-thirds vote it could also call a convention to amend the constitution if there ,vas an "absolute necessity." Irnnicaiiy, this is ,vhat the second session of the councii did when it met in 1790. /'\ new constitution was created ,vith an upper house and governor and ,vithout a Council of Censors.

The 1\fassachusetts constitution, ,vhich was not approved until 1780, is an important model for the development of state constitutional changes in the next decade. Although A.merica had no hcrcditarv titled aristocrac~'- the constitution reiicd heavily on the republican theory ;if a mixed govern;;wnt, as developed in classical thought by Aristotle and Polybius and accepted bv British \Vhig theorists. According to this theory, representation by variou; economic interests rn society assured stability and iibertv. Massachusetts kepi: a birnmerni legislature but significantly altered revoiutionary repubii- can theory by dranrntical!y increasing the powers of the governor. The new state chief executive was eiected bv the people at large rather than bv the iegislaturc. He was also e!igible fo;· reelection indefinitely and was £i;,en a veto pu.ver over legislative acts. The property quaiification for voti;g (100 pounds) was the sarne in the senate as in the lower house. but eiigibilitv for office in the senate was higher (300 pounds or an estate ta~ed at 60 pou(,ds).

Compared to the excitement and experimentation in founding these var- ious state constitutions~ the attention paid to our nation,.d. doc ... {1n1ent was airnost an afterthought. In fact, at one J;Oint during t.he Revolution the busi~ ncss of the Continental Congress was delayed because so many delegates ,vere in their home states participating in the drafting of their mv;1 stat/con- stitutrons. There is a similarity lx.:t,veen the /'\rticies of Confederation and the Pennsylvania constituti.on. The Articles authorized a sinde ie£:isiature and an executive on the principle of rotation in office. (No ~~oDg;~essionai n1er.nber co1..dd setv'e for n1orc tban three out of six years~- and no ~president for more than one vear in tbree."l A. committee cr)11sistiiw of 0'le •·epresent,•-

~ii~:}~~~: C:i::~:~~~;:~fn~;;:t·~~:; ~;~': ~~:r:1~:i~:r~;~:;i:i;l~:~~C ~~:~,~i;;1:::: ,~\~t;;; of a national model that conceived of the states as participants in a limited

;ii~:~D~~;~,T?.::E:i ~'.:!;:~::~i,1%}1:,'.f ::~~tI;:;:~~7~f :~,;~:~ i:1~1}ii'.:t ~~:,~:~i\~~;~~~'::a~'.L:~~~/;::;'~~eJ::~: ~/:;:~~-~:~1~1~~~~~~::~~:[ist·'.1:sf ~21~~;~~:~~ ~:~!:~ ~1~~:i •;;~~~~:~1s;~'~,-~'.;:'~'.1l~~';!~·e;:~:l:,~:!:t~:,::::,e;~_~:~~!;: ,~-:1 ::1~ 1~:;:1~;~:;v~1: separate guvcn.1.rr:ent. ·~ ··r11.e prean1ble of the i-\rtic!es reflects J\da.n1s\ inter-

Founding 77

pretation: the "states hereby separnteiy enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defence, security of their liberties and

general weifare .... " ~ The dissatisfaction with the performance of both the state constitutions and the nationai one can be illustrated by discussing two important docu- ments of the 1780s: John Adams 's Defence of the Constitutions o_f the United States and James Madison's "Vices of the Political System of the United States." Adams focused on what he regarded as the deficiencies of st,1te con- stitutional arrangements, and lv1adison concentrated on the Articles of Con- federation. Both works are important theoreticai precursors to the political thought of the Federalists in their justification for a second founding.

· Adams's Defence was written in response to Turgot's criticism that most of the America~ state constitutional founders had missed a historical oppor- tunity by imitating British constitutional arrangements. Adams's three-vol~ urne rejoinder was hardly at all a defense of most of the American constitu"tions but rather an indictment of most states who had abandoned the Biitish model in favor of the Virginia and Pennsyivania versions of legis- lative supremacy; it was also a defense of the Massachusetts constitution, of

which he was a major author. The principle· theoretical alteration in Adam s's previous thought that

animates the Defence is his dramatic loss of faith in the tenets of n1oralistic republicanism. Early in the revoiutionary struggle Adams had expressed per- sonal doubts about the viability of a society based on republican virtue. "Even in Ne,v England" there was so much "rascality, so much venaiity and corruption, so m;ch avarice and ambition," he wrote his wife Abigail, that perhaps republicanism \vas a doomed experiment. To contemporary historian Gordon \li/ood, "it was as if Adams was carrying in his own mind ail of the promise and an of the anxiety engendered by the Revolution." By the 1780s Adams had lost aii his faith in virtue as a source of restraint against individual and class self-interest. Elections were not a school for republican virtue since voters' opinions shifted according to demagogic appeais. There were "mil- lions" of people \vhose "sentiments derived from education," but still no restraint "from trampling on the laws." The hope of an austere and simple American culture was a delusion. "The love of gold grows faster than the heap of acquisition·,; "a free people are the most addicted to luxury of any."

Adams then arrived at the conclusion that there ,vas no providentiai basis for /,,merica as an exception to the fate of other republics in history. Adams, hmvever, had not become a Tory. He dearly believed in the existence of the "rich. the well-born and the able" but did not deny that an aristocracy represented a danger to society. If any theory of human nature approximates Adams's, it is probably that of Thomas Hobbes. The great English philoso- pher, whose masterpiece Leviathan was in part a reaction to the Eng]ish Civ!l \Var. argued that the "natural condition" of humanity was one ot competi- tion: re:·r. and aggression. Hobbes concluded his famous description of 1he ·f,,,<.·1t;i,., .. ~ n"'1· ~' ""'l·,-·;t~ d natt,re" (iife 1,vithout governmcnt11 bv remarking that if ... . 'I., .. .._,,, ~-- .... .., . _, .. • ....... ,.( .....

78 Chaprer Three

rhcre are those who think his description is too harsh, why do they lock their doors <.tt night and hide their valuables when they undertake a journey?

Adam; did not propose Hobbes's solution-the absolute concentration of po\ver in a single per:;on or body. But Aclams's observations .on hum~1!1 n,:1t-ure are remarkablv similar to those of the English theorist. AH human lite ;;-a struggle for pmv~r, wealth, and deference, Adams concluded. '"'V'/e may call this :lcsire of dlstinC[iOn childish and silly but we cannot alter the nature of men ... The desire for praise is so intense that .. every man is miserable everv moment when he does not snuff the incense." i\mbition "takes the \vhoic soul so absolutelv. that a man sees nothing in the \Vorld of importance to others, but in his object.'' People arc, for Adams, extremely unequal in their abilitv and talents even as they pursue distinction. This inequality --no human behavior can eradicate." But like Hobbes, Adams recognizes that this ineqLtality is rarely accepted by other individuals who P?sses~ the sa_me desires although not the same means to fulfill them. In a society \Vlthout for- mal titles that~attempt to justify inequality, each person \1,,--ho sees his neigh- bor ··\:vhom he holds his equal" with a ne\v house or clothing '·cannot bear it; he must and will be upon a level \vith him."

GiYen lhese assu~ptions, hovv can republics possibly survive, cspecialiy \Vhen in these regimes there arc more opportunities for people to act on their ·'consLant desire;,":, Here Adams argues that the republican theorists of mixed government are as important to America as they are to polities \Vith formal aristocracies. And here Adams relies on Polybius, a crafty ancient Greek the- orist in exile at Rome. Clearly writing after Rome \Vas in decline as a republic, Polvbius explains Roman imperial success as the result of Rome·s mixed con- srit~rion. The people through their tribunes were able to exert influence on publtc poltcy; the aristocracy residing in the Senate represented the_ h~nd~)wn- ing classes: and the Roman consuls acted as mediators bet1.vcen both factions.

- /'.\darns took 1his lesson and those offered by other theorists to imply that some institutional structure is necessary in any society to mediate bet\Yeen the people as a whole and those who have excelled through talent or the aclvamages of birth. To Adams a bicameral legislature represented both winQ.s of the results of '·constam desire." For those human beings who aspired tZ) greatness, there would be the lower chamber of the lc~isla_:ure. The Senate would be reserYed for the already successful. The executive tunc- tioncd as the balancer, the third part of a trinity of stability whose function \vas to balance the other two forces in society. For \vithout an independent execrn:i\'e. the people would overcome the aristocracy of talent om of resent- ment. And without full representation the aristocracy \vould repress those less successful in the race for power and distinction. Thus, Adams reintro- duced executive authoritv to American republican political thought. Accord- ing to him, states that f;tiled in their foundings to respect rhis Iriumvirate solmlon 10 the problems of republics \Vere courting disaster.

James IVladison's t:Ssay. --vices of the Political System of the United States_,. was completed in April 1787. A year earlier ::V1adison had begun an

Founding 79

exhausLi 1ie cx2rr1.inmion of the history of the- con.t'edc:rnte form of republics. Thomas Jefferson. un diplornmic assignment in r::uropc, sem \fadison over 200 volurnes frorn Paris to aid him in his stud1:. ·From Lhese and orh.::r sou.rec:-; I'vladison dre\v up a set of cornplcx notes on {he upcntion or past confcdcLt- cies, ranging fn.Jm ccrn.mcms on rhc: ancient Creek Lvcian Confc:deracv m Lhc: Belgic Confederacy established in 1679. The rcSult u{this effort ,xas pttbJished in the spring of 1786 as '·Of Ancient anU ivfodcrn Confederncies." :<.1anv por- tions of these digests made their \Vay intu The Fr.:demlisr when IVhtd.ison: \~Til- ing as Publius, concluded that past confederation:-; proYide ··no other li~hI than that of beacons, ,xhich gtve \varning uf the cours~ tu be shunned. ~

The negative historical lessons of previous confederacies \verc clear to lVIadison. But in ·'Vices of the Political System of the United Slates." he undertook the bold step of applying this history of failure rn Lhe br!d life of the American Articles of Confederation. ··Vices" is a brief work, rnore like a grocery list of indictments against the: confc:dernre form them a complete essay. But it is a major document-nor only bcc~iusc of its irnmedia1.e in~paCl on the second founders and because of its in.sights !mo .\·hidison·s Luer thought but also because :V1adison proYided an irnf)onant focu:-; for critics of the first founding. The troubics of the past \'cars \Vt:re the r,.:suit, in major part, of the political structures on \vhich reo~tbiicans had historicallv reli~d - ' , ..... Confederacies, rather than protecting the republican governmenh of their constituent units, exacerbated the problems th::t all rcpubilcan Lhcorists admitted existed: the division of republics into \\·cirrinl! factions, the decline of public vinue, and rhc inability i:o ·resolve conflicts pc-acefolly. Past republi- can theorists fron1 the Greeks to Montesquieu had insisted that rep~ibtics could only function in political units small enough rn enable represemmivcs to be in direct comact 1,vith the people. The cont~dc-rcrcy, then. \;·as a conces- sion ro lhe need to resolve problems such as defense and cooperation that seemed to require larger p~)!itical structures. T:) )\-'ladlson the- confed:.:ratt:: model had never achieved these goab and, in focr, had contributed to the decline of individual rcpubiics. ~ --

In "Vices" he s;hmvs how confederacy in America is repc-ar!ng these frtil- ures. To Madison the evils to \vhich republics arc prone ar,.:: projecred and magnified b:y confederate arrangements. States trespass upon rhe righrs of one another. (For exarnpie, Iv1ary1and passes legislari,nn fav~rin2. rhc sl1ios of her mvn citizens.) Stares encroach upon nario~ntl :uahoritv. (f'or cxa1;rnlc, Georgia negotiates its mvn treaties \~>'iih the Indians.) St;tes act indc;cn- dently with regard to foreign powers. (For c:G:unp!e, the Tremy or Ut1".cch1 has been violated by several states.) States arc unable or unwilling ro come to the aid of their neighbors threatened by internal v!olcncs: (for~ cxan11)le, Shay·s Rebellion). The indictment given the kngthicst rrearrnem by l'v!.;tdi- son involves rhe "injustice of the lmvs of the stare." The causes ut' iegislat!ve eviis, according to .'.Vfadison, can be traced to t;,vo sources: the rep;esenu- tives and the people therns:.:::lves. The former ma\' be driven b\· a sense of rhe public good, but unfortunately ambition and pc-rsonal imert~c.;t are the most

Chapter Three

prevalent motivations of !cgis!ators. The peopie. too, can be motivated bv a dc::-:i,c to promote the ·'permanent good of the community,'· but tlley, t:)o, often act on baser desires. The failure of virtue to act as the prime motive for actions on the part of both representative and citizen is that

uli civilized societies arc divided into interests and faction~ as they hap- pen to be creditors or debtors-rich or poor-husbandmen, merchanb or mam1focturcrs--mcmbers of different religious sects-foiiO\vcrs of different lc,,ders-inhahi1crnts of different districts-owners of different kinds of property &c c:1nd &c.

Madison·s solution to the inability of republics to fo,m just majorities would be fu]]y presented in The Federalisr, but in "Vices" he states the cen- tral premise cf his revisionist republicanism. V/e need to enlarge the sphere of cuntlic. by abandoning the confederacv form fer a more centralized gov- ernment since ·\he inconveniences of po1)ular States, contrary to prevailing Theory, are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrov,mess of their limits. -- ''Common passions"' will he more difficult to form if political con- flicts arc to be decided at the national level. h is difficult to overstate the brilliance of !v!adison·s contribution to republicanism. One of the most intractable problems in the history of political thought, in generai, involves conceptualizing a level of governrnrnt conducive to the values one seeks to maximize. Fm- the Greeks, political organization was inconceivable other than through the city-state. Americans had largely accepted their own bcloved stat cs as the epitome of rcpu blican political organization. Nation- stcltes and empires \vere structures appropriate only to monarchies and dic- tatorships. The idea of an empire of iiherly implicit in \fadison ·s theory becarn.e a model as exhiia,·ating to the second founders as republicanism \Vas to the revo!utiona0/ gencralion<

\\1hen the Constituticmai Convention completed its -,vork in the summer of J 7S7. the document was not an institutionai ·implementation of I'vJadison's theory. The \iirginian fought hard for, and lost a provision for a national veto of stc1te iegislation that v, ouid seem to be a prerequisite for avoiding tbe kinds of probicms he had raised in his critique of confederncies. He sup- DOrted the Vir.!2.inia Plan a~ essentiai to the formation of a trulv national gov- ~rnrncnt: like tl,c other dciegatcs, he \vas forced to accept a ·c~1rnprornis;_ In light of these and other concessions as vi.:eH as the general polit1cal climate that led 1{) the rejection of the first -founding: hO\\ .. should the efforts of the ;-;ccond founders be judged'?

~rhere arc three rnajor interpretations of the convention as a ne\\' found- ing. Before \VC rcvi.c\v t.he argurncnts of the Fecleraiists ihen1sc]\,.CS a.s \veH as

to

offcrc-:d by John E. Roche~ ernphasizes the contingent e1ern_ent5 of the Con-

Founding 81

stitution: the Great Compromise itself as a resolution between de1ega,es of large and small states: the episodic history at the convention or the invention of the presidency: and the three-fifths compromise that permitted :-:iaves to be counted for national 1egisiati"ve apportionment. For Roche. the Constitu- tion was not "a triumph of architectonic genius."' It ,vas the result of effective but hurried committee action not unlike the activities of any modern legisla- tive reform caucus. The Constitution was ''a patch-\vork sc,vn 1.ogetber under the pressure of both time and events by a group of extremely talented democratic politicians.''

Years earlier Charles Beard presented a much harsher assessment of the Constitution and tbe convention when he wrote An Economic lnterwewlion of" the Constitution ( 1913). Examining the arguments of The Federalist: espe- cially No. JO, as weil as the economic backgrounds of the delegates to the convention, he concluded that

the Constitution was cssentiaily an economic document based upon i:he concept that the fundamental private rights of property arc anterior to government ar:d morally beyond the reach of popular rnajoritieo.

As to the ratification procedure itselL which stipulated the acceptance of thl:.'. document by nine of the conventions rather than by state legislatvres (the Articles had required unanimous consent for amendments), Beard said that if sucll revolutionary processes had been performed by Caesar or Napoleon. "they vvould have been pronounced coups d'etat.'" Beard's insistence that the second founders economically benefited from the Constitution leci 10 severe and damaging criticism of his method and findings. But other scholars. whiie rejecting the literalness of Beard's approach, still support his basic conten- tion. Gordon \\iood, for example, argues that despite the democratic rheto- ric of The Federalist, the second founding represented a fundamental "repudiation of 1776" and the ratification debates represented a contest

between "aristocracy and democracy." Martin Diamond's assessment is considerabiy more charitable to the

delegates at the convention. His focus rests on the delicacy and momentous- ness of a founding in itself. For Diamond, the Federalists appreciated this moment in tbe history of regimes. Therefore, they designed a regime based on reason that would guide the passions of its citizens in peaceful directions. Their '·harsh realism" concerning tbe inability of human beings to engage in public regarding conduct necessarily required that the founders thcm~clves "be free of these shortcomings in order to have had a disinterested :ind true knowledge of political things.'' The men who came after 1hem ·'need he' only iegislators who are but interested advocates and parties to the causes they determine-, since the Constitution \vas designed to be "durable and seif per- petuating." But for those -,vho actually construct the system, a great mearnre of intellect and greatness \Vas required. Diamond is careful to note that not all the deiegates deserve the title philosopher kings, but enough of them were.

to deserve the titlefoundingfathen.

82 C:hapter Three

Each of these intcrprctarions of the second founding ratses troubling questions. Beard's indictment is obvious in that it suggests that the Constitu- tion itself is responsible for the grave poliricai problems that have troubled America throughout its history. Roche's assessment is designed m itlusmite how innovative nn d ingenious democratic politicians can be when con- fronted with an immense problem that demands resolution in a brief time. Bm he admits that his analysis means that the American Constitution may rhus not be appropriate for export since its origins are considerably less than "semi-Divine." Diamond presents a vievv" that suggests that all Americans mve an unredeemable deb1 of gratitude to the second founders, since it was they who saved America from the fate that had beset the republics of the past. But Diamond closes his essay with the observation that the kind of pol- iticians and citizens that the Constitution is designed to produce and restrain may nm be adequate. He asks:

Bm does nol 1he intensity and kind of our modern problems seem to require of us a greater dcgr.:e of refkcrion and public-spiritedness than the Founders thought sufficient for the men who came after them·,

An ideal place to begin to answer the questions raised by these interpre- tations is The Federaiist itself. It is important to remember, especially since The Federalist has assumed such an exalted role in American political and constitutional rhcory, rhat the essays were \vritten as partisan political docu- ments. No writer of the papers was personally satisfied with the new Consti- tution. They wrote as political persons defending provisions and offering arguments that they themselves might not have adopted as their first choice. Forrest McDonald reports that of the seventy-one specific proposals Madi- son moved, seconded, or spoke for unequivocally at the convention, he vvas on the losing side forty times. Madison desperately wanted a congressional veto of state legislation: he opposed the listing of congressional powers and a vice presidency; and he favored the establishment of a national university and property qualifications for voting. None of these features appeared in the final document. Hamilton shocked the convention when he proposed that the ne\v Constitution should include a president elected for life with an absoiure veto over legislation. He left the meetings in June~only to return iater to sign the document.

The essays themselves \Vere written in great haste. Hamilton gathered together two other ,vriters to provide ideological support for the ratification srruggle in New York. The three contributors (Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay) assumed the pseudonym of Publius, a noble Roman who helped depose the "forquin monarchy and found the Roman Republic. The identity of i:he authors was kept secret in order to permit the authors to advance opinions to which rhey might not wish to be personally committed . .tv1oreover, the pres.sure of time was extremely intense. Madison later reported tlrnr "whilst the printer was putting into type the parts of a number, the following parts arc under the pen, and robe furnished in time for the press." This secret col-

Founding 33

labor;_-1tion hns ,~:dso Jed scholars to question \vhether ·rhe r·ederat/":<t has a ~~spilt pc.~rsorhdity~~ (especially \\'lth the hindsight clcri\.:ed frorn the stnJgQies her,·",,,_,,, ·,"·JM,,,·. '· ·h,1-,-9,·,, '\ -i ,,. -~. ... ,,c..._..,.__ .-:: .. .r, ..... !.. _..:_t(d~on 111 L:'-' ,.. ,1 .... u~ j_ 1-- f·'": r11 1~ Puniiu, :--,.-::;;~::i,,, v-'P:l-_ ten by Harnilton more narionalis,ic and less c!~moc~a~i:,1,.:::;,·;!;;)s-~:;~~th(;J:;~1 by Madison?

_ ;:n of these circun1stances seern to support ~Roche\; rhesi:s:: that the Con- st1tunon Vv'as ::-1 ct)rnpron1ise docurnent best understood in tenns of the fac- tion-11 S'Tilaoh-- ')+" [. h," ]'- ,.~ 1'8-,(-l·· V -,-· -·- -' -- - - - ·. .. , ·

--' --t ----·:=-o,.c:J -.. _,,_ 1~v d~,_, 1( ~S. 1\.t.-ep1.ug trtc2>e cncurnstances hrrnlv ~n mind (the multiple aulhorshio of the ess;::,vs ',h"" imn1'•'d;.,,,-,-, pc)ii•;,,,-t·I (,i-:';.,c, ' ' ! ·· .. ., ·w '~ __ ,.,_,. ··-,l •• ~ z,(~ v _ >.:!_.1.._,;, _,-(_J;C - tive, and the writers' haste in composition). The Federa!iw sri!I reprr0 sent~ -:in ;ttempt to,, bring into fo~u~ the appiication of rcpub!ica~; · th;c;1; ;;) , t;~ 1oundmg or a new republic rn America There ,,re eiahtvJivµ .c.sqv-· •n·,,,,. dealing ~vith overlapping topics and e~tremely -~om;·ic:,t~-/ c::; 1~,~t\;~t:i0'~~{~ questions. But ir is possible to present a summary of their conrenrs bv focus- ing on four concerns of PubVius: the critique of the confedcracv rr:oue·i of republics based on general experience and th;:; brief historv of th; American f~rst founding; a philosophical diagnosis of the ~~diseases~· r:1r republican poli- ties; a general set of ren1edies f()r these defects; and a defense of specific fea- tures of the new Constitution as the appropriate remedy.

A third of the essays are devoted to establishing rbe severe deficiencies of t_he current founding. Hamilton writing as Publiu: imrocbces rbe p!anned series bv attacking the Confederation 5p,cl \v-::p-·n-ino 1-lr··,~ tl-.p ce:~~c-r····li,t-·~ desire f~r "the cn~rgy and effici~nc;,· ;f -~;,;Tn~I;~:,n; \v'.ilt;e ':~i:m~ti:1-~d ,: th 0 o+-fspr·ino- ,,1' 'l r~mpe-~ ·"01d "'. ',-p -·, , "'f'J ~ 1 --:. • - '- , -- -··c:o ~ '- c., _ ~, t 1 z,1 OGS: ouc pmvc::r. , 'le 1~eu.era/1sr contains numerous arguments against the confederate model of republtz:s, manv of \:hich are derived from Madison's study wrttten a year ear:lter. Confcd~rn- t1ons are politica!lv unstable, ,vith narticinam nov,,'rnnPn[S v·nc!inv '(' encroach on central authority (Nos. l 7~20), ~rnd c:ntr~tl--,~:t~I~-c;rin~ j~ -~u~:b;~ to perform basic tasks such as promotiort of commerce and esrnblishmem of nationai defense (Nos. 4, 21, and 22).

These critiques are especially effective criticisms because of two rnctical thrusts made by Publius. First, the authors, by focusing on the confederacv modei of repubiics, arc able to direct their criticism rn the historical srruc"- Iures of republicanism rather than against the theorv of republicanism itself. While Publius contains many attacks on republican" ~ • u,s \Ve shaU revle\v\ the attention to the confeder(ltc acntn£cr.nent in t.hc ,cssavs places much of the blarnc ()n the rL:::iiancc on.., :t !nose of republics as the on!~{ permissible n1eans of rn!;ctlng the nc-eds cuordin:J- tion and co1nn1on defense. In f'etleroli\t Nn q T--r '.·~n;ilt1) 1 1 (e,.,1 q •·,::,. • •h ·= ,- ,-,··i ~-1; tiona1 republican theory lrns ,;ir~;::1;1. t:,;en ° -1~1::~i'~' ,. '--"d'-'' '··"' l.ec.u,- COnStltllent republics of t.he American much

larger than most classical rbeurisrs <.:D\isione(L Fticusinc:: uoun N1ontesquieu~·s assertion that republics n1u~t be snian ro s...nc 1:rnil active interact.ion hcr\vccn citizens and

84 Chapter Three

I IJf V"'c tht.re.fore take hi~ Ideas on this point as tbe criterion of truth~ \VC sh.ail be drlvcn to the aHernat.iv·c either of taking refuge in ffiOnarchy~ or of spEtting ourse)ves into an infinity of Httle~ jealous~ clashing~ tun1ultu- ous con1n1on\veahhs~ the- \vretchcd nurseries of unceasing discord and the rniscrahk objects of unf·v·crsal pity and contcrnpt.

In No. 14 1V1adison urges Americans to ''shut your ears against ... the unhai• lowed ianguage" of classical repubiicanisrn and boldly accept novelty. "Is it not the glory of the people of America," he writes. "that, whilst they have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration of antiquity. for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggesttons of their own good sense, the know-iedge of their 0\,1./n situation~ and the lessons of the fr o\.vn experjencc?':~

This position that the initial founding \vas unsuccessful because it was too conservative is a significant rhetorical advance over Adams's revision of rcpubiicanism. A.clams, in his Discotu:w:s, argued that America was not an exception to the greed and scif-interest that had plagued previous republi- can forms. Pubiius would certainly not disagree, but his critique is based on the assertion that ,\rnerica is indeed exceptional in that it is capable of revis- ing republican theory in entirely ne,v directions. This combination of conser- vatism with nationalism and republican rhetoric pervades The Federalist. It is one explanation for the political success of the second founders.

·rhc other rnajor attack on the C,.~onfederat.lon is cspeciaHy brilliant because it focuses fess on the imn1edL:1te failures of the founding than on the nkcly structure of gtr,/e1-rn11.cnt in /\n1erica-: given the assun1pt.ions of classical republican theory There is, of cour5c, mention of Shay's Rebellion and the Confederation·s tax probierns: but Publius directs his attention to the fact that since confederations ahvays fa.il~ \VC n1ust look at i\1.1.1erica either as a coUcction of confederations or as a set of independent sr11aH republics. In other words, tht authors of "JJw Fcderoiisr offer criticisms of the Articles of C~onfcderation based on the assun1ption that the C~onfcderation has already been transforrned into se\ .. eraI confederatlvc units or a coilectlon of indepen- dent republics. For example, John Jay in No. 5 compares America to Great I-3rita.in. The latter has experienced great quarrels and tragedies because the -~island should be one nation_t~ He continues:

Should th~ people nf :\n1crica divide thcn1.s::.::Jvcs into U1rc-c or four ni:Hicn~. \v(;uld not t11c- sarnc thing happen? \Vould net si.n-:i:ilar jc,ah)u~ics arise. ~ind be in like rn~n,nc:r cherished"?

·rhc rernainder of the css::-1y is .;:1n account of the anirnosities that tire certain ro occur if /\.rnerica bcc{)1T1cs three republics. ~fhc northern confederacy \V(n,dd cc.rtai.n1y be the. rnost forrnidable. i\nd v-:hat \-\-\)uld be the conse- qucncc.s shou.Jd th!: southern con:fc:dcracy be at \\:ar \vith a E:uropcan povver \V_ith \vhich the northern confcdc,racy had e.stabhshcd an alliance.?

\\/hat iYiight be called disosre1· scen.arios appear jn n1any ()f tb.e essays. ln Nci. ~ t·1.an1il.ton addrc.sses ~Jn issue n1uch on the I11ind of the opponents of

Founding 85

the Constitution-the absence of a prohibition of standing armies in the proposed document. Here he assumes that America c?~sists of thirt~en -~' more independent republics. In Europe the presence 01 mnumerab!e fortifi- cations makes military expeditions very costly and leads to cautious foreign policies despite the large number of troops in the field. But in Am~rica, where there are no castles and no moats, circumstances would be radically different. Populous states couid easily overrun small ones. With this knov..-i- edge small states would rationally devote a good portion of their energies to th; formation of large disciplined armies. We know from history, concludes Hamilton, that discipiined armies have triumphed over iarger territories with greater natural resources. The picture presented is one of a miiitarized Ame;ica in which large, roving armies in the service of the separate states would be in nearly constant movement in order to gain the advantage from preemptive strikes. . ..

Of course. America was not in 1787 a territory of independent reput1lics. Nor ,vas it on~ in which there were any standing armies. The choice offered the state convention delegates was a nevv constitution without a prohibition against a standing army, which was a central tenet of republicanism and the 1\r·ticles of Conf;deration. Still Hamilton insists that "these are not vague inferences drn\vn from supposed or speculative defects in a constitution ... but they are solid conclusions, drav,·n from the natural and necessary progress of human affairs." _

The second motif of The Federalist is a philosophical analysis of the weakness of repubiican governments. AH Americans were especially vulner- able on this point since republican theory emphasized the fragility of repub- lica11 r=oime" and their p"opensitv aion° with other kinds of political svs;~m;:~,;d;gen,erate ti:to ~orru~t f~rms. The core of the argument. of Pub~ lius on ~his p;int is contained in No. 1(). This essay written by Madison is rfaht!v regarded as a classic (perhaps the classic) statement of American p~liti;al thought. Indeed, if one \Vere forced to present a singie document other than the Dedaration of Independence that described the philosophi- cal dimensions of the American political system after .1787, it would be this brief essav.

Ma.dt-;on begins his discussion by asserting that every "friend of popular governments" has been disturbed by the existence of the "vioience of fac- tion·· in republican governments throughout history. And thus every republi- can wil! i~ok sympathetically upon "any plan which, without vioiating the principles to \Vhich he is attached, provides a proper cure for it." He contin- ues by recounting the compiaints made by "our most considerate and virtu- ous citizens" that America is itself cursed by these republican defects. "Our governments are too unstable"; "the public good is disregarded in the con- flicts of rival narties"; decisions are made not by the "rules of justice" but by the pmver of ;'the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority.''

Tv1adison, writing as Pubiius, defines faction as

86

,t number of cirizcns, wherher amounting ma majority or minorily of ,he whole, \vlw arc united and actuated by ,ome common impulse of pas- sion. or of interest~ adverse te: the rights of other citizens~ or to the pcr- rnanent and aggrcgale interests of the cornmunity.

He contends that rhe causes of faction are myriad. They may result from religious differences, from differences in wealth, and from attachment to dif- ferent political theories or to different political leaders. Even when there arc circumstances in ,vhich ,here is no objective reason for factions to form, the "most frivolous and fanciful distinctions" ,,viJl give rise to factions. Factions, then, are ··sown in rhe nature of man."

Classical republican theorists as well as American revolutionaries could scarcely disagree with these comments. The novelty of Madison's argument rests wilh his assertion that neither enlightened statesmen nor reiigious com- mitrnent nor virtuous citizens can prevent the emergence of faction. "Enlightened sta,esmen will not ahvays be at the helm" is one of Madison's retorts to republican theory. A more serious objection on 1\fadison's part invoives his estim,,tion of the capacity of human beings to ascertain the pub- lic good. There is for Madison an unbreakable connection bet\veen "reason and self \ove," \Vith the latter as the ruling force in human relationships.

In a single paragraph he rips away a centuries-old set of beliefs from republican theory. Hmv can a republic survive if citizens will naturally form factions and ignore the public good? Are the proponents of monarchy and dictarorship, men like Hobbes in England and Oliver and Boucher in Amer- ica, right after all about the futility of self-governance? In this essay Madison comes quite close-in a theoretical sense dangerously close-to the conclu- sion that the experiment in a free society is a mistake. But he skins this infer- ence by contending that while "liberty is to faction, what fire is to air," it would be folly to abolish liberty because it leads to discord as it ,.vould be an error to "wish the annihilation of air" because without it fire \vould not exist. Whatever criticisms subsequent generations might level against the second founders, they should be thankful for Madison's refusal to take the final step toward an obvious Thermidor. In this sense Diamond's admiration for the founders is well stated. Perhaps Publius stepped back before the abyss because he saw the possibility of civil war ,vith a more frank appraisal of the effects of liberty. Perhaps Publius took Machiavelli's advice that those vvho squander the historical opportunity before them to establish republics deserve the comempt of later generations. Perhaps Publius was a committed republican vvho was simply working his way through a set of new challenges and was unwilling to rely on previous theory. In any case, this single commit- ment to republicanism is the philosophical basis for the second founding and the American Constitution. Once Madison insists that the solution of dicta- torship is worse than the problem of faction, he is driven to explore republi- can remedies for republican defects.

Publius outlines several general solutions to the "disease" of faction that so affiins republican regimes. The first is the concept of the extended repub-

.Founding 87

88 Chapter Three

reminds his readers that national powers are limited to "certain enumerated objects only." But if ali these reassurances are to be taken at face vaiue, then tbc Federaiist argument for the serious deficiencies in the Confederation loses its piausibility.

\Vills calls these comments "sweet talk," and suggests that Pubiius must be held accountable for those strict constructionist arguments that ,vere iater used in defense of states· rights policies that the Federalists certainly would have opposed. !v1adison cvcn1ualiy states the Federaiist position when he points out near the dosed No. 39 that the proposed Constitution is "neither wholly national nor ,vholly federal." federal features are included in the Sen- ate (two for each state elected by state legislators) and in the ratification pro- cess itseif. National features exist in the apportionment of seats to the House of Representatives and the authority of Congress in general over individual citizens. Many portions of the Constitution arc neither national nor federal but a "compouncL .. such as the election of a president. Pubiius concludes by dismissing the focus on the entire question. He defines republican govern- ment as one which derives its powers from the people through election.

Clearly, what the Federalists did was to redefine the concept of federal- ism to include a government that did not totally abandon constituent units but that also departed from the republican method of a limited league of states. \Vhen Publius criticizes the Articles of Confederation, he speaks as a nation- alist~ assum.lng that the old definition of fcderalisrn as a treaty among states is untenable because the confederacy is bound to disintegrate at ieast into sev- eral confederacies. But when Publius speaks in defense of the new· Constitu- tion, he praises federalism (the new version) as a soiution to the problem of :faction in republican governments and as a method to extend the size of republican governments. Thus in No. l.O Madison praises fcderaiisrn as a structure tlrnt limits the abilit-y of factions to extend tbeir reach to other states:

/\. rage for paper n1onc_)\ for an abc,iit~on of debt~~ [or an c.qual division of property~ or for any other irnpropcr or \vlcked project. \vii! be less apt to pervade the \vholc body of the lJnion . ...

:BoLh fvf.adison and }-Iarnilton \vouJd ha\.re preferred the C~onstitution to be n1ore national and !ess federal than it i.,vas~ and their defense vvas compli- cated by the fact that both en1phasized Its federal features in an effort to secure;: ratification. On the other hand, both men believed 1ha.t the Constitu- tion represented a ck.Jse enough con1.bination to deser,.:e support. Their posi- ti<Jn on this question and on related issues can be iHun.1in~tted by \.Vhat Robert Dahl~ a conternporary political theorist~ has caHcd the (_;ofdilocks prohicrn. in dcn1ocratlc political phi.iosophy. f)ahl~ in /1_flcr The .l?.evo!u.tion ( 197 l ) ... desc.ribe,s the search_ fen· political. solutions to probiern.s of size in tcrrns elf the fairy-taJe c.haracter's quest for resolution of b.er needs that \Vere not too big~ not t<..>o .srnalL bu.t "j-i-1st right_~~ Publius regards th.e basic unit of re.pubi~can governrncnt~ the city-state in the classical age and the state in the }\rner!cnn experier:ce~ as H)O sn1aU. /\. \Vide-ranging crnp1rc n1ight be too

Founding 89

large to maintain a republican government, but the thirteen states, given the right form of political organization, are just right. The extended republic is big enough to create a multiplicity of interests but not too big to prevent their eventual formation into a majority, shouid the need arise. Similarly, the abolition of the states would be a solution too drastic for resolving Gold- ilocks' dilemma. The country might be too large to govern directly. On the other hand, the limited conception of federalism in the Articles of Confeder- ation ,vas not strong enough to prevent disintegration and the successful control by factions in the states. The constitutional solution of a regime part national and part federal was "just right."

This Goldilocks approach also emerges in Madison's discussion of rep- resentation. The Federaiist bristles with attacks on ancient republics for fail- ing to protect their citizens from the effects of faction. In Nos. 10, 14, 49, and 55 Madison is sharply critical of direct democracy as well as of le.gisiatures of too short a duration or too large a size. In fact, direct democracies are not, properly speaking, republics at ail, despite the pronouncements of "some celebrated authors" (No. 14). In No. 49 he concedes that in a nation of phi- losophers, a direct reliance on opinion may permit stable government, but quickly reminds his readers that "a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings \vished for by Plato." In No. 55 he concludes that in "very numerous assemblies ... passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob."

Direct democracy then gives too much opportunity for factious activity that caused the turbulence of the ancient Greek polities and the Italian city- states. So too do representative bodies that are too large since, for Madison, they approach the danger point of a factious society in microcosm. On the other hand, too smail a representative body must be avoided to "guard against the cabals of a few." "Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionally a better depository." The size of the House of Representatives is thus vigorously defended on the prin- cipie that it fits the Goidiiocks test.

But the size of representative bodies is not the oniy concern of Publius. Representation, properly proportioned, is defended as a more general solu- tion to faction. Recall that Publius in No. 10 in effect rejected republican vir- tue as a barrier against faction. But now Publius is able to conclude then in an extended republic with appropriateiy sized legislative bodies, the opinions of the people can undergo a process which permits politicians to "refine and enlarge the public vie\v." Elected representatives under these conditions are indeed capable of discovering "the true interests of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, \vill be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." This vvas Madison's assessment in No. JO. Hamilton repeated this conclusion when he defended the eiectoral college as an institu- tion designed to be "filled by characters preeminent for ability and virtue."

90

The creation of a vir!Lwus represenrative out of the factious activity that u!! republics can never ccmpktely avoid was still nm enough in the way of f,:LtaE;ntce for the second founders. '·Checks and balances"-thc ability of ;ach branch of government to defend itself against another-were also dis- cLtssed as a re~cdv for republican diseases. Although Publius reminds his readers that the ne~v Constitution is republican in the sense that the national les:islature is the oredominant institution, in No. 48 Madison still insists that, e\~n wirh the rigt,t size. the ic9.islarnre cannot be relied upon not to encroach on the other br;nches of gO\•;mment. Both republican Venice and the state of Pennsv\ ania c!re singl.;d out as negative examples of legislative tyranny. Jeffers01;"s criticism of the powers of the legislature in his state's constitution in Notes on Vi1ginia is also cited. But Publius rejects the idea of an absolute execurive veto ~ver legislation for the same reason he uses in attacking legis- \,~tive suprernacv ( although we know that Hamilton supported this power at the com;emion). For M,7dison, writing as Pub!ius, it is rejected because it miQ.ht be ·'Derfidiouslv abused." In this manner the powers of each branch of go;ernmc;,t (veto and override, selection of justices, senatorial confirmation, ;nd other pmvers) are defended as part of a "just right'' solution to the dan- ger of con~entration of power in a single department of government. - Despite the brilliance of Publius's arguments, not everyone in America accepted this defense of the new Constitution. Five stares rati!'ied_ the_ docu- ment quite quicklv. Pennsylvania also accepted the new ConsL1tuuon m pan becaus·c of 1:1ea1 political controversies. Massachusetts narrowly supported rhe proposal but offered nine "recommendations" for revision. In New Hampshire the vote \Vas delayed because the Federalists realized they lacked a rna;·£in for victor,'. The state ratified in the spring with suggested amend- ments~ iust as Ivia~sachusetts had done. North Carolina turned down the Cons~it~nion in Julv bv a \Vide margin. The battles in Virginia and Nev,r York, two large states, w~re, thus crucial and closely contested. The Federalisr itself was written as part of the effort to promote adoption in New York; copies were rushed to Virginia as \veil in hopes that they might influence the out- come there.

Given the success of the second founding, the question naturally arises, "\Vhm did the Anti-Federalists want?" It is certainly a mistake to conclude that the Anti-Federalists were persons unable to see the problems in the Articles of Confederation or, at a broader level, unwining to revise republi- can theorv. Near!v all the opponents of the Constitution accepted rhe need for major, amend~1ents to the Confederation. most of which tmplied a stron- ger ce;tral governmenr. The various essays of the Anti-Federalists suggest ;upporr for a bicameral legis!aturc at the national level as \vell as for some kind of executive authority. Thus, the designation men of !iule ftlith as a description of the Anti-Fec!eralisrs-rhar is. people umvil!ing to explore the strucr{md possibilities of republicanism-is ovcrdrmvn.

Yet there was a difference in political philosophy between the support- ers of the second founding and their critics. Since there is no equivalent text

Found:n.g 91

10 ?tu.: F'edera/i_"J~t. a. syn1__)psis of the debate ls difflcul t. I-<.ich,J.nJ 1---Icn t) L\~'-e \ Lener:: ti F'ed!.!r(d FLn?ner ( 1787-SS) \viU pruvide rhe focus for uur rc-.,:lc\\- of r\nti~Fedcralist thoughL rrhe \''irginlD. ~lfi'.~~ocnu \\(.' th.s-

~~:::.tcc;( i~~~~~~,t:,' I~<~~;~~: :~:~i~~ '~~~~ ~]::~:~~~;:~; ~!~\'.'l}~:~-~.~u ~i,~/~;:~ ~~\ {~~~1~ ,~\;~~~ mizeel the kind of objcnions that emerged from one form ~)f re\·o1uti,;nar1 republicanisrn. The .Letters Yvern through four edirions in three rnoruhs. ~4-.lthough ·Lee produced another ser. he failed 10 his f..:Hcnv J.Jlanrers in rejection. The WH::: was 89~ 79 in favor of the Cunstitution.

Like all Ami~Federnlists, Lee objected to ,he convention\ cornp!cte abandonment of rhe Articics a~ wcJl as the method of rntific,!,,ion, \\'hie the .Articles had required unanirnous consent: to amcndn1ents. the: SCC()ncI founders boldly 2l';scncd rlrnt 1he new Constiturion viould be impicmcmcd by the assem of nine states. Moreover, the recommended method of rznifica- tion avoided state Iegis1aturei and called for constitutional cnn1r·ention:-;_ 'This creation of a ne\V political arena confounded the ~A,.nti-f"'t~:der2111~ts~ \.vho \Vere Jate in organizing delegares. ln Pcnnsy'i"vanla i\nri~federaiist::--, re~ortcd tu running Benjamin Frankiin on Lheir tid--::.c,, even th,lugh he ,vas :, particip<tnt and signer of the Constitution.

Lee knev/ that lhcse objections \Vere n100L ~rhc c1.)t1\·enticn1s \.Vc~rc Ldking place, and in1pticitly the nine-Yore n1inin1un1 \Va~~ being accepted as the sian~ dard for ratification. Nevcnheless, Lee began his esc;avs with she assertion that the political probiems that had emerg~d 1.vith the ,Articles \Ve re not as theoretically signiii::am as the Federalists ~1ssened. "ff we remain coo( and temperate~ \\l-C are in no irnmediate danger/' he ren1inded his rc~·uJers in Ne;. L

Lee ,v~s careful to nore that ~·regulation of trade" and ~Tsecuring credit'" \Vere not bemg successfully addressed bv the Corrn.ress. He reminded hi~ readers. however, that the nation had been :'hardiv re;oved from a Jong anci distres~- ing war." The "farmers, fishermen. etc. h,ave nm yet fullv rt:pui~ed the 1,va~:e 1nade by it.~·1 Lee concfudcs: ~·Indusrrv and frugatltv arc ~;gai~1 assurnlni::: lhi~ir proper station.~~ He regards the argu;11cnts of ;hos~ \rho ;htin1 thar a c;i~~1s [s at hand as a --custurn of tyrams and their dependents in all aQ.es.''

At a theoretical level, Lee atwcked Pubiius\ ckscrio{iun oi the new Constitution as neither national nor federal b1 assc:rting ~hat the so-called compound ·'only proves ... rhal \Ve cannot for;1 one cc.:n°tra! governmcm on equal and just principles." In other \vords. he argues that ~he Go1dilocks solution is not a rational resolution tu the proble1;s of size and faction. as Publius contended, but proGf of the irrmio~1al compromises which mu,r be met in attempting to create an extended repubk from large and small ,taks.

The concept uf the extended repub!i~ is abo subie:tcd tu criticism in Lee's assessment of the House of Rcpt·esentari, cs. The Ami-Feder:tlist criri-

92

cisrn of the H ousc \vas so sharp that Pubiius devoted several cssavs to the subject. The FC-:derol l::,cnner pro\ .. ides evidence of doubts about the ... virtuous representative. The so-called dcmocrntivc branch perrnits representation of one in 30.000 inhabitants. Since thirty-three representatives constitute a quorum, Lee doubts that '"the interests, feelings. and opinions"' of the peo- ple can be served. Only "men of the elevated classes'· wiH have the resources to be elected. To L,e the ·'licentiousness of the multitude" was but "small evils·• compared to '"the factions of the few .. , The ncv,1 Constitution faiied to provide an institution iarge enough to "sympathize" and "communicate" with the pcopic. The Fedemi Fanner fears that the House will be influenced more by tbe "expectations uf appointments and offices" of the executive rhan b~~/ the nL~e,ds of th_e peopic at large.

The A.nti-Fcdcralists looked \vith suspicion upon the other arguments of Pub!ius in support of the extended republic Perhaps the single most fre- quent objection To the proposed constitutirn1~asidc from the demand that it inc1udc a "bill of rights"-v.'a.~ the absence in the new document of a nrohibi- ticn against "'standing armi-cs.·· The belief that a permanent and prof~ssional mil itaJ)' force v,·<:S anti tbetic,1] to republicanism was reinforced by British irnperi,1i policy during the Revolution. In brief, republicans argued that a Luge ,rn.d hciercgeneous stale required hy nature a iarge army to police its perimeters and to ensm·c safoty at the center. \Vas this not the exact policy lhat had icd ro rhc stationing of British troops in the colonies? V\ias this not the exact policy to which all imperial regimes rcsorted"01 Publius rejected the prohibition agains1 a standing nrmy in 771e Federalist No. 8. To Lee the size of 1:hc proposed extended rcput::l.i.c seen1ed to require a 1nllltia to "execute the 1av,s d tbc union: suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.'' He was she.eked to see "so cnany n1cn in /\1ncrica fond of a stancli.ng a.rrny.~~ and he expected the pressure on t.hc, ne\v }egis1ature for provision of funds to be ]rrcsistih!e. Not docs ;_Hl extended repub11c require a ]arge n1ilitary force to keep the peace" but ~\-111. arn1.)-'· is a very agreeab1e place of en1ployn1ent for the young gcntlen1en of rn~1ny fan1 iEcs. ~~

The Fcdcra! Fanner, reflecting tbc views of most Ami-Federalists, was extremely concerned ahout the pmvers of the Senate. ),. bicamcra! legisla- tun: \.\··as accepted as an appropriate rc.rnedy for republican defects (indlcat-

ho\,:;..- far ~,\rncrican republicans had a!rca.dy dcpctrted from. the Pennsylvania model). But the mixture of executive and _judicial functions

ratification~ advjcc and con~cnt of executive appointrncnts~ and ~n:1pcachn1.enr.) in the· second h.:.Juse disturbed critics. 'They· ,~n1.CHed a.rlstocc', racy. San1uc:i of Pennsylvania, in his Letter cc·en.tenniaL argued that L:t"1c pcnvers c,f the Senate dcrnonstratcd that. the c::onstlV.J.tjon \vas not fc~;ter-

but ~~a perrnanc.nt aristocracy.:: Federalists Fcderal.i~ts as. ''the fetus of iiristocrat.ic don1]nation.~· Striking in this regard \\:as the /\nti~Fcdcrahst reaction to the presidency. \\/hi.le sornc. stiU insisted on a supported the presi--

Founding 93

as well as the electoral college. Lee, in fact, iike many Anti-Federal- ists, thought the president insufficiently powerful vis-a-vis the Senate.

In summary, the Anti-Federalists, despite variations in their assessment of the new Constitution, simply did not accept the idea of an extended repub- lic. Republics, to be viable, must primarily be local. They were willing to extend the scope of national powers but not wiliing to conceive of a republic in which citizen loyalty ,vas not chiefly directed toward a state. The "just right"' solutions of a system part national and part federal. the complex system of national checks and balances. the concept of tbc virtuous representative

· who emerged from a multiplicity of interests-these arguments. and more- they saw as a movement of America a\v,ry from republicanism and toward empire. As Herbert Storing concludes in his assessment of the opposition, \Vhere Publius saw "a finely wrought clock the anti-Federalists sav.,,- darkness and danger." Patrick Henry, Lee's Virginia compatriot in opposition, com- plained that governments ought to be "like a beacon" dear and understand- able to every citizen, "but this government is of such an intricate and complicated nature, that no man on this earth can know· its real operation." To the Anti-Federalists, complexity \vas a sign of decadence, not of balance.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

Both American foundings~the Articies of Confederation and the Con- stitutton-represcnt rbe iast time in American history that the fundamental principles of the regime would be examined by leaders in a position to alter its basic premises. \Vitb no disrespect to the first founders, the Articles were in important ·ways an afterthought since the core of the new political system was meant to function at the state lcveL It is only with the second founding that a truly national regime was conceived. Whatever the motives of the sec- ond founders, it is in the belief that an extended republic was possible that America \vas born as a nation.

Certainiy the formation of the second founding was the result of a good deal of political compromise, as Roche suggests. But it is true, as tbc Anti- Federalists insisted and as Beard and other interpreters discovered, that an extended republic involved an exploration of a regime even ncv,·cr than l\fadison intimated in Federalist No. 14, For good or for ill Pubiius modified repubiicanism, even of the American variety, so as to establish a new ideol- ogy for the United States. There arc clear republican remnants in the Con- stitution-in the idea of the virtuous representative and even in the American version of the balanced Constitution. But the novelty of the Con- stitution lies in its phiiosopbical assumptions, which might not have been folly appreciated even by l\fadison himself when be wTotc Federa!isr No. HL For the second founding was premised on the assumption of a pluralist soci- ety in \vhich different conceptions of the good life contest with one another, ancl the Constitution ,vas designed as a structure in v.-hich these conflicts

94 Chap,er Three

would compete. Republicanism, on the other hand, had ahxays assumed a homogeneity of belief. .

Once l:vfadison had abandoned republican virtue a:; the central tenet in rn?imaining the i\merican regime while still remaining committed to a free socierv, he opened the door 10 a regime that deserves the description liberal rnth<.:'; than ;epublican. Pub\ius's Constirntion is not liberal in the sense that FDR created in rhc 1930s (as significant as that definition is). Instead, Pub- lius's Constitution is liberal in the sense that politics is regarded as an arena in which manv different inreresrs arc entitled to compete. The Federalist came to this ;onc!usion as a result of its fear of majorities. Like Jefferson and Hamilton-two divergent figures who would compete for the soul of the republic in the next generation-Madison himself was in important respects a transitional figurc;~he was both republican and liberal. Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton were liberal in their conception of politics as a lhearer in which every interest deserves to play its part; they were republican in their belief that there is a considered judgment of the community at large that ultirnatelv must be discerned and followed.

Rept~blicanism lost in 1787. But America won in its ability to secure a foundi~g, albeit a second one. that evaded so many other revolutions. As ?vlcrcv \\1arren, an Anti• Federalist, observed ten years after the ratification dcb<tte, Americans were "too proud for monarchy, yet too poor for nobility, and ... too selfish and avaricious for a virtuous republic."

Bibliographic Essay The importance of the founding is stressed by nearly all the classical

republican theorists. See especially Montesquieu's The Spiri.t of the Laws and tvlachiavelli's Discourses. J. G. A. Pocock emphasizes this aspect of republi- canism in his Polirics, Language and Ti1ne (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1971 ). Foundings in cross-national and historical perspectives have been explored from a variety of perspectives. J\aron \Viklavsky in The Nursing Fmher: ,Woses as a Polirical Le£1der (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984) ,;reats Moses as a paradigmatic case of a leader who confronted the paradox of employing his own talents for wider purposes. His leadership, ~ccording to \Vikbvskv. was directed toward constructing a regime designed to functi~n without hts own personal abilities. Along the way, Moses faced a,wnizing choices between freedom and order. Louis Hanz, in collaboration with scv;ral specialists, compares the American founding experience to that of four other culrures (Latin America, South Africa. Canada, and Australia) in The Founding of 1'-iew Societies (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964). Seymour Lipset compares the American case \Vith that or Canada in F&voiwion and Countem:wlurion ( Garden Ciry, NY: Doubleday. 1970), chap. 2. Also sec the analysis of Kart Deutsch and associates, who examine the ·efforts of confederations, including the United Srates, 10 form new polit- ical units in Political Communiry am! rhe North Atlamic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

'1\vo syn1p.athctic cxarninations of the opera11on of state constlt.1..nions

~:;:f :ti~; ?r~~~l:/;,2:::or:o~~~.l\~ 9;;;:•~~~ i;,;-,:,:;'";':~; . Opel,,,, Co!,.\<!,, di,U !O!)li!l/1 Conu-o! ( i:.htton 1-Zo"""'" L ('l')S:Ypn s,,·-te r '·,·,n•ce,,.. sity Press. 1980). \Vooct is especidly ~;seful.her~·f;)~-1~,;s·";~;~:·;~rn~'l;t ,;/1~\;1·1~

~::;t~::!~:~:~~:E!i~:~Ei~,~~~if ~t~~:;~f :¥:f :;::;;~;,;;! Cons!imr!on of 1776 (New York: OctaG(y1 Bo<A~ : 071 ·) r=-r-r .,, .-.1,.r,,. ·,,,.,r:,, .. ,, . .. , -.. 0 AA · • ._ • --~ - / - , • .<. J_ 1..:. 11 .-.__/ ._. ~~ E. ... J.\.-C!A view, see Allan Nevins, The Arnerican Simes dwin/{ and a(rer du: Ren;!wion (f~irficlcl, NJ: /\ugustus M. Kelley, 1969). The Confeclc~arion is irnplicitiv

~~~::1t1~;a~~.s~:~: 1~~;::~:i~;.'. :::\~'.:J~~~~:~~~;r!~:, t~i;;~;\;·~;t;~; 'j:~7});,::c:~:::; (New York: 1:\lfred ,'\.. Knopf, l 950). ·

,-fhe second founding natura.Hy has been the focus of n1anv students of Arneriecm political thouuht AssessmcnF 1',"l"''' ,,,, 1-i,"cf 1•' .. ,-i·r, .,.,.,, ".,.. ,i., ., c,··~· - -~ · ,,, -,, -~ -~ r-..... V C:.t ·"-' • 1-. l-! :::a\- 'I.., 1..,;l :;..!.~C, achievement of the :foundin0 fathers 10 m,"2.su.r<"-'d "ri·ric··i~n, ,·t·• •. ,,l"'"··I·,· .. "i·,, 1, ~ • L _ .......... , .... ,;..- .... _ .......... A,, .. ,~:;_. ;:,._...,.UL+&-!:"tLA J :. Michael Kammens's A Machine rhaf l-Voufd Go of Jtse{f-:· The Com:tirwion in American Cu!ture (New Yoi·k- Aifred i\ Kn,·,l}1· l 9R6\ eirph•1s; .. "., ;ii, -r 0 ,, growth in the presr'ige of th; i:our~der~, /)·l,; ;;,~/ f~;Cl'"'O~ ,11:: ~.';.~·~•.~~'~1;c~,c_~ ;_ :: aspect of 1\m~rican L,constitution~~jisn1. ~ !~dir-f ·:~-~ r,:n,i:;-~Y ~~1~, i ;. ~;: ~~-~>l~:: ,-s ,~-.:~.c\ (:.\-_·

• _ • , - ••• --,~ •• '-.-·/..-- ._.--.-.....··~· {. • .,!.. t: ... tii.Jl.;1(,_(.~

a. ma.v:r 1:-lC!or rn his assessment. l\fanin Diamond's apprnisa! is rnore posi- uve. See h1s 'Democracy and the Fcderalists: A Reconsideration cf Ihe Farmers' Iment,'· American Political Science R:ei"i.c11· 53 (\-larch 1959) as well as his extended treatment in The Foundin,g o( 1he Denwcm,ic Republic (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock, 1981 ). Beard's mtack on the founders m~st be considered in rhc context of progressive reform (see chap. 8), bm his An Ecm101nic fnterpreration o{ the Constitlliion o/ !he C>1ired Swtes !Neve" York· Macmillan, 1913.) clearlv opened old wound~ in /' meri,"1,1 0 ,-11 ,ti·c·tl "Ltlr•t·i·-,· .., • ._, ...... ., .•. ~-l_··· • ...,,:; • . ~.t., .... ~c~.._ ._:.,.C. Beard's analysis has been meticulously cri1iquecl by Rol1en E. Brown. Charles Beard and the ConsJituJion (Princeton: Princeton Universirv Press, l956), and Forrest McDonald, Ht the People (Chicago: Univers(n,.of Chi- cago Press, 1958). Neo-Bearclians emphasize le~s the immediate el:tss inter- ests of the farmers than the change in ideoi(wiG,1 emphasis th•1·' ,1,,,ri• • •b," 1.- 0 ,.- 0"<'- ·[' h ' f\i - ;::. A .• s- G ,._, . . ' _· . ~ ., .... _ .,, .... ~- •X" _. ... .(.L , ;t . .(.~ t"\..:'., l_, ___ anc,udbc O td: dillcl!-;. ce ordon Vvooc1, J he Crea!ion or the American

Republic, Pan 5, and Sheldon \Volin, Pu!irics u1ui !ision · Brown, 1960), pp. 388-93. John Roche's vie.\\ is mentary and critical asscssmems of rhc

Reform Caucus in Action,'' _,-.inzerican Politico! Science Re1·ie,c,· !.December 1961 ). Four recent \VCrks examine che founders' re iigious vic\c...';: Da-(ci L. Holmes. The Fairhs of" 1he Foundine Press, 2006); Frank L~unben, The ,,

in America (Princeton. NJ: Princeton man, Founding Faith: 1-fm,.' Our Approach Jo Religious

Chapter Three

American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the Making of a Nation (New York: Random House, 2007).

Despite the haste of their composition, the essays of The Federalist deserve to be read very closely. There are many editions of the papers avaii- able. Ciinton Rossiter's coilection, The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library. i 961 ), is useful in that it includes the Constitution itself with annotated references to remarks in the essays by Jay, Hamiiton, and l'vfadison. The debates at the Constitutional Convention arc also avaiiable in a collection edited by \fax hi.rrand, The Records of the Constitutionai Con- vention 1787, 3 vols. (Nnv Haven: Yale University Press, 1911). Douglass Adair's dose reading of the essays with a vie,v toward estahiishing the "schiz- oid" Publius interpretation are contained in frune and the Founding Fathers (Ne,v York: \V \V. Norton, 1974). Garry Wills extends Adair's thesis by argu- ing that both Madison and Hamilton \Vere directly influenced by David Hume's concept of the commercial repubiic. See Wiils's £.,plaining America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981 ). Most of Robert Dahl's theoretical work can be seen as a commentary on The Federaiist. See his A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956) for his interpretation and revision of l'v1adison. Dahl's Goldilocks problem is pre- sented i.n Afrer the Revolution (New Haven: ·Yale University Press, 1970). Neal Reimer offers an abie revie,v of Madison as a political theorist in.James iv!adison: Creating the American Constitution CvV~1shington, DC: Congres- sional Quarterly Press, 1986), and Marvin Meyer provides primary material on the development of Madison's political thought along with incisive com- mentary in The J\!Jind of the hnmdr:-rs (Hanover, NH: University Press of New EngiamL 1981). Coikn Sheehan emphasizes the influence of French politi- cal thought especiaiiy l'vlontcsquieu, in his approach to poiitics in Jmnes Madison and the Spirit of Republican SeifGovenzrnent (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 2009).

The Anti-Federalists are assessed by Cecilia Kenyon in "IVIen of Little Faith: The 16-.ntifcderalist~ on the Nature of Representative Government," Fli/ii;;m and Almy Quarteriy, 3rd series, 12 (1955). Jackson Turner Main pro- vides a sympathetic review in Yhe Antif'ederalisis (Ne,v York: \V W. Norton, i961). Christopher Duncan's The Anti-Federaiists and Early f1merican Politi- cai Thought (De Kaib: Northern Hiinois University Press, 1995) is also posi- tive in its assessment and a tour de force in terms of its interpretative range, since it connects the A.nti-Fcdcra!ists to contemporary political thought. David J. Siemers presents detailed analyses or poiitical thought of represen- ta.tivc anti-federalists in 77r.e .1•:Inti-ff:xlera!ist.r,·: Afen c~.f (;reat r-·aifh and Forbear- ance (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003). The impact of the deciskm by the Anti- _Feder.a]jsts to parti.cjpate in the nc\v gcrv·ernn1cnt after ratification is e,xplored by Dav~d J_ Sicrners in l~o.!.(!)~ing 1he Rerntbli.c: .--llnti-f(~deralists and Fcdcrniisis in Consrirutiow!I Tirne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). Herbert Storing offers a balanced account in ItVhar the AntH'ederaiists I+(~~re F()1· (C~hicagc1: U njvc.rsi ty of C:h icago Press~ ! 981 )~ excerpted and. pub-

Founding 97

lished separately from bis collection of Anti-Federalist writings, The Com- plete AntiJederalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981 ). The latter includes a reprint of Lee's 7he Federal Fanner.

1776 Defence c;f the Constitutions of the United States, John Adams 1787-88 The Federaiist, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Jolrn fay* 1787 "Vices of the Political System of the United States," James

Madison 1787-88 Letters of a Federal Fanner, Richard Henry Lee

*A collaborative effort

356 Chapter Ten

2003 "The Unipolar Moment Revisited," Charles Krauthammer 2004 "Hegemony. Hubris and Overreach," Kevin Phillips 2003 Fixed Ideas, Joan Didion 2000 Boi-i--fing /Uone~ Robert Putnan1 2003 Terror and Liberdisn1, Paul Berman 2001 9/J l. Noam Chomsky 2002 An Autumn of vVi:.u; Victor David Hanson 1994 "Patrimism and Cosmopolitanism," Manha Nussbaum 2001 ,Waking Cirizens, Walter Berns 2003 Jus1 f.-Viir Against Terror, Jean Bethke Elshstain 2003 "Septernber l L A Pacifist Response," Stanley Hauerwas 2UD2 "\Vest Point Address,'· George W. Bush

The Next Crisis Globalization and the

End of American Exceptionalism?

\\lhen the Cold \\/ar ended there \vere nurnerous pre-dlctions about the future of America. While some observers spoke of [be danger of terrorism. no one forecast the calamitous events of 9/ l l. There were also those who claimed that contemporary economic conditions might produce a "ne,v para- dign1~:- in \Vhich cycles of boom and recession •,.vould no longer be a feature of capitalism. Instead, market societies wouid travel on a Dever-ending trajcc~ tory of prosperity fueled by technological innovations. Other predictions focused on political trends. E. J. Dionne, 1,vho argued in 1991 that the end of the 1980s was comparable for conservatism lO the problems that New Dea! liberalism faced in thel 960s, claimed that a new progressive movement was at hand in 1997 in his They Onzv Look Dead. In i996, Michael Kazin (The Popu- list Persuasion) suggested that a new populis[ movement was imminent. The preponderance of these predictions seemed to suggest a populist/progressive period of reform like the 1890s or the early 1900s, or even the L930s.

Many commentators were fascinated with cultural implications of the technological leaps of the 1990s. Robert D. Kaplan sought to gauge the future impact of these advances by undertaking a 1bcquevillian journey across America (An Empire Wilderness, l 998). Cities like Omaha and Orange County seemed to him to be losing their disrinctiveness. Instead of reflecting a unique local culture~ each futun: fragments of a new national one. He noted corporate fortresses, tourist bubbles, restaurants serving the same several points to £tsk if the blurring. graphical boundaries 1nigJ-1t gi\,,e birtl1 to a ne\Y led by internmionaHy n:crnited high-tech

357

3.53

post-racist: perhaps Earth Day \vould replace independence Day as a focus <.If patriotisn1. ~rhc next decade rnight sec i\mcrica "reinventing itself in a 1argcr ,,orld by becoming history's first international nation (and the home of a Yaiue-drivcn international constabulary hunting down war criminals, piutonium terrorists, and so \vhere the best and brightest of ?vkxico and other continents come to live_·· Kaplan even quoted the great historian E.d-...vard Gibt-Jons~ \vho obscr\icd that ~~a decentralized~ pluralistic societ)'' \;/ith a highly mobile citizenry n1ight survive forever.~~

Other writers were less optimistic. Francis Fukuyama. whose initia1 anal- ysis of a post~Coid War cm we discussed in chapter 9, cxpanck:d his observa- tions in The End of' Histon aiid the Las/ Ivfan (1992). He predicts a bizarre, dystopian future. In this emerging woricL no quarter would be given to any pursuits bey(mcl cv,ncrnic calculation. ln fact. he believed thaI a process had already been set in motion to create what C. S. Lewis called a society of '·men withou1 chests.·· Be predicted ,rn unending process in market societies to extend cqua1 recognition thai refused to acknowledge even "natural or nec- essary residual forms of inequality." At the moment liberals devoted their 1in:s to "the total and complete elimination of any vestiges of inequality. making sure that no littie girl should have to pay more to have her locks cut than a little that no Boy Scout troop be closed to homosexual scoutmas- ters, that no bu}1d1ng be built v,·'itbout a concrete \::..cbec]chair ran1p going up to the front door.-· The equalitarian impulse that Fukuyama called isothymia \.va.s e\:en ~tronger than these projects. I...ibcra1 societies might revive /\ris- rophanc< plnn in _/1sse1nb1~r U).11nen to '·force handsome boys to marry ugly \\:ornen and \·ice. \·ersa:~ i\n.irnai rights activists \vould rnake rnore aggressive demands. arguing that ''man is <mply a more organized and n,tional form of siirne ... Hwa:-; e\·cn possible there would be those who will argue that intesti- nai parasites and HlV viruses should have "right5 equal to human beings.''

For Fukuyama. the combination of rciative world peace, economic pros- ncritv and 1iberal reform ,vere a dcac!iv concoction. For Sanrnd Huntimrton. i- .., _. ._.. , hO\"_.e-\,,,-cr. threats \:i,/otdd cornc fron1 other quarters. I-iis The Clo.sh of Ciriliza~ tions ( i 9%) often has been described as an aiternative to Fukuyama·s end- n-f-history scenario. for he regarded /\n1erican cconon1lc/n1lhtary hcgernony of the ) lJ90s as temporary and il)uso0. Huntington found a different set of novel conditi.ons cn1erging in the \~,,,.odd: global polifcs is no\v for the first time in history both multipolar and multicultural. Composed of eight clash- ing civii izations. in \Vhich the pn\ver of the \\,est is in rcJative decline .. the intcrnati.onfd s:,.-·stern is hkcl.y lo produce a series of v,...-ar~- that could threaten not only the hegcrnony of /\n1crica but its ·\.~~ry existence.

constructed a sccJ1ario that takes p]acc in 20 .l.O i.n ...,vhicb c=hfna reduces a unified \/ielnan.1. ~fhe lJnitt,d Stales atlernpts u.-:: respond~ but Inct!a ~·,cizcs upon the

tcs in\:adc Pak~~J?ri. ,.-\rnb state~ attack Israet and Serbia invades f5usni;:1. /\~ ~~ rt":sult the LI1:itcd Stai.es~ \Vith Europe and Russiii as ailics~ finds }tsclf in ::\ \Y(1dd \\-'ar (:hina: Japan and n1os1. of 1sknn. Vlhate\'C•r the

The Next Crisis 359

outcome-nuclear devastation, a negotiated settlement after much loss of life. the eventual march of allied troops into Tiananrnen Square--the result would be a dramatic decline in U.S. power and general shifl in wodd hegemony to the East, possibly to India. Huntington's polic.J lesson to preserve U.S. power is to stay out of the "core states" of other "civilizations.'· Not only is American pmver not able to enforce a world peace in a muiticultura! system. but partici- pation in such efforts is certain to increase conflict.

Some of these post~Cold War predictions have already been proved wrong (a period of uninterrupted prosperity): others seem to be correct (a period of reform): others remain possible. \I/hat each one of these forecasts has in common, however, is the attempt to describe the nature of globaliza- tion and its impact on American values, particularly the effect on beiicf in American exceptionalism.

1\vo GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Globalization is a relativeiy new term. It appeared in the early 1960s but only began to be used widely in the 1980s and l 990s, to discuss the impact of information technology. In his second inaugural address, President Clinton noted that ''Ten years ago. lhe Internet was the mystical provrnce of physi- cists: today it is a commonplace encyclopedia for millions of schoolchildren." Nayan Chanda (Bound Together, 2007), in his analysis of over 8,000 newspa- pers and magazines, found only two references to globalization in 1981 and over 57.000 in 2001. Briefly put, globalizmion is a term used to designate a set of changes-economic, political technological. culturai-that have mack the \VOrld much more interconnected. Ciearly, distant economic or politicai forces have always had a significant impact on local communities. Imagine hmv the lives of residents of an English village were changed when Caesar's Roman legions arrived in 55 BCE, and changed again \vhen they left nearly four hundred years later. What so impresses contemporary analysts of gio- halization, however, is the speed and interrsity of global change.

Two attempts to describe globalization illustrate the nature of this pro- cess. In his 1999 book (The Lexus and the Olive Ti-ee), Thomas L. Friedman compared the international system during the Cold Vlar to the one that replaced it. During the Cold \Var there were two glohal economies. one led by the United States based on market principles and one led by the Soviet Union based on socialist ones. The movement of individuals was quit<.:: limited ,vithin the Soviet bloc, and economic goods circulated almost exciusively ,vithin each camp. Political divisions \vere, of course, the predomin:rnt feature of the system, although each side constantly tested its advers2r:/s ,ulnerablc points. Communications technology was never completely contained in this bipolar world, and both sides readily used propaganda to further their cause.

For Friedman, division was the defining characteristic of the Cold War system: "The world was a divided up. chopped up place and both your

360 Chapter Eleven

threats and opportunities ... tended to grmv out of \Vho you were divided from." If vou ·li~ed in one of the many divided nations of the period (Korea, Viernam., Germany). chances of war or high levels of conflict were great. If you lived in a strategic place you might be courted with economic favors by

both sides. The new svstem's central feature, however, is integration. Technology, a

central fearur; of globalization. emphasizes speed. During the Cold War, the most frequently a~ked question \vas, "Whose side are you on'?" Today the question has been replaced by "To \Vhat extent are you connected rn every• one?" The next most common question was "How big is your missi!e?" NO\v it is ·'How fast is your Internet connection?" As a result, global economics, according to Frie~lman, has overtaken politics.'' The defining document of the Cold War svstcm was "The Treaty": now it is "The Deal." Nation-states still matter, and Friedman notes that the United Stares as the "sole and dominant superpower" is in fundamental ways the guarantor of the global system, but global markets and individuals nmv play a major role. .

\Vhile a nation-state no longer has the Soviet Union or the United States surveving their actions and~ threatening intervention. the nevv" system

' ~ h 1 d ' is not without rules. As soon as a country accepts rhe new tee no ogy an me o-lobal free market- it dons \Vhat Friedman calls the Golden SrraitjackeL The ;djective "golden" is meant to convey the economic prosperity ~hat a natio_n· state can cniov as a member of this new system. But membership also has its rules. Memb~rs must make the private sector the primary engine of eco- nomic growth. Thev must maintain a lmv rate of inflation and produce bud· gets th;t are dose to balanced. They must use a convertible currency, accept {ariff reductions, and make the stock of its companies open to foreign inves· tors. Friedman notes that this Golden S1raitjacket is "one size :fits a!L" It "pinches certain groups, squeezes others, and keeps a society unde_r press~tre to constantlv streamline its economic institutions and upgrade its perfor· mance." Th~ enforcer of this system is no single nation-state but what Fried· man calis the Elecrronic Herd: international stock and bond traders, currency traders, and investors. Their army, so to speak, is the various credit•rating firms like Moody's who "prowl the world, constantly sniffing over countries." When one attempts to slip out of the Golden Straitjacket, they bark loudly. Investments and loans are curtailed or made more costly. Although only a few coumries do not accept the Golden Straitjacket (North Korea, for exam- ple)_ others do not always wear it gladly. Friedman not~s that nearly ~v_ery nation in the international system has at least one populist party or pol!t1cal

figure who campaigns against globalization. Whik Friedman's conceptualization of globalism acknowledged the

constraints of the system, he believed that a balance between "the lexus and the olive tree ''-economic change and local needs-can be achieved. Another formulation, however, presents a darker picture. Empire, a lengthy and dense analysis of globalization \vritten by Michael Hardt, an American professor of literature, and Antonio Negri, an Italian radical acfrvist, was

361

pubFshed in 2000. Surprjsing!;,:. 1he vi-"ork undcr\vt::nt tcI1 printin2.s \Vithi:n ;J. year. i:·~ a controversit11 \'vork. It has been cL:scribc=:d ~is :~he ('ornn-zunL··/! !vlo.nifr:sto of th,::: twenty.first centuIJ by philosopher Si~r-:oj Zizek a,,d rts a ~~lazy pc:rsorfs guide LO revoluUon~~ /\L);-: \\/o]-f,.~·- Like ft·tcdrnan~ 1-Ltrdt and ~egrl regard recent globalization as a nuvel phenorncnon in \vorld iris-

~~~~s;):i;~~·~c ~;l:: t:~~tl~~~:n:;~:1!1:~~;;\~\'t:~:~:t?:1c~~;1i~~~:~~\~~~·::i~~:~'.~/d!~::~:~ of nation~stau::s and the rise of international _g}obai er:rities undct· the n,;;v system. They also refuse to endorse movements that have a --nostalgia" for past structures and attempt to •:resurrecr 1hc~ nafon-stnt:..~ to protect --ag~!tnst global capital... · -

Despite thc.:1r ?v1arxist perspecrive 1 the authors use a figure lYftcn cired in republican thought lO describe this nev,c system. Polybius (20-1-~LZU BC) con- tended the stability of the Roman Ernpire rc·sted \Vith the \Vay it dispersc,d and arranged political powi.::r. Hardt and Negri cle,cribe the global svstem a~ one tn which power is shared by ·'monarchic;,1-- elements (A~1erican- nuclear supremacy·)~ aristocratic ones \,\/Calth of the G7 states and transnational corporations), and democratic ones (the Internet and other acce.ssihk tech• nology). Somctirnes they n1ix ,.::Jassicat republican analo2:ic:s \vith biblical ones, such as their eomparison of NGOs (~ongm ernmen;al organizations) like .Amnesty International to feudal monastic::it order;,, like che Frnnciscan'> and Dominicans.

Yet even with this constitutional analu£v, l+.udt arcd ~s;.e2:ri press:m a chillingly efficient world order that utilizes i(; comnlexitv w ex~-n totai con- trol. \Vithout a home capital like London, Rumc, _;r Vie.nna. nrotcst canm)[ be focused on a single elite in a single place :is, for example, .:i..mericans did in their revolution. The Empire is everywhere. Irc. ecorn)mic centers art in Ho:g Ko~g and Singapore as well as London and New '{ork. Protest might be 1mrnediately covered by rhe media but, since for Hardt and Negri nation- states are only minor players, they !ack power w rcallv rneer anv demands. In the Comrmmist Manifesto Marx and Engels predicte-d worker~ of the world would unire to overthrow capitalism. The aurhors noti.:: how rhe Enrnire has altered industrial labor to "immaterial" forms of work, the produ~tion of social relations, feelings. and ideas rather than objects. Thi~ '·biopo!itica1 production" makes the traditional Marxian idea uf a proletariat obsolete. Instead, Hardt and Negri speak of the concept of the -"mu!riwde," collec- tions of individuals across the globe who labor under this system of '•biopo- litical labor." This vaguely defined multitude tepresems the onlv real prospect of challenging rhe Empire presumably since. like Mar<'s pr;iietar- iat, they directly experience the most advanced form of labor and can antici- pate democracy globally rarher than from a national perspecrive. Hardi: and ~egri are noticeably reluctant to offer specific recommendations, perhaps because the totalitarian nature of Empire preclude~ visions of the fmure, They do, however, support the eiimination of all res1rictions on immigration. "7) . . . I" 'd t I f' .. ' ' ~ rapiers pour !OU.\', corn ,e tne trst pol1t1ca! d,:.:mand of the multitude.

362 Chapter Eleven

It would not be difficult to make the case that Friedman's vision of glo- balization is too benign and Hardt's and Negri's too malevolent. Neverthe- less, there are enough common features in their analyses to permit us to ask if globalization represents the basis for future crises for Americans.

A GLOBAL AMERICA? The giobalization of culture may be as controversial a phenomenon as

the globalization of markets. A major portion of this debate has focused on the dominant role of American culture in this process. Some critics identify the widespread use of English (particularly on the Internet), and the global proliferation of American music, fashion, and movies and television as "cul- turai imperialism." Several countries have attempted to resist the infusion of American culture by instituting quotas on imported programming. One viewpoint sees the globalization of American culture as a new stage of American exceptionahsm. David Rothkoph, a former official in the Com- merce Department in the Clinton administration, contends this globaliza- tion will creaie a better \Vor!d. American culture is the "best model of the future" because it is "the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to improve itself." From this perspective, television shows like West VVing intro- duce to the world a myriad of American values. For example, episodes expiain hmv the twenty-first amendment works, the use of the filibuster in the U.S. Senate, the appointment of a Supreme Court justice, and even how rhe nation responds to an attempted presidential assassination. Viewers learn about Thanksgiving and the lighting of the Christmas tree. President Bartlett of !lest Wing is a Catholic, two of his advisors are Jewish, and the chair of the joint chiefs of staff is African American. All the political lan- guages of American culture are explored. Republican dedication, liberal tol- erance, and religious conviction infuse the arguments of both president and his adversaries_ If the Declaration of Independence and the Statue of Lib- erty have been models of American exceptionalism in the past, why not this fictional \Vhite House?

Others, however, have expressed doubts about this interpretation. Some contend that popular cultural exports are generally not positive depictions of American culture. For example, Martha Bayles, a media critic for the Wall Streer Journal, discusses Benjamin Franklin's visit to Paris in 1776 on a diplo- matic mission to obtain French support for the American cause. She quotes Bernard Bailyn's observation that Franklin "kne\v that America had a unique and powerful meaning for the enlightened reformers of France" and that he was an embodiment of that ideaL Hence, he dressed in a fur cap and simple ciothes in contrast to the powdered wigs and expensive bodily adorn- ments of the members of Louis XV's court. Today, she argues, instead of the Franklin image American popular culture emphasizes crime, drugs, and community disintegration.

The Nex1: Crisis 363

Other vvriters question if this ne,.v global ctdtu.re is reaHy r\n1erican. SONY, a. Japanese~based corporation:- ovvns se\'eral film studios and nrusic companies th.at produce /-\rnerican entertainment. Nevvs c·orp.~ O\vned b~/ Australian-born Rupert 1viurdock, controis Fox Broadcasting and T;venti,,:,th Century Fox as well as the British Brnadcasting Nerwork: and Star Tv~ an Asian outlet. 1b some analysts, this international ownership creates a phe- nomenon called hyhridiry, in \Vhich pieces o-f different cultures are mixed together. A customer in Des Moines may find A.sian-flavored sauces ar her local Burger King, and one in 1bkyo may find a "Phtladelphia roll" in her sushi shop. Similarly, the same American might use the words P;coon hon- cho, karaoke, and anitne (all Japanese) during lunch as her ~ount~rpan might mention boxf1·end (boyfriend) or haku (computer hacking). Richard Pelis, an American hiswrian, argues that hvbriditv i;· not new. He -,~rgues that America has always been heavily influen;ed by- other cultures. Indeed, he contends that many of the icons of American popular culture are global adaptations. Before the Big \\.fac, there was fi~h ·and chips (British) and wurst (German sausages). Before Disnevland there was Copenhagen's Tivoli Gardens (which vValt Disney used as ,~ prototvpe for his Anah~im theme park). Hemming,vay and Dos Passos \Ve;e hea~:ilv influenced bv Jovce and Proust. America, Pei!s concludes, has alwavs bee!; ''a recipient ;;;s w~ll as an exporter of giobal culture." · ·

But does hybridization represent the loss of all cultures as segments of each are appropriated for cultural consumption') Beniamin Barbe; refers to the new <>lobc;l cu'1t·11r,,, -,,s "~v•~''',,rH"· · ·· L-- - e ... .., .. ..... .. .:. li-.... vv ...._, ... ~u .

IVlusic, video, theatre, books, and theme parks-the nc,v churches of a cornn1crcial civilization in \Vhich 111.aHs are the public squares and sub- Erbs the neighbodess neighborhoods-are aH con~tructed as irnage exports creating a ccnnmon \:i..:orld taste around ton1n1on logos. advcrr!s- ing slogans, stars~ songs~ brand names~ jingles and traden1a1~~s. ·

For Barber, Mc\Vorld undermines not onlv American culture but all others as well. Although sociologists of everyday life wiU continue rn distin- guish a Japanese from an American mode," he observes, "shopping has a common signature throughout the world." As this globalization ~c;nti7mes ro obliterate national and local culture, resistance takes the forms of what Bar- ber calls jihad, the second concept in his dichotomy. He realizes that the term he employs is a strong one, often used to describe violenr rc!igious- based reactions to giobalization. Barber, however, uses the conc;p1 to denote all attempts to retrieve a local or national identitv. inc!udin,2_ Chris- tian as well as Musiirn, German, and American as well a;· Arab. In fact. he discusses what he regards as an "American jihad": ·

l'hc yearnings of .A.n1erican suburbanites for the cenainties of a bterai Ne\V ~festa1nent are no less ingenuous than the yearnings of /\rab mar-

!;';~1:~:re~1;p~::;:,~~~~~~;~' ~~:t~)cl;;/:;i~t~;; ]~'~:;,:~~;~· :.~)l :~: t b~~:j ''.~:.~I~ii;~;;

364 Chapter Eleven

they v.--ant rnartyrdorn before the \\\::ber~s pronbcC-1-/ that rational men and bureaucratic: go•,.,.ernments \viU disenchant !he \\~orid can come true_ Son1c join fund.,;n1cntaiist c-oH~cti.ves, others culti-vatc a pioneer solitude~ going ·'off the grid'. to combat the '·new world order" thev believe is c-,ndangering Lhe anti-modern values the::" cheri.sh. .,

Barber regards Mc\Vcrld c:nc1 jihad as t\vo 'Nays of life iocked in a deadlv strnggic. Richard Rosecrancc. an international politics theorist, offers a~ rntngurng vartation cm this facet of globalization. He notes how states have changed historicaily. The sovereign state of the .sixteenth centl1rv- husbanded its economic and military E·sources to protect and extend its tei~ritorv. Trad- ing states then emerged \vith colonies designed to promote economic" ,:,;rowth by enhancing its manufacturing capacity. Now a new kind of state has appeared in which territory and manufacturing is of iittle conscauence. R , . , , , osccrance. DOrrnwmg trom computer terminoiogy, calls these virtual srates. Virtu_ci stat~s do not produce tangible manufacturing goods, aithough they may invest m states that do. Their territory is defined not in land, but in the services they provich. Much like computer soft·,.varc, virtuai states specialize ill ··products of the mind." Rosccrance identifies several virtual states that prosper by providing research and development, product desigm, marketino. and fimmcial and legai sen·iccs. Hong Kong, Singapore, and ':"fai,van arc th~ most advanced examples of this type. Rosccrancc a1so mentions Korea. Swit- zerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands as c1osely approximating virtual sta- 1us. Note th2-t in each of tht:se exarnpks the states a.re territoriallv small. some arc democratic and othc-rc: arc no1· ,nd Hero K',,1g i, 1·o·L· =ven°a po·i· 1···' • _, . --~ • . A 1,::- - \, • '--.-- d.,. l , 'i_, · ~ . l ....

independent entity. According to Rosecrance, the United States-with over 70 percent of its GNP in services 01 nd 18 r,e 0·cpnt ;11 ,.,.,.,n '1'i'ac·t'ti·1'·.-o- 's •. . . ~ ~. · l~ -'- '-' ;_ .L:.:.,.~ ~ • ,._ ll--.-1._ on the threshold of becorning a virtual state. ._,

For Rosccrance, there arc many advantages to becoming virtuaL These nc-w states arc more prosperous, more educated, and less concerned about war since their existence does not depend upon tcrritorv. Thus. he is not concerned about outsourcing (about 20 pe;ccnt of U.S. production has ~mwed overseas in recenr years) or free trade agreements like NAFT.A. Rosccrance concludes, "The rise of the vinuai sratc thus inaugurates a new epoch of pcacef1..d competition among nations, promising a cooperative tran• si t1on to the ne\v n1 iifenniurn. _,,.

Like many of the analyscc- discussed, Roscerance admits problems with h;<; ()\Vl" °Ce'T!J''(' 1·-1 ·r ·1- ' " -. I••'• o•' ' . ,, ' . " . "··· . , ,, 1,, , " .d6 i ,ll1c.n,qc:;-muL dnd a ma1a1se among: outsourced v-,-·orkcrs n1a~/ occur. Job insccur/cy may f.ncreasc. NC\.·"Crthc!ess: he befi~ves vinua: slates are " , - ,.:,,: · , ·h · · · · · · - f l

;~~;;, ':,:~ r :~;cc,:f '.~: ,~:~;'i';:~:i:, ~~::~:,:;'. :~;i~::Jti~it~~~l~~ ~:;~ 1JUJCh. hke the. characters ln \\/_iHiarn CJibson~s prescient sc.ic.ncc:: ficti.on ncr\:ei (Lbout the Internet. In a character \'fITuaf bv do\.vnloading his con.sciousness to the Internet. \1/itbout a boci-y~ he hvcs fo(- 8\--·cr el-:::ctron;cally·, Cfibsun ~s fie Cron raises the qtiestion of ho\'.;,.- our existence

The Next Crisis 365

would be transformed by a virtual life. \Vhat would be gained or iost when a state becomes virtual? What vmuld it be like to be a virtual citizen in a virtual state? Rosecrance notes that virtual states compete for "brain power,"' and there would be intense competition for the most talented. Since virtual states are more concerned \Vith "mastery of flmvs" of capital and technology than "large fixed territory," would patriotism, with all its liabilities, become obso- lete'? What would be distinctive about America among other virtual srates?

TWO Vmws ON IMMIGRATmN Another approach to globalization predicts a sorne,vhat different future.

The sociologist Roland Robertson notes that globalization increasingly cre- ates a globai frame of reference for thought and action. But he has identified a form of hybridization he calls glocalization, "a massive, t,.,,,ofold process involving the universalization of panicutarism and the particuiarization of universalism." One example might be the use of the concept jihad by Ben- jamin Barber. Originally a uniquely Islamic concepL the term is used by Robertson to describe any protest against globalization. Another might be the use of South African and South American music by the U.S. rock per- former Paul Simon or the rise of ecotourism (taking vacations to view spec- tacular naturai sites). These exampies are especially appropriate for Robertson's analysis, since he suggests that glocalization is primarily driven by rnateriai consumption as market analysts seek to create "micro-markets" that fit the interests of various class, ethnic, or gender groups around the ·world. Presumably. local music that does not find a market niche is forgot- ten, and sites not deemed intriguing enough for the ecologically curious trav- eler may not survive economic development.

One example of giocalization may be especiaily important for American culture. According to some observers, ethnic and religious attachments may actually increase due to globalization, partly as a protest to cultural central- ization. Thus, a member of the Taliban might be 1-vcaring Nike shoes and using a Verizon cell phone. Also, the movement of labor across national boundaries and the increase in media communication and international travel may lead to nc\v kinds of ethnicity. For example, a Canadian of French descent living in Montreal might \Vork for a corporation with French ties, \Vatch cable television from Paris, and vacation in Breton.

Il lan Stavans's The Hispanic Condition (1995) is one ,1ttcmpt to examine the consequences of glocalization in the American context. The book is an innovative blend of historical analysis and memoir somewhat similar to DuBois·s foe Souls of Biack Folk. He also uses an additional narrative device to predict the future. The Hispanic Condition includes discussion of an imag- inary book, Caiihan '., !.Jtopia, published in 202L a dream by the auihor and a letter sent to the author's child. In the invented monograph of the future, Stan's author describes an A.rnerica in which the Rio Grande has become

366 Chapter Eleven

,, just another Mississippi River,' a natural sight, a commercial avenue, a rnurisI spot." Ali American governments, north and south, have dismarrtled all borders and established a "single hybrid nation of nations, simply caned lhe ~cw \Vorld." At one point, this new political structure attempted to use both the languages of Cervantes and Shakespeare bm "a strange phenome- non took place-Spanglish became an astonishing linguistic force":

Television, radio and the prim media soon mollified their communica- tion codes m accommodate the new ci1alccL a son of Yiddish; English ,vi,h a phonetic Iberian spelling. A vasr quantity or what sounds !ikc to me as unrccognizabk words circulated.

For Stavans, this futuristic scenario is a utopia. In a variation of the DuBois concept of African Americans as dual citizens, both American and black, he contends those who are part of the "Hispanic condition" are "t\vice American,'' the "children of Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, but, also as cirizens of the so-called Ne,v World.'' He argues that "whi!c some persist in seeing us as at the bottom of the social hierarchy, at least three-fifths of us were in the territories before the Pilgrims arrived on the Mayflower." A future in which this Hispanic culture becomes a major part of America is thus for him a ,,velcome culmination of /\merican exceptionalisrn,

For Samuei Huntington, hO\vever, immigration from Mexico in particu- lar represents a traumatic fumre in which America may lose its very identity. In Who are J.--Vi:? (2004 ), Huntington acknowledges that American idemity has been formed by many cultures. He contends, however, that Mexican immigration is different. No other First World country shares a land border with a Third World one. Mexican immigration is also quite large, increased significamly by illegal entry and also regionally concentrated. Moreover, previous patterns of immigration have been episodic, proceeding in waves and periods in which it subsided, while Mexican immigration is persistent. He also controversially argues that Mexican assimilation lags behind that of previous groups, in part as a result of the g!ocalization we have discussed. Perhaps even more controversially, Huntington contends that American exceptionalism has up to now been guaranteed by the tradition of 'Anglo- Protestant culture" established during the revolutional)' and founding peri- ods. Mexican immigration may change the nature of that cultural tradition.

In his war scenario described above, Huntington predicts an opposition to American participation by the "Hispanic-dominaicd states of the south- western U.S." and anticipates generally a domestic "clash of civilizations" in the United States. Hurrtington seems to suggest that, with or without world war, the agenda of the next decade will be protection of the ''A.merican creed" and cont«inment of "de-Westernization" in ,he United States and Europe:

The futures of the United States and of the \Vcsr depend upon Ameri- cans reaffirming their commitment to Western civilization. Domestically this means rejecring the divisive siren calls of multiculturalism .... .Americans are culturally pan of ,he West, multiculturalisrs may damage

The Next Crisis

and even des.troy that relationship but they cannot n:::piace iL ·\:-Vhen /\-111trlcans look for their cultural roots, the.y find t.hcn1 in Europe.

367

Two caveats should be made about globdization 2md its impact oo America. First, as iVC have already seer1, predictions are frequently wrong, Globalization may slow down or stop, even reverse. The "Electronic Herd" may not be as vigilant as Friedrn.an described, as in the case of the bankin::z practices that led to the global financial crisis of 2008. Globalization may also produce changes in America that are not foreseen by any of the theo- rists discussed. Second, Americans have clcdarcci the end of American exceptionaEsm even before the revolution. Samud Langdon, as we nmed in chapter 2, ended hls 1775 serrnon by asking if .A_rnerica had departed from its foundations. Pan of the reason for this continual concern that America may cease to be exceptional is i.har the concept is defined differently in each American political language. For Langdon, American exceptionalisrn depended on continued adherence to cenain religious ideals. For a republi- can in the same period a different assessment \vas !ikely. Jefferson, for exam- ple~ strongly asserted i\1nerica~s uniqueness and did not base this belief in biblical terms, He worried instead about America becoming ''European- ized" if the narion chose a path to industrialization. In rhe case of globaliza- tion, some theorists are concerned about foreign influences because of their impact on American religious values and orhers, perhaps !ike Jefferson, are more worried about economic change.

Nevertheless, the end of American exccprionaiism \VOL!ld represent a major crisis for Americans. If Americans corne to believe that their nation is no longer distinctive in at least some sense, they '.vould iose a core aspect of their identity. Such a loss might well produce the kind of A.merica~ jihad predicted by Benjamin Barber, There may be other ways, however, that a sense of i\merican exceptionalism could be recovered. On additional feature of American exceptionalism is the capacity of its believers m fashion new, unexpected versions. Certainly, Abraham Lincoln's vision both symhesized and redefined discordant interpretation of American exceptionalism. Another possibility, welcomed by some theorists including Louis Hartz, is for Americans to finaUy accept that their nation is tike uthers. Beth Fried- man and Negri and I-lardt, although frorn. diff::·re nt van rage nrs, sccrn LO look for,.vard to this devcloprnem. \Vould the abandonmem c,f A.nk:rican exceptionalism produce a more sober, reaiisric or viould ll represe11t the inevitable downfaU of America so often preciicted in the

Bibliographic Essay There are 2 number of general

OsterhammeI ,tiKi Niies P Peterson trnce

368 Chapter Eleven

ba!ization: A Shorr Histmy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). ).,fanfred B. Steger reviews numerous theoretical perspectives in his The Rise of rhe Globai !nwginmy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). His more brief examination-Globalization: A vby Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) is also useful. Also see Frank J. Lechner's and Jon Boli's anthology: The Globalization Reader (London: Blackwell, 2004).

Thomas L. Friedman reassesses his approach to globalization after 9/11 in The H-'orld Is Flat (Nevi York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), and l'vlichae1 Hardt and Antonio Negri continue their exploration of their con- cept of empire in }vfultitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (Balti- more: Penguin, 2005). For analyses of Ernpire, see Jodi Dean and Paul Passavant, eds., The Etnperor\ New Clothes (New York: Routledge, 2004).

For differing views oo the impact of globalization on America, see David \,1. Haugen and Susan Musser's collection of essays, America-'., Global Injiuence (Detroit: Thompson Gale, 2007). Lane Crothers presents a thor- ough and balanced revie,v in Globalization and .American Popular Culture (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). For a differing view that chal- lenges the predominance of American culture in a giobalized world, see Wil- liam H. l\farling, How Arnerican" Is Globalization? (Baltimore, :\-1D: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). Benjamin Barber's revised edition of Jihad vs. ,'vldt'cJr!d (New York: Ballantine Books, 2001) includes an attempt to incorporate the events of 9/1 l into his account.

Richard Rosecrance's The Rise of the Virtual State (New York: Basic Books, 1995) is one of many attempts to assess the changes in the interna· tional system as a result of globalization. See, for example, the essays in David Held's and Anthony McGrev/s The Globalization Iiw,sfonnation Reader (London: Polity Press, 2000).

Both Stavans and Huntington are outspoken and controversial writers. Stavans has been criticized for the alleged influence of his own multicultural heritage and Huntington for his conservatism. Stavans pursues his advocacy of Spanglish in 5JJanglish: The lvfaking of a Ne,v A1nerican Lanpwge (New York: Harper, 2004). For other examples of multiculturalism as a positive outcome of globaiization, see Anthony Simon Laden and David Owens, eds., lv!u!ticu!turalism and Political 71ieory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) and Bhikhu Parekh, A i\!e,v Politics of Identity (New York: Pal- grave Macmillan, 2008). Samuel P. Huntington's Who Are We? (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004) is one example of an anti-globalization position.

Opposition to globalization has appeared from both left and right. In the United States, both Pat Buchanan and Ralph Nader have been outspo- ken critics of globalization, particularly from an economic standpoint The protests in Seattle against the World Trade Organization in 1999, heavily influenced by anarchist political thought, have received a good deal of atten- tion. For a sympathetic narrative of the demonstrations, see Alexander Cockburn, Jeffrey St. Clair, and Allan Sekula, Ffr,e Days that Shook the vVorld: The Bartle of Seattle and Beyond (London: Verso, 2003).

The Next Crisis 369

..fherc are several exarninations of 1\.ruerican exceptionalisn1 in HQ.ht of

f .! (:;'~~!~~:~ r;.·r,~.;~; i~i~~:~ :~:'~~1 '~·i ~:~!g~;:/ ;·g~~::e,~·;:;:;es 1;;~ ::~c::~--~~-(,I~:~~,;~1-~~:~; cosmopo!itanisrn rnigbt actuany provide the basis for resistance to ec.oncn11ic-

~~~:f~~~:~t~f1~;i~~~~:;~;~ai::~\sa:~:;•;{:~~~1;;,1n:::t~·eJ;~~~~~;~;::;;7(;::~~:~:l~:r~;;~~~:·: a/ism in rhe Age c~f Globalization (Albany: Swte University of New York Press; 2008) base their assessrnents on ch,1r1ges in recent literarv texts. Andre,v J. Bacevich in his The Limits of Power: -:The End ofA.merican-E\cep• tiona!isn1 (Nev; York: Metropolitan Books, 2008) focuses on impact of recent presidential policies. · ·

For n1ore in-depth treatn1ents on the topic of globalization_ see John c,,van ,wh ,, nd Jerrv \;fan,·l;,r .41ter1·1t,tii1e· )" le') r:,,,J··nc,'r'>;;L,. (,'lo· o' ,1-'i-•111·in,··•. ,,j B•c,i .. ~ .. -o .... -~- ., ~ - __ ..,_ . ..,... .. ,. • --- _._ ... ~-· . .. _._._ .. ...... . t (...,! • ..::. p,.,. =· ..:--i. l~- ter ~Vor!d Is Possible, 6th ed. (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler. 2004i: Pbilip King and Sharrni!a King, !nte; ... naiionat E~conornics~ CJloba!izati;Jn~ an:i Po!ic~~: ,1 R 1 ~., ! ,.B . "f G· H""'I . ~()('•··· B n k. . . , r. eac,er, .:irn ec. ,.- ostcm; ,,,.c raw-. !!l/ nvm, ~ J;:-;); 'ietsy rc1:·ocy, Alejan- dro Reuss, and Chris Smrr, Real florid Globalization: A Reader in Business, Econmnics, and Politics, 9th ed. (Boston: Economic Affairs Bureau. 2007): K. S. Jomo and Jacques Baudot, Flat f1Vorid, Big Gaps: Economic U0eralizc;- tion, Globalization and Inequality (London: Zed Books, 2008); David Schnei- derman. Constitutionalizing Econmnh- Globalization: fm·est~nem Rules and Democracy":; Promise (Cambridge Studies in Law and Society) (Nev,; York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Robert K. Schaeffer, Undenwnding G!oba!ization: 71,e Social Consequences of Politico.!, Economic. and E:nviro1;~ nu:nwl Change, 4rh ed. (Lanham, ivlD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

Major Works

1992 The End of History and ,he Lasr Alan, Francis Fukuyarna 1995 Jihad n-. I\kWorld, Benjamin R. Barber 1995 n,e Rise of the Virtual State, Richard Rosecrnnce 1996 The Clash of Civilizations, Samuel P. Huntington 1999 The Lexus and the Olive Ti·ee, Thomas L. Friedman 2000 Empire, lvlichad Hardt and Antonio Negri 2001 The Hispanic Condition, lvan Stavans 2004 H·7w Are tf-e? Samuei P. Huntington

ISBN 13: 978-1-57766-627-1 ISBN 10: 1-57766-627-5

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