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Course of Study: (5PIRS007W) Global Security

Title: Contemporary security studies (Chapter 28: After the return to theory: the past, present and future of security studies)

Name of Author: Waever, Ole and Buzan, Barry & Collins, Alan

Name of Publisher: Oxford University Press

28 After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies Ole Wrever and Barry Buzan

Chapter Contents • I n tro d u c tio n 4 1 8

• T h e o rig in s a n d in stitu tio n a l s t r u c t u r e o f s e c u r ity s t u d ie s 4 1 9

• T h e G o l d e n A g e o f s e c u r ity s tu d ie s 421

• I n s titu tio n a liz a tio n a n d sta g n a tio n 4 2 3

• D isc ip lin ary q u e s tio n in g a n d th e o r e tic a l re la u n c h 4 2 6

• C o n c lu s io n : t h e p o w e r s o f t h e o r y a n d t h e c h a lle n g e s o f t h e f u t u r e 431

Reader’s Guide T h is c h a p t e r p r e s e n t s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e p a s t a n d p r e s e n t o f s e c u r ity s tu d ie s w ith an e m p h a s is

o n t h e ch a n g in g p e r i o d s o f t h e o r y p r o d u c tio n a n d p ra c tic a l p r o b le m so lving. T h e field s t a r t e d o u t a s a d is tin c t U S sp e c ia lty m u c h s h a p e d b y t h e n e w c o n d itio n s o f t h e 1 9 4 0 s s e t b y n u c le a r w e a p o n s

a n d a lo n g - te r m m o b iliz a tio n a g a in s t t h e S o v ie t U n io n , t w o f a c t o r s t h a t c r e a t e d a n e e d f o r a n e w

k in d o f civilian e x p e r t in d e f e n c e a n d s tr a te g y . F ro m an A m e r ic a n , th in k -ta n k b a s e d , in te rd is c ip lin a ry

field , s e c u rity s tu d ie s b e c a m e in s titu tio n a liz e d a s a p a r t o f o n e d isc ip lin e, I n te rn a tio n a l R e la tio n s (IR),

in c re a sin g ly in te r n a tio n a l a n d w ith t h e o r y a n c h o r e d in t h e u n iv e rs itie s . S in c e t h e 1 9 9 0 s, t h e field h a s

b e e n in a n e w p e r io d o f high t h e o r y p ro d u c tiv ity , b u t la rg e ly in t w o s e p a r a t e c l u s te r s w ith t h e U S A

a n d E u r o p e as c e n t r e s o f e a c h . T h is an aly sis is u s e d as a basis f o r raising s o m e c e n tr a l q u e s t io n s a n d

p r e d i c t i o n s a b o u t t h e f u t u r e o f t h e field .

Ole W aver and Barry Buzan

Introduction

T he fact that a book like the present one can be made, indeed had to be made, to present an existing field to people entering it testifies to major change in security studies. H ad a similar book been produced in previous decades, it w ould have looked very different. A 1950s version would have been very short. In the 1960s, it w ould have been structured with chapters on differ­ ent kinds o f policy questions—strategy, economy o f defence, decision making—and in some o f these (not­ ably the chapter on strategy) there would have been a lot o f theory (deterrence theory), but the theories w ould n ot have com peted for dealing w ith the same questions; a division o f labour would have kept them in different chapters, The 1970s edition would prob­ ably have been thinner on theory and more com pre­ hensive in the them atic chapters—and it w ould have com e w ith a com panion volum e (in German) de­ nouncing the whole field as part o f the repressive, mili­ tarized, Cold W ar system. The 1980s textbook would have been a reader o f texts arguing for and against the continued relevance o f the field, its possible widen­ ing o r even dissolution and m erger into wider fields. W ith developments in the 1990s, the field has come to take a shape as reflected in the structure o f this vol­ ume: the wideners have succeeded enough for chap­ ters on different sectors o f security to be necessary, and a num ber o f theories now com pete for tackling the whole field o f security In the first decades o f the twenty-first century, this reshaped discipline seems to gain increased attention, generate more undergradu­ ate courses and n o t least m ore—often theoretically inclined—PhD projects. This augm ented attraction is supported b o th by the prom inence o f "security" in the era o f the ‘global w ar on terror" and "climate security', and by the availability o f the family o f theories that sprang up during the 1990s.

O ur focus in this chapter is on security theory, which w e define as theory that aims at the understanding a n d /o r m anagem ent o f security issues. Such theory at different points in time resembles developments w ithin general 1R theory, while at other points there is less contact. For instance, some major developments in IR theory, such as 1970s interdependence and re­ gim e theory, had minimal im pact on security studies (at the time, at least), and some security theories were (originally) specific to security studies, such as deter­ rence theory or the C openhagen School, not gen­ eral theories o f IR* O ther cases o f security theory are

simultaneously IR and security th eo ry such as con­ structivism , feminism, or dem ocratic peace. While distinct from IR theory, security theory is also differ­ ent from security studies at large, because much work in security studies does not deal explicitly w ith theory Thus, security theory is a specific subset o f security studies and one whose development has gone through distinctive phases. (See Key Ideas 28. L)

One peculiarity o f this field is that it is divided more strongly than comparable fields into subsets w ith­ out m utual recognition, often w ithout even mutual awareness. Especially in European journals, confer­ ences, departments, and research centres, one finds a lively discussion o f a num ber o f relatively recent approaches: Critical Security Studies, feminism, the Copenhagen School, the Paris School, and the merits o f all these compared to "the traditional approach". Go to m ost departm ents in the USA or the leading jour­ nals, such as International Security and Security Studies, and m ost scholars there w ould say who?' and 'what?* about authors intensely discussed by a large n u m ­ ber o f scholars especially in Europe and parts o f the

KEY IDEAS 28J Terminology’ ’ ' ‘

The names ‘strategic studies ‘security sU;cte' (of "iniem atonal s<*cg* .1/ .if'r > i'» a

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r^mut^nalizeci in outfits ike the Imemakonai tosn* ute Strategic ofStrcie^k* S:u3$% 3*xl}'attnci of W h m jrid Yjczt^i Sructi The demi ta/tir • the t^nr 'strategic stuoe^ d-ini the Cold VVfcr m -jirf- .^ e mom pervasive ir? the UK than jn vr& USA

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After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 419

developing world (Waever 2012a). In turn, the mostly American m ain scene has had theoretical debates cen­ tred on offensive versus defensive realism, the relative im portance o f ideational variables, and the role of pow er and institutions in orders (and empires). These debates did not structure the universe for m ost schol­ ars in the rest o f the world.

Therefore, w hen this concluding chapter attempts an assessment o f where we are, where we came from, and n ot least w here we might be going, it needs to fol­ low an asymmetrical structure, where the first part treats the field as hom ogeneous—a kind o f unified centre-periphery structure w ith the US definition of security studies unrivalled—while the later part splits into two parallel tracks. In the very last part of the chapter this evolves further into a global constellation, w here theory emerges from many parts o f the world, n o t least beyond the West. The chapter is structured chronologically. The first section looks at the origins and institutional structure of security studies—w hat and w here is it? The second covers the so-called Golden Age, the formative period o f strategic studies w hen m ost notably deterrence theory was developed and game theory applied to it (and in tu rn given m uch original impetus at the level of abstract theory), to as­ sist in the handling o f novel challenges from nuclear weapons. The third section is about the immediate post-Golden Age, when strategic studies was consoli­ dated as an integral part o f the security establishment, and theory often lost out to ‘hectic empiricism' (Buzan 1981, 2000), which m ight in tu rn have contributed to the decline o f strategic studies as a field. A fourth sec­ tion deals w ith the soul-searching debates on w iden­ ing and (sub)disciplinary identity during the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in various theoretical innovations. The final section looks from the current situation o f theoretical wealth into a future where these theories have begun to change their m utual relationships while also developing new ways to be involved w ith the m ain issues on the policy agenda.

T he first and second sections deal overwhelmingly w ith the USA, because this is w here m odern strategic studies em erged and found its characteristic shape. W h en m odern-style strategic studies grew else­ where, even w here independent traditions existed, this happened to such a large extent by attem pts to copy or im p o rt the American experience, that the formative period o f American strategic studies b e­ came the referent point for the field everywhere. A systematic com parison o f American and European

strategic studies is therefore presented towards the end o f the second section (referring to th e status in th e early 1970s), and only in the latest phases do distinct trajectories becom e self-reliant enough that a story o f two parallel tracks can explain th e pecu­ liarity o f debates unrecognizable to each other. The World beyond the West is for similar reasons only dealt w ith quite marginally, and mostly towards the end o f this chapter.

The origins and institutional structure of security studies

W ar and peace, threats and strategy, as well as dem o­ graphics and epidemics: issues like these have been on the agenda o f thinkers and w riters for centuries. However, anything resembling security studies as we now know it did n o t becom e a distinct field o f study until around the end o f the Second W orld War. As always, when a field is established, it is easy to see predecessors and preparatory w ork done in previous phases, and thus security studies can be projected back into the inter-w ar period w ith reference to w ork done on the causes and prevention o f wars (Baldwin 1995).

The novelty in the 1940s, however, was the emer­ gence o f a distinct category o f w ork at the intersec­ tion o f military expertise and university-based social science aimed at delivering policy-relevant knowledge supported by a broad, interdisciplinary academic knowledge base. In large part because o f the unprece­ dented implications o f nuclear weapons for w ar fight­ ing, b u t also because o f the broad-spectrum challenge to the USA posed by the Soviet Union (ideological and economic, as well as military) and the general prestige gained during the Second World War by both natural scientists (new weapons, code breaking) and social sci­ entists (for example, in advising on strategic bom bing priorities), civilian experts w ould now also specialize in military issues under the heading o f security. That the leading strategic thinkers should be mainly civil­ ians was w hat distinguished post-1945 security studies both from w hat had been done before, and from w hat continued to be done outside the West.

This institutional innovation happened at the same time as the concept o f security moved centre stage, becoming the guiding idea over previously supreme slogans such as defence and national interest (Yergin 1977; Waever 2012b).

420 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

General enabling conditions in the USA were: opti­ mism about the usefulness o f science; the possibility o f rational solutions to societal problems; novel secur­ ity issues that seemed n o t only urgent and prim ary but very much so (nuclear weapons and the Soviet, com m unist threat); generous funding for research; and exponential expansion o f higher education.

T he m ain key to the emergence o f strategic stud­ ies around the time o f the end of the Second World W ar and the beginning o f th e Cold War was the need for civilian experts to balance the military leadership, a need driven certainly by technological developments (nuclear weapons and the rapid rise o f war avoidance as the key strategic imperative), b u t also by broader political considerations about the potentially problem ­ atic political implications o f long-term mobilization.

The military driver is straightforward: gradually it becam e clear how radically nuclear weapons would transform the security equations, and the kind o f expertise needed differed from the classical military one. At some risk o f oversimplification (actual plan­ ning was quite a bit more mixed), the problem was that wars should no longer be fought b u t avoided, and ways should be found so that the possibility/ impossibility o f w ar generated by nuclear deployments could be manipulated for political gain. The centre of gravity shifted from the tactical and operational level to true long-term strategy (Brodie 1949), and from, the deployment o f a given technology to the targeted development o f fast-changing technologies for the fu­ ture. Although at first it seemed that even the games o f deterrence could be seen as controlled by the bot­ to m line o f w hat would happen in an actual fight, it gradually became necessary to treat nuclear strategy as a partly independent universe to be analysed in its own. right. This demanded a completely different form of knowledge from the one delivered by military experts. As succinctly p ut by Richard Betts (1997; 13); "Nuclear w ar spurred theorizing because it was inherently m ore theoretical than empirical: none had ever occurred/ Or, in the words of Richard Smoke (1976:275), the first pre­ condition for the emergence o f security studies was a "complexity dissectible by abstract analysis",

W hile this is probably a relatively uneontroversial interpretation o f the emergence o f security stud­ ies, it should also be noticed that the combination of nuclear w eapons and the Cold W ar m eant a need to coordinate m ore closely military and non-military considerations. Already w artim e experiences had shown, especially in. the USA, how challenging it was

to coordinate economic, political, and military plan­ ning (Etzold 1978: 1-2; Hogan 1998: 25). As it began to be clear that the Cold W ar could becom e a drawn- out, all-encompassing, and existential struggle, the idea took hold that one needed a form o f integrated understanding, where these different forms o f know­ ledge could become combined, and this was a major part o f the reasoning behind the N ational Security Act of 1947“ in addition to closer coordination o f the ser­ vices plus intelligence reform (Stuart 2008),

The specific challenge of th e USA, w ith its ''no- standing-armies '* tradition having to organize for long­ term mobilization, shaped the em erging civil-military interface in strategic studies. It was a deep-seated argum ent within American political thought that a perm anent military institution w ould be a threat to dem ocracy because it could be misused by fa tyrant \ an anti-democratic executive (Publius 1787-8: Bailyn 1992; Deudney 1995), Also, it was only during the Second World War that "the uniformed heads of the US arm ed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation s foreign policies1 (Stoler 2000: m). Therefore, when the USA moved to­ wards institutionalizing an unprecedented level of military mobilization, this could not be done purely in term s of ‘war* o r ‘defence". This is a central part o f the explanation for the rise o f the term "security" to cover the mobilization in. m ore inclusive and "civilian terms (Waever 2008, 2012b). And it conditioned a particular space for civilian expertise in a military-centred uni­ verse, The Cold War mobilization inevitably entailed a tension between American liberalism and military pro­ fessionalism, and the field o f strategic studies emerged as part o f the institutional responses to this tension (Lasswell 1950; H untington 1957).

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After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies

The Golden Age of security studies

The period o f the 1950s and 1960s is widely celebrated as one w here the field was simultaneously productive, influential, and relatively coherent. Although the field contained a wide variety o f other kinds o f w ork (to which we return shortly), the central and defining area was gam e theory and nuclear strategy. We pay particu­ lar attention to this period for two reasons. First, it was the formative period o f the new discipline, and therefore developments in the so-called Golden Age are n ot ju st episodes equal to m any others; they de­ fined how security studies was perceived: for good and bad these developments were the quintessential w ork o f security studies. Second, this m arked a (first) high point o f theorization, and we w ant to point to the pat­ tern o f ebb and flow o f theory m aking w ithin security studies.

The w ork on game theory and deterrence theory was a rare instance o f an intellectual development that scores high in term s o f theoretical creativity and sophistication, and simultaneously policy relevance. Very often this is seen as a trade-off—policy rele­ vance/utility versus theoretical abstraction /sophisti­ cation (cf. Hill 1994; Lepgold and Nincic 2001)—but w hen nuclear weapons created a novel challenge o f understanding a situation that was hypothetical and speculative through-and-through and open to swift and dramatic developments, a very sophisticated theoretical boom gained centrality politically. At the same time, this development became highly influen­ tial w ithin the academic world, because the nature o f the object allowed for a high degree o f abstraction and formalization that scored well on the criteria o f the day for a new, m ore 'scientific' form o f Inter­ national Relations. Under a Cold War situation w ith a boom ing US economy, a m ood o f technological optimism and a willingness to support social science as part o f the solution to social challenges (including n o t only the Cold War struggle b ut social problems o f all kinds), the reward was high for new approaches that seemed to move IR in the direction o f the use of scientific m ethods and tools, ranging from coding o f events data allowing for computerized data process­ ing, through cybernetic models and experimental psychology, to game theory. Deterrence theory be­ came a success story in this context for tw o reasons. On the one hand, it produced a seemingly productive (‘progressive’) research program m e where theoretical w ork produced ever new and m ore complex problems

that could in tu rn be dealt w ith by new theoretical moves. O n the other hand, all this seemed highly use­ ful because the theories actually produced their own reality o f abstractions, the w orld o f ‘secure second- strike capability’, ‘extended deterrence’, and ‘escala­ tion dom inance’.

This was reflected in the critique from peace re­ search and critical theory th a t the w hole 'Golden Age’ idea is a self-glorifying construction o f academ ­ ics whose real accom plishm ent was to make morally co rru p t governm ent policies (MAD, Vietnam) look respectable a n d /o r inevitable. Some critics said th at this w hole literature produced validating smoke­ screens for w hat the politicians and the military w anted to do anyway: build up a huge nuclear force and prom ote m ilitary Keynesianism (Green 1966, 1968; Senghaas 1969). A lthough it is undoubtedly true that these theories legitim ized deterrence and nuclear weapons as such, it is n o t fair to conclude that their ‘influence’ on policy was illusory. Theories of deterrence shaped the whole way o f m aking sense o f nuclear weapons, and thereby influenced th e shape, if n o t necessarily the size o f investments. The relative merits and roles o f bom bers, missiles, submarines, the uses and non-uses o f tactical nuclear weapons, and how to avoid vulnerability o f systems (the fa­ m ous basing study by W ohlstetter et al. in 1954)—for all such policies, there was a clear link from theorists to policy makers. But, in relation to targeting, there was a m ajor slippage w here Strategic Air Com m and largely continued w ith its ow n roughly ‘first-strike’- oriented policy (Rosenberg 1983). If one counter- factually im agined th a t the civilian experts had n o t existed at all, it seems m uch m ore probable th at the w hole nuclear build-up w ould have been shaped by an old-fashioned m ilitary logic o f maximizing ‘fire pow er’ w ithout m uch concern for overall stability and the political possibilities for signalling and m an­ oeuvring. Nuclear quantity was probably a product o f semi-independent dynamics having to do w ith the military industrial complex and the overall politics o f sizing the defence budget, b u t it should be beyond doubt th at Golden Age theorizing produced a dif­ ferent mix o f nuclear weapons w ith different quali­ ties and locations, and a different role in policy, from w hat w ould otherw ise have happened. For better or worse, this story o f the Golden Age and deterrence theory becam e the h e a rt o f th e discipline—its found­ ing m yth som ew hat similar to the way the first great debate operates in IR theory.

W h at is .most unique about this particular episode is, however, the degree to which policy-oriented w ork m ade significant contributions to general theory. This was n o t ju st application o f w ork done elsewhere to policy questions o r transfer o f knowledge to the political world, as we have come to expect o f th in k tanks, N either was it, as w ith the m ost recent think tanks* primarily about lobbying for specific policies, although the w ork o f RAND clearly served the gen­ eral interests o f the air force and had built-in biases towards a distrustful policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union (Green 1968), This did not prevent lasting contribu­ tions to game theory. Even a m athem atician prefac­ ing the sixtieth anniversary edition o f von N eum ann and M orgenstem s foundational Theory o f Games and Economic Behavior (Kuhn 2004: x) posits that "many observers agree" that RAND was one o f tw o centres in which gam e theory flourished in the first post- war decade (see also D im and and Dimand 1996: 142-3), One need ju st m ention the 1950 invention at RAND o f the prisoner s dilemma (Poundstone 1992:103) and the late 1950s bargaining twist given to game theory by Thom as ScheUing (1960b). It is quite easy to see how these developments grew o ut o f specific chal­ lenges relating especially to the nuclear situation. Not­ iceably, these were also m ajor contributions to basic science at the same time (Dodge 2006),

The second biggest example from the Golden Age o f policy-relevant w ork that simultaneously consti­ tuted general theory was systems analysis, a m ethod for solving problems o f force structure and resource allocation th a t drew on economic theory as well as operations research developed by natural scientists, engineers, and economists during the Second World W ar (Stem 1967; Smoke 1976: 290-3). Several pion­ eering RAND studies were im plem ented into policy, notably the famous "air-bases" study by W ohlstetter et a i (1954). Several o f the leading representatives entered the Kennedy administration—McNamara's "whiz kids* (Brodie 1965; Kaplan 1983), From there, this m ethod and related RAND techniques like the * Plannmg~Programming-Budgetmg-SystemJ "spread through m ost o f the federal government" (Smoke 1976: 292). It is generally underestimated today how much, o f early strategic studies was n o t only inspired by the discipline o f economics (Hitch 1960; Schell- ing 1960a) b u t was actually about economics. A typi­ cal early course or 1960s-1970s textbook in strategic studies had strategy and deterrence as the biggest sub-field, but the second biggest w ould usually be 'the

422 Ole Wasver and Barry Buzan

economics o f defence"—n o t so puzzling given the size o f the American defence budget! (See Knorr and Trager 1977 for a broader treatm ent o f "economic is­ sues and national security'.) The image nowadays is often that Cold W ar strategic studies was obsessed w ith military questions, and this is partly tru e —it was mostly the economics o f defence planning—but strat­ egy was closely followed by economics as a key con­ cern. Most o f these textbooks had either no definition o f security studies or ju st a vacuous or circular defin­ ition o f security (something like securing th e state or essential values against threats; cf surveys in Buzan 1983; Buzan and H ansen 2009), W hat, de facto, .held the field together was a focus on defence as a pecu­ liar effort by society and an attention to all the related dimensions necessary for this; that is, selection, fund­ ing, m anagem ent, and politico-strategic utilisation o f military force, and the support thereof by various non-military instruments, Strikingly, clear definitions o f this kind o f security studies were only articulated m uch later, in the context o f the 198Cs-199Qs debate on widening. That is, their appearance testified to the opposite o f w hat they stated: that the field by then en­ capsulated a broader agenda w ithin which this narrow definition was a possible bastion o f resistance (see Key Q uote 28.1). D uring the Golden Age w here a defini­ tion like Wait s corresponded well to actual practice, it had rarely if ever been spelled out—this was not necessary, b u t implied- . ; ■

Many other things happened in strategic -studies around this nexus, b ut the identity and nature;o f the field were shaped by the Golden Age episode.-Beyond, nuclear strategy, im portant areas w ithin strategic stud­ ies were systems analysis (planning, organization), arm s control, alliance politics, counter-insurgency, and organization o f governm ent institutions and deci­ sion making (Smoke 1976), In the late 1960s and early 1970s, were added area studies and internal develop­ ments (bureaucratic politics; decision making). Later in the 1970s came perceptions, arms race theory, proliferation o f nuclear weapons, proliferation o f ad­ vanced military technology, utility o f force, strategic intelligence, conventional strategy, and self-reflections o f the field (Bull 1968; Gray 1977; How ard 1979),

Many o f the new developments (notably percep­ tions and decision making) were reactions to the dif­ ficulties that the classical form o f security studies ran into. The overly rational gam e theory became com­ plem ented by theories of Irrationality* like bureau- eratic politics, and this, along w ith the V ietnam War,

After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 423

became a turning point towards the next phase. The USA entered the w ar w ith all the instrum ents o f stra­ tegic studies in high esteem. The Kennedy adminis­ tration and M cNamara’s time as Secretary o f Defense m arked a high point in the belief in the social-scientific vision o f security knowledge (Morgenthau 1962). But, in the words o f Colin Gray (1982: 90), the strategists knew ‘next to nothing’ about ‘peasant nationalism in Southeast Asia or about the mechanics o f a counter­ revolutionary w ar’.

K E Y P O I N T S »

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Institutionalization and stagnation The crisis for security studies—or w hat Baldwin (1995) dubs the move into a phase o f 'decline'—was, how ­ ever, n o t only about external challenges to an other­ wise perfect theoretical construction. The previous period had already witnessed some 'internal weaken­ ing’ o f the m ainstream strategy scholarship. Even in the core area o f nuclear (and other forms o f military) strategy, the highly theoretical and academic scholar­ ship o f the earlier period had succumbed to 'hectic empiricism’ (Buzan 2000). The task o f security schol­ arship was to keep up w ith fast-changing technologies and the twists and turns o f political developments. Increasing am ounts o f effort therefore w ent into ever­ m ore detailed w ork on technical specificities and nar­ row perfection o f isolated bits o f knowledge.

The corrupting influence o f policy was, however, n o t the only explanation. During the 1970s and 1980s, the very abstraction o f deterrence logic m ore o r less broke down under the weight o f its own complexity (ex p o st/e x ante, limited nuclear war, rationality de­ bates), causing an exhausted drift towards general or existential deterrence (Morgan 1983; Freedman 1988). The Golden Age lost its lustre also because the inter­ nal logic o f its key contribution atrophied.

A fu rth er complication o f the policy-academe in­ teraction has to do w ith an aspect that is very often

ignored in the debates these days, especially within the m ore critical a n d /o r European forms o f security studies: in the post-Golden Age period, the field was m arked by a gradual IR-ification o f security studies. It moved from interdisciplinarity into becom ing one o f IR’s two pillars, paralleling International Political Economy (IPE), N ot only did this m ean th at IR be­ came almost formalized as consisting o f these tw o com ponents (in the USA symbolized by two lead jo u r­ nals, International Security and International Organiza­ tion); m ore im portantly in the present context—seen from the angle o f security studies itself—it m eant that IR became the main disciplinary context for security studies theorizing, in striking contrast to the early Golden Age situation. Previously, the leading scholars cam e from a variety o f backgrounds—sociology, mathematics, psychology, natural sciences, political science, and quite a lot o f economists. Increasingly, one discipline came to dominate: political science (Waever 2010). In the retrospective construction o f mainstream security thinking, (neo)realism and strat­ egic studies came to be seen as almost synonymous, whereas, in actual history, they emerged as p art o f separate communities, shaped by different dynamics and only w ith limited personal overlaps (Hagemann 2011; Waiver 2015: 85).

Since the late 1960s, ‘strategic studies’ has becom e the subject for specific courses as part o f general IR /political science departm ents (Smoke 1976: 292; Gray 1982: 86) and n o t least in specific, specialized institutes, often w ith governm ent support, such as SAIS at Johns Hopkins, the Saltzman Institute at Columbia, and H arvard’s ‘John M. Olin Institute’. The m ilitary academies and (especially in the USA) the 'w ar schools’ o f each service becam e another arena for systematic teaching o f courses in security studies. Particularly in the USA, scholars—w ith military o r civilian background—in these latter institutions have been natural participants in the 'international secur­ ity studies’ / ‘international security and arms control’ sections o f ISA (International Studies Association) and APSA (American Political Science Association) th at were set up in the 1980s. 'Security theory' almost only develops w ithin the civilian, university-based part—no longer in th e think tanks. It is im portant for understanding the current situation regarding secur­ ity theory, th a t the field is now closely intertw ined w ith the (sub)discipline o f IR in universities.

The potential problem for policy in this academi- cized development has been compensated by a

424 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

gradual modification o f the role o f think tanks in the USA, In the early period, the leading think tanks— notably the pioneering RAND C orporation—housed (within their social science sections) heavy theory w ork and large innovative projects. Today theory has moved to the universities, and think tanks have com e un d er strong competitive pressure for delivering fast, usable policy guidance. Some think tanks have been politicized and operate n ot only from a political per­ spective b ut as a key elem ent in political strategies for conservatives or liberals; others are still loosely tied to the services., b u t follow the policy agenda closely (Rich 2004; Buzan and Hansen 2009), It has becom e m uch rarer to find theory even explicitly discussed in think tank work, b u t it is clearly drawn upon. The re­ sult is a chain construct, where academe, think tanks, and policy m akers are distinct and each purifies its role. Persons m ight travel betw een the categories— move from think tank to university or to policy or vice versa—but, as institutions, they are distinct, This is, as we will re tu rn to in the next section, m uch less clearly the case outside the USA (probably because o f weaker competitive pressures on the intellectual market).

Structural observation about the different kinds of intellectual institutions in strategic studies is also the ideal context for characterizing the difference b e­ tween the USA and W estern Europe during the early decades, a comparison that should be introduced here because the contrast will carry increasing weight as our story unfolds. In Europe, even in the UK, think tanks from the beginning mostly had the roles w ith which they are associated today: to influence policy in a specific direction, to mobilize the public behind policy and at best to digest, popularize, and apply aca­ demic w ork done elsewhere into a m ore useful form at for policy makers (Abelson 2002; Haas 2002; Parm ar 2004). In the area o f foreign and security affairs, m ost policy-oriented w ork took place in 'foreign-policy in­ stitutes’, which rarely engaged in m ore theoretical ef­ forts. One partial exception was in the early decades of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in London, where the series o f Adelpki Papers especially included serious research, often by scholars from around the world who were resident at the Insti­ tute for a period. But generally during the Cold War Europeans characteristically conducted their political, argum ents over political and military strategy—often against the USA—on the basis o f theories made in the United States.

The m ost im portant non-American contributions to strategic studies were probably Hedley Bulls (19 61) foundational w ork on arms control and the continu­ ous interaction o f American social science scholarship w ith a tradition o f British w ork steeped in classical military strategy (Basil Liddell H art, Michael How­ ard, Lawrence Freedman, and P. M. S. Blackett). The US-European contrast is clearly expressed in the way France's leading IR scholar, Raymond Aron, w rote re ­ peatedly about Clausewitz, and France's m ain entries in the history of post-war strategic thought are two generals involved with the argum ent behind France's independent nuclear force, This is in contrast to the centrality in the USA o f a kind o f strategy rooted in m odern social science and relatively independent o f classical military strategy, In hindsight, it can be seen th at Pierre Hassner (1997), thro u g h o u t the Cold War and after, produced a unique series o f analyses of the political dimension o f security anchored in political theory b u t this did n o t take off as a style or approach establishing itself as a distinct presence in security studies, and m ost o f his w ork during the Cold War appeared in policy^oriented anthologies on current challenges as ‘the French chapter’, rarely recognized for the theory w ork it constituted (Gloannec and Smolar 2003).

T he distinct phenom enon o f strategic- studies emerged in Europe clearly as an im ported American speciality, A m ost revealing testim ony to the asym m et­ rical relationship is the incredibly condescending tone in W ohlstetter and W ohlstetter's 1963 report on the state o f strategic studies in Europe. They give marks to the different national research comm unities (good to Sweden, not so good England, hope for G erm any and so on). Security studies was n o t born simultane­ ously in two places, and developments cannot be com ­ pared as independent phenom ena. It em erged in the USA and was exported to Europe, Since European se­ curity studies mostly took shape in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it becam e the post-Golden, institutional­ ized, theory-has-already-been-done kind o f w ork that struggled to keep up w ith the newest technological developments to assess optimal W estern military pol­ icy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Strategic studies beyond the NATO area (Japan, third world, Israel, and so on) has been almost, solely o f the kind resembling political argum entation w ith a bit o f factual, technical expertise—never "basic con­ ceptual analysis* (W ohlstetter and W ohlstetter 1966). An interesting parallel to the US case was the Soviet

After the Return to Theory; The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies

one, w here think-tank-like 'institutes' gained a distinct niche producing research w ith a different theoreti­ cal orientation than the (Marxist-Leninist) one in the dom inant academic institutions. It is far beyond the rem it o f this chapter to include a detailed and nuanced coverage o f this development, but, in striking parallel to the USA, real-world challenges form ed the basis for innovative w ork in an institutional setting w ith a crea­ tive tension betw een tw o creative tensions: combining a bond w ith a distance to high academe and a similar duality in relation to policy itself. Comparable devel­ opm ents were n o t found to the same extent in Europe,

Nowhere beyond the USA did anything occur, w ithin an independent field o f strategic studies, similar to 'RAND’s ability to produce systematic, long-range, ‘creative’ research rather than to engage in m ere short- range tinkering w ith other peoples’ ideas’ (Green 1968: 304). If one chooses anachronistical^ to project the his­ tory o f security studies back into the inter-war period, it can be noted that the think tanks o f the day (the first such) produced policy-oriented w ork that simultane­ ously was theoretically innovative and entered the an­ nals o f IR-theory history. This happened in think tanks such as the 'Institute for Government Research’ (later Brookings), Carnegie, the Council on Foreign Rela­ tions, and the Hoover Institution, plus Chatham House in Britain. They contributed to the formulation o f plans for the international order in the inter-war period, and m uch o f the thinking recorded in IR theory’s history as 'idealism’ was produced in connection to these.

Thus, the simultaneity o f policy and theory w ork in universities and especially in separate institutions characterized bo th the inter-war and the first post-war periods in the USA, b ut this changed towards the end o f the 1960s. ‘Having played a central role in the devel­ opm ent o f deterrence theory, economists were by [the 1970s] found hardly anywhere in the academic study o f military affairs. RAND had also evolved into a bureau­ cratized contract research organization as m uch as a think tank and was no longer the hothouse o f theoreti­ cal ferm ent it had been in the 1950s’ (Betts 1997:16).

A final elem ent to cover regarding this phase is the parallel track constituted by peace research in relation to security studies. These two tracks merge only dur­ ing the 1980s and 1990s, and, despite some overlaps o f subject m atter (arms racing, arms control, war), generally treated each other as political rivals divided by the acceptability, or not, o f the whole structure o f nuclear deterrence specifically, and the role o f w ar in hum an relations generally (Buzan and Hansen 2009).

Sometimes peace research w ould be treated as left- w ing’ security studies, and on o th er occasions as some­ thing (very much) other than security studies. Most often, peace research repaid the latter favour by seeing itself as certainly n ot 'security studies’. Early peace re­ search ironically emerged in forms reminiscent o f stra­ tegic studies—as a scientific alternative to mainstream IR. Much inter-war IR had been programmatically constructed as aiming for the production o f peace, and thus the history o f peace research can quite easily be anchored in inter-war (and im m ediate post-war) clas­ sics such as Quincy W right’s A Study o f War (1942) and Lewis Fry Richardson’s books, Generalized Foreign Poli­ tics (1939), Arms and Insecurity (1949), and Statistics o f Deadly Quarrels (1960). After 1945, the UNESCO-spon­ sored attem pt to form a social-science-based study o f w ar was dismissed by the em erging discipline o f Inter­ national Relations (Aron 1957; Waltz 1959), and con­ sequently peace research form ed w ith roots mostly in the 'softer o r m ore hum anistic social sciences such as sociology and psychology, w ith pioneers like H erbert Kelman andjo h an Galtung. An irony o f this is that the same impulse towards ‘scientific’ approaches spurred the development o f strategic studies mostly anchored in game theory and thus economics. Some o f the m ost ‘scientific’ work, such as quantitative events data and psychological experiments m anaged to count as both peace research, security studies, and IR (cf. the Correlates o f War project and the Journal o f Conflict Resolution). Especially in Europe, peace research w ent through a radicalization in th e late 1960s and early 1970s, and so-called critical peace research w ith strong­ holds in Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, came to see strategic studies as part o f the problem.

Especially in analyses like D ieter Senghaas’s cri­ tique o f deterrence theory (Senghaas 1969) an djohan Galtung’s w ork on violence (Galtung 1969), mainstream theories were understood as part of the balance o f ter­ ror, bipolar, Cold War system o f militarization, super­ power dominance, and exploitation o f the third world. Critical peace research was usuaEy n ot seen as part o f strategic studies or even security studies, either by the mainstream or by the critics themselves. The critics did n ot write in the nam e o f security, but m ore often in the name of peace depicting ‘security’ as a destructive pur­ suit (Jahn et al. 1987; Waever 2008). Peace and security were symbols of the opposing sides during the Cold War (Buzan 1984; Waever 2008).

The period 1965-80 has been seen by m any obser­ vers as less successful, and by Baldwin (1995) it was even

426 Ole W aver and Barry Buzan

labelled 'decline'. Already in the 1970s, however, some new developments had begun that came into clearer focus in the 1980s. Critics o f the traditional approach had started to make the case for the inclusion o f se­ curity challenges in, for example, the economic and environm ental sectors (Brandt et al. 1980; Palme et al. 1982; Buzan 1983; Ullmann 1983; Nye and Lynn-Jones 1988; Mathews 1989).

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O f particular interest is the parallel tu rn to increas­ ingly abstract and ambitious theorizing o n both sides o f the Atlantic—on separate tracks. The US m ain­ stream o f security studies focused on debates over offensive and defensive realism, some discussion o f constructivism, democratic peace, and a debate on power versus institutions in e m p ire/o rd er building— all shaped by a quest for empirically validated gener­ alizations about cause-effect relationships. A specific form o f knowledge is hegemonic: cause-effect state­ m ents backed up either by statistical data or m ore often by historical case studies (Walt 1999; Waever 2012a). In Europe, a debate em erged betw een a num ­ ber o f m ore o r less critical theories: Critical Security Studies, feminism, Copenhagen School, Paris School, and poststructuralism.

The different form o f knowledge in Europe re­ lates to a conflicting conception o f the relationship to policy: less inclined to search for cause-effect generalizations to assist policy makers in calculating policy, m ore partaking in political reflections-—that is, more the role o f public ‘intellectual’ than ‘expert’. It is striking, however, that, parallel to both these th eo r­ etical clusters, lots o f specific ‘technical expertise* developed on b o th sides, and they were often less dif­ ferent th an the theories: knowledge about AIDS as a security problem , health security, or missile defence. O n top o f this practical, empirical knowledge, tw o different clusters o f theorization have developed. This general split partly reflects a m ore problem-solving' tradition in US social science versus a m ore critical one in Europe, b u t recent developments are m ore ex­ trem e than the usual pattern, and security studies was largely coherent across the Atlantic during the Cold War, w ith the deep split developing only during the 1980s and especially after the end o f the Cold War (see T hink Point 28.1).

While it would probably be w rong to explain this dif­ ference by policy needs (that is, an externalist sociology o f science), the pattern is clearly reinforced by the pat­ tern o f w orld power at the beginning o f the twenty-first century. In a world that m ight be described as consist­ ing of one superpower and four great powers (‘1 + 4 ’ according to Buzan and Waever 2003; Buzan 2004b) or uni-multipolar (Huntington 1999) w ith the USA seeing and handling it as unip o lar and the other great powers acting according to multipolar logic, the different angles o f watching the w orld point to different jornts of knowledge (Waever 2012a, 2015): US decision makers and academics see the USA as the actor that shapes

After the Return to Theory; The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 427'

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the world and accordingly they need knowledge about cause-effect relationships in order to understand how to w ork the material they act upon (the world).

From a European perspective, in contrast, it is m ore com m on to see the main voice o f security as an ex­ ternal factor to deal w ith (the USA) and therefore to be in a tension-ridden relationship to security as such. Calls for action in the nam e o f security can be seen as p art o f US attem pts to organize the world—for exam­ ple under the slogan of a global w ar on terro r (Buzan and W aver 2003:297,300,303,2009; Buzan 2006), and therefore ‘E urope’ takes a position vis-a-vis security where it is possible to problematize pronouncem ents about w hat is a security issue (that is, de-securitize) and insist on a wider concept o f security—for exam­ ple, an interpretation o f terro r and terro r fighting th at emphasizes economic and political mechanisms. Therefore, the whole question o f w hat should and should not count as security issues and how to concep­ tualize security is m uch closer to the European policy agenda than to the US one.

The difference also expresses a general meta-theoret­ ical divide—w ith the USA the more rationalist, Europe the more reflectivist (Tickner and Wi-ever 2009)—but this is far from the whole story. At least tw o other d e m ­ ents need to be taken into account (Wsever 2012a); one is the different relationship to the concept o f security. In Europe, the debate on this has stayed part o f the field. It is seen as part o f the ongoing practice of being a security analyst, to reflect on and problematize the concept—in order to understand and unveil the actions by practition­ ers in the name o f security, but also as the politico-ethical self-reflection o f a scholar who inevitably 'does security’ w hen working in the name of security. In the USA, the question o f the concept o f security is seen as at most a necessary ‘define your terms’ operation in order to delineate w hat is counted in and out. W hen done with,

one knows w hat is security o r not, and the concept is not interesting in itself any more (Key Quote 28.1).

The other elem ent is the exact form o f knowledge th at is valued. In contrast to the situation in general IR, where the USA was dom inated especially in the 1990s by ra tio n a l choice and in later years by large-N quantitative studies, the US security studies field is absolutely not hard-core rational choice or num ber- crunching. The leading security theory journals, In­ ternational Security and Security Studies, publish rather little formalized rational choice, and even soft rational choice th at draws on economic theory or organiza­ tional theory is far from valued in the way it is in journals such as International Organization or Inter­ national Studies Quarterly (Wsever 1998, 2013; Brown 2000). T he typical article in International Security uses historical case studies—maybe one in-depth histori­ cal case study—to examine a hypothesis fram ed as a cause-effect relationship and very often tied into general debates that are, on the one hand, o f sweep­ ing m agnitude, and, on the other hand, boiled down to the m easurem ent o f one o r a few variables, such as offensive versus defensive motivations (do states maximize power or security?), the im portance o f ideational variables, o r w hether international order builds on pure pow er o r also on institutions and legit­ imacy. Although each of these debates could easily be phrased as broad philosophical issues (as predecessors o f each were in previous decades) o r as ethical dilem­ mas, the American security literature constructs these questions as part o f a tight, causal machinery, where a single, crucial question o f ho w the logic unfolds is to be settled by empirical knowledge.

The m ost focused and sustained debate has prob­ ably been offensive versus defensive realism (plus neo­ classical realism), where a num ber o f m onographs (some m ajor ones reviewed in Rose 1998) tried to use

428 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

historical case studies to settle big, causal questions (see also M earsheim er 2001), Similarly, the challenge from constructivism, which in Europe turned into m ajor self-reflective debates on the conditions and responsibility o f scholarship, became in US security studies m ostly a question o f testing the influence of ideational variables in the big causal picture (Desch 1998; Tannenwald and W ohlforth 2005).

The top-level policy debate on American grand strategy under presum ed unipolarity was academi­ cally addressed mainly in term s o f the proper expec­ tations regarding the balancing behaviour o f others (Brooks and W ohlforth 2005), which again hinges mostly on the general questions from the offensive- defensive realism debate, and second on the pow er o f institutions. The latter question generated a very focused debate easily stylized (and taught) as Iken- berry versus W ohlforth (Ikenberry 2002). Realism traditionally took unipolarity to be impossible, and the strictest o f neorealists—Waltz himself—actually p re­ dicted th at it would n o t last long. Those w ho w anted to argue th at som e kind o f preponderance could endure faced the challenge o f explaining its relative stability. The major competing explanations emphasized, on the one hand, the United States1 uniquely reassuringliberal form o f hegem ony partly derived from attributes o f the US state, partly built into US policy o f institution building and self-binding, and, on the other hand, the purely power-based stability o f a situation where the USA is so superior that balancing becomes im ­ possible. (The debate is collected in Ikenberry 2002; see also M earsheimer 2001; Buzan and Waever 2003; Buzan 2004b; Brooks and W ohlforth 2005; Deudney 2006; Ikenberry et al. 2011.) The debate clearly had im m ediate implications for optimizing American grand strategy. But it was conducted less in term s o f a future-oriented, purposive, and partly ethical debate about w hat future to aim for, and almost solely as (if it was) a theoretical-empirical debate over what theory can explain the past record. During the presidency o f Bill Clinton, the debate on democratic peace had m uch the same status: the seemingly m ost relevant knowledge for security studies to supply to policy makers is whether there is or is no t a reliable causal connection betw een democracy and peace (Lepgold and Nincic 2001: ch. 5). After the collapse o f Bush Era global can-do4sm, US scholarship has come to include m ore w ork on terrorist movements and their internal dynamics, as well as a predictable rehashing o f the de­ bate for and against US decline.

The com m on denom inator tying together these Euro-American differences is diverging understand­ ings o f the role o f security studies, their function vis-a- vis policy. In the USA, this is m ost clearly understood as theory uncovering causal laws about the workings o f world politics, which enables policy makers to make the right choices w hen facing situations where these relationships are relevant. This in tu rn reflects a situation o f an acting power, one th at has to decide about how to shape world affairs, and it reflects a clear division o f labour betw een politics, policy advice, and academic research.

In circles m ore clearly anchored on the European side, the trend was towards critical theories o f vari­ ous kinds th at reflected on the practices o f policy and problem atized the nature o f security making. This goes for Aberystwyth-style Critical Security Studies, the Bourdieu-inspired w ork around Didier Bigo as well as the Copenhagen School, feminists and radical postm odernists such as Dillon, Constantinou, and D er Derian. Here, the concept o f security has stayed p art o f the ongoing debate, and the form o f knowledge dif­ fers from th e one in the American m ainstream , and is closer to that o f a critical intellectual reflecting openly about one's own political responsibility—w ho argues about one's analytical and theoretical choices in term s o f their political implications (Booth 1997, 2007; Wyn Jones 1999; Bigo 1996, 2002a, 2002b; Huysm ans 2002, 2006; Buzan et al. 1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009).

A part o f this story is the role o f peace research and its change during the 1980s. W ith the new peace movement, peace research suddenly gained a new practical relevance. W hat Hakan W iberg (1988) has called ‘the peace research m ovem ent' had to fulfil its function as the natural intellectual adviser (more or less asked for) to the peace m ovem ent (Jahn 1984). This led in m uch o f N orth European peace research to a new 'realism3. Peace research became pro-security and pro-Europe (where previously it had been anti­ security in the nam e o f peace and anti-Europe in the nam e o f the third world). Even defence was reappro­ priated as alternative defence (non-offensive defence) (Mailer 1991).

Security became, during this period, a m eeting ground for strategic studies, which had until then op­ erated m ore w ith power as the guiding concept and peace research having obviously peace as the key con­ cept. In the 1980s, security emerged as a m ore construc­ tive analytical concept (Buzan 1984; Jahn et al. 1987). Power thinking is a national concern and sees anarchy

After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 429

as inescapable and the end o f the story—peace is cos­ m opolitan and claims that anarchy has to go before anything good can be achieved. In contrast, security is a relational concept (that is, in-between national and cosmopolitan), and sees anarchy as a spectrum, where conditions can be improved in the direction o f a m ature anarchy (Buzan 1984). In this sense, security became the middle ground and increasingly explicit as the basis for m uch IR w ork from the 1980s and onwards.

Peace research institutes, especially in the 1980s, were often in a position somewhat parallel to that o f think tanks during Golden Age strategic studies, The link to policy was very different—n o t official advisers to policy makers—bu t European security studies gained political relevance (in a broader sense) because o f the politicization o f security issues during the period de­ fined by the peace movement, Reagan, and Gorbachev. The setting was—as in the 1950s—simultaneously inter­ disciplinary and connected to current developments in theory in the different disciplines. Peace research in contrast to university IR was under pressure to deal w ith relevant issues, but there was no expectation o f immediate delivery o f policy answers. At RAND in the 1950s, the theorists were given extraordinary lee­ way to pursue highly abstract, idiosyncratic theoretical tracks, which clearly could not be justified in term s of a guaranteed pay-off vis-a-vis products to be delivered to policy makers (Stem 1967). Precisely, therefore, pub­ lications often ended up being innovative solutions to policy questions. Similarly peace research was interdis­ ciplinary, politically oriented, bu t with a distance both to immediate policy responsibility and to the major powers of the academic system. It is less clear w hether there were policy effects, bu t our main point here is the impact o f political involvement on theory. As rightly noted by Betts (1997: 32) in relation to traditional stra­ tegic studies: 'Ironically, in the past quarter century, policy experience has enriched academic research m ore than the reverse.' The same might be said about the 1980s and the birth o f critical, European theories. A volatile political situation, a sense o f importance and relevance, and engagement in heated poHtical debates clearly contributed to the birth o f these theories, and, in a few cases, theorists probably had some role as intel­ lectuals o f or for social movements such as the peace movements and Pugwash as well as some, mostly op­ positional, political parties, but in general the effect o f practice on theory was probably larger than vice versa.

Several observers (and observer participants) have noted th at the debates am ong the new critical schools

o f security studies—to some extent seen as a 'E uro­ pean’ development—have becom e surprisingly pro­ ductive and generated theory o f broader relevance and inspiration to the field o f IR in general (Huysmans 1998b; Eriksson 1999; Williams 2003). Security stud­ ies in the USA largely works w ith theories th at are de­ veloped within IR and then tested and refined within security studies on security cases—neorealism, soft constructivism, and so on (Waever 2012a). T he m ost m onum ental illustration o f this is the nature o f con­ structivism in American security studies. T he main w ork here is the big Katzenstein volum e on The Cul­ ture o f National Security (Katzenstein 1996b). This was mainly m anned by scholars w ho did no t have a long­ term involvement w ith security affairs. They were IR scholars who had taken part in the theory wars on the constructivist side, and it seem ed the right move at the time to prove constructivism on the hom e ground of materialist approaches: security. Quite visibly this is a foray by general IR theorists into security stud­ ies for the sake o f m aking a point within IR theory debates. The new ‘European’ schools, in contrast, did no t develop deductively from the guiding symbolic positions within the theory debates (and therefore they are often hard to pin down—is the Copenhagen School constructivist, neorealist, postm odernist, or all o f these?); they emerged as p art o f the engagements on a distinct security scene, and the theoretical inno­ vations have become part o f the theory landscape in IR theory. For instance, one can find discussions o f securitization theory in general IR journals (Williams 2003; Balzacq 2005; Vuori 2008) in ways that constitute the main investigations o f the potential for IR o f draw­ ing on speeeh-act th e o ry in general. Similarly, debates within the discipline (at least in Europe) o f the political role o f researchers have been conducted w ith secur­ ity theory as the platform (Eriksson 1999; Huysmans 2002). The fate o f Frankfurt-style 'Critical T heory' in IR has also been decisively influenced by security stud­ ies. The attem pts in the ‘fou rth debate’ in the 1980s to launch Critical Theory w ere largely abortive, and postm odern approaches came to structure the meta- theoretical scene to a much larger extent. But gradu­ ally Critical Theory gained a position in the general IR landscape mainly because o f the success o f Ken Booth and others in showing its value within the area o f se­ curity (Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2005b, 2007).

One might ask now whether these lively debates in and among the new schools still qualify as ‘security stud­ ies’. Have they simply become IR and lost the in-between

430 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

position, that defines security studies? W here the first- generation representatives o f the different schools— Booth, Bigo, Buzan, Waever—had developed their arguments in engagements with policy questions and in direct interaction with, policy makers and think tanks, the next generation would be more clearly academicaEy defined and develop these arguments in a more isolated academic setting. However, the set-up continues to be one where security theory is located between the IR discipline as such and technical experts and practition­ ers, only w ith the arrows somewhat different from the N orth American ones (see Figure 28.1),

The place of security experts here underlines the point that m uch w ork in European and N orth Ameri­ can research institutes is quite similar; detailed techni­ cal w ork on AIDS as an epidemic; on the proliferation o f missile technology; on the efficiency o f various counterterrorist strategies. Most o f w hat goes on in for- eign-policy institutes as well as the IIS5 in Europe and in American think tanks is o f this nature, delivering on the dem and o f politicians for factual knowledge here-and- now on a question that came up yesterday and needs an answer tom orrow (maybe with the main difference that in the USA this is often structured m ore as a partisan ad­ vocacy for a specific policy, and in Europe as seemingly neutral, technical background knowledge)* The point here is that, as soon as this is reflected on in terms o f theory—when an interaction emerges between, on the one hand, technical experts in say European foreign- policy institutes or Washington think tanks, and, on the other, in university circles, for instance through PhD students who do w ork that is simultaneously part o f their university-based PhD and part o f the research in­ stitute—-the theoretical context differs. In the USA, this will usually be the discussions reflected in International Security, whereas in parts o f Europe, the young scholars will relate to and draw inspiration from the new

theories that emerged in European research institutes and now mainly thrive in European universities.

O n both sides, it is essential to the particular nature of security theory that there is a distinct category of "policy knowledge" that functions as expertise sup­ porting policy—-a form o f knowledge th at security theory in the USA wants to assist, while security th e­ ory in Europe (to draw the contrast sharply) treats it as a main empirical source for critical analysis, Critics o f current policy in the USA will aim to obtain a pol­ icy change by presenting theoretical generalizations based on empirical data that give scientific credentials to a different policy as m ore likely to achieve the aims aspired to. Critics working w ith the theories here asso* d a te d w ith European security studies are m ore likely to criticize politically and ethically the current policy for its aims and effects and to expose the involved pol­ icy knowledge" as a p art o f policy-making, stru ctu r­ ally com plidt and produced from the policy m ak ers perspective, rather than criticizing it for being scien­ tifically w rong and up for revision.

Beyond the West, security theory throughout the 1980s m eant the frames o f reference used in think tanks dealing with military matters, most strongly articulated in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, India, and Pakistan (Ttekner and Waever 2009). These frames were usually vague general coimnon-scnse realism, or (especially in Latin America) if they were more distinct theories then they were o f a more geopolitical ilk, Increasingly, a new security studies has emerged in m ost parts o f the world, most often affiliated with uni­ versities, and often engaging more with European than American traditions, for example, South African scholars have contributed im portant reflections on the concept of emancipation in Critical Security Studies, n ot wres­ tled with offensive versus defensive realism (Tickner and Blaney 2012). H um an Security resonated where

_----- — ,— .— ,— -------.— ,— ,— _— ,— ,— ----- — — «— _ _ _ _ _ _ — — .— ,— _ — _ — ------ ----- — — ,— „ — ^

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After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies

security and development were most closely linked (see Chapter 10), while Africa was often presented as exhibit A for the case against IR approaches being relevant at all to real-world concerns. East Asian schools paid much atten­ tion to securitization theory as an element in an original literature on 'non-traditional security’, often anchored in Singapore and Hong Kong (see Chapter 12 and Curley and Siu-Lun 2008). Another project that also places it­ self between, and bridges, the dominant approaches in the USA and Europe was an impressive edited volume by Muthiah Alagappa (1998). Empirically, it is a compre­ hensive investigation o f Asian Security Practices', and as the subtitle ‘material and ideational influences’ indicates, it follows a US ‘soft mainstream’ approach in including constructivist elements as a causal question about idea­ tional factors. It is representative o f much w ork done by scholars in, especially, South Korea, Singapore, and India.

The m ost thought-provoking developments in re­ lation to foreshadowing a future global landscape of security theory are taking place in China. The m ost determ ined project at producing a non-Western theory, the Chinese School, aspires to build general theory based on Chinese traditions, Chinese history and political theory (Qin 2010; Yan 2010; Nielsen & Kristensen 2013; Wang & Buzan 2014). However, this has evolved during a period where the overriding sub­ stantial IR question for Chinese scholars to address has been a policy question from the security field: Various versions o f ‘peaceful rise’ thinking were m eant to counter a US 'China th reat’ story (Buzan 2010). Given th a t the principal conceptions o f ‘theory’ in China places it closer to practice than in the West, it is not hard to see how each attem pt to construct a general IR theory from China, at the same time offered an explanation why and how China’s rise can be peace­ ful. However, it is a remarkable development that this takes place n o t only or primarily through direct w rit­ ings on 'peaceful rise’, b u t as part o f a broader, general theory building effort. And as Chinese policy makers and think tankers possibly shift towards a more

ambitious ‘China D ream ’, it will be interesting to see w hether the m ore IR discipline centred construction o f general theory continues w ith its ow n m om entum .

As the general global trend is towards a w ider distri­ bution o f power and a general strengthening o f South and East, m ore security theory is likely to emerge in new locales around th e world. As witnessed by the account o f the USA and Europe, the link is far from autom atic betw een power, policy, and theorizing, b u t given the great variety o f academic, institutional structures in different rising powers, and the different attitudes towards th e im portance o f theory, it is likely th at at least some will yield new security theory ap­ plicable beyond its parochial point o f origin. Emerg­ ing powers are likely to emerge in the field o f security theory as well. The next era in security studies is likely to become driven increasingly by interactions along axes other than the previous transatlantic one.

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Conclusion: the powers of theory and the challenges of the future Security studies in the second decade o f the twenty-first century is in a strong position. It has been through a prolonged period o f theoretical productivity. Strangely, this has happened to roughly parallel degrees in Europe and the USA, despite the very minimal connections be- tw een these two sets o f theoretical developments; and increasingly the general strengthening o f non-Western theory delivers security theory as well. Now the field is

well equipped with a battery o f theories and since it is imultaneously seen as generally im portant, it attracts right students, and, increasingly, funding. W hat kind o f development will this lead to?

s b

Increasingly, the new ‘European’ security studies does not remain structured by separate ‘schools' (Waever 2012a). There is a tendency in the fast-growing and very active trans-European community o f PhD students to

432 Ole Waever and Barry Buzan

move am ong and across these schools. Thereby they be­ come treated, more as theories, where one has to under­ stand their distinct character—they do not blend into one synthesized European security theory—but they can be drawn upon in individual projects as inspiration and instruments. While it is still possible to find contribu­ tions (e.g. Booth 2005b) that try to cultivate a situation of competition and theory construction through caricatur­ ing others, it is dearly more common among the emerg­ ing generation of scholars to see the combined field of "New European Security Theories" (NEST) as a joint de­ bate where the different theories are developed and ap­ plied through their interaction (Biiger and Stritzel 2005; Huysmans 2006), For instance, an expanding debate on the relationship between risk and security .is largely con­ ducted in terms set by the theories o f the 1990s mixed up w ith the main social theories of risk (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Rasmussen 2010; Petersen .2012). Im­ portant recent work on ‘the politics o f possibility" and "speculative security" (de Goede 2012; Amoore 2013) use securitization theory's focus on exceptional measures as a foil to develop a more Paris-School-like argument about the procedures that have evolved, where the mere possibility o f something* the imagination o f scenarios, become the centre of preparations irrespective o f classic­ al calculations o f risk. Analyses Eke these provide a new generation of analytical models.

The future o f security theory in the USA should be assessed in a different manner, because the the­ ories there are less security specific than the European theories and m ore closely integrated into the main constellation o f IR theories. The .future o f these secur­ ity theories is therefore inseparable from the general prospects for IE theory. As often noticed (e.g. Gold- m ann 1988), US theory debates within IR tend to be about general theories—frameworks potentially ex­ plaining everything o r at least a m ajor part o f every im portant question. The main theories in the security field are expressed in such general term s that, if valid, they w ould be overarching frameworks for our general understanding o f international relations. Therefore, their fate as security theories hinges on their ability to prevail in the general debates in the discipline o f IR, and these are at the m om ent quite inconclusive and some­ w hat unfocused (Waever 2013; Wight et a l 2013). The only strong candidate for a kind o f hegemony is ra ­ tional choice as m eta-theory and this is exactly the the­ ory that is comparatively w eak within security studies even in the USA. Therefore, it is unlikely that the intern­ al dynamics o f the theory debate will be decided by a general prevalence o f one o f the current candidates.

More im portant for the future development of each theory in both Europe and the USA is probably how it handles some o f the current issues on the political agenda. The two sets o f theories will be working on. partly overlapping sets of questions, as indicated in many chapters o f this book. Probably it will mostly be the European theories that try to make sense o ut o f environmental security, health security identity issues, and gender, while the US theories will be m ost active in areas such as proliferation o f weapons o f mass de­ struction and global military stability Both will work on terror and anti-terror practices (with Europeans comparatively more attentive to domestic practices, the USA to international, operations). Also, both will work on migration and the tension between security and liberty including the logic o f exceptionalism. al­ though at least at present the theoretical side of this is far m ore developed in the debate am ong the European schools, while in the USA this is mostly policy work disconnected .from the m ain theories b ut with some- notable exceptions (like Andreas and Biersteker 2003), Both will be working on. the role and nature o f technol­ ogy globalization, risk society and international eco­ nomic order. This quick picture shows that there will actually be m any points o f contact between the cur­ rently disconnected fields o f theory A m ajor question is, therefore: will they merge again-Htiot in agreement but in debate? Will there be more exchange between the different research environments? Some signs in this direction can be found in the acceptance o f a some­ w hat widened security agenda in American textbooks, while-—as always—all m ajor American theories are read in Europe. The particularly heavy-handed usage o f se­ curity justifications under the administration of George W. Bush (2001—8), spurred an increased interest among American scholars in the European theories, not least securitization theory As the polarization o f IR's '4th de­ bate" (i^tionaUsm-versus-reflectivisin) wears off, there are also signs of European critical scholars reintegrat­ ing arguments about pow er and polarity; maybe they too were motivated by the Bush administration,

W hat will happen w hen the theories meet first trans- Adantically and later globally on issues o f common concern? Will they try to learn from, contrasting insights from different kinds o f theories? The academic world is usually quite slow, so if we lookat the cumulative effect of 15 years o f reaction to 9 /11 there were, on the one hand, some overlapping concerns about the question of to what extent the US-initiated w ar on terror could and would become a globaly structuring political programme (Buzan 2006; Ikenberry et a l 2011; de Goede 2012).

After the Return to Theory: The Past Present, and Future of Security Studies 433

On the other hand, the more general attem pt to de­ velop cumulative research agendas for a world where the fight against terror topped the policy agenda hap­ pened very much on separate tracks. Here, it is strik­ ing that the European approaches have refined their analysis o f Anti-Terror, that is sophisticated analyses o f the emerging rationalities of Western societies in the p o st-9 /11 period (Bigo 2002a, 2002b; de Goede 2012; Petersen 2012; Amoore 2013), while the spearhead o f mainstream security studies in the USA has been an increased understanding of Terrorism, The leading journal International Security compiled a collection o f recent articles where the two focal points clearly are to understand the inner dynamics o f terrorist groups and the efficiency o f different strategies against them, n o t­ ably decapitation (Cronin et al, 2014). In term s o f m ore short-term reactions to new surprising events, it was thought-provoking to see how the quickest, strong, and theory-driven intervention in the Ukraine crisis came from neither novel US theorizing, nor critical Euro­ pean approaches, b u t John Mearsheimer (2014) writing almost as a classical realist, exposing hubris and self­ righteousness in a Western policy unwilling to under­ stand the security needs o f another major power. The almost total silence from critical theorists on an issue so close to hom e for most European scholars points to a worrying division o f labour that has emerged. The 'new security theories' do 'new security issues', like environ­ m ent and disease, and they do the dark side o f dominant policies; but (with notable exceptions: Peoples 2010; Pouliot 2010), they do not engage with military security, so "traditional security" is accepted by all parties to be the domain o f 'traditional theories*.

Fast-rising concerns over environm ental/clim ate security could easily provide another big linking issue. It seems less likely, however, that the rise o f China will w ork in this way because the rise o f China threatens US unipolar status, and is therefore becom ing a m ore central concern of US security studies than its Euro­ pean counterpart. The broader coming to term s w ith a post-W estern world is unlikely to become a fruitful theoretical challenge, even in their separate universes. Americans insist on repeating the debate on decline (i.e. about themselves, n o t listening to new voices), while European security studies is mostly about Eur­ ope. T hat challenge m ight have to wait for non*West­ ern scholars to lift it.

Beyond the West, theorizing is in m ost cases ru n ­ ning parallel to the main definition of policy issues. Therefore, some o f it will remain local and be ignored by scholars elsewhere. However, some im portant

m eeting points can be discerned. H um an security de­ bates in the West are likely to be increasingly impacted by scholarship from especially Africa and the Middle East, The Asian approach to non-traditional security should find a voice within the European debates. W ork on Islamic approaches to IR m ight become lis­ tened to in the West as policy becom es more and m ore serious about n o t transform ing the region top-down b u t acting strategically in relation to a region dom ­ inated by regional actors. Most im portantly however, will be the question o f how debates within rising powers about pow er transition are mediated with de­ bates from declining powers on the same issue.

W ith or w ithout such a meeting, this will be a time w hen theory is central to security studies. W hat can be envisaged here is not a "new great debate" between coalitions o f security theories—rather a new encounter between different debates in which the theories to some extent represent a division o f labour brought to bear on com m on problems. The grand theories of the 1990s as well as the more recent innovations will have to prove themselves in a dual challenge. The first question to each is does it have the inner vitality to become a dynamic research programme that continues to evolve? This de­ pends largely on the constellation o f key concepts—is this at once tight enough to be operational and open enough to generate puzzles and research problems? So far the signs here are quite promising. The second challenge is to be able to take up in interesting ways the political challenges of the day In that regard, security studies will continue to grapple with the problem noted long ago by Waltz (1979: 112): 'States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent o f their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted/

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♦

1. W h y w as it primarily in th e USA th a t strategic studies form ed as a separate field?

2. W h y did th e Vietnam W a r no t b eco m e th e g en erato r o f new waves o f theorization t o deliver on this new policy

challenge?

3. O n th e basis o f th e previous chapters in this b ook as well as this chapter, t o w hat e x te n t d o es ’security studies' ap p ear t o b e on e integrated field, o r is it m ore appropriately seen as tw o o r m ore arenas sharing a nam e b u t '

separated by either geographical o r meta-theonetica! distance? .

4. W ould you explain th e increasing distance b etw een security theorizing In E urope and th e USA mainly by differences

in foreign policy, genera! philosophical orientations, institutional differences within th e academic world, o r o th e r

factors? .

5. W h y d o es constructivism lead t o such different kinds o f work in th e USA and Europe?

6. W h a t is difference b etw een th e form o f knowledge in US and European work?

7. W h a t institutional reform s regarding universities, think tanks, policy institutes, o r policy-making would be m ost

conducive to b e tte r security th e o r y and b e tte r security policy? . ■

8. W h a t are th e m ost im portant questions on th e policy agenda to g et a b e tte r understanding of, and why d o th e s e n o t b eco m e th e m ost active areas o f research?

9. D o th e cu rre n t policy challenges point t o a n eed for n ew interdisciplinary configurations? ;

10. Is a d o s e connection b etw een th e o ry and policy conducive o r disruptive for good theory?

11. If th e distribution o f po w er in th e global system becom es less unbalanced, and security th e o ry sta rts to em anate from many quarters, will this result in a thoroughly fragm ented field, o r will it b eco m e m o re integrated as policy, makers and scholars get a real n eed to understand pow erful o th e rs - for security reasons? .

FURTHER READING . ’

* B ro w n , Michael E, (ed.) (2000), Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Wait and his Critics, Cambridge, HA; MIT Press. Stephen Walt's attack on rational choice approaches t o security is both interesting as an exploration o f t h e pros.: ■

and cons o f this approach, and as a clarification o f how security studies, international Security style, defines itself, methodologically and meta-theoretically.

» Buzan, Barry (1983), People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Brighton; • W h e a tsh e a f (2nd edn subtitled An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Fra), Boulder CO; Lynne Rienner 2 0 0 1; re-issued with a new introduction as ECPR classic (2007). A defining w o rk fro m th e second

productive period, which bo th summarizes th e preceding reflections on th e co n cep t o f security and puts forw ard an

original synthesis th a t m ade on e o f th e first co h eren t cases fo r widening.

• Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lens (2009), The Evolution o f International Security Studies, Cambridge: Cam bridge; University Press. Surveys th e history of security studies, traditional as well as critical forms, and offers an explanation .'

in te rm s o f driving forces th a t shaped debates in 1SS. \

* B uzan, B a rry , Waever, O l e , and d e W ilde, jaap ( 1998), Security: A New Framework fir Analysis, Boulder; C O ; Lynne ■■ Rienner (Chinese translation 2004). T he main theoretical sta te m e n t from th e C openhagen School. W hile its world

analysis is m o re fully elaborated in a 2003 book, th e defining categories o f th e th e o r y are p u t forw ard here;

securitization and sectors.

• Gray Colin (1982), Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience, Lexington, KY: University Press o f f Kentucky. A critical history o f early strategic studies, which com bines observations a b o u t institutions, politics, and theory. . .

434 Ole W aver and Barry Buzan

After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies 435

• G uzzini, Stefano and Ju n g , Dietrich (eds) (2004), Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, London: Routledge, E x p lo re s th e ro le o f peace research (especially in N o rth e rn Europe) in furthering th e em ergence

o f th e new European security theories.

• Huysmans, je f (2006) The Politics of insecurity: Security, Migration and Assylum in the EU, London: Routledge. State- o f-th e-art discussion— and partial synthesis— o f som e o f th e main th eo ries from Europe: C openhagen School, Paris

School, and post-structuralist political theory.

« tkenberry, G. John (ed.) (2002), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell. Includes a n um ber o f pow erful contributions th a t rep re sen t th e main American d eb ates over both offensive/defensive realism

and international o rd ers built on power/institutions.

» Jervis, R obert ( 1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. O n e o f th e main books (to g eth er with Allison's ( 19 7 1) Essence of Decision) t o op en up th e psychological and decision­ making approaches t o strategic thinking in opposition to rational acto r models,

• Krause , Keith and Williams , Michael C, (eds) ( ’997), Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. The defining w o rk from Critical Security Studies, which includes sufficient diversity t o

re p re se n t much o f th e n ew w ork in general, n o t only o n e narrowly defined school, and paradoxically th ereb y

p roduces th e ideal manifesto for CSS.

» Scheiling, Thomas C. (I960), The Strategy o f Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. O n e o f th e m o st original w orks fro m th e (first) Golden Age, produced a t RAND, eventually earning t h e au th o r a 2005 N obel Prize in

econom y (o r in security studies, if o n e reads closely th e justification from The Royal Swedish Academy o f Sciences),

Even fun to read.

• http://w w w .isn.ethz.ch International Relations and Security N etw ork. C e n te r fo r Security Studies, ETH, Zurich,

Switzerland. A good collection o f links t o both c u rre n t security Issues and cen tres o f research. From h e re o n e can

get to t h e institutes, journals, and organizations, o f which th e re are to o many to list individually here.

• h ttp ://w v w .m itp ressjo u m als.o rg /is international Security, th e leading m ainstream journal.

• http://w w w .tandf.co.uk/loum als/titles/096364l2.asp Security Studies, a n o th e r high-ranking journal mostly publishing American m ainstream research, b u t o ften m o re op en to d e e p theoretical d e b a te than International Security.

• http://ejt.sagepub.com European Journal of International Relations. Much o f th e d e b a te o v er th e new European th eo ries has taken place in general IR journals such as EjlR, International Political Sociology, Review of International Studies, and Millennium.

• http://sdi.sagepub.com Security Dialogue has recently developed into o n e o f th e leading places for discussion on 'hum an security', 'risk/security', 'g ender and security', and th e new European theories, while it is also relatively strong

on critical policy articles.

Visit th e O nline R esource C e n tre t h a t accom panies this b o o k fo r lots o f in terestin g additional m aterial:

w w w .oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/collins4e/