sociology short answers

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Course: SOC 311

Instructor authorizing: Jepson

Extracted from (source citation): Contemporary Sociological Theory / edited by Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, et. al. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

Source owned by: Instructor

3 0 A So ciological Theory of P o s tm o d e rn ity Z y g m u n t Bauman

I propose that:

1 The term postmodern i t y renders accurately the defining traits of the social condition that emerged throughout the affluent countries of Europe and of Euro­ pean descent in the course of the twentieth century, and took its present shape in the second halt of that century. The term is accurate as it draws attention to the conti­ nuity and discontinuity as two faces of the intricate relationship between the present social condition and the formation that preceded and gestated it. It brings into relief the intim ate, genetic bond that ties the new, postmodern social condition to mod­ ernity - the social formation that emerged in the same part of the world in the course of the seventeenth century, and took its final shape, later to be sedimented in the sociological models of modern society (or models of society created by modem sociology), during the nineteenth century; while at the same time indicating the passing of certain crucial characteristics in whose absence one can no longer ad­ equately describe the social condition as modern in the sense given to the concept by

orthodox (modern) social theory. 2 Postmodernity may he interpreted as fully developed modernity taking a full

measure of the anticipated consequences of its historical work; as modernity that acknowledged the effects it was producing throughout its history, yet producing inadvertently, rarely conscious of its own responsibility, by default rather than design, as by-products often perceived as waste. Postmodernity may be conceived of as modernity conscious of its true nature - modernity for itself. The most conspicuous features of the postmodern condition: institutionalized pluralism, var­ iety, contingency and ambivalence - have been all turned out by modern society in ever increasing volumes; yet they were seen as signs of failure rather than success, as evidence of the unsufficiency of efforts so far, at a time when the institutions of modernity, faithfully replicated by the modern mentality, struggled for universality, h om ogen eity, m o n o to n y and clarity. The postmodern condition can be therefore described, on the one hand, as modernity emancipated from false consciousness; on the other, as a new type of social condition marked by the overt institutionalization of the characteristics which modernity - in its designs and managerial practices - set about to eliminate and, failing that, tried to conceal.

3 The tw in differences that set the postmodern condition apart from modern society are profound and seminal enough to justify (indeed, to call for) a separate sociological theory of postmodemity that would break decisively with the concepts and metaphors of the models of modernity and lift itself out of the mental frame in which they had been conceived. This need arises from the fact that (their notorious

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disagreements n o tw ith s tan d in g ), the ex tan t m o d e ls o f m o d e r nity a r t ic u la t e d a

shared vision o f m odern history as a m o v e m e n t w ith a d i r e c t i o n a n d d iffe r e d s o le ly in the selection o f the ultim ate d e s tin a tio n o r the o r g a n iz in g p r in c ip le of th e p ro c e s s ,

be it universalization, ra tio n a liz a tio n or s y s te m iz a tio n . N o n e of th o s e p r in c ip le s

he upheld (at least nor in the radical fo rm t yp ic a l of th e o r t h o d o x s o c ia l th e o r y ) in

the light o f postm odern experience. N e ith e r c a n t h e v e r y m a s te r m e t a p h o r th a t

underlies them he sustained: that of the process w ith a p o in te r .

4 Postmodernity is not a transitory d e p a rtu re fr o m th e ‘ n o r m a l s ta te ' o f m o d e r n ­

ity; neither is it a diseased state o f m o d e rn ity , an a ilm e n t likely to b e r e c t i f i e d , a case o f ‘modernity in crisis’. It is, instead, a s e lf- re p ro d u c in g , p r a g m a t ic a l l y self s u s ta in - able and logically self-contained social c o n d itio n d e fin e d In d is t in c tiv e fea tu res o f its own. A theory of p ostm odernity therefore c a n n o t he a m o d if ie d th e o r y o f m o d e r n it y , a theory of m odernity w ith a set of negative m a rk e rs . A n a d e q u a t e th e o r y o f postmodernity may he only constructed in a c o g n itiv e space o r g a n iz e d b y a d if f e r e n t

set of assumptions; it needs its o w n v o c ab u lary . The de g re e of e m a n c i p a t i o n f r o m the concepts and issues spaw ned b y the discourse of m o d e r n it y o u g h t to s e r v e as a measure o f the adequacy o f such a theory.

Conditions of Theoretical Emancipation

W hat the theory of postm odernity must discard in the first p la c e is the a s s u m p t io n o f an iorgamsmic', equilibrated social to ta lity it p u r p o r ts to m o d e l in P a r s o n s - lik e sty le: the vision o f a ‘principally co-ordinated' a n d e n clo se d to t a lit y (a) w ith a d e g re e o f cohesiveness, (b ) equilibrated or m arke d b y an o v e r w h e lm in g te n d e n c y t o e q u i l i b r a ­ tion, (c) unified by an internally coherent value s y n d ro m e a n d a c o r e a u t h o r i t y a b le to promote and enforce it and (d) d e fin in g its e le m e nts in te rm s of th e f u n c t io n th e y perform in that process of e q u ilib ra tio n or the r e p r o d u c tio n o f th e e q u i l i b r a t e d s ta te .

The sought theory must assume instead that the social c o n d it i o n it in t e n d s to m o d e l is essentially and perpetually unequilibrated: c o m p o s e d of e le m e n ts w it h a d e g re e o f autonom y large enough to justify the view o f to ta lity as a k a le i d o s c o p ic - m o m e n t a r y and contingent - outcom e o f interaction. T he ord e rly , s tr u c tu r e d n a tu r e o f t o t a lit y cannot he taken for granted; nor can its p se ud o - re p re se n ta tio n al c o n s tr u c t io n be se en

as the purpose of theoretical activity. The r a n d o m n e s s of th e g lo b a l o u t c o m e o f uncoordinated activities cannot be treated as a d e p a rtu re fr o m the p a t te rn w h ic h

the totality strives to m aintain; any pattern th a t m a y te m p o r a r ily e m e rg e o u t of th e

random movements o f a uto n o m o us agents is as h a p h a z a r d a n d u n m o t iv a t e d as th e

one that could emerge in its place or the one b o u n d to replace it, if a ls o fo r a r im e o n ly .

All order that can be found is a local, em ergent a n d tra n s ito ry p h e n o m e n o n ; its n a t u r e

can he best grasped by a m etaphor o f a w h ir lp o o l a p p e a r in g in the flo w o f a river,

retaining its shape only for a relatively b rief p e rio d a n d o n ly a t the e x p e n s e o f

incessant metabolism and constant renewal o f co n te n t.

The theory of postm odernity m ust be free o f the m e ta p h o r o f p r o g r e s s t h a t informed all com peting theories o f m od e rn society. W it h th e t o ta lity d is s ip a t e d

into a series of random ly emerging, sh iftin g an d e van e sce n t is la n d s o f o rd e r, its

temporal record cannot be linearly represented. P e rp etual lo c a l t r a n s f o r m a t io n s d o

not add up so as to prom pt (m uch less to assure) in effect a n in cre ase d h o m o g e n e ity ,

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r a t i o n a l i t y o r o r g a n i c s y s r e m n e s s o f th e w h o le . T h e p o stm o d e rn condition is a site o f c o n s t a n t m o b i l i t y a n d c h a n g e , h u t n o c le a r d ire c tio n o f developm ent. The image o f B r o w n i a n m o v e m e n t o f f e r s a n a p t m e ta p h o r fo r th is aspect o f postm odem ity: each m o m e n t a r y s t a t e is n e i t h e r a n e c e s s a ry e ffe c t o f th e preceding state n o r the sufficient c a u s e o f t h e n e x t o n e . T h e p o s tm o d e r n c o n d itio n is b o th undeterm ined and unde- t e r m i n i n g . It 'u n b i n d s ’ t im e ; w e a k e n s th e c o n stra in in g im pact o f the past and e f f e c t i v e l y p r e v e n t s c o l o n i z a t i o n o f th e fu tu re .

S i m i l a r l y , t h e t h e o r y o f p o s t m o d e m i t y w o u ld d o w ell if it disposed o f concepts like s y s t e m in i ts o r t h o d o x , o r g a n i s m i c se n se (or, fo r th a t m atter, society), suggestive o f a s o v e r e i g n t o t a l i t y lo g ic a ll y p r i o r t o its p a rts , a to ta lity bestow ing meaning on its p a r t s , a t o t a l i t y w h o s e w e l f a r e o r p e rp e tu a tio n all sm aller (and, by definition, s u b o r d i n a t e ) u n i t s s e r v e ; in s h o r t , a to ta lity assum ed to define, and be practically c a p a b l e o f d e f i n i n g , t h e m e a n i n g s o f in d iv id u a l a ctio n s an d agencies th a t compose it. A s o c i o l o g y g e a r e d t o t h e c o n d it io n s o f p o s tm o d e m ity o u g h t to replace the category o f s o c i e t y w i t h t h a t o f s o c ia l it y ; a c a te g o ry th a t tries to convey the processual m o d a l i t y o f s o c i a l r e a l it y , th e d ia le c tic a l p lay o f random ness and pattern (or, from t h e a g e n t 's p o i n t o f v ie w , o f f re e d o m a n d dependence); an d a category th a t refuses to t a k e t h e s t r u c t u r e d c h a r a c t e r o f th e p ro c e ss fo r g ran te d - w hich treats instead all f o u n d s t r u c t u r e s a s e m e r g e n t a c c o m p lis h m e n ts .

W i t h t h e i r f ie ld o f v is io n o r g a n iz e d a ro u n d th e focal p o in t o f system-like, re­ s o u r c e f u l a n d m e a n i n g - b e s t o w i n g to ta lity , sociological theories o f m odernity (which c o n c e i v e d o f t h e m s e l v e s a s s o c io lo g ic a l th eo ries to u t court) concentrated on the v e h i c l e s o f h o m o g e n i z a t i o n a n d c o n flic t-re s o lu tio n in a relentless search for a s o l u t i o n t o t h e ‘H o b b e s i a n p r o b le m ’. T h is cognitive perspective (shared with the o n e r e a l i s t i c r e f e r e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f ‘so c ie ty ’ - th e n atio n al state, the only totality in h i s t o r y a b l e s e r i o u s l y t o e n te r ta i n th e a m b itio n o f contrived, artificially sustained a n d m a n a g e d m o n o t o n y a n d h o m o g e n e ity ) a prio ri disqualified any ‘uncertified* a g e n c y ; u n p a t t e r n e d a n d u n r e g u la te d s p o n ta n e ity o f the autonom ous agent was pre­ d e f i n e d a s a d e s t a b i l i z i n g a n d , in d e e d , a n ti-so c ial facto r m arked for tam ing and e x t i n c t i o n in t h e c o n t i n u o u s s tru g g le fo r societal survival. By the same token, prime i m p o r t a n c e w a s a s s i g n e d t o th e m e c h a n ism s a n d w eapons o f order-prom otion and p a t t e r n - m a i n t e n a n c e : th e s ta t e a n d th e leg itim atio n o f its authority, power, social­ i z a t i o n , c u l t u r e , i d e o lo g y , e tc . - all se le c te d fo r the role they played in the promotion o f p a t t e r n , m o n o t o n y , p r e d ic ta b ility a n d th u s also m anageability of conduct.

A s o c i o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f p o s tm o d e r n ity is b o u n d to reverse the structure of the c o g n i t i v e f ie l d . T h e f o c u s m u s t be n o w o n agency; m ore correctly, on the habitat in w h i c h a g e n c y o p e r a t e s a n d w h ic h it p ro d u c e s in the course of operation. As it offers t h e a g e n c y t h e s u m t o t a l o f re s o u rc e s fo r all possible action as well as the field inside w h i c h t h e a c t i o n - o r i e n t i n g a n d a c tio n -o r ie n te d relevancies m ay be plotted, the habitat is t h e t e r r i t o r y in s id e w h i c h b o t h fre e d o m a n d dependency of the agency are consti­ t u t e d ( a n d , i n d e e d , p e rc e iv e d as su c h ). U nlike the system-like totalities of m odem s o c i a l t h e o r y , h a b i t a t n e it h e r d e te rm in e s th e c o n d u c t of the agents nor defines its m e a n i n g ; i t is n o m o r e ( b u t n o less e ith e r) th a n the setting in which both action and m e a n i n g - a s s i g n m e n t a r e p o s s ib le . Its o w n id en tity is as under-determined and motile, a s e m e r g e n t a n d t r a n s i t o r y , a s th o s e o f th e a ctio n s a n d their meanings th at form it.

T h e r e is o n e c r u c i a l a r e a , th o u g h , in w h ic h the h a b ita t performs a determining ( s y s t e m a t i z i n g , p a t t e r n i n g ) ro le : it sets th e agenda for the ‘business of life’ through

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supplying the inventory of ends and the p ool ot m e a n s. The w ay in w h ic h the en d s

and means are supplied also determines the m e a n in g of the 'business of lif e ’: the

nature o f the tasks all agencies confront and have to take u p in one fo rm o r a n o th e r.

In so far as the ends are offered as p o te n tia lly a llu rin g rather th a n o b lig a to r y , a n d

rely for their choice on their ow n seductiveness rather th an the s u p p o r tin g p o w e r of

coercion, the ‘business of life’ splits in to a series o f ch oice s. The series is n o t pre-

structured, or is pre-structured only feebly an d a b o ve all in c o n c lu s iv e ly . F o r th is

reason the choices through w hich the life of the agent is c o n stru e d a n d s u s ta in e d is

best seen (as it tends to he seen by the agents them selves) as a d d in g u p to the process

o f self-constitution. To underline the grad uate d an d ultim ate ly i n c o n c l u s i v e n a tu r e of the process, self-constitution is best viewed as self-asse m b ly.

I propose that sociality, habitat, self-constitution an d self a s s e m b ly s h o u ld o c c u p y

in the sociological theory o f p o stm o d e m ity the central place that the o r t h o d o x y o f

modern social theory had reserved for the categories o f s o c ie t y, n o r m a tiv e g r o u p

(like class or com m unity), socialization an d c o n tro l.

Main Tenets of the Theory of Postmodernity

1 Under the postmodern c o n d itio n , habitat is a co m p lex system . A c c o r d i n g to contemporary mathematics, com plex systems d iffer from m e c h a n ic a l system s (th o se

assumed by the orthodox, m odern theory of society) in tw o c ru cia l respects, First,

they arc unpredictable; second, they are not c o n tro lle d by statistica lly s ig n ific a n t

factors (the circumstance dem onstrated by the m a th e m a tic a l p ro o f o f the f a m o u s

‘butterfly effect' ). The consequences of these tw o d istin ctive features of c o m p le x

systems arc truly revolutionary in relation to the received w is d o m of so c io lo g y . The

‘systemness’ of the postmodern habitat no longer lends itself to the o r g a n is m ic

metaphor, which means that agencies active w ith in the h a b ita t c a n n o t be assessed

in terms o f functionality or dysfunctionality. T he successive states o f the h a b ita t

appear to be unm otivated and free from co nstraints of d e te rm in istic logic. A n d the

most form idable research strategy m odern sociology had d e velo ped - s ta tis tic a l

analysis - is o f no use in exploring the dynam ics of social p h e n o m e n a an d e v a lu a t in g

the probabilities o f their future developm ent. Sig nificance an d n u m b e rs have p a rte d

ways. Statistically insignificant phenom ena m ay prove to be decisive, a n d th e ir

decisive role cannot be grasped in advance.

2 The postmodern habitat is a com plex (non- m e ch anical) system for tw o c lo se ly

related reasons. First, there is no ‘goal setting’ agency w ith overall m a n a g in g a n d c o ­

ordinating capacities or am b itio n s - one w hose presence w o u ld p ro v id e a v a n ta g e

p o int from which the aggregate o f effective agents appears as a ‘t o t a lit y ’ w it h a

determined structure of relevances; a totality w h ic h o n e can th in k as o f a n o rg a niza - tion. Second, the habitat is populated by a great n u m b e r o f agencies, m o s t o f th e m single-purpose, some o f them sm all, some big, but n o n e large e n o u g h to s u b s u m e o r

otherwise determine the behaviour o f the others. F o cu sin g on a single p u r p o s e

considerably enhances the effectiveness o f each agency in the field o f its o w n

operation, but prevents each area o f the h ab itat from being c o n tro lle d fro m a s in g le

source, as the field o f operation o f any agency never exhausts the w h o le a re a th e

action is affecting. O perating in different fields yet ze ro in g in o n shared a re a s ,

433 agencies are partly dependent on each other, but the lines of dependence cannot be fixed and thus their actions (and consequences) remain staunchly under-determined, that is autonom ous.

3 A uton o m y means that agents are only partly, if at all, constrained in their pursuit of whatever they have institutionalized as their purpose. To a large extent, they are free to pursue the purpose to the best of their mastery over resources and m anagerial capacity. They are free (and tend) to view the rest of the habitat shared w ith other agents as a collection of opportunities and ‘problems' to be resolved or removed. O p p o rtunity is what increases output in the pursuit of purpose, problems are w hat threatens the decrease or a halt of production. In ideal circumstances (m ax im ization of opportunities and minimization of problems) each agent would

tend to go in the pursuit of their purpose as far as resources would allow; the availability of resources is the only reason for action they need and thus the sufficient guarantee o f the action's reasonability. The possible impact on other agents’ oppor­ tunities is not automatically re-forged into the limitation of the agent’s own output. The m any products of purpose-pursuing activities of numerous partly interdepend­ ent but relatively autonomous agents must yet find, ex post facto, their relevance, utility and demand-securing attractiveness. The products are bound to be created in volumes exceeding the pre-existing demand motivated by already articulated prob­ lems. They are still to seek their place and meaning as well as the problems that they

may claim to be able to resolve. 4 lo r every agency, the habitat in which its action is inscribed appears there­

fore strikingly different from the confined space of its own autonomic, purpose- subordinated pursuits. It appears as a space of chaos and chronic indeterminacy, a territory subjected to rival and contradictory meaning-bestowing claims and hence perpetually am bivalent. All states the habitat may assume appear equally contingent (that is, they have no overwhelming reasons for being what they are, and they could be different if any of the participating agencies behaved differently). The heuristics of pragm atically useful ‘next moves’ displaces, therefore, the search for algorithmic, certain knowledge of deterministic chains. The succession of states assumed by the relevant areas of the habitat no agency can interpret without including its own actions in the explanation; agencies cannot meaningfully scan the situation ‘object­ ively’, that is in such ways as allow them to eliminate, or bracket away, their own

activity. 5 The existential modality of the agents is therefore one of insufficient determin­

ation, inconclusiveness, motility and rootlessness. The identity of the agent is neither given nor authoritatively confirmed. It has to be construed, yet no design for the construction can be taken as prescribed or foolproof. The construction of identity consists of successive trials and errors. It lacks a benchmark against which its progress could be measured, and so it cannot be meaningfully described as ‘pro­ gressing’. It is now the incessant (and non-linear) activity of self-constitution that makes the identity of the agent. In other words, the self-organization of the agents in terms of a life-p roject (a concept that assumes a long-term stability; a lasting identity of the habitat, in its duration transcending, or at least commensurate with, the longevity of human life) is displaced by the process o f self-constitution. Unlike the life-project self-constitution has no destination point in reference to which it could be evaluated and monitored. It has no visible end; not even a stable direction.

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It is conducted inside a shifting (and, as we have seen befo re , u n p r e d ic ta b le c o n s te l­

lation of m utually auton om o us points of reference, a nd t h u s p u r p o s e s g u id in g the

self-constitution at one stage m ay soon lose their current a u t h o rita t ively c o n f ir m ed

validity. Hence the self-assembly of the agency is not a c u m u la tiv e p r o c e s s ; self-

constitution entails disassembling alongside the asse m b lin g, a d o p tio n o f n e w e le m ­

ents as much as shedding o f others, learning together w ith fo rg e tting . The id e n tity of

the agency, m uch as it remains in a state of p e rm ane nt ch an g e , c a n n o t he the re fo re

described a s ‘developing’. In the self-constitution of agencies, the ‘ B r o w n ia n move-

m ent-type spatial nature of the habitat is projected o n to the tim e a x i s .

6 The only visible aspect o f co n tin u ity an d of the c u m u la tiv e effects of self-

constitutive efforts is offered by the h u m a n body - seen as the sole c o n s ta n t fa c to r

am ong the protean and fickle identities: the m ate rial, ta n g ib le s u b s tra tu m , c o n ta in e r,

carrier and executor o f all past, present an d future identities. The se lf-constitutive

efforts focus on keeping alive (and preferably e n h a n c in g ) the of the b o d y for

absorbing the input of sensuous impressions an d p ro d u c in g a co n stan t s u p p ly of

publicly legible self-definitions. H ence the centrality of b o d y -culturation a m o n g the self-assembly concerns, and the acute atte n tio n devoted to e ve ry th in g ‘ta k e n in te r n ­

ally’ (food, air, drugs, etc.) and to everything c o m in g in to u c h w ith the sk in - th a t

interface between the agent and the rest of the h a b ita t a n d the h o tly c o n te ste d

frontier of the autonom ously m anaged identity. In the p o s tm o d e rn h a b ita t, D I Y

operations (jogging, dieting, slim m ing , etc.) replace an d to a large extent d is p la c e the

panoptical drill of m odern factory, school or the barracks; u n lik e their predecessors,

however, they arc not perceived as externally im p o se d , c u m b e rso m e a n d resented

necessities, but as manifestos of the agent’s freedom . T he ir h e te ro n o m y , o nce b la ta n t

through coercion, now hides behind seduction.

7 As the process of self-constitution is not g uide d o r m o n ito re d by a so v e re ig n

life-project designed in advance (such a life-project can o n ly be im p u te d in r e tro ­

spect, reconstructed out of a series o f em ergent episodes), it generates a n a cu te

dem and for a substitute: a constant supply o f o rie n ta tio n p o in ts that m a y g u id e

successive moves. It is the other agencies (real or im a g in e d ) o f the h a b ita t w h o

serve as such orientation points. T heir im p act on the process of se lf- c o n s titu tio n

differs from that exercised by norm ative groups in th at they neither m o n it o r n o r

know ingly adm inister the acts o f allegiance an d the a c tio n s th at follow- it. F r o m the

vantage point of self-constituting agents, other agents can be m e ta p h o r ic a lly v is u a l­

ized as a random ly scattered set o f free-standing a n d u n g u a rd e d to te m ic poles w h ic h

one can approach or aban d on w ith o u t a p p ly in g for p e rm ission to enter o r leave. T h e

self-proclaimed allegiance to the selected agent (the act o f selection itself) is a c c o m ­

plished through the ad op tion o f sym bolic tokens o f b e lo n g in g , a n d fr e e d o m o f choice is lim ited solely by the availab ility an d accessibility o f such toke ns.

8 Availability o f tokens for potential self-assembly d epends o n th e ir visibility, m uch as it does on their m aterial presence. V isib ility in its tu rn d e p e n d s o n the

perceived utility of sym bolic tokens for the satisfactory o u tc o m e o f se lf- co n s tru ctio n ; that is, on their ability to reassure the agent that the curre nt results o f self-assem bly

are indeed satisfactory. This reassurance is the substitute for the ab se n t c e r ta in ty ,

m uch as the orientation points w ith the attached sy m b o lic tokens are c o lle c tiv e ly a

substitute for pre-determined patterns for life-projects. T he reassuring c a p a c ity o f

sym bolic tokens rests on borrow ed (ceded) a u th o rity ; o f exp ertise, o r o f m a ss

435 f o llo w in g . Symbolic tokens are actively sought and adopted if their relevance is v o u c hed for by the trusted authority of the expert, or by their previous or concurrent a p p r o p r i a t i o n b y a great number of other agents. These two variants of authority are in their turn fed by the insatiable thirst of the self-constituting agents for reassur­ ance. T h u s free d o m of choice and dependence on external agents reinforce each other, and arise and grow together as products of the same process of self-assembly and of the constant demand for reliable orientation points which it cannot but generate.

9 A ccessib ility of tokens for self-assembly varies from agent to agent, depending mostly on the resources that a given agent commands. Increasingly, the most strategic role am ong the resources is played by knowledge; the growth of individu­ ally appropriated knowledge widens the range of assembly patterns which can be realistically chosen. Freedom of the agent, measured by the range of realistic choices, turns under the postmodern condition into the main dimension of inequality and thus becomes the main stake of the re-distributional type of conflict that tends to arise from the dichotomy of privilege and deprivation; by the same token, access to knowledge - being the key to an extended freedom - turns into the major index of social standing. This circumstance increases the attractiveness of information among the symbolic tokens sought after for their reassuring potential. It also further enhances the authority of experts, trusted to be the repositories and sources of valid knowledge. Information becomes a major resource, and experts the crucial brokers of all self-assembly.

P o s t m o d e r n P o litic s

M odern social theory could afford to separate theory from policy. Indeed, it made a virtue out of that historically circumscribed plausibility, and actively fought for the separation under the banner of value-free science. Keeping the separation watertight has turned into a most distinctive mark of modern theory of society. A theory of postmodernity cannot follow that pattern. Once the essential contingency and the absence of supra- or pre-agentic foundations of sociality and of the structured forms it sediments has been acknowledged, it becomes clear that the politics of agents lies at the core of the habitat’s existence; indeed, it can be said to be its existential modality. All description of the postmodern habitat must include politics from the beginning. Politics cannot be kept outside the basic theoretical model as an epiphe- nom enon, a superstructural reflection or belatedly formed, intellectually processed

derivative. It could be argued (though the argument cannot be spelled out here) that the

separation of theory and policy in modern theory could be sustained as long as there was, unchallenged or effectively immunized against challenge, a practical division between theoretical and political practice. The latter separation had its foundation in the activity of the modern national state, arguably the only social formation in history w ith pretensions to and ambitions of administering a global order, and of m aintaining a total monopoly over rule-setting and rule-execution. Equally policy was to be the state’s monopoly, and the procedure for its formulation had to be made separate and independent from the procedure legitimizing an acceptable theory and,

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more generally, intellectual work m odelled after the latter procedure. Th e g ra d u a l, yet relentless erosion of the national state's m o n o p o ly (u n d e rm in e d sim u lta n e o u sly

from above and from below, by tran sn atio n al an d s u b n a t io n a l a g e n c ie s , an d weakened by the fissures in the historical m arriage betw een n a tio n a lis m a n d the

state, none needing the other very strongly in their m atu re form s ended the p la u s i­

bility of theoretical segregation.

W ith state resourcefulness and a m b itio n s sh rin k in g , re sp onsib ility (real or just

claimed) for policy shifts away from the state or is actively shed on the state's o w n

initiative. It is nor taken over by another agent, th o u g h . It dissipates; it splits in to a

plethora of localized or partial policies pursued by lo c a liz ed or p a rtia l (m o stly one

issue) agencies. W ith that, vanishes the m od e rn state's te n d e ncy to co n d e n sa te a n d

draw upon itself alm ost all social protest arising from unsatisfied re d is trib u tio n a l

demands and expectations - a quality that further enh ance d the inclusive role of the

state am ong societal agencies, at the same tim e rendering it v u ln e rab le a n d exposed

to frequent political crises (as conflicts fast turned in to p o litic a l protests). U n d e r the

postmodern condition grievances w hich in the past w o u ld c u m u la te in to a collective

political process and address themselves to the state, stay diffuse a n d tran slate in to

self-reflexivity of the agents, stim u latin g further d iss ip a tio n of policies a n d a u t o n ­

om y of postmodern agencies (if they do cu m u la te for a tim e in the fo rm of a one-

issue pressure group, they bring together agents to o heterogeneous in o th e r respects

to prevent the dissolution of the fo rm atio n once the desired progress o n the issue in

question has been achieved; and even before that fin al o u tc o m e , the fo r m a tio n is

unable to override the diversity of its supporters' interests a n d thus c la im a n d secure

their total allegiance and identification). O n e can speak, alle go rically , of the ‘ fu n c ­ tionality of dissatisfaction’ in a postm odern h a b ita t.

N o t all politics in postm odernity is u n a m b ig u o u s ly p o s tm o d e rn . T h r o u g h o u t the m odern era, politics o f inequality and hence of redistribution w as by far the m o st d o m in an t type of political conflict and co n flict- m an ag e m e n t. W ith the a d v e n t o f

postm odernity it has been displaced from its d o m in a n t role, b u t re m a in s (a n d in all

probability will remain) a constant feature o f the p o stm o d e rn h a b ita t. In d e e d , there

are no signs that the postm odern c o n d itio n prom ises to alleviate the in e q u a litie s (a n d

hence the redistributional conflicts) p ro life ratin g in m o d e rn society, Even s u c h an em inently m odern type o f politics acquires in m a n y cases a p o s tm o d e rn tin ge ,

though. Redistributional vindications o f o u r tim e are focused m o re ofte n th a n n o t

on the w in n in g of human rights (a code nam e for the ag e n t’s a u to n o m y , for th a t freedom o f choice that constitutes the agency in the p o stm o d e rn h a b ita t) by c a te g o r­

ies o f popu lation heretofore denied them (this is the case o f the e m a n c ip a to r y

movem ents of oppressed ethnic m inorities, o f the b lack m o v e m e n t, o f one im p o r t a n t

aspect o f the feminist m ovem ent, m uch as o f the recent re bellion a g a in s t the

‘dictatorship over needs’ practiced by the c o m m u n is t regim es), rather th a n at the

express redistribution of w ealth, incom e an d other c o n s u m a b le values by society at

large. The m ost conspicuous social division un d e r p o stm o d e rn c o n d itio n s is o n e

between seduction and repression: between the choice a n d the lack o f c h o ic e , between the capacity for self-constitution an d the d e n ial o f such cap acity , b e tw e e n

auto n o m o usly conceived self-definitions an d im posed c a te g o riza tio n s e x p e rie n ce d

as constraining and incapacitating. T he re d istrib u tio n a l a im s (or, m ore precisely,

consequences) o f the resulting struggle arc m ediated by the resistance a g a in s t repres-

437 sion of hum an agency. One may as well reverse the above statement and propose that in its postmodern rendition conflicts bared their true nature, that of the drive tow ard freeing of hum an agency, which in modern times tended to be hidden behind ostensibly redistributional battles.

Alongside the survivals of the modern form of politics, however, specifically postm odern forms appear and gradually colonize the centre-field of the postmodern political process. Some of them are new; some others owe their new, distinctly postm odern quality to their recent expansion and greatly increased impact. The follow ing are the most prominent among them (the named forms are not necessarily

m utually exclusive; and some act at cross-purposes):

1 Tribal p olitics. This is a generic name for practices aimed at collectivization (supra-agentic confirmation) of the agents’ self-constructing efforts. Tribal politics entails the creation of tribes as imagined communities. Unlike the premodem com­ m unities the modern powers set about uprooting, postmodern tribes exist in no other form but the symbolically manifested commitment of their members. They can rely on neither executive powers able to coerce their constituency into submission to the tribal rules (seldom do they have clearly codified rules to which submission could be dem anded), nor on the strength of neighbourly bonds or intensity of reciprocal exchange (most tribes are de-territorialized, and communication between their members is hardly at any time more intense than the intercourse between members and non-members of the tribe). Postmodern tribes, are, therefore, constantly in statu nascendi rather than essendi, brought over again into being by repetitive symbolic rituals of the members but persisting no longer than these rituals' power of attraction (in w hich sense they are akin to Kant’s aesthetic communities or Schmalenbach’s c o m m u n io n s). Allegiance is composed of the ritually manifested support for positive tribal tokens or equally symbolically demonstrated animosity to negative (anti-tribal)

tokens. As the persistence of tribes relies solely on the deployment of the affective allegiance, one would expect an unprecedented condensation and intensity of emotive behaviour and a tendency to render the rituals as spectacular as possible - mainly through inflating their power to shock. Tribal rituals, as it were, compete for the scarce resource of public attention as the major (perhaps sole) resource of survival.

2 Politics o f desire. This entails actions aimed at establishing the relevance of certain types of conduct (tribal tokens) for the self-constitution of the agents. If the relevance is established, the promoted conduct grows in attractiveness, its declared purposes acquire seductive power, and the probability of their choice and active pursuit increases: promoted purposes turn into agents’ needs. In the field of the politics of desire, agencies vie with each other for the scarce resource of individual and collective dreams of the good life. The overall effect of the politics of desire is heteronomy of choice supported by, and in its turn sustaining, the autonomy of the choosing agents.

3 Politics o f fear. This is, in a sense, a supplement (simultaneously a complement and a counterweight) of the politics of desire, aimed at drawing boundaries to heteronomy and staving off its potentially harmful effects. If the typical modem fears were related to the threat of totalitarianism perpetually ensconced in the project of rationalized and state-managed society (Orwell’s ‘boot eternally trampling a hum an face’, Weber’s ‘cog in the machine* and ‘iron cage*, etc.), postmodern fears

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arise from uncertainty as to the soundness and reliability of advice ottered through the politics of desire. More often than not, diffuse tears crystallize in the form of a suspicion that the agencies promoting desire are (tor the sake of self-interest) oblivious or negligent of the damaging effects of their proposals. In view of the centrality of body-cultivation in the activity of self-constitution, the damage most feared is one that can result in poisoning or maiming the body through penetration or contact with the skin (the most massive panics h a v e focused recently on incidents like mad cow disease, listeria in eggs, shrimps ted on poisonous algae, dumping of toxic waste - with the intensity of fear correlated to the importance of the body among the self-constituting concerns, rather than to the statistical significance of the event and extent of the damage).

The politics of fear strengthens the position of experts in the processes of self­ constitution, while ostensibly questioning their competence. Each successive in­ stance of the suspension of trust articulates a new area of the habitat as problematic and thus leads to a call for more experts and more expertise.

4 Politics o f certainty. This entails the vehement search for social confirmation of choice, in the face of the irredeemable pluralism of the patterns on offer and acute awareness that each formula of self-constitution, however carefully selected and tightly embraced, is ultimately one of the many, and always ‘until further notice'.

Production and distribution of certainty is the defining function and the source of power of the experts. As the pronouncements of the experts can be seldom put to the test by the recipients of their services, for most agents certainty about the soundness of their choices can be plausibly entertained only in the form of trust. The politics of certainty consists therefore mainly in the production and manipulation of trust; conversely, ‘lying’, ‘letting down’, ‘going back on one’s words’, ‘covering up’ the

unseemly deeds or just withholding information, betrayal of trust, abuse of privileged access to the facts of the case - all emerge as major threats to the already precarious and vulnerable self-identity of postmodern agents. Trustworthiness, credibility and

perceived sincerity become major criteria by which merchants of certainty - experts, politicians, sellers of self-assembly identity kits - are judged, approved or rejected.

On all four stages on which the postmodern political game is played, the agent’s

initiative meets socially produced and sustained offers. Offers potentially available

exceed as a rule the absorbing capacity of the agent. On the other hand, the

reassuring potential of such offers as are in the end chosen rests almost fully on

the perceived superiority of such offers over their competitors. This is, emphatically,

a perceived superiority. Its attractiveness relies on a greater volume of allocated trust. What is perceived as superiority (in the case of marketed utilities, life-styles or

political teams alike) is the visible amount of public attention the offer in question seems to enjoy. Postmodern politics is mostly about the reallocation of attention.

Public attention is the most important - coveted and struggled for - among the

scarce commodities in the focus of political struggle.

Postm odern Ethics

Like politics, ethics is an indispensable part of a sociological theory of postmodern­

ity pretending to any degree of completeness. The description of modern society

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could leave critical problems aside or ascribe to them but a marginal place, in view of the fact that the moral regulation of conduct was to a large extent subsumed under the legislative and law-enforcing activity of global societal institutions, while what­ ever remained unregulated in such a way was ‘privatized* or perceived (and treated) as residual and marked for extinction in the course of full modernization. This condition does not hold anymore; ethical discourse is not institutionally pre-empted and hence its conduct and resolution (or irresolution) must be an organic part of any theoretical model of postmodemity.

Again, not all ethical issues found in a postmodern habitat are new. Most import­ antly, the possibly extemporal issues of the orthodox ethics - the rules binding short-

distance, face-to-face intercourse between moral agents under conditions of physical and moral proximity - remain presently as much alive and poignant as ever before. In no way are they postmodern; as a matter of fact, they are not modem either. (On the whole, modernity contributed little, if anything, to the enrichment of moral problematics. Its role boiled down to the substitution of legal for moral regulation and the exemption of a wide and growing sector of human actions from moral evaluation.)

The distinctly postmodern ethical problematic arises primarily from two crucial features of the postmodern condition: pluralism of authority, and the centrality of c h o ice in the self-constitution of postmodern agents.

1 Pluralism of authority, or rather the absence of an authority with globalizing am bitions, has a twofold effect. First, it rules out the setting of binding norms each agency must (or could be reasonably expected to) obey. Agencies may be guided by their own purposes, paying in principle as little attention to other factors (also to the interests of other agencies) as they can afford, given their resources and degree of independence. ‘Non-contractual bases of contract', devoid of institutional power support, are thereby considerably weakened. If unmotivated by the limits of the agency’s own resources, any constraint upon the agency’s action has to be negotiated afresh. Rules emerge mostly as reactions to strife and consequences of ensuing negotiations; still, the already negotiated rules remain by and large precarious and under-determined, while the needs of new rules - to regulate previously unantici­ pated contentious issues - keep proliferating. This is why the problem of ru les stays in the focus of public agenda and is unlikely to be conclusively resolved. In the absence of ‘principal coordination* the negotiation of rules assumes a distinctly ethical character: at stake are the principles of non-utilitarian self-constraint of autonom ous agencies - and both non-utility and autonomy define moral action as distinct from either self-interested or legally prescribed conduct. Second, pluralism of authorities is conducive to the resumption by the agents of moral responsibility that tended to be neutralized, rescinded or ceded away as long as the agencies remained subordinated to a unified, quasi-monopolistic legislating authority. On the one hand, the agents face now point-blank the consequences of their actions. O n the other, they face the evident ambiguity and controversiality of the purposes which actions were to serve, and thus the need to justify argumentatively the values that inform their activity. Purposes can no longer be substantiated monologically; having become perforce subjects of a dialogue, they must now refer to principles wide enough to command authority of the sort that belongs solely to ethical values.

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2 The enhanced au to n o m y of the agent has sim ila r ly a tw o fo ld eth ical c o n s e ­ quence. First - in as far as the centre of gravity shifts decisive!) from hete r o n o m ous control to self-determination, an d a u to n o m y turns in to the d e fin in g tra it of p o s t­

m odern agents - self-monitoring, self-reflection a n d self-evaluation In c o m e p r in c i­

pal activities o f the agents, indeed the m echanism s s y n o n y m ica l w ith their self-

constitution. fn the absence of a universal m o d e l for self-im pro vem ent, o r of a

clear-cut hierarchy o f models, the most ex cruciating choices agents face are betw een

life-purposes and values, not between the m eans serv in g the a lre a d y set, uncontro-

versial ends. Supra-individual criteria of propriety in the form of technical precepts o f instrumental rationality do nor suffice. This circum stance, a g a in , is p o te n tia lly

propitious to the sharpening up of m oral self-awareness; on ly ethical p r in c ip le s m ay offer such criteria o f value-assessment and value-choice as are a t the sam e tim e

supra-individual (carry an authority ad m itte d ly superior to that of in d iv id u a l self-

preservation), and fit to he used w itho u t surrendering the a g e n t’s a u to n o m y . H ence

the typically postm odern heightened interest in ethical debate an d increased a ttr a c t­

iveness o f the agencies claim in g expertise in m o ral values (e.g., the revival of

religious and quasi-religious m ovem ents). Second, w ith the a u to n o m y of all a n d

any agents accepted as a principle and in stitu tio n alize d in the life-process c o m p o s e d

o f an unending series o f choices, the lim its of the agent w hose a u to n o m y is to he

observed and preserved turn into a most closely g u a rd e d a n d h o tly con te ste d

frontier. A long this borderline new issues arise w h ich can be settled o n ly th ro u g h

an ethical debate. Is the flow and the outcom e of self-constitution to be tested before

the agent’s right to auton om y is confirm ed? If so, w hat are the sta n d a rd s by w h ic h

success or failure are to be judged (w hat a b o u t the a u to n o m y of y o u n g a n d still

younger children, o f the indigent, o f parents raising their ch ild re n in u n u s u a l w ay s,

o f people choosing bizarre lifestyles, o f people in d u lg in g in a b n o r m a l m e a n s o f

intox ication, people engaging in idiosyncratic sexual activities, in d iv id u a ls p r o ­

nounced m entally handicapped)? A n d , h o w far are the a u to n o m o u s p o w e rs of the

agent to extend and at w hat p o in t is their lim it to be d r a w n (re m e m b e r the

notoriously inconclusive contest between ‘life ’ a n d ‘c h oice ' prin ciple s of the a b o r tio n

debate)?

All in all, in the postm odern context agents are c o n s tan tly faced w ith m o r a l issues

an d obliged to choose between equally well fo u n d e d (or e q u a lly u n fo u n d e d ) e th ic a l

precepts. The choice always means the assum ptio n o f responsibility, a n d fo r this

reason hears the character o f a m oral act. U nder the p o stm o d e rn c o n d it io n , the

agent is perforce not just an actor and decision-m aker, b u t a m oral subject. T he perform ance o f life-functions dem ands also th at the agent be a m o ra lly c o m p ete n t subject.