

In 1983, the WPPSS defaulted on its revenue bonds because the revenue from the nuclear power electric generation did not meet debt service requirements. WPPSS defaulted on payments of \$2.3 billion in bonds issued to finance two nuclear power plants in the state of Washington. Epple and Spart argued that the default of the WPPSS raised that state's general obligation borrowing costs. Because the market held the jurisdiction responsible for repayment of principal and interest of this revenue bond default, potential GO bondholders viewed the revenue bond default as

Washington State Public Power Supply System (WPPSS)

Exhibit 8-6 shows the credit rating change for New York City. Notice from 1965 to 1975 the remarkable drop to a low of Caa. Also note that since 1977 the rating has improved. In the precrisis era, state and local governments sold their bonds without revealing much about their financial situation. Since the crisis, investors have demanded greater disclosure of facts about the community and bonds.

The nation felt the effects of the New York crisis, and North Carolina is one example. In *Southern City* Kenneth Murray (1976, 6) reported that a study by the Municipal Finance Officers Association (MFOA) showed "that the New York City financial crisis already cost local governments in North Carolina \$424,000 in first-year added interest costs on bonded indebtedness and \$5.1 million total in interest over the life of municipal bonds issued in 1975."

In April 1975, New York City hovered on the brink of default on its obligations. With help from New York State, the federal government, and others, it averted default, but two significant consequences emerged after the crisis. The first was that state and local governments now paid higher interest rates. The second was the financial community now required more elaborate financial disclosures.

New York City Financial Crisis

LOOKING BACK FOR FUTURE LESSONS: SOME IMPORTANT CASES

Investors treat revenue bonds much like private corporation bonds. State law often does not prescribe limits and the market establishes the limits. Investors examine forecasts of income to ensure local governments will meet their debt services and the investors' investments are safe.

Investment calling for a referendum on long-term indebtedness bond issues. tax imposed for servicing the debt. Another common state limitation is the procedural ping jurisdictions. Also state laws sometimes establish artificial limits based on the limits. This avoids greater taxpayer liabilities for citizens from two or more overlapping state laws add provisions so those jurisdictions that tax the same citizens have lower debt limits. Typically, they express the limit as a percent of the property tax base. Often Exhibit 8-5 illustrates that state constitutions and laws do establish artificial

agreement practices. The FTMS groups the indicators by factors, using historical profiles for each indicator.

EXHIBIT 8-5 State Debt Limitations of the 50 States

STATE	AMOUNT OF GO DEBT LIMIT	CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY	OVERRIDE PROVISIONS	AMOUNT OF SHORT-TERM DEBT LIMIT	CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY	OVERRIDE PROVISIONS
Alabama	U	C	—	\$300,000	C	—
Alaska	U	—	—	U	C	—
Arizona	\$350,000	C	—	—	—	—
Arkansas	\$1,350,000,000	C	—	N	—	—
California	U	—	—	—	—	—
Colorado	U	C	—	N	S	X
Connecticut	1.6 × Rev.	S	—	—	S	—
Delaware	—	S	—	—	—	—
Florida	—	C	—	N	—	—
Georgia	10% Rev.	C	—	—	—	—
Hawaii	—	C	—	—	—	—
Idaho	\$2,000,000	C	X	\$2,000,000	C	X
Illinois	—	C,S	X	15% total app.	C,S	—
Indiana	N	C	—	N	C	—
Iowa	\$250,000	C	—	U	S	—
Kansas	\$1,000,000	C	X	U	—	—
Kentucky	\$500,000	C	—	U	—	—
Louisiana	—	C,S	X	—	—	—
Maine	U	—	—	5% of G.F.	S	0
Maryland	—	—	—	\$100,000,000	S	—
Massachusetts	—	S	—	—	—	—
Michigan	—	C,S	—	—	C	—
Minnesota	3% non—ded. Rev.	—	—	—	S	—
Mississippi	1.5 × Rev.	C	—	5% of G.F.	S	—
Missouri	1,000,000	C	C	N	C	X

Montana	U	—	—	U	—	—
Nebraska	N	C	—	N	C	—
Nevada	2% of assessed val	C	—	—	—	—
New Hampshire	10% Rev.	S	—	\$125,000,000	—	—
New Jersey	1% of G.F.	C	Referendum	N	—	—
New Mexico	—	C	—	\$200,000	C	—
New York*	U	C/S	—	\$1,000,000,000	S	X
North Carolina	U	C	Popular Vote	50% yr. total	C	X
North Dakota	\$10,000,000	C	X	N	—	—
Ohio	—	C	—	—	C,S	—
Oklahoma	U	—	—	U	—	—
Oregon	—	C	Const. Amendment	—	—	—
Pennsylvania	—	C	Referendum	20% of rev.	S	—
Rhode Island	\$50,000	C	Referendum	\$150,000,000	C,S	—
South Carolina	—	C	—	N	—	X
South Dakota	N	C	—	\$100,000	C	—
Tennessee	—	S	X	N	—	—
Texas	5% of GR	C,S	X	—	—	X
Utah	20% of state appr. limit	C,S	C	—	—	—
Vermont	U	S	—	—	S	—
Virginia	9,425,434,000	C	—	3,310,975,000	C	—
Washington	7 or 9% of general Rev.	C,S	—	—	—	—
West Virginia	per amendment	C	—	per statute	S	—
Wisconsin	formula	C	X	10% of G.F.	S	S
Wyoming	1% assessed value	C	—	N	—	—
Puerto Rico	Annual pmt. < - 15%	C	—	—	S	—

Codes:
 C . . . Constitutional
 S . . . Statutory

U . . . Unlimited
 N . . . No debt allowed

Source: As adapted from National Association of State Budget Officers. *Budget Processes in States*, Washington, DC: NASBO, 2002.

EXHIBIT 8-6 Moody's Rating for New York City

DATES	RATINGS
07/65	Baa
05/68	Baa1
12/72	A
10/75	Ba
10/75	Caa
05/77	B
11/81	Ba1
11/83	Baa
07/85	Baa1
08/88	A
07/93	Baa1
02/98	A3

Source: *Moody's Municipal Credit Report*. Used by permission. City of New York, Bureau of Debt Management, 2002.

evidence that the jurisdiction managed itself poorly. Epple and Spatt posited that reputation costs affect borrowing across all jurisdictions within a state when a local bond default occurs. Moreover, following years of contentious bankruptcy proceedings, the jurisdiction did make some \$500 million in payments to bondholders.

Orange County, California

The more significant local government financial crisis was the Orange County situation discussed earlier in this chapter. Orange County, one of the wealthiest local governments in the world, defaulted on general obligation bonds. Prior to that time, American local government, with very few exceptions, considered GO debt "sacred," with governments going to great lengths to protect their GO bond rating. Overnight, Orange County changed the rules and traditional financial emergency signals, which this chapter explains later, were inadequate in dealing with poor financial management using derivatives.

What are the consequences of Orange County? Fortunately, investors did not abandon the municipal market, which investors had considered about the safest place to invest. Interest rates did not spike up, except for California issuers. Most of Orange County bond investors were money market fund managers, and they reacted by either buying at par or by acquiring letters of credit or portfolio insurance with the permission of the U.S. Security Exchange Commission. Fortunately, the bond fund managers sold off their shares to investors because they realized that the Orange County median family income was a full 20 percent higher than that of the state as a whole. Unfortunately,

Under chapter 9 of the federal bankruptcy law, the government facing bankruptcy must develop a plan of composition or financial adjustments. First, the eligible local government unit must file a voluntary petition for bankruptcy and a plan of composition with the petition. Those holding 51 percent of the securities affected by the plan must accept it. Upon filing, judges enter an order either approving or dismissing the plan. If approved, the resources of the debtor come within the jurisdiction of the court and the court fixes a time and place for a hearing. The court gives notice to the creditors, and others can file answers, and the court holds the hearing. After the hearing, the court may confirm a plan of composition that the creditors involved in two-thirds of the aggregate amount accepted. The court may but seldom does continue jurisdiction after the confirmation of the plan.

CAPITAL BUDGETING

Operating versus Capital Budgeting

Most local and state governments have two types of budgets: operating and capital. The operating budget deals with everyday types of activities. The capital budget deals with large expenditures for capital items. They differ in the nature of items that they purchase, the methods of financing, and even the accompanying decision-making process. In most instances, government depletes operating expenses in a single year. Typically, capital items have long-range returns and useful life spans, are relatively expensive, and have physical presence, such as a building, road, water supply system, or sewage system. Fifty-six percent of American cities have a separate capital budget, and 73 percent of cities over 100,000 have them. Over forty states have capital budgets. Interestingly, the U.S. federal government does not have a capital budget, but the U.S. General Accounting Office champions this reform strongly.

The most significant difference between operating and capital budgeting is the method of financing. Governments finance capital budget items through borrowing, but they can also fund them by saving money over a period of years for the capital item or by using grants, special assessments, and the general revenue fund. Because government debts are often complex and can create financial hardships if local governments manage them incorrectly, state laws, not surprisingly, do establish debt limits (usually associated with the assessed value of property). Also, states often require equalization rates to ensure consistent treatment throughout each state. The debt limits vary from state to state, and there are exceptions to the limit and application of equalization rates. Some local governments shift as many expenses as possible from operating to capital budgets. For example, in both West Point, Mississippi, and New York City, the local governments called bond uniform capital budget items. This tendency can lead to corruption of the concept of a capital item to such an extent that the government has two operating budgets, with one financed through borrowing. That situation in turn leads to overuse of bonding, greater government resources used for debt retirement, and proportionately less money used to meet operating budget demands. Eventually, the debt can become large enough that a government cannot meet its payments, and the community must face the possibility of management bankruptcy. Tradition-

