Compare the differences in the US foreign policy to Guatemala between the Bush II and Trump administrations.

CHAPTER 5

FRAMING AND THE POLIHEURISTIC THEORY OF DECISION: THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AND THE 1954 U.S.-LED COUP IN GUATEMALA

Michelle M.Taylor-Robinson and Steven B. Redd

Introduction

On June 27, 1954, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán of Guatemala re-signed. His government was threatened with an invasion by a group of exiles led by Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas who were part of a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–sponsored covert operation to overthrow Arbenz. Militarily, Castillo Armas’s small band of exiles had not been very successful; however, the intensive psychological battle being waged by the CIA was very intimidating to the people of Guatemala City, the Guatemalan military, and even to President Arbenz. Arbenz felt certain the Guatemalan military could defeat Castillo Armas, but his concern was that the United States would send its own military to invade if he did not back down (Gleijeses 1991, 317–322). Thus, the United States brought an end to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944 and the democratic government it established.The United Fruit Company also got rid of a government that seriously threatened its interests in Guatemala and throughout the region of Central America.This brief period of reform and progress in Guatemala was

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replaced by a succession of military-led authoritarian regimes and more than three decades of instability and guerrilla warfare.

This chapter uses the case of the 1954 U.S.-led coup in Guatemala to illustrate how a third party can attempt to frame a situation to bring about a desired foreign policy outcome. Specifically, we utilize the poliheuristic theory of decision and the concept of framing to more fully understand U.S. actions in Guatemala. This case has long been a subject of debate among scholars concerning the reasons for U.S. intervention, particularly whether the decision was based on Cold War security concerns or eco- nomic considerations.We argue that the United Fruit Company was mo- tivated by its own economic concerns but recognized that those concerns alone were not sufficient to induce the U.S. government to take action against the Arbenz regime. Hence, United Fruit framed events in Guatemala, through the U.S. press and contacts within the U.S. govern- ment, as a Cold War threat to the United States.We contend that framing and lobbying by a third party (the United Fruit Company) constrained President Eisenhower’s choice set and led him to the decision to authorize a covert operation to overthrow President Arbenz.

The stage began to be set for U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1944 when a popular revolutionary uprising overthrew the longtime dictator, General Jorge Ubico, who had ruled the country since 1931. Ubico came to power as a result of the world depression and its harsh impact on Guatemala’s economy. In response to growing working class unrest, the Guatemalan elite decided that they needed a strong leader, and General Ubico was their choice (Gleijeses 1991, 11). The “revolution” that over- threw Ubico was a spontaneous uprising by “frustrated and idealistic urban middle-class groups” (Ebel 1996, 458; see also Schneider 1958, 10–11). Al- though Ubico had succeeded in balancing the country’s budget, reducing graft, and building some infrastructure, his was a staid government that re- lied on repression to silence opposition and strikes and unpaid, forced labor to build public works projects. He was also an old-style dictator in his dealings with the United States and with United Fruit (UFCO). He cooperated with the company, gave it the policy concessions it wanted, and did not in any way threaten its lopsided, profitable arrangement in Guatemala (Gleijeses 1991, 11–22; Melville and Melville 1971, 21–22; Schneider 1958, 6–9).

In 1944, what started out as a teachers’ strike grew, ending with the ouster of Ubico and then the election of Dr. Juan José Arévalo to the pres- idency. Arévalo’s rhetoric of spiritual socialism and passage of a labor code threatened the Guatemalan elite and United Fruit, and began to concern the United States. However, Arévalo served out his six-year term, which

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