Term Project about US foreign policy regarding North Korea's nuclear program

Following North Korean missile and nuclear tests and a series of other bellig- erent actions and threats, tensions on the peninsula have entered a dangerous phase. There is a heightened potential for regional conflict and global reper- cussions if the wrong precedents are set by, for example, acquiescing to the North’s nuclear rule-breaking. Demanding to be recognised as nuclear-armed and focused on leadership succession, Pyongyang seems no longer to be using brinksmanship for negotiation leverage. In response, the United States and its Asian allies have signalled that North Korea cannot expect business as usual. Even China’s posture has begun to shift, although not nearly enough.

For the past two decades, the United States and its allies have sought to test the proposition that North Korea would be willing to trade its nuclear programme for the right economic and political concessions. In 1994 and again in 2007, North Korea did pledge to give up its weapons capabilities, although implementation of the agreements never went beyond the pre- liminary steps. Regardless of whether North Korea was ever serious about denuclearisation, Pyongyang has now staked out, in word and deed, the position that it will never let go of its nuclear arsenal. In doing so, it may well have hastened its own demise.

Answering the threat What a difference a year makes. In summer 2008, North Korea submitted a declaration of its plutonium holdings, turned over 18,000 pages from the

Stopping Nuclear North Korea

Mark Fitzpatrick

Mark Fitzpatrick is Senior Fellow for Non-proliferation at the IISS.

Survival | vol. 51 no. 4 | August–September 2009 | pp. 5–12 DOI 10.1080/00396330903168782

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operating records of its Yongbyon facilities, and destroyed the cooling tower of its reactor. Twelve months later, North Korea has newly tested its most destructive weapons, resumed plutonium reprocessing, unveiled a uranium- enrichment programme, annulled the Korean War armistice agreement, declared void all bilateral agreements with South Korea and all multilat- eral agreements from the Six-Party Talks, and threatened ‘merciless’ nuclear attacks if nations implement measures adopted by the Security Council in response to North Korea’s provocations. Given the timing of these changes, which can be traced back to autumn 2008, they are surely connected with the succession question that suddenly became more acute upon leader Kim Jong Il’s stroke last August.

Some analysts contend that the United States is to blame for having demanded excessive verification measures that went beyond the agreed staged requirements of the Six-Party Talks. This criticism downplays Washington’s September 2008 fall-back to a more reasonable verification plan, one that North Korea agreed to orally, then refused to put in writing, even though the Bush administration, at great jeopardy to its alliance rela- tionship with Japan, had followed through with removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Bush has since been replaced by a president who has promised the respect and bilateral communications Pyongyang has long sought, but the North Korean regime has shown no interest.

With the North now insisting that it no longer cares about the normali- sation of relations with the United States,1 the Obama administration has reluctantly concluded that the time for incentives is over. In case Pyongyang does not mean what it says, the door to dialogue – whether through the Six- Party Talks or some other mechanism – should remain open, but the North must no longer be begged or paid just to show up for a meeting.

Containment of the country’s nuclear and missile programmes is the immediate policy objective, to block what has been Pyongyang’s readiness to sell such technology. For instance, North Korea was the source of the plutonium-production reactor that Syria began to construct in 2001; at around the same time, Libya acquired gasified uranium through the A.Q. Khan network that financial records show came from North Korea. In October

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2007, in an agreement reached through the Six-Party Talks, Pyongyang ‘reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how’. In diplomatic parlance, this was the North’s way of saying that it never helped Syria or Libya with their fledgling nuclear-weapons programmes and never would do so again. On 14 April 2009, however, the North stated that it would no longer be bound to any agreements under the Six-Party Talks. Although North Korea has not repeated threats it had made in 2005 to transfer nuclear-weapons technology, the 2007 commitment has to be considered nullified. Iran and Myanmar are the most likely next cus- tomers, if not for nuclear technology, then for missiles, which the North has already sold in abundance to Iran and which it offered to Myanmar earlier this decade. UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which bans all North Korean arms exports, provides the basis, indeed the obligation, to inspect any suspect ships, planes or trucks for contraband.

A containment policy cannot mean acquiescing to North Korean nuclear and missile programmes that are confined to its own territory. Japan and South Korea worry that Washington may come to accept a nuclear-armed status for North Korea the way it did for India and Pakistan. Obama has reassured its Asian allies that the United States would never recognise North Korea as a nuclear power. This does not mean being blind to the reality that the hermit kingdom has nuclear weapons that work, albeit imperfectly, and rockets that rise. Nor does saying the North Korean nuclear programme is unacceptable mean that it will absolutely not be toler- ated; for the time being there is little choice but to do so, absent military intervention, which has too many downsides. What Obama’s assurances mean is that these programmes are not accepted as legitimate or lasting. Normal diplomatic relations with North Korea are impossible without its denuclearisation. How, though, to eliminate its plutonium stockpile, given North Korea’s disregard for both sanctions and importuning?

If left to fester, the problem will get worse. North Korea’s decided to test-launch a long-range rocket on 5 April, ignoring Obama’s outreach, and

These programmes

are not accepted as legitimate or

lasting

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followed this with a nuclear-weapon test a mere seven weeks later on the flimsy excuse that the country was insulted by a Security Council statement that was not even a resolution. The timing of these tests is suggestive of a weapons-development programme that is proceeding according to a pre- designed plan. The North is likely to conduct further missile and nuclear tests, each of which will move it closer to being able to combine the two systems. North Korea may already be able to produce nuclear warheads that fit its medium- and long-range rockets. Vice Admiral Lowell F. Jacoby, then head of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, testified four years ago that North Korea had the capability to mount a nuclear weapon on a bal- listic missile. The North’s success on 25 May in achieving a yield of about 4 kilotonnes (estimates ranged from 2–6kt), which is what it said it had aimed for in its October 2006 test, may mean that it is skipping the usual progres- sion of simpler, larger-yield tests in order to produce a higher-tech device designed to fit a missile warhead.2

US officials assess, however, that North Korea probably cannot yet accom- plish the much harder task of delivering a missile-propelled nuclear weapon that can withstand the tremendous heat and buffeting a warhead must endure upon atmospheric re-entry. For now, Soviet-designed bomber aircraft are probably the North’s only delivery vehicles, but they would almost surely be shot down before reaching any intended target. North Korea is more vulner- able now than it will be when it can reliably deliver a nuclear warhead.

There is thus an imperative to use all tools of persuasion to stop North Korea’s nuclear-development programme before it becomes more deadly. Denying North Korea international financial services, forbidding arms exports, and scrutinising its cargo transport in accordance with Resolution 1874 are good measures to start with. As part of Washington’s tougher new approach, the United States could also lead a global imposition of financial controls outside the UN, as it did in 2005 when it persuaded foreign banks to freeze North Korean bank assets connected with counterfeiting and other illicit activity. The freezing that year of $25 million in North Korean accounts at Macao’s Banco Delta Asia caused great consternation in the North, although the policy backfired by contributing to the conditions that led to North Korea’s first nuclear test.3

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Cutting off the country’s trade and cash flow will be a powerful tool that North Korea is likely to seize upon as an excuse for further belligerence, including a third nuclear test that is likely to be planned anyway. However strong the economic sanctions may turn out to be, they may not prove suffi- cient to change North Korean security calculations that seem to be predicated on a belief that regime survival at a time of succession uncertainty depends on asserting strength by possession of the ultimate weapon. Sanctions will work only if they convince North Korean leaders that the regime is more, not less, likely to topple under a continuation of the current nuclear policy.

The role of China Short of military action by the other members of the Six-Party Talks, China has the best chance of persuading North Korea to return to the goal of denuclearisation. China is North Korea’s only treaty ally and supplies the impoverished state with close to half of its food, three-quarters of its trade, and nearly all of its oil. This dependency, which has grown stronger as South Korea and other countries have reduced aid and trade, provides China un- rivalled leverage.

Yet China’s influence over North Korea is considerably less than these numbers would seem to suggest. North Koreans demonstrably resent their rich Communist neighbour and have repeatedly ignored its demands. China played the oil card in March 2003 and September 2006, in the after- math of North Korea’s missile test that summer, by temporarily interrupting supply, a move that was attributed officially to technical troubles. North Korea returned to multilateral negotiations, but not exactly to praiseworthy effect, as witnessed by the October 2006 nuclear test.

Interrupting the oil supply is not an immediate chokehold because oil comprises less than 10% of North Korea’s total energy mix, most of which is supplied by domestic coal. The oil is mostly used for transportation and the military industry, and would have to be cut off for a sustained period before it would cause suffering for the leadership, who are largely immune to foreign pressure. Temporary cut-offs do not directly threaten regime survival.4

Any measure that would threaten North Korean regime survival has always been seen as anathema by China. North Korea employs the power of

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the weak because its collapse could threaten China’s perceived vital security interests in several ways. Chaos in North Korea would likely spark a massive wave of refugees, many of them armed, across the Yalu River, threatening the domestic stability – so prized by Beijing – of China’s northeast provinces. Collapse of the one-party Kim regime could also have a knock-on effect in stimulating pressures for political change in one-party China. Disintegration of the system would result in the loss of a buffer state for China through unification of the peninsula under the leadership of US-allied Seoul. The last time American troops took up positions north of the 38th parallel, in November 1950, China intervened massively to repulse them.

Among at least some of China’s strategic thinkers, calculations are begin- ning to change about what is best for China’s vital interests. The Chinese

know that North Korea has become more of a lia- bility than an ally; they just do not know what to do about it, short of Beijing’s ever-cautious attach- ment to the Six-Party Talks, which have become irrelevant in the face of North Korea’s provocations. If this behaviour continues, a regime collapse in North Korea, even with all its attendant disruptions, would be better for China than the degradation of its security position caused by its ne’er-do-well nuclear-armed neighbour. In addition to spurring

talk of nuclear armament in South Korea and Japan, North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests have also prompted both US allies to advance their missile- defence capabilities, weakening China’s nuclear deterrent. North Korea’s brinkmanship could also spark a conflict leading to US military interven- tion. The priority China places on stability perversely allows North Korea to destabilise the entire region in ways that seem wholly contrary to China’s national interests.

For all of North Korea’s neighbours, the collapse of the Kim regime could be best way out of a downward cycle – and the sooner this happens, the better. This is not to say that any of them should purposely push for regime change, for which the short- and medium-term costs would be consider- able. But neither should fear of a possible regime collapse in North Korea

The Chinese know that North Korea has become more of a liability than an ally

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continue to block Chinese actions that stand the best chance of meeting Beijing’s goal of Korean denuclearisation, as well as its imperative of stabil- ity. To start with, China should be expected to implement Resolution 1874 by applying financial sanctions, insisting on inspection and denying refuel- ling and resupply to North Korean ships suspected of carrying arms and nuclear-related materials. Border traffic should also be strictly regulated in accordance with the resolution. If these steps prove insufficient, ultimately, China should join an oil-trade embargo, and be prepared to enforce it for the time it would take to be effective. China today is unwilling to take this step, but by employing its latent economic leverage, China could seek to force Pyongyang to make a choice between economic collapse and the irreversible dismantling of its nuclear weapons and facilities.

To assist China in coming to this conclusion, the United States, South Korea, Japan and Russia should engage Beijing in strategic planning about the future of northeast Asia.5 Contingency plans should be coordinated for dealing with a North Korean collapse and the resultant refugees in a way that does not put an undue economic burden on China. South Korea, mean- while, should find a way of assuring China that it need not fear a revanchist appeal from a unified Korea to the two million ethnic Koreans in Manchuria. Economics may hold the key. The introduction of capitalism and a market economy north of the 38th parallel would contribute to further development across the Chinese border.

Above all, Beijing needs to be assured that a unified Korea will not harm its interests. There would be less need for US troops to be stationed in a unified peninsula and Washington could agree to forego permanent bases in what is now North Korea. There would still be reason for a US–Korea alliance, but it would not be threatening to China if the trend of US–China rapprochement and economic integration continues. In fact, the American alliance would underscore assurances by Seoul that a unified Korea would be non-nuclear. Such assurances would be less credible if the unified nation could not rely on US extended deterrence.

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In a joint statement issued to mark the 16 June White House visit by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, the United States and the Republic of Korea reaffirmed the goal of peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula on the principles of free democracy and a market economy, in order to build a better future for all people on the peninsula. The statement did not refer to the ‘soft landing’ that remains the ideal scenario for North Korean absorp- tion by the South. The strategic consultations that are emphasised in the statement will need to focus on how best to balance the goals of denucleari- sation, reunification and human rights. Most of all, a similar joint vision is now needed with China, to establish how a reunified peninsula could promote peace, security and prosperity for all – except those who cling to the Kim regime.

Notes

1 Evans J.R. Revere, ‘North Korea’s Latest Challenge: What Is To Be Done?’, Issues and Insights, Pacific Forum CSIS, vol. 9, no. 5, May 2009.

2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘North Korea’s Dangerous Game’, Strategic Comments, vol. 15, no. 5, June 2009.

3 Ibid. 4 Julia Joo-A Lee, ‘To Fuel or Not to

Fuel: China’s Energy Assistance to North Korea’, Asian Security, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2009, pp. 64–5.

5 Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Reining in Pyongyang’, Washington Post, 8 June 2009.