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Institute of Pacific Relations

Social Controls in Communist China Author(s): A. Doak Barnett Source: Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 22, No. 5 (Apr. 22, 1953), pp. 45-48 Published by: Institute of Pacific Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3023706 Accessed: 22-04-2018 21:39 UTC

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f&t Cast&iM Siviuotj AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

Social Controls in Communist China By mass organization, indoctrination, and police state methods, the Chinese people have been brought under effective Communist discipline.

BY A. DOAK BARNETT

The first three years of Communist rule in China have been a period of consolidation of power. Many, if not most, of the Chinese Communists' policies during this phase of their program have been frankly transi- tional. Land distribution has been carried out to achieve the "elirnination of the landlords as a class" and to

pave the way for steps toward collectivization. Industrial production has been restored, and controls have been established over private enterprise, to make possible comprehensive state planning. And, as prescribed by the Common Program in 1949, the "people of all circles have been fully organized," preliminary to introduction of a more regularized, permanent system of government based upon people's congresses.

The task of organizing and achieving effective social control over the entire populace has received top priori- ty, because in the last analysis this has been a pre- requisite for implementation of all of the Chinese Communists' other policies, and the recent announce- ment that people's congresses are to be elected during 1953 is a significant indication that the Chinese Com? munists themselves now believe that their controls are

adequate and dependable enough to permit this step. The myth, formerly accepted by many people, that

no regime could effectively organize and discipline the Chinese people, seems to have been exploded. Reports from refugees and persons expelled from China since the Communist takeover give a startling picture of regimentation. It appears that in three short years the

Mr. Barnett, an associate of the Institute of Current World Affairs, has spent many years in China, including some months under Communist rule, and returned in December from a period of study in Hongkong. He is currently working with the American Universities Field Staff. The present article was presented as a paper at the recent meeting of the Far Eastern Association,

Chinese Communists have in fact accomplished what must rank with the most phenomenal feats of social organization in history.

The type of control which the Communists have es- tablished over the Chinese people is not remote control exercised only at the top levels of administration. The Communists have constructed an organizational ap- paratus which reaches deep into the grass-roots levels of the country and into the privacy of people's lives. Al- though our knowledge of this apparatus is still incom- plete, the general outlines are sufficiently clear. In this brief paper I shall discuss some of the instruments and techniques of control which the Communists have de? veloped in China.

The Communist Party itself is, of course, the con- trolling nerve center in the body politic of China today, and its cells and ganglia are located in every part of the country. The quarter of a million basic party branches, containing approximately six million members, are distributed among villages, factories, and organiza- tions, and these branches direct the control apparatus at every level.

Lack of space precludes a lengthy discussion of the

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party, but it should be noted in passing that the crea- tion of a disciplined party?a Leninist elite organized according to the principles of "democratic centralism" ?has been one of the Chinese Communists' most re-

markable accomplishments, for they have succeeded where others in China have tried and failed. How

have they been able to achieve disciplined unity and sup- press or control the factionalism which has plagued other Chinese political groups? There can be no simple answer, but two important factors are worth men- tioning. Despite rapid expansion of the party they have maintained tight controls over membership through careful selection, screening, indoctrination, and proba- tionary testing. In addition, the concept of inner party struggle has been extremely important. The process of inner party struggle might be described as a ceaseless purge?not in the sense of physical liquidation but rather of ideological purification, with the weapons of criticism and self-criticism, designed to maintain standards of loyalty, discipline, and orthodoxy.

Party "Leadership" Backed by Force The controlling position of the Communist Party in

China, and of its members in any situation in the coun? try, is sanctioned by the principle of leadership, ac? cording to which all other groups must defer to the alleged superior wisdom and authority of the Com? munists, or risk being classified as reactionaries or counter-revolutionaries. The sanction of force is also

essential, however. The Communist Party in China came to power by military means, and the role of military force has continued to be important. Public Security units of the army garrison key centers throughout the country and provide support to the political function- aries of the party even when the military remains in the background.

The controlled use of violence, terror, and class warfare in the Comunists' mass campaigns during the past three years has also clearly indicated to the Chi? nese people that the members of the Communist Party are backed by effective weapons of physical coercion, even when they rely on persuasion to achieve many of their aims. The hundreds of thousands of "unde-

sirable elements" publicly executed during the agrarian reform program and the campaign against counter-re? volutionaries do not represent a large proportion of the Chinese population in percentage terms, but the execu- tions have created an atmosphere of fear and an at- titude of submissiveness which affect the majority of the population, and they have removed many of the potential leaders of opposition. Class warfare in both countryside and city, furthermore, has undermined the solidarity of local interests which might have joined in opposition to the Communists.

The legal vacuum in which the Chinese Communists have operated since their takeover of power has also reinforced their controlling position. Upon assuming power the Communists abolished "all laws, decrees, and judicial systems" previously existing in China, and although a few laws, and many decrees with the force of law, have issued from the Communist-controlled Central People's Government since then, no general codification has yet been completed. In this situation there has been no possibility of appeal to previous laws, customs, or traditions against the policies of the Com? munist Party or the will of its local functionaries. The Communist-established People's Courts have been re- sponsible for enforcing policies more often than laws, and the regulations establishing the courts specifically state that "Where no [legal] provisions have been made, the policy of the Central People's Government [for which one could substitute: Chinese Communist Party] shall be adhered to."

The few definite laws which have been promulgated merely provide "legal" justification for the revolutionary policies of the Chinese Communist Party, and are generally applied ex post facto to the period prior to the Communist takeover. The vague terminology in many of the laws, furthermore, leaves ample room for interpretation according to the whims of local party leaders. The regulations for the punishment of counter- revolutionaries, for example, authorize severe punish? ment, including even the death sentence, for such vague crimes as "conducting counter-revolutionary pro- paganda and agitation" and "fabricating and spreading rumors."

All of these factors?the discipline within the Com? munist Party, the unchallengeable principle of party leadership, the ever-present backing of military force, the selective use of terror, the elimination of potential opposition leaders, the social disruption of class warfare, and the use of law to support revolutionary political action?help to explain how a minority of one to two percent of the population has been able to carry through the organizational, propaganda, and indoctrina- tion programs through which they have established ef- fective social control over approximately 450 million people.

Non-Party Activists The Communist Party does not rely solely upon its

own membership to establish control over the popula? tion as a whole, however, for the role of non-party kanpu, or political workers, is extremely important. Recruited largely from youth, and from the "activists" who emerge in every locality during Communist-con- ducted mass campaigns, these political workers are sup- ported by the party and subjected to its discipline.

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Literally millions of them have been mobilized during the past three years.

These workers, after they have been indoctrinated, trained, and organized in small groups, are sent on as- signments all over the country, to work directly in contact with the masses and to help implement Com? munist policies. They are, in effect, a tremendous corps of political extension workers who help bridge the gap between high-level decisions and inplementation of these decisions at the grass-roots level. In short, the Chinese Communists, when they want to carry out a policy, do not merely issue orders and instructions, or rely solely on the established bureaucracy to carry them out. They also dispatch specially trained groups of party members and non-party political workers to assist the regular party and government hierarchy in im- plementing the policies. There has been no shortage of volunteers for this political work. For youth the work provides an outlet for energy and enthusiasm and a sense of participating in important activities. For any- one, furthermore, virtually the only stepping-stone to prestige, influence, and power in China today is po? litical work of some sort.

Wide Impact of Mass Organizations One of the principal responsibilities of party mem?

bers and political workers is the development of mass political organizations, and these organizations are an important element in the Chinese Communists' appa? ratus of control. It is not an exaggeration, I believe, to say that their ultimate aim is to bring all people, ex- cept for elements branded as political pariahs, into mass organizations under party control, and considerable progress has already been made in that direction. All of these organizations carry out propaganda, agitation, indoctrination, and other activities, and they are un- doubtedly the agencies through which the Communist Party apparatus has the widest impact in making itself felt upon the average individual.

Mass political organizations serve a dual purpose. On the one hand they mobilize the energy and enthu? siasm of supporters of Communist policies and direct them into channels considered important by the re- gime. They also facilitate surveillance, intimidation, and control of non-supporters. Such organizations have been established for peasants, urban laborers, women, stu- dents, and youth, indeed, for almost every identifiable group in the arts or professions, and even for business- men. Each is established on a national basis and is

organized according to the principles of "democratic centralism."

Supporting organizational control measures of this kind, the Chinese Communists have established ideolog- ical controls of an extremely effective sort and have

progressed very far toward their aim of complete thought control. In many respects their techniques of propa- ganda and indoctrination, utilizing mass psychology, are the most distinctive feature of the regime they have set up. The Chinese Communists, at least at this stage, seem to rely more on the control of people's min<is, and less on crude police repression, than their mentors in the Soviet Union.

The volume of propaganda output in China today is staggering. The Chinese Communists do not confine themselves to modern means of communicating ideas, such as radio, motion pictures, the press, and publica- tions?although these are devoted wholly to propa? ganda purposes. In addition, propaganda themes, slo- gans, and symbols are injected into entertainment media such as operas and rural story-telling, into all the arts including painting, drama, music, and dancing, and even into industrial products, for example, machine- knitted garters which bear slogans such as "Aid Korea and Oppose America."

Great stress is also placed upon meetings, parades, demonstrations, and oral propaganda. A propaganda network of oral agitators, who work directly under the party's propaganda machine and are fed ideas and material by it, is responsible for carrying the party line directly into people's homes. One of their mottos pro- claims, without a trace of humor, that they are to "replace family gossip with talks on current events." There are already over two million propagandists in this network.

Indocfrinafion by Discusslon Groups Even more important than propaganda as such in its

possible long-run implications is the method of indoc? trination through small discussion groups which is be? ing widely used by the Chinese Communists to indoc- trinate not only active political elements but also the mass of ordinary people in China today. The Com? munists' aim is to introduce "Marxism-Leninism and

the thought of Mao Tse-tung" as a universally accepted ideology, supplanting traditional Chinese ideas and values.

The indoctrination in these groups varies in intensity and is given various labels (most commonly it is called hsueh hsi, "study," or szu hsiang kai tsao, "ideological reform"), but certain basic principles are characteristic of the process in all its forms. The groups are small, usually with less than a dozen members. Almost always one or more members have been previously indoctrin- ated, and one is designated group leader, who reports attitudes and opinions to higher authorities. Meetings are held at regular fixed periods, often for an hour a day, and they are generally convened at one's place of work. The subjects for discussion, and the material to

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be discussed?which may be contained in a pamphlet or newspaper editorial defining the party line on a particular question?are given to the groups, whose members are then expected to discuss thoroughly all aspects of the question under consideration. Discussion of a single question may be extended over several weeks, or even months.

One aim of the discussion process is to have aired all possible heterodox views and then to have the group demolish them through criticism and self-critic- ism. A premium is placed upon confession of past errors. No one can be a passive participant in such a group, and discussion on a question is not ended until each mem- ber expresses acceptance of the "correct" party line. If, after prolonged discussion, a member persists in holding out against the orthodox viewpoint, he runs the risk of punishment?which may be more intensive indoctrination or something worse. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of this group indoctrination is the way in which intense social pressure is generated within the group, by the participating members themselves, to force complete conformity, at least on the surface, with the Communist-approved line.

So far, I have not even mentioned the hierarchy of government itself as an instrument of social control in Communist China, although obviously the government bureaucracy, which is controlled by the Communist Party, is extremely important. And during the past three years this bureaucracy has expanded both in its size and in its functions.

Two general categories of controls over the popula? tion exercised by the government bureaucracy at the lower levels of society deserve at least brief mention here. Since their takeover of power the Communists have transformed and adapted traditional forms of neighborhood organizations which have a long history in China. They have also adapted and refined modern techniques of police state control which are a more recent innovation.

Neighborhood Associations The Pao-Chia system reintroduced by the Chinese

Nationalists to organize and control the population was a major target of Chinese Communist fulmination prior to 1949, and the system was abolished when the Communists took over power. But in its place a new sys? tem of an almost identical nature has been set up in China's cities. The principal change has been a simplifi- cation of the structure in which one level of organiza? tion, the Residents' Committee (Chu Min Wei Yuan Hui) has been substituted for both Pao and Chia. If anything, however, the new neighborhood associations seem to be under more effective control than their pre- decessors, owing to an expansion of the number of

Public Security Police Outposts (Pai Chu So) which closely supervise them.

In the countryside, the situation is somewhat dif- ferent, but the result appears to be about the same. In each village the Peasant Association, which at least for a period of time has extraordinary powers and serves as a revolutionary junta to carry out land reform, and the village Militia Unit, organized on a permanent basis, seem to have taken over the control functions of the old Pao-Chia system. In both city and country the government bureaucracy at all levels has Public Se? curity Bureaus whose responsibilities include general political control as well as maintenance of order.

Secret Police and Informers

Secret police organizations exist in Communist China under both the Ministry of Public Security of the government and the Bureau of Social Affairs of the par- ty's Central Committee, but not a great deal is known of their operations. They do not appear to be as omni- present as their counterparts in the Soviet Union. One important public manifestation of police state controls, however, is a system of so-called Public Security Com- mittees, established on a nation-wide basis in 1952. These committees, composed of three to eleven mem? bers each, are to be organized in every village, factory, institution, and organization in the country "to organize and lead the masses to help the government and public security organs to denounce, supervise, and control counter-revolutionary elements" and "to protect the state and public order." In short, it is an organized, nation-wide system of police informers. Anonymous de- nunciations have also been legalized and systematized by such devices as "people's opinion boxes" run by the local representatives of the Committee of People's Con? trol. These and similar measures have contributed to a

general atmosphere of mutual suspicion which effectively inhibits the expression of any opinions in conflict with the official line.

The total web of organizational and ideological con? trols in Communist China appears to have brought the entire population under control of the ruling group to an unprecedented degree. A situation has been created in which there seems to be little likelihood of successful

organized opposition to the Communists within China, regardless of the state of "public opinion," so long as the Communists can maintain their control apparatus.

The Chinese Communists are now using their control over the population not only to maintain their power but also to engineer one of the most thorough revolu- tions of modern times, for, as Mao stated in the summer of 1949, the Chinese Communist leaders regard the conquest of power not as the final aim of their revolu- tion but rather as the "first step in a 10,000-^" march."

48 FAR EASTERN SURVEY

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