Question
Example 1: My Walk to Work
This morning I dropped my kids off at their daycare. I then turned down Harvard Ave and proceeded to walk toward SU. I soon arrived at Pine Street. I could keep going straight or go left. The light was red so I turned left (1). When I got to Broadway I could immediately turn right or cross the street and then turned. The light was green so I crossed the street and turned (2). I got to Madison and the light was red. There was little traffic. I briefly considered crossing illegally, but I wasn’t in a hurry so I waited for the light to change (3). I crossed the street to campus and went to my office.
Did I exercise free will?
Example 1: My Walk to Work
This morning I dropped my kids off at their daycare. I then turned down Harvard Ave and proceeded to walk toward SU. I soon arrived at Pine Street. I could keep going straight or go left. The light was red so I turned left (1). When I got to Broadway I could immediately turn right or cross the street and then turned. The light was green so I crossed the street and turned (2). I got to Madison and the light was red. There was little traffic. I briefly considered crossing illegally, but I wasn’t in a hurry so I waited for the light to change (3). I crossed the street to campus and went to my office.
Did I exercise free will?
Example 2: Divine Foreknowledge
Suppose that God exists, God created the known universe, and God is omniscient. Along with everything else, this would entail that God knew I would take this exact path to school today. And God can’t be wrong.
Did I have a genuine choice in the path I took? Did I exercise free will?
No, it seems not. My deliberation was an illusion, because it was predicated on my having a choice, but since God knows the future and God can’t be wrong, it seems I could have only chosen one path—the path I chose.
Example 3: Locke’s Locked Room
Imagine I have just woken up in my room after a nap. I consider getting up and going downstairs, but I voluntarily choose to stay in bed and scroll Reddit on my phone instead. Unbeknownst to me my kids locked the door, and I could not have left the room had I chosen to do so.
Do I have free will?
Two possible answers:
No, I could not have left the room if that is what I decided to do. I did not have the “ability to do otherwise” regarding this choice.
Yes, I voluntarily choose to stay. I was able to determine my will according to my desires. If I had chosen to read the book on my nightstand instead, I could have done that as well. I was free to determine my will even if I was not free to leave the room.
Example 4: A Murderer’s Threat
Imagined you witnessed a murder and the murderer threatens to kill your whole family if you snitch.
Do you have a genuine choice about telling the truth? And are you morally responsible for your choice?
Response 1. You are an unreasonable person (say zealously moral). You are so committed to truth and justice that the threat has no effect on you. Not an example of coercion.
Response 2. You are stampeded by the threat. You are so terrified by the penalty that you feel utterly compelled to keep the secret.
You are not morally responsible.
Response 3. You are compelled by the threat. The threat alone would make you keep the secret. But prior to this you had decided to keep the murder a secret anyway (say you were having an affair with the victim and you don’t want your spouse to find out).
You are morally responsible but you lack the “ability to do otherwise”
A different approach to free will
This is an example used by Frankfurt (1969) to show that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for moral responsibility.
In other words, free will traditionally conceived.
A difference between free action (external constraint) vs. free will (internal constraint).
We have free will, he contends, so long as we endorse or identify with the desires that cause us to act, even if we cannot avoid choosing what we do.
A Preview
| Determinism? | Free will? | Incompatible? | |
| Libertarianism | No | Yes | Yes |
| Hard Determinism | Yes | No | Yes |
| Compatibilism | Yes | Yes | No |
Chisholm (Monday) defends libertarianism.
Frankfurt (Wednesday) defends compatibilism.
G. Strawson (Friday) defends hard determinism.