Discussion 6

Paul J. Weithman

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 30, Number 3, July 1992, pp. 353-376 (Article)

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1992.0058

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Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function o f

Political Authorit, Y P A U L J . W E I T H M A N

THE REDISCOVERY OF A r i s t o t e l i a n m o r a l t h o u g h t in t h e t h i r t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n f l u e n c e d m e d i e v a l p o l i t i c a l t h e o r y p r o f o u n d l y . R e c o v e r y o f A r i s t o t l e ' s Poli- tics,' f o r e x a m p l e , m a d e a v a i l a b l e t o p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s o f t h e p e r i o d a n a l y s e s o f p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t d i f f e r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m t h o s e t h e y f o u n d in P a t r i s t i c s o u r c e s . D i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n A r i s t o t l e ' s views a n d t h o s e o f A u g u s t i n e w e r e e s p e c i a l l y s t r i k i n g . T h o m a s A q u i n a s w a s o n e o f t h e first a n d m o s t i n f l u - e n t i a l o f t h e t h i r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y A r i s t o t e l i a n s . C h a r t i n g t h e m e d i e v a l a s s i m i l a - t i o n o f A r i s t o t e l i a n p o l i t i c a l i d e a s a n d t h e r e j e c t i o n o f A u g u s t i n i a n p o l i t i c s t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t o f A q u i n a s ' s o w n p o l i t i c a l t h o u g h t a n d o f his d e p a r t u r e s f r o m p o l i t i c a l A u g u s t i n i a n i s m . "

A number of friends, colleagues, and advisors have commented on various drafts o f this essay. Special thanks go to Sharon Lloyd, Alasdair Maclntyre, R. A. Markus, A. S. McGrade, Michael Pakaluk, John Rawis, Theresa Rice, and Judith Shklar. Thanks are also due to the editors of theJournal oftht Histo~ of Philosophy for helpful comments.

' On the reception and interpretation o f the Politics in the thirteenth and fourteenth centu- ries, see F. Edward Cranz, Aristotelianism in Medieval Political Theory (unpublished Ph.D. disserta- tion, Harvard University, 1938); Conor Martin, "Some Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Politics," History 36 0955): 29-44; Jean Dunbabin, "The Reception and Interpretation o f Aris- totle's Politics," in Kretzmann et al., eds., Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 723-38. On Aquinas's interpretation and reinterpretation of Aristotle, see Harry Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianisra (University of Chicago Press, 1952); also Anthony Celano "The Concept o f Worldly Beatitude in the Writings of Thomas Aquinas," Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 ( 1987): 215-26.

�9 The recovery o f Thomistic politics may be of more than historical interest, as recent at- tempts to bring versions of it into contact with contemporary political philosophy suggest. For such attempts, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Right (Oxford University Press, 198o); also Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). These attempts obviously raise a number of very important questions, but questions which lie beyond the scope o f this paper.

354 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 3 JULY ~ 9 9 ~

A c c o r d i n g to m o s t s t a n d a r d w o r k s o n m e d i e v a l political t h e o r y , A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s o f f e r v e r y d i f f e r e n t e x p l a n a t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y a n d subjec- tion.s A u g u s t i n e , it is said, t h o u g h t political a u t h o r i t y essentially c o e r c i v e . H e c o n s i d e r e d s u b j e c t i o n to a c o e r c i v e political a u t h o r i t y n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e h e t h o u g h t t h a t w i t h o u t r e s t r a i n t h u m a n b e i n g s a c t i n g o n t h e i r lust, a v a r i c e , a n d d e s i r e f o r p o w e r w o u l d m a k e so ciety i n t o l e r a b l e i f n o t impossible. A q u i n a s , b y c o n t r a s t , f o u n d in A r i s t o d e a m o r e p o si t i v e political t h e o r y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h life in a w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g polls c o n d u c e s to h u m a n f l o u r i s h i n g . Political a u t h o r - ity, o n A q u i n a s ' s view, d o e s n o t exist o n l y to r e s t r a i n t h e vicious a n d a g g r e s - sive; it also has t h e positive f u n c t i o n o f l e a d i n g h u m a n b e i n g s to v i r t u e .

S c h o l a r s h a v e l o n g a d d u c e d p assag es in w h i c h A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s discuss p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y in s u p p o r t o f this g e n e r a l a n d g e n e r a l l y h e l d account.4 A u g u s t i n e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f a u t h o r i t y in t h e state o f i n n o c e n c e is c o n - f i n e d to a b r i e f p a s s a g e in T h e City o f God. T h e r e h e s e e m s to a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be n o political a u t h o r i t y h a d o r i g i n a l sin n o t b e e n c o m m i t t e d . T h i s is t h e view h e w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d t o e n d o r s e i f h e t h o u g h t t h a t political a u t h o r i t y is e x e r c i s e d o n l y to c o e r c e a n d r e s t r a i n t h e vicious, since t h e r e w o u l d b e n o vice i f t h e r e w e r e n o sin. A q u i n a s , like o t h e r Scholastics, t r e a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f p r e l a p s a r i a n r u l e at s o m e w h a t g r e a t e r l e n g t h t h a n d i d A u g u s t i n e . H e first t o o k it u p in his c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e Sentences o f P e t e r L o m b a r d ; h e r e t u r n e d to it y e a r s l a t e r in t h e P r i m a P a r s o f his S u m m a Theologiae. B e c a u s e h e t h o u g h t t h a t political a u t h o r i t y m a k e s a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a life o f v i r t u e , h e a r g u e d t h a t it w o u l d h a v e b e e n f o u n d h a d t h e Fall n o t o c c u r r e d .

T h e s e p a s s a g e s o n p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y a r e o f t e n e m p l o y e d only as p r o o f - t e x t s to establish t h a t t h e t w o t h i n k e r s d i f f e r . B u t t h e i r analysis c a n also be e x p e c t e d to s h o w e x a c t l y h o w A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s d i f f e r b y s h o w i n g exactly w h a t f u n c t i o n s e a c h d e e m s essential to political a u t h o r i t y . A f t e r t h e Fall it is d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h f u n c t i o n s t h a t h a v e a c c r u e d to political a u t h o r - ity as a r e s u l t o f h u m a n s i n f u l n e s s f r o m t h o s e t h a t A q u i n a s t h i n k s a r e essen tial to it. I n t h e state o f i n n o c e n c e as A q u i n a s d e s c r i b e s it, h o w e v e r , f u n c t i o n s h e

s For this contrast, see A. P. d'Entreves, The Medieval Contribution to Political Though (The Humanities Press, 1959), a4; Otto Gierke, Political T~ories oft~e Middle Age (Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1987), 145, note 137; Alan Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua: Defeasor Pat/s, Volume x (Columbia University Press, 1951), 85 and note 3.

4 For the claim that Augustine locates the origins of political authority in the consequences of the Fall, see J.N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "C@ of God" (Longmans, Green and Co., 19~,), 6~-63; Norman Baynes, The Political Ideas of St. Augustine's "De Ci~ita~ DeC' (The Historical Association, 1968), 6-7; Herbert Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (Columbia University Press, ,963), 39; Dino Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Augustine," Essays "on Dante and Medieval Culture (Biblioteca dell "Archivum Romanicum," 1964), 94- For the claim that Aquinas does not locate its origins in human sinfulness, see Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas," in op. cit. x ao.

A U G U S T I N E A N D A Q U I N A S ON O R I G I N A L S I N 3 5 5

t h i n k s c o n s e q u e n t o n sin w o u l d , ex hypothesi, b e a b s e n t ; o n l y t h o s e h e d e e m s essential w o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d . Hi s d i s c u s s i o n o f p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y is t h e r e - f o r e c r u c i a l f o r d e t e r m i n i n g his c o n c e p t i o n o f political a u t h o r i t y a n d h e n c e f o r l o c a t i n g his d e p a r t u r e f r o m A u g u s t i n e . I n s o f a r as t h a t c o n c e p t i o n r e f l e c t s A q u i n a s ' s A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m , analysis o f his discussion will also r e v e a l w h a t r e - s o u r c e s r e c o v e r y o f t h e Ethics a n d Politics m a d e available to h i m a n d w h a t u s e h e m a d e o f t h o s e r e s o u r c e s t o e f f e c t a b r e a k w i t h A u g u s t i n e ' s political t h o u g h t .

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e two t h i n k e r s lies, I will a r g u e , in t h e d i f f e r e n t v a l u e s e a c h ascri b es t o citizens' a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e c o m m o n g o o d . A c c o r d i n g to A q u i n a s , a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political so ci et y is p a r t o f t h e v i r t u e o f legal j u s t i c e , t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f t h e n o n t h e o l o g i c a l v i r t u e s . S u c h a t t a c h m e n t is t h e r e f o r e a n essential p a r t o f a well-lived h u m a n life. A q u i n a s t h i n k s t h a t p o s s e s s i o n a n d e x e r c i s e o f legal j u s t i c e m a k e s a v a i l a b l e a n o t h e r c e n t r a l f e a t u r e o f t h e g o o d life: p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e civic f r i e n d s h i p t h a t g r o w s o u t o f collective p u r s u i t o f a c o m m o n g o o d . F o s t e r i n g a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d is t h e r e f o r e a m o n g t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s A q u i n a s t h i n k s political a u t h o r i t y m a k e s t o a life o f v i r t u e ; in this h e d e p a r t s significantly f r o m A u g u s t i n e . A u g u s t i n e d e n i e s t h a t a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e c o m m o n g o o d s o f political s o c i e t y - - e a r t h l y p e a c e a n d n a t i o n a l g l o r y - - a r e v i r t u e s at all5 a n d h e d e n i e s t h a t m e a n i n g f u l ties o f f r i e n d s h i p can d e v e l o p in political society. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s p o i n t s to i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s in t h e n o t i o n s o f civic v i r t u e a n d t h e c o m m o n g o o d , a n d t h u s t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l c h a n g e s political A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m o c c a s i o n e d . I t is also, I will a r g u e , b a s e d u p o n a m o r e f a i t h f u l r e a d i n g o f t h e passages in w h i c h t h e two t h i n k e r s discuss p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y t h a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t e r s p r o p o s e . L e t m e b e g i n m y a r g u m e n t b y p r e s e n t i n g A u g u s t i n e ' s views.

2 .

A u g u s t i n e n e v e r w r o t e a b o o k o r a t r e a t i s e d e v o t e d ex clu siv el y t o political t h e o r y . R e m a r k s a b o u t politics c a n b e f o u n d in a n u m b e r o f his w o r k s , b u t t h e d i f f e r e n t c o n c e r n s t h a t g a v e rise t o t h o s e wo rk s, t h e d i f f e r e n t views ex - p r e s s e d 6 a n d t h e s p a n o f t i m e o v e r w h i c h t h e y w e r e w r i t t e n m a k e v i r t u a l l y

5 Augustinemakes an exception to this claim for Christian emperors, for whom this attach- ment is virtuous, "if they put their power at the service of God's majesty": City of God, V, ~4- Thanks to Alasdair Maclntyre for reminding me of the significance of this passage.

References throughout are to the corpva Christianorum, Series Latina; I have also relied upon City of God (Penguin Books, 1972 ) trans. Bettenson.

r As on the question of whether heresy ought to be suppressed by political authority. The best treatment of this issue is Peter Brown, "St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion," Journal of Roman Stud.s 54 (1964): 107--16"

356 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 3 J U L Y X 9 9 a

i m p o s s i b l e t h e i s o l a t i o n o f a political t h e o r y wh i ch c o u l d b e d e s c r i b e d as A u - gustine's c o n s i d e r e d v i e w : E v e n The C/ty o f God, t h e r i c h e s t s o u r c e o f political m a t e r i a l in A u g u s t i n e ' s c o r p u s , was c o m p o s e d o v e r a p c r i o c l o f t w e n t y y e a r s a n d a d d r e s s e s a g r e a t v a r i e t y o f issues. T h e ~ c~sl/cus o f A u g u s t i n e ' s views o n sin a n d political a u t h o r i t y , h o w e v e r , is B o o k X I X o f t h a t w o r k , esp eci al l y C h a p t e r s 14 a n d 15; it is t o t h e s e t h a t r e a d e r s u s u a l l y t u r n t o s u b s t a n t i a t e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s . I shall t h e r e f o r e c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e views t h a t A u g u s t i n e p u t s f o r w a r d t h e r e .

I n t h e o p e n i n g s e n t e n c e s o f C h a p t e r 15 o f B o o k X I X , A u g u s t i n e asserts t h a t s e r v i t u d e is a c o n d i t i o n o r i n s t i t u t i o n n o t f o u n d i n " t h e o r d e r o f n a t u r e " in which G o d c r e a t e d m a n . G o d , A u g u s t i n e writes, i n t e n d e d h u m a n b e i n g s t o e x e r c i s e d o m i n i o n o r dominiura o n l y o v e r i r r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s , a n d n o t o v e r o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g s ; h e q u o t e s G e n e s i s 1:26 as e v i d e n c e o f G o d ' s i n t e n t i o n . ' " T h e first j u s t m e n , " h e c o n t i n u e s , w e r e t h e r e f o r e s h e p h e r d s r a t h e r t h a n kings; s l a v e r y , A u g u s t i n e says i m m e d i a t e l y , e n t e r e d t h e w o r l d as a r e s u l t o f sin.

It is i m p o r t a n t to see j u s t w h a t t h e s e b r i e f r e m a r k s in C h a p t e r 15 a r e usually t a k e n t o assert. A u g u s t i n e t h o u g h t t h a t h u m a n b e i n g s w o u l d h a v e lived a social life e v e n h a d t h e Fall n e v e r o c c u r r e d . H e d o e s n o t d e n y t h a t s o m e e x e r c i s e o f a u t h o r i t y w o u l d h a v e b e e n n e c e s s a r y in a s t a t e o f i n n o c e n c e . B u t A u g u s t i n e ' s r e m a r k s in C h a p t e r 15 a r e g e n e r a l l y t a k e n t o i n d i c a t e his b e l i e f t h a t s u b j e c t i o n to political a u t h o r i t y as well as t h e s u b j e c t i o n o f slav ery w e r e i n s t i t u t e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f h u m a n si n fu ln ess. W h a t a u t h o r i t y w o u l d h a v e b e e n e x e r c i s e d in a state o f i n n o c e n c e w o u l d , A u g u s t i n e is t h o u g h t to h a v e said, h a v e b e e n p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y like t h a t t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t p a t r i a r c h o r R o m a n p a t e r f a m i l i a s e x e r c i s e d o v e r his wife a n d c h i l d r e n . It w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n t h e political a u t h o r i t y a k i n g e x e r c i s e s o v e r his subjects.9

C h a p t e r 15 is c l e a r e n o u g h a b o u t t h e o r i g i n s o f s l a v e r y b u t it c o n t a i n s n o explicit a s s e r t i o n t h a t political a u t h o r i t y was e s t a b l i s h e d o n l y as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f sin; i n d e e d t h e c o n t r a s t d r a w n in p a s s i n g b e t w e e n s h e p h e r d s a n d kings is t h e c h a p t e r ' s o n l y m e n t i o n o f political a u t h o r i t y . It m i g h t t h e r e f o r e s e e m q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r t h e c o n c l u s i o n s A u g u s t i n e r e a c h e s a b o u t sl av ery in C h a p t e r ~ 5 a p p l y to political s u b j e c t i o n as well.

On the unsystematic character of Augustine's political philosophy, see Baynes, The Political Ideas of St. Augustine's "De Civitatr De/," 3, 15; Brown, "St. Augustine," in Smalley, ed., Trends in Medieval Political Thought (Barnes and Noble, 1965), 1 ; Deane, The Social and Political Ideas of Si. Augustine, vii-viii; Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "'The City of God," 7-8.

' "Hoe naturalis ordo praescribit, ira Deus hominem condidit. Nam: 'Dominetur', inquit, 'piscium maris et volatilium caeli et omnium repentium, que repunt super terram'." The Revised Standard Version translates the quoted verse: "[A]nd let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air, [...] and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth."

9 For this interpretation, see the sources cited above in note 3.

A U G U S T I N E A N D A Q U I N A S O N O R I G I N A L S I N 357

But R. A. Markus, who has w r i t t e n t h e most p e n e t r a t i n g study o f passages in which A u g u s t i n e a n d Aquinas discuss prelapsarian authority,'~ cites t h r e e reasons for t h i n k i n g that they do. First, he argues, "in the absence o f positive g r o u n d s for e x c e p t i n g political authority, t h e most natural way o f r e a d i n g what A u g u s t i n e says about the subjection o f m a n to m a n is to take it quite generally, including within its scope t h e subjection o f m e n to their r u l e r s . " " Second, Markus points to Augustine's quotation o f Genesis in this chapter. I n that verse, G o d gives h u m a n beings d o m i n i o n over birds, fish, a n d reptiles. Augustine quotes it to u n d e r l i n e t h e fact that God did not give some h u m a n beings d o m i n i o n over others. M a r k u s argues that t h e juxtaposition o f this quotation with Augustine's contrast between s h e p h e r d s a n d kings implies that Augustine i n t e n d e d his r e m a r k s a b o u t the origin o f slavery to apply to politi- cal authority as well.', Finally, Markus draws on a lengthy discussion o f d o m i n - ion in Augustine's c o m m e n t a r y o n Psalm 12 4 to a r g u e that "slavery and o t h e r institutions o f h u m a n subjection a r e not f u n d a m e n t a l l y distinguished in Au- gustine's mind."'s

Markus's t h i r d a r g u m e n t explains i m p o r t a n t features o f C h a p t e r 15 a n d in doing so supports its traditional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . For o n e thing, the elision o f slavery a n d political subjection shows why A u g u s t i n e m a d e what might o t h e r - wise seem an irrelevant allusion to kingship in the middle o f his discussion o f slavery. It also entails that Augustine's r e m a r k s about the origins o f slavery apply to political a u t h o r i t y as well, a n d provides m o r e conclusive g r o u n d s f o r that claim t h a n d o Markus's o t h e r two a r g u m e n t s . Because o f t h e weight it bears a n d because it p u r p o r t s to explain t h e text in which Augustine diseusses t h e origins o f political authority, I want to e x a m i n e t h e a r g u m e n t m o r e closely.

T h a t t h e r e is n o f u n d a m e n t a l distinction between slavery a n d subjection to political a u t h o r i t y seems highly implausible a n d a position that o u g h t not to be ascribed to Augustine. Only t h e most tyrannical regimes subject their people to a condition that can plausibly be described as slavery; Augustine's study o f history should have t a u g h t him as m u c h . But Markus rightly points o u t that Augustine distinguishes t h e institution o f authority, which is t h e subject o f C h a p t e r 15, f r o m t h e way in which a u t h o r i t y is exercised, which is the subject o f the p r e c e d i n g chapter. T h u s A u g u s t i n e implies, in C h a p t e r 14 o f Book

'~ A. M a r k u s , " T w o C o n c e p t i o n s o f Political A u t h o r i t y : Augustine, De Cimtazt Dei, XIX. 1 4 - 1 5 , a n d S o m e T h i r t e e n t h - C e n t u r y I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , " Journal of Thtological Studies, New Series 16 (1965): 6 8 - l o t . T h i s essay a p p e a r s , b i f u r c a t e d , as two a p p e n d i c e s to Markus's Saeculum (Cam- b r i d g e University Press, 1988 ), 1 9 7 - ~ i t a n d a I l - S o .

'~ Markus, " T w o C o n c e p t i o n s o f Political A u t h o r i t y , " 7 a. " M a r k u s , " T w o C o n c e p t i o n s o f Political A u t h o r i t y , " 7a. ~s Markus, " T w o C o n c e p t i o n s o f Political A u t h o r i t y , " 7 2 - 7 3 ; M a r k u s r e f e r s to Enarrcaionts in

Psalmos t ~4, 7 - 8 .

3 5 8 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 3 J U L Y I 9 9 2

XIX, that p a t e r n a l a u t h o r i t y can b e exercised either cruelly o r f o r t h e benefit o f those in o n e ' s care; t h e s a m e applies to political a u t h o r i t y o r a u t h o r i t y o v e r slaves. T h e claim that A u g u s t i n e does n o t distinguish slavery f r o m political authority t h e r e f o r e d o e s n o t imply that Augustine thinks political a u t h o r i t y as repressive as slavery o f t e n is.

Moreover, A u g u s t i n e ' s c o m m e n t a r y on Psalm 1 , 4 c o m p o r t s well with o t h e r r e m a r k s o f his in C h a p t e r 15 o f The City of God, B o o k XIX. I n the p a r a g r a p h s o f his c o m m e n t a r y to which Markus refers, A u g u s t i n e takes u p the question o f w h y t h e g o o d a r e o f t e n subject to the a u t h o r i t y o f the bad. H e emphasizes t h a t e a r t h l y a u t h o r i t y should b e o b e y e d f o r t h e sake o f heavenly a n d that r e n d e r i n g service to masters o f slaves a n d to political a u t h o r i t y fos- ters humility. B o t h f o r m s o f subjection, he argues, t h e r e b y p r e p a r e the g o o d "to possess [their] eternal inheritance."'4 Both are teachers o f humility, b o t h rely on coercion o r t h e t h r e a t o f it, a n d b o t h a r e n e e d e d only as a result o f original sin, b e c a u s e o f which h u m a n beings n e e d to b e t a u g h t humility.'s T h u s the c o m m e n t a r y d o e s i n d e e d suggest that t h e r e a r e i m p o r t a n t respects in which A u g u s t i n e thinks the two f o r m s o f subjection similar. T h e c o m m e n - tary's emphasis on salutory humility is e c h o e d in the relevant passages o f The City of God w h e r e A u g u s t i n e stresses that slavery was instituted by G o d as a discipline to h u m b l e t h o s e subjected to it. T h i s suggests that the c o n c e p t i o n o f political a u t h o r i t y at w o r k in Augustine's c o m m e n t a r y o n Psalm 1 ~4 is also at work in C h a p t e r 15, B o o k X I X o f The City of God. T h i s conception, taken t o g e t h e r with A u g u s t i n e ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t slavery, d o e s i n d e e d s u p p o r t the traditional r e a d i n g o f A u g u s t i n e on the origins o f political authority.

Markus's r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f Augustine's a r g u m e n t d e p e n d s crucially u p o n the similarities A u g u s t i n e sees b e t w e e n slavery and political subjection and, t h e r e f o r e , o n the i m p o r t a n c e A u g u s t i n e attaches to political authority's puni- tive and disciplinary functions. B u t Augustine ascribes a n o t h e r function to political authority, o n e which political authority d o e s n o t s h a r e with the mas- tership o f slaves. A n d h e has available to him an a r g u m e n t that it too has its origins in the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e Fall. T h a t f u n c t i o n - - o f which Markus takes no a c c o u n t w i s the establishment o f what Augustine calls "earthly peace" in a geographical t e r r i t o r y o v e r which that authority exercises s u p r e m e power. ~6

T h e earthly p e a c e which political authority exists to s e c u r e is "a c o m p r o - mise b e t w e e n h u m a n wills in respect o f the provisions relevant to the mortal n a t u r e o f man."~7 A m o n g the ways in which it differs f r o m t r u e peace, Augus-

~4 "ad possidendam sempiternam haereditatem," Ennarationes l ~4, 8. ,5 The humbling function of political subjection is also stressed at Brown, "St. Augustine," 5. ,6 See also George J. Lavere, "The Problem of the Common Good in Saint Augustine's Civitas

Terrena," Augustinian Studies 14 0983): 6. ', City of God, XIX, 17.

AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS ON ORIGINAL SIN 359

tine insists, is in the security and fellowship the latter provides. T h e condition o f earthly peace is m a r k e d by t r e a c h e r y a n d the e v e r - p r e s e n t d a n g e r o f civil and domestic strife. 's Political a u t h o r i t y is a regrettable necessity.,9 It employs coercive m e t h o d s to insure the lack o f o v e r t hostility necessary so that all can have access to the material necessities; it cannot be s u r e o f securing b e t t e r conditions than these n o r can it reliably lead its subjects to virtue.

Augustine w o u l d a r g u e that this second function o f political authority, like the first, w o u l d n o t be exercised h a d the Fall n e v e r o c c u r r e d . Political a u t h o r - ity exists to establish earthly p e a c e because earthly peace is necessary f o r the best life h u m a n beings can live a f t e r the Fall. B u t if original sin had not b e e n committed, conditions o f t r u e p e a c e would have prevailed which far super- cede earthly peace '~ in the o p p o r t u n i t i e s they a f f o r d to cultivate friendships and exercise the virtues. A far b e t t e r life, a life o f what Augustine considers genuine virtue, w o u l d have b e e n possible. T h e qualifies o f character devel- o p e d and exercised in p u r s u i t o f earthly peace are not, t h e r e f o r e , qualities that sinless p e o p l e w o u l d possess. T h i s is confirmed by Augustine's attack on the heroes o f t h e R o m a n republic. It is crucial to this attack that the virtues, like courage a n d self-restraint, which pursuit o f earthly peace seemed to elicit in the Romans were really f o r m s o f sinful p r i d e . " T h e y t h e r e f o r e would not be d e v e l o p e d a n d exercised had t h e Fall not o c c u r r e d .

Augustine d o e s not indicate which o f the two functions o f political author- ity he thinks the m o r e essential. N o d o u b t the two were closely linked in his mind, for the law a n d the penalties by which political authority humbles a n d disciplines those subject to it are m e a s u r e s taken to secure earthly peace. T h e importance o f noting this second function is that it shows what is at the h e a r t o f Augustine's critique o f politics. A u g u s t i n e locates the origins o f political authority in the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f sin because he thinks that the moral improve- m e n t to which political subjection c o n d u c e s is either remedial o r illusory. T h e filnction o f political a u t h o r i t y o n which Markus focuses p r o d u c e s g e n u i n e moral i m p r o v e m e n t , b u t it is i m p r o v e m e n t that only those p r o n e to p r i d e require. T h e second function aims at an e n d p u r s u i t o f which d o e s not elicit genuinely virtuous b e h a v i o r at all. Recognizing this critique o f t h e morally improving functions o f politics suggests a very d i f f e r e n t interpretation o f Aquinas's d e p a r t u r e f r o m A u g u s t i n e than the o n e Markus defends.

T h e p r o b l e m with Markus's r e a d i n g is that it obscures i m p o r t a n t differ- ences between the ways in which A u g u s t i n e a n d Aquinas think political sub-

,s City of God, X I X , 5; see also William R i o r d a n O ' C o n n o r " T h e Uti/Frui Distinction in A u g u s - tine's Ethics," Aug~tinian Studies 14 (1983): 59-

~gCL City of God X I X , 6. �9 *Cf. Cityo]'God X I V , IO. "' See C ~ of God V, 12 a n d i S.

360 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 o : 3 JULY t 9 9 2

j e c t i o n m o r a l l y i m p r o v i n g . F o r A u g u s t i n e , political s u b j e c t i o n i m p r o v e s b y h u m b l i n g a n d d i s c i p l i n i n g ; o t h e r q u alities t h a t p u r s u i t o f t h e c o m m o n g o o d r e q u i r e s a r e n o t t r u e v i r t u e s . F o r A q u i n a s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , political a u - t h o r i t y g e n u i n e l y i m p r o v e s t h o s e s u b j e c t to it b y f o s t e r i n g in t h e m a c o n c e r n f o r t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political society. T h e i m p r o v e m e n t is n o t m e r e l y a r e m e d y f o r sin; this f u n c t i o n o f political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d , A q u i n a s says, h a v e b e e n e x e r c i s e d e v e n h a d o r i g i n a l sin n o t b e e n c o m m i t t e d . T h e m o s t p r o - f o u n d d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s is t h e r e f o r e in t h e v a l u e e a c h a t t a c h e s to a citizen's c o n c e r n f o r t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political society. This way o f c a s t i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t wo t a k e s s e r i o u s l y t h e s e c o n d as well as t h e first o f t h e t w o f u n c t i o n s A u g u s t i n e ascribes to political a u t h o r - ity. It also, I will a r g u e , fits m u c h b e t t e r with A q u i n a s ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a state o f i n n o c e n c e t h a n d o e s M a r k u s ' s a c c o u n t .

.

A q u i n a s first b r o a c h e s t h e issue o f r u l e in t h e state o f i n n o c e n c e in his c o m - m e n t a r y o n B o o k I I , d i s t i n c t i o n 4 4 o f P e t e r L o m b a r d ' s Sentences." T h e q u e s - tion A q u i n a s p o s e s - - " U t r u m in st at u i n n o c e n t i a e f u i s s e t d o m i n i u m " - - i s n o t a b o u t w h a t A d a m a n d E v e d i d i n t h e g a r d e n o f E d e n b e f o r e t h e i r c o m m i s s i o n o f o r i g i n a l sin, b u t a b o u t w h a t p o w e r (dominium) w o u l d h a v e b e e n e x e r c i s e d , in E d e n a n d e l s e w h e r e , if o r i g i n a l sin h a d n e v e r b e e n c o m m i t t e d a n d i n n o c e n t s h a d m u l t i p l i e d to p e o p l e t h e e a r t h . ' ~

A q u i n a s b e g i n s his a n s w e r b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g two f o r m s o r m o d e s o f r u l i n g . T h e first, h e says, is " o r d e r e d t o g o v e r n i n g " (ad regimen ordinatus) a n d t h e s e c o n d is " f o r t h e s a k e o f d o m i n a t i o n " (ad dominanclura). A q u i n a s i m m e d i a t e l y e q u a t e s t h e s e c o n d m o d e o f r u l i n g with t h a t e x e r c i s e d b y a m a s t e r o v e r his slaves. In o r d e r to e l u c i d a t e this s e c o n d m o d e a n d d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m t h e first, h e i n t r o d u c e s a c o m p a r i s o n w i t h political r u l e , s a y i n g t h a t " t h e r u l e o f a m a s t e r o v e r slaves is like t h a t o f a t y r a n t o v e r his subjects, as t h e P h i l o s o p h e r says in t h e e i g h t h b o o k o f t h e Ethics.".4 T h e r u l e o f a t y r a n t d i f f e r s f r o m t h a t o f a king, A q u i n a s says, in t h a t a k i n g o r d e r s his r u l e f o r t h e g o o d o f t h o s e

"' Thomas Aquinas, Scripture Super Libros Senl~atmrum in Opera Omnia (Parma Edition), vol- ume 6. All subsequent references to and quotations from Aquinas's work will be to and from this edition.

�9 s Thus Aquinas uses fuisset, the pluperfect subjunctive, rather than the perfect or pluperfect indicative. It seems to have been standard to address the issue of power and original sin coun- terfactually, for Bonaventure in his own Sentence commentary uses the same form of the verb when he says that there would have been no power of one person over another had original sin not been committed: "Si enim homo stetisset [...]." See Bonaventure, Opera Omnia (Ludovicus Vives, 1864), volume 3-

,4 "Domini autem ad servum, ut in 8 Ethicorum Philosophus dicit, est praelatio sicut tyranni ad subditum" (my translation).

A U G U S T I N E A N D A Q U I N A S O N O R I G I N A L S I N 3 6 1

subject to it while a t y r a n t o r d e r s his rule for his own good. T h e r e f o r e , Aquinas concludes, the d i f f e r e n c e between the two modes o f rule is that the first aims at the good o f those ruled; the second aims primarily at the good o f the ruler and benefits those subject to it only incidentally.

With his o p e n i n g distinction thus elucidated, Aquinas proceeds to argue that t h o u g h the second m o d e o f rule would not be f o u n d in a state o f innocence, the first would be. Rulership aimed primarily at the good o f the ruler would not be f o u n d in a state o f innocence, Aquinas says, because rational creatures are de se; they exist, not for the sake o f o t h e r rational creatures, but for their own sake. O r d e r i n g or governing some h u m a n beings for the benefit o f others h a p p e n s only when man "is c o m p a r e d to irrational creatures," as in Aristotle's compari- son o f slaves to animate instruments.'5 But the likening o f h u m a n beings to irrational creatures, Aquinas says, occurs as a result o f sin a n d therefore would not have been f o u n d h a d original sin not been committed.

Aquinas then r e t u r n s to what he calls rule " o r d e r e d to governing" and distinguishes three o f its functions: the direction o f subjects " i n what is to be done," the s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f certain defects (his example is a king's defense o f the populace), a n d the correction o f morals by the p u n i s h m e n t o f evil and the e m p l o y m e n t o f coercion to i n d u c e acts o f virtue. T h e last two functions, Aquinas asserts, would not have been necessary had original sin not been committed. However, Aquinas says, there would be some authority providing direction "in things to be d o n e a n d known" even in a state o f innocence, because even in that state some would have greater wisdom and intellect than others.

It is i m p o r t a n t that Aquinas does not d e p a r t from Augustine in thinking that h u m a n beings would live socially in a state o f innocence. Moreover, the two thinkers do not disagree a b o u t w h e t h e r or not some would have directed others had the Fall never occurred. T h e significant difference between t h e m is on the question o f w h e t h e r rule exercised in a state o f innocence could properly be described as an exercise o f political authority.

Aquinas's remarks t h r o u g h o u t his discussion o f rule in the state o f inno- cence suggest that he had a m u c h clearer conception o f political authority than did Augustine. He equates rule for the sake o f d o m i n a t i o n with slavery, but as we saw he explicates the relationship between master and slave by analyzing that between a t y r a n t a n d his subjects. T h e consequent analysis o f ruling for the sake o f d o m i n a t i o n is less than t h o r o u g h . Aquinas's a r g u m e n t does, however, show that far f r o m assimilating t y r a n n y to slavery, Aquinas relies upon an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the f o r m e r to explain the latter.

"s Aristotle, Poliz~;s t253b3off.; for Aquinas's commentary on this passage, see in Libros Pol~- ~:o, ru~ Book 1, lect. 9.

36z J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 o : 3 JULY t 9 9 2

This use o f a political analogy to explicate slavery serves as a r e m i n d e r o f how f r e q u e n t l y Aquinas e m p l o y s such analogies to elucidate p h e n o m e n a that are not at all political. This is particularly so in his later work. Aquinas fre- quently uses political m o d e l s to explain various sorts o f familial a u t h o r i t y , t h o u g h he follows Aristotle in thinking political a n d familial a u t h o r i t y q u i t e distinct. '~ Elsewhere, Aquinas uses the rule o f a king o v e r his subjects to describe that o f the m i n d o v e r the passions.'7 An especially r e m a r k a b l e e x a m - ple occurs in Aquinas's discussion o f the effects o f fear. T h e r e he n o t e s that fear causes h e a t to c o n t r a c t toward the interior o f the b o d y , a p h e n o m e n o n h e likens to the citizens o f an e n d a n g e r e d city forsaking its exterior a n d racing for its interior parts. 's

T h e s e e x a m p l e s suggest that care m u s t be taken in d r a w i n g conclusions from Aquinas's e m p l o y m e n t o f political analogies a n d imagery. This is espe- cially i m p o r t a n t to b e a r in m i n d w h e n i n t e r p r e t i n g the passage f r o m Aquinas's Sentence c o m m e n t a r y on a u t h o r i t y in the state o f innocence. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f this passage is its a r g u m e n t that the authority exercised in the state o f innocence w o u l d have b e e n political. B u t the occurrences o f political l a n g u a g e in the passage can deceive the r e a d e r a b o u t what parts o f t h e passage b e a r t h e b u r d e n o f this a r g u m e n t .

T h e distinction b e t w e e n m o d e s o f rule with which Aquinas o p e n s his dis- cussion o f prelapsarian a u t h o r i t y might b e t h o u g h t to p r o v i d e s o m e reason for thinking that political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d b e f o u n d in a state o f innocence. T h e first o f the two m o d e s Aquinas distinguishes is rule " o r d e r e d to g o v e r n - ing," ordinatus ad regimen. T h i s characterization o f t h e first m o d e d o e s not, however, imply that it is political. While Aquinas o f t e n employs the w o r d regimen to d e n o t e political rule, his Sentence c o m m e n t a r y contains m a n y in- stances o f the w o r d in which it is clear that the g o v e r n i n g being d e s c r i b e d is nonpolitical. T h u s Aquinas speaks o f the regimen rationis to describe reason's rule o v e r t h e senses'9 a n d o f regimen mulieris when talking a b o u t a h u s b a n d ' s rule o v e r his wife.so T h a t Aquinas thinks authority in the state o f i n n o c e n c e would be ordinatus ad regimen d o e s n o t itself imply, t h e r e f o r e , that h e thinks that a u t h o r i t y w o u l d be political.

N o t e v e n the analogy Aquinas draws b e t w e e n the first m o d e o f rule a n d

,6 T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y well d o c u m e n t e d in J a m e s B i y t h e , "Family, G o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e M e d i e v a l A r i s t o t e l i a n s , " H/story o f Political Thought l o (1989): 3 - 7 .

�9 ~ F o r e x a m p l e , Summa Theo/og/ae I, 81, 3; I - I f , 17, 7; I - 1 I , 56, 4; I - I I , 58, 2; t h i s w o r k will h e r e a f t e r b e c i t e d as ST.

, s S T 1-11, 44, I. ,9 II Sentences d . z 4 , q. 3, a.4; II Sentences d . 3 o , q. l , a. ~ ; I l l Sentences d. ] 7, q- 1, a.~; 111 Sentences

d . 3 7 , q . l , a. 3. 3~ Sentences d . ~ 2 , q . l , a.3; I V Sentences d . 3 5 , q . l , a. 4.

AUGUSTXNZ AND AQUXNAS ON ORIGXNAL SIN 363

the rule exercised by a king o v e r his subjects establishes that. Aquinas's o p e n - ing distinction b e t w e e n the two m o d e s is a distinction between two ways o f exercising any kind o f rule, a n d n o t j u s t two ways o f exercising political rule. T h u s Aquinas thinks that political, familial, o r ecclesiastica[ authority can b e exercised in e i t h e r o f the two ways o r modes. T h e parallels he draws b e t w e e n kingship a n d the first m o d e , a n d b e t w e e n t y r a n n y a n d the second, are d r a w n to explain a n d illustrate the two ways o f ruling that Aquinas distinguishes. T h e use o f political analogy f o r illustrative o r e x p l a n a t o r y p u r p o s e s is not, as already noted, u n c o m m o n in Aquinas's work. His use o f such analogies d o e s not imply that h e thinks the p h e n o m e n o n b e i n g explained is itself political. In this case, his a p p e a l to kingship a n d t y r a n n y to explain two ways o f ruling d o e s not imply that the rule he has in m i n d is political rule.

T h e strongest evidence that A q u i n a s is talking a b o u t political rule in this passage is his e n u m e r a t i o n o f t h e functions o f rule " o r d e r e d to governing." T h e t h r e e functions he d i s t i n g u i s h e s - - g u i d a n c e , s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f defects, a n d correction o f m o r a l s - - a r e a s c r i b e d to political rule o r political society in Aquinas's later works. In t h e passage o f his Sentence c o m m e n t a r y u n d e r discus- sion, Aquinas says that the last o f t h e s e functions is fulfilled by punishing the evil a n d leading t h e m to acts o f virtue. T h e p u r p o s e o f h u m a n law is described in virtually the s a m e terms in the S u m m a Theologiae.s~ A n d the p r o p a g a t i o n o f laws which serve this p u r p o s e is, A q u i n a s insists, a function p r o p e r to political authority.3, T h e second o f these functions, the s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n o f defects, is p r o m i n e n t a m o n g the reasons A q u i n a s cites for t h e h u m a n n e e d to live in political society in the o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h s o f De Regno.ss T h e s e suggest that an authority which c o m b i n e s these two functions with that o f guidance "in things to be d o n e a n d known" is political authority, a n d that Aquinas is analyz- ing political a u t h o r i t y at the close o f his r e m a r k s a b o u t dominium a n d original sin.

B u t an a u t h o r i t y that acts only to g u i d e those subject to it and which has b e e n s t r i p p e d o f its coercive f u n c t i o n s does n o t m u c h resemble political au- thority as we a f t e r the Fall are familiar with it. Aquinas may be justified in claiming that s o m e functions o f political authority w o u l d have b e e n exercised even h a d original sin n o t b e e n c o m m i t t e d . Description o f the authority exercis- ing that function as itself a political authority, however, might seem far less legitimate.

Markus's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Aquinas's position a n d his differences f r o m A u g u s t i n e d e p e n d s heavily u p o n t h e s e considerations for its plausibility. Aris-

s~ S T I - I I , 95, t. ST 1 - I I , 9 o, 3 a n d ad a.

33De Regno Book I, chapter I.

364 . J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 3 J U L Y ~ 9 9 2

totle's claim that h u m a n beings a r e naturally political, Markus argues, implies that h u m a n beings a r e naturally subject to an a u t h o r i t y that is fully political a n d not j u s t o n e that exercises o n e o f the functions o f political authority. T h e prelapsarian a u t h o r i t y o f Aquinas's Sentence c o m m e n t a r y is not, Markus says, an authority Aristotle w o u l d recognize as political; fidelity to Aristotle there- fore r e q u i r e d that Aquinas locate all t h r e e functions o f political authority even in prelapsarian rule. Markus a r g u e s that as Aquinas became m o r e d e e p l y i m b u e d with Aristotle's political t h e o r y in the years a f t e r he c o m m e n t e d on the Sentences, he c a m e increasingly to recognize the f o r c e o f this r e q u i r e m e n t . W h e n he r e t u r n e d to these issues in the S u m m a Theologiae, Markus says, Aquinas rejected his earlier c o n c e p t i o n o f political authority as "a citizens' advice b u r e a u , " r e c o g n i z e d that political authority is inherently coercive a n d claims that political a u t h o r i t y "with the full a p p a r a t u s o f g o v e r n m e n t a n d the p o w e r o f e n f o r c e m e n t " w o u l d have b e e n f o u n d in a state o f innocence.s4

T h e tensions in Aquinas's view begin to show w h e n his views a b o u t the centrality o f coercion a r e c o n j o i n e d with his explanation o f the origins o f political authority. Aquinas's claim that political a u t h o r i t y is not a c o n s e q u e n c e o f sin implies that it w o u l d have b e e n f o u n d even had original sin not b e e n committed. T h e views a b o u t coercion Markus imputes to the m a t u r e Aquinas t h e r e f o r e imply that coercion w o u l d have been f o u n d even a m o n g the inno- cent. T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t Aquinas, like Augustine, t h o u g h t that sinless h u m a n beings w o u l d h a v e b e e n fully free. I n d e e d , Markus says, it was Augustine's views a b o u t t h e f r e e d o m o f t h e sinless which forced him to d e n y that coercive political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d have b e e n f o u n d in a state o f innocence. B u t this r o u t e was not o p e n to Aquinas. Aquinas's solution to the problem, Markus argues, was to a d o p t a notion o f " p o s i t i v e f r e e d o m " according to which h u m a n beings are free e v e n if c o e r c e d , p r o v i d e d that they a r e being directed to their own o r the c o m m o n g o o d . D i f f e r e n c e s between Aquinas a n d A u g u s t i n e o n the origin o f political a u t h o r i t y in h u m a n sinfulness are t h e r e f o r e tied, Markus concludes, to d e e p e r d i f f e r e n c e s "about the m e a n i n g o f 'freedom'."ss

o

Markus's claim that Aquinas located the exercise o f coercion in the state o f innocence is definitely a minority interpretation,36 o n e which must explain why Aquinas t h o u g h t sinless h u m a n beings would n e e d to be coerced. His claim that Aquinas t h o u g h t coercion an essential f u n c t i o n o f political a u t h o r -

s4 Markus, "Two Conceptions of Political Authority," 94- s5 Markus, "Two Conceptions of Political Authority," loo.

See for example Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas," i lo; d'Entreves, The Medieval Con:rib~ion to Political Thought, a 4.

A U G U S T I N E A N D A Q U I N A S O N O R I G I N A L S I N 365 ity a n d t h e textual i n t e r p r e t a t i o n h e builds u p o n that claim do, however, have m u c h to r e c o m m e n d them.

First, i n t e r p r e t e r s who d e n y that Aquinas t h o u g h t t h e exercise o f coercion essential to political authority m u s t d e f e n d t h e p r o p r i e t y o f Aquinas's describ- ing noncoercive prelapsarian a u t h o r i t y as political. For it m i g h t seem n a t u r a l to think that Aquinas would assimilate t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e state o f innocence to that f o r m o f postlalSsarian a u t h o r i t y which it would most have resembled. Since a u t h o r i t y that exercises no coercive p o w e r seems so little like political authority as it exists a f t e r t h e Fall, description o f the f o r m e r in terms o f t h e latter seems illegitimate. Markus's claim that prelapsarian authority would have been coercive avoids this difficulty.s7

Second, Markus's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n links Aquinas's appreciation o f coercion's centrality to political a u t h o r i t y with his g r a d u a l absorption o f Aristotle's politi- cal theory. Markus t h e r e f o r e c o n c e d e s that t h e y o u n g Aquinas was m u c h less ready than t h e m a t u r e o n e to n u m b e r the exercise o f coercive p o w e r a m o n g political authority's essential o r definitive functions. Markus appeals to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f Aquinas's political t h o u g h t in this respect to explain what a p p e a r to be very d i f f e r e n t t r e a t m e n t s o f prelapsarian political authority in the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y a n d t h e Summa.sS

T h i r d , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n e w political theories o f t e n involves, not only the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f new political concepts, b u t also t h e redefinition o f con- cepts long r e g a r d e d as fundamental.sg I n d e e d conceptual c h a n g e o f the latter sort often plays a crucial role in t h e acceptance o f novel ideas in political theory. T h e r e f o r e an a d e q u a t e explanation o f a theory's novelty a n d o f how it secured acceptance over previously d o m i n a n t views o f t e n requires an accurate m a p p i n g o f t h e conceptual c h a n g e s that t h e o r y entails. Markus, by focusing on the new m e a n i n g Aquinas gave to t h e notion o f political f r e e d o m , p u r p o r t s to provide j u s t such an e x p l a n a t i o n o f how political Aristotelianism differs f r o m political Augustinianism a n d o f how t h e f o r m e r gained acceptance over the latter.4o

sv This is the a r g u m e n t Markus presses against the view that ptelapsarian authority would have been noncoercive; see Markus, " T w o Conceptions o f Political Authority," 94. A variant o n Markus's objection to the usual r e a d i n g seems to have been anticipated by Deane; see The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine, ~ 34, where D e a n e contrasts Aquinas's "idealization" o f politics with the political realism o f Augustine. For Augustine's political realism, see also Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "City of God," 63.

ss Markus, " T w o Conceptions o f Political Authority," 9 1 - 9 4 . s9 For but o n e discussion o f this a p p r o a c h to the history o f political theory, see Anthony

Pagden's " I n t r o d u c t i o n " to The Languages of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1987), ed. Pagden, l - 1 7 ; StL~ 3 f f, for discussion o f how this methodology applies to political Aristotelianism.

40 For the importance o f this conceptual change in the acceptance o f political Aristotelianism by Aquinas's successors, see Markus, " T w o Conceptions o f Political Authority," 9 6 - 9 7 .

366 J O U R N A L O F T H E H I S T O R Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 : 3 J U L Y X 9 9 2 Markus's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n suffers, h o w e v e r , f r o m a f u n d a m e n t a l flaw. Fidel-

ity to Aristotle's claim that subjection to political authority is natural d o e s not require that Aquinas reject o r m o d i f y the analysis o f his Sentence c o m m e n t a r y . Nor d o e s it d e m a n d that he locate an Aristotelian c o n c e p t i o n o f political authority in the state o f innocence. It only requires Aquinas's acknowledge- m e n t that the natural processes o f h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p e r f e c t i o n re- quire h u m a n subjection to political authority. This a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t is com- patible with the analysis o f the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y because Aquinas insists that the state o f i n n o c e n c e w o u l d be n e i t h e r a state in which h u m a n beings exist in a p u r e l y natural condition n o r o n e in which the processes o f p e r f e c - tion are entirely natural. T h i s is a p o i n t o n which Aquinas's writings, b o t h early and late, a r e consistent. It is o n e he makes most clearly a n d succinctly in question 5, article a o f t h e Summa's Secunda Secundae. T h e r e he contrasts his own view that " m a n [was] c r e a t e d with the gift o f grace" with the position that man was c r e a t e d in a p u r e l y natural state. Earlier, in his Sentence c o m m e n t a r y , Aquinas h a d m a d e the s a m e point. T h e r e , he a r g u e d that the state o f inno- cence w o u l d b e o n e in which h u m a n beings were s u p e r n a t u r a l l y p e r f e c t e d o r were "elevated" a b o v e t h e i r n a t u r e by grace.4~

A m o n g the elevating effects o f grace, he says there, was "the p e r f e c t obedi- ence o f the inferior p o w e r s to reason,"4, so that h u m a n beings in a state o f innocence w o u l d have b e e n less distracted by sensuous delights than a r e hu- man beings a f t e r the Fall. It is precisely t h e attraction to what Aquinas calls " i m p r o p e r delights" that he says makes the coercive function o f h u m a n law necessary.4s T h e r e w o u l d have b e e n no n e e d for political a u t h o r i t y to exercise coercion in a state o f innocence, because in the state o f innocence h u m a n beings would b e elevated a b o v e their n a t u r e by the effects o f grace. It is t h e r e f o r e n e i t h e r s u r p r i s i n g n o r p r o b l e m a t i c that Aquinas thinks innocents would n e e d only the directive g o v e r n m e n t m e n t i o n e d in the Sentence c o m m e n - tary. A n d because A q u i n a s c o n s i d e r e d the state o f i n n o c e n c e an elevated condition, he w o u l d see n o inconsistency b e t w e e n the Aristotelian dictum that h u m a n beings are naturally subject to political authority a n d the description o f noncoercive p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y as political.

Contract theory's e m p l o y m e n t o f a hypothetical state o f n a t u r e has p e r - haps inclined historians o f political t h o u g h t to r e a d this intellectual device back into Aquinas. T h i s r e a d i n g is no d o u b t facilitated by Aquinas's having taken o v e r f r o m Aristotle a r o b u s t notion o f nature. A n d it no d o u b t gains some plausibility f r o m t h e i m p u t a t i o n to Aquinas o f m o d e r n philosophical

4, I I I Stntencesd.~, q . t , a.2 a d 9. 4, [ I Sentences 29, t, 3" 4sST l - I f , 95, t.

AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS ON ORIGINAL SIN 3 6 7

i n t e r e s t s - - t h e i n t e r e s t , f o r e x a m p l e , in a st at e o f p u r e n a t u r e in w h i c h a r e d i s p l a y e d t h e m o t i v e s t h a t give ri se t o political society.

B u t t h e c o n c e r n s t h a t led A q u i n a s to c o n s i d e r w h a t a u t h o r i t y w o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d i n a state o f i n n o c e n c e a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h o s e w h i c h l ed H o b b e s a n d L o c k e to c o n s i d e r w h a t life w o u l d b e like in a state o f n a t u r e . H o b b e s a n d L o c k e w e r e i n t e r e s t e d p r i m a r i l y in q u e s t i o n s a b o u t w h a t i n t e r e s t s a r e s e c u r e d b y s u b j e c t i n g o n e s e l f t o political a u t h o r i t y , u n d e r w h a t c i r c u m - stances a n a u t h o r i t y is l e g i t i m a t e a n d i n t o w h a t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r m it is ra- tional to c o n t r a c t . T h e s e q u e s t i o n s r e f l e c t a n i n t e r e s t in political t h e o r y . A q u i n a s , by c o n t r a s t , was m o v e d b y i n t e r e s t s t h a t w e r e p r i m a r i l y t h e o l o g i c a l . I n his discussion o f w h a t r u l e t h e r e w o u l d b e in a s t a t e o f i n n o c e n c e , h e was c o n c e r n e d to establish, not t h a t political s u b j e c t i o n is n a t u r a l , b u t t h a t subjec- tion to political a u t h o r i t y is n o t t h e r e s u l t o f sin.

O n c e A q u i n a s ' s t h e o l o g i c a l c o n c e r n s a r e a p p r e c i a t e d , t h e r e is less inclina- tion to assimilate his s t a t e o f i n n o c e n c e to a state o f nature.44 T h e r e is c o r r e - s p o n d i n g l y less r e a s o n to s u p p o s e h e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e c o e r c i v e f u n c t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d t h e r e . T h e r e is t h e r e f o r e f a r less r e a s o n to e n d o r s e a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h A q u i n a s b e c a m e dissatisfied with t h e t r e a t m e n t g i v e n in his S e n t e n c e c o m m e n t a r y , l a t e r l o c a t e d c o e r c i v e a u t h o r i t y in a s t a t e o f i n n o c e n c e a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y d e p a r t e d f r o m A u g u s t i n e o n t h e n a t u r e o f f r e e d o m .

T h e c h a l l e n g e t h a t r e m a i n s is t o d e v e l o p a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h s h a r e s t h e s t r e n g t h s o f M a r k u s ' s r e a d i n g , b u t a v o i d s this e r r o r . A q u i n a s ' s cl ai m in t h e c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e Sentences t h a t political a u t h o r i t y h as o n e f u n c t i o n t h a t is n o t a c c o u n t e d f o r e n t i r e l y by h u m a n s i n f u l n e s s is in i t s e l f a sig n ifi can t d e p a r - t u r e f r o m A u g u s t i n e ' s political t h o u g h t . P r o p e r l y to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t d e p a r - t u r e , it will b e h e l p f u l to a t t e n d to w h a t s u b t l e d i f f e r e n c e s d o r e v e a l t h e m s e l v e s w h e n A q u i n a s ' s e a r l y t r e a t m e n t o f p r e l a p s a r i a n a u t h o r i t y is c o m p a r e d wi t h t h a t o f t h e S u m m a .

.

I n t h e S u m m a as in t h e Sentence c o m m e n t a r y , A q u i n a s s p e a k s o f two m o d e s o f dominium. T h e first is t h e m a s t e r y o f slaves; t h e s e c o n d is clominium " i n a g e n e r a l sense r e f e r r e d to a n y k i n d o f subject.'4~ It is e x e m p l i f i e d b y r u l e o v e r

I have tried to suggest that the equation of a state of innocence with one of nature underlies Markus's reading of the development of Aquinas's political thought. There is, however, only one brief passage--at Markus, "Two Conceptions of Political Authority," 93--in which the equation is explicit. The equation is much more flagrant in D. E. Luscomhe, "The State of Nature and the Origin of the State," Cambridge Histo" O of Later Medieval Philosophy, 757-7 o.

45"A1io modo accipitur dominium, secundum quod communiter refertur ad subjectum qualitercumque" ST I, 96, 4.

3 6 8 J O U R N A L OIg T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 0 " 3 JULY ~ 9 9 a

f r e e p e r s o n s . T h e f i r s t m o d e , A q u i n a s says, w o u l d not b e f o u n d i n a s t a t e o f innocence. T h e a r g u m e n t Aquinas provides is m u c h the same as that f o u n d in his earlier work, t h o u g h without the analogy between slavery a n d tyranny. Aquinas argues t h a t being ruled f o r the utility or good o f a n o t h e r is a cause o f sadness and can h a p p e n only as a p u n i s h m e n t for sin. This a r g u m e n t like the earlier one turns on the claim that h u m a n beings are created for their own sake r a t h e r than to be used for the good o f a n o t h e r . Aside f r o m the absence o f the political analogy, the a r g u m e n t o f the Summa differs f r o m that o f the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y only in its allusion to unhappiness, which makes clearer t h a n did the earlier work in what the punitive character o f slavery consists.

Aquinas offers two a r g u m e n t s to s u p p o r t the claim that the second m o d e o f rule would be f o u n d in a state o f innocence. O n e r e t u r n s to considerations m e n t i o n e d briefly at the e n d o f his discussion in the c o m m e n t a r y on the Sentences. He says in the Summa as he did in the earlier work that even in a state o f innocence, some would be wiser t h a n others. T h e gift o f superior wisdom, he argues, should be used for the benefit o f others a n d would be so used were the wisest e m p l o y e d in the direction o f those whom they exceed.46 T h e second a r g u m e n t is premised on the claim that h u m a n beings are naturally social a n d so would have lived socially even h a d original sin not been committed. Social life, Aquinas argues, is not possible without someone presiding who intends the c o m m o n good. In defense o f this claim, he writes that " m a n y people per se intend many ends; one, however, only one." Even in a state o f innocence, Aquinas concludes, t h e r e would have to be some a u t h o r i t y to direct all to the c o m m o n good.

T h e t r e a t m e n t o f the Summa, like that o f the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y , lacks a clear statement t h a t political a u t h o r i t y would have been exercised had original sin not been committed. T h e second m o d e o f rule is a u t h o r i t y taken generally a n d not specifically political a u t h o r i t y . A n d direction to c o m m o n goods is a function o f paternal as well as political authority. Aquinas seems to conclude that some a u t h o r i t y would be n e e d e d in a state o f innocence, but seems to leave open what sort o f a u t h o r i t y it would be. T h e problem o f i n t e r p r e t i n g Aquinas's remarks is complicated by the "elevated" condition o f the innocent, for not all the functions o f political a u t h o r i t y would n e e d to be exercised in a state o f innocence.

Here reference to Aquinas's earlier work is helpful. In the Sentence com- mentary, Aquinas had a r g u e d t h a t o n e o f the functions o f political a u t h o r i t y

46 For an interpretation that makes much of this line of reasoning, see Samuel H. Beer, "The Rule of the Wise and the Holy: Hierarchy in the Thomistic System," Political Theory 14 (1986): $9~-42a; for a convincing response, see Brian Tierney, "Hierarchy, Consent and the 'Western Tradition'," Political Theory 15 (1987): 646-52.

A U G U S T I N E A N D A Q U I N A S O N O R I G I N A L S I N 369 w o u l d be exercised in a state o f innocence. H e shows no signs o f having r e p u d i a t e d his earlier views. T h e r e f o r e the most natural way to r e a d the passage f r o m the Summa is as c o n c l u d i n g that b o t h paternal a n d political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d have b e e n exercised even had original sin n o t b e e n commit- ted. Paternal a u t h o r i t y would have b e e n exercised in family life a n d political a u t h o r i t y o v e r o t h e r groups. O f c o u r s e the graced condition o f t h e innocent entails that the disciplinary functions o f these f o r m s o f authority w o u l d n o t be exercised. B u t in the Summa as in the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y , Aquinas a r g u e s that o n e function would be. T h e m o s t significant d e p a r t u r e f r o m the c o m m e n - tary on the Sentences is the function o f political authority that Aquinas says innocents w o u l d require. W h e r e the Aquinas o f the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y spoke vaguely o f guiding the i n n o c e n t "in things to b e d o n e a n d known," the later Aquinas emphasizes in the Summa that even innocents w o u l d n e e d direc- tion to their c o m m o n good.

T h a t Aquinas c o n s i d e r e d p u r s u i t o f the c o m m o n g o o d an i m p o r t a n t func- tion o f political a u t h o r i t y is not o p e n to doubt. Pursuit o f the c o m m o n g o o d is definitive o f w h a t Aquinas calls "regnative p r u d e n c e , " the virtue by which political a u t h o r i t y is wisely o r p r u d e n t l y exercised.47 In De Regno, Aquinas a r g u e d that political authority is n e e d e d to direct m e m b e r s o f political society to the c o m m o n g o o d . T h a t a r g u m e n t is virtually identical to the second argu- m e n t Aquinas a d d u c e d in the Summa to d e m o n s t r a t e that even the innocent would n e e d to be governed.48 Direction to the c o m m o n g o o d is thus the function o f political authority that, according to the Summa, w o u l d be exer- cised even h a d the Fall n e v e r o c c u r r e d .

T h e centrality o f the notion o f the c o m m o n g o o d to Aquinas's m a t u r e political t h o u g h t has long b e e n recognized. D e v e l o p m e n t o f that notion in Aquinas's t h o u g h t has not, however, b e e n studied sufficiently. Attention to the textual evidence o f this d e v e l o p m e n t suggests why, by the time Aquinas w r o t e the Summa, he characterized the g o v e r n m e n t a l function exercised a m o n g the innocent as direction toward the c o m m o n g o o d r a t h e r than in the terms em- ployed in his discussion o f the s a m e issue in his Sentence c o m m e n t a r y . It also provides a p r o m i s i n g clue to the n a t u r e o f his d e p a r t u r e f r o m Augustine.

T h e notion o f the c o m m o n g o o d is p r e s e n t in the c o m m e n t a r y on the Sentences. In B o o k III, f o r example, Aquinas notes that legislators f r a m e laws to p r o m o t e the c o m m o n good.49 Nonetheless, the c o m m o n g o o d plays a far less i m p o r t a n t role in the Sentence c o m m e n t a r y than it does in Aquinas's later work. T o see this, it is helpful to c o n s i d e r Aquinas's discussion o f t h e virtue o f

4 7 S T I I - I I , 5 ~ , I . 4SDe Regno, B o o k I , c h a p t e r 1. 49 I l l Sentences d . 3 7 , q . l , a . 2 , q . a a d 5 .

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legal justice, which he says in the S u m m a has the c o m m o n good as its object.5o Comparison o f Aquinas's later t r e a t m e n t o f legal justice with that o f the Sen- tence c o m m e n t a r y suggests t h a t as Aquinas's t h o u g h t m a t u r e d , his grasp o f the c o m m o n good became f i r m e r a n d the i m p o r t a n c e he accorded it as a motive increased.

In the S e n t e n c e c o m m e n t a r y , the link between the c o m m o n good a n d the virtue o f legal justice is t e n u o u s at best. In that work, legal justice is character- ized as the virtue by which one obeys the law.5, While he says that laws are f r a m e d for the c o m m o n good, the impression his remarks convey is that the virtue o f legal justice moves those who possess it to obey only the letter o f the law. He contrasts legal justice with the virtue o f epieikeia which, he says, "obeys the intention o f the legislator.%" I n the S e n t e n c e c o m m e n t a r y , there is no clear statement that the person o f legal justice obeys the law because her obedience promotes the c o m m o n good.

In his c o m m e n t a r y on the N i c o m a c h e a n Ethics, by contrast, Aquinas illus- trates how the c o m m o n good can function as a motive by appealing to an example taken over f r o m A r i s t o t l e - - t h a t o f a soldier who holds his place in battle. T h e courageous soldier holds his place because o f equanimity in the face o f d a n g e r a n d because o f the d i s h o n o r associated with forsaking his post. T h e soldier exercising t h e virtue o f lega] justice, however, is moved to a n act o f courage primarily by his a t t a c h m e n t to the c o m m o n good o f his political community. While Aquinas notes that acts o f courage are required by law, he implies that it is the soldier's knowledge that his c o m m u n i t y will be o p e n to greater d a n g e r if he forsakes his post that motivates him to remain and fight.s3 T h e example o f the steadfast soldier shows how a t t a c h m e n t to the c o m m o n good can f u n c t i o n as the reason or the motive to p e r f o r m acts o f o t h e r virtues like courage which the law requires; Aquinas also thinks that such a t t a c h m e n t can be the motive for p e r f o r m i n g acts o f t e m p e r a n c e .

I n d e e d Aquinas argues in the S u m m a that a t t a c h m e n t .to the c o m m o n good can provide a motive f o r p e r f o r m i n g acts o f all the o t h e r virtues.~ Acts o f bravery, t e m p e r a n c e , p r u d e n c e , or particular justice can all be motivated, ultimately, by a concern for the effect o f one's actions on the c o m m o n good o f one's c o m m u n i t y a n d by the desire to p r o m o t e or maintain the conditions in which the c o m m o n good consists. A t t a c h m e n t to the c o m m o n good o f political society can t h e r e f o r e , Aquinas thinks, be central to one's structure o f motives. T h e person for whom the c o m m o n good is a d o m i n a n t or, in Aquinas's termi-

~ S T II-II, 58, 6. 5, III Sentences d . 3 3 , q . 3 3 , a . l , q . 5 . 5, Ibid., ad 5- 53 In Libros Ethicorum, Book V, lect. s. •ST II-II, 58, 6.

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nology, a "general" motive,s5 acts o n the virtue o f legal justice. This shift in t h e characterization o f legal justice is a c c o m p a n i e d by a m o r e n u a n c e d description o f the relationship b e t w e e n ep/t,/ke/a a n d legal justice. In the Summa, Aquinas says that ep/e/ke/a is a p a r t o f legal justice, because the virtue o f legal justice can be u n d e r s t o o d to c o m m a n d o b e d i e n c e "either to the letter o f the law or the intention o f t h e legislator."56

C o m p a r i s o n o f Aquinas's earlier a n d later treatments o f the virtue o f legal justice suggests that as his political t h o u g h t d e v e l o p e d , he c a m e increasingly to a p p r e c i a t e t h e value o f the c o m m o n g o o d as a motive central to one's char- acter. It f u r t h e r suggests that the virtue o f a t t a c h m e n t to the c o m m o n g o o d manifests itself in activity which t h e law enjoins. Finally, the d i f f e r e n c e in t h e two accounts o f legal j u s t i c e which such a c o m p a r i s o n reveals suggests an i m p o r t a n t d e v e l o p m e n t in Aquinas's analysis o f political authority. It suggests that the Summa goes b e y o n d t h e Sentence c o m m e n t a r y in n u m b e r i n g a m o n g the functions o f political a u t h o r i t y the f r a m i n g o f legislation which permits citizens to cultivate a n d act o n the motive o f a t t a c h m e n t to the c o m m o n g o o d .

This a c c o u n t o f Aquinas's d e v e l o p m e n t explains the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n Aquinas's discussion o f p r e l a p s a r i a n rule in the Summa a n d in the c o m m e n t a r y on the Sentences. A c c o r d i n g to b o t h accounts, a r u l e r o f innocents exercises only o n e o f the functions characteristic o f political authority. Aquinas's views on t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f legal justice a n d the c o m m o n g o o d w e r e not, h o w e v e r , fully d e v e l o p e d at the time he c o m m e n t e d o n the Sentences. T h e r e f o r e only according to the later a c c o u n t o f t h e Summa is the g o v e r n m e n t a l function exercised in a state o f i n n o c e n c e described as that o f guiding innocents to their c o m m o n good.

T h e a c c o u n t also highlights o n e o f the most i m p o r t a n t issues at stake in the discussion o f prelapsarian political authority. According to Augustine, the earthly p e a c e which is t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political society a f t e r the Fall is sought so that h u m a n beings can secure "the things relevant to mortal life."s7 T h e o b e d i e n c e to law necessary to sustain it and the humility which such o b e d i e n c e teaches a r e n o t qualities which w o u l d be n e e d e d o r exercised w e r e h u m a n beings not sinful. A u g u s t i n e t h e r e f o r e thinks that t h e r e w o u l d b e n o political subjection had original sin n o t b e e n committed. For Aquinas, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , political subjection m a k e s possible citizens' d e v e l o p m e n t o f an a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d a n d o r d e r s society so that citizens can act o n that attachment. Aquinas, unlike Augustine, thinks this is genuinely perfect-

s~ST I I - I I , 58, 6. T h e notion o f a general motive is a very i m p o r t a n t but u n d e r e x p l o r e d o n e in Aquinas's t h o u g h t . For o t h e r sources, see S T I I - I I , 95, 8 where charity is treated as a g e n e r a l virtue; see De Ma/o 8, a a n d S T l I - I I , x6~, 7 a n d 8 f o r p r i d e as a general vice.

s t S T I I - I I , l a o , ~ ad l, emphasis a d d e d . 5~ Ci 0 of God XIX, 17.

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i n g a n d n o t m e r e l y a r e m e d y f o r sin. H e t h e r e f o r e c o n c l u d e s t h a t o n e o f t h e f u n c t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d h a v e b e e n e x e r c i s e d e v e n in a state o f i n n o c e n c e . O n e o f t h e m o s t p r o f o u n d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e political views o f A u g u s t i n e a n d A q u i n a s is t h a t b e t w e e n t h e v a l u e e a c h a t t a c h e s t o b e i n g m o t i v a t e d b y t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political society.

T h i s a r g u m e n t , i n s o f a r as it d e n i e s t h a t A q u i n a s t h o u g h t c o e r c i o n a n essen - tial f u n c t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n e x e r c i s e d in t h e state o f i n n o c e n c e , c o n c u r s w i t h t h e u s u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A q u i n a s ' s political t h o u g h t . I n s o f a r as it stresses t h e r o l e o f a u t h o r i t y in s e c u r i n g a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d , h o w e v e r , it is at o d d s w i t h p r e v a i l i n g views. T h e c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d r e a d i n g h o l d s t h a t A q u i n a s t h o u g h t t h e e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t , a n d t h e o n l y o n e t h a t w o u l d b e e x e r c i s e d in a state o f i n n o c e n c e , is t h a t o f g u i d i n g i n d i v i d u a l s ' p u r s u i t s o f t h e i r o w n e n d s . T h i s is s u g g e s t e d b y Bigongiari~ s a n d b y t h e e a r l y w o r k o f Yves Simons9 a n d is e x p l i c i t in a n essay b y J e a n D u n b a b i n . 6~ T h e essential f u n c t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y , o n this view, i n c l u d e t h a t o f c o o r d i - n a t i n g t h e p u r s u i t o f i n d i v i d u a l g o o d s , g u i d i n g s u b j e c t s in t h e p u r s u i t o f c o m - m o n g o o d s w h e n m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e ways o f a t t a i n i n g c o m m o n g o o d s a r e avail- able, 6~ p r o m o t i n g t h e g o o d s o f c u l t u r e so i m p o r t a n t t o a well-lived life, 6' a n d p r e s e r v i n g a social o r d e r in w h i c h e n r i c h i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s a r e possible.6s It is, h o w e v e r , c r u c i a l to t h e political t h o u g h t o f t h e m a t u r e A q u i n a s t h a t a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d is d e v e l o p e d b y b e i n g s u b j e c t e d t o political a u t h o r i t y . F o s t e r i n g this a t t a c h m e n t , a n d n o t j u s t a r r a n g i n g t h e p u r s u i t o f p r i v a t e g o o d s so t h a t t h e c o m m o n g o o d is r e a l i z e d , is in A q u i n a s ' s view t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n o f political a u t h o r i t y . T h e p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A q u i n a s ' s r e m a r k s o n t h e state o f i n n o c e n c e r e v e a l s this c a r d i n a l t e n e t o f his political t h o u g h t .

6 . T h e r e are, n o d o u b t , a n u m b e r o f r e a s o n s w h y A q u i n a s b r o k e with A u g u s t i n e o n t h e m o r a l v a l u e o f a citizen's a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d . I n his

ss Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas," 1o9: "Order, then, comes into existence when a multiplicity of individuals are brought together and so arranged that by their united efforts a common end may be attained" (emphasis added).

~0 See Yves Simon, The Nature and Functions of Authority (Marquette University Press, 194o), i6ff. For qualifications of this view in Simon's later work, see his Philosophy of Donoc~atic Govern- merit (University of Chicago Press, 1951), 59ff., especially note 93; also his A General Theory of Author/ty (University of Notre Dame Press, 198o ), 5o-6o.

60 Dunbabin writes: "For St. Thomas, social intercourse among men would be quite impossi- ble in the absence of government. Hence his famous doctrine that even in the state of innocence there would have been dominion. For men in a body need one man in authority over them to look after the common good while they pursue their individual interests." Jean Dunbabin, "Aristode in the Schools," in Smalley, Trends in Medieval Political Thought, 79.

6, Simon, The Nature and Functions of Authorily, 18. 6, Bigongiari, "The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas," 1o8.

Dunbabin, "Aristotle in the Schools," 79-

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interpretation o f t h e Nicomachean Ethics on legal justice, Aquinas i m p u t e d to Aristotle the view that the c o m m o n g o o d could function as the definitive motive o f t h e g o o d citizen. His r e v e r e n c e for Aristotle's moral t h o u g h t n o d o u b t strongly inclined him to reject Augustine's view. M o r e o v e r , Aquinas f o u n d in Aristotle's works the c o n c e p t o f natural virtues, which he c o n t r a s t e d with the theological o r i n f u s e d virtues.64 This c o n c e p t enabled him to a r g u e that the life o f a g o o d citizen in a well-structured political society was a life o f virtue without i m p l y i n g t h a t such a life was a life o r d e r e d toward God. A u g u s - tine, who lacked t h e c o n c e p t o f natural virtue, t h o u g h t that the only truly virtuous activity was activity o r d e r e d to God.65 H e t h e r e f o r e a r g u e d that t h e r e can be no j u s t i c e in a society in which the t r u e G o d is n o t w o r s h i p p e d , e~

In conclusion, I want to c o n s i d e r a n o t h e r a n d c o m p l e m e n t a r y explanation o f why Aquinas s h o u l d have t h o u g h t , in the face o f Augustine's insistence to the contrary, that a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d o f political society is mor- ally perfective. I will d e v e l o p it by considering an objection to the r e a d i n g o f Aquinas that I have b e e n d e f e n d i n g . R e s p o n d i n g to the objection a n d f u r t h e r explaining Aquinas's d e p a r t u r e f r o m Augustine helps bring o u t what Aquinas considers the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e s o f political subjection and political authority.

T h e notion o f t h e c o m m o n g o o d is a notoriously elusive o n e in Aquinas's political t h o u g h t . At o n e point he r e m a r k s enigmatically that it consists o f ':justice and peace. ''67 B u t w h a t e v e r the c o m m o n g o o d includes, t h e c o m m o n good o f a society in t h e state o f innocence is certainly very d i f f e r e n t f r o m the c o m m o n g o o d o f a political society that exists after the Fail. Because o f the elevating o r p e r f e c t i n g effects o f grace, the ties that Aquinas w o u l d J h i n k obtain a m o n g innocents w o u l d d i f f e r significantly f r o m those that Augustine, f o r example, sees a m o n g m e m b e r s o f political society. Relations a m o n g the inno- cent would be m u c h like those which Aquinas t h o u g h t t h e i n f u s e d virtue o f charity makes possible: relations o f peace, love, and u n d i s t u r b e d h a r m o n y . 6s

Aquinas t h e r e f o r e seems to have paid a very d e a r price for his claim that o n e o f the f u n c t i o n s o f political a u t h o r i t y w o u l d have b e e n exercised in a state o f innocence. H e s e e m s f o r c e d to claim that political authority exists to secure an e n d that is h a r d l y recognizable as an object o f political rule. M o r e o v e r , the d e v e l o p m e n t o f his t h o u g h t a n d t h e increasing i m p o r t a n c e he attached to the c o m m o n g o o d s e e m only to have elevated the price. His r e m a r k s in the Sen- tence c o m m e n t a r y imply that p r e l a p s a r i a n rule w o u l d n o t be fully political because only o n e o f the functions o f political authority w o u l d have b e e n exercised. T h e claim that that f u n c t i o n /s a function o f political authority,

O n this c o n t r a s t , see S T I - I I , 41 , 4 a n d 6 3, 3; also De Virtv2ibm in Communi l, Jo. ~City of God X I X , 2 5. ~ C i t y of God X I X , z l . ~TST I - I I , 9 6, 3" s~See $ T I 1 - I 1 , ~9, t a n d ad 3-

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however, seemed unexceptionable. T h e t r e a t m e n t o f the Summa, on the o t h e r h a n d , is vasdy m o r e problematic. T h e r e too Aquinas claims that only one g o v e r n m e n t a l function would be f o u n d in a state o f innocence. But that func- tion seems little like any o f the functions which political a u t h o r i t y actually exercises.

Aquinas would certainly concede that the c o m m o n good sought in a state o f innocence differs in significant respects f r o m the c o m m o n good o f postlapsarian political society. H e would argue, however, that before the Fall as after, g u i d e d collective e f f o r t toward a c o m m o n good produces ties o f friendship a m o n g those subject to guidance. Aquinas thus takes f r o m Aris- totle the notion o f civic f r i e n d s h i p a n d argues that ties o f civic f r i e n d s h i p obtain a m o n g citizens o f a well-structured political society a f t e r the Fall. A n d he would a r g u e that, regardless o f the differences a m o n g the c o m m o n goods sought, the ties that would develop a m o n g innocent adults guided to a com- mon good are a p p r o p r i a t e l y described as ties o f civic friendship.

Aquinas does not discuss the friendship a m o n g the innocents. But t h a t their relations could be described as civic f r i e n d s h i p is suggested by Aquinas's willingness to b r o a d e n the notion o f civic f r i e n d s h i p beyond political contexts. De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis is a late treatise and t h e r e f o r e one which can be taken to express Aquinas's m a t u r e views. In c h a p t e r 14 o f that work, Aquinas considers the Scriptural injunction to love one's n e i g h b o r as oneself. He says that the love o f charity d e p e n d s u p o n there being a natural c o m m u n i t y a m o n g h u m a n beings all o f w h o m are o r d e r e d to beatitude. T h e ties a m o n g members o f that c o m m u n i t y are, Aquinas says, perfected by charity. He uses a political model to explain the n a t u r e o f the c o m m u n i t y itself, saying that all m e n are u n d e r God, as "the highest r u l e r o f all a n d font o f beatitude, a n d the legislator o f all justice."~

Aquinas's use o f a political model in this context is very suggestive. It conveys the impression that the charity to which God guides all m e n is best u n d e r s t o o d as a m o r e perfect f o r m o f the civic f r i e n d s h i p to which political a u t h o r i t y guides its subjects; this despite the fact that the c o m m o n good to which God guides h u m a n i t y is very d i f f e r e n t f r o m that at which political a u t h o r i t y aims.7o Aquinas thus thinks that civic f r i e n d s h i p or a more perfect form o f it obtains even a m o n g those who are not cooperating to secure the ends o f posdapsarian political society. T h e r e is t h e r e f o r e no reason to think Aquinas would d e n y that it would obtain a m o n g the innocent.

~ De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis, chapter ~B. On charity as the perfection of friendship and the implications of this for Aquinas's politics,

see the very general remarks of G. B. Phelan, "Justice and Friendship," in his Selected Papers (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967), ~ 13-3o, especially 224ff.

A U G U S T I N E AND A Q U I N A S ON O R I G I N A L SIN 375

Aquinas's assertion that a u t h o r i t y b e f o r e the Fall would be political rests o n his claim that those b e f o r e t h e Fall a r e guided, as a r e m e m b e r s o f a well-ruled society after t h e Fall, in activities that p r o m o t e the ties o f civic friendship. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f civic f r i e n d s h i p a m o n g m e m b e r s o f political society is, in Aquinas's view, t h e most i m p o r t a n t function o f political authority, f o r h e writes that: "the principle intention o f h u m a n law is that it p r o d u c e [fat/at] friendship a m o n g men."~' This d e v e l o p m e n t bulks large, h e argues, a m o n g the ways in which political a u t h o r i t y perfects those subject to it.

T h e i m p o r t a n c e Aquinas attaches to civic friendship constitutes a signifi- cant d e p a r t u r e f r o m Augustine. For Augustine, the ties that develop a m o n g m e m b e r s o f political society a r e e x t r e m e l y uncertain~, a n d pale beside t h e c o m m u n i o n o f fellow m e m b e r s o f t h e City o f God.73 For Aquinas, ties o f civic friendship a r e i m p o r t a n t a m o n g t h e goods that political subjection m a k e s available; a n d they significantly resemble the ties b i n d i n g those w h o love o n e a n o t h e r with t h e love o f charity. Aquinas's a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f civic friendship f r o m Aristode a n d t h e links h e establishes b e t w e e n it a n d t h e g u i d e d pursuit o f a c o m m o n good t h e r e f o r e proved crucial in his break f r o m political Augustinianism.

T h e r e are, m o r e o v e r , reasons to believe that t h e links Aquinas f o r g e d a m o n g the n o d o n s o f legal j u s d c e , t h e c o m m o n good, civic friendship, a n d t h e love o f charity p r o v e d i m p o r t a n t to t h e later acceptance o f his political Aristo- telianism. T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f these links f o r the d e v e l o p m e n t o f ideas o f c o m m u n i t y in f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Italy, f o r example, has been stressed in a r e c e n t essay by A n t o n y Black74 a n d was previously d o c u m e n t e d by Nicolai Rubinstein.75

Aquinas's political t h e o r y was especially well-received in t h e Italian city- states. T h e r e instilling citizens' love o f the c o m m o n good was seen as a way o f restoring peace a n d civic f r i e n d s h i p to citizens divided into factions, a n d pro- vided a way o f doing so that did n o t rely on despotic a u t h o r i t y . # Rubinstein argues that t h e frescoes in t h e council c h a m b e r s o f t h e Sienese city govern- m e n t were designed to illustrate a n d teach these Thomistic political ideas: t h e frescoes show a cord linking t h e personifications o f justice a n d t h e c o m m o n

~' S T I - l I , 99, 2. ~, City of God XIX, 5; O'Connor, "The UtilFrm Distinction," 57-59- ,sCity of God XIX, 27. 74Antony Black, "The Individual and Society," The Cambridge History of Medieval Political

Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1988 ), ed. Burns, 596. 75 Nicolai Rubinstein, "Political Ideas in Sienese Art: The Frescoes by Ambrogio Lorenzetti

and Taddeo di Bartoio in the Palazzo Publico," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes ~ t (1958): 179-~o7.

Rubinstein, "Political Ideas in Sienese Art," 184.

37 6 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 o : 3 J U L Y 1 9 9 2

good.77 T h e f u r t h e r tie t h a t A q u i n a s saw b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d t h e c o m m o n g o o d o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d c o n c o r d a m o n g citizens o n t h e o t h e r is similarly depicted.TS S h o w n a b o v e t h e p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e c o m m o n g o o d is t h e p e r - s o n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e v i r t u e o f c h a r i t y . T h e s u p e r p o s i t i o n o f c h a r i t y , R u b i n s t e i n a r g u e s , e m p h a s i z e s t h e social f u n c t i o n s o f t h a t virtue79 a n d suggests t h a t t h e t r u e s t a t t a c h m e n t to t h e c o m m o n g o o d a n d to o n e ' s fellow citizens is t h a t r o o t e d in love o f G o d . T h i s is a s u g g e s t i o n , I h a v e n o t e d , t h a t c a n be f o u n d in A q u i n a s ' s l a t e r w o r k .

N o t all o f A q u i n a s ' s i n f l u e n c e o n I t a l i a n political t h o u g h t a n d practice was direct. His i d e a s w e r e also t r a n s m i t t e d by P t o l e m y o f L u c c a , w h o c o n t i n u e d his u n f i n i s h e d t r e a t i s e D e R e g n o . P t o l e m y ' s w o r k , like A q u i n a s ' s a n d like t h e Sienese frescoes, asserts a link b e t w e e n c h a r i t y a n d t h e political virtues. 8o A q u i n a s ' s ideas w e r e also t r a n s m i t t e d , to I t a l y a n d to D a n t e , by t h e F l o r e n t i n e D o m i n i c a n R e m i g i o d e G i r o l a m i . 8' R e m i g i o ' s works a r e especially r e m a r k a b l e f o r t h e way in w h i c h A u g u s t i n e ' s ideas a b o u t p e a c e a r e j u x t a p o s e d a n d i n t e r - p r e t e d to a g r e e w i t h T h o m i s t i c ideas a b o u t peace, j u s t i c e , t h e c o m m o n g o o d , a n d t h e e n d s o f political society. R e m i g i o , it seems, h a s so t h o r o u g h l y ab- s o r b e d A q u i n a s ' s political A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m t h a t h e was b l i n d to t h e p r o f o u n d c h a n g e s A q u i n a s h a d w r o u g h t in t h e n o t i o n o f society's c o m m o n g o o d .

H o w A q u i n a s ' s political t h o u g h t was assimilated i n t o m e d i e v a l politics a n d political t h e o r y is a l o n g a n d c o m p l i c a t e d story, o n e I c a n n o t tell h e r e . B u t t h e e x a m p l e s o f R e m i g i o , o f P t o l e m y o f L u c c a , a n d o f t h e Sienese frescoes s u g g e s t t h a t his d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l political a n d t h e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s o n which I h a v e f o c u s e d in this p a p e r p l a y e d a crucial r o l e in s e c u r i n g his views w h a t success t h e y e n j o y e d .

University o f N o t r e D a m e

v7 Ibid. 7s Ibid., a 86. ~9 Ibid., 185-86. so In Ptolemy's case, between charity and amor patr/ae; see Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two

Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton University Press, 1957), t 13. For more on the Sienese frescoes, see the sources cited at 112, note 74.

sl Charles Till Davis, "Remigio de Girolami and Dante: A Comparison of Their Conceptions of Peace," Studi Danteschi 36 (1959): 1o5-36.