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Psychology of Sport and Exercise 9 (2008) 721–728

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Review

A critique of the development of the Competitive Aggressiveness and Anger Scale

John H. Kerr

Faculty of Health and Sport Sciences, Kokushikan University, 7-3-1 Nagayama, Tama, Tokyo 206 8515, Japan

Received 11 June 2007; received in revised form 14 December 2007; accepted 2 January 2008

Available online 12 January 2008

Abstract

Objectives: In order to really understand aggression in sports, it is important that psychological research on the topic

remains well founded, valid and grounded in reality. The Competitive Aggressiveness and Anger Scale (CAAS) [Maxwell,

J. P., & Moores, E. (2007). The development of a short scale for measuring aggressiveness and anger in competitive

athletes. Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 8, 179–193], which purports to measure aggressiveness and anger in competitive

athletes, has recently been developed. The present critique highlights a number of shortcomings in the rationale behind

the scale and its development.

Design: This critique will focus on three major problem areas. These are: (1) the definition of aggression in sports

adopted by the scale’s developers; (2) the ‘‘one size fits all’’ element in the thinking behind the scale’s development; (3) the

nature of the CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items.

Results: The approach taken in the development of CAAS means that the scale, as it is currently formulated, can offer

only an incomplete understanding and measurement of anger and aggressiveness in sports. Among other things, the

measure ignores a whole range of frequently occurring legal, sanctioned aggressive and violent behaviour in sports. In

addition, it ignores sources of motivation beyond anger which underpin other types of aggressive and violent behaviour in

sports.

r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Anger and aggressiveness in sports; Sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression in sports

Contents

The general definition of aggression in sports adopted by the scale’s developers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 722

The ‘‘one size fits all’’ element in the thinking behind the development of the CAAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 723

The CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724

Concluding comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727

e front matter r 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

ychsport.2008.01.001

ess: [email protected]

ARTICLE IN PRESS J.H. Kerr / Psychology of Sport and Exercise 9 (2008) 721–728722

A new short scale, the Competitive Aggressiveness and Anger Scale (CAAS; Maxwell & Moores, 2007) has been developed purportedly to measure aggressiveness and anger in competitive athletes. However, there are a number of shortcomings in the rationale behind the scale and its development which need to be addressed in the interests of keeping psychological inquiry into aspects of aggression in sports well founded, valid and grounded in reality.

This critique will focus on three major shortcomings associated with the development of CAAS and present arguments to support the points being made. The problems with the scale concern: (1) the definition of aggression in sports adopted by the scale’s developers; (2) the ‘‘one size fits all’’ element in the thinking behind the scale’s development; (3) the nature of the CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items.

The general definition of aggression in sports adopted by the scale’s developers

The construction of a scale can only really be valid if the definitions, concepts and rationale underlying the scale are realistic and meaningful. Although not stated directly by the authors, the definition of aggression in sports used in the thinking behind the development of CAAS appears to be one previously used by Maxwell (2004):

y any [intentional] behaviour, not recognized as legal within the official rules of conduct, directed towards an opponent, official, team-mate or spectator who is motivated to avoid such behaviour (p. 280). This definition concurs with the International Society of Sport Psychology (ISSP) position stand and acknowledges the role of legitimacy (Tenenbaum, Stewart, Singer, & Duda, 1997). (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 180)

Definitions of aggression and violence in sports, and particularly the stance taken in the ISSP position stand, have been discussed at length in previous publications (Kerr, 1999, 2002; Tenenbaum, Sacks, Miller, Golden, & Doolin, 2000; Tenenbaum et al., 1997). It is not the purpose here to revisit those discussions in depth, but merely to precise some of the main points which are directly relevant to the definition quoted above.

Maxwell’s (2004) definition takes a rather limited view of aggression in sports for at least three reasons. First, the definition makes no allowance for sports, like team contact sports (e.g., rugby, American football, Aussie Rules football, ice hockey), where certain types of aggression (and violence) are an intrinsic, legal and acceptable or sanctioned part of the play (Kerr, 2006). Second, in some sports (e.g., rugby union, rugby league) the rules or laws are in some circumstances superceded by player norms and what players perceive as acceptable or unacceptable aggression. Ice hockey is an even more extreme example where ‘‘fighting’’ is technically against the rules, but is accepted by players and coaches and tolerated by administrators (Colburn, 1985, 1989; Dryden, 2004). Third, in some sports, especially those mentioned above as examples, players are not generally ‘‘motivated to avoid such behaviour’’. Rather, they are motivated to play game after game knowing that they are liable to be subject to both legal and illegal, sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression (and violence). As Kerr (1997, pp. 115–116) put it:

In general, aggression can be seen as unprovoked hostility or attacks on another person which are not sanctioned by society. However, in the sports context, the aggression is provoked in the sense that two opposing teams have willingly agreed to compete against each other. Aggression in team contact sports is intrinsic and sanctioned, provided the plays remain permissible within the boundaries of certain rules, which act as a kind of contract in the pursuit of aggression (and violence) between consenting adults.

This working definition of aggression and violence in team contact sports takes into account the special nature of sanctioned aggression and violence in sports. This is a view shared by several other observers of aggression and violence in sports in the psychology literature (e.g., Apter, 1982; Russell, 1993; Smith, 1983), but not apparently by Maxwell (2004) and Maxwell and Moores (2007, p. 180). Maxwell and Moores (2007, p. 180) stated that Maxwell’s definition ‘‘concurs with the ISSP position stand and acknowledges the role of legitimacy’’. However, one of the major problems with the ISSP position stand (Tenenbaum et al., 1997) was the lack of a clear and comprehensive definition of aggression in sports. If Maxwell and Moores (2007) definition does indeed concur with the ISSP position stand, then this supposed agreement does not provide validation for using his definition as the authors suggest, but rather damns it by association with a flawed

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document that ‘‘failed to provide a real understanding of the motivation behind aggression and violence in sport (especially team contact sports like rugby and Australian Rules football)’’ (Kerr, 1999, p. 83).

What Kerr (1999, 2002) was arguing for was recognition by psychologists that sports is a special context, different from everyday life, in which there are two

1 types of aggression (and violence). One type is legal (while

it remains within the rules or laws of the sports) and sanctioned aggressive violent physical contact, which is a source of pleasure, satisfaction and enjoyment for the athletes involved (e.g., in team contact sports). The second type of aggression involves illegal (outside the rules or laws of the sports) and unsanctioned aggressive and violent acts which are of a fundamentally different nature (underhand, malicious or treacherous) than legal and sanctioned aggressive and violent plays (Russell, 1993; Smith, 1973; Theberge, 1999).

As should be apparent from the distinction between legal and illegal, sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression detailed in the original two papers (Kerr, 1999, 2002) and outlined in the previous paragraph, Maxwell and Moores (2007) misrepresented Kerr’s (1999, 2002) stance when they stated:

The argument put forward by Kerr (and others) states that aggression is an accepted part of many sports (e.g., American football and boxing) and should be acknowledged as such. Merely redefining these acts as non-aggressive simply because they are accepted (or sanctioned in Kerr’s terms) does nothing to change their nature and the harmful intentions of the perpetrator. (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 180)

While the first part of this quote is correct, the second part is clearly erroneous. In addition, the authors skirted the real issues raised by Kerr (1999, 2002) and more recently by Kerr (2006).

To summarize, the approach taken in the development of CAAS takes into account only illegal, unsanctioned aggressive and violent acts in sports and therefore can only offer incomplete measurement and understanding. The CAAS, as it is currently formulated, ignores a whole range of frequently occurring legal, sanctioned aggressive and violent behaviour in sports.

The ‘‘one size fits all’’ element in the thinking behind the development of the CAAS

The scale’s developers stated that:

The CAAS was developed using participants from a number of individual and team sports, but no attempt was made to distinguish possible construct differences between sports. This decision was taken because a general measure of aggressiveness and anger was sought that could be used for virtually any type of sport. (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 189)

Lumping performers from different individual and team sports together is not meaningful because of the extreme differences in the nature of aggression between different types of sports. For example, what constitutes sanctioned and unsanctioned or legal and illegal aggression in racquet sports, such as tennis, badminton and squash, is very different from sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression in team sports like basketball. Similarly, there are also very specific differences between sanctioned and unsanctioned, or legal and illegal aggression (and violence) in combat sports. Judo, karate, boxing and K1 or ‘‘ultimate fighting’’ could be grouped together as combat sports, but the difference between the two former and the two latter, in terms of legitimate sanctioned aggression and violence, is enormous. While karate and judo have strict codes of conduct, the use of physical violence to deliberately injure opponents is the main objective of boxing and K1 fighting and fighters become expert at landing blows where they will do the most damage (e.g., Jefferson, 1998, p. 83; Patmore, 1979, p. 175). Even though boxing and K1 fighting are admittedly extreme examples (they do have some rules which must be adhered to), they are mentioned here to underline the sports-specific nature of sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression in sports. As a result, attempts to construct a ‘‘one size fits all’’ measure of aggressiveness are misguided.

1 There is a ‘‘grey area’’ which exists in some sports between sanctioned and unsanctioned aggression and violence. This concerns what

have been termed the ‘‘unwritten rules of the game’’ and ‘‘player norms as to acceptable aggressive and violent behaviour in specific

sports’’ (Kerr, 2006, pp. 66–68). These are technically illegal acts of aggression or violence that are accepted by the players in certain

circumstances.

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The inexact approach of the scale’s developers is evident in the sampling used in the various phases of the development of the CAAS. For example, in Phase III: exploratory factor analysis (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 183), the scale’s developers grouped together participants from various sports, ‘‘such as football, hockey, rugby, tennis and squash’’ in their analysis. To group together athletes from these and other (unidentified) sports is not meaningful.

In addition, there is a general lack of detail about the sporting backgrounds of most of the other samples of respondents utilized. In Phase II (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 183), no details are given about the sporting backgrounds of the sample of sports science lecturers and M.Sc. students, other than the statement that all ‘‘participated or had participated in competitive sports’’. There is thus the possibility that many performed sports in which aggression is absent or so ‘‘tame’’ as to be negligible (e.g., tennis, badminton or golf). If so, the ability of these respondents to make valid judgments based on their own experience about the severity of scale items dealing with aggression in sports is questionable. The same is true in Phases IV and V (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 184), where respondents were identified simply as ‘‘athletes’’. Only in Phase VI did Maxwell and Moores (2007, p. 184) use players from one specific sports (football).

In the Results section, under the heading ‘‘Norms’’, the results of an analysis of CAAS data comparing male and female contact and non-contact sports participants (obtained by combining the general samples of athletes in Phases III and IV, n ¼ 539), was presented in Table 5 (Maxwell & Moores, 2007). This analysis and table comes as somewhat of a surprise, as no previous mention of this analysis (as a possible Phase VII) was made in the Method section. Also, no details of the allocation of specific sports to contact and non-contact groups were provided. This would appear to be another example of lumping large number of participants from unrelated sports together. No important differences between these groups were found for CAAS Anger (which might have been expected if Maxwell & Moores’ (2007) arguments about the connection between anger and aggressiveness were correct), but a significant effect for CAAS aggressiveness was obtained. However, the fact that there is a difference in aggressiveness between athletes in contact and non-contact sports is self- evident and this result does little to provide support for the CAAS, or further understanding of the true nature of aggression in sports.

The present author would argue that, in spite of the statistical associations obtained, any test development procedure could only be valid and meaningful if the respondents are separated into individual sports or possibly small groups of sports where the nature of any aggression, and athletes’ experience of it, might be similar.

The CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness items

According to the scale’s developers, the process of item selection ‘‘was adopted to maximize content and face validities’’ (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 182). They examined items from existing scales which reflected anger, acceptance of aggressive behaviour and aggressiveness but did not provide specific details of which items from which particular existing scales were selected. These existing scales were presumably the same scales that they had previously argued in the Introduction were problematic for use in sports for a number of reasons, including non-applicability of items and inability to account for differences between sports (Buss–Durkee Hostility Inventory; Buss & Durkee, 1957; Buss–Perry Aggression Questionnaire (AQ); Buss & Perry, 1992), and lack of internal reliability, questionable face validity and lack of severity of items (Bredemeier Athlete Aggression Inventory; Bredemeier, 1975, 1978).

The scale’s developers then arrived at a pool of 15 items and modified the wording ‘‘to reflect competitive situations and possible provocateurs (e.g., opponent, coach, officials)’’ (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 182). In addition, a group of 11 items which addressed hostile and instrumental aggression were also considered for inclusion, but later rejected because the developers thought that they did not fit with the development of a general measure of aggressiveness or anger. Again, no source or reference was provided for these 11 items, and no previous explanation of the concepts of so-called ‘‘hostile’’ and ‘‘instrumental’’ aggression was provided in the Introduction. The original 15 items were not provided and the argument for acceptance or rejection of items was not convincing. The 12 items remaining following factor analysis were listed. There were six items each for anger and aggressiveness.

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Psychological scales are valid when they measure what they are intended to measure. Do the items included in the CAAS Anger and Aggressiveness subscales really stand up to scrutiny in terms of face and content validity for the intention of measuring aggression as it occurs at the cutting edge in sports? Consider the Anger subscale items:

I become irritable if I am disadvantaged during a match. I feel bitter towards my opponent if I lose. I get mad when I lose points. I show my irritation when frustrated during a game. I find it difficult to control my temper during a match. Official’s [sic] mistakes make me angry.

First, in general, the terminology used in several of these items (e.g., irritable, irritated, bitter) is not representative of the high arousal emotion anger. Also, feeling ‘‘bitter’’ is concerned with experiencing resentment rather than anger. Second, these items are mostly relevant to non-contact sports and would appear to make little sense when applied to, for example, combat or team contact sports.

For example, was Vancouver’s Bertuzzi feeling ‘‘irritated’’ with Colorado opponent Moore during a recent NHL ice hockey game when he punched him on the head from behind and continued to try to land another punch and drive his face into the ice when the two players fell down (Kerr, 2006)? Was French international soccer player Zidane showing his ‘‘irritation’’ with Italian defender Materazzi when he head-butted him near the end of the recent 2006 World Cup Final (Kerr, 2007)? The short answer is that both Betrtuzzi and Zidane were feeling intensely angry, not just merely irritated, when they committed their violent acts. There is an obvious mismatch between the raw violence in these recent examples and the terminology used in CAAS’ rather weak Anger items.

The Aggressiveness subscale items include:

Violent behaviour, directed towards an opponent, is acceptable. It is acceptable to use illegal physical force to gain an advantage. I taunt my opponents to make them lose concentration. I use excessive force to gain an advantage. I verbally insult opponents to distract them. Opponents accept a certain degree of abuse.

Careful consideration of the Aggressiveness items reveals a number of problems. First, item 1 contains the first mention of the term ‘‘violence’’ in the paper (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 188); however, the relationship of violence to aggression was not previously established by the CAAS developers. They might have used the explanation of the relationship between the two concepts given by Smith (1983, p. 3) (to whom they referred in their paper), when he stated that ‘‘physical violence represents the end point on a continuum of aggressive behaviour, it is the most extreme form of aggression’’. Also, Maxwell and Moores (2007) use the word violence only in a limited negative sense. Others have conceptualized the term ‘‘violence in sports’’ in a broader sense, as applying both to violent action, as in a severe or violent collision or tackle (legal or sanctioned), and to physical force employed (especially in an unsanctioned illegal way) so as to damage or injure (Atyeo, 1979; Kerr, 2006; Russell, 1993; Smith, 1983).

Second, three of these items (Violent behaviour, directed towards an opponent, is acceptable; It is acceptable to use illegal physical force to gain an advantage; Opponents accept a certain degree of abuse) are asking respondents about their attitudes towards, or beliefs about aggression in sports, rather than how aggressive or violent they themselves are in sports situations. Anyone who has been involved in team contact sports knows that while many players would agree that the use of illegal physical force might be necessary under certain circumstances, not all players actively engage in it.

Third, there are two very similar items dealing with verbal aggression (I taunt my opponents to make them lose concentration; I verbally insult opponents to distract them). In a subscale of only six items, why would it be necessary to have two items which are so very similar? In addition, in many sports verbal aggression, as described in these items, is not actually against the rules or laws of the sports. For example, verbal aggression

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is commonplace in soccer, and other examples include ‘‘trash talking’’ in NBA basketball and ‘‘sledging’’ in International cricket. Consequently, the inclusion of verbal aggression items is also at odds with Maxwell’s (2004) definition which specifically mentioned ‘‘behaviour, not recognized as legal within the official rules of conduct’’.

Fourth, given the fact that virtually all acts of unsanctioned aggression and violence can be classified as acts of intimidation or retaliation (Kerr, 2006, p. 68), it is perhaps surprising that there are no items which specifically highlight these two types of aggression and violence among the six CAAS Aggressiveness subscale items. Looking back at the item development procedure in more detail, the 11 discarded ‘‘hostile and instrumental’’ aggression items, mentioned above, may have included items of this type. At least one of the two items provided as examples (If I was hit by an opponent I would hit back), would appear to be concerned with retaliation, but it was excluded on the grounds that ‘‘it was not always possible to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate use of force’’ (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 182). Here, suddenly, the CAAS developers have brought in the notion of sanctioned aggression and violence in sports as a basis for choosing their test items, in spite of rejecting this distinction in their Introduction section. Excluding this item, and other possible items dealing with intimidation and retaliation, was surely a misjudgment in a scale to measure anger and aggressiveness in sports.

Fifth, the Aggressiveness subscale items are all concerned with behaviour or attitudes towards opponents, even though the CAAS developers stated that ‘‘Wording was modified to reflect competitive situations and possible provocateurs (e.g., opponent, coach, officials)’’ (Maxwell & Moores, 2007, p. 182) and Maxwell’s (2004, p. 280) definition of aggression in sports specifically mentioned ‘‘behaviour not recognized as legal within the official rules of conduct, directed towards an opponent, official, team-mate or spectator’’. Somewhere in the process of producing an all-embracing measure of anger and aggressiveness in sports, coaches and officials and possibly team-mates and spectators were somehow overlooked.

A last general point about items in any measure of aggression and violence in sports is that they must be realistic and meaningful to those who play, or perhaps coach the sports. Silver (1998) described an incident involving American footballer Kevin Gogan, a 60700 330 pound guard who played for the San Francisco 49ers:

y amid the pushing and grabbing he saw a smidgen of daylight between himself and Neil Smith, the Denver Broncos defensive end who seconds earlier, in retaliation for a punch in the chest, had slugged Gogan in the back of the head. Even if he deserves it, Gogan doesn’t take a poke from anybody, and Smith was about to experience the swift kick of injustice. ‘‘It was amazing’’, Gogan recalls. ‘‘All of a sudden, this space opened that was the perfect size for me to get my leg through and kick him in the nuts.’’ y ‘‘The referee told me it was the most vicious kick to the groin he had seen in 23 years’’. (Silver, 1998, p. 48)

How would Gogan have responded to the CAAS items, if he had been asked to complete the questionnaire? Would those items have been realistic, specific and subtle enough to provide a real insight into his ongoing aggressive and violent behaviour with Smith and others in American football? These are, of course, hypothetical questions, but they are the type of questions that scale developers should be asking themselves when developing scales for measuring aggressive and violent behaviour in sports, especially when considering the face and content validity of their scale items.

For researchers, the CAAS would appear to have few advantages (and several disadvantages) for predicting athletic aggression in sports settings, over the AQ (Bushman & Wells, 1998; Buss & Perry, 1992). As mentioned earlier, the AQ was one of the scales rejected by Maxwell and Moores (2007) as a source of items for the CAAS. Evidence of the AQ’s psychometric features, including the critically important property of predictive validity, is well established and extensive. Although not a measure developed specifically for use in sports, Bushman and Wells (1998), for example, in a study of competitive ice hockey involving Iowa high school athletes over a full season, provided evidence of the AQ’s predictive validity in a sports context.

Concluding comments

Three major problems were at focus in this critique of the CAAS and its development. These were (1) The general definition of aggression in sports adopted by the scale developers. (2) The ‘‘one size fits all’’ element in

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the thinking behind CAAS’ development. (3) The CAAS Anger and Aggression items. Each of these problems was discussed in detail above and arguments presented to support a critical counter-view.

In defence of the procedures they adopted, the CAAS developers may argue that they followed the standard procedures for scale development and obtained satisfactory results from their statistical analyses. However, no matter how powerful factor analytic associations may turn out to be, they do not compensate for lack of construct validity. If the thinking behind the scale is erroneous and the items are not truly representative of authentic aggressive and violent behaviour in specific sports contexts then the whole exercise becomes flawed.

Angry aggressive and violent acts do take place in sports (e.g., Kerr, 2006, 2007), but there are also other types of unsanctioned, illegal aggressive and violent acts which have different underlying motivation. These are thrill violence and power violence (Kerr, 2006). Thrill violence has no real purpose beyond being carried out for the thrill of physical confrontation and the pleasure associated with breaking rules. It is concerned with immediate gratification and pleasant high arousal experience (e.g., a player deliberately starts a punch-up just for ‘‘kicks’’). In contrast to thrill violence, power violence does have a purpose and is used to dominate and subjugate opponents in a cold, calculated way (e.g., boxing and K1 fighting or the ‘‘enforcers’’ used in NHL ice hockey to fight with opponents). A fourth type, concerned only with legal sanctioned acts is play violence and occurs when people take part in sports where they can enjoy the pleasures of this type of violence in the relatively safe and controlled environment of organized sports (e.g., fixed playing area, a set of laws or rules, match official) (Kerr, 2006; Russell, 1993; Smith, 1983; Theberge, 1999).

If the psychological inquiry into aggression in sports is to be kept valid and grounded in reality, then there are a number of elements which need to be addressed in scale development. For any scale developed to measure aggression and violence in sports to be truly comprehensive, it needs to include subscales that encompass both sanctioned and unsanctioned acts by addressing play, anger, thrill and power violence and including items which are realistic, meaningful, and probably sports specific. In this way, by truly understanding aggression and violence in sports, sports psychologists are more likely to gain the respect of athletes, coaches and administrators.

Any response to this critique by the authors of the CAAS development paper or other interested observers would be welcomed.

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