business case study

i Jessica Peters is a pseudonym.

case W28C67 October 20, 2020

Andrew Hoffman

Brightline: Targeting a Successful Future with High-Speed Rail

Jessica Peters,i executive vice president of rail infrastructure for Brightline Trains, stared at the bumper-to-bumper traffc in front of her along the I-95 route to her offce in Orlando. Despite this being a regular sight on her daily drive from her home in Jupiter, Florida, it made the trip no less exhausting. She contemplated what it would be like to avoid this odious journey each day, and how such a reality may be feasible in the near future. Brightline’s successful implementation of Phase I of development—high-speed passenger trains between Miami and West Palm Beach, with an intermediate stop at Fort Lauderdale—left Peters optimistic about the company’s future, a future that could reduce such bumper-to-bumper traffc. Now with the construction of Phase II, the extension connecting West Palm Beach and Orlando over one- third of the way complete, Peters’ focus shifted toward determining how Brightline could ensure the launch of this extension would be successful.

Despite the success of Phase I inspiring confdence for similar results in the future, Peters recognized the company was at a critical point. With a limited budget, she must determine how to market and position Brightline’s expansion to capture the attention and interest of potential riders, ensuring strong adoption rates upon launching operations. With investors looking for returns, Phase II needed to have a successful launch. Which segment—business or leisure travel—was more impacted by the congested routes and had a higher likelihood to switch transportation modalities? To what extent should Brightline target both business and leisure travelers for the new route? What were the risks and benefts of prioritizing a particular target market? How should Brightline position itself to reach each target market? Was it possible to be sustainable with private funding only?

Overview of High-Speed Rail

High-speed rail (HSR) aims to be time-competitive with both airplanes and automobiles. The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) defned HSR as a form of travel whose

Published by WDI Publishing, a division of the William Davidson Institute (WDI) at the University of Michigan.

© 2020 Kunaal Kapadia, Nisha Patel, Emma Phillipson and Serena Wang. This case was written by University of Michigan students Kunaal Kapadia, Nisha Patel, Emma Phillipson and Serena Wang, under the supervision of Andrew Hoffman, Holcim (US) Professor of Sustainable Enterprise, a position that holds joint appointments at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business and School for Environment and Sustainability. The case was prepared as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a situation. The case should not be considered criticism or endorsement and should not be used as a source of primary data.

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cruising speed ranges from 100 to 500 miles per hour (mph).1 The European Union defned it as capable of reaching at least 150 mph on HSR-specifc rail lines or 125 mph on upgraded existing lines.2 Whether at top speed or less, HSR trains shared one critical commonality: use of continuous welded rail. This feature reduced vibrations and discrepancies that could occur between rail segments, allowing safe use above 120 mph.3 The FRA had a system of classifcation for railroad track quality ranging from 1 to 9 (see Appendix A).4,5 Each classifcation defned the track’s tolerances for particular speeds, thus setting the speed limits for freight and passenger trains.

A 2019 study of Italian HSR found there were three general sources of its riders. The frst was passengers acquired from conventional rail, followed by those formerly using air transport, and then induced demand. Induced demand was generated from people who would not have otherwise traveled or who were willing to increase the frequency of their trips as a result of the introduction of HSR.6 In general, although induced demand initially contributed little to the total HSR demand, within a few years of the rail’s opening it accounted for approximately 10-20% of ridership.7

By increasing connectivity and reducing travel time between cities, HSR can bolster economic activity within the area surrounding the rail’s tracks, either by catalyzing new growth or unlocking existing growth potential.8 In cities with low economic growth, HSR can act as a catalyst by drawing in new activity that spurs economic development. For cities with strong local economies and high economic potential, such as metropolitan centers or capitals, the introduction of HSR facilitates development and may act as much- needed infrastructure to support the city’s growth. HSR-linked areas were found to attract residents and businesses due to HSR’s superior level of connectivity compared to non-linked areas. As a result, economic growth and development were redistributed to HSR-linked areas.9

An example of such growth is Japan’s Shinkansen railway stations, which opened in 1964. Regions with direct connection to the Shinkansen stations were found to have higher employment growth compared to those without this accessibility.10 Additionally, the presence of these stations improved tourism, that rose from 15% to 25% from 1964 to 1975. These areas became city centers, offering transit terminals, hotels, offces, retail, dining and cultural facilities, and parking.11 Overall, the stations had an above-average impact on redevelopment of the surrounding areas compared to existing stations, indicating further HSR development might result in similar, positive economic development.12

Environmental Sustainability in High-Speed Rail

Transportation was a primary source of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion, accounting for 36.3% of the country’s CO

2 emissions in 2018.13 Transporation via passenger automobiles,

commercial aircraft, and rail constituted 41.2%, 6.9%, and 2.3% respectively of the total U.S. transportation CO2 emissions.14 Comparatively, HSR’s improved energy effciency made it much less of a polluter.

HSR’s lower emissions were attributed to reduced technology and operating costs achieved through effcient route planning, superior aerodynamic design, and fewer stops. HSR’s design reduced aerodynamic drag, which allowed faster acceleration.15 Fewer stops reduced the energy dissipated from acceleration and brake activation. Finally, more direct routes decreased wasted travel miles experienced with other transportation modalities such as hub-and-spoke air travel with connecting fights.16

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HSR produced the least emissions per passenger kilometer (17g of CO 2 ), followed by buses (30g),

automobiles (115g), and airplanes (153g) (see Appendix B). This suggested that shifting travel to HSR could substantially reduce the negative environmental implications of the U.S. transportation sector.17

Inception of High-Speed Rail

Since its introduction in the mid-1960s, HSR came to serve (by 2020) 20 countries and 1.6 billion passengers annually with 28,000 miles of track.18 This growth came primarily in Asian and European countries, principally Japan, France, and China.19 The reasoning behind introducing HSR varied from country to country, with some focused on reducing travel times, and others on offering an environmentally sustainable alternative to air and road transport.20

Japan’s frst high-speed railway opened in 1964.21 The Tokaido bullet train line, connecting Tokyo and Osaka, was built to meet transportation demand and serve as a preliminary step to revolutionize Japan’s entire transport infrastructure to meet the needs of the country’s rapidly growing economy. Japan went on to integrate nine more high-speed rail systems that reached speeds of approximately 200 mph.22 In 2018, Japan’s high-speed network spanned 1,890 miles and served roughly 355 million passengers annually.23 The network cost approximately $54 million per mile to implement.24 Travelers could take the three-hour train ride from Tokyo to Osaka for roughly $125, compared to the approximately $110 plane ticket cost and two- hour long fight.25

Seventeen years after Japan introduced high-speed rail, France opened Europe’s frst high-speed rail between Paris and Lyon. France went on to deploy over 1,700 miles of high-speed rail lines throughout the country, capable of speeds up to 200 mph.26 The cost for implementation was over $47 million per mile.27 For a passenger, the Paris-Lyon trip was $75, compared to $115 via plane, with the travel times very similar.28 Most of Europe adopted the same speed, voltage, and signaling in order to increase the feasibility of inter-country rails. This allowed development of HSR in Spain, Germany, Belgium, and Britain, including cross-border links between Italy and France, with stops in Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia.

China launched HSR before hosting the 2008 Beijing Olympics with a 75-mile, 217-mph track between Beijing and Tianjin. The train featured magnetic levitation (maglev) and reached 268 mph between Shanghai and Shanghai Pudong International Airport. Maglev trains use magnetic repulsion to levitate slightly above the ground29 and can travel very fast, with lower maintenance costs as a result of less wear and tear due to no contact between the train and the guideway.30 But maglev trains cannot use existing rail and, therefore, require high upfront investment.31 China dramatically expanded its use of HSR, with over 21,000 miles of track, accounting for nearly 70% of the HSR track in the world. In 2019, China’s HSR served over 2.29 billion passenger trips, with ridership expected to grow 8% annually.32

The Beijing-Shanghai HSR journey cost passengers $85 and took about seven hours. The same route cost airplane passengers $110 for a four-hour trip.33 (See Appendix C for rail/airline comparisons). The Chinese government set train ticket prices substantially lower than airfare to dissuade domestic air travel and recognized substantial growth in train ridership.34 By 2020, China had dedicated over $300 billion toward building its internal high speed capabilities.35 The government said it spent approximately $30.4 million per mile to implement high speed track.36

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High-Speed Rail in the United States

As HSR continued to improve transportation around the world, the U.S. Congress showed ongoing interest in its potential benefts.37 In 1965, Congress initiated development of the Metroliner, a fast train between Washington, D.C., and New York City.38 But, the United States had nothing comparable to the HSRs Europe and Asia. By 2020, HSR plans existed for California, the greater Northeast area, Texas, and Florida (see Appendix D for U.S. train lines that had some HSR features).

In 2008 California undertook planning for HSR development, and began construction in 2015.39 The aim was to connect northern cities Sacramento and San Francisco with southern cities Los Angeles and San Diego with trains that could reach up to 220 mph.40 However, development proved more costly than expected: 2008 projections estimated $45 billion in costs, while estimates in 2019 were closer to $80 billion.41

Construction costs rose to $89 million per mile of track for portions of the route, such as between Madera and Shafter, California.42 Expectations for the most anticipated service—San Francisco to Los Angeles— were that the HSR trip would take 2.5 hours and cost $90, compared to a $60 for a 1.5-hour fight.43 The rail advantages included no air travel and arrival points closer to downtown.

The Northeast Corridor (NEC) plan followed California’s efforts as the second-biggest U.S. HSR project; this multi-phase development, spanning from 2021 to 2040, would revamp the Acela Express’s aging infrastructure, insuffcient capacity, sub-HSR track, and gaps in connectivity.44 The project, NEC Future, aimed to improve connectivity and speed between Boston and Washington D.C., with stops in New York and Philadelphia. It dedicated $2.45 billion to provide pockets of high-speed rail capabilities on the Acela Express, with trains reaching 180 mph.45

Unlike the California and NEC projects, Texas Central Railway was a privately-owned HSR development started in 2014 that aimed to connect Dallas and Houston in under 90 minutes, allowing travelers to avoid a 3.5-hour drive.46 The $20-billion railway, that planned to cover over 240 miles, projected a cost per mile of $83 million.47 (See Appendix E for cost comparisons for track implementation per mile). The project planned for trains to leave every 30 minutes and reach speeds of 200 mph, using Japanese engines and cars.48 Texas Central endured legal battles over acquiring property from owners along the route49 but hoped to begin construction in 2020 and start operations in 2026.50

Funding was a primary constraint for HSR development in the United States.51 High upfront costs, long periods before revenue was generated, and little evidence that HSR could be proftable led to skepticism from potential investors.52 However, private investors recognized that HSR was a business model that disrupted historical rail transportation, thus making it a potential worthwhile investment. Further, as concerns grew over climate change and increased traffc congestion, HSR became part of the proposed Green New Deal, a resolution offered within Congress.53 Several governments, at both the national and state level,54 have chosen to implement Cap-and-Trade systems, utilizing proceeds from these programs to fund environmental initiatives, such as HSR.55 Under Cap-and-Trade, businesses are given a credit that represents the amount of CO

2] they are allowed to emit and can buy and sell credits in a government-run auction setting. In California,

for example, 25% of the proceeds from the Cap-and-Trade system were then used to fund the California HSR system, indicating such government initiatives can be utilized to fund HSR projects.56 The proceeds from California’s program, however, ultimately provided insuffcient funding required for the HSR development.57

High-Speed Rail Funding

HSR systems were typically funded in one of three ways: publicly, privately, or through public-private partnerships.

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California’s HSR project was an example of a publicly-funded system and received money from both the state and federal government. The frst funding came in 2009, with $2.5 billion in federal money allocated through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.58 In 2010, the system received an additional $929 million through a Transportation, Housing and Urban Development grant.59 In 2014, the state Legislature appropriated 25% of the annual proceeds from a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program, but its revenues were disappointing.60 Additionally, in 2019 the federal $929 million was revoked by the Trump administration,61

an example of how public fnancing can be unreliable or insuffcient to cover the extensive costs associated with building HSR systems. Funding approval was often contingent upon external factors such as economic conditions, political viewpoints, and other issues at the time.

Private funding was considered by some to be more viable. Texas Central’s funding came solely through private investors and private loans.62 Privately-funded projects needed to meet an investor threshold for likely profts that usually meant buy-in from the public to a greater extent than a government-funded service project.

A third funding route was through a public-private partnership (P3). According to the World Bank, a P3 “combines the strength of the public sector’s mandate to deliver services and its role as regulator and coordinator of public functions with the private sector’s focus on proftability and, therefore, commercial effciency.”63 As shown in Appendix F, the structure of P3s differed from traditional, publicly-funded projects, which were solely government-run. With P3s, a project company received funding through both the government and the private sector; control of the project was then allocated between each entity. Proponents said P3s could be a more feasible funding structure for bringing HSR to the United States, though it had not happened yet. P3s had been implemented in other countries for HSR, and for non-HSR projects within the United States such as toll roads.64 Portugal fnanced its Porto-Lisbon HSR through P3s.65

Brightline Background

Brightline, headquartered in Miami, Florida, was the only privately-funded and operated passenger railroad in the United States. It offered an alternative to driving on congested highways and taking on the inconvenience and expense of short airline fights. Brightline also challenged the traditional image of a train station as a stodgy single-story building with tracks below. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP, the designer of Brightline’s stations, “envisioned [the stations] not only as gateways to their respective cities, but also as iconic destinations, … flled with spaces to shop, eat, and meet.”66 Brightline’s Miami station, for example, contained two offce towers, retail space, a food hall, and 800 apartments.67 Moreover, by creating development around the stations, Brightline initiated opportunities for economic activity which was predicted to bring over $6 billion in investments to Florida’s economy by 2022.68 New offces and apartment buildings opened near the Miami and West Palm Beach Brightline stations in 2018.69 The Miami station connected to a 12-foor offce and retail building, with additional developments under way and access to other forms of mass transit.70 Similarly, West Palm Beach saw infrastructure improvements to improve pedestrian access to the Brightline station and surrounding areas with the building of a new road with sidewalks that connected to the station’s entrance.71

Brightline’s journey began in 2007 when Florida East Coast Industries (FECI), the parent company of Florida East Coast Railway, was sold to the Fortress Investment Group. In 2012, FECI announced its intention to build a privately-owned and operated rail system that connected Miami and Orlando that would leverage 200 miles of existing track in addition to building a new 40-mile corridor.72 Originally known as “All Aboard Florida”, the project was rebranded “Brightline” in 2015.

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Despite the benefts Brightline’s development could bring to Florida communities, the frm faced some scrutiny regarding its use of private activity bonds as a funding source. In 2015, Martin and Indian River counties fled federal lawsuits against the U.S. Department of Transportation, challenging the legality of All Aboard Florida’s use of $1.75 billion in tax-exempt bonds to fnance a signifcant portion of its private passenger train service, in addition to questioning whether the FRA’s environmental impact statement was adequate.73 The lawsuits were dismissed by a federal judge in 2017 after All Aboard Florida withdrew its $1.75-billion bond request.74 (For a summary of Brightline’s ownership and fnances, see Appendix G.)

Brightline’s route development was divided into three phases. Phase I trains connected West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale in January 2018, and then Ft. Lauderdale and Miami in May 2018. This phase utilized Class 4 tracks accommodating speeds up to 80 mph (see Appendix A).

In 2020, National Public Radio gave Brightline the title of the nation’s deadliest railroad after over 40 people were killed by Brightline trains.75 However, the majority of these deaths were ruled suicides, while most of the others involved individuals impatiently seeking to cross the tracks and ignoring bells, gates, or other warnings.76 Before Brightline had begun service, an FRA report by engineer Frank A. Frey said “the company was not exercising appropriate safety practices and reasonable care when designing for high speed passenger rail service.”77 This revelation resulted in growing pressure from groups such as the Alliance for Safe Trains for more stringent safety regulations,78 and Brightline agreed to integrate more stringent safety standards for the 170 miles of Phase II.79 This phase, which began construction in May 2019, would connect West Palm Beach and Orlando with Class 7 tracks allowing travel up to 125 mph.80 Phase III, which was still in the planning stage, was expected to cover 85 miles, also with speeds up to 125 mph, and connect Orlando International Airport and Tampa.81

Go-to-Market Options

To successfully launch Phase II, Brightline recognized its go-to-market strategy must include both business and leisure travelers. Given the frm’s limited marketing budget, Peters needed to evaluate the opportunities, risks, and potential returns of targeting each of these segments. Then, she could determine how to effectively market to each segment to ensure successful adoption rates. She also had to consider Brightline’s long-term goals in conjunction with the size of each market segment and the costs to reach them.

Comparisons between Brightline’s offerings along the Phase II route and other transportation modalities could be based on several criteria. Brightline would be the second-fastest mode of travel between West Palm Beach and Orlando International Airport, with airplanes frst, followed by buses, automobiles, and Amtrak rails, respectively, with passenger costs as shown in Figure 1. However, if Brightline applied the same Phase I rate of $0.30/mile to determine ticket prices for Phase II, HSR could be a more expensive travel option when compared to Amtrak rail and automobile.82 Brightline could raise prices for specialty offerings and ancillary services, such as business class tickets. Peters recognized the cost and time of travel could infuence which market segment Brightline could most readily reach. But she wondered what characteristics of the travel experience each market segment valued the most: time, cost, or convenience?

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Figure 1 Travel Mode Comparisons: West Palm Beach to Orlando Airport

Car Bus Airplane Amtrak Rail Brightline

Travel Time 2.71 hours 2.83 hours 1.16 hours 3.56 hours 2 hours

Price $94.22 ($0.57/mile)

$25-$58 $45-$180 $19 $45*

*Assuming use of Brightline’s previous rate of $0.30 per mile83 covering 170 miles of track84

Source: Created by the case authors using data from Wanderu.com, Accessed 21 Aug. 2020; Brightline, gobrightline.com, Accessed 21 Aug. 2020; rome2rio.com, Accessed 21 Aug. 2020; Spear, Kevin. “Brightline Passenger Rail in Florida: Trains Whisper, Doors Swish, Bubbly Flows.” Orlando Sentinel. 14 Nov. 2018. www.orlandosentinel.com/news/ transportation/os-ne-brightline-orlando-preview-20181114-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

Target Market Segments

Leisure

Florida’s large and growing tourism market indicated Brightline could see long-term benefts from effectively targeting domestic and foreign leisure travelers. The state accommodated 126 million visitors in 2018.85

Orlando and Miami were two top destinations.86 Tourism in Orlando hit new highs in 2018, with a record number of U.S. visitors (68.55 million, +4.1%) and international visitors (6.48 million, +5.4%).87 The Orlando International Airport maintained its ranking as Florida’s busiest airport, serving 47.7 million passengers (+6.9%), including a record 6.6 million international passengers (+11.64%).88 Miami also saw a high number of tourists in the same year, with 16.5 million overnight visitors and 6.8 million day-trippers (23.3 million visitors in total).89 International visitors accounted for 35% of the overnight visits to Miami and, with their longer stays, accounted for 54% of total visitor expenditures in the area.90 Likely due to the kid-friendly attractions the state had to offer, Florida was the top travel destination for multi-generational groups.91 Since Brightline’s Phase II Orlando-Miami route included the popular destinations Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach, tourists could travel this route multiple times during their vacations in Florida. (For Brightline’s Phase II route map, see Appendix H.)

When selecting a transportation modality, leisure travelers valued comfort and experience over travel time. According to Berkshire Hathaway, families with children tended to travel with more luggage and had more concerns about fying.92 HSR had the potential to provide a more comfortable and enjoyable experience. It was also a viable option for those traveling without driver’s licenses, an essential consideration for international travelers who may not be able to drive in the United States. Additionally, foreign leisure travelers generally spent more per day and per person. Although foreign travelers made up less than 10% of total visitors to Orlando, the average international traveler spent roughly $700 per day on transportation, souvenirs, and other tourism-related expenses.93 For travelers accustomed to traveling via air, rail offered many of the same conveniences without the additional stress and time of navigating the airport and airport security. Given the data about leisure travelers, Brightline might experience fewer hurdles in acquiring customers in this segment.

However, acquiring leisure travelers also might turn out to be a challenge for Brightline due to the traveler’s cost of switching from one type of transportation to another. Many domestic leisure travelers came to Florida via automobile and therefore were likely to use their vehicles for travel between Florida cities. In 2014, 56.3% of Florida’s domestic visitors traveled to the state by car, with the remaining 43.7% traveling by air.94 Brightline’s marketing to this segment would have to clearly communicate how it was a safer, more convenient, and more cost-effective form of transportation.

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Brightline could tailor incentive programs to specifc needs and preferences that might include developing partnerships with popular tourist destinations and brands, such as Walt Disney World, and/ or with hotel chains. To cater to larger families and touring groups, it could offer volume discounts. If Brightline developed such offerings and effectively communicated them to leisure travelers, it could capitalize on the strong growth of Florida’s tourism market.

Business

The business travel category included anyone that was traveling to, from, or for their jobs. In general, business travelers valued time, convenience, and control over amenities, at a reasonable cost.95 Many were willing to pay a premium for superior offerings.96 One study found that 30% of business travelers value travel times that best accommodate their schedule as their highest priority when booking transport.97 The study also found that 48% ranked controlling booking themselves as the most critical element of a corporate travel program.98

In 2019, Miami ranked 9th and Orlando 31st as having the most congested highway traffc in the United States.99 On average, Miami commuters lost 17.5 minutes per 30 minutes of driving during rush hour100 and those in Orlando lost 13 minutes per 30 minutes of rush hour driving.101 Utilizing Brightline could reduce business travelers’ daily travel time considerably, at least for those living near a Brightline route.

According to a report published in January 2017, commuting for work was the major use of public transportation in the U.S., accounting for 49% of trips, with shopping/eating out, recreation, and school accounting for 21%, 18%, and 6%, respectively.102

Beyond work commutes, HSR could be a viable transport modality for business travel required by employers, especially between major cities such as Miami and Orlando. Greater comfort and superior quality of services had been proven to attract business travelers away from air travel.103 Additionally, depending on the individual’s actual starting and destination points, HSR could be a total end-to-end timesaver compared to traveling through airports.

A challenge for Brightline in acquiring business travelers was that many businesses had established reduced-rate agreements with existing transportation modalities. Brightline would need to incentivize companies to enter into contracts for recurring travel, including ending existing contracts with other transportation options such as airlines and car rental agencies. Brightline would need to minimize its new customers’ costs of switching and persuade them that booking travel with Brightline was easy and quick. The potential reward of a foothold in the business travel market was signifcant, with contractual agreements ensuring recurring revenue and the opportunity to charge premium prices.

Structuring Brightline’s Go-To-Market Strategy

Peters glanced toward the traffc once more, wondering which of the cars held business travelers and which held tourists that could become Brightline passengers. She also wondered to what extent the company should focus on targeting each segment. How feasible would it be to acquire customers from each? How would this decision align with Brightline’s overall goals? How would the risk versus potential benefts of capturing each market compare? How could strategic partnerships help drive demand in the future?

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Appendices

Appendix A Federal Railroad Administration Track Classifcations

Class Description

1-3 Allow for the operation of freight and passenger trains from 10-60 mph.

4 The most common for commuter and passenger railroads, 60-80 mph.

5 Expected to become more popular as the demand for speed increases.

6 The threshold necessary for HSR trains.

7-8 Limited availability, primarily in Amtrak’s Northeast Corridor.

9 Allows 200 mph; none currently within the United States. Sources: “49 CFR § 213.9 - Classes of track: operating speed limits.” and “49 CFR § 213.307 – Classes of track: operating speed limits.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix B Comparison of Average CO

2 Emissions per Passenger-Kilometer in Europe

Note: Calculations for HSR were done using the average European electricity mix, a 75% load factor and the electric consumption of an Alstom AGV (0.033 kwh/seat.km) Source: Jehanno, Aurélie, et. al. “High Speed Rail and Sustainability.” International Union of Railways, Nov. 2011. https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/High-Speed-Rail- Sustainability-UIC-2011.pdf. Accessed 23 Sept. 2020.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix C HSR and Airplane Comparison of Travel Times and Ticket Prices

Source: Bachman, Justin, et al. “Watch Out, Airlines. High Speed Rail Now Rivals Flying on Key Routes.” Bloomberg, 9 Jan. 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/high-speed-rail-now-rivals-fying-on-key-global-routes. Accessed 23 Sept. 2020.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix D Prominent Rail Corridors in the U.S.

Corridor Length (Miles)

Motive Power Current Top

Speed (mph)

Current Average Speed

(mph)

Los Angeles - San Diego, CA 130 Diesel - electric 90 55

Chicago, IL - Detroit/Pontiac, MI 304 Diesel - electric 95 53

New York City - Albany/Schenectady, NY 158 Diesel - electric 110 56

Philadelphia - Harrisburg, PA 104 Electric 110 66

Northeast Corridor (NEC):

Boston, MA - New York City 229 Electric 150 68

New York City - Washington D.C. 225 Electric 135 82

Note: The top speeds listed for these corridors were attainable only on portions of the routes; for example, on the Boston-New York segment the top speed of 150 mph was attainable on less than 10% of the total route.

Source: Adapted from the Government Accountability Offce, High Speed Passenger Rail, GAO-09-317. March 2009, Table I; Average speeds from Appendix II, except Chicago-Detroit, Philadelphia-Harrisburg, and New York City-Albany calculated by Congressional Research Service based on those corridors’ fastest scheduled trips.

Source: Peterman, David Randall, et. al. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States.” Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 23 Sept. 2020.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix E High-Speed Rail Cost and Duration Comparisons

Rail Link Project Length Miles

Start Date

Finish Date

Schedule in days

Top train speed (MPH)

Cost in USD Cost/MI

Sunrail Phase 1 32 1/27/2012 2/28/2014 810 79 $ 650,000,000 $ 20,312,500

Sunrail Phase 2 18 10/25/2015 7/30/2018 761 79 $ 187,000,000 $ 10,388,889

Tri-Rail Segment 5 double tracking

44 1,400 79 $ 333,800,000 $ 7,673,563

NM RailRunner 18 4/13/2005 7/14/2006 457 79 $ 350,000,000 $ 19,444,444

UTA Frontrunner North

45 10/15/2004 4/15/2008 1,278 79 $ 611,000,000 $ 13,577,778

UTA Frontrunner South

45 12/7/2008 12/6/2012 1,460 79 $ 850,000,000 $ 18,888,889

California HSR Madera-Shafter

119 8/1/2012 12/31/2022 3,804 217 $ 10,668,743,740 $ 89,653,309

Cologne-Frankfurt High Speed Line

110 12/13/1995 8/1/2002 2,423 186 $ 6,900,000,000 $ 62,727,273

Berlin-Munich High Speed Line

387 10/1/1996 12/10/2017 7,740 186 $ 11,500,000,000 $ 29,715,762

Paris Lyon High Speed Line

254 12/7/1976 9/27/1981 1,755 198 $ 4,025,000,000 $ 15,846,457

Rhin Rhone Eastern branch (Genlis-

87 7/3/2006 12/11/2011 1,987 198 $ 2,658,800,000 $ 30,560,920

Lutterbach)

Tours-Bordeaux 188 2/1/2012 2/28/2017 1,854 198 $ 10,350,000,000 $ 55,154,668

Hokkaido Shinkansen

93 5/1/2005 3/26/2016 3,982 160 $ 5,053,211,009 $ 54,616,216

Tokyo-Osaka 320 4/20/1959 10/1/1964 1,991 175

Tanger-Kenita (Morocco)

116 12/10/2010 12/31/2018 2,943 198 $ 2,094,240,838 $ 18,120,182

Texas Central 240 $ 20,000,000,000 $ 83,333,333

Average $ 35,334,279

Per mile costs include land acquisition, station construction, vehicle maintenance facility, project management, and professional services costs Source: High Speed Rail Benchmarking. 10 Feb. 2019, Brightline, Miami.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix F The Public-Private Partnership for Portuguese HSR

Source: Huang, Teng. Financial Impacts of and Financing Methods for High-Speed Rail in Portugal. 2011. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thesis.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix G Ownership and Financing History of Brightline

Date Event Funding Received or

Revoked

May 9, 2007 Florida East Coast Industries (FECI), parent company of Florida East

Coast Railway, sold to Fortress Investment Group for $3.5B.

March 22, 2012 FECI announces plans for “All Aboard Florida” project.

October 3, 2013

All Aboard Florida secures the rights to use a strip of land along

SR 528 to build its fnal leg connecting tracks between Cocoa and

Orlando International Airport.

August 2014

All Aboard Florida applies for the sale of tax-exempt bonds raising

$1.75 billion for the rail project’s second phase connecting Orlando

and West Palm Beach.

October 29, 2014 Construction begins on Ft. Lauderdale station.

November 12, 2014 Construction begins on West Palm Beach station.

December 22, 2014 U.S. DOT approves a provisional allocation of private activity bonds

(PABs) for $1.75 billion to All Aboard Florida.

December 2015 U.S. DOT provisionally grants the $1.75 billion using tax-exempt PABs. $1.75 billion

September 30, 2016

In response to the Indian River and Martin counties lawsuit, All

Aboard Florida withdraws its application for $1.75 billion worth

of bonds and instead applies for a bond sale of just $600 million

(earmarked specifcally for Phase I of the project).

November 28, 2016 U.S. DOT withdraws approval of the $1.75 billion in bonds and grants

provisional permission for the $600 million bond sale. ($1.75 billion)

February 14, 2017 Fortress Investment Group is bought by Japanese conglomerate

SoftBank Group for $3.3 billion.

March 28, 2017

Florida East Coast Railway is sold to Mexican mining and rail

conglomerate Grupo México Transportes for $2.1 billion in cash. The

sale doesn’t affect Brightline, as spokeswoman Anne Marie Mathews

told the Miami-Herald: “Brightline is a separate company that has

dual ownership of the corridor and the right to operate passenger

service.”

May 10, 2017

A federal judge dismisses the lawsuit against the U.S. DOT fled by

Indian River and Martin counties, saying that since All Aboard Florida

pulled its original request for $1.75 billion in bonds, the issue is

moot.

October 30, 2017

Brightline wins approval from the Florida Development Finance Corp.

(a state-run fnancing unit that issues tax-exempt bonds to private

entities) to sell $600 million in tax exempt bonds for Phase I of the

rail project.

$600 million

December 18, 2017

Brightline asks the FDFC to be conduit issuer of a $1.15 billion tax-

exempt bond sale to fnance the Orlando leg (Phase II) of the rail

project. Just days later (December 22), the company announces the

USDOT had approved the bond allocation.

$1.15 billion

November 16, 2018 Virgin Group makes a minority investment in Brightline. Undisclosed

Source: “Timeline: History of Florida’s Brightline High-Speed Train Service.” Click Orlando, 11 Jan. 2018. www.clickorlando.com/enterprise/2018/01/11/timeline-history-of- foridas-brightline-high-speed-train-service/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Appendices (cont.)

Appendix H Brightline Routes in Florida

Source: “Brightline Route Map.” Virgin Miami Central. https://virginmiamicentral.com/brightline/brightline-route-map/. Accessed 23 Sept. 2020.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Endnotes

1 “High-Speed Ground Transportation for America.” U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Rail Administration, Sept. 1997. https://railroads.dot.gov/elibrary/high-speed-ground-transportation-america-cfs-report-congress. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

2 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

3 “High-Speed Rail.” Railsystem.net. www.railsystem.net/high-speed-rail/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

4 “49 CFR § 213.9 - Classes of Track: Operating Speed Limits.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/text/49/213.9. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

5 “49 CFR § 213.307 - Classes of Track: Operating Speed Limits.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. www.law.cornell. edu/cfr/text/49/213.307. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

6 Borsati, Mattia, and Daniel Albalate. “On the modal shift from motorway to high-speed rail: evidence from Italy.” Research Institute of Applied Economics, University of Barcelona, Oct. 2019. http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2019/201910.pdf. Working paper. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

7 Givoni, Moshe, and Frédéric Dobruszkes. “A Review of Ex-Post Evidence for Mode Substitution and Induced Demand Following the Introduction of High-Speed Rail, Transport Reviews.” Transport Reviews, vol. 33, no. 6, 2013, pp. 720-742.

8 Melibaeva, Sevara. Development Impacts of High-Speed Rail: Megalopolis Formation and Implications for Portugal’s Lisbon- Porto High-Speed Rail Link. 2010. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thesis. Dspace@MIT, https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/60807. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

9 Melibaeva, Sevara. Development Impacts of High-Speed Rail: Megalopolis Formation and Implications for Portugal’s Lisbon- Porto High-Speed Rail Link. 2010. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thesis. Dspace@MIT, https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/60807. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

10 Melibaeva, Sevara. Development Impacts of High-Speed Rail: Megalopolis Formation and Implications for Portugal’s Lisbon- Porto High-Speed Rail Link. 2010. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thesis. Dspace@MIT, https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/60807. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

11 Melibaeva, Sevara. Development Impacts of High-Speed Rail: Megalopolis Formation and Implications for Portugal’s Lisbon- Porto High-Speed Rail Link. 2010. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thesis. Dspace@MIT, https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/60807. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

12 Melibaeva, Sevara. Development Impacts of High-Speed Rail: Megalopolis Formation and Implications for Portugal’s Lisbon- Porto High-Speed Rail Link. 2010. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Thesis. Dspace@MIT, https://dspace.mit.edu/ handle/1721.1/60807. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

13 “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2018.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 13 Apr. 2020. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/fles/2020-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

14 “Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks 1990-2018.” U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 13 Apr. 2020. https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/fles/2020-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2020-main-text.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

15 Hassan, Rakibul, et al. “Numerical Study on Aerodynamic Drag Reduction of Racing Cars.” 10th International Conference on Mechanical Engineering, ICME 2013, Procedia Engineering, Dec. 2014.

16 Deakin, Elizabeth, and Blas Luis Pérez Henriquez. High-Speed Rail and Sustainability: Decision-Making and the Political Economy of Investment. Routledge. 2017.

17 Deakin, Elizabeth, and Blas Luis Pérez Henriquez. High-Speed Rail and Sustainability: Decision-Making and the Political Economy of Investment. Routledge. 2017.

18 “What Is High-Speed Rail?” High Speed Rail Alliance. www.hsrail.org/high-speed-rail. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

19 Molitch-Hou, Michael. “The Rest of the Industrialized World Has High-Speed Rail, Why Can’t the U.S.?” Engineering.com, 22 Mar. 2019. new.engineering.com/story/the-rest-of-the-industrialized-world-has-high-speed-rail-why-cant-the-us. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

20 Borsati, Mattia, and Daniel Albalate. “On the modal shift from motorway to high-speed rail: evidence from Italy.” Research Institute of Applied Economics, University of Barcelona, Oct. 2019. http://www.ub.edu/irea/working_papers/2019/201910.pdf. Working paper. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

21 “History of the Shinkansen: 50 Years of the Japanese Bullet Train.” Japan RailPass, 25 Jan. 2019. www.jrailpass.com/blog/ shinkansen-bullet-train-history. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

22 Nunno, Richard. “Fact Sheet: High Speed Rail Development Worldwide.” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 19 July 2018. www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

23 “Japan’s High-Speed Rail.” The Globalist, 9 Sept. 2018. https://www.theglobalist.com/high-speed-rail-japan-shinkansen/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Endnotes (cont.)

24 High Speed Rail Benchmarking. 10 Feb. 2019, Brightline, Miami.

25 Bachman, Justin, et al. “Watch Out, Airlines. High Speed Rail Now Rivals Flying on Key Routes.” Bloomberg, 9 Jan. 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/high-speed-rail-now-rivals-fying-on-key-global-routes. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

26 Nunno, Richard. “Fact Sheet: High Speed Rail Development Worldwide.” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 19 July 2018. www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

27 High Speed Rail Benchmarking. 10 Feb. 2019, Brightline, Miami.

28 Bachman, Justin, et al. “Watch Out, Airlines. High Speed Rail Now Rivals Flying on Key Routes.” Bloomberg, 9 Jan. 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/high-speed-rail-now-rivals-fying-on-key-global-routes. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

29 Wang, Serenitie, and Karla Cripps. “China Unveils 600km/h Maglev Train Prototype.” CNN, 24 May 2019. www.cnn.com/travel/ article/china-highspeed-maglev-prototype/index.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

30 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

31 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

32 Xinhua. “China’s Railways Report 3.57b Passenger Trips in 2019.” China Daily. 3 Jan. 2020. www.chinadaily.com. cn/a/202001/03/WS5e0eada7a310cf3e355824c4.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

33 Bachman, Justin, et al. “Watch Out, Airlines. High Speed Rail Now Rivals Flying on Key Routes.” Bloomberg, 9 Jan. 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-09/high-speed-rail-now-rivals-fying-on-key-global-routes. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

34 Bradsher, Keith. “Speedy Trains Transform China.” New York Times, 23 Sept. 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/ business/global/high-speed-train-system-is-huge-success-for-china.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

35 Nunno, Richard. “Fact Sheet: High Speed Rail Development Worldwide.” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, 19 July 2018. www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-high-speed-rail-development-worldwide. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

36 “Cost of High Speed Rail in China One Third Lower than in Other Countries.” The World Bank, 10 July 2014. www.worldbank.org/ en/news/press-release/2014/07/10/cost-of-high-speed-rail-in-china-one-third-lower-than-in-other-countries. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

37 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

38 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

39 “Connecting California, Expanding the Economy and Transforming Travel.” California High Speed Rail Authority, 2019. https://hsr. ca.gov/docs/communication/info_center/factsheets/Connecting_California.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

40 “California High-Speed Train Business Plan.” California High Speed Rail Authority, Nov. 2008. https://hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/ business_plans/BPlan_2008_FullRpt.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

41 Brinklow, Adam. “Likely Cost of High-Speed Rail Rises Again.” Curbed San Francisco. 2 May 2019. sf.curbed. com/2019/5/2/18527196/high-speed-rail-california-cost-estimate-overbudget-sf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

42 High Speed Rail Benchmarking. 10 Feb. 2019, Brightline, Miami.

43 Morrison, Geoffrey. “Is High-Speed Rail in the US Ever Going to Happen?” CNET, 10 Feb. 2019. www.cnet.com/news/is-high- speed-rail-in-the-us-ever-going-to-happen/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

44 “A Rail Investment Plan for the Northeast Corridor Record of Decision.” U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration, July 2017. https://www.fra.dot.gov/necfuture/pdfs/rod/rod.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

45 “Next-Generation High Speed Trains.” Amtrak The Northeast Corridor. nec.amtrak.com/project/next-generation-high-speed-trains/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

46 “About Texas Central.” Texas Central. www.texascentral.com/about/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

47 High Speed Rail Benchmarking. 10 Feb. 2019, Brightline, Miami.

48 “About Texas Central.” Texas Central. www.texascentral.com/about/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Endnotes (cont.)

49 Begley, Dug. “Opponents of Houston-Dallas Bullet Train Trumpet Ruling That Company Is Not a Railroad.” Houston Chronicle, 12 Feb. 2019. www.chron.com/news/transportation/article/Opponents-of-Houston-Dallas-bullet-train-trumpet-13607501.php. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

50 “Media Center.” Texas Central. www.texascentral.com/media-center/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

51 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

52 Peterman, David Randall, John Frittelli and William J. Mallett. “High Speed Rail (HSR) in the United States”. Congressional Research Service, 8 Dec. 2009. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40973.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

53 “Recognizing the duty of the Federal Government to create a Green New Deal.” Government Printing Offce. 2019. 116th Congress, 1st Session. https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/604-green-new-deal-resolution/e0c468643280097e630e/ optimized/full.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

54 “Cap and Trade Basics.” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 9 July 2020. https://www.c2es.org/content/cap-and-trade- basics/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

55 Stark, Kevin. “California’s Cap-and-Trade Program Generates Severely Reduced Revenue.” KQED, 28 May 2020. https://www.kqed. org/science/1965124/californias-cap-and-trade-program-generates-severely-reduced-revenue. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

56 “Capital Costs & Funding.” California High-Speed Rail Authority, hsr.ca.gov/about/capital_costs_funding/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

57 “Effect of Lower Cap-and-Trade Revenues on the High-Speed Rail Project.” California Legislative Analyst’s Offce, 4 June 2020. https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4252. Accessed 2 Oct. 2020.

58 “Capital Costs & Funding.” California High-Speed Rail Authority. hsr.ca.gov/about/capital_costs_funding/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

59 “Capital Costs & Funding.” California High-Speed Rail Authority. hsr.ca.gov/about/capital_costs_funding/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

60 “Capital Costs & Funding.” California High-Speed Rail Authority. hsr.ca.gov/about/capital_costs_funding/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

61 Adler, Ben. “Trump Administration Cancels Nearly $1 Billion in California High-Speed Rail Funding.” National Public Radio, 16 May 2019. www.npr.org/2019/05/16/724145472/trump-administration-cancels-nearly-1-billion-in-california-high-speed-rail-fund. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

62 “Learn the Facts.” Texas Central. www.texascentral.com/facts/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

63 Delmon, Jeffrey. “Creating a Framework for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Programs.” World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/22822/Creating0a0fra00for0decision0makers. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

64 “Public-private partnerships in the US: The state of the market and the road ahead.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, Nov. 2016. https:// www.pwc.com/us/en/capital-projects-infrastructure/publications/assets/pwc-us-public-private-partnerships.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

65 Huang, Teng. Financial Impacts of and Financing Methods for High-Speed Rail in Portugal. 2011. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Thesis. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

66 “SOM’s MiamiCentral Brightline Stations Open in Florida.” World Architecture Community, 18 June 2018, http://worldarchitecture. org/article-links/ehgve/soms_miamicentral_brightline_stations_open_in_forida.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

67 Vianna, Carla. “Offces Set to Open Before Brightline Trains Reach Miami.” Blanca, 13 July 2017. www.blancacre.com/tere-blanca/ offces-set-open-brightline-trains-reach-miami. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

68 “SOM’s MiamiCentral Brightline Stations Open in Florida.” World Architecture Community, 18 June 2018, worldarchitecture.org/ article-links/ehgve/soms_miamicentral_brightline_stations_open_in_forida.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

69 Kornfeld, Meryl. “Brightline Train Stations Boost New Development in South Florida’s Downtowns.” Sun Sentinel, 3 July 2018. www.sun-sentinel.com/news/transportation/f-reg-brightline-stations-redevelopment-20180703-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

70 Kornfeld, Meryl. “Brightline Train Stations Boost New Development in South Florida’s Downtowns.” Sun Sentinel, 3 July 2018, www.sun-sentinel.com/news/transportation/f-reg-brightline-stations-redevelopment-20180703-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

71 Kornfeld, Meryl. “Brightline Train Stations Boost New Development in South Florida’s Downtowns.” Sun Sentinel, 3 July 2018, www.sun-sentinel.com/news/transportation/f-reg-brightline-stations-redevelopment-20180703-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

72 “Timeline: History of Florida’s Brightline High-Speed Train Service.” Click Orlando, 11 Jan. 2018. www.clickorlando.com/ enterprise/2018/01/11/timeline-history-of-foridas-brightline-high-speed-train-service/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

For the exclusive use of B. Siwakoti, 2022.

This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Endnotes (cont.)

73 Winikoff, Mike. “Indian River County Loses Train Lawsuit.” Hometown News, 2 Jan. 2020. www.hometownnewstc.com/news/ indian-river-county-loses-train-lawsuit/article_f5eac45e-2d74-11ea-b563-a3be201ba165.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

74 “Timeline: History of Florida’s Brightline High-Speed Train Service.” Click Orlando, 11 Jan. 2018. www.clickorlando.com/ enterprise/2018/01/11/timeline-history-of-foridas-brightline-high-speed-train-service/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

75 Allen, Greg. “Florida’s Brightline Railroad Is Nation’s Deadliest After High Rate of Track Deaths.” National Public Radio, 29 Jan. 2020. www.npr.org/2020/01/29/799962246/brightline-nations-deadliest-railroad-after-high-number-of-track-deaths. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

76 Spencer, Terry. “New higher-speed Florida train has highest US death rate.” Associated Press, 2 Dec. 2019. https://apnews. com/0973281682ed4cc9bbd33a5fd569d5d5. Accessed 10 Sep. 2020.

77 Feltgen, Ann Henson. “Before It Became Nation’s Deadliest Railroad, Brightline Rejected Safety Fixes.” Florida Bulldog, 9 Jan. 2020. www.foridabulldog.org/2020/01/before-brightline-became-nations-deadliest-railroad-owners-rejected-safety-fxes/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

78 Allen, Greg. “Florida’s Brightline Railroad Is Nation’s Deadliest After High Rate Of Track Deaths.” National Public Radio, 29 Jan. 2020, www.npr.org/2020/01/29/799962246/brightline-nations-deadliest-railroad-after-high-number-of-track-deaths. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

79 Feltgen, Ann Henson. “Before It Became Nation’s Deadliest Railroad, Brightline Rejected Safety Fixes.” Florida Bulldog, 9 Jan. 2020. www.foridabulldog.org/2020/01/before-brightline-became-nations-deadliest-railroad-owners-rejected-safety-fxes/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

80 Roustan, Wayne. “South Florida Gets First Peek at Brightline Express Train.” South Florida Sun Sentinel, 11 Jan. 2017. https:// www.sun-sentinel.com/f-brightline-train-arrives-20170111-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

81 “Brightline High-Speed Rail Project, Florida.” Railway Technology. https://www.railway-technology.com/projects/brightline-high- speed-rail-project-forida/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

82 Spear, Kevin. “Brightline Passenger Rail in Florida: Trains Whisper, Doors Swish, Bubbly Flows.” Orlando Sentinel, 14 Nov. 2018. www.orlandosentinel.com/news/transportation/os-ne-brightline-orlando-preview-20181114-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

83 Spear, Kevin. “Brightline Passenger Rail in Florida: Trains Whisper, Doors Swish, Bubbly Flows.” Orlando Sentinel, 14 Nov. 2018. www.orlandosentinel.com/news/transportation/os-ne-brightline-orlando-preview-20181114-story.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

84 “Orlando Train Station.” Brightline. www.gobrightline.com/orlando. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

85 “Record 126.1 Million Tourists For Florida In 2018.” WLRN, 21 Feb. 2019. www.wlrn.org/post/record-1261-million-tourists-forida- 2018#stream/0. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

86 Zemler, Emily. “The Top Cities for Tourism in Florida.” USA Today, 15 Mar. 2019. traveltips.usatoday.com/top-cities-tourism- forida-38217.html. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

87 “Orlando Announces Record 75 Million Visitors.” Visit Orlando, 9 May 2019. www.visitorlando.com/en/corporate-blog/post/ orlando-announces-record-75-million-visitors. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

88 “Orlando Announces Record 75 Million Visitors.” Visit Orlando, 9 May 2019. www.visitorlando.com/en/corporate-blog/post/ orlando-announces-record-75-million-visitors. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

89 “Record Tourism Industry Performance 2018.” Miami and Beaches, 30 Apr. 2019. www.miamiandbeaches.com/press-room/miami- press-releases/record-tourism-industry-performance-in-2018. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

90 “Record Tourism Industry Performance 2018.” Miami and Beaches, 30 Apr. 2019. www.miamiandbeaches.com/press-room/miami- press-releases/record-tourism-industry-performance-in-2018. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

91 “Where did you go on your most recent multi-generational trip?” Statista, 2015. https://www-statista-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ statistics/426694/most-popular-domestic-destinations-for-multi-generational-travel-us/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

92 Smith, Deb. “5 Trends (And 6 Concerns) That Defne Today’s Traveling Families.” Berkshire Hathaway Travel Protection, 30 July 2019. www.bhtp.com/blog/family-travel. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

93 Peltier, Dan. “International Traveler Spending in U.S. Snapshot for November 2016.” Skift, 26 Jan. 2017. skift.com/2017/01/26/ international-traveler-spending-in-u-s-snapshot-for-november-2016/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

94 “Florida Tourism by the Numbers.” Visit Florida, 14 Jan. 2016. https://fvrma.wildapricot.org/resources/Documents/ tourismbynumbers.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

95 Perrotta, Adam. “What Business Travelers Want.” Business Travel News, 27 Sep. 2018. www.businesstravelnews.com/Management/ What-Business-Travelers-Want. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

96 Allum, Andrew, et al. “New Routes to Proftability in High-Speed Rail.” L.E.K. Consulting, vol. 21, no. 9, 2019. https://www.lek. com/sites/default/fles/insights/pdf-attachments/2109-High-Speed-Rail-Proftability.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

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This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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Brightline: Targeting a Successful Future with High-Speed Rail W28C67

Endnotes (cont.)

97 Perrotta, Adam. “What Business Travelers Want.” Business Travel News, 27 Sept. 2018. www.businesstravelnews.com/ Management/What-Business-Travelers-Want. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

98 Perrotta, Adam. “What Business Travelers Want.” Business Travel News, 27 Sept. 2018. www.businesstravelnews.com/ Management/What-Business-Travelers-Want. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

99 “Traffc Index 2019.” TomTom Traffc Index, 2019. www.tomtom.com/en_gb/traffc-index/ranking/?country=CA%2CMX%2CUS. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

100 “Miami Traffc.” TomTom Traffc Index, 2019. www.tomtom.com/en_gb/traffc-index/miami-traffc/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

101 “Orlando Traffc.” TomTom Traffc Index, 2019. www.tomtom.com/en_gb/traffc-index/orlando-traffc/. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

102 Clark, Hugh M. “Who Rides Public Transportation. The Backbone of Intermodal Lifestyle.” American Public Transportation Association, Jan. 2017. https://www.apta.com/wp-content/uploads/Resources/resources/reportsandpublications/Documents/ APTA-Who-Rides-Public-Transportation-2017.pdf. Accessed 21 Aug. 2020.

103 Hickman, Robin, et al. A Companion to Transport, Space and Equity. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019.

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This document is authorized for use only by Bishal Siwakoti in BUS3310 HBR Coursepack taught by Jonathan Schultz, Amberton University from Oct 2021 to Apr 2022.

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