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612Lesson.docxIntroduction
Topics to be covered include:
· The Purpose of a Budgeting System
· Themes and Values of Budgeting
· Executive-Level Budgeting
· The Congressional Budget
· Ways to Ease Conflicts
· State Budgeting Systems
· The Line-Item Veto
· Local Budgeting Systems
· Balanced Budget Requirements
· Balanced Budget at the State and Local Level
· Tax and Expenditures Limits (TELs)
· Types of TELs
· Rights-Based Budgeting
· Divided vs. Unified Governments and Fiscal Choice
· Examples of Lack of Unity
Welcome to PADM612, Public Finance. This class will focus on budgeting aspects at all levels of government, including the budget process, resource allocation, budget choices, taxation, intergovernmental fiscal relations, macro-budgeting, new approaches to budgeting, and public accountability of government budgets. Generally, the budgeting process can be divided into four stages: preparation, submission and approval, implementation, and reviews and reports.
The Purpose of a Budgeting System
Need for Budgeting System-The need for a public budgeting system is not unlike the need for a system for budgeting within a company or individual household. A well-balanced and managed budget system demonstrates how money is spent over both short and long periods of time. A company uses a budget system to accomplish its goals of growing, profiting and remaining sustainable. This includes coordination among all individuals involved, allocating resources responsibly and developing a plan for operations. No matter how successful a company may be, its capital and assets are finite and must be used wisely. A good budgeting system allocates resources for the company’s needs while also ensuring that enough money is set aside for any unexpected event.
Public Budgets-A public budgeting system is not much different. Just as a Chief Executive or other upper-level manager within a company assists his or her subordinates in developing a budget and then approves it, Chief Executive Officers within the government (such as the U.S. President, state Governor, or municipal Mayor) review and approve budget proposals that are prepared by executive agencies. The agencies that prepare these budgets tend to focus on their own needs while formulating them, which is one reason why coordination across the board is of great importance.
Federal Budget Authority-At one time in the nation’s history, no centralized authority had control over agency budget proposals. The Budget and Accounting Act (BAA) of 1921 created the Bureau of Budget, now known as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). This federal office employs expert budget information and techniques as well as executive authority to review agency budget requests in order to ensure that all budget requests are fair and balanced and that all proposals are in line with available resources and current policy preferences.
State Budget Systems -The State of Maryland had adopted such a system in 1916 before the BAA was even passed, and by the 1960s most states had done the same. Over time, legislatures began to assume a greater role than before in the budget-making process, although Governors remained the major authorities. This balance of power has occasionally resulted in conflict, as it has between Mayors and city councils on the localized level.
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA)- In 1974, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) represented an effort to reorganize budget policy by establishing the Congressional Budget Office as well as standing budget committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The CBO and budget committees assumed some of the power previously held by the OMB. Nonetheless, the OMB still maintains the authority to control budget proposals that executive agencies propose (GPO, 2012).
Recommended Practices and Guidelines-Few themes in public administration have been more constant than the search for greater effectiveness and efficiency. In fact, nearly every aspect of the field has been defined by various principles, best practices, and recommended guidelines that can, according to their supporters, lead to better organizational performance. While many public organizations adhere to these types of guidelines, others do not. The research of David Helpap attempts to explain such variation by examining recommendations developed and promoted by the Government Finance Officers Association. Using a national survey of local public budget and finance officials, a number of explanations are explored with various quantitative methods. Results indicate elite support, organizational professionalism, and certain municipal characteristics most determine the degree to which the practices of local governments match those associated with the organization (Helpap, 2015, pp. 259-294).
Themes and Values of Budgeting
Budgeting and how it should be tackled is a controversial subject, and individuals involved in the process take many perspectives towards it. Essentially, these varied perspectives share common themes and values.
THEMES
CONTROL
Concern about detail in expenditures reflects the control theme. These expenditures must be monitored, and accountability must be taken where spending is concerned.
MANAGEMENT
The successful, well-organized programs and policies that result from responsible budgeting reflect the management theme.
PLANNING
As budgeting activities are linked to long-term goals, the planning theme is reflected. A public budget should always be well-controlled, well-managed, and well-planned—regardless of the perspective taken by the policymakers towards budgeting.
VALUES
ECONOMY
As far as values are concerned, the economic value is often linked to the theme of control. Expenditures should be minimized in order to keep the budget in the black.
EFFICIENCY
Costs should not be cut at the expense of sacrificing efficiency , a value associated with management that involves maximizing outputs as well.
EFFECTIVENESS
The effectiveness value is often associated with planning as it places emphasis on desired outcomes.
RESPONSIVENESS
Responsiveness involves the policymakers’ interaction with the public, whom they serve, and how the budget they prepare reflects the will of the people.
SOCIAL EQUITY
Also associated with the public is the value of social equity . While some members of the public most desire that their own needs be addressed, others may demand that the budget treats all sectors of society with fairness, even if it means a redistribution of wealth through the budget (Swain & Reed, 2010, pp. 13-14).
Executive-Level Budgeting
The federal budget process, which is considerably more complex than those found at the state and local levels, rotates around the Fiscal Year (FY) cycle, beginning October 1 and ending September 30 of the following year. Federal agencies begin developing their budgets prior to the start of each fiscal year; the OMB sometimes begins issuing advice to agencies on the topic two years before a fiscal year begins! For example, in preparation for FY 2019 (which starts on October 1, 2018), the OMB issued the OMB Circular A-11 (detailed instructions for budget data and materials) to all executive agencies involved in the budgeting process in July of 2017.
During September, executive agencies begin submitting their budget requests to the OMB, which reviews these requests over the course of October and November, and by late November recommends a complete set of budget requests to the President. All federal agencies have the next two months to submit their own budget data, after which all agencies are locked out of the OMB’s database. If any agencies wish to express grievances, they have the opportunity to do so as the OMB reviews the budget requests that these agencies have made. Also over this time, these agencies begin to prepare their own defenses for their requests.
The executive budget is often referred to as the “President’s budget,” but different U.S. Presidents have played different roles in the budget process. Bill Clinton issued policy guidelines in the executive budget process’s early stages, while George W. Bush waited until all agencies had submitted their proposals before becoming involved. The OMB serves as an important tool for the President where budget policy is concerned. OMB examiners have also been very vigilant about policy preferences of congressional committee members and their staffs. It also assists federal agencies in processing policy and budget information and in coordinating conflicts where they arise within executive agencies and their programs.
For more information about federal budgeting and how it works, review:
Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal Budget
The Congressional Budget
Before the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) was passed, President Richard Nixon had become notorious for altering the federal budget so as to reallocate money reserved for domestic social programs for defense purposes. To regain budget control power from the executive branch and to end such abuses, Congress established congressional budgeting with the CBA. The CBA created Budget Committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Before Appropriations Committees commence their annual reviews, Budget Committees set budget targets specified in resolutions and reconciliations.
HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE HEARINGS
On the state level, legislative budgeting systems have been adopted by some states as well. In Texas, the Legislative Budget Board prepares a budget that reflects each executive agency’s current service levels. In Mississippi and South Carolina, state legislatures have central budget offices that review budget requests from executive agencies. In all of these states, executive and legislative budget offices are highly coordinated within this system, which cannot be said for their federal equivalents.
Congressional budgeting often results in conflict and tension between the two branches, as the House and Senate Budget Committees have not always agreed on budgeting matters—and occasionally their goals conflict with those of other congressional committees as well, especially the Appropriations Committee. Differences between the House Budget Committee (HBC) and the Senate Budget Committee (SBC) have both been subjected to a partisan divide, as both committees count both Democrats and Republicans among their membership. Many potential sources of various institutional conflicts beyond these remain within Congress.
To learn more about the role Congress plays in budgeting, review:
· U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget
Budget conflicts are nothing new. This 1923 political cartoon portrays President Calvin Coolidge veto of the McNary-Haugen Farm Relief Act, with the distressed figure of Congress hollering “Calvin!” The Act never became law (Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation, 2014).
Ways to Ease Conflicts
Where budgeting is concerned, suggestions have been made to ease the tensions between the President and Congress to bring this relationship to a point similar to the collaboration between Governors and state legislatures in states such as Texas, South Carolina, and Mississippi. One example would include a joint budget resolution between the two branches, which would carry the power of law. The BAA intended to help Congress exercise its budget power more effectively. A more centralized budget policy mechanism in Congress would also make this process move more smoothly.
But the congressional budget process is a politically charged one, and the political influences upon it strongly influence the final budget choices. So what would be the best way to get as many policymakers to agree on a budget as possible? If the House and Senate each had a central budget office in the two branches of the federal government, it might help navigate the partisan divide through expedited collaboration on budget-related information.
State Budgeting Systems
State executive budget processes are somewhat similar to those on the federal level. In the state of Idaho, for example, up to the 1990s, the Division of Financial Management (DFM) distributed central budget guidelines to executive agencies at the beginning of the state budget process, not unlike the OMB’s dissemination of Circular A-11. In this system, budget analysts were assigned to oversee budgets for four agencies—education, general government, human resources, and natural resources—and to coordinate budget requests by these agencies along with several budget targets. Requests were evaluated against gubernatorial policy preferences, available revenue, and other policy considerations, and the DFM made recommendations to the governor based on these evaluations. The governor then finalized the executive budget based on this information, and the finalized budget was then approved or rejected by the state legislature.
The state of California is similar to Idaho in that it also has a central budget office, the Department of Finance (DOF), which develops the executive budget on behalf of the Governor. The DOF disseminates information that may be helpful to executive agencies within the state and uses an automated system to instantly provide data concerning the current budget base and potential changes that price and demographic factors may inflict upon the budget. Budget change proposals (BCPs) are submitted by executive agencies to the DOF that may include changes in workload, need for new technology, court decisions, federal law changes, or new policy directions. The DOF checks the accuracy of needs and benefits for agency programs, whether the documentation for cost justification is sufficient, and if the assumptions in budget justifications are relevant.
State budgets in many ways depend upon federal budgets. Mike Maciag’s article “How Much Do States Rely on Federal Funding?” explores this relationship further (Maciag, 2017).
The Line-Item Veto
When faced with the decision of whether to sign or veto an appropriations bill, most state Governors have the authority to strike line items—that is, veto certain appropriations while giving approval to others. The power of the line-item veto was originally intended as a way to control wasteful spending in the legislature. Item veto power is not an authority that U.S. Presidents have, as this mechanism could be expected to function much differently on the federal level. Some have suggested it, however, as a means of controlling deficit spending.
In the 1980s, the Governor of Wisconsin was allowed by the state constitution not only the power to veto appropriations in appropriations bills but also to change the actual language within the bill. This power could be used to eliminate or modify the legislature’s intentions as well as striking appropriations. The power of partial veto that was accorded to the Governor was later prohibited for this reason. However, Governors in this state continue to enjoy a great measure of line-item veto power, which allows them to line-item veto legislative initiatives that are unacceptable or that are intrinsically different from the recommendations previously made by the Governor.
Ten states grant their Governors line-item veto power on all bills, while 34 others extend line-item veto power on appropriations only. Some Governors have the authority to reduce the dollar amounts in appropriations items. Without this power, Governors would be faced with an all-or-nothing choice. In 16 states Governors can line-item veto appropriations for a specific language, meaning that the Governor can veto certain provisions of a bill while retaining the majority of the bill.
Local Budgeting Systems
Executive budget systems at the local levels, such as those operated by Mayors and city councils, are less structured and more fluid than those used on the federal and state levels. The budget systems, institutions, and revenue capacities of state governments are integral to local budget systems; however, they are not without importance as executive budget reform initiatives have their origins in local governments.
During the Progressive Era (1895-1920), public budgets made the effort to make activism compatible with efficiency in governmental programs. It was believed that both activism and efficiency could be enhanced through budget reform. Professional managers began to take the reins in controlling budgets following World War II, and more recently forms of local governments headed by Mayors have been on the rise again. Most local governments, regardless of the forms they have taken, have used an executive budgeting system of some type.
Balanced Budget Requirements
Balanced budget requirements (BBRs) are the norm for state governments; most states call for them either in their constitutions or under statutory law. Some states do not allow budget deficits for any reason. As federal deficits continue to increase, federal BBRs have gathered support. However, just because BBRs are feasible on the state level does not mean that they will be as successful a fiscal constraint for the federal government.
Fiscal conditions were worsened throughout the United States during the Great Recession, on federal, state, and local levels. Multiple rounds of stimulus spending and unprecedented quantitative easing to heal the impact of this economic disaster caused the federal government’s budget deficit to reach record highs. In 2011, a bipartisan “super-committee” was established, the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction. This committee was tasked with developing a plan to cut the national deficit by $1.2 trillion over the next 10 years, a plan that would be put into effect by November 23 of that year. However, this committee failed to perform its task, also rejecting a plan proposed by President Barack Obama to reduce the deficit through raised taxes on the wealthy. The “super-committee” was only the latest in a string of attempts since the 1980s to enforce a balanced budget.
Balanced Budget at the State and Local Level
While most state and local governments have had more luck in enforcing balanced budgets, their efficacy as a fiscal constraint is debatable. Thirty-six states reference balanced budgets in their state constitutions, with Vermont being the only remaining state without a statutory BBR. As of 2017, most states had some form of constitutional or statutory BBR provision. Thirty-three states have constitutional BBRs and 25 have statutory BBRs that require Governors to submit balanced budgets. Thirty-four states had constitutional requirements and 17 had statutory requirements that state legislatures pass balanced budgets. Thirty-one state Governors are constitutionally required to sign balanced budgets, while 17 state Governors are statutorily required to do so. Only seven states were allowed to carry a deficit in their state budgets.
But how effective are such constitutional and statutory laws requiring balanced budgets? Empirical studies conducted in the past have been inconclusive, indicating that there are too many economic, political, cultural, and institutional factors present to effectively isolate the effects of BBRs on taxing, spending, and borrowing. The most important factor in explaining state fiscal choice has consistently shown to be per-capita income as a reflection of a state’s wealth. Liz Farmer’s article “The Difference Between a Sustainable Budget and a Balanced Budget” describes the ways in which a balanced budget is not always the best choice in budgeting (Farmer, 2014).
Tax and Expenditures Limits (TELs)
Illinois garnered national attention over the woeful state of finances, even to the point of being months late paying state employees. The Illinois legislature finally approved a balanced budget for FY 2018 after three years of a stalemate with no budget being passed at all (Dabrowski, Lesner, Klinger, & Lucci, 2017).
Mechanisms used by states to control the fiscal choices of their governments, such as their levels of taxation and spending, are known as Tax and Expenditure Limits (TELs). While their employ has become more common in recent years, their efficacy in controlling taxation and spending levels in state and local governments have been more unexpected than remarkable.
Local budgeting is greatly influenced by the state government, and this influence has been growing since the Great Depression. State governments regulate taxing, borrowing, spending, and administration that occur at the municipal level. The principle is known as Dillon’s Rule indicates that if state governments are silent regarding the actions of the local governments under their control, it is assumed that these local governments have limited or no authority. Thus, relationships between state and local governments are controlled entirely by the state. Home rule movements, which work towards allowing local governments a greater degree of discretion, have gained traction and support in recent years. Even under home rule charter powers, however, many state laws deny local freedom to decide on fiscal affairs. Thus, the general assumption in state-local relationships is that local discretion, especially in the area of fiscal affairs, is highly restricted.
Beginning around 1970, state governments began to impose more diversified TELs on local budgets, and a decade later taxpayers began to do the same. Taxpayer participation began in 1978 when two-thirds of California’s voters passed Proposition 13 in a statewide referendum. Proposition 13 reduced property taxes on homes, businesses, and farms by 57 percent. Before this reform was passed, the average property tax rate throughout the state was approximately three percent of the property’s value; once enacted, it limited this to two percent per year when unsold, one percent of the sale price when sold, and with a two percent yearly cap applicable to future years (California Tax Data, 2005).
Types of TELs
Property tax rate limits are the most common types of TELs. When limits are placed on overall property tax rates, the limits cannot be bypassed without a referendum vote within the local government. But while property tax rates are limited, property tax bases can expand. California’s Proposition 13 showed that as the assessed values are adjusted due to inflation, property tax revenues can increase as well. In other words, property tax rate limit TELs can easily be circumvented by changing the manner in which the property is assessed.
Other types of TELs exist as well. Some impose limits on general revenue or increases in local government expenditures. Revenue limits are expressed as a maximum percentage increase in certain tax revenues or a maximum proportion of income to be taxed. Restrictions on the maximum level of expenditures are set as a maximum annual percentage increase, and the limits are often indexed to the inflation rate. These limits are typically more binding than property tax rate limits or expenditure limits, as state legislatures can get around expenditure limits by using both general and special funds for spending.
Limits on assessment increases constitute the third type of TEL. If assessed values of properties continue to increase, property tax rate limits are not a particularly binding fiscal constraint. However, if limits are placed on assessed property values, and these values may increase through reassessment or increases in property values, property tax rate limits become potentially more binding.
Some states require public discussion followed by a vote in the legislature before increasing tax rates or revenues. The state of Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights (TABOR), adopted in 1992, required the approval of voters and two-thirds of the state legislature for all tax increases and required the state to refund surplus revenues to taxpayers. TABOR stands as the strictest form of TEL for several reasons, primarily in that it allowed adjustments for population growth and inflation but not for personal income growth. It also limited the annual growth rate of property tax revenues and required property tax rates enacted by local governments to be approved by voters.
Rights-Based Budgeting
· COURT INFLUENCE ON BUDGETS
· INCREMENTALISM
· According to incrementalism , one framework for explaining the budget process, budget policymakers exert their discretion it in a way so that their own interests are sufficiently funded, and as a result budget outcomes follow predictable, stable patterns. Entitlement programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid significantly restrict the discretion of these policymakers.
· JUDICIAL ESTABLISHMENT
· The judicial establishment is another source of rights. Courts have upheld that overcrowded conditions in state correctional facilities violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Inmate safety, brutality, racial segregation, and general sanitation levels have been other issues that have prompted the courts to interfere on constitutional grounds. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a series of lower court rulings by establishing a maximum inmate population per correctional facility. State agencies, which typically serve in the defendant roles in these cases, must comply with court decisions regardless of the funds allocated for this purpose. (Ryu, 2014)
· If a court decision requires a state agency to spend in excess of its allocated resources, the state’s budget is typically increased; states often use this situation as a “crisis technique” to justify increased spending outside an established budget. Rights-based budgeting usually increases judicial power, but it can also afford executive agencies the opportunity to increase their control over the policymaking process.
· SOCIAL EQUITY DEMANDS ON BUDGETS
More frequently, the courts have dealt with social equity surrounding state education financing, where fiscal disparities occur that violate federal and state constitutional equal protection clauses. For instance, grants from foundations have attempted to allow state grants to local school districts inversely based on wealth. This resulted in the development of power-equalization grants to ease fiscal disparities. More recent court cases related to education reforms have focused more on providing an adequate education than on being fiscally neutral.
Divided vs. Unified Governments and Fiscal Choice
As mentioned earlier in this lesson, disagreements between political parties, legislative houses, or branches of government can make reaching consensus on a budget more difficult. Clearly, a divided government can lead to gridlock or difficulty in enacting public policy. Most scholars on the subject have agreed that a unified government achieves more in a more efficient manner where budget policy is concerned.
Under a divided government, subtle dimensions in inter-branch partisan power configurations may exist. These types of configurations differ between split-branch governments, in which the executive branch is dominated by a different party than the legislative branch, and split-legislature governments, in which each chamber of the legislature is under the control of a different party. Different levels of inter-branch power configurations will affect how influential key budget actors are where state budget outcomes are concerned.
If a government is fully unified, a move towards a preferred governmental budget level (namely the share of income collected as public revenue) is unobstructed. New budget levels tend to reflect the fiscal scale the majority party pursues, and since most states adopt some form of executive budgeting, governors and other budget actors in the executive branch are likely to exert a dominant influence on the state budget if the government is unified. The dominant party will prevail in budget decisions if all other factors are equal, thus unified governments quickly adjust to unexpected external fiscal changes.
Examples of Lack of Unity
Consider a split-branch government, where the President or state Governor belongs to a different political party than that which dominates the legislature. In such a situation, budget choices will most likely reflect the preferences of the party that dominates the legislature. When a Governor is faced with a budget deficit or surplus due to their own veto of a budget resolution, they might try to achieve fiscal balance because such an imbalance generally strengthens the position of the opposing party in the legislature. If the legislature has the support to override a Governor’s veto, they can impose their own budget preferences. Even when legislatures are not strong enough on their own, they can impose their preferences based on their appropriation powers.
But what if each chamber of the legislature is under the control of a different party? In this case, interchamber problems with coordination will replace inter-branch problems with veto bargaining. Policy gridlock is often more frequent under split-legislature governments since budget policy actors who propose more reactionary budgets are more likely to have their fiscal choices adopted when a deadline looms. Typically, the chamber of the legislature who shares their dominant party with the Governor will have the advantage. The result of bargaining between governors and legislatures usually resembles the Governor’s preferences more closely. Essentially, budget proposals that satisfy both state Governors and their party members in the legislature are far less likely to be vetoed.
Conclusion
Reflection:
· What impact did the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) have on federal budgeting in the United States?
· Why is unity important to a state or federal budgeting body?
· Some people have condoned a constitutional amendment requiring the federal government to balance its budget each year. Do you think this is a good idea?
Public budgeting is the domain of two branches of government: the executive branch and the legislative branch. The many perspectives of this process share three themes (control, management, and planning) and five values (economy, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and social equity). Executive budgeting involves executive agencies who propose budgets and the Chief Executive (President, Governor, or Mayor) who gives their approval. Standing congressional budget committees discuss and pass congressional budgets. States generally require that budgets be balanced, though this requirement does not hold on the federal level; states also have tax and expenditure limits (TELs) at their disposal to control their governments’ fiscal choices. Rights-based budgeting incorporates the judicial branch in the process as well.
References
California Tax Data. (March 2, 2005). What is Proposition 13? Retrieved from https://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/Prop13.pdf
Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation. (November 10, 2014). Coolidge and the Battle over McNary-Haugen. Retrieved from https://coolidgefoundation.org/blog/coolidge-and-the-battle-over-mcnary-haugen/
Carreras, A., Mujtaba, B.G., & Cavico, F.J. (May 2011). Don't Blame the Budget Process: Exploration of Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Ethics. Business and Management Review, Vol. 1(3), 5-13. Retrieved from http://www.businessjournalz.org/articlepdf/BMR_1304.pdf
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