Exceptional Proff only

Commentary

Bruce A. Androphy is an ethics prac-

titioner with more than 25 years of service

who currently directs an ethics program at

an agency of the federal government.

E-mail: [email protected]

Understanding the Limited Authority of Ethics Commissions 111

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 75, Iss. 1, pp. 111–112. © 2014 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12316.

Bruce A. Androphy

For the practitioner, Jonathan Rauh’s very com-pelling article, “Predicting Political Infl uence on State Ethics Commissions: Of Course We Are Ethical—Nudge Nudge, Wink Wink,” provides perspective on and understanding of the nature of ethics commissions and their inherent limitations. It also reveals to a larger audience some uncomfortable truths that many of us in the world of government ethics already know: state ethics commissions are primary compliance organizations that come into existence after scandals to appease public sentiment. According to Rauh, their mandates “generally are not well defi ned and usually target popular notions of cor- ruption, such as quid pro quo, while failing to address more nuanced indicators of corruption, such as strong fi nancial disclosure requirements for elected offi cials.” Rauh is on point when he notes that, generally, public attention to ethics commissions quickly fades once the scandal subsides, thus reducing the commission’s mission and eff ectiveness.

Rauh also correctly identifi es the paradox that com- missions are created by the very legislatures or execu- tive branches that they are asked to oversee. Th us, there is an incentive for the legislative body to take steps to ensure that the ethics commission is not too successful or threatening to the body that created it. Rauh identifi es such steps as appointing commission- ers who have strong ties to the political establishment or are otherwise nonthreatening, providing the com- mission with limited investigative authority, and pro- viding insuffi cient funding or personnel. He depicts most ethics commissions as “a palliative for public distrust” and notes that elected offi cials are more likely to create and empower ethics commissions when they do not perceive them as a serious threat.

Rauh does not limit himself to the restraining power of legislatures on the authority of ethics commissions. Certainly, the recent example of Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York interfering with his state’s ethics authority reinforces Rauh’s argument that ethics com- missions cannot bite the hands that feed them.

Much of the article addresses the authority and proc- ess for appointing ethics commissioners, which varies from state to state in terms of which body makes appointments and which gets to confi rm. Against this background, Rauh proposes several theories on pre- dicting political infl uence on state ethics commissions. One of those is the locus of the appointment power. Rauh argues that where there is greater centralization of appointment (limited oversight of the appoint- ment), those making the appointments will have more political infl uence over their appointees. He also notes that the power to remove a commissioner may also be a “potent weapon” to keep ethics commissioners under control.

Rauh proposes several other somewhat speculative theories on measuring the eff ectiveness of ethics com- missions. For example, he uses the salary of the leg- islature compared with the average salary in the state to determine whether the legislator is incurring a cost by his or her service. Studies have shown that poorer citizens who run for offi ce have more incentive to behave honestly because they have a higher incentive to keep their positions, while wealthier legislators have the fi nancial ability to absorb the costs of any fi nes.

Another barometer for assessing the independence and eff ectiveness of an ethics commission is the prevalence of corruption convictions. Th e premise is that where there are convictions, there is a strong and independ- ent ethics commission. But Rauh correctly notes that it is diffi cult to draw such a conclusion. For example, most corruption convictions stem from federal investi- gations. In fact, the intervention of a federal author- ity may be more indicative of an ineff ective ethics commission.

Rauh looks at other variables to assess eff ectiveness. For example, he proposes considering the budget of an ethics commission against the number of indi- viduals under its jurisdiction, as well at the budget compared to the number of activities tasked to the commission. He also suggests that more professional

Understanding the Limited Authority of Ethics Commissions

112 Public Administration Review • January | February 2015

credentials for appointment to its ethics commission (former judges) and where the executive and legisla- ture have limited appointment authority.

Nonetheless, when all is said and done, the fact remains from Rauh’s initial assessment that ethics commissions have limited authority and are more often created to momentarily appease the public after scandal. Noble eff orts such as Rauh’s to predict eff ectiveness and political infl uence must confront this reality.

commissions (i.e., those with more full-time commis- sioners and larger staff s) will be more eff ective than less professional commissions. He considers socioeco- nomic factors and the correlation between wealthier and more educated states and political activity and awareness.

Rauh accepts the limitations of his model and the need for further research. However, he makes some salient points, especially with regard to appoint- ment powers and, for example, Wisconsin, which has

Public Administration Review is now introducing podcasts alongside many of its articles,

providing listeners a chance to learn more about the article and the authors.

Listen to recent podcasts at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-6210.

Copyright of Public Administration Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.