

- and to the increase in the possibility that persons might be subject to an increase in State coercion if they are placed under surveillance. As such, then, it would not be inappropriate to hold that their concern with liberty is also a concern with autonomy.
28. The account of privacy that is offered here is an account of what it is for something (e.g., an item of information) to *be* private, rather than an account of what it is for a person to be *in a condition* of privacy. (As Adam Moore puts it, the concern of the account of privacy outlined here “is what should be considered a ‘private affair’—something that is no one else’s business.” “Intangible Property: Privacy, Power, and Information Control,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 35, no. 4 [1998], 372.) The focus of this account of privacy is thus different from accounts of privacy such as that developed by William Parent or Ferdinand Schoeman, for whom, respectively, “Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others,” and “A person has privacy to the extent that others have limited access to information about him ... the intimacies of his life, or ... his thoughts or his body.” W. A. Parent, “Privacy, Morality, and the Law,” in D. Johnson and J. Snapper, *Ethical Issues in the Use of Computers* (Wadsworth, 1985), 203 (reprinted from *Philosophy and Public Affairs* [1983]: 269–288), and Ferdinand Schoeman, “Privacy Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature,” in Schoeman, ed., *Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy*, 3. This difference in focus is important, for it explains why descriptive (rather than normative) accounts of privacy (such as Parent’s and Schoeman’s) do not compete with the normatively laden account that is offered here, and so there is no need to argue that this account is preferable to (e.g.) Parent’s.
 29. Thus, if persons did possess a moral right to privacy this pro-surveillance argument would not justify its violation. And this is true whether this right to privacy was purely a principle-based right, or one that was based on practical considerations (i.e., that such a right is needed to protect some more fundamental human good, such as autonomy or well-being).
 30. It should be noted that, unlike the type of surveillance argued for here, that which the Party subjected the citizens of Oceania to frequently *did* violate their privacy.
 31. For a discussion of the relationships that hold between privacy, autonomy, and the ceding of control, see Taylor, “Autonomy and Privacy,” 460–473.
 32. “There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment.... You had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized,” Orwell, 1984, 4–5.
 33. David Lyon offers evidence that shows that persons do not change their behavior when they are under surveillance once they realize that it is unlikely that their images will be accessed. See his discussion of the use of surveillance cameras in retail stores in *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life* (Milton Keynes, UK: Open University Press), 51, 62.
 34. Thus, if persons did possess a moral right to autonomy, this pro-surveillance argument would not justify its violation.
 35. The claim that the proliferation of surveillance devices will lead to an “Orwellian nightmare” occurs frequently in the philosophical literature on this subject. See, for example, Adam Moore, “Employee Monitoring and Computer Technology: Evaluative Surveillance V. Privacy,” *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Vol. 10, no. 3 (2000), 698. 36.
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