


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This is an older article, but it has good content on both the policy process and Theodore Lewis's original policy typology.

Note that different policy types ("distributive", "redistributive", and "regulatory") are created and operate under different political dynamics.

Hankels 9/28/15



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THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: RESEARCHING THEIR INTERACTION IN DOMESTIC POLICY FORMATION

by

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Introduction

This overview article posits that a public problem cannot be understood apart from knowing about the participants in the process of policymaking or without analyzing the content of resulting policies themselves. Thus, the *process* of policymaking depends upon the emphases, strategies, and interactions of political actors and upon the particular *content* of public policy. The interplay of these three components in domestic policy formation, then, is the subject of this paper, which puts forth a strategy for their examination.

Policy *process* refers to how decisions are made to attain desired goals. This process is dynamic (ongoing but changing), and cyclical (recurrent and continuous). Such a characterization suggests sequential development of policy formation, consisting of several subprocesses: identification of the problem, gathering of information, screening and weighing of alternatives, and the approval of a preferred choice. Several analogous substages of policy formation can be empirically examined: agenda-setting, initiation, modification, and adoption. While the line separating these activities (or substages) is often blurred, the distinction is useful in understanding interactions in policymaking. In order to attain desired results, decisionmakers, focusing here mainly on Congress and the President, must first traverse several stages in the policymaking process. Such a process orientation assumes that the behavior and influence of actors differ across the policy stages.

Policy *content* (or substance) is posited as the primary explanatory variable in the

analysis. Studies have demonstrated that executive and legislative actors perceive the content of policy similarly (Clausen, 1973; Kessel, 1974). These and later works establish that while policy positions may change, underlying substantive dimensions or areas of policy remain relatively consistent over time (Clausen and Van Horn, 1977; Sinclair, 1981). Agreement on the meaning of policy among participants helps structure their emphases in policymaking and suggests that observed differences in behavior may be attributable to the type policy under consideration.

Policy typologies or categorizations help explain differences in the content of public policy. Fairly broad substantive areas are examined and then narrowed into six policy groups: agricultural price supports, public works, crime, anti-trust, civil rights, and poverty. Concrete examples and case studies will illustrate the importance of these six groups. Analytical (or functional) typologies may also help explain actor emphases and behavior in the process of domestic policy formation. A widely cited functional typology by Theodore Lowi (1964) is also incorporated to organize the data and discussion. An empirical test of Lowi's typology should reveal whether the meaningful differences among distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies claimed by its proponents exist or not. While there has been debate over the utility of such policy categorizations, this examination should allow comparisons of the relative salience of substantive and functional typologies, and perhaps even their capability of predicting the policy process.

The goal of empirically testing for the effects of policy content and actor inter-

action on the policy formation process makes it impossible to cover the universe of any of the three phenomena. Data availability and pervasiveness of their roles make it imperative to focus on Congress and the President as the ultimate deciders (primary *actors*) in national policy formation. Influence is expected to result from skillful and effective interaction among actors in policy formation. Normally this involves such components of politics as successful bargaining, accommodation, and the minimizing of conflict. Rationality is assumed; actions at one stage are assumed to be consistent with their behavior at other stages in the policy process.

Domestic policy formation is anticipated to have changed greatly over the years. Once the province of Congress and subgovernments, agenda-setting and initiation have largely come under the purview of the institutionalized presidency. (Recent interest in water policy by Carter and Reagan illustrates this change.) But, if Congress has actually initiated far less than previously, it still clearly plays a major and probably growing role in modifying and legitimizing (adopting) presidential policy preferences. The relative influence of Congress and the President, then, is expected to differ widely across the stages in the policy process and according to the policy content and the political environment. Concealed beneath this rubric of domestic policy should be variations in presidential-congressional behavior depending on issue content. Poverty policy, for example, should be more "President oriented" while public works should evidence more congressional leadership.

What, then, do we hope to establish in this study? We should observe that the policy formations process is quite complex, with widely differing roles, emphases, and behavior from Congress and the President. Judgments about the rationality and consistency of such decisionmaking should be possible. Further, a winnowing process is anticipated, with the broad general agenda issues being refined into specific policy outputs in policy adoption. Finally, the expectation is for

some diminution of presidential dominance in policy formation—a dominance that reached its zenith in the mid 1960's.

Apart from the overriding theme of explaining the policy process, this study seeks to address several subsidiary questions 1) Can we identify and clarify roles in policy formation? 2) Do such conditions as political party, presidential assertiveness, congressional acquiescence, and time relate to differences in actors emphasis and behavior? 3) Is the functional or substantive content of issues more important in predicting the policy process than the behavior of political actors? 4) Are actors rational and consistent? 5) What conditions have contributed to an expected decline in executive dominance in policy formation? And 6) What changes are observable in the process, content, and actor roles in domestic policy formation?


Policy Process

Why the Sequential Approach?

This study asserts that the roles, emphases, and behavior of political actors vary across stages of the policy process. As should be readily apparent, fluidity is an important part of policymaking, which the sequential approach highlights. The sequential approach is advantageous in examining actor interactions to see whether rhetoric translates into action and then to observe whether legislative action is congruent with executive policy preferences. At the same time, the approach avoids rigidly assigning specific functions to particular actors. By emphasizing interaction among actors, the sequential approach also lends itself to meaningful comparisons across and between substantive policy areas (Anderson, Brady, Bullock, 1978: 12). Because policy often is chronological and not static, many writers used the sequential approach to emphasize its fluid, cyclical nature.¹

Advantages of the sequential approach are mitigated somewhat by its tendency to over-simplify the enormously complex policy formation process. Policy sometimes emerges without a clear beginning

Figure 1
Policy Formation Process



or end and frequently is not as orderly or rational as a literal interpretation of the sequential approach may imply. Critics of the chronological approach contend that it encourages the assumption of a rational process "with each part logically tied to each succeeding part" (Lindblom, 1980: 4). Lindblom goes further to argue that the actors, strategies and issues do not vary much across the policy stages (1980: 3).

Acceptance of some of these criticisms as valid need not require rejection of the sequential scheme of policy formation, which, incidentally, may have even more validity than when used to encompass the entire policy process (including implementation and evaluation). Certainly we cannot draw neat lines between the point where one substage ends and another begins; and, it probably matters little that we cannot (Jones, 1977: 59). The process of policy formation should be thought of as fluid, as depicted in Figure 1, where there are primary one way relationships, but where reciprocal relationships can also occur. Indeed, such substage can occur at different times. For example, another problem frequently reaches the agenda before the previous one is adopted; or the agenda may be modified before it is actually formulated. Thus, the sequential approach to policy development probably had considerable utility when boundary and other conceptual difficulties are accounted for.

Roles in the Policy Process

We assert that the executive is involved most in agenda-setting and policy initiation and the role of Congress is greater in modification and adoption (Redford, 1969: 124). Congress expects the President to set forth and advocate programs, as witnessed in its dismay over Eisenhower's seeming failure to do so in 1953 (Neustadt, 1955: 1015). Congress perceives its own role as working over these proposals at a later date. Our task now is to examine these substage interactions between Congress and the President more closely.

Agenda-setting

The public agenda consists of "items receiving active and serious consideration by important policymakers" (Edwards and Sharkansky, 1978: 100). Although getting on the government's agenda frequently is the result of many diverse environmental circumstances, the President stands at center stage because of his role in stating and ranking policy issues (Light, 1982). When innovation occurs (an infrequent happening), it comes from the presidency in the agenda-setting stage. Instances of presidential activism abound, including Johnson's use of task forces to bypass the bureaucracy and to set agendas in poverty policy. But we should remember that agenda items may also result from "followership" rather than over leadership from elected officials. Proposition 13 in California and the subsequently broader tax revolt is one prominent example.

Since many public issues require legislative action, much of the President's agenda transfers to Congress, too. Congress occasionally is important in agenda-setting, and it has increasingly put forth many items on its own (such as area redevelopment and environmental pollution). Although its role is greater in formulation and later stages, Congress is next most important to the President and his staff in creating and defining issues for the public agenda (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963:478).

Although there are many forums for government's agenda, the main one considered here is public expressions by the

President, regardless of where an issue actually may have originated. Presidential statements, usually calling for legislative action, are the data used to determine which problems actually become political issues. Although issues reach Congress by other means, the President's public concerns almost automatically reach and may even largely determine, the legislative agenda (Anderson, 1979: 57; Lindblom, 1980: 60; Redford, 1969: 124).

Initiation

Presidents have a far greater role in initiating national policies in the twentieth century than they did previously. Perhaps because of the relative ease of proposing rather than implementing or evaluating, Presidents come to believe that initiating programs is the best way to assert their leadership and to make a distinctive mark in history. Although Neustadt calls the President the "Great Initiator" (1976: 281), Congress, too, can initiate policy.

Disagreement abounds over the ability of Congress to initiate policy. Some writers have charged that policy initiation is a function that Congress is increasingly unwilling and unable to perform. According to one researcher, the fragmented and diffuse nature of Congress cannot allow it to compete with the President as Chief Initiator (Gallagher, 1974: 231). Others argue, however, that Congress is not powerless in policy formulation; it still shares power approximately equally with the President (Chamberlain, 1946; Moe and Teel, 1970; Schwarz and Shaw, 1976). Congress, then, plays a more important role in formulation than often is recognized, certainly with respect to the specific policies initiated, if not in setting broader national goals.

Evidence of formulation of policy by the President can be obtained from his initiatives to Congress (specific presidential proposals), showing whether the President follows through on his statements. Although we would expect presidential statements to translate into subsequent actions, legislative initiatives and budget requests require more commitment and the making of hard choices than do mere public statements.

Presidential initiatives to Congress are important indicators of his priorities. The initiatives themselves tell us something about a President's level of activity (the volume of initiatives), as well as his policy interests and priorities (the relative distribution of initiatives). It is easy to compare the requests of Presidents from year to year and across administrations. Very little research, however, has probed beyond the numbers and delved into the substance of policy initiatives. That task is begun here.

Modification

Modification refers here to potential, if not actual, legislative scrutiny of presidential policies. If agenda-setting and initiation are dominated largely by the President, modification and adoption are much more under the purview of Congress (Jones, 1977: 94). Congress has many opportunities to place its stamp on, greatly redefine, or outright reject presidential initiatives. The decentralized, diffused nature of power in Congress requires constant majority building by the President if he is to receive only limited tampering with his initiatives. Although he has persuasive powers, he communicates his views to Congress primarily through public messages and legislative liaison. Indeed, the quality of liaison operations probably has a great deal to do with the degree of legislative modification. The chaotic nature of liaison during Carter's first two years surely contributed to his inability to obtain his desired policy preferences (Ripley and Franklin, 1980: 54-55; Davis, 1979).

Congress frequently has different predispositions from the President. It also has many ways of monitoring executive proposals, including committee hearings, legislative veto provisions, administrative oversight, and committee and floor amendments. While a number of these techniques are important, the scrutiny of presidential positions on legislation is paramount. The extent to which Congress modified presidential preferences depends upon many factors in the political environment. Party affiliations of Congress and the presidency, constituency views

and reelection prospects, and the perceived views of interest groups, the media, and the general public are among the more important conditions affecting congressional modification.

Adoption

Congress must approve legislation, with the President relegated to the formal task of signing or vetoing bills. Only occasionally can he shape them to his will. Thus, one of the biggest hurdles a President now faces is getting Congress to accept presidential policy initiatives. A primary manifestation of his leadership over Congress is the extent to which it gives the President what he wants.

With its ability to override presidential vetoes of adopted policies too divergent from its preferences, Congress is the ultimate decider of most domestic policies. It is asserting its independence through greater scrutiny of policy initiatives from Presidents and other sources. Although there are varied pressures on congressional decisionmaking, it is gaining the capability to play a leadership role in adoption, not insulated from these pressures, but better able to obtain a more comprehensive picture of policymaking overall and its ramifications.

Approval of presidential initiatives provides us with information about both the Congress and the President. Comparisons across policy areas may suggest arenas of presidential strength vis-à-vis the Congress, and, conversely, arenas of congressional independence. Comparisons across party, administration, and time provide a view of change in presidential strength or weakness in dealing with the Congress. The imperfections of this kind of "scorecard" are well documented.² Yet congressional approval of presidential initiatives remains a very useful set of data when used in the proper context. Probably most important, the data indicate some measure of how successful Presidents have been in obtaining support for their proposals from Congress. Also, it should reveal the extent that adopted policies deviate from the original agenda.

Expectations in the Policy Process

Despite caution and difficulty of

change in domestic policy formation, we normally expect Presidents to try to exert leadership early and Congress to respond. We have asserted generally decreasing influence of the President relative to Congress as the policy process unfolds from agenda-setting through adoption. Thus, presidential influence is usually opposite the strength of Congress in each substage. Accommodation is necessary at each substage, but the period since the 1960s suggests more conflict than cooperation. Generally Presidents who cooperate with Congress should have greater legislative success, but success also is dependent upon both the internal and external social, economic, and political environment.

Whether the President can exert leadership over Congress is related to many phenomena. Various environmental conditions suggest that actor perceptions are important. Presidential personality and popularity, the extent to which he seeks innovative change, the nature of economy and the times in general, the timing of presidential proposals, the quality of his liaison staff, his previous experience, the extent to which he becomes involved personally, the degree of congressional assertiveness, and the partisan and leadership composition of Congress may all be important in assessing actor interactions in the policy formation process.

With respect to personal involvement, several propositions seem plausible. Because legislation is an important way to formulate policy, especially in the domestic sphere, it seems reasonable to assert that Presidents will use legislative initiatives to enhance their influence. Thus, presidential attention early in policy formation should enhance his influence later. In short, Presidents who actively articulate an agenda and propose legislative initiatives may be subject to considerable legislative modification, but also should attain substantial legislative success.

Policy Content

In addition to identifying the early substages of the policy process, policy formation may be analyzed according to content areas. Content refers to the function or

substance of the policies themselves. Examples of functional areas authors have used include distributive and symbolic; examples of substantive areas include defense and civil rights. It is hypothesized here that variations in the content of policies under consideration produce variations in the roles and behavior of actors. Both functional and substantive typologies are used to ascertain whether differing processes and actor interactions are at work.

Policy Typologies

Empirical and/or theoretical differences in policies have been found in both the legislative and executive spheres.³ Research at the national level has discerned that both Congress and the President perceive domestic policy according to at least four substantive areas: social benefits, civil rights, government management, and agriculture/natural resources (Clausen, 1973; Kessel, 1974; Leloup and Shull, 1979). The substantive policy areas to be incorporated here include all of these broad substantive dimensions of domestic policy as well as narrower subissues.

One may also categorize policy according to functional areas. Functional categorizations usually group policy outcomes in some theoretically interesting way rather than according to the substance of issues themselves. Numerous scholars have advanced theoretical justification for such typologies (Lowi, 1964; Edelman, 1974; Froman, 1970; Salisbury and Heinz, 1970). A functional typology first advanced by Theodore Lowi in 1964 is perhaps the most popular and has been

adopted widely.⁴ Lowi categorized policies as distributive, regulatory or redistributive depending upon their relative coercion and impact on society.⁵

The Lowi typology will be used in this examination of presidential and congressional roles in policymaking. A conceptual treatment of the properites of the three categories follows. The data to be incorporated not only indicate actor focus and behavior in policy formation, but should also allow us to ascertain the discriminating value of Lowi's functional classification scheme.

This discussion of Lowi's three policy types can be summarized diagrammatically (see Figure 2). The defining characteristics may be viewed along a continuum ranging generally from low on distributive to high on redistributive. Normally, regulatory issues fall between the two extremes. It is primarily the relationship between Congress and the President (# 5-6 in Figure 2) that is of present concern, however. The study hopes to establish that the two actors differ in their roles, their emphasis on policy issues, and their behavior in both the process and content of policy formation.

The Lowi functional areas are quite broad and provide the starting point for examining policy content. The six substantive areas are an amalgamation of Lowi's on one hand and those mentioned previously by Clausen and Kessel on the other. The Clausen/Kessel areas (agricultural assistance, natural resources, government management, civil rights and liberties, and social benefits) do not perfectly fit Lowi, so by choosing

Figure 2
Characteristics of Lowi's Policy Typology

DISTRIBUTIVE	REGULATORY	REDISTRIBUTIVE
Low	Moderate	High
<i>Characteristics</i>		
1. Visibility		
2. Number of people affected		
3. Instability		
4. Innovativeness		
5. Presidential dominance/emphasis		
6. Conflict between Congress and President		

Table 1
Substantive and Functional Areas

GENERAL	I. <i>Distributive</i>	<i>Regulatory</i>	<i>Redistributive</i>
	II. Agriculture, Natural Resources	General Government, Economic Management	Social Benefits, Civil Rights and Liberties
	III. Price Supports, Public Works	Crime, Anti-Trust	Poverty, Civil Rights
	IV. Acreage Allotments, Water Projects	Organized Crime Control, Enforcement Provisions of Clayton Act	Federal Housing, School Desegregation
SPECIFIC	V. ^a Parity for Cotton, Tenn-Tombigbee Project	Wiretapping of Crime Figures, Business Mergers	Busing, Rent Subsidies

^a Level V discussed intermittently

somewhat more specific types that do fit more closely we can get a better handle on both functional and substantive areas. Thus, we begin with more general policy and then gradually work toward understanding more specific issues. All policy requires some intellectual ordering; level of generality is a good way to sort things out.

The various levels of generality to be examined appear in Table 1. Such disaggregation allows indepth investigation of policy content and also manageability in the various data to be used. At the same time, subissues at least through level IV in Table 1 are probably still broad enough to allow quantitative analysis. The designations by Congressional Quarterly are used as the basis for the fit of subissues to broader substantive categorizations. The substantive issues focused upon appear typical of the three types of policy Lowi identifies.

All of the substantive areas were chosen primarily for their visibility and political salience. Both governmental and non-governmental actors have shown interest in each of these policy areas. Some public opinion and interest group data are available, as are measures of the congressional and presidential activity that occurs in each. The fact that some of these areas have frequently been controversial may not allow generalization across all government programs, but they are at the cutting edge of politics by virtue of controversy and perceived high stakes. Thus, comparisons among and between these issues

should be a useful step in understanding policy formation.

Expectations Across Content Areas

The substantive and/or functional content of the policy under consideration affects both the policy process and actor roles and expectations. Because the six substantive areas considered are all under the rubric of the functional typology, we expect actor roles to correspond to those asserted for each category. Distributive policy (e.g. price supports and public works) should be more "Congress oriented", partly because of the influence of subgovernments, while redistributive issues (e.g., civil rights and poverty) are more "President oriented." The entire domestic policy arena is probably more conflictual than it once was (Wildavsky, 1966; Leloup and Shull, 1979; Shull, 1979: ch. 10). Therefore, over time, increasing conflict may occur in each of the policy areas, partly because of more direct involvement by both the President and Congress. These actors share power roughly equally and domestic legislation seems to be the primary battleground.

Both Congress and Presidents focus on their areas of influence and expertise and seek to define issues accordingly. Presidents seem to prefer policies in areas where their influence is greatest and that have broader impact (Vogler, 1977: 317). Reflecting its own interest, Congress tries to transform redistributive policies (such as the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act) into distributive ones

(Lowi, 1972: 306). Even conservative congressmen clamor for distributive programs. Such "bringing home the bacon" is helpful in reelection, while redistributive policies are less helpful (Fiorina and Noll, 1979: 1098, 1101). Thus, distributive programs are probably the most likely and redistributive programs the least likely to be initiated, let alone to complete the process of policy formation.

It is asserted that the increasingly technical nature of society has necessitated a growth in regulatory policy.⁶ This may have been largely at the expense of distributive issues, which dominated the policy arena in the 19th century (Lowi, 1972:300). Because of the level of expertise required, it is probable that a shift has occurred, moving policymaking in general and regulatory policy specifically from the legislative to the executive sphere (Vogler, 1977:304). In a sense, both actors will be "captured"; Presidents will be required to emphasize regulatory measures more and Congress will increasingly defer. The regulatory area and subareas such as crime and anti-trust are expected over time to occupy an even larger share of the domestic policy arena.

Since redistributive issues tend to be controversial and ideological, normally it is the President, not Congress, who initiates policy in behalf of society's poorer elements (Ripley and Franklin, 1980: 183). The exception, of course, would be when conservative and/or inactive Presidents occupy the White House. Nixon and Ford placed relatively low priority on broad social reform. Because it requires a strong, assertive, and ideologically committed President to initiate redistributive policies (Lowi, 1972: 302-303), programs reflecting a major redistributive change in existing policy are least likely to be initiated (Hayes, 1978).

Distributive policies are less ideological than regulatory and redistributive issues in that they require fewer social rearrangements. Such issues as acreage allotments and water projects are more likely to be approved by Congress than are the more conflictual redistributive policies (Ripley and Franklin, 1980: 230-231; Hayes, 1978: 154). Congress is more sym-

pathetic to distributive issues and will scrutinize them less intently (Fiorina and Noll, 1979). Accordingly, Presidents should obtain greater approval on their distributive than on their regulatory and redistributive proposals.

Environmental variables are also important in examining the content of policy. The extent to which Presidents choose to be innovative in policy formation is a crucial consideration. Innovations are large-scale changes in existing policies or completely new endeavors of government activity. While they may be either progressive or regressive, policy innovation implies a change of considerable magnitude in policy. In contrast, consolidation suggests little or no change in these policies. Decision-makers offer few totally new or innovative ideas, as most policy formation builds heavily from existing programs (Wildavsky, 1979: 65). To the extent that policy innovation does involve altering the nation's agenda, however, innovative policies frequently occur with partisan and/or ideological changes in government.

There is probably also a partisan element in the propensity to initiate particular policies, and expectations by party have already been hinted at. Based upon a wide variety of literature (Orfield, 1975; Uslaner and Weber, 1975; Fry and Winters, 1970; Wayne, 1978:20), a relationship between party control of the presidency and the tendency to initiate redistributive policies is expected. Specifically, Democratic Presidents should emphasize redistributive policies (e.g. civil rights and poverty) to a greater extent than do Republican Presidents.

Presidents are expected to be more assertive during their first and last years in office, but less so during reelection years (Light, 1982:41; Kessel, 1975:9) Not only are they less assertive during reelection years, but they also receive less support from Congress at that time (Wayne, 1978:130). Thus, there should be less congressional acquiescence during presidential election years. The reasons for these expectations are simple. Although first year requires organizing and getting a feel for the office, Presidents realize they must

make their mark early while the "honeymoon" lasts. Thus, they should be most aggressive then and also when they are "lame ducks". During this last year, they have greater freedom of action and presumably wish to leave an historical legacy. Election years differ because of their heightened political climate.

Redistributive policies tend to be innovative, and innovations tend to come earlier in presidential terms; their later years are more frequently characterized by consolidation (Nathan, 1975: 23). Since distributive policies "pass around the pork," it is probably a normal tendency for Presidents to initiate them if they are about to leave office, or, particularly, if they are seeking reelection. Thus, Presidents should emphasize redistributive policies during their first year and distributive policies in their last year, especially if they are running for reelection.

Summary

This paper has outlined the basis for the process, content, actor organization mechanism in studying domestic policy formation. This approach facilitates comparing roles, emphases, behavior, and in assessing overall interaction and performance in the domestic policy arena. Limitations of the distinction among stages in the process and among substantive and functional areas of policy should be kept in mind. The complexity of the policy process can be observed as the wide range of early policy options narrows considerably; issues become less diffuse and more specific as the process unfolds.

Rhetorical statements by Presidents assert broad policy emphases, a type of *agenda-setting*. Presidential formulation is determined by their policy requests to Congress, the *initiation* of policy. *Modification* arises when legislative efforts are made to redefine presidential actions, primarily through acceptance or rejection of his positions on legislation. The legislative success obtained by the President taps Congress's role in policy *adoption*. No one actor can control all of the stages, since policy formation normally involves examining alternatives developed by others. However, presidential in-

fluence is important in agenda-setting and initiation, while Congress's influence is greatest in modification, adoption, and appraisal. Presidential influence, then, is greater in the beginning and middle stages of policy formation and that of Congress nearer the end. Although its role sometimes is important in issue formulation, Congress normally enters the policy formation process after some groundwork has been laid by the executive.

This study introduces the domestic policy arena centered around Congress and the President. It examines whether actor roles and influences differ across the substages of policy formation. Influence is expected to result from skillful interactions among participants in policy formation. Normally this involves successful bargaining, accommodation, and the minimizing of conflict. Presidential leadership should also be important, particularly if he is personally active. Such active Presidents, normally Democrats, tend to push more policies and also policies that are innovative. It is also expected that Congress is more important than previously, especially in social policy (Orfield, 1975: 187, 225). Concealed beneath this rubric of domestic policy are variations in presidential-congressional responses, depending on issue content.

Empirical investigation such as that proposed here will help address these issues. In examining head-on Lowi's assertion that policy determines politics, the research proposed would test systematically the validity and utility of policy typologies. Reciprocal causation is expected; the pattern of politics should influence policy choices but so too should the type of policy affect the pattern of politics. Substantive and functional categorizations should be helpful in explaining policy outputs. If these issues are successfully dealt with in the domestic policy arena, then we should enhance our knowledge of the process and content of public policy as well as the interaction of the primary actors in its formation.

Notes

1. Sources utilizing the sequential approach include Anderson, ed., 1975; Jones, 1977; Anderson,

- Brady, Bullock, 1978; Anderson, 1979; Shull, 1979; Polsby, 1969: 66-68; and MacRae and Wilde, 1979.
2. For example, lumping all proposals together may not account for major policy initiatives. Spitzer, 1979; Sigelman, 1979; Wayne, 1978: 168-171; Edwards, 1980; Shull, 1979, 1981 all discuss problems with the C.Q. measures.
 3. Other studies incorporating substantive typologies include LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Hofferbert, 1974; Sharkansky, 1970; Shull, 1978; 1979.
 4. Examples of this utilization include Ripley and Franklin, 1980; Smith, 1975; Vogler, 1977; Uslaner and Weber, 1975; Fry and Winters, 1970; Spitzer, 1979; Hayes, 1978; Kessel, 1977.
 5. In later work, Lowi has discussed a fourth policy type—Constituent (1972: 300). Like distributive policy, constituent policy is characterized by little coercion. Logrolling also exists but is more partisan. This policy category is typified by issues like reapportionment and creation of new agencies. It has not received much subsequent attention, however, and is excluded from the present effort. A different policy type (self-regulatory) has been offered by Salisbury and Heinz (1970), but it was deleted for essentially the same reason.
 6. The *National Journal* documents a tremendous surge of regulation beginning about 1970. Nearly half of the federal regulatory agencies have been established since then, and the number of pages in the *Federal Register* has more than tripled (January 19, 1980: 101).
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