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Ethnic and Racial Studies

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Panethnicity in the United States: A theoretical framework

David Lopez & Yen Espiritu

To cite this article: David Lopez & Yen Espiritu (1990) Panethnicity in the United States: A theoretical framework, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 13:2, 198-224, DOI: 10.1080/01419870.1990.9993669

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Panethnicity in the United States: a theoretical framework

David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

Abstract

Panethnicity - the development of bridging organizations and the generalization of solidarity among ethnic subgroups - is important theoretically because it focuses attention on ethnic change, and allows one to assess the relative importance of structural and cultural factors. In this article we present a framework for the study of panethnicity, generate research questions from this framework, and then test these questions by examining panethnicity within four broad racial/ethnic groupings: Asian Americans, Native Americans, Indo Americans and Latinos in the United States. A review of these four cases demonstrates that those groups with the greatest cross- subgroup structural similarity (Asian Americans and Indo Americans) also display the greatest panethnic development and potential, despite their considerable cultural diversity. This suggests that structural factors are more important for understanding the development of panethnicity and, by extension, for understanding ethnic change generally.

Though little studied,1 panethnicity - the development of bridging organizations and solidarities among subgroups of ethnic collectivities that are often seen as homogeneous by outsiders - is an essential part of ethnic change. Indeed, in the United States today it may well be supplanting both assimilation and ethnic particularism as the direction of change for racial/ethnic minorities. In this article we first present a theoretical framework which specifies factors that facilitate and inhibit panethnicity. Within this framework, we review panethnicity among four sets of ethnic subgroups in the United States: Asian Americans, Native Americans, Indo Americans and Latinos.2 We conclude with a discussion of the relative importance of structural and cultural factors for understanding panethnicity.

None of the founding fathers of sociology foresaw a prominent role for race and ethnicity in industrial societies.3 However, subsequent developments have demonstrated that racial and ethnic divisions

Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 13 Number 2 April 1990 © Routledge 1990 0141-9870/90/1302-0198 $3-/l

Panethnicity in the USA 199

continue to define lines of social order (and disorder) throughout the world. Exploitation, oppression and even genocide on the basis of race and ethnicity have been sadly characteristic of the twentieth century. Ethnic cohesion and competition have been correspondingly vigorous, and play at least as strong a role in political and social processes today as they did at the beginning of the century. In recent decades the painful process of decolonization called attention to the complexities of race and ethnicity in the Third World, and how these complexities rebound back on the centre of industrial capitalism (Rex 1983; Horowitz 1985). For example, the migration of non-whites to Australia, Europe and the United States has increasingly transformed ethnic questions into racial issues.

Some two decades ago the black Civil Rights Movement re- awakened US sociologists and others to the continuing significance of race in America, and led to increased political awareness among other racial/ethnic groups seeking redress for past and present wrongs. An emphasis on change had been at the centre of research on race and ethnicity in the United States since at least the time of Park. But the earlier emphasis had been on establishing determinate models of transformation such as 'ethnic succession' and, later, 'assimilation'. The general idea was that all newly-arriving groups to this nation of immigrants went through fundamentally the same stages of cultural, economic and social incorporation (Gordon 1964). In contrast, one new school of thought (Blauner 1972), made a sharp distinction between the experiences of European and non-white groups in the United States, arguing that the latter were kept in a state of 'internal colonialism'. Another line of revisionism argued that ethnic conscious- ness, rather than gradually disappearing, actually developed and increased as part of the American experience (Yancey, Ericksen and Juliani 1976).

A variety of theories have sought to account for this persistence. Ultimately, the same question underlies them all: the relative importance of external constraints and economic interests as opposed to internal, cultural factors in determining the meaning and develop- ment of ethnic and racial categories, hostilities and solidarities. Those scholars who stress the latter emphasize that ethnic bonds are an extension of family feeling, and perhaps even genetic processes (Schermerhorn 1970; van den Berghe 1981; Horowitz 1985). Culture is seen as a representation of collective consciousness and solidarity. Structuralists, in contrast, emphasize the dependence of ethnic and racial categories on such factors as capitalist expansion, class and immigration patterns. Ethnicity is inherently mutable, subject to a combination of broad political and economic patterns (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Rex 1983; Geschwender 1988). Rational choice theorists focus on individual responses to these forces and how individual rationality affects ethnic borders (Banton 1983).

200 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

In the context of this debate panethnicity merits greater attention for two reasons. First, as a process, it focuses attention on ethnic change, and thus touches on many of the central theoretical questions in the sociology of ethnicity. Most contemporary researchers, whatever their theoretical perspectives, view ethnicity as a dynamic rather than static social phenomenon. But there is considerable disagreement over the forces behind the dynamics. When ethnic categories are, or appear to be, essentially stable, it is difficult to choose from among the various approaches to ethnicity. But the ebb and flow of panethnic tendencies obliges one to attend to the forces behind these changes.

Second, panethnicity may well be emerging as a significant empirical alternative to either assimilation or ethnic particularism, at least in the United States. Several authors have argued that panethnic generaliza- tion is essentially part of a more general assimilation process (Sarna 1978; Vecoli 1983). For earlier European ethnic groups this may well have been the case. Nelli (1970), for example, has shown how immigrants from different parts of Italy fused their regional distinctive- ness into a general Italian-American identity, as a step towards assimilation. But on both organizational and interpersonal levels panethnicity may well be providing a third way for the four 'peoples of colour' considered here. As often happens in the social sciences, our model of panethnicity may amount to little more than the recognition of an emerging social fact.

The central question to ask of panethnic developments is the degree to which they represent genuine generalization of ethnic solidarity and identity, as opposed to alliances of convenience. Our data relate primarily to organizations but we believe that they allow us to determine which panethnic political developments involve ethnic generalization at the level of individuals, and which are no more than alliances of convenience, devoid of any ethnic solidarity. We shall argue that the most effective panethnic developments have in fact involved elements of both, with the panethnic co-operation and identity serving as a complement to continuing ethnic particularism. We return to the interrelations of organizational and individual panethnicity at the conclusion of this article.

Factors affecting panethnicity

The analysis of social change requires some theory of causation, and the ebbs and flows of panethnicity allow us to test competing theories against the evidence. To that end, we have grouped factors that would seem to affect panethnicity into two broad categories: cultural and structural.4 Each factor is considered with respect to its variation across subgroups, and the general argument is that the greater the degree of variation from subgroup to subgroup, the less potential for panethnicity. We assess each panethnic group on these factors in two

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ways: structurally, according to our best reading of how much they vary across subgroups; and historically, by assessing the apparent relative importance of these factors in incidents of panethnic organization and activity.

Cultural variables: language and religion

Volumes have been written about the links between ethnicity and culture and for many social scientists the two mean pretty much the same thing. Cultural differences are inherently relative and situational, and not easily summarized under broad categories. Nevertheless, we believe that the two clearest components of ethnic culture are language and religion. Whatever is meant by 'ethnic culture', it cannot include qualities that are the direct consequences of structural conditions. Many of the apparent cultural contrasts between subethnic groups in the United States, for example Mexicans and Cubans or Japanese and Cambodians, are in fact attributable, at least in part, to class background and generational differences. And while the actual content of immigrant cultures can diverge profoundly from their national origins, they remain as fundamental symbolic links to those origins. Language, including symbolic commitment to a waning mother tongue, is at the centre of ethnic identity and ethnic conflict worldwide. Sub- national groups demand that their language be given official status, and used in schools instead of the language of the politically dominant ethnic group. Clearly, if subgroups snared a common language, they would be more likely to join together. The obverse is also true: linguistic dissimilarity among subgroups should be a powerful force for ethnic particularism.

Of our four groups, only Latinos share a common language. Latinos refer to themselves, and are referred to by others, as 'Spanish- speaking'. They have become the largest official 'language minority' in the United States, in spite of persistent evidence that most shift to English nearly as rapidly as other immigrant stocks (Lopez 1982). Native-born Latinos speak English more than Spanish, and lose their facility with Spanish by the third or fourth generation. But the large immigrant and second-generation population, combined with a strong symbolic commitment among subsequent generations, make Spanish and the Hispanic culture that it implies a potentially powerful basis for unity among Latinos.

Among the other three groups language defines the boundaries of ethnic particularism. Although native-born Asian Americans progres- sively lose command of their ethnic language at least as rapidly as the children of European immigrants did in the past (Lopez 1982, Veltman 1983), they remain strongly committed to passing at least appreciation for their mother tongue on to their children. Recent Asian immigrants live largely in communities defined in linguistic terms (Conklin and

202 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

Lourie 983, pp. 47-52). The overwhelmingly immigrant Indo-American population brings with it the fierce commitment to regional languages that has been at the centre of political conflict in India since Independence (Fisher 1980). For Native Americans their tribal language has a religious quality, which they revere even if they speak it little (Snipp 1986, p. 246).

The second discernible aspect of ethnic culture is religion. Today, as in the past, 'religion is one of the crucial defining characteristics in ethnic identity and one of the rallying points in ethnic conflict' (Yinger 1985, p. 168). In the United States ethnic churches continue to play an important part in the lives of immigrants and, to a lesser extent, subsequent generations. The tie that binds would seem to be strongest when subethnic groups share a distinctive religion that virtually defines their identity, as in the case of Jewish subgroups. But sharing a religion that is not distinctively their own can also be a powerful cultural bond, even if it is also a potential force for assimilation. On the other hand, when subgroups have distinctive beliefs, then religion can be a force for disunity. Certainly, the absence of any common religion means one less cultural resource for ethnic solidarity.

Again, of our four groups, only Latinos share a common religion.5

Catholicism binds Latino groups, particularly at local levels where different groups attend the same parish churches, and where services are in Spanish. However, because Catholic parishes are geographic- ally-based, subethnic separateness would be reflected in the churches. Catholicism could also be a force for assimilation for those Latinos who move out of ethnic neighbourhoods.

In contrast, for American Indians, tribe and ethnicity are sacred and each has its own religious beliefs and practices. Adherence to the 'old beliefs' varies considerably within Native Americans nations, and many have accepted the Western religions brought by missionaries. Various movements have attempted to unite all Indians on a religious/ spiritual level by emphasizing the sacredness of the land and the reverence for ancestors (Thomas 1968). However, in general, tribal religions tend to emphasize distinctiveness, not bonds with other groups.

Indo Americans are as diverse and divided religiously as they are linguistically. The majority are Hindus, but regional and caste divisions in Hinduism make it as much a force for division as for unity. Important components of the population are Muslim and Sikh, and religious conflicts between them and Hindus on the Subcontinent often reverberate in the United States. High status religious sects (e.g., Jains) are also well represented and, like most other Indo Americans, continue to adhere to strict practices of endogamy based on region, religion, caste and clan (Lopez 1987).

Similarly, there is no overarching religion to bind all Asians, though in this case religion is not a strong force for subethnic parochialism.

Panethnicity in the USA 203

Asian-American subgroups adhere to various traditions of Western and Eastern religions, as well as a combination of both, or neither. For Filipinos Catholicism provides some basis for subgroup solidarity. And a substantial proportion of Koreans are Presbyterian. For most other subgroups, religious practices are either too diverse or too weak to provide a basis for ethnic solidarity at any level (Melendy 1977, p. 28; Kitano 1981).

Structural variables: race, class, generation and geography

It is a commonplace that ethnic groups defined in terms of race6 tend to be more enduring than groups based on linguistic or other more mutable criteria.7 Certainly, this has been the case in the United States where the harsh and uncompromising black/white model has set the tone for all other race relations. Our descent rule allocates anyone with identifiable African origins to the stigmatized 'black' category (Harris 1964, p. 56). North Americans try to apply the same dichotomy to other non-Europeans, with varying degrees of success and stigmatization. Generally, when subgroups 'look alike' from the perspective of the outsider, they experience a powerful force for panethnic solidarity. When this is not the case, especially when subgroups have distinct 'Somatic Norm Images',8 recognized both within the group and by outsiders, then race is a barrier to panethnicity.

Racial lumping is an effective force for unity among Asian Americans, American Indians, and Indo Americans. For Asian Americans, racial lumping was brought out most forcefully in the 1982 killing of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American who was beaten to death in Detroit by two white men who mistook him for a Japanese. Among themselves, Asian Americans perceive minor racial differences among Asian subgroups, but boundaries are often blurred and particular individuals are often difficult to categorize. Certainly, most of these fine points are not noticeable to outsiders. Indo Americans have also suffered violent attacks recently. The Indo-American press has characterized these attacks as 'racially motivated' and as evidence that all Indians need to unite. Individual colour variation is perceived among South Asians, and colour is broadly correlated with status in some parts of the Subcontinent. (Ghurye 1932; Beteille 1968). But, with a few exceptions, Indo-American subgroups are not clearly distinguishable by colour, especially from the perspective of outsiders. Racial lumping and stigmatizing are also a powerful force for unity among American Indians. Like African Americans, Native Americans have received strong infusions of white blood. The degree of racial mixture figures in government definitions of who is Indian, and is certainly a recognized dimension of individual variation within Indian nations. But whites rarely make distinctions of any sort between

204 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

different Indian groups, especially in urban areas, and when distinc- tions are made they are on the basis of tribe, not race (Cornell 1988, pp. 132-8).

Racial variation is greatest among and across Latino subgroups in the United States. Throughout Latin America race and class are broadly correlated, with whites at the top, blacks and Indians at the bottom and mixed bloods in between. The racial composition of Latino subgroups in the United States, then, tends to reflect the class background of immigrants at least as much as regional variation. Many Puerto Rican migrants are 'black' by mainland definition and have experienced direct racism approaching that suffered by non-Latino African Americans (Rodriguez 1980). In contrast, most Cubans and South Americans, reflecting their middle-class backgrounds, look European, and can blend into white America. Although Mexican Americans are racially diverse, the average Mexican (or Central American) immigrant is at least part Indian, and the North American Somatic Norm Image (see note 7) of a Mexican is certainly mestizo. Among Latinos there is greater sensitivity to the class-colour link and to individual variation, but they too generally recognize these three distinct somatic norms (white, black/mulatto, Indian/mestizo), and associate them with different Latino subgroups. Race and colour, in sum, tend to divide Latino subgroups.

The four groups considered here vary substantially in their average class positions. When subethnic groups have distinct average class positions, we expect less potential for panethnic alliance, and even less for any sentimental solidarity. Of course, there is more to material interests than the similarity of one's relation to the means of production. Groups that are quite close in their objective class position can be in competition and bear more animosity towards one another than those farther apart on the class spectrum. Overall, however, we believe that subethnic groups sharing a similar class status are more likely to have a basis for co-operation than for conflict.

Reflecting their diverse origins and experiences of incorporation into the US class structure, Latino subgroups have the most diverse average class positions. The principal wave of Cuban immigrants arrived as middle-class political refugees, and were able to parlay their physical and human capital into a highly successful enclave in Southern Florida. In contrast, the socio-economic centre for Puerto Rican, Mexican, and Central American populations is located somewhere between the secure and the distinctly insecure working class. Of the three major Latino groups, Puerto Ricans have the lowest labour-force-participa- tion rates, the highest unemployment levels, the highest incidence of poverty, and the lowest levels of education. By their numbers, Mexicans and Central Americans look somewhat better off, though the average class status of these groups is constantly diluted by massive continuing immigration. (Moore and Pachon 1985; Portes and Bach

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1985; Bean and Tienda 1987). Overall, the persistence of socio- economic differentials among Latino subgroups should limit the potential for panethnic organization, at least between Cubans and others.

In contrast, Indo Americans, Asian Americans, and American Indians are each much more homogeneous socio-economically. Indo Americans are probably the most homogeneous, and certainly the most prosperous. They come to the United States with the highest level of human, if not material, capital of any immigrant population. Two-thirds of the recent immigrants have four years of college or more, twice the rate for the highly educated Korean immigrants, and six times the Cuban rate. Over half have professional or managerial occupations (the two most common occupations being engineering and medicine), again far outdistancing other immigrant groups (US Bureau of the Census 1983; Xenos et al 1987) There is some occupational variation across subgroups but it is more horizontal than vertical.9

Like Indo Americans, Asian Americans share relatively equal average status. According to the 1980 Census, major Asian American groups had roughly the same median family income, ranging from $20,000 to $27,000 for the four largest groups (Gardner, Bryant and Smith 1985). True, great disparities exist within the Asian American grouping, particularly between recently arrived refugees from In- dochina and native-born Japanese Americans. However, overall, the major Asian American groups share relatively high status: they are better educated, occupy higher rungs on the occupational ladder, and earn more than the general US population (Gardner, Bryant and Smith 1985). Indeed, much to their dismay, Asian Americans have been dubbed the 'model minority' by outsiders.

American-Indian subgroups are also relatively homogeneous socio- economically, though at the other end of the spectrum. Except for a few rich 'oil Indians', Native Americans are the most deprived group in the United. States on every available indicator: poverty, illness, life- expectancy, and educational attainment (Murray 1982, p. 5). However, this homogeneity does not automatically trigger co-operation: competi- tion for federal money divides tribal and urban Indians. In the eyes of many reservation Indians, urban Indians represent a potential drain on scarce reservation-dedicated resources, despite the fact that they are better off economically (Nagel 1988). Different tribes on contiguous reservations have also experienced conflicts over land and water rights.

Continuing immigration rejuvenates ethnic cultures, reinforces national allegiance, and reminds ethnic members of how little they have in common with other national groups. Therefore, continuing inflows of immigrants can impede the development of panethnicity. However, it is not just continuing immigration per se, but rather variation on this dimension across subgroups that affects panethnic development. Subgroups that have been in the United States for the

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same length of time are more likely to share similar concerns. In contrast, groups differing markedly in generational composition lack a basis for co-operation. Moreover, old-timers may feel intense competi- tion from the newcomers and newcomers may feel excluded by the old- timers.

For three of our four broad ethnic groupings, immigration is a continuing phenomenon, with from half to the vast majority of all adults having been born abroad. But there are significant subgroup variations among two of the groups. Among Asian Americans, only Japanese are overwhelmingly second and third generation, while the vast majority of Vietnamese (90 per cent), Koreans (82 per cent), Filipinos (66 per cent), and Chinese (63 per cent) are foreign born. AH but the Japanese subgroup have to contend with continuing large-scale immigration. The contrasts are equally great among Latino sub- groups,10 but, more importantly, each has its own distinctive pattern of immigration that foreign-born percentages only partly convey. Cuban immigration came in two distinct waves, the large flow of middle-class refugees in the 1960s, and the smaller working-class and lumpen Marielito migration in 1980. The great wave of movement from Puerto Rico to the Northeast of the mainland came between 1945 and 1960 (Moore and Pachon 1985, p. 33). Permanent migration from Puerto Rico since then has been modest, allowing the community to stabilize. Mexicans have been in the Southwest since long before Anglos arrived, but the majority trace their origins to immigration early in the twentieth century, and massive immigration from Mexico and Central America continues today.

Over two-thirds of all Indo Americans are foreign born, and most have arrived in the past two decades, via student visas, occupational preferences and family unification provisions of immigration law. All Indo-American subgroups share a great concern for laws that will allow immigration from India to flourish, and fear restrictions on foreign-trained physicians and engineers. It is for all, quite literally, a family matter. Indo Americans also maintain extremely strong ties with their communities of origin in India, with frequent visits to obtain spouses, to see the family or to do business (Lopez 1987).

In contrast to the other three groups, Native Americans have no generational (birthplace) split as such, though the emerging urban/ reservation distinction does provide a roughly equivalent basis of cleavage. When Indians talk about generation, however, they are usually referring to differences between more traditional older people (especially the old-style leaders) and younger Indians, who were active in the more assertive political movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Stanley and Thomas 1978, pp. 116-17). Given the massive and oppressive nature of Native American social problems, and the degree to which Indians have been pummelled by the twentieth century, it may well be that such generational differences are more significant for

Panethnicity in the USA 207

them than for other well-established ethnic groups. However these generational conflicts are shared by all tribes, and thus do not impede panethnicity.

Since interests, competition, and conflict in the United States tend to be strongly regionalized, it follows that co-operation is more likely when subethnic groups are concentrated in the same area. This should be especially true when the groups have similar material statuses and interests and are neither in direct competition with each other nor in a relation of exploitation. In particular, smaller groups profit from combining to speak with one voice to local and state governments. In general, we expect that panethnic organization and solidarity are facilitated by geographical overlap and concentration.

Asian Americans are far more concentrated geographically than the general US population. The 1980 Census found 56 per cent of Asian Americans living in the West, with 49 per cent residing in California or Hawaii. Only in these states do Asian Americans comprise a significant portion of the population. Asian-American organization at the national level means essentially an extension of the California base. Additionally, the major Asian-American groups are roughly equal in size, with Chinese comprising 21 per cent of the total in 1985, Filipinos 20 per cent, Japanese 15 per cent, and Vietnamese and Koreans 12 and 11 per cent respectively (Gardner, Bryant and Smith 1985). Their relatively small numbers make co-operation necessary; their spatial concentration and rough numerical equity make it possible.

In contrast, the three major Latino groups occupy three distinct spaces, and are numerically quite unequal. Mexican Americans constitute over 60 per cent of the total, and are concentrated in California and the Southwest, though their numbers are growing across the country. Puerto Ricans are still found primarily in New York and New Jersey, and Cubans continue to concentrate in South Florida (US Bureau of the Census 1981). The overall preponderance of Mexican Americans, as well as the high concentration of each major group in one state or region makes regional/state alliances meaningless, and national ones difficult. A Puerto Rican in New York City and the hispano in rural New Mexico may share a language, a religion, and a heritage of exploitation, but they still have little common ground on which to co-operate.

American Indians are divided between reservation and urban dwellers. In 1980 one-third of all American Indians lived on reservations and in the historic area of Oklahoma (excluding urbanized areas); approximately half lived in urban areas (US Bureau of the Census 1988). Indian communities have developed in many major cities, with the largest numbers going to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, Dallas, Denver and Minneapolis St. Paul (Murray 1982, p. 21). Most American Indians lived west of the Mississippi River. In 1980, more than one-half of the population lived in just five states:

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California, Oklahoma, Arizona, New Mexico, and North Carolina (US Bureau of the Census 1988). Reservation and other rural Indians share many of the same problems, but since their relation to the government is through geographically-based reservations they often find themselves in competition with each other, as well as with urban Indians.

Asian Indians are spread throughout the United States, with one- third in the Northeast and, in 1980, the smallest segment (one-fifth) in the West. Ninety-two per cent reside in urban areas, with New York- New Jersey having by far the largest concentration, and thriving communities in Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago (US Bureau of the Census 1983). However, the prosperity and close-knit nature of Indian subethnic groups means that this geographical dispersion does not lead to the loss of contact that it might among less well-off and less organized ethnic groups.

Table 1. Factors affecting panethnicity: how they vary among major subgroups of each broad ethnic group

Cultural factors Language: Religion: Structural factors Class: Race: Generation Geographical

dispersion:

Asian Americans

different different

same same different same/ concentrated

Latinos

same same

different different different different

Native Americans

different different

same same same different

Indo Americans

different different

same same same same/ dispersed

Table 1 summarizes the factors affecting panethnicity as they apply to our four case studies. Ethnic groups whose components are similar economically, racially, religiously, linguistically, generationally, and are also geographically concentrated, should have considerable panethnic potential. But this is a laundry list, not a theory. In the next section we assess which of these factors have been more important in facilitating or hindering panethnic developments. In particular, we are interested in the relative significance of cultural and structural factors.

Panethnic activism and organization

Panethnic activism was prompted by the social struggles which swept across America in the 1960s. These movements - civil rights, anti-war, women, student, and minority group - fought against racism, poverty,

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war, and exploitation. These social struggles led minority groups to recognize that their interests could be advanced only by forming coalitions. In particular, the civil rights movement had a profound impact on the racial ideology of minority groups, sensitizing them to racial issues. The Black Power Movement instilled pride in one's racial and cultural heritages and set into motion the struggles for Yellow Power, Red Power, and Brown Power (Uyematsu 1971; Cornell 1984, p. 46; Barrera 1988). International events also contributed to ethnic and panethnic activism. The visibility and success of anti-colonial nationalist movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America stirred racial and cultural pride and provided a context for ethnic movements. Student and other progressive forces within the minority populations began to conceive of themselves as part of the Third World struggle, and referred to linkages among US minorities as a "Third World' coalition.

A result of the 1960s movements was the institutionalization of ethnicity. Radicalism gave way to electoral politics and the politics of government funding for social programmes. Because ethnic member- ship could lead to entitlements, minorities, as well as new immigrant communities, have continued to use ethnic political power to improve their economic and social conditions. Whatever the balance of sentiment, most of the subethnic groups within each broad group concur that political alliances at the panethnic level are important, even essential, for protection and advancement. In these new or previously marginalized populations, political power is heavily depend- ent on the ability of the subgroups to speak with one voice. This is true not only because there is strength in numbers, but also because outsiders (including other minorities) are rarely willing to listen to a myriad of voices representing particular subethnic groups.

But these apparent practical advantages have not led to a total transformation from particularistic to panethnic levels of organization and sentiment. Since numbers count in the American political structure, Asian Americans, Indo Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos have all had to organize to some degree at the panethnic level. However, these four groups have had varying degrees of success in their panethnic efforts. To understand this variability, we need to examine the effect of the structural and cultural factors discussed above on the development and maintenance of panethnicity.

Asian Americans

Asian American subgroups are culturally diverse, both in terms of language and religion. However, outsiders have had little understand- ing or appreciation of these distinctions. Asian Americans, largely on

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the basis of race, have often been lumped together and treated as if they were the same (US Commission on Civil Rights 1986). Because the public could not distinguish among Asian groups, racism and deteriorating public attitudes towards Asians affect all members and require organization at the pan-Asian level. Moreover, government agencies use 'Asian American' as a unit in economic allocation and political representations. For example, the Census Bureau attempted (unsuccessfully) to collapse all Asian racial codes into one summary Asian-American category for the 1990 Census. In addition to this continuing external pressure to be seen as one 'racial' minority, Asian Americans share two other important structural similarities: similar average class positions; and geographical and geopolitical concentra- tion in California. During the heyday of the Asian-American movement in the 1960s most Asian Americans were native born, though subsequent immigration has had a differential impact on subgroups, and has brought new groups into the Asian-American fold.

Pan-Asian identity emerged in the 1960s and became strong both organizationally and sentimentally (Liu 1976). Since the 1960s movement, the term Asian American has been used extensively, especially by professional groups (Jo 1980, p. 106). In large cities and in all regions of the United States, Asian Americans have established pan-Asian organizations to lobby for the welfare, health, and business interests of the entire Asian community (Liu 1976, pp. 6-7; Kuo 1979, pp. 283-̂ 4). Pan-Asian media such as Amerasia Journal, Asian Week newspaper and AsiAm magazine have also been established. More- over, single ethnic organizations such as the Japanese American Citizens League and the Organization of Chinese Americans began to take up issues that affect all Asians. Along the same line, single ethnic newspapers such as East/West News, a Chinese American newspaper, expanded its coverage to include other Asian-American communities.

The new Asian immigration since 1965 has made it difficult to maintain pan-Asian unity. The newcomers reinforce cultural dif- ferences and increase the generational gap among Asian subgroups. The increasingly variegated character of Asian Americans makes it difficult to speak of a shared experience, common sensibility, or unified political outlook (Omi and Winant 1986, p. 143). Furthermore, the new immigration has added to the numerical strength of previously smaller groups such as Filipino Americans; they are no longer the minority groups. With their numerical dominance, these Asian groups are challenging the established power structure of the Asian American community. Some members have contended that they no longer need to coalesce with other Asian groups.

However, the new immigration has also given Asian Americans an incentive to organize at the panethnic level. In the arena of electoral politics, immigration has boosted the political clout of Asian

Panethnicity in the USA 211

Americans, particularly in California. By the turn of the century, California's Asians are expected to reach three million, then double by the year 2030 to comprise nearly 16 per cent of the state (Bouvier and Martin 1985). With such numbers, Asians can expect to become a political power if they vote and lobby as an Asian bloc. The new immigration has also contributed to the upsurge of violence against Asian Americans (US Commission on Civil rights 1986). Because the public cannot distinguish between Asian groups, Asians have no choice but to concern themselves with a hostility that implicates them all. Regardless of one's ethnic preference, anti-Asian violence requires response at the pan-Asian level.

Two examples highlight the enforced nature of Asian-American panethnicity: one, the reaction to an indiscriminate murder and the other, a reaction to federal attempts to lump all Asians together. In 1982 a Chinese American, Vincent Chin, was clubbed to death by two unemployed auto workers who mistook him for a Japanese. After pleading guilty to manslaughter, both men were fined a mere $3,000 and released. Outraged by these light sentences, Asian Americans across the country rallied and raised funds to continue the legal batle. In publicizing the case, leaders emphasized that all persons of Asian descent are potential victims because of their race. A federal jury ultimately acquitted Chin's killers of civil rights charges, but the Chin case has continued to be an effective symbol of anti-Asian violence, reminding Asians of their racial ties (Takaki 1983; Zia 19894; Fukuzawa 1989).

The second example is somewhat ironic: for the 1980 Census Asian American groups had lobbied successfully for a detailed enumeration of Asians, with separate categories for nine subgroups. The logic behind this was that individual groups needed more recognition, and also that separate counts would result in more accurate (i.e., larger) counts. For the 1990 Census the Census Bureau attempted to collapse all Asian racial codes into one summary Asian American. Asian- American groups united to fight, with eventual success, the Bureau's proposal, claiming that individual group data are needed to target service delivery, and also produced more accurate overall results. To those involved in this struggle there was no contradiction between a concerted pan-Asian effort and the goal of separate counts (Pian 1976; Matsui 1988).

Continuing immigration reinforces cultural differences among Asians, but linguistic and other cultural differences recede into the background with succeeding generations. There seems to be a correlation between panethnic orientation and generation in the United States, in the sense that more established groups (e.g., Japanese and Chinese Americans) lead the panethnic efforts, with smaller recent immigrant groups generally following. The clearest example of a group that resists panethnic organization are the Filipinos, who are not only (by their

212 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

count) the largest subgroup, but are also among the most socio- economically distinctive. Overall, external pressure and other struc- tural factors best explain the relatively high level of Asian-American panethnic consciousness and organization.

Indo Americans

Indo Americans reflect the regional, linguistic and religious diversity that make it problematic to consider the Indian subcontinent as one society, and that constantly threatens India's political unity. On the other hand, they are bound by several structural commonalities: they are similar economically, racially (at least to outsiders), and genera- tionally; and they are geographically concentrated in major urban centres. These structural similarities would seem to explain why Indo Americans have been comparatively successful in establishing bonds of political if not moral panethnic solidarity.

Indo Americans only came to the United States in large numbers in the 1970s. Utilizing liberalized professional preference and family unification immigration regulations, the half million or so Indo Americans constitute the best educated immigrant community in the United States today, with physicians and engineers being the two most common occupations (US Bureau of the Census 1983; Xenos, Barringer and Levin 1989, p. 32) Though divided along religious and regional language lines, they do share the second language of the South Asian elites: English. The ties to the homeland for these recent and affluent new Americans are understandably strong (Saran 1985). These ties simultaneously bond Indo Americans together, on issues of common interest (e.g., opposition to Pakistan), and divide them, reflecting communal strife in India (e.g., the Punjab).

Indian religious and language communities established particularistic organizations almost immediately upon arrival. Initially these com- munities were based on broad linguistic and religious lines; as they grew they tended to split along the finer lines of caste and sect. A South Indian Association split into several groups, including one for Tamil Brahmins, one for other Tamils, and the rest for other caste and language-specific groups, as numbers permitted. But at the same time Indo Americans had begun to form new umbrella organizations, both nationally and locally. By the mid-1980s, most metropolitan areas with a significant Indo-American presence had federations composed of most local religious and language region Indian organizations. These federations are often the focus of bitter personal and community rivalries, at times reflecting ongoing conflicts in India. But for the most part, they continue to exist and sponsor genuinely panethic 'all-Indian' activities like Independence Day celebrations and conferences on the

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problems of Indian youth in America. There is also one successful national federation, composed of both national and some active local religious and language region associations. There have been at least two attempts to form national associations composed of individuals rather than organizations but, significantly, both have faded away (Fisher 1980; Lopez 1987).

The national and metropolitan federations of associations bring the diverse Indian communities together on the basis of shared interests: support for India in US foreign policy, immigration policies favourable to Indians, and, increasingly, 'racist' attacks against Indo Americans. In this they are strongly supported by the vigorous English-language Indo-American press (India Abroad, India West). Leaders have also endeavoured to make Indo Americans a certified minority, along with other Asian Americans, in the probably mistaken belief that somehow this will provide material affirmative-action benefits for Indo Americans.11 In alliance with (East) Asian Americans, they succeeded in having Indo Americans included in the list of Asian-American subcategories for the 1980 and 1990 Censuses. At state and national levels, they have fought to have Indo Americans included in the list of underrepresented minorities eligible for small business loans and government priority contracts. At the last meeting of the national federation, delegates voted to replace 'Asian Indian' and 'Indo American' with the 'Indian-American,' in explicit parallel with other hyphenated American ethnic groups. To the extent that the dialectical relation between governmental bureaucracies and ethnic groups serves to define group boundaries and identities, such efforts can only reinforce panethnic Indo-American solidarity and identity.

The Indo-American attempts to ally with other Asian Americans are particularly instructive. In Detroit, where the well-established Indo American community has often been the target of violence, they eagerly joined and materially supported the Vincent Chin campaign. Indo-American organizations also involved themselves in the 1980 census effort, and took an equally active role in quashing the recent attempts to return to a single Asian category which, for Indo Americans, would mean no count at all at even the panethnic level.12

Given their small numbers in most localities and institutions, their exotic character in the eyes of the majority community, and the dangers of being associated with Arabs and Iranians, Indo Americans have good reason to ally with other Asian Americans. But all these attempts to insert Indo Americans into the mainstream of Asian- American communities have brought no genuine increase in social integration.13

Most Indo Americans still recognize three distinct levels of ethnicity: the endogamous marriage group defined by subcaste and clan, the language community based on their region of origin in India, and the 'all-Indian' level. It is too soon to assess whether or not the successful

214 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

organizational panethnicity of Indo Americans will translate into social panethnicity, breaking down the strong boundaries of region, religion and caste. The single factor that most unites them today, namely, loyalty to their common nation state of origin, will presumably decline in strength among subsequent generations, but it may be replaced by domestic considerations such as discrimination against South Asians in the United States. In the meantime, the three levels of Indo-American ethnicity coexist and, it would seem, complement each other.

Latinos

The Latino label combines colonized natives, legal and illegal immigrants and their offspring, and political refugees under one umbrella. While a common language and religion suggest an underlying cultural commonality, the diverse incorporation experi- ences of Latino groups have led to significant social and economic differences that hamper the development of panethnic organization and identity. This disunity is compounded by the lack of geographical overlap among the three principal Latino subgroups.

Mutual aid associations and religious brotherhoods are as old as Mexican settlement in California and the Southwest, and several defensive civil rights groups emerged or were reinvigorated in the aftermath of the Second World War. But it was only with the emergence of the Chicano Movement in the 1960s that Mexican- American organizations developed into genuine political organizations oriented to social change. Just knitting together these diverse groups, ranging from Cesar Chavez's farm workers to urban college students, from land hungry New Mexican farmers to the Brown Berets, and combining them with the older civil rights groups like the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), was an exercise in panethnicity. The Chicano movement relied heavily on the ethnic- specific imagery of Mexico and its Indian past, and tended to be most effective at local levels. Puerto Rican militancy originated in the movement for independence for the island, and less radical Puerto Rican politics were enmeshed in the local politics of New York City politics. Cuban-American politics were long oriented to the 'liberation' of Cuba, though this has gradually been supplanted as a practical goal by the need to establish a favourable political climate in South Florida for the development and maintenance of Cuban-American prosperity. Obviously these three political impulses have had little to do with each other (Padilla 1985; Moore and Pachon 1985, pp. 169-98).

At the level of national politics, there exists a Hispanic caucus in the House of Representatives, and the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), which extends to those elected at state and local levels. This is the most significant panethnic

Panethnicity in the USA 215

Latino organization, and it is essentially a (de facto Democratic) congressional alliance between Mexican Americans from the South- west and Puerto Ricans from the New York City area. It remains to be seen how the newly elected Republican Cuban Congressperson will fit into this alliance. Apart from NALEO, few genuinely panethnic institutions have developed among Latinos. Small circulation maga- zines, in both English and Spanish, come and go. The most persistent are targeted to special audiences, such as Replica, a Spanish-language glossy oriented to conservative and affluent immigrants. Academic leaders and professionals, many of whom come from the student movements of the late sixties and early seventies, have tried to forge links via Hispanic caucuses in academic, political and professional associations. Many universities have research centres devoted to the study of Latinos but, significantly, most of them continue to be named for and oriented to the locally dominant subgroup, not Latinos generally. The National Association of Chicano Studies accepts research papers on other Latino groups, but the centre of concern remains those of Mexican origin. Outside of academe, LULAC has attempted to broaden its membership, but it is still essentially a Texas- based Mexican American Democratic organization, and expansions of its political and ethnic base (especially to conservative Cubans) have often resulted in turmoil.

Clearly, the regional separation among Latino subethnic groups makes it difficult to assess whether or not they would co-operate more if they did overlap more geographically. Evidence from the one major point of overlap, Chicago, suggests that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans can co-operate, but that this co-operation does not easily lead to social assimilation. Padilla (1985) traced the development of Mexican and Puerto Rican ethnic organizations in Chicago during the 1970s and found a high degree of co-operation in efforts to improve schools and job opportunities. But he concluded that cultural similarities were, if necessary, certainly not sufficient bases for this co-operation: a common sense of economic deprivation and political exclusion and an objectively similar class position were the essential factors. He also noted that the co-operation relied heavily on the activities of a few highly panethnic individuals.

For the past two decades Hispanics have been labelled the sleeping giant among American ethnic groups, about to emerge and exert their strength. Despite indicators that something must happen soon (e.g., the majority of public school students in Los Angeles are now Latino), Hispanics, overall, and most of the subgroups, are still woefully disadvantaged economically and underrepresented in most desirable and powerful segments of American society (most notably in politics, where they appear to be losing ground). Many factors contribute to this state of affairs, but surely the complex of forces that work against Latino panethnicity are among the most important. African Americans

216 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

have much more severe problems of poverty and continuing racism to contend with, but they have also been much more successful politically, due no doubt in large part to the unity that has been imposed upon them from outside.

Native Americans

Linguistically, religiously, and geographically diverse, Native Americans do not generally see themselves as a single people. Like Asian Americans and Indo Americans, Native Americans lack a single cultural heritage to draw upon in the formation of panethnicity. For the most part, Native Americans still maintain their tribal identities. The US government recognizes approximately five hundred tribal entities, over three hundred of which still function as quasi-sovereign nations under treaty status (Murray 1982, p. 5).

The case of Native Americans is unique because their ethnic organization is largely determined by federal Indian policies. The government appears to pursue a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they recognize tribes as geopolitical units and the foci of various government programmes and legislation. To avail themselves of the special 'privileges' of being Native American, Indians must prove membership with their particular tribe. As such, tribal organizations continue to be essential and inescapable for them. On the other hand, the government insists that Indianness is the relevant ethnic distinction for political policy purposes, thus making pan-Indian organization necessary (Nagel 1982, p. 39).

Unwittingly, some government policies fostered pan-Indianism by facilitating inter-tribal contact and communication. In particular, federal Indian education policies required all Indians to learn English, thus providing the linguistically diverse tribes with a common language for inter-tribal communication. In addition, the boarding schools established in the early twentieth century provided an opportunity for American Indians to interact with members of different tribes. Many pan-Indian leaders came out of these boarding schools. However, these inter-tribal links involved primarily individuals, families, or at most, members of religious movements. Formal inter-tribal alliance for political purposes did not occur until the 1950s when Indians organized against the termination and relocation policy (Lurie 1968, p. 297). This policy sought to assimilate Indians into American society through eliminating reservations and tribal government (Trosper 1981, pp. 284-9). In the past, Indians had organized at the tribal level to protest against undesirable government policies. However, because the termination policy was designed to destroy Indian community life, it affected all Indians and therefore forged pan-Indian co-operation (Lurie 1968, p. 295).

The pan-Indian political movement began with the establishment of

Panethnicity in the USA 217

the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in 1944 (Trosper 1981, p. 248). The NCAI gained more support among American Indians with its successful opposition to the termination and relocation policy. By the 1960s, there was a proliferation of political organizations along both tribal and inter-tribal lines. Means of communication among Indians improved as mimeographed tribal newsletters and inter-tribal newspapers appeared (Lurie 1986, p. 295). Influenced by the climate of activism of the late 1960s, pan-Indian political activities turned militant and attracted significant media attention. Led by the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), this Red Power era began with the occupation of Alcatraz Island by 'Indians of all Tribes' in November 1969 and continued throughout the 1970s with other attempted and successful takeovers and occupations. In contrast to earlier Indian protests, the Red Power movement organized along supratribal rather than purely tribal lines and the issues and goals of the protest involved all Indians or multiple tribes. The occupation of Alcatraz Island involved Indians of different tribes and its goals were to establish an American Indian studies and cultural centre (Nagel 1989). The Red Power movement declined in the 1970s due to increased repression of the movement by law enforcement agencies and the federal government's policy response to the protest action of the early 1970s (Nagel 1988, p. 11).

Because US policies vacillate between recognizing the individuality of specific groups and insisting that they be lumped together for administrative purposes, Native Americans will probably continue to organize at both the tribal and pan-tribal levels. For example, in preparation for the 1990 Census, the Census Bureau consulted the national American Indian Census Advisory Committee as well as the regional American Indian tribal governments. The latter focused on enumeration concerns on reservations whereas the Advisory Com- mittee addressed a broader spectrum of issues. There is some evidence that pan-Indianness is growing among the urban Indian population. In 1976 off-reservation Indians founded the National Urban Indian Council to advocate on their behalf for funding. According to the chief executive of the Council, reservation Indians 'had a lot of anxiety about the urbans getting organized' for fear that they would divert federal money away from the reservation (Frazier 1980). However, this group has apparently managed to co-exist and co-operate with tribally-oriented organizations.

The growing urban Indian population plays a special role in Indian panethnicity. Though most maintain links with their tribes they also face a day-to-day white environment in which their Indianness, not their tribal membership, is their salient ethnic identity. As Indians become increasingly urban we can expect that these external and internal forces for pan-Indianness, combined with the reduced benefits accruing from specific tribal membership in the city, will result in a

218 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

gradual rise in the importance of the more general American Indian level of identity (Sorkin 1978; Cornell 1988).

Discussion and conclusion

None of the four sets of ethnic subgroups considered here has completely evolved to a more general level of ethnic identity, but some have gone farther than others. Latinos, the set of subgroups which is culturally the most homogeneous, but which also shares the least in terms of structural characteristics and apparent common interests, are clearly the least panethnic. The other three sets of subgroups are much more diverse culturally. On the other hand, each set shares comparatively common material circumstances, including the dominant society's definition of them as a distinct race apart. And at least two of the three sets - Asian Americans and Indo Americans - have been relatively successful at forging panethnic alliances and at least the kernel of panethnic identities. Their success relative to Native Americans (and Latinos) would seem to be due in part to their comparative affluence and effective intergroup communications, and especially to the absence of major conflicts of interest among subethnic groups.

The question of community affluence merits further comment. It might be argued that the relative effectiveness of Asian-American and especially Indo-American panethnic organization is due not so much to the class and racial homogeneity of these groups, as to the fact that they are so thoroughly middle class and professional in status. Affluence may indeed be a factor, but since it is a structural/material one it does not contradict our general conclusions. Middle-class professionals are joiners, to be sure, but we are concerned not with voluntary formal organization memberships per se but rather with the dynamics of panethnic organizations. We suspect, though we lack the data to prove it, that the relative affluence of Indo Americans and Asian Americans, broadens organizational participation of all sorts. Affluence, independent of class homogeneity per se, is one additional structural factor conducive to panethnicity.

Clearly, structural factors, not cultural commonalities, better explain the emergence and success of panethnicity.14 This conclusion emerges from examining the incidents that have led to increased panethnic solidarity: all have drawn subgroups together on the basis of some common material concern, not on the basis of common cultural symbols. Asian Americans have been drawn together by the classic 'mistaken identity' case of Vincent Chin, and by the need and opportunity to combine and make their 'numbers count' in California politics. Indo Americans are brought together by their common political concerns, a perceived rise of attacks against them in the United States, and the hope that being a united certified minority will

Panethnicity in the USA 219

have its rewards. Native Americans, when they are able to co-operate, come together out of a consciousness of common interest and, above all, by the will of the State. In contrast, Latino subgroups see no compelling material reason to merge their efforts; moreover, they believe that they have cogent reasons to pursue their own paths, developing political and economic power in their regional arenas.

Our evidence for these conclusions has been drawn largely from the level of formal organizations. It can fairly be asked, what is the relation between this and the level of individual behaviour and attitudes? Certainly, only a minority of each community is actively involved in panethnic organizations. And our own field work suggests that those individuals who do become active are often marginal to their specific communities. Could it be that we have been looking at nothing more than organizational epi-phenomena, devoid of any underpinning in the communities?

We argued above that the organizational level is both intrinsically worthy of examination and that it tells us about the present and future directions of the populations supposedly represented. The cultural and structural factors we discussed are in fact characteristics of the populations, not of organizations, and the organizational developments and responses to events could not exist without at least some popular support. The case of Vincent Chin brought together Asian Americans, not just Asian American organizations, and the lobbying efforts of the National Association of Asian Indian Associations regarding immigra- tion law is supported by, and for the benefit of, Indo-American families, not organizations. Not only do the organizations speak for their constituents; participation in and awareness of panethnic organizations stimulate panethnic consciousness.

We lack the data to draw firm conclusions about the development of panethnic behaviour and attitudes among individuals, but we note some suggestive developments that merit further research. Heading the list is that most important of all social facts regarding members of ethnic groups: marriage patterns. Most often used to study rates of assimilation, intermarriage between ethnic subgroups is an equally good measure of panethnicity on the level of individuals. Just as intermarriage between major ethnic categories can obliterate boun- daries, so intermarriage within these categories ('intramarriage') can consolidate subgroups into one panethnic identity. There is evidence that intramarriage is occurring at substantial levels among one of our most panethnic set of subgroups: Asian Americans (Kitano et al. 1984; Shinagaw and Pang 1988; Yu 1983). Panethnic intermarriage, like panethnic organization, is not necessarily just a step towards assimilation.

Finally, we emphasize that in all four of the panethnic groupings considered here the question of race is fundamental. Those three groups that, from an outsider's point of view, are most racially

220 David Lopez and Yen Espiritu

homogeneous are also the groups with the greatest panethnic development. Even the racially variable and often ambiguous Latino population is, in the Anglo view of things, something of a race apart: for example, crime reports regularly use the term 'Latin' to refer to someone who appears mestizo. Our conclusions, then, may not be generalizable to sets of panethnic subgroups that are not, to the Anglo- American eye, racially distinct. On the other hand, the present and future of ethnicity in the United States is increasingly a question of race. Recent and probably most future immigration will be dominated by non-whites. And those well-established 'ethnic' groups that are still most excluded from the American mainstream are racial minorities. For Italians and other whites panethnicity may indeed have been a step towards assimilation and 'Anglo-conformity'. But, it is important to emphasize, no non-white ethnic group has ever fully assimilated into American society. Panethnicity among the four racial minorities considered here has been an uneven and slow process. But, given the external pressures and the benefits it promises, panethnicity, in contrast to ethnic particularism or assimilation, may well define the future of ethnicity in the United States.

Acknowledgements

The first author acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences Research Council for its support of his research on Indo Americans; the second author acknowledges the support of UCLA's Institute of American Culture and Asian American Studies Center for her research on Asian Americans.

Notes

1. Among the few works that deal directly with panethnicity are Trottier (1981); Nagel (1982) and Padilla (1986). The first author of this paper is engaged in a study of panethnicity among Indo Americans; the second is studying Asian-American paneth- nicity. 2. We use the term 'ethnicity' to include racial as well as culturally-defined groups. 'Asian American' is used here in its usual sense of East and Southeast Asian origins; 'Indo American' refers to those of south Asian origin, at times including Pakistanis and other national groups, but fundamentally referring to those from contemporary India; 'Native American' is used to refer to the first Americans rather than the often preferred 'American Indian', simply to minimize confusion with Indo Americans, who increasingly refer to themselves as Indian-Americans; 'Latino' encompasses all Hispanics of North, Central or South American origin. 3. Which is not to say that the traditions emanating from the understandably Eurocentric Marx, Simmel, Durkheim and Weber are incompatible with attention to ethnicity. Indeed, they represent the four principal sociological approaches to understanding ethnicity in complex societies. 4. We recognize that this is a crude dichotomy, and that greater theoretical impact might result from adherence to some specific school of thought, such as World System Theory or Rational Choice Theory. However, the preliminary nature of this investigation renders such an exercise premature. 5. By most estimates over 90 per cent of US Latinos are at least nominally Catholic

Panethnicity in the USA 221

(Moore and Pachon 1985, p. 110). As in Latin America, there are important Protestant minorities, usually fundamentalist sects. Most of these hold services in Spanish and are oriented to Spanish-speaking immigrants of all backgrounds. 6. By 'race' we mean 'social race' in the sense that Wagley and Harris (1958) defined the term over thirty years ago. However, while they used the term with respect to certain racially-defined groups that had little physical basis for the classification, we emphasize the social, and usually external definition of all so-called racial minorities. Racial minorities in the United States have, of course, developed cultures that go far beyond simple reactions to domination, and constitute bases for voluntary ethnic solidarity. However, our emphasis here is on the principal forces for social differentiation, and in the US case social definition in terms of race is largely imposed from outside. 7. Frank (1969), Wolf (1982) and others have emphasized that most contemporary socially-significant racial categories originated in the uneven division of labour produced by European capitalist expansion. Our views are broadly consistent with theirs, which we view as a starting point in studying the social significance of race, not a conclusion. 8. We adopt Hoetink's (1969) terminology without his accompanying theory of causation. Hoetink's terms are useful because, unlike more common terms such as 'stereotype', they relate only to perceived physical average types, without any accompanying 'racist' expectations about accompanying social and cultural characteris- tics. Hoetink emphasizes that, while there are physical bases for Somatic Norms, they are socially-derived images, not scientific measurements. 9. For example, Southern Brahmans are more likely to be doctors, and Gujarati Patels are more likely to be in business. 10. The 1980 census indicates the following foreign-born proportions for the population over 18: Mexican American (48 per cent), Cuban (97 per cent), Puerto Rican (80 per cent bom on the island), Other Hispanic (30 per cent). These figures, like those for Asian Americans, are very much out of date, and the pervasiveness of undocumented Latino residents makes even the best estimates only very approximate. 11. In this way they were surely influenced by Indian-style affirmative action, in which specific proportions of university seats and government jobs are set aside for scheduled castes and tribes. 12. Actually, the Census Bureau insisted that its proposed methodology, employing both a summary category and a write-in line to record specific identities, would result in more accurate counts. Indo Americans and other Asian Americans, probably wisely, thought this to be nonsense. 13. Recent interviews in Los Angeles confirm that Indo Americans and East Asians see few similarities with each other, and view any political co-operation as only an alliance of convenience. Interviewees often point to 'cultural' differences, but when the considerable cultural differences within each panethnic group are pointed out, they admit that racial differences also play a role. By this they mean both that they see socially significant racial and cultural differences, and also that no Punjabi would ever be mistaken for a Japanese. 14. Some readers may find this theoretical conclusion excessively crude, and we agree that, once cultural factors are taken into account, the question is which structural factors and historical sequences. However, this article is devoted to the prior question.

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DAVID LOPEZ is Associate Professor of Sociology at UCLA, Los Angeles. YEN ESPIRITU is a doctoral student in sociology at UCLA, Los Angeles, and will be joining the staff of the University of California at San Diego in the autumn of 1990.

ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles CA 90024-1551, USA.