psych questions
Hot and Cool Executive Function in Childhood and Adolescence: Development and Plasticity
Philip David Zelazo and Stephanie M. Carlson
University of Minnesota
ABSTRACT—Executive function (EF), which refers to the
more deliberate, top-down neurocognitive processes
involved in self-regulation, develops most rapidly during
the preschool years, together with the growth of neural
networks involving prefrontal cortex but continues to
develop well into adulthood. Both EF and the neural
systems supporting EF vary as a function of motivational
significance, and this article discusses the distinction
between the top-down processes that operate in motiva-
tionally and emotionally significant situations (“hot EF”)
and the top-down processes that operate is more affec-
tively neutral contexts (“cool EF”). Emerging evidence
indicates that both hot and cool EF are surprisingly mal-
leable, with implications for intervention and prevention.
KEYWORDS—executive function; prefrontal cortex; emotion;
neural plasticity; intervention
Generally youth is like the first cogitations, not so wise as the sec-
ond.
Francis Bacon, Of Youth and Age
Executive function (EF), also called cognitive control, refers
to the deliberate, top-down neurocognitive processes involved in
the conscious, goal-directed control of thought, action, and emo-
tion—processes that include cognitive flexibility, inhibitory con- trol, and working memory (Miyake et al., 2000). As shown in
Figure 1, research using measures of EF that are suitable for
participants aged 3–85 years suggests that EF improves most rapidly during the preschool period but continues to develop
during adolescence (and beyond; Zelazo et al., in press). These
changes in EF co-occur with substantial structural and func-
tional changes in neural systems involving prefrontal cortex
(Carlson, Zelazo, & Faja, in press).
Interest in the development of EF has increased dramatically
during the past decade, as reflected in a fivefold increase in the
number of publications on this topic (Carlson et al., in press).
One reason for this increased interest is that individual differ-
ences in EF measured in childhood have been found to predict
important developmental outcomes. For example, in a follow-up
to their seminal work on delay of gratification at Stanford’s Bing
Nursery School in the 1970s, Mischel and colleagues examined
adolescents who as children in the study had either refrained
from eating a marshmallow in order to receive a larger reward
15 min later or had failed to wait—an important index of child- hood EF. Adolescents who had delayed gratification as children
were judged by parents and peers to be more interpersonally
competent, and they demonstrated better concentration, self-
control, and frustration tolerance (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez,
1989; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990). They also scored signifi-
cantly higher on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), indepen-
dent of IQ, and as adults, they were less likely to use
recreational drugs (Ayduk et al., 2000). A more recent report of
individuals from a different longitudinal study found that self-
control—a construct that overlaps considerably with EF—mea- sured between ages 3 and 11 years predicted (as a gradient)
physical health, substance dependence, socioeconomic status
(SES), and the likelihood of a criminal conviction at age
32 years, even after controlling for social class of origin and IQ
(Moffitt et al., 2011). Together, the evidence suggests long-term
stability of early individual differences in EF that have mean-
ingful consequences for people’s lives.
The preparation of this article was supported in part by R01HD051495 to SMC.
The editorial review of this article and special section was handled by Nancy Eisenberg.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Philip David Zelazo, Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, 51 East River Rd., Minneapolis, MN 55455; e-mail: [email protected].
© 2012 The Authors
Child Development Perspectives© 2012 The Society for Research in Child Development
DOI: 10.1111/j.1750-8606.2012.00246.x
Volume 6, Number 4, 2012, Pages 354–360
CHILD DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES
In this article, we address two key issues for future research
on EF: the role of motivational significance in EF and the
degree to which EF is malleable. Both EF and the neural sys-
tems supporting EF vary as a function of motivational signifi-
cance, and a distinction has been made between the more
“cool,” cognitive aspects of EF usually associated with lateral
prefrontal cortex and the relatively “hot,” affective aspects of
EF usually associated with orbitofrontal cortex and other medial
regions (Happaney, Zelazo, & Stuss, 2004; Zelazo & Müller,
2002). In addition, although there are relatively stable individ-
ual differences in both hot and cool EF, there is also growing
evidence that EF is surprisingly malleable, with implications for
intervention and prevention.
HOT AND COOL ASPECTS OF EF
Traditionally, EF has been examined using abstract, decontex-
tualized problems that lack a significant affective or motiva-
tional component. For example, in the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948), widely regarded as “the
prototypical EF task in neuropsychology” (Pennington &
Ozonoff, 1996, p. 55), participants are given test cards that
vary on three dimensions (shape, color, and number) and are
required to discover the rules for sorting these cards correctly.
Although participants are given feedback, the task does not
involve obvious rewards or punishers—there is little to be gained or lost. Reliance on tasks such as the WCST and other
well-established measures of EF, including the classic Color-
Word Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), versions of the Eriksen
flanker task (Rueda, Rothbart, McCandliss, Saccomanno, &
Posner, 2005), and the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS;
Zelazo, 2006), have supported characterizations of EF and its
development that emphasize its more “cool” cognitive features.
In contrast to this emphasis on cool EF, more recent research
has employed a broader characterization of EF that also
includes the top-down control processes that operate in motiva-
tionally and emotionally significant high-stakes situations—what has been called “hot EF” (Zelazo & Müller, 2002). The distinc-
tion between hot and cool EF is similar in some respects to the
“hot–cool systems” distinction made by Metcalfe and Mischel
(1999), although it is also fundamentally different: In the Met-
calfe and Mischel (1999) framework, hot processes are not EF
processes at all but rather are bottom-up emotional influences
on behavior (e.g., associated with the amygdala, not orbitofrontal
cortex), which, in fact, tend to undermine top-down processes.
In contrast to the hot–cool systems framework, and indeed con-
trary to a more general assumption that emotional contexts
merely elicit stronger bottom-up influences or undermine top-
down control, the construct of hot EF captures the suggestion
that motivationally significant contexts also demand different
top-down processes.
The construct of hot EF is supported by neuroscientific
research on the functions of orbitofrontal cortex, which is
involved in the flexible reappraisal of the affective or motiva-
tional significance of stimuli (e.g., Rolls, 2004). The requirement
that representations of specific stimulus–reward associations be modified is common to a wide range of measures shown to
depend on orbitofrontal cortex (see Happaney et al., 2004, for a
review), including measures of reversal learning (in which a
rewarded approach–avoidance discrimination must be reversed), delay discounting (in which the value of an immediate reward
must be reconsidered relative to larger delayed reward), extinc-
tion (in which a previously rewarded stimulus is no longer
rewarded and must now be avoided), and gambling (in which
what initially appears to be advantageous is revealed over time
to be disadvantageous).
Lesion studies involving human and nonhuman animals indi-
cate clearly that hot EF is dissociable from EF as it is tradition-
ally measured (i.e., as cool EF). That is, impairments in hot EF,
as assessed by measures of gambling (e.g., Bechara, Damasio,
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994), risky decision making (e.g., Rog-
ers et al., 1999), and delay discounting (e.g., Elliott, Frith, &
Dolan, 1997), among other measures, can occur in the absence
of impairments of cool EF and vice versa. For example, consid-
erable research with both adult and pediatric patients (e.g., Bec-
hara, 2004; Eslinger, Flaherty-Craig, & Benton, 2004) has
shown that patients with damage to orbitofrontal cortex are often
unimpaired on classic measures of EF (e.g., the WCST) but
nonetheless have considerable problems in their daily lives and
on measures such as the Iowa Gambling Task. In an initial
study with the gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994), adult
patients and healthy controls were presented with four decks of
cards and told to turn over cards one at a time from any of the
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
N or
m al
iz ed
S ca
le d
Sc or
e
Age, Years
Figure 1. Performance on the NIH Toolbox DCCS Test across age groups. Note. Pediatric data are from a cross-sectional validation study of 476 indi- viduals aged 3–85 years. Error bars are ±2 SE. Also shown is the best fitting polynomial model (cubic, R2 = .76), which indicates two periods of rela- tively rapid growth (preschool and early adolescence). Source: Zelazo et al. (in press).
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 6, Number 4, 2012, Pages 354–360
Hot and Cool Executive Function 355
decks. After each card was turned, the participants were
informed that they had won either $100 or $50 (play money)
and, with some cards, that they were also being assessed a
penalty. Two decks were advantageous, and two were disadvan-
tageous. Whereas cards from the disadvantageous decks always
provided the higher reward ($100), the variable (and unpredict-
able) penalty losses were much larger on average than the gains.
The advantageous decks yielded an overall net gain. Bechara
et al. (1994) found that over trials, controls were increasingly
likely to select from the advantageous decks, whereas patients
were more likely to select from the disadvantageous decks.
Impairments on the Iowa Gambling Task have also been docu-
mented in pathological gamblers (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller,
D’Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002) and individuals abusing cocaine
(Monterosso, Ehrman, Napier, O’Brien, & Childress, 2001), her-
oin (Petry, Bickel, & Arnett, 1998), alcohol (Mazas, Finn, &
Steinmetz, 2000), and a combination of drugs (Bechara et al.,
2001; Grant, Contoreggi, & London, 2000).
It should be noted that although hot and cool EF can be dis-
sociated in lesioned brains, they typically work together as part
of a more general adaptive function. Indeed, one of the primary
ways in which individuals solve motivationally significant prob-
lems is to step back and reflect upon them, contextualize them,
and consider them in the abstract (Zelazo & Cunningham,
2007). There is also considerable overlap among the neural sys-
tems underlying hot and cool EF. Right ventrolateral PFC, for
example, appears to play a role in a wide range of situations,
including what might be considered both hot and cool contexts
(Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004).
Considering the development of EF in more affectively rele-
vant, hot situations extend the construct of EF to everyday deci-
sion making, which is rarely conducted in the absence of
motivational and emotional influences, and it provides a new
way to make sense of observed differences in performance on
relatively hot versus cool versions of the same task. For exam-
ple, using a delay-of-gratification paradigm, Prencipe and Zelazo
(2005) found that 3-year-old children were more likely to choose
a larger, delayed reward over a smaller, immediate one when
asked which reward the experimenter should choose (cool ver-
sion) but were more likely to select the immediate reward when
asked to choose for themselves (hot version). Similarly, 3-year-
olds, but not 4-year-olds, have difficulty when required to point
to a smaller reward (e.g., two jelly beans) rather than a larger
reward (e.g., five jelly beans) in order to get the larger reward,
but Carlson and colleagues found that when the rewards were
replaced with abstract symbols (i.e., “cooler” representations of
the rewards), 3-year-olds’ performance improved significantly
(Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005). Although a reasonable inter-
pretation of these findings is that the hot versions are simply
harder (e.g., because children face a stronger temptation), it is
also possible that the hot versions place greater demands on
orbitofrontally mediated hot EF and that the development of hot
EF may lag behind that of more lateral-prefrontal cool EF.
Although these particular tasks are readily accomplished by
older children, similar distinctions between hot and cool EF can
be observed in more challenging situations in older participants
(e.g., risky decision making for self vs. other during the transi-
tion to adolescence; Crone, Bullens, van der Plas, Kijkuit, &
Zelazo, 2008). Moreover, in another recent follow-up to the Bing
Nursery School sample, Casey et al. (2011) found that delay of
gratification in preschoolers was related to performance on a Go/
No-Go task 40 years later, but only when participants were
required to suppress responses to happy faces (rewarding stim-
uli), not when required to suppress responses to neutral or fear-
ful faces. Again, although it is reasonable to attribute these
patterns to differences in bottom-up influences (e.g., heighted
reward sensitivity when deciding for self vs. other), the patterns
may also reflect the relatively protracted development of hot EF
relative to that of cool EF.
IMPORTANCE OF HOT EF DURING THE TRANSITION
TO ADOLESCENCE
There is some suggestive evidence from direct comparisons of
cool and hot EF that the development of hot EF lags behind
(Bunge & Crone, 2009; Zelazo, Qu, & Kesek, 2010). For exam-
ple, Hooper, Luciana, Conklin, and Yarger (2004) tested chil-
dren aged 9–17 years on a measure of hot EF, the Iowa Gambling Task, and two measures of cool EF, Digit Span and a
Go/No-Go task. The results revealed age-related improvements
in performance on all three tasks, but whereas improvements on
Digit Span and Go/No-Go were seen between the two youngest
age groups, only the oldest adolescents (aged 14–17) performed well on the Iowa Gambling Task. Similarly, Prencipe et al.
(2011) tested children aged 8–15 years and reported that adult- like levels of performance were reached on hot EF measures
(including the Iowa Gambling Task) at an older age than was
the case for cool EF measures. In both studies, hot and cool
measures were weakly correlated. Together, these results are
consistent with the possibility that hot and cool EF may develop
somewhat independently into adolescence and that hot EF may
follow a different, perhaps delayed, trajectory of development
relative to that of cool EF. If so, this could help explain the
above-mentioned discrepancies between adolescents’ theoretical
understanding of the potential negative consequences of their
behavior and their real-life choices in emotion-laden situations
(e.g., in the face of peer pressure).
Although the distinction between hot and cool EF is well sup-
ported by lesion studies and neuroimaging research, and is evi-
dent in behavioral research with adolescents and adults, further
research is needed on its emergence in childhood. A number of
studies with young children have found that hot and cool EF
load onto distinct (but correlated) factors (e.g., Brock, Rimm-
Kaufman, Nathanson, & Grimm, 2009; Carlson, Moses, &
Breton, 2002; Davis-Unger & Carlson, 2008; Willoughby,
Kupersmidt, Voegler-Lee, & Bryant, 2011) and show different
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 6, Number 4, 2012, Pages 354–360
356 Philip David Zelazo and Stephanie M. Carlson
patterns of relations with other measures, such as verbal mental
age (e.g., Hongwanishkul, Happaney, Lee, & Zelazo, 2005), aca-
demic achievement (e.g., Brock et al., 2009; Willoughby et al.,
2011), theory of mind (e.g., Carlson et al., 2002), and behavior
problems (e.g., Thorell, 2007; Willoughby et al., 2011). Other
research, however, has failed to find evidence for hot and cool
factors (e.g., Allan & Lonigan, 2011; Sulik et al., 2010), sug-
gesting instead that EF may correspond to a unitary construct in
early childhood. To date, however, factor analytic research on
hot and cool EF has focused on children about 6 years old or
younger, and it is possible that the distinction is only starting to
emerge in this age range, consistent with a general process of
increasing functional specialization of neural systems that ini-
tially are relatively undifferentiated but become more special-
ized with experience as part of a developmental process of
adaptation (e.g., Johnson, 2011).
Research on cool EF shows a similar pattern: Whereas multi-
ple factors such as cognitive flexibility and working memory are
differentiated in older children (e.g., Huizinga, Dolan, & van
der Molen, 2006; Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003)
and adults (Miyake et al., 2000), research with younger children
supports a single-factor construct (Wiebe, Espy, & Charack,
2008; Wiebe et al., 2011). Research comparing cool EF with a
wide range of other less purely executive cognitive functions
(e.g., vocabulary) also finds evidence of increasing differentia-
tion (from two to six factors) with increasing age (Zelazo et al.,
in press).
PLASTICITY OF EF
Although longitudinal research suggests that individual differ-
ences in both hot and cool EF show considerable stability across
time (e.g., Casey et al., 2011; Polderman et al., 2007), the rea-
sons for this stability remain unclear. One likely possibility is that
key aspects of children’s environments tend to remain stable, and
there is now evidence that EF is associated with the contexts in
which children develop, including, for example, their SES and
their attachment relationships (see Carlson et al., in press, for a
review). At the same time, however, the human brain is an inher-
ently plastic organ, continually adapting to its environment.
Indeed, research on various neural systems (e.g., sensory systems)
suggests that there are periods of relative plasticity (often called
“sensitive periods”) when particular regions of the brain and their
corresponding functions are especially susceptible to environ-
mental influences. These periods typically correspond to times of
rapid growth in those regions and functions (Huttenlocher, 2002),
and in contrast to earlier notions of genetically programmed “mat-
uration” (e.g., Gesell, 1933), these periods of relative plasticity
are now assumed to reflect both experience-expectant and experi-
ence-dependent processes (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987).
The finding that EF develops most rapidly during the pre-
school years is consistent with the suggestion that this may be
a period of high malleability (Carlson et al., in press)—one
that occurs just as children face sharp increases in the
demands placed on their EF (e.g., as they transition to school).
A growing body of research has now demonstrated conclusively
that EF can be cultivated through training regimes that require
the use of prefrontal cortical circuits (cf. Hebb, 1949). Much
of this research has focused on the preschool years (see Dia-
mond & Lee, 2011, for a review), and research has shown not
only behavioral improvements but also corresponding changes
in neural function (e.g., Rueda et al., 2005). Preschool curric-
ula designed to foster the development of EF have also yielded
promising results (Diamond, Barnett, Thomas, & Munro, 2007;
Lillard & Else-Quest, 2006), and the beneficial effects of other
early childhood programs that promote competence and aca-
demic success may be associated with, and even mediated by,
concomitant improvements in EF (Riggs, Greenberg, Kusche, &
Pentz, 2006).
Although the preschool years may be an especially sensitive
period for EF, there is also considerable reorganization of pre-
frontal systems during the transition to adolescence, when gray
matter volume in prefrontal cortex reaches a peak (Giedd et al.,
1999). This reorganization is likely to be sensitive not only to
events in the internal environment (e.g., a shift in dopamine
receptors from mesolimbic toward mesocortical systems; Spear,
2000) but also to events in the external environment, and as can
be seen in Figure 1, it is associated with another increase in the
rate at which EF develops. Indeed, several studies have found
that EF can also be trained in older children and adolescents
(e.g., Duckworth, Grant, Loew, Oettingen, & Gollwitzer, in press;
Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Shah, 2011). One example of a
successful intervention with adolescents and adults is CogMed,
designed to train working memory. Klingberg et al. (2005) found
that after 5 weeks of training, a group of 7- to 12-year-olds with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) showed improved
working memory and reduced ADHD symptomatology. In a
study of CogMed with adults, Olesen, Westerberg, and Kling-
berg (2003) found training-related increases in activity in frontal
and parietal areas, as well as decreases in activity in cingulate
cortex.
CONCLUSION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR EARLY
INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION
Impairments in EF are prominent features of various clinical
conditions, such as ADHD and other externalizing problems
(e.g., Barkley, 1997), which have their origins in early childhood
and peak during adolescence. Although individual differences
in EF appear to be relatively stable across the lifespan, there is
also evidence that EF can be improved by practice, with corre-
sponding changes in neural function. This combination of stabil-
ity and plasticity underscores the potential value of promoting
the healthy development of EF, providing lasting opportunities
for what Bacon referred to as “second cogitations” to become
second nature. The preschool years may be a particularly valu-
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 6, Number 4, 2012, Pages 354–360
Hot and Cool Executive Function 357
able window for intervention: They appear to be marked by con-
siderable plasticity, and a boost in EF just prior to the onset of
school may initiate a cascade of beneficial events for children
(e.g., increasing their motivation to learn, helping them estab-
lishing good relationships with teachers, reducing their problem
behaviors, and allowing them to learn in a more proactive and
reflective fashion). It is also clear, however, that EF can be
improved by practice beyond the preschool years, and indeed,
the transition to adolescence may be another period of relative
plasticity. Research on hot EF and how best to foster its healthy
development may be of particular practical importance during
this transition, helping children to face what can be a daunting
set of new emotional and interpersonal challenges.
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360 Philip David Zelazo and Stephanie M. Carlson