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Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory, 2016, 113–127 doi:10.1093/jopart/muu032

Article Advance Access publication August 18, 2014

Article

The Administrative Organization of Sustainability Within Local Government Rachel M. Krause,* Richard C. Feiock, Christopher V. Hawkins

*University of Kansas, Florida State University, University of Central Florida

Address correspondence to the author at [email protected].

Abstract

Administrative structure can shape bureaucratic process, performance, and responsiveness and is a particularly important consideration when new bureaucratic functions and programs are being established. However, the factors that influence the assignment of these functions to specific gov- ernment agencies or departments are understudied, particularly at the local level. The absence of empirical evidence regarding bureaucratic assignment in local government limits understanding of institutional design and the organizational choices available, particularly as they relate to spe- cific policy areas. As an initial step in developing a theory of agency assignment at the local level, we examine the placement of sustainability programs in 401 US cities and assess explanations for assignment based on policy scope, interest group support, governmental capacity, policy charac- teristics, and institutional structures that shape the incentives of local decision makers. Although it is not a traditional function of local government, sustainability is becoming an increasingly com- mon objective. Because of its newness and cross-cutting nature, local policy makers have an array of institutional units to which they can assign the primary responsibility for sustainability. We focus on two dimensions of assignment of bureaucratic responsibility: whether the locus of responsibil- ity lies within the executive or a line department and whether there is a specialized unit within the city government that is explicitly responsible for sustainability. The scope and maturity of cities’ sustainability policies and the structure of local representation (i.e., whether council representa- tives are elected by district, at-large, or via a mixed system) have the greatest influence on shaping administrative placement. The latter suggests potential distributive outcomes from local sustain- ability efforts.

Introduction

The positioning of a program within the bureaucratic structure of government—whether as an independent unit or a subpart of another or whether as a component of the executive or legislative branch—can meaningfully affect its priorities, the amount of resources and author- ity it has available, and the types of interests that have access to it. The creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offers a well-known illustration of how these considerations can influence the development of administrative structure. The EPA was established as

an independent agency in the executive branch of the federal government—rather than as a program within an existing department, such as the Department of Interior—in part so that its mission of environmen- tal protection would not be influenced by competing organizational responsibilities (Percival 1991). In his statement announcing its creation, President Nixon acknowledged that each existing department “has its own primary mission – such as resource development, transportation, health, defense, urban growth or agri- culture – which necessarily affects its own views of envi- ronmental questions” and therefore reasoned that an

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independent agency was needed to ensure objectiveness and impartiality in the pursuit of strong environmental protection (quoted in Percival 1991, 132).

Administrative structures can shape bureau- cratic process, performance, and responsiveness and is a particularly important consideration when new bureaucratic functions and programs are being established. However, the factors that influence the assignment of these functions to specific agencies or departments of government are understudied. When they have been examined, the focus has often been on legislative delegation or the degree to which deci- sion-making authority is centralized or delegated among agencies at the state and national levels of government. To date, there has not been any system- atic examination of similar issues at the local level. This absence of empirical evidence regarding agency assignment in local government limits understanding of local institutional design and the organizational choices available, particularly as they relate to spe- cific policy areas.

We examine these issues in the context of urban sustainability. Sustainability is not a traditional func- tion of local government but is one that many have recently been embracing (Mazmanian and Kraft 2010). Because of its newness and cross-cutting nature, local policy makers have an array of institutional units to which they can assign the primary responsibility for sustainability. In some locales, this function is located in the mayor or managers’ office, and in others, it is placed in a line department. Some cities have created a specialized office or division to manage sustainabil- ity, whereas others have simply added it to an exist- ing unit’s list of responsibilities. No single unit type or location has emerged as either the dominant or most effective administrative headquarters for the implemen- tation of sustainability functions in local government (Portney 2013).

In this study, we seek to address these gaps in the literature by examining the administrative placement of responsibility for sustainability in US cities that have active sustainability efforts. We specifically address two questions: What are the patterns of administrative and organizational structures for managing sustainability activities in local governments? What factors explain these patterns?

Prior to discussing the research strategy developed to answer these questions, we provide a brief review of the literature on local sustainability. We then describe the theoretical approach of this study and our hypoth- eses related to the agency assignment of sustainability efforts. This is followed by a discussion of our unique data set comprised of over 400 US cities and the results of a multivariate analysis. We conclude with a discus- sion of our findings and avenues for future research on

the administration and management of urban sustain- ability initiatives.

Sustainability From a Local Perspective

Sustainability bridges human needs with ecological well-being and is generally accepted as comprising environmental, economic, and social components. These three pillars have been used extensively to frame research on local sustainability in a variety of disci- plines, rincluding public administration and policy (Bulkeley 2013; Feiock and Coutts 2013; Fiorino 2010). Much of the extant research is devoted to exam- ining sustainable development, which according to the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987) should “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” To advance the implementation of sustainability practices, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development adopted Agenda 21 in 1992 as a blueprint for environmentally sustainable growth. It encourages participating UN member states to consider the environmental impacts of their land, resources, and transportation development policies.

Cities are critical to improving sustainability. Of the 2,509 actions identified in Agenda 21 for achiev- ing greater sustainability, approximately two-thirds require the active involvement of local government (Keen, Mahanty, and Sauvage 2006). By 2030, urban areas are expected to be home to two-thirds of the global population (United Nations 2006). In the United States, approximately 84% of the population lives in urban areas where cities have broad authority over land use, environmental conservation, economic development, transportation, and energy use, all which have direct impact on sustainability (Portney 2013; U.S. Census Bureau 2011).

The scholarly work on local sustainability is now quite diverse. The literature includes reviews of sustain- ability ideals and principles (Fiorino 2010; Mazmanian and Kraft 2010; Pezzoli 1997; Wheeler 1998), exam- ples of local programmatic initiatives that promote sustainability (Portney 2013; Yanarella 1999), descrip- tive and explanatory studies of the types of policies cities have adopted (Francis and Feiock 2011; Jepson 2004; Portney 2013; Svara, Read, and Moulder 2011), the identification of mechanisms used to encour- age participation by stakeholders in decision making (Hawkins and Wang 2012), explanations for why cit- ies commit human and financial resources and become affiliated with institutions that promote sustainability (Feiock et  al. 2013; Krause 2011; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011), and descriptions of the content of local sustainability plans (Berke and Conroy 2000; Conroy and Beatley 2007; Conroy and Berke 2004).

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In light of this existing research base, studies on sustainability, it is argued, should be more focused on implementation and management (Conroy and Beatley 2007; Laws et al. 2004). Wang et al. (2012), for example, suggest research on sustainability needs to shift from the specifics of sustainability practices (what is sustainabil- ity?) and motives (why sustainability?) to strategies for implementing change. They argue more study is needed to better understand the conditions for the efficient and effective administration of local initiatives. Few studies, however, have focused on explaining the local admin- istration and management of sustainability efforts in general and, more specifically, the organization of sus- tainability efforts in terms of the city departments and agencies responsible for policies, programs, and activi- ties. As a result, we know very little about the way sus- tainability efforts are (or should be) organized in cities (Feiock et al. 2014; Portney 2013), particularly whether local governments have established the administrative arrangements and institutional changes necessary to facilitate the success of sustainability efforts.

These questions are especially important in the administration and management of sustainability efforts, which depending on the local context may emphasize the interrelationships among a relatively large number of variables. For example, water qual- ity monitoring in an environmental division, infra- structure provision in a public works department, and land-use projects promoted by an economic development office all directly influence sustainability. However, these units may not communicate regularly or share a single vision. Moreover, cities with numer- ous specialized departments or agencies may employ “different types of professionals, each trying to define the task of the agency in terms of their own external reference points” (Tompkins 2005, 22). Thus, because the fragmentation of policy making and implementa- tion within city government makes coordinating sus- tainability efforts particularly difficult, coordinating mechanisms, including administrative structures, may be required to effectively integrate the diverse goals of city departments (Keen, Mahanty, and Sauvage 2006). Creating a specific administrative department or office charged with leading sustainability efforts is one strat- egy to handle coordination challenges and may indi- cate strong local support. Portney (2013, 215) suggests that one of the primary benefits of having a specific administrator or office responsible for sustainability is “found in the expectation that it reflects a high priority for the city’s chief administrator . . . While this may not ensure compliance by other functional departments, at least theoretically, compliance seems more likely when sustainability is perceived as a high priority for the upper management of the city.” We discuss the implica- tions of these decisions in the following section.

Implications of Organizational Structure

At the center of decisions about administrative struc- ture is the fundamental tension about how govern- ments should intertwine and balance professional policy knowledge with democratic decision making (Bourdeaux 2008; Shulock 1999). Over-arching institu- tional structure, and the specific placement of an issue’s administration within it, can translate into meaningful differences in responsiveness and technical objective- ness. The role of interest groups in the policy making process is especially salient in debates over administra- tive structures, particularly with regard to sustainabil- ity initiatives. For example, local pro-growth interests, such as builders and developers, are often portrayed in the literature as preferring less local government intervention, particularly if the land-use policies that redefine property rights or resource allocations have negative consequences for their private interests (Alston, Eggersston, and North 1996; Liebecap 1989; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez de la Cruz 2005, 2009). In comparison, slow-growth interests, composed of envi- ronmental organizations, may push for more policy at the local level to conserve land from development and pressure local elected officials to pursue policy related to the broad goals of sustainability. In both cases, inter- est groups actively seek to shape the agendas of policy makers and influence the decision-making process so that it aligns with their particular position.

Within this context, much of the research on the structural design of local government emphasizes a political institutions perspective. This literature makes a distinction between cities with an elected mayor and an appointed city manager. Under the more politicized character of the former type of governing institution, policy outcomes are more likely to reflect the pressures of interest groups and mass political appeal (Sharp 2002). Under a manager-council government, the ori- entation toward efficiency and economic development translates into outcomes that are more insulated from interest group pressures (Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013; Stein 1991).

Early studies reported that municipal fiscal policy is unrelated to differences in form of government (Deno and Mehay 1987; Hayes and Chang 1990; Liebert 1974; Morgan and Pelissero 1980), but research over the last 10 years estimating more sophisticated models and examining specific policy choices rather than budg- ets reports clear and consistent impacts from local gov- ernment structure (Carr 2013). Differences in form of municipal government has been found to significantly influence fiscal outcomes (Craw 2008; Karuppusamy and Carr 2012), service contracting (Feiock and Jang 2009; Hefetz and Warner 2004; Levin and Tadelis 2010), economic development (Feiock and Kim 2000; Hawkins 2010; Kwon, Berry, and Feiock 2009), and

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growth management and sustainability policy (Bae and Feiock 2013; Krause 2013; Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez de la Cruz 2009; Ramirez de la Cruz 2009; Sharp, Daley, and Lynch 2011).

One theoretical perspective that connects agency assignment and administrative structures with the pres- sures placed on local officials by various interest groups is the “politics of structural design” thesis described by Krause and Douglas (2005). The structural design thesis predicts that agencies that are highly buffered from political influence produce more accurate and less biased policy information than agencies that have weaker institutional autonomy. The underlying logic of their thesis is that better-insulated agencies have a greater capacity to resist political pressures placed upon them to produce policy information that is com- patible with elected officials’ goals. If policy informa- tion produced by technical experts within government is politicized and generated in response to political demands, it may be contrary to information produced through expert and independent analyses (Moe 1991). It is also argued that, when administrative responsibil- ity is insulated from political interference, there is a stronger credible commitment or “institutional guar- antee” that revenue for a particular program or policy will not be rescinded in the future (Horn 1995).

Agency Assignment: Theory and Hypotheses

Given the important implications of where policy responsibility is located in the local government bureaucracy, one might expect to find a rich empiri- cal literature in public administration addressing the issue. That expectation is quickly dashed, however, as almost no attention has been given to the assignment of functions to agencies. Comparative studies investi- gate how workplace characteristics, political structure, and form of government, as defined in city charters, influence decision making. However, the assignment of responsibilities to specific bureaucratic agencies or departments, the scope of involvement of multi- ple departments in program decisions, and the use of cross-cutting agencies to coordinate action have been neglected. Taken together, this has produced a signifi- cant gap in our understanding of local bureaucracy and administrative governance.

The limited literature to date is based on the federal government and focuses almost exclusively on Congress. This literature addresses the design of administrative agency responsibilities in the legislative appropriation process. The principal agent approach applied in much of this work yields important insight, but its focus on del- egation and agency structure addresses assignment only peripherally. At the local level, the assignment of programs to agencies is more complex because local executives can

play a more prominent role. Theory and empirical research on the assignment of functions to agencies in local gov- ernment is almost entirely absent. The one area in which assignment has been studied is economic development. Fleischmann and Green (1991) investigate whether pri- mary responsibilities for development are housed within the executive, in a separate department, as part of larger agency, or in a decentralized line department. Park and Feiock (2012) examine changes in the location of devel- opment responsibility over time. These studies were not based on a theory of assignment and their analysis was mostly exploratory. They report that larger cities and the cities with a greater number of development programs are most likely to have a specialized separate department for promoting development (Fleischmann and Green 1991) and that demographically homogenous communi- ties were more likely to locate functions in the executive (Park and Feiock 2012).

Although this study does not advance a com- plete theory of agency assignment at the local level, we begin to fill this lacuna by testing explanations based on interest group support, governmental capac- ity, policy characteristics, and institutional structures that shape the incentives of local decision makers. We focus on two dimensions of assignment of bureaucratic responsibility for sustainability: location and structure. Specifically, whether the locus of responsibility lies within the executive or a line department and whether it is structured as a specialized independent unit, added as a specialized unit to an existing department, or inte- grated into an existing department. When sustainabil- ity efforts are located within the city’s central executive office (i.e., the Office of the Mayor or City Manager), they are more subject to political control. For this rea- son, they may receive higher priority, but decisions are less insulated from political intervention. When sustainability responsibility is located in a specialized unit, it is able to take an integrative approach, but the exclusive focus on sustainability also makes it more exposed to interests mobilized on that issue.

At the national level, agency design has been linked to political incentives that shape future agency deci- sions as well as to factors that influence their expo- sure to future political interventions (Moe 1991). We argue that, at the local level, the community, policy, and institutional environments faced by local officials shape their motivations to assign functions to specific types of agencies. We also anticipate that local govern- ments’ own capacities shape their preferences for the jurisdictional assignment of sustainability. We identify four factors that can shape local government officials’ preferences among assignment choices: the scope of sustainability policy efforts, governmental capacity, community and interest group support, and political institutions.

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Scope of Sustainability Policy Efforts Local governments can play a key role in advancing sustainability by establishing administrative structures for managing decision-making processes and project implementation. A practical challenge in pursuing sus- tainability, however, lies in the multidimensional char- acteristics of the concept (Saha and Paterson 2008; Wheeler 1998; Yanarella 1999). For example, a local government may adopt policies that aim to mini- mize energy use and conserve natural resources while also encouraging development and expanding access to economic opportunity to improve quality of life. Although these actions are all oriented toward improv- ing sustainability, the commonly held assumption of trade-offs between development and environmental protection can undermine the building of a broad base of support for local actions. Moreover, although many agree that cities should pursue a “holistic” approach in decision making that impacts the use and management of resources, there remain competing claims on how best to achieve sustainability through policy tools and governance mechanisms (Feiock and Coutts 2013).

ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability, an influential national association of municipalities com- mitted to climate action, sustainability, and clean energy, defines sustainability broadly in a technocratic manner and encourages actions by local government members across multiple program areas.1 The scope of local sustainability efforts is likely to influence the placement of their administrative headquarters, but it warrants mention that administrative placement may also influence scope. We anticipate that affiliation with ICLEI may produce a preference for an encompassing specialized unit able to utilize technical knowledge to inform policy and to integrate related policy areas that create policy spillovers (Feiock 2013). A  specialized unit may also result from sustainability policy being more mature, as indicated by earlier initial member- ship with ICLEI.

Governmental Capacity City size and fiscal resources have been linked to the policy outputs of numerous specialized agencies including sustainability (Wang et al. 2012). The estab- lishment of an office focused exclusively on sustain- ability is likely to involve substantial start-up costs. For this reason, we expect that cities with greater population and fiscal resources will be more likely to choose this organizational arrangement. Although it is likely to influence structure, government capacity is

not expected to systematically influence the location of sustainability in terms of its placement within the executive or a line department.

Community and Interest Group Support The link between community policy preferences and policy choice is much studied and debated, but the relationship between community preferences and the bureaucratic organization for the delivery of those ser- vices has attracted little attention. This is regrettable since agency choice has profound policy ramifications. In the case of local government sustainability pro- grams, we expect that when levels of community sup- port are high, sustainability will be institutionalized as a specialized unit within the executive or as its own independent dedicated office or department. These choices signal a significant commitment on the part of the city (Portney 2013). Thus, where there are high lev- els of public support, these assignments are more likely. Although support may vary between different commu- nity stakeholders—including environmental, business, and neighborhood associations—the presence of an organized group in favor of sustainability is expected to increase the likelihood of executive or independent placement.

Political Institutions Creating agencies involves political transaction costs because of uncertainty regarding agency action and the potential interventions of future policymakers (De Figueiredo 2002). Specialized agencies have wide dis- cretion over policies and are relatively insulated from temporal political changes. This arrangement reduces elected leaders’ ability to claim credit for policies, but permits them to shift blame for unpopular actions to the bureaucracy, which can reduce the burden of mak- ing the hard choices needed to address wicked prob- lems (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). At the national level, Presidents generally oppose attempts to insu- late since they are held accountable for performance whether they are involved or not (Lewis 2003). In a similar way, we anticipate that mayors seek con- trol over sustainability activities, the performance of which may affect their political careers. At the local level, the more prominent role played by local execu- tives in agency assignment makes form of government particularly important. We expect mayor-council gov- ernments to be linked to a preference to locate sustain- ability functions within the executive.

When governmental authority is divided in separa- tion-of-powers systems, independent agencies are often granted more discretion, whereas executive agencies are advantaged under unified governments. The trans- fer of discretion is also asymmetric, since the executive is not anxious to devolve power in executive agencies

1 ICLEI originally stood for the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. However, that full name has been dropped and the organization is now formally known as ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability.

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under divided government (Volden 2002). At the local level, separation of powers is manifest in mayor- council government where there is an independently elected executive (Svara 1990). Separate powers also create multiple principals problems that can impede auditing of policy performance (Gailmard 2009). In a study of 278 Portuguese local governments, Tavares and Camões (2010) identify factors that led local gov- ernments to assign service delivery responsibility to either municipal corporations or bureaus. They argue that local officials trade off bureaucratic costs with the agency costs of delegation when deciding how to deliver local public services.

Legislative representation at the local level is also salient to assignment decisions. Recent work links council size to constituency representation at the local level. Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that large council size results in increased logrolling. Exchange of political favors is facilitated by combining multiple functions within agencies and structuring them to be responsive to political interventions. The structure of local representation (i.e., whether representatives are elected by district, at-large, or via a mixed system) has been found to be particularly important in explana- tions of local policy choice (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001). Council members elected at-large are more likely to have a city-wide orientation, whereas those elected by district tend to focus more on distributing benefits to their particular neighborhood or district. Although sustainability is thought of as producing broad encompassing benefits for society in general, the individual programs that make up sustainability efforts are often highly geographically based and allo- cate benefits to specific areas. In this sense, they can be treated as distributive in Lowi’s (1972) terms.

Recent evidence suggests that when sustainability is directed to the community rather than just governmen- tal operations, it is often focused on projects and pro- grams directed toward particular neighborhoods and geographically based interests (Bae and Feiock 2013). A parallel exists with economic development. Although new development benefits entire cities and regions, the economic benefits are often concentrated in spe- cific neighborhoods. A survey of city council members revealed that, in cities with district-based representa- tion, elected officials often treat development projects as pork-barrels to be distributed to electoral districts (Clingermayer and Feiock 1995). Extant research has not identified links between specific administrative structures and the implementation of functions yielding distributive and community-wide benefits, respectively. On the one hand, because of their relative visibility and autonomy, agencies with a single specialized function may be more prone to the influence of distributive poli- tics. On the other hand, a specialized agency may be

better able to assume a comprehensive and integrated perspective of its function, making it less accessible to distributive politics. This leaves questions about the likely influence that legislative structure has on sustain- ability administration open to empirical examination. The above discussion suggests five hypotheses about factors that influence the organization of responsibility for sustainability within city governments and sets the stage for the development of a more complete theory of agency assignment at the local level.

Hypothesis 1: Cities with broad and mature scopes of sustainability are more likely to have created specialized adminis- trative units for sustainability.

Hypothesis 2: City governments with greater inter- nal capacity are more likely to have specialized units for sustainability.

Hypothesis 3: City governments that receive greater support for sustainabil- ity from community stakeholder groups are more likely to place its responsibility within the executive or as an independent department or office.

Hypothesis 4: Cities with mayor-council forms of government are more likely to place responsibility for sustainability in the executive.

Hypothesis 5: The size and electoral structure of city councils influence where responsibility for sustainability is placed within the local government bureaucracy.

Hypothesis 5a: Cities with larger councils and a greater proportion of council mem- bers elected by district are more likely to have a specialized unit administering sustainability.

Hypothesis 5b: Cities with larger councils and a greater proportion of council mem- bers elected by district are more likely to have sustainability inte- grated into existing operations.

Sample and Data

This study examines factors that influence the organi- zational structure and location of sustainability activi- ties in US cities with populations greater than 50,000. As of 2005, 665 US cities exceeded this population threshold. Because not all of these cities are engaged in sustainability, we utilize filters to ensure our sample includes only cities that have undertaken sustainability efforts. Specifically, our sample includes all cities above

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this population threshold that have been members of ICLEI-Local Governments for Sustainability. ICLEI membership entails a cost in the form of an annual fee, so it is reasonable to assume that participating cities are serious about implementing sustainability efforts. Previous research also shows that, all else equal, cit- ies in ICLEI have a larger number of sustainability activities in place than do nonmember cities (Krause 2012). However, non-ICLEI cities may also be engaged in sustainability. In order to capture as many of those as possible, we apply a second filter—having city staff designated as responsible for sustainability—to all nonmember cities for which this information is avail- able. Four hundred and forty-five, approximately 65% of all US cities over 50,000, meet one or both of these filter criteria.

The locus of responsibility for sustainability within city government is assessed along two dimensions: organizational location (i.e., placement within the mayor or city manager’s office or in a nonexecutive location) and structure (i.e., integrated into existing operations, structured as a specialized unit within a larger department, or as an independent sustainability office/department). Together, this results in five distinct organizational placement options that comprise the categories of the dependent variable in the subsequent analysis. The majority of the data for the depend- ent variable was obtained from the responses to one of two independently administered surveys to local government officials. In 2010, Feiock and colleagues administered a survey to the chief administrative officer in all cities over 50,000 which asked “Has your city government established an energy or sustainability office?” A follow-up question asked which department has primary responsibility for related efforts (Feiock et al. 2014). A 2010 National League of Cities survey, also sent to cities’ chief administrative officers, asked respondents to identify the position of the city’s admin- istrative leader on sustainability issues. Together, these surveys provide data on the placement of administra- tive responsibility for sustainability for approximately 75% of the cities in this article’s sample. Data for the remaining observations came from a search of city webpages. Dependent variable data were obtained for 401 of the 445 cities meeting the filter criteria.

Data for independent variables come from a variety of archival and survey-based sources as described in table 1. As with the dependent variable, searches of city government websites were used to “fill in the blanks” and obtain data for observations missing in the pri- mary source. The first three independent variables show the (perceived) level of support that local sustain- ability efforts receive from different community stake- holder groups, namely environmental, business, and neighborhood associations. This provides insight to

whether sustainability’s organizational arrangement is influenced by organized interests. Population and own source revenue both indicate city government capacity. Larger cities often have larger governments with more employees, some of whom may be assigned specialized functions. Cities with stronger finances, operationalized here by per-capita own source revenue, may likewise have a greater ability to pursue special projects and pri- orities. The institutional structure of city governments may influence the locus of sustainability activities and is operationalized by the independent variables: form of government, size of the city council, and the percent of council members elected at-large. State governments place different amounts of emphasis on sustainability and their pressure or support may influence where and how local efforts are structured. California arguably has the most significant sustainability orientation and, with Senate Bill 375, is the only US state that directs local governments to consider climate change in trans- portation and land-use planning. Twenty-five percent of the cities in the sample are located in California and a dichotomous variable is included to capture any “California effect.” Finally, 2007 ICLEI membership is used to indicate the maturity of sustainability policy. It is possible that, after being engaged in sustainabil- ity efforts for an extended period of time, cities may adjust the placement of administrative responsibility in systematic ways as they learn about implementa- tion challenges through experience. Cities that were members of ICLEI in 2007, the earliest year for which membership data could be gathered, had been active in sustainability at least 3 years prior to the 2010 data collection about organizational structure. This indi- cates a minimum level of policy maturity.

Analysis and Results

Patterns of Management for Sustainability Activities in Local Governments An overview of the primary locus of responsibility for the administration of sustainability shows considerable variation across cities. Local governments have not coa- lesced around a single organizational approach or struc- ture to manage this issue. Figure  1 shows the primary functional location of sustainability and reveals that no single department is home to sustainability efforts in more than a third of the sample cities. On the high end, primary responsibility for sustainability has been assigned to either public works or environmental ser- vices departments in approximately 30% of the sam- ple cities and to planning or community development departments for another 25% of cities. Approximately, 15% of cities have placed sustainability in the city man- ager’s office and another 15% have created an inde- pendent office or department of sustainability that is

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not a subunit of any other department. The Mayor’s office houses sustainability efforts in just less than 10% of cities, whereas municipally owned utilities are the responsible unit in approximately 4%. Although not examined in this study, the priorities and capacities of these departments likely differ and shape the subsequent sustainability actions taken by cities.

The right column of figure  2 lays out the five dependent variable categories that result from the combination of organizational location and

structure described previously and includes the num- ber of cities characterized by each. Starting the top, the first category indicates cities that have sustaina- bility programs integrated into the executive’s exist- ing structure. This characterizes approximately 13% of the cities in the sample. Champaign, Illinois, is an example of a city that utilizes this administrative arrangement: it added sustainability to the responsi- bilities of its two economic development managers who operate as part of the city manager’s office. The

Table 1. Description and Source of Independent Variables

Variable Description Mean (SD) Source

Support from local environmental groups

An ordinal variable indicating whether city officials perceive local environmental groups as opposing, being neutral about, or supporting sustainability efforts by the city

2.75 (0.53) Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD)a

Support from local chamber of commerce/ business groups

An ordinal variable indicating whether city officials perceive the chamber of commerce and local business groups as opposing, being neutral about, or supporting sustainability efforts by the city

2.63 (0.57) Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD)a

Support from neighborhood groups

An ordinal variable indicating whether city officials perceive neighborhood groups as opposing, being neutral about, or supporting sustainability efforts by the city

2.76 (0.45) Integrated City Sustainability Database (ICSD)a

Population City’s 2010 population in 10,000s

21.97 (50.75) U.S. Census, 2010

Own source revenue The amount of revenue, per capita, that a city generates locally in $100s (i.e., amount that does not come from state or federal sources)

7.03 (5.84) U.S. Census of Governments, City Finance Series, 2007

Mayor–council form of government

A dichotomous variable indicating whether a city has a mayor council form of government

0.36 (0.48) ICMA, Form of Government Survey 2006 and 2011

City council size Number of elected individuals on city council

8.23 (5.09) ICMA survey 2006 and 2011, city web pages

At large city council The percent of city council members elected at large

54.53 (42.01) ICMA survey, city web pages

California location A dichotomous variable indicating whether a city is located in California

25.93 (0.44) U.S. Census, 2010

ICLEI member 2007 A dichotomous variable indi- cating whether a city was a ICLEI member in 2007

0.31 (0.40) ICLEI—Cities for Sustainability, USA

aSee Fieock et al. (2014) for a full description of the Integrated City Sustainability Database.

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next category of dependent variable indicates cities that have created a specialized unit for sustainability and located it in its executive. For example, the City of Eugene, Oregon, has a sustainability office housed in the larger City Manager’s office, which is respon- sible for implementing its “Sustainable Eugene” ini- tiative. This is the least frequently used arrangement, characterizing only about 12% of the cities in the sample.

Compared to those that locate responsibility for sustainability in the executive, a larger portion of cit- ies (75%) put responsibility for sustainability in a line department. Approximately 30% of cities with sustain- ability efforts have not changed their organizational structure and have added it to the responsibilities of an existing line department. In Lancaster, Pennsylvania, for example, sustainability efforts were added to the respon- sibilities of existing employees within the department

Figure 1. Distribution of the Locus of Responsibility for Sustainability Administration Across City Departments (n = 401).

Executive Office Specialized unit for sustainability n=46 (12%)

Sustainability integrated into existing structure n=52 (13%)

Sustainability integrated into a department’s existing structure n=121 (30%)

Specialized unit for sustainability added to an existing department n=125 (31%)

Independent sustainability department n=57 (14%)

Line Department

Location Structure

Figure 2. Distribution of Locus of Responsibility for Sustainability Across Dependent Variables (n = 401).

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of public works. The most common approach, used by 31% of the sample cities, is the creation of a specialized sustainability unit placed within a line department. As an illustration, the City of El Paso, Texas, has a small, three person, sustainability program located within its division of community and economic development. Finally, 14% of sample cities have created an independent sustain- ability department or office. San Francisco, California, is one such city and its comprehensive Environment Department contains divisions related to energy, trans- portation, zero waste, health, buildings, education and equity, and climate change.

Factors Influencing Locus of Sustainability Responsibility The first set of analyses considers the factors that influence the assignment of bureaucratic responsibil- ity for sustainability along the two primary dimen- sions of location and structure. Table  2 presents the results of two logistic regressions that separately focus on whether the locus of responsibility lies within the executive or a line department and whether sustain- ability is assigned to a specialized unit responsible for its advancement. The results of the first analysis show that cities located in the state of California are approximately 15% more likely to place responsibil- ity for sustainability in a line department than oth- erwise similar cities located elsewhere. None of the other independent variables, which represent support for sustainability from different community stake- holder groups, the scope of a city’s commitment to sustainability, and local government resources and institutions, significantly influence whether responsi- bility for sustainability is located in the executive. On the other hand, the likelihood that a city has created a

specialized unit to implement sustainability efforts is significantly greater in cities with larger populations but decreases as a higher percent of city council mem- bers are selected via at-large elections. The substantive impact of population is modest, with every additional 10,000 people living in a city increasing the likelihood that it has a specialized unit for sustainability by 0.4%. The substantive effect of at-large council members is greater: every additional 1% of city council members elected at-large makes it 0.2% less likely that the city will have a specialized unit for sustainability. A 10% increase in members elected at-large, for example, 1 representative out of a 10 member council, decreases the likelihood by 2%. In our sample, 76 cities have councils elected entirely by district and 173 have them elected entirely at large. All else equal, the cities that have their entire councils elected via at-large elections are 20% less likely to have specialized units for sus- tainability than those with all representatives elected by districts.

As discussed previously and illustrated in figure 2, the two overarching dimensions of location and structure are arranged to create five distinct classifications that, together, characterize the bureaucratic options for the administration of sustainability by city governments. Table  3 presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression that assesses the factors that influence the organizational arrangement of sustainability. Of the 401 cities in the sample, 125 have their sustainability efforts headquartered in a specialized unit that is located within a line department. This is more than any other single arrangement and, as such, is designated the base outcome. The results, therefore, indicate the factors that make each of the other four possible arrangements more or less likely relative to that placement.

Table 2. Logistic Estimate of the Factors Predicting the Location and Structure of Locus of Responsibility for Sustainability

Placement in the Executive (1) or a Line Department (0)

Placement in a Specialized Unit (1) or Added to an Existing Department (0)

Coefficient Marginal Effects Coefficient Marginal Effects

Support from environmental groups 0.060 (0.230) 0.011 (0.041) 0.014 (0.204) 0.003 (0.049) Support from business groups −0.219 (0.215) −0.040 (0.039) −0.078 (0.190) −0.019 (0.059) Support from neighborhood groups 0.057 (0.274) 0.010 (0.050) 0.166 (0.241) 0.040 (0.059) Population 0.005 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.016** (0.007) 0.004** (0.002) Own source revenue −0.023 (0.024) −0.004 (0.004) −0.012 (0.022) 0.002 (0.005) Mayor-council form 0.094 (0.266) 0.017 (0.049) 0.043 (0.245) 0.010 (0.059) Council size −0.022 (0.035) −0.004 (0.006) −0.004 (0.035) −0.001 (0.009) Percent seats at large 0.001 (0.003) −0.000 (0.001) −0.007** (0.003) −0.002** (0.001) California location −0.969*** (0.348) −0.154*** (0.047) 0.033 (0.279) 0.008 (0.067) ICLEI member, 2007 −0.032 (0.268) −0.006 (0.048) 0.321 (0.240) 0.077 (0.057) Constant −0.512 (1.094) — −0.056 (0.986) —

n = 398, Likelihood ratio χ2 = 13.29 (0.000). n = 399, Likelihood ratio χ2 = 29.65 (0.001). 

Standard errors in parenthesis. **p < .05; ***p < .01.

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The three independent variables representing the support shown to cities’ sustainability efforts by dif- ferent community stakeholder groups have a small and

inconsistent impact. Relative to the base outcome, greater support from the business community slightly reduces the likelihood that responsibility for sustainability is

Table 3. Multinomial Assessment of the Factors Influencing the Locus of Responsibility for Sustainability

Coefficient Marginal Effects

Specialized unit in line department (base outcome) (1) Specialized unit in executive Support from environmental groups −0.010 (0.378) 0.016 (0.036) Support from business groups −0.409 (0.306) −0.047* (0.029) Support from neighborhood groups −0.104 (0.401) −0.009 (0.038) Population 0.011* (0.006) 0.002** (0.001) PC own source revenue −0.020 (0.047) −0.003 (0.004) Mayor-council form −0.152 (0.408) −0.012 (0.038) Council size −0.003 (0.052) −0.001 (0.005) Percent council at large 0.004 (0.005) 0.000 (0.000) California location −1.070** (0.509) −0.070* (0.037) ICLEI member 2007 0.719* (0.339) 0.034 (0.039) Constant 0.143 (1.660) — (2) Independent sustainability department/office Support from environmental groups −0.619** (0.311) −0.051* (0.026) Support from business groups 0.210 (0.346) 0.024 (0.030) Support from neighborhood groups 0.371 (0.463) 0.043 (0.041) Population 0.005 (0.006) 0.001 (0.001) Per capita own source revenue 0.060* (0.031) 0.006* (0.003) Form of government −0.013 (0.401) 0.004 (0.035) Council size 0.014 (0.043) 0.001 (0.003) Percent council at large −0.002 (0.005) −0.001 (0.000) California location −1.065** (0.527) −0.063* (0.035) ICLEI member 2007 1.706*** (0.380) 0.178*** (0.045) Constant −1.811 (1.724) — (3) Responsibility added to executive—no specialized unit Support from environmental groups −0.291 (0.323) −0.017 (0.029) Support from business groups 0.083 (0.321) 0.011 (0.030) Support from neighborhood groups 0.128 (0.397) 0.018 (0.037) Population −0.024 (0.015) −0.002* (0.001) Per capita own source revenue 0.013 (0.040) 0.000 (0.000) Mayor-council form 0.211 (0.375) 0.032 (0.037) Council size −0.017 (0.063) −0.003 (0.006) Percent council at large 0.004 (0.005) 0.000 (0.000) California location −1.208** (0.513) −0.080** (0.035) ICLEI member 2007 0.280 (0.413) −0.017 (0.035) Constant −0.336 (1.603) — (4) Responsibility added to line department—no specialized unit Support from environmental groups 0.136 (0.273) 0.003 (0.050) Support from business groups 0.013 (0.234) 0.008 (0.044) Support from neighborhood groups −0.223 (0.296) −0.062 (0.055) Population −0.006 (0.008) −0.001 (0.002) Per capita source revenue 0.003 (0.034) 0.001 (0.006) Mayor-council form −0.189 (0.312) −0.042 (0.057) Council size 0.022 (0.047) 0.005 (0.009) Percent council at large 0.010** (0.004) 0.002*** (0.001) California location −0.145 (0.332) 0.075 (0.066) ICLEI member 2007 0.237 (0.316) −0.060 (0.054) Constant 0.327 (1.254) —

Standard errors in parentheses. n = 399, LR χ2 = 107.13 (0.000). *p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01.

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placed as a specialized unit in the executive (outcome 1), and greater support from environmental groups is associated with a decreased probability that it is its own independent specialized unit (outcome 2), all else equal. Cities with larger populations, all else equal, are more likely to locate responsibility for sustainability as a specialized unit in the executive (outcome 1)  than as a specialized unit in a line department. Having a larger population decreases the relative likelihood of its inte- gration into the executive without a specialized unit (outcome 3). However, although statistically significant in both cases, the size of the impact of population on sustainability placement is small. Compared to the base outcome of placing sustainability as a unit within a line department, better financial health and an early com- mitment to sustainability increase the likelihood of cit- ies having created an independent office or department for sustainability (outcome 2). For every additional $100 dollars that a city has in per capita own source revenue, it is 0.6% more likely to have an independent sustain- ability office. This again is a relatively modest impact and equates to cities with values one standard devia- tion above the mean being 3.24% more likely to have an independent sustainability unit. Cities in the state of California are modestly more likely to place responsibil- ity for sustainability as a specialized unit in an existing line department (base outcome) than in the executive or as an independent unit. Early commitment to broad sustainability, as operationalized by 2007 ICLEI mem- bership, has a larger substantive impact: Cities that had joined ICLEI by 2007 are 18% more likely to have an independent sustainability unit than otherwise similar cities that had not. Finally, having a larger percent of representatives on city council elected at-large is associ- ated with an increased likelihood that cities will incor- porate responsibility for sustainability into the existing structure of a line department (outcome 4). Compared to otherwise similar cities that use only district-based elections, cities with councils entirely elected at-large are 20% more likely to utilize this arrangement than locate sustainability in a specialized unit within the executive.

Discussion and Conclusion

The organizational locus of a program within city government is a function of political, financial, and institutional dynamics. Because sustainability is a rel- atively new area in local governance, little empirical evidence exists on how cities administratively struc- ture sustainability efforts and the factors that influence these decisions. Our analysis is intended to provide new insight on agency assignment for sustainability. We find that overall there is considerable variation in administrative arrangements, but there are also clear delineations; some cities elect to locate responsibility

for sustainability within the executive, whereas oth- ers select a line department as the locus of responsi- bility. The decision may seem on the surface to be of little significance as long as environmental, economic, and social objectives of sustainability are being met. However, there are important trade-offs in the selection of administrative arrangement that can have meaning- ful implications for bureaucratic process, performance, and responsiveness. Explaining the choice in how sus- tainability efforts are organized from an administrative perspective is an important first step in untangling the resultant implications of these decisions.

Several of our findings conform to expectation; namely, that cities with a mature commitment to sus- tainability and greater overall population and resources are more likely to have specialized sustainability units that are either independent or headquartered in the executive office. Executive placement may indicate a greater priority for the program compared to similar investments in a line department (Feiock and Coutts 2013). When placed within a line department, such as planning or public works, the expertise and orienta- tion of the larger department will likely shape the focus of sustainability efforts. Within either an executive or line placement, responsibility for sustainability can be integrated into the existing organizational structure, assigned to a specialized sustainability unit within a larger office or department, or—in the case of line placement—made into its own independent unit. The creation of specialized units for sustainability indicates greater commitment to the issue (Portney 2013; Wang et al. 2012).

The relationship that the organization of responsi- bility for sustainability has with form of government is surprising in its lack of significance. Having a mayor- council form of government was expected to increase the likelihood of placement within the executive since that placement facilitates the ability of elected leaders, particularly mayors, to claim credit for popular pro- grams and may open a program up to greater political influence (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999). Similarly, the results corresponding to community groups’ support for sustainability, par- ticularly from environmental groups, were unexpected. Cities that experience higher levels of support from environmental groups (as perceived by the local offi- cials completing the surveys) are less likely to have sus- tainability structured as a specialized independent unit than to place it inside a larger line department. Because an independent unit suggests greater commitment to the issue, it was hypothesized that community support from any stakeholder group would make the use of this administrative structure more probable. However, there is relatively little variation in the environmental support variable, with 80% of sample cities claiming

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that local environmental groups are supportive of their sustainability efforts, 16% describing them as neutral or ambivalent, and less than 5% indicating opposition. Thus, although the negative coefficient associated with this variable is unexpected, its small substantive signifi- cance suggests little practical impact.

The finding that cities with a larger percent of their council members elected via at-large elections are sig- nificantly less likely to have a specialized sustainabil- ity unit within their city governments is robust and in some respects seems counterintuitive. As described pre- viously with the development of Hypotheses 5a and 5b, different arguments can be made regarding the likely impact of council structure on sustainability place- ment, and the extant literature provides little guidance as to which dynamic is more probable. Compared to those elected by district, representatives elected at- large are often better qualified and have a greater incentive to promote issues that benefit the community as a whole (England, Pelissero, and Morgan 2012). They are seen as better able to “rise above” the special interest politics of particular districts and consider the well-being of the community in a comprehensive man- ner. On the surface, this would seem to favor issues like sustainability. However, sustainability is often implemented in a project-by-project manner, which concentrates benefits in certain areas. The addition of a public transportation line or the establishment of a green impact zone, for example, could be important to geographically based political interests. Compared to when sustainability is integrated into existing city organizations, specialized units often have greater vis- ibility and a greater need to justify themselves politi- cally. Sustainability may therefore take on a more distributive nature when developed and administered by a centralized unit. Additional empirical research is needed to support this as a possible explanation.

A major advantage of district or ward-based elec- tions is that they result in a greater representation of the variety of social groups in a city, particularly if these groups have a geographic base. This representation has traditionally been measured in terms of race and ethnic- ity in which more African Americans and Latinos are elected to city councils when elections are by district (Marschall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Welch and Bledsoe 1990). However, district-based elections may also lead to a better representation of the “environmental minor- ity interest.” Many cities have distinct areas or neighbor- hoods that have a “new urbanist” or “smart growth” character and residents who value the environment and sustainability may self-select to live in these areas. Such concentrations increase the likelihood of electing a representative whose priorities reflect those values. Supportive elected officials can be an important force behind the creation of specialized sustainability units

within city governments. Although additional research is needed to empirically establish these explanations, they suggest that the outputs of centrally managed sustainability efforts may be more consistent with the incentives of representatives elected by district.

When interpreting the results of the analysis, one should keep in mind that the cities in our sample are limited to those with acknowledged sustainability efforts. Furthermore, in many cities, particularly those without distinct sustainability units, implementation responsibilities are shared by a number of depart- ments. This analysis considers the single location with primary responsibility over the city’s efforts, that is, where sustainability is headquartered.

Although sustainability is different from many services in both its novelty and cross-cutting nature, the increasing complexity and interconnectedness of traditional municipal functions produce functional spillover effects and efforts to integrate and consoli- date (Feiock 2013). Undoubtedly agency assignment can have important consequences for local sustain- ability. The logical next step in the study of sustain- ability is examining the effect administrative structure has on success. Evaluating success of course can be considered a “black box” or a moving target at best, but there are many incremental steps future research can take toward in these efforts. For example, does one type of administrative arrangement lead to a cer- tain type of policy regime? What effect does agency assignment have on collaborative efforts—within city government as well as across the region—that some argue is essential for local sustainability efforts to have impact? Questions of agency structure and design derived from work on the congressional-bureaucratic nexus in national politics can also be explored at the city level. These and related questions are primed to be a focus in the next generation of research on local sustainability.

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