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A_Study_on_Security_Awareness_in_Mobile_Devices.pdf

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A Study on Security Awareness in Mobile Devices

Mine Zeybek Information Security Engineering Institute of Natural and Applied

Sciences, Gazi University Teknikokullar Ankara 06500, Turkey

[email protected] Orcid: 0000-0002-8652-2082

Ercan Nurcan Yılmaz Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Faculty of Technology, Gazi University Teknikokullar Ankara 06500, Turkey

[email protected] Orcid: 0000-0001-9859-1600

İbrahim Alper Doğru Computer Engineering

Faculty of Technology, Gazi University Teknikokullar Ankara 06500, Turkey

[email protected] Orcid: 0000-0001-9324-7157

Abstract— With life becoming mobile in recent years, the use of smartphones is rapidly increasing in daily and business life. The increase in the use of mobile devices has made it increasingly difficult to ensure their security and privacy. Some of the attacks on mobile devices are related to social engineering. The main way to prevent such attacks is user awareness. In this study; A sample field study was conducted on the awareness of public institution personnel about the use of mobile devices. A questionnaire was developed and applied to 120 qualified public employees. Evaluations were made regarding the answers given in the questionnaire. The controls that can be evaluated to be included in the IT audit are specified and recommendations are made for the protection of mobile devices.

Keywords— Awareness, Mobile device, Cyber security, IT audit

I. INTRODUCTION Smart devices provide users with portable information

technology and make life easier for both personal and business use wherever they have internet access. Mobile phones are the most widely used smart devices in every aspect of our lives. However, these devices vary in terms of both operating systems and security systems and applications.

Looking at the smartphone operating systems in the world market, it is seen that 88% of all smartphones have Android OS in the second quarter of 2018 [1]. In the awareness research conducted within the scope of this study, it was found that 62% of the participants were a mobile device user with Android OS.

The purpose of these devices is to make life better and easier, but users often ignore the risk of security and privacy.

In the Nokia Threat Intelligence Report 2019, it is stated that among smartphones, Android devices are the most malware target. Furthermore, it is stated that 47.15% of malware distributions in mobile networks originate from Android, 35.82% from Windows / PCs, 16.17% from IoTs and less than 1% from IPhones [2].

According to the report published by Kaspersky, the number of attacks using malicious mobile software was 66.4 million in 2017 and 116.5 million in 2018. Researchers report that the number of attacks is increasing but unique malware is decreasing [3].

In this study, malware detection studies in the literature for mobile devices with the most used android operating system in the world market are examined, threats on mobile devices are specified, a field study was carried out for the awareness of the use of mobile devices by the personnel of a public institution, the answers given in the questionnaire were evaluated. In addition, controls that can be assessed for the inclusion of mobile devices for personal use as well as

corporate purposes in information technology audits to contribute to the management of additional risks for organizations specified, to protect mobile devices, systems and therefore institutions from threats; recommendations are presented, including the use of facilitator, consultancy and auditing roles by internal auditors.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ABOUT MALICIOUS SOFTWARE DETERMINATION STUDIES

When we look at the mobile operating systems in the world market, it is basically the most Android users, so we searched the literature about the detection of malware for Android systems. The number of applications on Android platforms is increasing. However, since the control of applications is insufficient, users can download malware to a large extent. These malware can cause loss of data, money, and so on. Although there are various approaches for detecting malware, it is basically divided into three as static analysis, dynamic analysis and hybrid analysis.

Static analysis examines the downloaded application and source code to look for patterns such as permissions, function calls, and hard-coded variables. It allows detection of malware before it is installed on the device [4].

According to Moser, Kruegel and Kirda, the major advantage of static analysis is that this technique is simple and fast. However, it is a disadvantage that all patterns need to be known in advance and it is difficult to identify new malware without the use of expert or machine learning techniques [5]. Malware can also use confusion techniques in practice to make static analysis even more difficult. In a study by Liu and Liu, malicious software detection was performed with the help of machine learning techniques based on the permissions requested during application installation and the permissions used during application [6]. In a study by Liang and Du, a combination-based method for detecting malware is presented [7]. Droid Detective tool that works offline has been developed. Here, permission combinations that are often requested by malicious applications are obtained, and Droid Detective generates rule sets based on these permission combinations and shows the link between the corresponding malicious behaviors. In the study conducted by Arp, Spreitzenbarth, Hubner, Gascon and Rieck, Machine learning approach was added to the static analysis approach and a tool used to detect malware on Android was presented [8]. With the tool called Drebin, the source code of the android application and its various features, such as application permissions, application programming interface calls and network addresses, are collected using the AndroidManifest file. All of these features come together and are embedded in a vector space and malware detection is performed with the help of the resulting patterns.

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Dynamic analysis does not examine the source code, but controls the behavior of the application during its use. The suspicious application is usually carried out in a controlled virtual environment, also called a sandbox. In the study conducted by Kurniawan, Rosmansyah and Dabarsyah, Logger, an application that can work within the Android platform, was developed [9]. The logger determines the internet traffic used per minute, the percentage of battery used and the temperature of the battery and sends it to the central server. The central server responds to the client by determining whether the application is malware based on the data in the signature database. In the Zhou and Jiang study, Android provides a systematic approach to malware detection [10]. In this study, data sets containing 1260 Android malware from 49 different malware families were used. Malware is characterized by a variety of behavior patterns, such as loading, activity, and transported data. In their study, Chau and Jung tried to solve existing problems such as the fact that emulators are generally slow in performance and contain traces of heuristic emulation, while the actual devices have limitations to improve the efficiency of analysis by the use of a restore mechanism and hardware. They have developed an android container called C-android using Linux container technology to provide a restore mechanism on the device and make the most of the available hardware. It has been found that C-Android can provide better compatibility than other platforms by making applications to compare other approaches with C android, but some applications have also failed [11]. Accordingly, the advantages;

• Since the analysis tools can be moved to the Linux layer, it is possible to create a normal Android environment without the need for internal analysis or rooting tools,

• Anti-emulator, antianalysis and anti-root control provided in some sensitive applications can be skipped,

• Hardware sharing can help provide both full Android and fewer environments,

are counted as. The disadvantage is that the container model is still core-based and vulnerable to container-based attacks. Sun et al. have implemented a system that identifies known and unknown malware because existing applications rely on the virus database [12]. In the system, certain applications that use the installation of a kernel module can be monitored, after detection, related documents are uploaded to the server and dynamic behaviors are recreated. As a result, a behavior diagram is produced. In addition, if the user needs to know if the application is malicious, the corresponding Android package can be sent to the server and analyzed. The results are then calculated and transmitted to the user.

Hybrid analysis is defined as the analysis method in which static analysis and dynamic analysis approaches are used together. In their study, Mao et al. emphasized the blocking of JavaScript function calls in hybrid applications [13]. When the JavaScripthibrit application is running, it reports the function level activity and extracts events from the WebView component to improve the behavior model. The solution in the Android system is prototyped and evaluated using real-world hybrid Android applications. However, it is noted that the detection in this approach is based on the function call relationship and triggering events, despite the effectiveness of the sample investigations, that attackers may be able to inject

and activate the code under the same condition as in the original application, and in such cases the approach may miss injections within the target function.

Li and colleagues in their study, to improve the efficiency of detection of malicious applications running on Android, propose a feature-based malware detection system [14]. A new android platform based on machine learning and feature integration, combining the advantages of static and dynamic detection, and a malware detection framework are proposed.

III. THREATS IN MOBILE DEVICES The fact that mobile devices are a part of our daily lives

has brought many threats and risks. In particular, related the use of mobile phones, in case of the lack of awareness about the devices we use and their security there may be material and moral losses in cases such as theft or loss.

Although the user-selected application does not contain harmful content, it can create security vulnerability if it is not a stable application. The application can be attacked through the wrong code snippets within the application code and these openings can be used against the user [15].

• By means of malicious code deliberately placed in the application, the user can be dominated [15].

• Some applications are able to perform what they intervene by running other applications without the user's approval [16].

• Some applications may access browser or application download services and download and run different applications to mobile devices without the user's permission [15].

• The user's searches, interests, frequently visited sites, shopping preferences, etc. all transactions on the mobile device are examined and according to these data, customized advertisements can be sent to the user without request [17].

• By sending a text message to the toll phone numbers that are unaware of the user, the user can spend money [18].

• In banking transactions, user identification and financial data records can be obtained [19, 20].

• Special information can be accessed by listening to the media via the microphone [19].

• Keylogger-style applications with unauthorized operation on the mobile device, clicked or touched by the user can record every movement [21].

• By capturing the session previously opened by the mobile user, it is possible to bypass the authentication part of the email system [21].

• By capturing the user's IMEI (International Mobile Device ID) number, GPS location information, phone book, device model and serial number, conversation records, installed applications, e-mail information, browser histories and photographs; can be used for blackmail, espionage or financial gain [22].

• By disrupting the service to the mobile device, the device can be rendered unusable or overloaded by

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overloading, causing the device to discharge in a short time [23].

IV. FIELD RESEARCH ON MOBILE DEVICE USER AWARENESS

In this study, a field study was conducted to evaluate mobile device user awareness. The field research was conducted with 120 people among the employees of a public institution using the survey method. The basic topics in the survey are the operating system of the device used, whether the device has antivirus software or applications installed or in use, whether the screen lock is used to prevent unauthorized access to the devices physically, and whether or not the contents of the required access permissions are installed before the application is installed on the devices used for business purposes, and whether these devices used in work- related operations are allowed to be used by different people. In addition, it was assessed whether mobile devices used for personal or corporate purposes are included in the corporate network using wireless internet access provided by the organization. Figure 1 shows screen lock usage percentages by gender.

Fig. 1. Screen lock usage rates for women and men

In this context, 62% of the devices used by the users participating in the study, as shown in Figure 2, is stated to be a mobile device with Android OS while 5% of the users do not even know the operating system of the device they use.

Fig. 2. Operating system usage percentages

99% of the users participating in the study stated that their devices have internet access.

Figure 3 shows the percentages of corporate network usage on personel mobile devices.

In addition, as seen in Figure 4, it is found that users mostly use their mobile devices for internet browsing, personal e-mail access, banking transactions and social media tracking.

Figure 5 shows the permission reading percentage by gender. In this content, 44% of women read permissions, 34% read sometimes, 22% do not. 51% of men read permissions, 37% sometimes read, 12% do not. In addition, according to

the survey, 16% of respondents do not read the application permissions, and 68% of them refuse to install the application because of the application permissions.

According to the answers given, 65% of the users use their mobile devices for business purpose like reading e-mail. Furthermore, 90% of them had access to personal e-mail, 80% had social media tracking, and 65% had mobile shopping on their mobile devices (Figure 6). In addition, 83% did not install applications from outside Playstore or Appstore; 21% of them are currently using antivirus software (Figure 7).

Fig. 3. Corporate network usage

Fig. 4. Intended use of mobile devices

Fig. 5. Permission reading percentage by gender

However, it is seen that 3% of the users using their mobile devices in corporate transactions such as accessing corporate e-mail are IOS users and those people still do not have the antivirus software they use, and even those who emphasize that they are IOS users.

Yes 89%

No 11%

Screen Lock Usage (% of Male

Participants)

Yes 83%

No 17%

Screen Lock Usage (% of Female Participants)

Android 62%

iOS 33%

Not Known 5%

OS Usage (%)

58% 42%

Corparate WiFi Network Usage on Personal Mobile Devices

Using corporate WiFi Not using corporate WiFi

6 9

36 45

62

65

9599

104

107

# of Applications/Purpose Usage on the Mobile Devices

Other

Smart Devices Cont.

Business

Gaming

Corp. e-Mail

Shopping

Social Media

Pers. e-Mail

e-Banking

Web Surfing

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Reading Not reading

Sometimes reading

Men 51% 12% 37%

Women 44% 22% 34%

Permission reading percentage by gender

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Fig. 6. Ratio of participants using mobile devices for business purposes and other uses of these users

Fig. 7. Awareness of participants about mobile devices using mobile devices for business purposes

V. AUDIT APPROACH FOR MOBILE DEVICES The widespread use of mobile devices enables people to

work independently of place and time and makes life easier with many applications.

For these reasons, in most institutions other than private life, users can also monitor, control and communicate business with their own devices or with the mobile devices that the institution gives them, even creating documents.

In this context, regulations are also made regarding the use of mobile devices in public institutions in our country.

First of all, in organizations that use mobile devices in their work, updating the information technology architecture structures to include mobile devices and systems, processes, policies, procedures, data, infrastructure and employees will ensure compliance, physical security and information security and privacy risks are considered at the level of mobile technology in investment, controls and audits.

When the threat areas related to mobile technology are considered in three categories as devices, infrastructure, people; while the risks in the threat area associated with people can only be reduced with awareness, control tests to reduce the risk of data loss, unauthorized access and fraud related to the device and infrastructure are proposed as follows [24]:

Tests to reduce the risks in the threat area associated with device;

• Encryption of the data at rest in the mobile device application is set to Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128, 192 or 256.

• Encryption of data is enforced for data in transit using Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and strong security protocols such as:

a. Web access—HTTPS vs. HTTP

b. File transfer—FTPS, SFTP, SCP, WebDAV over HTTPS vs. FTP, RCP

c. Security protocols—Transport Layer Security (TLS).

• Binary protections are standard protocol for application development life cycle and enforced by the development team at time of application coding and maintenance.

• Mobile application management (MAM) is utilized to manage access and deployment of the application. Additionally, proper whitelists and blacklists are maintained. Examples of MAM services include MobileIron, Airwatch and Apperian, providing a central online location for distribution and tracking purpose.

• A governance structure is in place for mobile app life cycle management, specifically, the release of mobile applications to the application store and modification of future releases.

• The application is signed using the enterprise account of the company’s enterprise account certificate.

• Enterprise applications that are released to company employees or contractors using companyowned devices utilize a remote mobile management software, such as MobileIron, to facilitate remote wiping.

Tests to reduce the risks in the threat area associated with infrastructure;

• Transmission of data utilizes, at a minimum, SSL or TLS—both cryptographic protocols for secure transmission of data.

Using for Business

65%

Other 35%

Usage Rate

7%

10%

46%

65%

80%

90%

94%

94%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other

Smart Devices Cont.

Gaming

Shopping

Social Media

Pers. e-Mail

e-Banking

Web Surfing

Other Uses of Business Users

21%

35%

49%

74%

83%

91%

94%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Antivirus App Using

Authorized Usage

Reading Application Permissions

Updating without Delay

Installing App from Official Store

Screen Lock Using

Installation Rejection due to App's Permissions

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• Connection protocols for the uniform resource locator (URL) via TLS are through HTTPS rather than HTTP to securely connect to a URL.

• Proper packet filtering setup is built in to verify source address and blocking packets with conflicting source address. Utilization of TLS, Secure Shell (SSH) and HTTPS is enabled for secure communication protocol.

• Processes exist for the deployment of system patches for all applicable systems. Processes exist for identifying new patches or for notification of new patches from vendors. The system is current with the latest patches prescribed from central IT. If any vulnerability scans have been performed, patches have been applied to address any identified issues. Missing patches are identified and compared against documented formal exceptions from security team.

• All applicable web servers have been assigned both technical and business system owners, as required. The defined roles and responsibilities are adequate, especially for internal and thirdparty personnel.

• Lock-out protocols are enabled for accounts with multiple incorrect password attempts. Utilization of CAPTCHA (program that distinguishes between humans and computers) is recommended to avoid DoS.

• Access to database is limited to appropriate individuals, and proper access reviews and documented system accounts are kept on file. All default accounts and passwords are disabled by enforcing strict password controls.

• Input validation technique is in place; specifically defined rules for type and syntax against key business rules exist.

• Sanitization of application user data coming from the mobile application is properly protected through embedded logic checks within the application. Proper implementation of logic checks is enabled at the server side.

• The database server is properly tested and hardened against malicious attack. Login forms have HTTPS required. SSL connections are mandatory.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF MOBILE DEVICES

Users should be aware of the value of mobile devices and the data inside, and be careful about moving them safely, and forgetting, losing or stealing. Furthermore, the measures that can be taken regarding security are listed below:

• User awareness of application permissions and requirements should be high, access rights should be queried and applications requiring unnecessary permissions should not be preferred [15].

• During application installation, the criteria of the application, such as certificates or electronic signatures, should be checked for reliability [16].

• Antiviral software and applications that detect both viruses and spyware should be used [25].

• The data considered to be important should not be kept in the device, if it is to be kept encrypted, [22, 26, 27].

• The data stored on the mobile device should be backed up regularly and very important data should never be kept only on the mobile device [23].

• Wi-Fi and bluetooth access should be turned off when not in use [23, 26].

• Application usage rate and battery information should be compared and sould be check whether the unaware application is running in the background [23, 26].

• Applications not to be used should not be downloaded to the phone [15].

• Gift phone should not be taken [28].

• The remote data wipe and lock feature must be activated [28].

• Passwords used in mobile devices should not be easily predictable [23, 27].

• The IMEI number must be registered against the risk of theft or loss of the mobile device [23].

• All files copied and downloaded to the mobile device should be used after virus scanning [23].

• Mobile device application developers should be aware of vulnerabilities in operating systems and develop applications accordingly [29].

• Mobile device manufacturers should deliver the device to the user with antivirus software installed [30].

• Telephone operators should educate their customers on how to identify and protect mobile viruses [30].

• The “secure internet” service provided by the operators must be utilized [15].

• In mobile devices using network and internet connections, the firewall should be installed and kept open at all times [22].

• The network applications of the devices should be turned off or the ‘visibility’ option should be set to ‘hidden’. Sales personnel should provide information to users to ensure that these features are used [23].

• Mobile devices must be set up to require authentication for access [23].

• The scope of crimes committed in mobile environments should be determined and legal regulations should be made on this issue [23].

• Rights related to downloaded applications should be known [15].

• Awareness should be raised that users themselves are responsible for all actions taken, even if they do not have the knowledge and permission [15, 23].

• Awareness trainings should be organized in order to raise the awareness that the security of mobile devices is a part of personal and corporate information security.

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VII. RESULT The use of smart phones in daily life and business life is

increasing rapidly with the life becoming mobile in recent years. Occasionally, confidential information or documents can be received by malicious people via mobile phones. Only applications that analyze malware cannot block malicious people. User awareness is very important here. Awareness training and malware analysis are required. In general, awareness training is provided through external institutions. However, internal audit mechanisms exist in the institutions and there are internal auditors who are knowledgeable about this subject. Internal auditors in institutions should be used at this point, and given roles such as consultants, facilitators or trainers on risk analysis and awareness issues. Internal auditors should consider that the mobile systems integrate with the information technologies in their institutions. They should assist senior management to provide reasonable assurance that the risks are appropriately controlled in their audits. Most importantly, it should be remembered that it is very important for users to become aware of the data security practices and their permissions.

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