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Moving on Up? The Gendered Ambitions of State-Level Appointed Officials Author(s): Kaitlin Sidorsky Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 68, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2015), pp. 802-815 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24637817 Accessed: 21-01-2019 19:11 UTC

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Article

Moving on Up? The Gendered Ambitions of State-Level Appointed Officials

Political Research Quarterly 2015, Vol. 68(4) 802-815 © 2015 University of Utah

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Kaitlin Sidorsky1

Abstract

Many scholars have offered explanations as to why women are underrepresented at all levels of government. Conventional wisdom states that fewer women are in public office due to lower ambition, and that the presence of gendered perceptions among women considering elected office contributes to women's disinterest in the political arena. Using original survey data, this article expands the theory of gendered perceptions to current state-level appointed officeholders to explain their levels of interest in pursuing higher public office. The results indicate that gendered perceptions affect the progressive ambitions of appointees; like studies of ambition in elected officials, this

study of appointed officials finds that women are generally less ambitious, and unlike studies of ambition in elected officials, this study of appointed officials finds that women with higher self-assessments are less ambitious rather than more.

Keywords U.S. politics, state and local politics, progressive ambition, political appointments, gender and politics

The political arena continues to be mostly populated by men. In 2014, less than 19 percent of Congress and less than

a quarter of state legislatures were comprised of women. Only six governors were women, and fewer than 20 percent of statewide executives, such as secretaries of state, were

female (Center for American Women and Politics [CAWP]

2014). The underrepresentation of women in politics even

appeared in the 2012 presidential race. When asked what he

would do about the wage gap between men and women, Mitt Romney said he was dedicated to including more women in the workforce, going so far as to question where

the "binders full of women" were when trying to decide on

candidates for political appointment within his gubernato rial administration. Lower numbers of women in public office means women may be unjustifiably excluded from

political discussions and decisions.

Romney's "binders full of women," made to demon strate how important it was to appoint more women to cabinet-level positions, reveals a political office that is rarely studied when we question women's representation. Scholars have focused almost exclusively on the nascent ambitions, or initial interests of women for elected office,

or the progressive ambitions (the interest in pursuing higher public office) of current elected officials. Few ask why women enter into appointed office, or even if appointed office is a more attractive pathway into the political arena and up the political career ladder.

Because it is unknown how appointments factor into the female pipeline to public office, we do not know

what affects that pathway, including whether or not the

same variables affect the appointed pathway as well as the elected pathway. For example, how does a woman's perception of her capabilities, often different from a man's and a strong predictor of her interest in elected office, affect her ambition for an appointment? It is this

disparity between self-perceived qualifications, known as gendered perceptions, Lawless and Fox (2005, 116) said is "the most potent explanation we uncovered for the gender gap in political ambition." No study focuses on the presence of gendered perceptions and their effects

on the ambition for appointed office, or its effects on progressive ambition, despite the strong effect it has on the initial interest in elected office. Yet thousands of

men and women are appointed at all levels of govern ment, with thousands serving on the rarely studied state level boards alone.1 The most recent data indicate 35

percent of high appointees are women (Center for Women in Government and Civil Society [CWGCS] 2008). Given that the highest percentages of women in public office at the state level hold appointed and not

'Coastal Carolina University, Conway, SC, USA

Corresponding Author: Kaitlin Sidorsky, Department of Politics and Geography, Coastal

Carolina University, Brittain Hall 349, 125 Chanticleer Dr. West,

Conway, SC 29528-6054, USA. Email: [email protected]

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Sidorsky 803

elected office, this omission is significant in our under standing of gender and politics.

Using a unique data set of appointed officials drawn from the results of my State Political Pathways Survey, this article will show how progressive ambition among appointed women differs from their male counterparts, and from previously identified trends in progressive political ambition for elected office among women. I find

that women in appointed positions have lower ambitions than men in appointed positions, mirroring the ambitions

of women in elected office. That women in appointments

continue to have lower progressive ambitions suggests a competitive environment may not be the only reason for

women's lower ambitions. Furthermore, my findings show that it is the women who self-assess their abilities

the highest who are the least progressively ambitious. This complicates the role of self-assessment in women's ambition. Put together, these two findings challenge the conventional wisdom that women are less ambitious

because they do not like the competitive electoral envi ronment and that women with more confidence in their

abilities will automatically become more ambitious for public office.

Why Political Appointments?

Women in appointments are invisible when we focus on elected office alone. Little is known about who holds

political appointments and their progressive ambitions at the local and state levels. This is due to an almost exclu

sive focus on federal or high-level state appointments coinciding with the study of electoral ambition alone. My focus on all state-level political appointments expands the definition of public office to include men and women who

have been overlooked in prior political ambition studies to

reveal how women exhibit different levels of progressive ambition for nonelected political positions. How do appointed women approach seeking higher public office? Do appointed women have lower progressive ambitions like female elected officials? To assume women in

appointments have similar ambitions as women in elected

positions is problematic because both kinds of offices rep resent very different levels of public exposure, time com

mitment, and skills necessary to attain each position.

Women in elected office rely upon support from party

leadership and need an extensive fundraising background. Women tend to be much more concerned about their

ability to fiindraise and are much more reliant upon party

recruitment to even consider elected office (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013; Fox and Lawless 2010; Sanbonmatsu

2006; Welch 2008). Women running for elected office, especially if they are considering moving to more presti

gious offices, have to expose themselves to a higher level of public exposure and media scrutiny. These requirements

of fundraising and media exposure alone deter many women from considering seeking elected office at all or

considering a higher public office.

The appointment world is different. Although party support is beneficial for networking, it is not a necessity.

Seeking or being recruited for appointment does not require any fundraising, and if it is a low appointment, such as a commission appointment, it has little public scrutiny or media exposure. Board and commission appointments have low time commitments and concern specific issues or professions that directly affect potential

appointees' personal and professional lives. High appoint ments also allow for issue specificity and may act like any other full-time job, meaning appointees do not have to juggle a career alongside their political position like many elected officials must do. In contrast, potential elec

toral candidates need to be prepared to cover a wide range of issues. The lack of fundraising, lower media exposure,

and the opportunity to work on a specific issue area may make political appointments more attractive than elected office for women, a notion that has not been considered in

political ambition studies until now.

If it is important that women be equally represented in

governmental bodies at all levels, then we need to better understand ambition for all offices, and not just the initial

or progressive ambitions for elected office. Although this

analysis cannot tell us for certain that a presence or lack of progressive ambition among appointees leads to more or less women in public office, it can begin to tell us how

progressive ambition functions within the appointment world, and if the same psychological doubts that affect the initial interest in public office continue to affect inter

est in moving up in public office.

Gendered Representation Elected office has been treated more as a pathway within the women's and politics literature, with discussions on potential institutional, psychological, or social barriers and how any one or more of these may affect the road to

elected office. Appointed office, however, is rarely treated

as a pathway to public office. Studies on state political appointments, for example, reveal the glass ceilings and glass walls in particular state agencies or departments (Bullard and Wright 1993). The scholars who study the women in appointed office rarely ask why women pur sued or were ambitious for their appointed positions. This

is especially confusing given the benefits of being in appointed office versus elected office, such as the ability

to work on one specific issue and the lower media expo sure. Few studies have questioned whether the variables that affect the pathway to elected office (i.e., family, political, and state-specific dynamics) also affect the pathway to appointed office.

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804 Political Research Quarterly 68(4)

Family Dynamics and Women Seeking Public Office

At first, scholars focused on the challenge of being both a mother and a potential elected officeholder. It was argued that juggling both childrearing and running for political office could prove to be a unique obstacle for many women who consider adding their name to the ballot. Women do tend to be older when they first enter

electoral politics, with childbearing and childrearing as two of the major reasons for the delay in entering poli tics (Carroll 1985a, 1985b; Diamond 1977; Dolan and Ford 1997; Kirkpatrick 1974). Both men and women reported family-related conflict to holding office, but men reported higher levels of conflict than women because women tended to forgo politically ambitious related opportunities until they could devote their energy

to it without losing time with their family (Sapiro 1982). Yet marital status, having children, and the amount of household responsibilities were insignificant predictors of nascent ambition for elected office, questioning the effects of children on a woman's ambition for elected

office at all (Fox and Lawless 2014; Lawless and Fox 2005).

Only one study in 1983 asked female appointees their marital status and whether or not they had children (CAWP 1983). No scholar has questioned whether or not having children affects a woman's decision to seek or accept an appointment. Female appointees were less likely to be married and among appointees who were married, women had fewer children than the main sample

(CAWP 1983). As these data are more than thirty years old and only included high-level appointments, we have no idea whether or not the trends in family dynamics for appointments have continued till today.

Personal Political Characteristics and Women

in Public Office

Personal political characteristics, such as the value of an individual's current position, affect progressive and nascent ambition for elected office. When elected offi

cials feel they have a higher chance of winning and are risk takers, their interest in seeking higher elected office

increases (Fulton et al. 2006; Rohde 1979). One study found women are more affected by the expected benefit

gained from holding higher level office, making them as

likely as men to be progressively ambitious (Fulton et al.

2006). Furthermore, the more qualified women feel to run for or hold elected office, the more likely they are to

consider seeking elected office (Lawless and Fox 2005). This is all keeping in mind that women are less likely to

feel qualified in the first place and are also less progres sively ambitious once they reach elected office (Bledsoe

and Herring 1990; Fox and Lawless 2011; Lawless and Fox 2005; Maestas et al. 2006; Palmer and Simon 2003).

Our understanding of the ambitions of appointed offi

cials is limited in comparison with our understanding of the ambitions of elected officials. We do not know how

the value of a current appointment (or perhaps a job out side of politics) affects interest in appointed office, nor do

we know whether one's feelings on their qualifications for

the appointment affect the interest in appointed office. The

1983 CAWP study shows that women were more likely to express an interest in a future gubernatorial appointment.

Why these women had ambitions for another appointment

and whether or not they are interested in a higher level appointment is unknown. Also, because the 1983 CAWP study did not include board and commission members, we do not know what the ambitions of board and commission

members are, and whether or not boards and commissions

can act as a stepping stone to higher public office.

It remains incumbent on scholars of gender and poli tics to explain how and why we expect political ambition

to function for women as compared with men. Although prior literature in this field has shown that female elected

officials are more influenced by the expected benefits of seeking a higher office than by their lower ambitions (Fulton et al. 2006; Maestas et al. 2006), these studies have not taken into account how the candidates feel about

their ability to either win the higher political position or

govern effectively within it. Subjectively being able to say whether or not they may win an election for higher public office is not the same as understanding whether or

not they feel they are qualified to run or hold that higher

public office.

Furthermore, this study is situated in a nonelectoral environment. It may not be as clear to appointees whether or not they would be awarded the higher appointment, including how competitive it may be or if anyone else is seeking that appointment as well, nor is there necessarily a direct pathway up the appointment ladder like there is for those holding elected office, such as those in the state

legislature considering a congressional campaign. This means it is very difficult to measure the chances of being

awarded an appointment in addition to being theoretically

problematic in a nonelected world. Given that women are

less ambitious when self-perceived qualifications are taken into account, and that these self-perceived qualifi cations are relevant in both elected and nonelected posi tions, I argue that appointed women actually do hold lower progressive ambitions than men (Carroll 1994; Constanini 1990; Lawless 2012; Lawless and Fox 2005; Palmer and Simon 2003). Therefore, I seek to test the fol

lowing hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: All else equal, a female appointee will be less progressively ambitious than a male appointee.

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Sidorsky 805

And because self-assessed qualifications have been shown to have such a strong effect on a woman's ambition

for elected office, I seek to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Appointed women will have lower self assessments on their qualifications for higher office than appointed men.

Gendered perceptions, or the difference between how

women view their capabilities versus how men view their capabilities, affect a woman's initial interest in elected office (Lawless and Fox 2005). Timothy Bledsoe and Mary Herring (1990) also suggested a psychological bar rier affecting female city councilor's progressive ambi tion. They argued that experiences may be the same, but the perceptions of those experiences can diverge drasti cally based on the sex of the individual, which in turn affects future decisions. They contended that the higher men and women go up the political career ladder, the more their political experiences and circumstances should

be similar, but this does not necessarily create a stronger link between experience and perception, especially as the

female city councilors were more affected by their politi

cal circumstances (i.e., electoral security) than male councilors (Bledsoe and Herring 1990). Lawless and Fox (2005) found similar results and argued that men and women have very different perceptions of their qualifica

tions to run for public office; these different perceptions

in turn affect each sex's ambition differently. Based on the earlier findings of Bledsoe and Herring, and the recent

findings of Lawless and Fox, I seek to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Appointed women will be more pro gressively ambitious as they have higher self perceived qualifications for higher office.

The appointee sample used in this analysis has a wide variety of appointments, from the lowest level board and

commission to the commissioner of an entire state depart ment. Lawless and Fox (2005) argued that studying indi viduals who hold public office means we are already studying individuals who have expressed some level of political ambition. However, the appointees in my sample may have very different levels of political ambition according to what level appointment they hold. A female

appointed as the deputy commissioner of an entire state

department may have a history of public office success in

her past, which may in turn affect her perceptions of her

qualifications for higher public office. This is in compari

son with the female appointed to a low-level board and commission, who may be less likely to have a history of

public officeholding and therefore a very different per ception of her abilities to hold a higher public office.

Given the differences in level of appointment and how the level of appointment may affect one's self-perceived qualifications, I test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The effects of gendered perceptions on progressive ambition are conditioned by the level of office the individual holds.

Testing these hypotheses on appointed officials expands our understanding of why there are fewer women

holding public office at the state level beyond elected office. We can further our understanding of the role gen

dered perceptions play in decreasing the numbers of women holding public office by focusing on the climb up

the political career ladder (i.e., moving up to a higher office) instead of concentrating on the first rung.

Data: The State-Level Political

Pathways Project

This analysis uses data from my original survey of appointed

state officials.2 In the fall of 2013,1 sent an email survey3

through Qualtrics to more than 3,500 appointed officials in

the state departments of Health, Commerce (including pro

fessional licensing), Environment, and Natural Resources

across twenty states.4 The twenty states were varied on

their culture, region, professionalism of legislature, per centage of females in the legislature, and percentage of high-appointed females. The twenty states were Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont,

Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

It was important to get as diverse a sample of states as possible to not bias the results. States were varied on the

professionalism of their state legislature, for example, because states with professional legislatures are usually more competitive and prestigious, making them harder offices to attain. The characteristics associated with the

public offices in states with professional legislatures, or in

states with citizen legislatures, could affect a potential can

didate's political ambitions. Half (ten) of the states in the sample have semiprofessional legislatures, six have citizen legislatures, and four have professional legislatures.

States with higher percentages of female state legisla

tors or female high appointees may suggest a more female-friendly state. Female-friendly states tend to be

more liberal, have higher populations of underrepre sented groups, and have a history of electing women to public office (Ondercin and Welch 2009). Women who live in female-friendly states or who have seen more females elected or appointed may have different levels of

ambition. The opposite may be true as well, with women

in states that are less friendly to women exhibiting lower

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806 Political Research Quarterly 68(4)

ambitions, or bigger doubts about their ability to hold public office. The states in my sample therefore represent

states with all levels of representation of females in their

legislatures. The average percentage of women in the state legislature across the twenty states is 23.45 percent,

just under the national average, and the average percent age of women in high appointments across the twenty states is 37 percent, slightly over the national average of

35.1 percent (CWGCS 2008). The diversification of the states on these five areas ensures the generalizability of the findings across the United States.

Although it is relatively easy to track down high-level appointee names and contact information, the same is not

true for finding out information for boards and commis sions. In fact, some states do not even have a complete listing of their boards and commissions (New York), other states have outdated lists (Massachusetts), and some states, such as North Dakota, have one portal where all board and commission members are listed with con

tact information. Contact information came from a vari

ety of sources, including state websites, professional associations, and educational institutions.

Studying state-level appointees is advantageous for a few

reasons. First, most state-level appointment structures are

very similar from state to state—allowing for comparison between states and increasing the number of subjects stud

ied. Second, our understanding of state-level appointments

is lacking, mostly because appointment studies do not include board and commission members. Boards and com

missions offer individuals the opportunity to take part in

state government issues that are important to them with lower media exposure and time commitments. Because the

appointment world offers unique opportunities to become

involved in politics without some of the negativity associ ated with elected office, it is important that we consider how

all appointments may serve as departure points for politi cally ambitious individuals. Third, studying the state level allows me to capture progressive ambition within the state

level and to the federal level. Studying local appointments is

far more difficult due to the varying governmental structures

and difficulty of obtaining information on appointees.

In total, I gathered 12,544 appointee names from 1,314

boards and commissions, and sixty state agencies and departments. I was able to find the emails of 3,587. Of the

3,587 appointees I contacted, 1,130 completed the survey

for a response rate of 31.5 percent. A total of 163 were high appointees and 967 appointees were serving on boards and commissions (low appointees).

The survey covered four areas: prior political history, current position opinions, future political ambitions, and

demographics. Questions under prior political history included the number and types of offices run for and held

(i.e., elected vs. appointed, local vs. state levels). Within the subheading of Current Position Opinions, I asked

about the nature of their current position, including if it

was part-time or full-time, was subject to term limits, and

who they were appointed by. Future political ambition questions included their attitudes toward running for elected office, how qualified they felt to attain a higher level of office, and how likely it is they would win a cam

paign if they decided to run. The survey ended with demographic questions. (The entire survey is available in the online appendix accompanying this article.)

I chose state-level departments in three areas: Health,

Commerce (including professional licensure), and Environment and Natural Resources. I chose these three

areas for a few reasons. First, I wanted to make sure I was

not biasing the departments; therefore I chose one distrib

utive, regulatory, and redistributive department. This pol

icy typology created by Theodore Lowi and built upon by

Newman argues that the type of department one works in

affects the amount of power one can wield (Lowi 1972; Newman 1994; Newman 1995; Ripley and Franklin 1991). The three areas within the typology have been studied by women and politics scholars and very often are

gendered (Kelly and Newman 2001; Miller, Kerr, and Reid 1999; Newman 1994; Newman 1995). Commerce departments, for example, are a regulatory department where communication is most formal, lateral entry is most

common, and is the kind of department most likely to be male dominated (Lowi 1972; Newman 1994; Reid, Miller, and Kerr 2004). Health departments, however, are redis tributive, and afford the least amount of access to policy

making (Ripley and Franklin 1991), yet is one of the areas

women are most likely to be found (Newman 1994; Reid,

Miller, and Kerr 2004). Finally, the distributive depart ments of Environment and Natural Resources most often

support a patron-client relationship where everyone is a winner and cooperation is a must, and are more likely to be male dominated (Lowi 1972; Newman 1994).

Second, I chose the Health department because it is one of the areas that a substantial amount of a state budget is

allotted to. States spend the majority of their budgets on K-12 education and Medicaid. More than 25.8 percent of states' total expenditures go to Medicaid, 19.5 percent of state expenditure goes to K-12 education, and 10.1 percent

goes to higher education (National Association of State Budget Officers 2014). Choosing the health department ensures I am capturing appointments that are important to

the duties of state governments. Finally, these three areas

were chosen because many of the boards and commissions within a state fall within one of these three areas. States can

have dozens of professional licensing boards that fall under

the Commerce department, dedicate substantial board and commission resources to understanding specific diseases,

and use boards to regulate many areas of environmental law.

The appointees range from full-time department secre taries to board/council members who meet a few times a

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Sidorsky 807

year. Board responsibilities and agendas vary widely, even within the same state. Some meet only four times a year and serve in an advisory capacity. Others meet monthly, and have the sole responsibility to set the regu

lations and rules regarding a certain profession. Still oth ers concern very specific populations, and include members who are experts in a field, or who represent the

populations most affected by the board's mission. For example, the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission

in the Department of Natural Resources meets only three to

four times a year but has a relatively wide scope of authority.

The Commission's mission is to protect and set policy for

the land within the Illinois Nature Preserve System. This gives the commission the authority to protect lands currently

within the Nature Preserve System and preserve the lands by

overseeing a staff of biologists. No lands currently under the

Nature Preserve System can be taken under the power of

eminent domain without the approval of the commission, governor, and other invested public owners (Illinois Department of Natural Resources 2014). Boards such as the

Illinois Nature Preserve Commission are both policymakers

and regulators within their respective jurisdictions.

In contrast, the Illinois Real Estate Administration and

Disciplinary Board (IREADB) meets every month, but as a

regulatory board, only has regulatory power over the licens

ing of real estate agents within the state. The meetings for

the IREADB comprise mostly of reviewing disciplinary cases and deciding the fines, penalties, and possible revok

ing of real estate licenses. The board meets every month,

and all members are appointed by the governor besides the

chair (Illinois Office of Executive Appointments 2014).

And finally the Illinois Advisory Board for Services for Persons Who Are Deaf-Blind (IABDB) represents advisory boards with the least amount of authority. The

IABDB was created in 1975 and "provides advice to the State Superintendent of Education, the Governor, and the General Assembly on all matters pertaining to policy concerning persons who are deaf/blind, including the implementation of legislation enacted on their behalf' (IABDB 2014). The board must meet at least four times a year, but cannot meet more than twelve times. This board

can act as a voice for the deaf/blind community and make

recommendations on their behalf, but they cannot regu late any prior laws regarding services for individuals who

are deaf/blind, nor can they implement any policies on behalf of those populations.

Descriptive Statistics: Individuals Appointed in State-Level Boards, Commissions, and Departments The State Political Pathways Survey provides more insights into who holds state appointments. Table 1 pro vides descriptive statistics of the sample to better

understand state-level appointees. More than 40 percent of appointees were female, with no variation between the percentage of females on boards and commissions or in high appointments. Appointees were also overwhelm ingly white (90.09%), with boards and commissions slightly less diverse than high appointees. The average age of appointees was fifty-five, with high appointees younger than board and commission members by three years on average. The appointees in the sample are very well educated; more than 60 percent completed graduate school and more than 70 percent had family incomes at US$100,000 or higher. Many of the appointees were also married, and high appointees were almost 10 per cent more likely than board and commissions members to have children below eighteen at home.

Moving to the characteristics associated with their current positions, appointees reported holding their cur

rent positions for an average of seven and a half years. Appointees were more likely to come from Health depart

ments, with equal percentages coming from Commerce and Environment/Natural Resource department. The gov ernor appointed most of the appointees (77%), and the average number of board members was eleven.

More appointees identified as Democrat than Republican. Over half of all appointees reported being recruited for elected or appointed office at some point, representing the importance of recruitment on political

participation. Close to 30 percent of appointees overall, and more than 37 percent of high appointees had held a prior appointment; on average, appointees held two appointed positions in two different departments, with many appointees having held positions at the local level. Far fewer appointees reported having run for elected office, particularly among the high appointees.

Qualifications and Interest in Higher Office

Do appointed officials feel qualified for higher public office? In short, yes. Almost two-thirds of appointees felt

qualified or very qualified for higher office. The number

of high appointees (more than 80%) compared with the number of board and commission level appointees (more than 60%) who view themselves as qualified hints at an increase in confidence in one's abilities as they climb the

political career ladder, providing early support for Hypothesis 4 (see Table 2). In addition, the gender gap in

self-qualifications continues for appointee holders, with

males more likely to assess their qualifications higher than females, supporting Hypothesis 2 (Table 3,p < .01).

Board and commission members have the most doubt

in their qualifications compared with any other group; females at the board and commission level suffer the great

est self-doubts (Figure 1). High-appointed men were more likely than high-appointed women to assess themselves as

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808 Political Research Quarterly 68(4)

Table I. Descriptive Statistics.

All High appointed Low appointed

Demographics Female

White

Average age

Average education level Married

Have children below 18

Current position

Average years in position

Health department

Commerce department

Environment/Natural Resources department Political history

Democrat

Republican

Recruited for public office Ran for elected office

Held prior appointment

40.27%

90.09%

55.25

Some graduate school 83.81%

19.64%

7.61

43.40%

28.07%

28.43%

35.50%

21.77%

52.04%

18.63%

29.96%

40.00%

90.91%

52.41

Some graduate school 87.27%

32.12%

8.39

32.73%

33.33%

33.94%

36.48%

21.38%

55.15%

13.94%

37.80%

40.31%

89.95%

55.74

Some graduate school 83.21%

23.55%

7.47

45.23%

27.28%

27.49%

35.34%

21.84%

51.50%

19.44%

28.62%

1,125 164 961

Table 2. Self-Assessed Qualifications for Higher Office.

All High appointed Low appointed

Not at all qualified 9.29% 2.45%** 10.48% Somewhat qualified 25.96% 12.88%** 28.24% Qualified 31.88% 22.70%** 33.48%

Very qualified 32.88% 61.96%** 27.81%

n 1,098 163 935

Comparisons are between high and low appointees. Chi-square tests are used for difference in means; Fisher's exact test is used when observations are less than or equal to 5. < . 10. *p < .05. **p <.01.

qualified for higher office, but the most dramatic split is between women on boards and commissions and women

who hold high appointments. For example, the gap between

a board-level female's and a high female appointee's responding that they were "very qualified" for high office

is 45%, but is only 26% for men appointed to boards and

commissions versus higher appointments.

Interest in Higher Office

A notable difference emerges between appointed men and

women when it comes to interest in higher office (Table 4),

the dependent variable. While appointed men and women

exhibit similar levels of overall progressive ambition, with

about 38 percent of males and 33 percent of females saying

that they are somewhat or very interested in higher office,

appointed women are about 5 percent more likely to not be

interested at all in higher office (p < .10). Low appointees are slightly less progressively ambitious than high appoin tees (see the online appendix).

Part of the reason why low appointees seem to be uninterested in seeking higher office may be due to the

nature of their current appointments. Many appointees at

the board and commission level expressed their love of public service without a personal ambition for public office. As a male council member from North Dakota

remarked,

I am currently employed and very busy in my position as a

manager in the energy industry. My appointment by the North Dakota Governor as Chairman of the North Dakota

Workforce Development Council is based upon my interest in Workforce Development. . . My role as chairman is not

Table I. Descriptive Statistics.

All High appointed Low appointed

Demographics Female

White

Average age

Average education level Married

Have children below 18

Current position

Average years in position

Health department

Commerce department

Environment/Natural Resources department

Political history Democrat

Republican

Recruited for public office Ran for elected office

Held prior appointment

40.27%

90.09%

55.25

Some graduate school 83.81%

19.64%

7.61

43.40%

28.07%

28.43%

35.50%

21.77%

52.04%

18.63%

29.96%

40.00%

90.91%

52.41

Some graduate school 87.27%

32.12%

8.39

32.73%

33.33%

33.94%

36.48%

21.38%

55.15%

13.94%

37.80%

40.31%

89.95%

55.74

Some graduate school 83.21%

23.55%

7.47

45.23%

27.28%

27.49%

35.34%

21.84%

51.50%

19.44%

28.62%

n 1,125 164 961

Table 2. Self-Assessed Qualifications for Higher Office.

All

Not at all qualified 9.29% Somewhat qualified 25.96% Qualified 31.88%

Very qualified 32.88%

n 1,098

High appointed Low appointed

2.45%**

12.88%**

22.70%**

61.96%**

10.48%

28.24%

33.48%

27.81%

163 935

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Sidorsky 809

Table 3. Self-Assessed Qualifications for Higher Office by Sex.

Male Female

Not at all qualified 6.44%** 13.45% Somewhat qualified 19.63%** 35.20% Qualified 35.74%** 26.23%

Very qualified 38.19%** 25.11%

n 652 446

Chi-square tests are used for difference in means. fp < . 10. < .05. **p <.01.

Hot *! All Qualified Somewhat Qualified Qualified

Qualification SelfAiWiilMRl

Very Qualified

• High-Appointed Men • High-Appointed Women

- Low - Appointed Me» * Low - Appointed Women

Table 3. Self-Assessed Qualifications for Higher Office by Sex.

Male Female

Not at all qualified 6.44%** 13.45% Somewhat qualified 19.63%** 35.20% Qualified 35.74%** 26.23%

Very qualified 38.19%** 25.11%

n 652 446

Not at All Qualified Somewhat Qualified Qualified Very Qualified

Qualification StlfAtMismenl

■ High-Appointed Men ■ High-Appointed Women

> Low - Appointed Men * Low - Appointed Women

Figure I. Appointee qualification self-assessment by level and sex.

monetarily compensated and part-time. It is more a labor of love. I have no political ambitions, but am seeking to provide better work opportunities in North Dakota for our young people.

A female appointee on a Louisiana commission said something similar:

I first began in politics when I was 7 and [my] father ran for office; [I] have one MS in campaign management and another in public administration. I love politics and loved running campaigns—but never wanted to run for office. At present [I]

work for an organization and [my] work encompasses policy and lobbying. My appointments are in areas where I have the greatest interest—workforce, education and healthcare. [I] have worked at all levels—city, state and as a Congressional staffer—and loved every position.

For others, their position is purely due to their specific qual

ifications as related to their job or education. A female

board member from Oregon expressed a recurring theme among the appointees at the board and commission level, "The motivation to serve on a board in my state is directly related to my career. I am not at all interested in politics." Still others expressed an active interest in pursuing higher office and even elected office, but age, self-doubts, and lack of support from family members interfere. A female com mission member in Massachusetts stated the following:

I am a perfect example of someone who never considered running for office even though I am passionate, articulate and have leadership skills. I advocated to be appointed to [my] commission for over a year. When I finally was appointed I was terrified to participate at that level of our government having no former experience. I have thrived there and have been one of the leaders despite the fact that I am out experienced by almost everyone there. I also am from Western MA, which is a huge obstacle to real political engagement. Despite that, I have been a key leader on the committee and my leadership has grown. I am not clear what

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810 Political Research Quarterly 68(4)

Table 4. Current Interest in Higher Office by Sex.

Men Women

Not interested at all 61.56%' 67.18%

Somewhat interested 33.95% 29.27%

Very interested 4.50% 3.55%

n 666 451

Chi-square tests are used for difference in means. Fisher's exact test

is used when observations were less than or equal to 5. fp < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

my own next steps might be at the state-level and I'm interested in pursuing more opportunities.5

To reiterate, appointees overall feel they are qualified to

attain higher public office, although differences exist between high and low appointees, with low female appointees least confident in their qualifications for pub lic office. The most notable split is between male and female appointees and their self-assessed qualifications, and there is also a gender gap in the interest in higher office, with females slightly less interested in considering higher office at all.

Models and Results

To present a more systematic analysis of the gender dynamics for progressive ambition at the state appointed office level, I constructed several quantitative models. In

the first model, I use interest in higher office as a dichoto

mous dependent variable where 1 denotes very interested or somewhat interested in higher office and 0 indicates no

interest in higher office.

I use a series of controls that are hypothesized to influ ence progressive ambition. They include the following: (1) demographic measures (such as education level and family income); (2) family dynamics, including responsi bility over household tasks; (3) political dynamics, such as recruitment; (4) personal political characteristics, including current position value; and (5) state-specific variables, such as state culture, state political opportunity

structure, and local political opportunity structure. Both

the local and the state political opportunity structure vari ables measure the number of offices available at each

level, or the opportunity to hold public office at either the

state or local level. All variable descriptive statistics and explanations for coding are available in the online appen dix. Predicting interest in higher office was completed using robust logistic regression. The "Impact" column in Table 6 represents the change in probability for the vari

ables that were statistically significant using Clarify. Table 5 presents the results for the ambitions for interest

in higher office. The results are reported in terms of

changes in predicted probability (Table 6) as well as ref erence coefficients (Table 5).6

The variables of main interest here are the sex, level of

office, and qualifications for higher office as well as their

interactions. As stated above, I expect sex (Hypothesis 1) and self-assessed qualifications to be significant predic tors of progressive ambition. In particular, gendered per

ceptions should be present in the analysis of progressive ambition (Hypothesis 3) and those gendered perceptions should be conditioned by the individual's level of office (Hypothesis 4).7

Results

There are three major patterns in the baseline model (model 1). First, all of the family dynamics variables are

significant when predicting interest in higher office. Second, sex is a statistically significant predictor of pro gressive ambition (confirming Hypothesis 1 that female appointees will be less progressively ambitious). And finally, self-assessed qualifications are significant predic tors of progressive ambition for appointed officials and supporting earlier research that with higher self-assessed

qualifications comes more interest in seeking public office.

Focusing on the baseline model first and the two vari

ables of main interest, self-assessed qualifications and sex, we can see that both qualifications and sex are sig nificant. An appointee who assesses herself as very quali fied for higher office is more than 19 percent more likely

to be interested in higher office than an appointee who assesses herself as not at all qualified for higher office. Female appointees are about 9 percent less likely than male appointees to exhibit interest in higher office.

Indicators of family dynamics, such as being married, are a significant negative predictor of progressive ambi tion. Having a parent suggest that, someday, the respon dent could run for office increased interest in higher office by almost 13 percent. Here we also see the effects of having children above eighteen: appointees with chil dren above the age of eighteen were 8 percent more likely

to be interested in higher office than those with no chil

dren or children below eighteen. With one notable excep

tion (state political opportunity structure), all of the state-specific variables were insignificant.

The Role of Office Level, Sex, and

Self-Assessed Qualifications for Appointees

The results in model 1 show the continued effects of self

assessed qualifications on progressive ambition as it relates to an interest in seeking higher public office. The

results also show the negative effects of sex on political

appointee progressive ambition. Models 2 to 5 test the

Table 4. Current Interest in Higher Office by Sex.

Men Women

Not interested at all 61.56%' 67.18%

Somewhat interested 33.95% 29.27%

Very interested 4.50% 3.55%

n 666 451

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Sidorsky

Table 5. Logistic Regression Interest in Higher Office for Political Appointees.

Model Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Demographics Sex: I = female

Age

Family dynamics

Married/long-term relationship

Majority household responsibilities

Children above eighteen

Parental suggestion

Personal encouragement

Political dynamics

Recruited since position

Political participation

Personal political characteristics

Qualifications

Low appointee

Had sponsor or mentor

Sought appointment prior to position

Difficulty of attaining position

State-specific variables

State political opportunity structure

Local political opportunity structure Interactions

Sex x Children Below Eighteen Qualifications * Sex Low Level x Sex

Low Level x Qualifications

Sex x Qualifications * Low Level Constant

-0.568* (0.227) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.641* (0.293) 0.276+ (0.151) 0.496* (0.215) 0.205+ (0.113)

0.806** (0.190)

0.366+(0.196) l.324**(0.38l)

0.400** (0.109)

0.374 (0.252) 0.074(0.219)

0.504* (0.207) 0.812** (0.271)

0.005+ (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

-0.952** (0.313) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.644* (0.293) 0.273+(0.150) 0.238 (0.256) 0.199+(0.112)

0.813** (0.191)

0.371+(0.197) 1.311** (0.384)

0.397** (0.109) 0.366 (0.252) 0.076 (0.218)

0.513* (0.207) 0.832** (0.276)

0.005+ (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

0.642+ (0.361)

-0.449 (0.600) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.645* (0.295) 0.271+(0.150) 0.230 (0.258)

0.196+ (0.112) 0.814** (0.191)

0.377+(0.197) 1.311** (0.384)

0.474** (0.144)

0.355 (0.253) 0.070(0.219)

0.509* (0.208) 0.838** (0.256)

0.005+ (0.003)

-0.0003 (0.0002)

0.657+ (0.359) -0.173 (0.184)

2.211+(1.243) 2.398+(1.260) 2.235+(1.265)

-0.566 (0.823) -0.088** (0.011)

-0.615* (0.295) 0.265+ (0.150) 0.214(0.259)

0.188+ (0.113) 0.832** (0.191)

0.376+ (0.197)

1.295** (0.386)

0.508** (0.147)

0.657* (0.297) 0.036 (0.220)

0.526* (0.209) 0.829** (0.278)

0.004+ (0.003)

-0.0003 (0.0002)

0.729* (0.361) -0.279(0.193)

-0.884+ (0.490)

2.056(1.269)

2.905 (1.999) -0.088** (0.011)

-0.622* (0.295) 0.251+(0.151) 0.218(0.261) 0.193+(0.113)

0.833** (0.191)

0.364+ (0.196) 1.309** (0.385)

0.635 (0.452)

1.133 (1.687) 0.033 (0.220)

0.522* (0.209) 0.828** (0.280)

0.004 (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

0.725* (0.362) -0.939+ (0.558) -3.473+ (2.091) -0.135 (0.462) 0.755 (0.594)

1.598 (1.953)

n

Pseudo-R2

865

.2181

865

.2209

865

.2216

865

.2243

865

.2261

Standard errors are within the parentheses. The models control for race, family income, education, political efficacy, political interest, party, personal political

characteristics such as number of years in positions and position value and state-specific variables such as political culture, and state legislature political congruence. For full models, see Table 7 of Online Appendix A.

+p <. 10. *f><.05. **p<.01.

interaction between level of office, sex, and self-assessed

qualifications.8 Table 6 provides the predicted probabili ties of model 5 using Clarify.

Each model builds upon the baseline model by adding an interaction term. Model 2 includes the interaction of

sex and having children above eighteen to test the long held theory that women will become more ambitious after

their children have left the home: being a mother to chil dren above the age of eighteen does have a positive effect on progressive political ambition for appointees at the state level. A female appointee who has children above eighteen is almost 14 percent more likely to exhibit an interest in higher office than a woman who does not have

adult children, as well as politically appointed men.

Models 3 to 5 tease out the relationship between sex, self-assessed qualifications, and level of office. Low female

appointees are more than 15 percent less likely to have pro

gressive ambition (p < .10). Both the interactions of sex

and level of office, and sex and qualifications are signifi

cant at the/? <. 10 level. However, the direction of the inter

action of sex and qualifications goes in the opposite direction from what was hypothesized in Hypothesis 3, which argued that appointed women would become more

progressively ambitious as they have higher self-perceived qualifications for higher office.

The table also shows the null results of Hypothesis 4, which argued that gendered perceptions are conditioned by the level of office a female holds. The triple interac tion of .vex, self-assessed qualifications, and level of office

fails to attain standard levels of statistical significance. This suggests that gendered perceptions do exist at the lower appointee levels, because the interaction between sex and self-qualifications is significant. However, these gendered perceptions are not related to the individual holding low-level appointed office because neither the interaction between qualifications and level of office, nor

Table 5. Logistic Regression Interest in Higher Office for Political Appointees.

Demographics Sex: I = female

Age

Family dynamics

Married/long-term relationship

Majority household responsibilities

Children above eighteen

Parental suggestion

Personal encouragement

Political dynamics

Recruited since position

Political participation

Personal political characteristics

Qualifications

Low appointee

Had sponsor or mentor

Sought appointment prior to position

Difficulty of attaining position

State-specific variables

State political opportunity structure

Local political opportunity structure Interactions

Sex x Children Below Eighteen Qualifications * Sex Low Level x Sex

Low Level x Qualifications

Sex x Qualifications * Low Level Constant

n

Pseudo-R2

Model I

-0.568* (0.227) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.641* (0.293) 0.276+ (0.151) 0.496* (0.215) 0.205+ (0.113)

0.806** (0.190)

0.366+ (0.196)

l.324**(0.38l)

0.400** (0.109) 0.374 (0.252) 0.074(0.219)

0.504* (0.207) 0.812** (0.271)

0.005+ (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

2.211+ (1.243)

865

.2181

Model 2

-0.952** (0.313) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.644* (0.293) 0.273+ (0.150)

0.238 (0.256) 0.199+(0.112)

0.813** (0.191)

0.371+ (0.197) 1.311** (0.384)

0.397** (0.109) 0.366 (0.252) 0.076 (0.218)

0.513* (0.207) 0.832** (0.276)

0.005+ (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

0.642+ (0.361)

2.398+(1.260)

865

.2209

Model 3

-0.449 (0.600) -0.087** (0.011)

-0.645* (0.295) 0.271+(0.150) 0.230 (0.258)

0.196+ (0.112) 0.814** (0.191)

0.377+(0.197) 1.311** (0.384)

0.474** (0.144)

0.355 (0.253) 0.070(0.219)

0.509* (0.208) 0.838** (0.256)

0.005+ (0.003)

-0.0003 (0.0002)

0.657+ (0.359) -0.173 (0.184)

2.235+(1.265)

865

.2216

Model 4

-0.566 (0.823) -0.088** (0.011)

-0.615* (0.295) 0.265+ (0.150) 0.214(0.259)

0.188+ (0.113) 0.832** (0.191)

0.376+ (0.197)

1.295** (0.386)

0.508** (0.147)

0.657* (0.297) 0.036 (0.220)

0.526* (0.209) 0.829** (0.278)

0.004+ (0.003)

-0.0003 (0.0002)

0.729* (0.361) -0.279(0.193)

-0.884+ (0.490)

2.056(1.269)

865

.2243

Model 5

2.905 (1.999) -0.088** (0.011)

-0.622* (0.295) 0.251+(0.151) 0.218(0.261) 0.193+(0.113)

0.833** (0.191)

0.364+ (0.196) 1.309** (0.385)

0.635 (0.452)

1.133 (1.687) 0.033 (0.220)

0.522* (0.209) 0.828** (0.280)

0.004 (0.003) -0.0003 (0.0002)

0.725* (0.362) -0.939+ (0.558) -3.473+ (2.091) -0.135 (0.462) 0.755 (0.594)

1.598 (1.953)

865

.2261

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812 Political Research Quarterly 68(4)

Table 6. Impact of Key Variables ori Progressive Ambition for Political Appointees.

Variable Impact

Family income -8.89%** Age -26.86%** Married or long-term relationship -11.36%* Majority household responsibilities +7.93%* Parental suggestion +10.10%t Personal encouragement +15.44%** Recruited since position +5.97%* Political participation +17.47%** Sought prior appointment +9.18%* Difficulty of attaining position +15.47%** Sex x Children Above Eighteen +13.58%* Sex x Qualifications -15.55%t Sex x Low Level -15.53%*

Predicted probability of Sex x Qualifications represents going from a female who rates herself with low qualifications for higher office to a woman who rates herself with high qualifications. +p < . 10. *p < .05. **p<.0l.

the triple interaction of level of office, sex and self qualifications was significant. Most interesting are the results for the interaction

between sex and self-assessed qualifications: they go in the opposite direction that was hypothesized. Past gen dered perception studies have found that women tend to

have lower perceptions of their own abilities, which neg

atively affect their ambition; therefore, the higher percep

tion a female has of her qualifications, the more ambitious

she will become (Fox and Lawless 2011 ; Lawless and Fox 2005). Here, the coefficient of the interaction sex and

self-assessed qualifications is negative, meaning that as women rate their own qualifications higher, they become less progressively ambitious. A female appointee who assesses herself as very qualified for higher office is more

than 15 percent less likely to be progressively ambitious than a female appointee who assesses herself as not quali fied at all for higher office. In this sense, having a higher

perception of one's qualifications is not an asset to pro gressive ambition, but a detriment, at least in the appoint

ment world. Why might this be the case?

Discussion and Conclusion

The analysis of the State Political Pathways Survey demonstrates that what explains the progressive ambi tion of appointed officials does not fully explain the pro

gressive ambitions of elected officials. In prior studies of nascent ambition, gendered perceptions were a major factor for women considering elected office (Lawless and Fox 2005). I have argued here that gendered percep tions persist in the calculations of progressive ambition

for appointed women at the state level; higher self assessed qualifications would increase a female's inter est in higher office, although her level of office would condition this. I did find that female appointees are less progressively ambitious than male appointees, and that this is affected by how a woman perceives her own qual ifications. This relationship is not affected by an appoin tee's level of office. However, the direction of this effect

was unexpected; women with higher self-assessed qual ifications are less ambitious than men and women with

lower self-assessed qualifications, deviating from previ ous studies in this area (Bledsoe and Herring 1990; Fox and Lawless 2011).

Why might a female appointee who sees herself as qualified for higher office be less interested in higher office than a woman who assesses her qualifications lower? Part of the reason may be due to the fact that these

women are appointed, and not elected. In American poli tics, we tend to think that the most powerful positions in

our government are elected and not appointed, which may affect the ambitions for each kind of office. But the

answer may be in the words of the appointees themselves.

Appointees insisted that their positions are not political because they are only appointed due to their profession or

expertise. In fact, many appointees, both high and low, argued their positions were not political, even though the state government appointed them, their board is funded

by state governments, and they enact state policies and regulations. The disavowal of politics is an area that has been studied quite extensively (Baiocchi, Bennett, Cordner, Klein and Savell 2014; Bellah et al. 2008; Craig 1993; Macedo 2005; Pharr and Putnam 2000) and is likely part of the reason why appointees are hesitant to

say they are in politics, and why female appointees with high self-qualification scores would be less ambitious for public office. The problem is not that these women do not

see themselves as experts in their fields or as unqualified for higher positions, but that this expertise can be put to

better use outside of the political arena. The female appointees in the sample are a highly moti

vated and successful group of women, holding positions where they can make a real difference. These women have

both a proven track record of success in their own lives,

and a glimpse into the world of state politics through their

appointments. This puts them in a unique position of hav

ing personal experience in state-level politics dedicating their time and energy to an issue they care about without

committing to a more high-profile, demanding political position. In this sense, these women have a front row seat

to the politics of state government and recognize that while they may be qualified to do the job as a more "politi

cal" public official, they are still opting out and in fact may feel they have never opted into a political position in

the first place. These results suggest that we cannot assume

Table 6. Impact of Key Variables ori Progressive Ambition for Political Appointees.

Variable Impact

Family income -8.89%** Age -26.86%** Married or long-term relationship -11.36%* Majority household responsibilities +7.93%* Parental suggestion +10.10%* Personal encouragement +15.44%** Recruited since position +5.97%* Political participation +17.47%** Sought prior appointment +9.18%* Difficulty of attaining position +15.47%** Sex x Children Above Eighteen +13.58%* Sex x Qualifications -15.55%* Sex x Low Level -15.53%*

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Sidorsky 813

that women with high-qualification self-assessments will

automatically be interested in higher public office, or that

politics is even something a woman would want to aspire to. They also suggest that we cannot assume that women

should be politically ambitious, and that women in politi

cal positions, such as appointments, will perceive their appointment as political at all. Future scholarship should examine why these women are not interested in higher office and at what point they

consider their positions as political and why. Is it truly a

disavowal of politics, or is it some other factor such as financial concerns, family obligations, or an ambition for

something other than public office? It may even be that these women are satisfied with the impact they are having

with their appointments, and do not feel they need to move higher up. What we do know for certain is that future studies on women and politics should consider including appointees as part of their analysis, as many women contribute to politics through appointed posi tions, yet behave differently than similarly situated women in elected positions. Future studies should also include individuals appointed to boards, as it may be an area where women feel they can make a difference in a policy area without committing to the responsibilities of

a higher or more political public office. If we really want to understand representation of women in government,

expanding beyond electoral national and state offices will

go a long way to revealing the true status of women in public office in the United States.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Wendy Schiller, Susan Mofïitt, Aaron Weinstein, Matthew Hodgetts, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. For the few studies that have researched state boards

and commissions in any capacity, see Mitchell (1997), Weingart (2004), and Schneider (1986,1987).

2. Full model specifications and a copy of the survey ques tionnaire can be found in the online appendix.

3. I used an email survey instead of a phone or mail survey for a couple of reasons. First, accessibility of informa tion was the major challenge of this project. Where con tact information was provided, it was usually in the form of an email address or a telephone number. Because the

goal of this study was to reach as many individuals as pos sible, it was not feasible to call each person to try to con

duct a phone interview. Second, although mail surveys can

achieve higher response rates, finding physical addresses to send the surveys was not possible and was costly. The implications of only using email to conduct the survey may

mean that older citizens who participate on a board or com

mission could be less likely to be contacted or to answer the survey at all. A good portion of the email addresses for these individuals were not on the board and commission

websites themselves (i.e., they were on professional associ ation, educational institution, or business websites), which

means I was able to get the email addresses of those who provided them on the state-provided website and those who

either could not provide them on the website or wished not

to, further helping to diversify the individuals in the sample.

4. Qualtrics is an Internet-based survey software that I used through Brown University. It is where the survey is devel

oped, disseminated, and data are collected from the survey

responses.

5. A total of 205 appointees left comments in open-ended sec tions. More than 35 percent (73) regarded why they served

and their political ambitions—15 appointees reported they

served because of a passion in an area, with no political aspi

rations; 43 reported they served due to their profession or

expertise; and 15 responded they were interested in politics

and had or were interested in pursuing more political roles.

6. Dichotomous variables were set to most frequent response, and continuous variables set to their means. When predict

ing the change in probability for categorical variables, I went from the lowest level (i.e., setting self-assessed quali

fications to not at all qualified) to their highest level (very

qualified). For continuous variables, I went 1 SD above and below the mean.

7. I expect a few to be significant predictors of progressive ambition: recruitment may also be important for progres

sive ambition among political appointees and, similarly, the family socialization variables of parental suggestion and personal encouragement may have a positive effect on

progressive ambition.

8. The analysis was also conducted using high female appoin tees as the group of interest. High female appointees are not

statistically different from high male appointees when it comes to self-assessment of qualifications. The interactions

between sex and qualifications, and between sex, qualifica

tions, and high appointee were not statistically significant,

but the interaction between sex and high appointee was that

high female appointees exhibit more progressive ambition

than high male appointees or low appointees.

Supplemental Material

Replication data and the online appendix for this article are stored at http://prq.sagepub.com/supplemental/.

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