help with article analysis social psychology

Received: 22 September 2021 | Revised: 9 February 2022 | Accepted: 10 March 2022

DOI: 10.1111/jasp.12871

OR I G I NA L A R T I C L E

Psychological bases of anti‐immigration attitudes among populist voters

Valerio Pellegrini1 | Marco Salvati2 | Valeria De Cristofaro1 |

Mauro Giacomantonio1 | Luigi Leone1

1Department of Social and Developmental

Psychology, Faculty of Medicine and

Psychology, Sapienza University, Rome, Italy

2Department of Human Science, University of

Verona, Verona, Italy

Correspondence

Valerio Pellegrini, Department of Social and

Developmental Psychology, Faculty of

Medicine and Psychology, Sapienza University

of Rome, Rome, Italy.

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

The ascent of populism has been linked with economic and cultural disruptions of

modernization. From this perspective, it could be implied that factors such as

psychological insecurity and uncertainty are key in making voters gravitate toward

the populist narrative. The present research aimed at highlighting the psychological

determinants that uncertainties deriving from modernization processes may activate

in populist voters. Specifically, we focused on immigration in Italy, investigating

whether and how support for different populist parties relates to development of

negative attitudes toward immigrants. Two samples of Italian adults (total N = 1655),

who voted in the Italian general elections of March 4, 2018 took part in the research.

Multigroup path analysis showed that assumption of anti‐immigration stances

through the joint mediating role of Dangerous World Belief and Right‐Wing

Authoritarianism was shared by different groups of populist voters. However,

different populist voters differed in the strength of the path passing through

Competitive Jungle World Belief and Social Dominance Orientation. Results

underline the relevance of social worldviews and ideological attitudes in shaping

the attitudes of the Italian populist electorate.

1 | INTRODUCTION

A growing literature has tackled the question of explaining the rise of

populism and its connections with immigration phenomena (e.g.,

Diehl et al., 2019; Hochschild, 2016; Zaslove, 2004). Research

focusing on populist voters often overlooks individual differences

characterizing this electorate and the psychological dynamics that

might explain their stances on a variety of issues (e.g., Ivaldi

et al., 2017). Support for populist ideology and the empirically

related expression of anti‐immigration attitudes are often traced back

to the economic and cultural changes that mark postmodern society

(Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012; Ibsen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2016;

Rodrik, 2018), and to the globalization processes which have

produced the so‐called “losers of modernization” (Betz, 1994).

Previous research has provided valuable insights about the

current varieties of populism. However, apart from recent excep-

tions (e.g., Fatke, 2019; Salvati et al., 2022; Van Hiel et al., 2021),

scant emphasis has been posed on the psychological reactions—in

terms of specific psychological variables—that lead people to

resolve their concerns through adhering to populism and endorsing

anti‐immigration attitudes. The present research attempts to

address this gap.

Populism has been conceptualized as a “thin‐centered ideology,”

lacking a central political core (Mudde, 2004, 2007). Because of this

J Appl Soc Psychol. 2022;52:449–458. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jasp | 449

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lack, populism often needs to lean on themes and issues belonging to

traditional ideologies. Such a distinctive characteristic of the populist

ideology suggests that support for it and the assumption of certain

stances on various social issues might be explained by resorting to

psychological factors that are key for endorsing classical ideologies.

For instance, sensitivity of populist voters to the immigration issue

might be explained through psychological dimensions that are

traditionally posed as the underpinning of political ideologies and

discriminatory attitudes toward outgroups. Dangerous World Beliefs

(DWB) and Competitive Jungle Beliefs (CJB; Duckitt, 2001) represent

prominent conceptual candidates to fill such a role. Belief in a

dangerous world and belief in a competitive jungle world were found

to be central antecedents of the ideological dimensions of Social

Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA;

Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt, 2001), which in turn are relevant

predictors of adherence to the ideologies of the classical left‐right

political spectrum (Conway et al., 2018; Duckitt, 2001) and of

prejudice (Asbrock et al., 2010). The present research thus focused

on how support for populist parties and movements is linked to the

adoption of prejudicial attitudes toward immigrants through beliefs

about the social world (i.e., DWB and CJB) and ideological attitudes

(i.e., SDO and RWA).

1.1 | Populism and anti‐immigration attitudes

As mentioned above, the thin‐centered conceptualization of populism

(Mudde, 2004, 2007) posits a void of typically populist policy tenets,

underlining that populism needs to rely on classical ideologies.

Political movements that clearly show such feature have risen to

political prominence across the world, assuming different ideological

shades. Populism represents a malleable ideology able to incarnate

under left‐ and right‐wing semblances (Ibsen, 2019). The shift toward

a left‐ or right‐leaning direction occurs as a function of which social

issues become salient in a particular context. In countries that have

been affected less drastically by the Great Recession (e.g., Northern

Europe and North America), populism materializes in its ethnocentric

right‐wing variant. In countries that still struggle to recover from the

financial crisis (e.g., Latin America and Southern Europe), populism

materializes in its left‐wing antielitist variant, focused on justice,

social equality, and redistribution.

Italy represents a peculiar case in which both economic and

identity‐threat issues became salient. Economic hardship was felt

acutely during the financial crisis and its aftermath (austerity) in the

decade before 2018 (Corbetta et al., 2018). This favored the spread

of antielitist sentiments against the so‐called “old politics,” allowing

hybrid populist movements (e.g., the Five Stars) to attract voters on a

platform of redistribution and fight against political corruption. At the

same time, a constant inflow of immigrants deftly framed as an

identity threat has allowed the use of nationalism and ethnocentrism

as viable political platforms (e.g., the populist right‐wing).

Copious research has shown that anti‐immigration attitudes

can be traced to natives' economic (e.g., Facchini & Mayda, 2009;

Hanson et al., 2007) and identity (e.g., Brown, 2011; Louis et al., 2010)

concerns. Immigration may represent a convenient issue to exploit as a

means to boost political gains. It may be framed as a threat to the

usages and customs of a nation, or it may be portrayed as the cause of

a potential drop in economic resources available for natives. Consistent

with this, Ivaldi et al. (2017) described how the Populist Right‐Wing

advanced an ethnocultural exclusionist conception of the people,

rooted in a nativist and nationalist ideology (e.g., “Italians first”). On the

other hand, the Five Star Movement, though not relying explicitly on

cultural and identity motives, opportunistically embraced the public

opinion's fear of immigration to compete with the Populist Right‐Wing

(Gerbaudo & Screti, 2017). The Five Star Movement added to the

narrative the topic of bad management of migratory flows by the

European Union (a quintessential elite) as the biggest failure of

traditional national parties (i.e., “old politics”). These narratives were

used to speak to specific portions of the population with characteristics

congruent to the electoral prototypes of the two parties. The Italian

populist right‐wing pressed traditional conservative issues as reducing

taxation, along with a strong emphasis on security and immigration

control. This message resonated particularly in the rich Northern

Italian regions and among small‐business owners and trades people

(Faggian et al., 2021). The five‐star movement, on the other hand, has

been followed above all in the less economically thriving regions of

southern Italy. It has made its themes typically associated with a left‐

wing ideology by proposing a redistribution of wealth or social support

systems such as basic income. Its message has resonated among the

young educated unemployed in Southern Italy (Faggian et al., 2021).

For these reasons, the five‐star movement has been likened to other

left‐wing populist movements such as the Spanish Podemos or the

Greek Syriza (e.g., Font et al., 2021). Despite this apparent socialist

semblance, the five‐star movement has repeatedly highlighted some

ideological contradictions, sometimes veering toward right‐wing

positioning on issues like immigration control.

1.2 | Psychological bases of traditional political ideologies and prejudice

Immigration undoubtedly has represented an issue on which the

Populist Right‐Wing and the Five Star Movement based their political

narratives and gained support among Italian voters. However, the

psychological motives that lead populist voters to be sensitive to the

immigration phenomenon remain unexplained.

Over the last few decades, some variables have been persua-

sively connected with enhanced prejudice and convincingly framed as

the psychological basis of the assumption of traditional ideological

stances. Specifically, SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) and RWA (Altemeyer &

Altemeyer, 1996) have been proven as stable ideological orientations

that characterize people's general views of intra‐ and intergroup

relationships (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002).

They have been shown also as relevant dimensions associated with

left‐ and right‐wing voting behaviors (e.g., Conway & McFarland,

2019; Conway et al., 2018; Crowson & Brandes, 2017), as well as

450 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.

with adhesion to conservative rather than liberal political orientations

(Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Wilson & Sibley, 2013).

Duckitt (2001) proposed that ideological orientations derive from

particular worldviews held by individuals. According to Duckitt, social

worldviews may in turn be stimulated by contextual factors that—or

are perceived to—characterize society, leading people to attribute

unpleasant characteristics to intergroup interactions. They can be

viewed as threatening the established society and consequently lead

to believing that the world is a dangerous place (i.e., DWB). Belief in a

dangerous world activates the need for control and security that is

expressed in authoritarian and conservative attitudes and values. It is

oriented to the defense of conventions and punishment of those who

threaten them (i.e., RWA). On the other hand, intergroup interactions

may be perceived as ungovernable and unregulated. People may see

the world as a lawless place, where only the strong rule—the belief in

a competitive jungle world (CJB). The view of intergroup interactions

as competitive and ruthless may elicit the need to defend and

maintain order and social stability through power and dominance, and

through attitudes glorifying inequality (i.e., SDO).

It could therefore be reasoned that the psychological uncertain-

ties deriving from cultural‐norm modifications and economic changes

could make these worldviews salient and lead individuals to adopt

ideological attitudes aimed at reducing such insecurities. The political

response to these processes could in turn be found in the populist

narrative and in the related firm adoption of hostile attitudes toward

minority groups (i.e., immigrants).

1.3 | Research hypotheses

Drawing on this reasoning, we aimed mainly at investigating whether

the dual process outlined by Duckitt (2001) could account for the

psychological dynamics characterizing the Italian populist electorate.

We aimed to explore if social worldviews and ideological attitudes

may represent the psychological underpinnings of the association of

the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing voting with anti‐

immigration attitudes. We anticipated that populist (vs. nonpopulist)

voters could show enhanced levels of the competitive jungle world

belief and dangerous world belief. These were expected to favor,

respectively, the adherence to ideological attitudes based on

dominance relationships (i.e., SDO) and susceptibility to the

traditional norms and conventions (i.e., RWA), which in turn should

positively affect the rise of hostile sentiments toward immigration.

Specifically, we would anticipate that:

Hypothesis 1. (H1): Populist voting was positively associated with CJB

and DWB.

Hypothesis 2. (H2): CJB and DWB related positively and respectively

to SDO and RWA.

Hypothesis 3. (H3): RWA and SDO were positively associated with

anti‐immigration.

Hypothesis 4. (H4): Populist voting was indirectly associated with

anti‐immigration attitudes through the joint mediating role of

DWB with RWA and of CJB with SDO.

We thus investigated the relationship between populist voting

and anti‐immigration attitudes, focusing on how it could operate

through different social worldviews and ideological attitudes.

2 | METHODS

2.1 | Participants

The predicted associations were examined for two distinct conve-

nience samples of Italian participants. The decision to use two

independent samples was made to increase the robustness of the

results and confidence in their generalizability across a relatively

short, though significant, time‐gap. The size of both samples was

established according to a power analysis specifically designed for

mediational effects. The analysis was performed by means of an R

application written by Schoemann et al. (2017), which entails a Monte

Carlo simulation approach. We estimated statistical power for a serial

mediation model, by setting a high power threshold of 0.90 and

conservative effect sizes (i.e., expected correlation of 0.15) among

predictors, mediators and criterion (Cohen, 1988). Following

Schoemann et al. (2017), we also opted for a large total number of

power analysis replications (5000) and wide coefficient draws per

replication (20,000). A sample size of around 700 participants was

needed to achieve a statistical power of .90.

Sample A consisted of 774 Italian participants (418 female,

Mage = 38.4, standard deviation [SD]age = 13.9) recruited by psy-

chology students who were instructed to enroll nonstudent adult

participants in exchange for extra course credits (i.e., snowball

sampling). 78.8% of the sample was indeed represented by

nonstudent adults involved in various occupations: 68.5% employed,

5.1% retired or houseworker, 3.2% unemployed. The remaining

22.2% were students. As for educational level, 4.4% had a lower

secondary school diploma, 45.2% a high school diploma, 39.5% a

degree, while 9.4% had a postgraduate qualification (for a detailed

description of the Sample A data, see Pellegrini et al., 2019).

Importantly for our research purposes, the data were collected in a

period immediately following the Italian general elections of March 4,

2018, when the first government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe

Conte had not yet been formed.

Sample B was recruited with the same data collection procedure

and answered the same questionnaire as Sample A. These data were

collected about 10 months after the general elections of March 4,

2018, during the month of January 2019, while Italy was governed by

the populist coalition formed by the Five Star Movement and the

League. Sample B consisted of 881 participants (476 female,

Mage = 46, SDage = 17.2), of which 79.5% were nonstudent adults

who varied in terms of employment conditions (59.1% employed,

16.3% retired or houseworker, 4.3% unemployed). The educational

PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 451

level was distributed as follows: 9.6% had a lower secondary school

diploma, 46.7% a high school diploma, 38.7% a university degree, and

5.7% a postgraduate qualification.

2.2 | Measures

2.2.1 | Self‐reported vote

Participants were asked to indicate for which party (e.g., Democratic

Party, Five Star Movement, and League) they voted in the Italian

general elections of March 4, 2018. In Sample A, the self‐reported

vote was distributed as follows: 23.3% Five Star Movement, 24.4%

Populist Right‐Wing Coalition, 19.9% Democratic Party, 12.3% other

left‐wing parties, and 12.8% abstained. In Sample B, 27.8% of

participants declared to have voted for the Five Star Movement,

14.6% for the Populist Right‐Wing Coalition, 32.7% for the

Democratic Party, 12.7% for other left‐wing parties, while

the remaining 12.8% abstained. Because of analysis purposes, the

reported voting behavior was coded into dummy variables opposing

populist (i.e., Five Star Movement or Populist Right‐Wing = 1) and

nonpopulist voters (i.e., the remaining voters and abstained = 0)1. We

considered this variable as indicating belongingness to specific

electorate clusters. We were thus able to investigate the distinctive

psychological processes that linked these electoral clusters to anti‐

immigration stances.

2.2.2 | Social worldviews

Participants answered two distinct 10‐item scales of beliefs in a

dangerous world and beliefs in a competitive jungle world (DWB,

CJB; Duckitt, 2001). A high score on DWB reflects the extent to

which participants deem that the social world is a dangerous and

threatening place, where the values and lifestyle of good and

respectable people are threatened by bad people. Items were rated

on a 7‐point Likert scale and then averaged to obtain an overall score

(Sample A: M = 4.05, SD = 1.0, α = .82; Sample B: M = 4.01, SD = 1.04,

α = .83). A high score on the CJB scale indicates instead the view of

the world as a place characterized by a ruthless and amoral struggle

for resources and power. Items were again rated on a 7‐point Likert

scale and averaged to get a whole score (Sample A: M = 2.51,

SD = 0.98, α = .85; Sample B: M = 2.39, SD = 0.93, α = .83).

2.2.3 | Ideological attitudes

As measures of ideological attitudes, participants were asked to

answer 10 items of the RWA scale (Altemeyer & Altemeyer, 1996)

and eight items of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994). RWA taps the

tendency to submit to the authorities, to adhere to the conventions

and norms of society, and to be hostile toward those who do not

adhere to them (Sample A: M = 3.54, SD = 1.02, α = .85; Sample B:

M = 3.11, SD = 1.28, α = .86). SDO gauges the adherence to an

ideological attitude based on support for the social hierarchy and the

desire that one's group is superior to the outgroup (Sample A:

M = 2.47, SD = 1.10, α = .87; Sample B: M = 2.09, SD = 1.03, α = .86).

Participants provided their answers for both measures on a 7‐point

Likert scale ranging from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”).

Responses to each item were averaged to obtain an overall score

whose high values corresponded to high SDO or RWA levels.

2.2.4 | Anti‐Immigration attitudes

Participants rated one item taken from the American National

Election Study (2016). It asked participants to select one of four

response options about the policies that the government should

adopt about immigration, ranging from permissive (“Allow irregular

immigrants to stay in Italy and apply for citizenship, without

penalties”) to restrictive political actions (“Make irregular immigration

a crime, and expel legal immigrants to their countries of origin”). The

average score of the item was equal to 2.45 (SD = 0.93) and 2.27

(SD = 0.78), respectively for Sample A and Sample B.

3 | RESULTS

The main aim of our research was to investigate whether the Duckitt

(2001) dual‐process model could weave the psychological dynamics

delineating the Italian populist voters. Thus, we tested a multiple

serial mediation model where voters of the Five Star Movement and

Populist Right‐Wing (vs. abstainers and voters of nonpopulist parties)

could develop negative attitudes toward immigration through two

parallel paths: on the one hand, passing through the dangerous world

belief and then RWA; on the other hand, through the CJB and then

through SDO. We therefore dummy coded the Five Star Movement,

Populist Right‐Wing, nonpopulist groups of electors, and abstainers

with two variables: the first, opposing Five Star Movement voters

(coded 1) to all other electors (coded 0), and the second, opposing the

Populist Right‐Wing electors (coded 1) to all other participants

(coded 0). By keeping constant the non‐populist group coding across

the two dummy variables, we were able to obtain a straight

comparison between the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐

Wing groups of voters with voters of nonpopulist parties. Differently

put, the mutual partialization of the two variables' associations

allowed us to interpret the unique paths that characterized the Five

Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing participants as opposed to

the nonpopulist participants.

We first examined zero‐order associations among the measured

variables (Table 1). They highlighted a positive relationship of the two

voting dummies with the DWB, and only of the Populist Right‐Wing

dummy with the CJB. Consistently with the Duckitt model, DWB and

CJB were respectively associated with RWA and SDO, which in turn

related positively with anti‐immigration attitudes. Analysis of zero‐

order association thus provided initial support to our expectations,

452 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.

suggesting that they could be profitably probed by means of a path

analysis model.

As depicted in Figure 1, the model thus specified the two dummy

variables opposing Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing

voters to the nonpopulist participants as the exogenous variables,

DWB and CJB as first step mediators, RWA and SDO as second step

mediators; anti‐immigration attitudes were modeled as the final

criterion.

The model was tested by a robust maximum likelihood method,

with the Huber–White correction. We used this correction since we

were also interested in testing indirect associations, which are

conventionally not normally distributed. Analysis was conducted with

lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), an R package for Structural Equation

Modeling, by using the RStudio graphical interface (2020).

The proposed model was performed simultaneously across the

two research samples by means of a multigroup path analysis.

We initially set free to vary the effect among variables, obtaining a

specific baseline model on which to examine any differences

between the samples. Figure 1 summarizes the standardized

parameter estimates for Samples A and B. The free model fitted

very well (χ²[10] = 30.39, p = .001; Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = 0.99;

Tucker–Lewis Index [TLI] = 0.95; Standardized Root Mean Square

Residual [SRMR] = 0.018; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation

[RMSEA] = 0.050, 90% confidence interval [CI] = 0.031–071). We

then imposed equality constraints on all regression coefficients to

gauge if the structural relations in the specified model could be

considered invariant in magnitude across Samples A and B. This

model fitted the data nicely (χ²[23] = 55.91, p < .001; CFI = 0.98;

TLI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.032; RMSEA = 0.041, 90% CI = 0.027–071).

However, as can be seen in Table 2, an omnibus difference test

between the two models showed that they differed significantly in

terms of overall fit, and hence the coefficients could not be

TABLE 1 Intercorrelations of Five Star Movement (5SM) and Populist Right‐Wing (PRW) dummies, Dangerous World Belief (DWB), Competitive Jungle Belief (CJB), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Anti‐Immigration Attitudes (Anti‐Imm)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1. 5SM – −.25** .10** −.03 −.08* .09** .08*

2. PRW −.31** – .17** .12** .18** .36** .25**

3. DWB .19** .16** – .15** .03 .48** .29**

4. CJB −.03 .13** .08* – .53** .25** .19**

5. SDO −.05 .21** .04 .54** – .30** .23**

6. RWA .06 .35** .46** .25** .23** – .43**

7. Anti‐Imm. .09* .17** .22** .20** .19** .32* –

Note: Sample A (N = 774) below the diagonal and Sample B (N = 881) above the diagonal.

*p < .05; **p < .01.

F IGURE 1 Path analysis model. Note: Figure shows standardized parameters. Sample B in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. CJB, Competitive Jungle Belief; DWB, Dangerous World Belief; RWA, Right‐Wing Authoritarianism; SDO, Social Dominance Orientation

PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 453

considered fully invariant across samples. Some coefficients

appeared to be slightly different across the two samples. Specifically,

the relationship between the Five Star Movement and DWB was

slightly higher in Sample A (β = .26) than in Sample B (β = .15). Thus,

we decided to again fit the model, removing the constraint on this

pair of coefficients. The model fit was highly satisfactory

(χ²[22] = 48.54, p = .001; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.030;

RMSEA = 0.038, 90% CI = 0.024–0.53). The omnibus hierarchical

difference test between this latter model and the baseline

unconstrained model resulted nonsignificant. Hence, coefficients

could be considered equivalent across the two samples, except for

the abovementioned (small) difference in a coefficient pair. We thus

reported and discussed standardized beta coefficients common to

both samples, except for the association between the Five Star

Movement dummy and DWB, and for estimated indirect effects.2

Turning to the associations, support for the Five Star Movement

was found to be related to the belief in a dangerous and threatening

world. As previously made explicit, this relationship was significantly

higher in sample A, albeit slightly (β = .26, SE = 0.037, z = 7.17,

p < .001, 95% CI = 0.192–0.336), than in sample B (β = .15,

SE = 0.031, z = 4.67, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.085–0.209). To obtain the

most parsimonious model possible, we decided not to relate the Five

Star Movement dummy to the belief in a competitive jungle world.

This decision was also supported by the results of correlation

analyses, which highlighted the lack of a significant link between

these variables in both samples. Support for the Five Star Movement

was unrelated to SDO, but directly associated with RWA (β = .11,

SE = 0.021, z = 5.39, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.071–0.153) without media-

tion of DWB.

Support for the Populist Right‐Wing coalition turned instead

associated with both social worldviews. The Populist Right‐Wing

dummy related positively with the dangerous world belief both in

Sample A and Sample B (β = .22, SE = 0.024, z = 9.36, p< .001, 95%

CI = 0.176–0.269). Similarly, it was also related to CJB in both samples

(β = .12, SE = 0.026, z = 4.80, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.074–0.175). The

dummy was also associated with RWA (β = .29, SE =0.020, z = 14.12,

p < .001, 95% CI = 0.249–0.329) and SDO (β = .12, SE = .022, z = 5.66,

p < .001, 95% CI = 0.081–0.167) without the effects being mediated by

DWB and CJB, respectively. The corresponding associations with DWB

and CJB were invariant across the two samples.

As expected, social worldviews showed in turn to be associated

with ideological attitudes. In particular, DWB was positively related

to RWA in both samples (β = .39, SE = 0.021, z = 18.96, p < .001, 95%

CI = 0.353–0.434). The association between DWB and SDO was not

tested in the path model because such association is also excluded

from the more parsimonious version of Duckitt's dual process model,

and since they were not related in correlation analyses. Instead, CJB

was positively associated with both RWA (β = .17, SE = 0.020,

z = 8.39, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.129–0.207) and SDO (β = .51,

SE = 0.022, z = 23.48, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.466–0.551). Recall that

these associations held invariant in both samples.

Finally, we found anti‐immigration attitudes to be positively

associated with both ideological attitudes. The rise of hostile

attitudes toward immigration related positively to RWA (β = .31,

SE = .026, z = 11.93, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.262–0.364), and with SDO

(β = .11, SE = .025, z = 4.44, p < .001, 95%CI = 0.063–0.162) in both

samples. Moreover, although equivalent across Samples A and B,

direct associations of anti‐immigration attitudes with voting for both

the Five Star Movement (β = .10, SE = 0.024, z = 3.96, p < .001, 95%

CI = 0.048–0.142) and Populist Right‐Wing (β = .11, SE = 0.028,

z = 3.81, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.052–0.161) were detected.

Overall, these patterns of associations suggested that the

presence of indirect relationships, though partially mediated, could

be probed profitably. We indeed tested and found serial mediation

paths for the Five Star Movement voters, which involve the

sequential association of DWB and RWA on anti‐immigration

attitudes (Sample A: β = .026, SE = .006, z = 4.53, p < .001, 95%

CI = 0.015–0.038; Sample B: β = .021, SE = 0.005, z = 4.29, p < .001,

95% CI = 0.011–0.030). For Populist Right‐Wing voters instead, we

tested two serial mediation paths: one involving the sequential

association of CJB and SDO and another on the serial association of

DWB and RWA. The Populist Right‐Wing dummy resulted indirectly

related to the adoption of anti‐immigration attitudes through the

mediators DWB and RWA (Sample A: β = .024, SE = 0.006, z = 4.41,

p < .001, 95% CI = 0.014–0.035; Sample B: β = .030, SE = 0.006,

z = 5.06, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.018–0.041). Similarly, indirect relation-

ships were found from Populist Right‐Wing voting through CJB and

SDO (Sample A: β = .008, SE = 0.003, z = 2.33, p = .02, 95%

CI = 0.001–0.014; Sample B: β = .007, SE = .003, z = 2.26, p = .02,

95% CI = 0.001–0.012).

These indirect associations indicated that for voters of the Five

Star Movement, anti‐immigration attitudes were conveyed by

concerns related to the view of the world as a dangerous and

threatening place which, in turn, favored the adoption of an

TABLE 2 Omnibus test of nested multigroup models

χ² df TLI CFI SRMR RMSEA Model comparison Δχ² Δdf p

Model 1 Unconstrained 30.394 10 0.95 0.99 .018 .050 (.031, .071) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

Model 2 Full Constraints 55.914 23 0.97 0.98 .032 .041 (.027, .055) 1 versus 2 24.26 13 .02

Model 3 Full–5SM_DWB 48.543 22 0.97 0.99 .030 .038 (.024, .053) 1 versus 3 17.21 12 .14

Note: Sample A (N = 774); Sample B (N = 881). Model 3 left free to vary the coefficient and standard error of the path between the Five Star Movement

dummy (5SM) and Dangerous World Belief (DWB).

Abbreviations: CFI, Comparative Fit Index; df, degree of freedom; RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; TLI, Tucker–Lewis Index.

454 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.

ideological attitude based on traditional norms and conventions. This

pattern was likewise relevant for the Populist Right‐Wing coalition

voters. The overlap of both groups of populist voters was also

corroborated by nonsignificant differences about contrasted indirect

effects for both groups of voters across the two samples. Moreover,

the specific pattern of indirect associations for each distinct group of

electors was non‐significantly different across Samples A and B.

However, the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing

voting showed different relationships with immigration concerns

through CJB and SDO: this pathway was significant only for Populist

Right‐Wing voting (in both samples).

4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research investigated whether support for populist

parties and movements could be associated with social worldviews

and ideological attitudes which, in turn, would have led to negative

attitudes toward immigration. Despite the multiplicity of studies on

the possible connection between populism and the emergence of

anti‐immigration attitudes, scant emphasis was paid to the explora-

tion of the psychological mechanisms characterizing populist voters.

Most research has focused on the anti‐immigration populist narrative

(e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2017), while others have investigated the role of the

media discourse in conveying populist positions on immigration (e.g.,

Diehl et al., 2019). However, only few scholars have examined the

psychological dispositions which make populist voters sensitive to

the immigration issue.

Pursuing this aim, we tested a multigroup path analysis model

where the association between support for populist parties and anti‐

immigration attitudes was mediated by the joint role of DWB and

RWA and by the joint role of CJB and SDO. We found that the Five

Star Movement support and Populist Right‐Wing support were both

positively associated with increased DWB levels. These results

indicated that both groups of populist voters (compared to non‐

populist) shared stronger beliefs concerning the world's dangerous-

ness. Populist voters are often represented as the “cultural losers” of

modernization processes (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012). They are

framed as people disoriented by changes in values, new waves of

migration, and the loss of national sovereignty toward the super-

national entities, such as the European Union (Inglehart &

Norris, 2016). Rapid changes can always be framed as deviance from

a hallowed tradition and as a threat to society as we knew it. In

particular, changes due to increasing migratory flows could prompt

populist voters for motivational goals guided by threat‐control

reasons. As intergroup situational dynamics are perceived as

threatening unwanted change, identity‐threat could in turn translate

into an ideological stance aimed at reducing the pace of change—

thus, the DWB association with RWA. In turn, such an array of

threat‐control motivation and ideological aversion to change tran-

spired into hostile attitudes toward immigration. Immigrants embody

several characteristics that natives may view with discomfort, such as

different worldviews, moral standards, and religious beliefs

(Rustenbach, 2010). Immigrants represent a target that, given the

cultural distance, can easily be framed as threatening and therefore

become objects of hostile attitudes to reject this threat (Salvati

et al., 2020).

Both groups of populist voters shared threat‐control motives,

eventually breeding anti‐immigration attitudes. However, the two

groups differed as far as the path passing to CJBs and SDO was

concerned. Analysis revealed a positive and significant association of

CJB only with the Right‐Wing Populist voting. Instead, the Five Star

Movement vote was unrelated to perception of the social world as a

ruthless jungle. The path from voting to anti‐immigration attitudes

passing through CJB and SDO thus materialized only for right‐wing

populist supporters. As an alternative to the “cultural losers”

perspective, populist voters are referred to further as “economic

losers” (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012)—those for whom the globalization

process has meant economic hardship, downward social mobility, and

employment uncertainty. This perspective is commonly used to frame

leftist variants of populism oriented toward redistribution

(Rodrik, 2018, 2018). However, our results underlined other motives

deriving from uncertainty about managing resources. Perception of

scarcity of resources could activate a competitive and unregulated

view of their management that elicits a dominant response aimed at

restoring power hierarchies in society, and in turn translates to

discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants.

To summarize, besides threat‐control motivations, for right‐wing

populist voters appeared to be also salient concerns related to

economic uncertainty proposed by the perspective of “economic

losers” (or by those who perceived themselves at risk of becoming so)

about the rise of populism. This result may open an interesting

starting point and a new perspective from which to look at the

outcomes of economic processes of globalization. It might suggest

that psychological insecurity deriving from economic uncertainty may

give rise to motivation aimed not only at restoring social equity;

instead, it may be proposed that this insecurity may also elicit

motivational goals aimed at the oppression of others and the

corroboration of status quo power hierarchies in the distribution of

resources. Deprivations in the economic sphere of individuals' lives

may represent a key element in shaping their anti‐immigration

attitudes (Pellegrini et al., 2021). Consistently, we found that the view

of intergroup interactions as competitive and ruthless resonated with

a dominance‐enhancing response aimed at restoring hierarchies in

society by discriminating against perceived competing groups (i.e.,

immigrants).

5 | APPLIED IMPLICATIONS

In the last few decades, the Italian context was characterized by an

extraordinary combination of factors that created a platform for

populism to become a central political reality. A concentration of

relevant sociopolitical transformations has occurred. For instance, the

fading of traditional parties which historically led the country after

theWorld War II because of pervasive corruption, the mass arrival of

PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 455

refugees in a country previously quite homogeneous both ethnically

and culturally, and in some cases, recurrent corruption scandals that

plagued the somewhat new political parties that have dominated

Italian politics since the middle 1990s (Corbetta et al., 2018). The

combination of these factors may have emphasized the deficiencies

of the political and institutional systems, which were unable to

respond to uncertainties and insecurities deriving from the cultural

and economic turmoil of the 21st century.

Consistently, our results highlight that endorsement of populism—

and its correlates (e.g., anti‐immigration)—find their psychological roots

in deep concerns related to the perceived social context. Support for

populist parties appeared as a political response aligned to specific

ideological preferences due to pervading concerns on the functioning

of the polity and of citizens' social world. Populism and anti‐

immigration attitudes emerged as viable solutions to the uneasiness

experienced in front of individuals perceived as threatening in cultural

and economic terms.

Thus, from an applied perspective, what populist voters seem to

crave fervently are institutional responses to economic and identity

issues representing the triggers of their concerns. Our results could

provide an indication on how to manage social system in which

populism thrives. On the one hand, it would be desirable to

implement policies aimed at reducing—or preventing—economic

inequalities to tackle the disorientation and anomie associated with

them. On the other hand, strategies aimed at alleviating the cultural

disorientation resulting from the modernization processes might be

implemented. Under this light, the immigration issue would represent

an important opportunity for reformed institutions. Virtuous immi-

gration policies may favor an overturning of the perspective capable

to assuaging concerns of identity and economic nature. These

policies could accentuate the enrichment arising from the contact

based on mutual respect and valorization between ethnic groups with

different cultural roots. Similarly, the economic positive implications

that the presence of immigrant population has for the host country

could be emphasized. Thus, placing immigration in a framework of

cultural and economic enrichment might represent a first step toward

a reconciliation between the “malfunctioning” institutions and the

“betrayed” citizens.

6 | CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The present research may provide interesting insights into the

widely supported theses for the explanation of right and left‐wing

variants of populism. One may speculate that our findings

corroborate the idea that support for right‐wing populist parties is

attributable to identity‐threat motives in face of cultural dis-

orientation. We might somehow speculate that their success can

also be traced back to economic concerns, or at least to the

uneasiness deriving from the competitive and unregulated percep-

tion of resource management. It appears that the explanation

relating to economic losers can be considered as a double‐edged

sword. On the one hand, it may give rise to the demand for a fair

redistribution of resources. However, and in our research this seems

to be the case, it may inspire motivational goals based on the

hierarchical redistribution of resources as a function of dominance

relationships. Future research might usefully focus its efforts on

investigating this second evidence.

Another speculative conclusion could be found in results that

emerged about the Five Star Movement voters. Although this

movement is described as a hybrid populist movement

(Diamanti, 2014b), it has often been associated with issues and

themes shared by the classical left‐wing ideologies. Voting for the

Five Star Movement has been often attributed to the so‐called

“economic losers.” However, we found an identity‐concern associ-

ated with an authoritarian ideological attitude characterizing these

voters. At the same time, they appeared as not associated with

concern about a competitive and unregulated social world and to

ideological attitudes aimed to cope with it. Consistent with findings

of Corbetta et al. (2018), this could indirectly indicate that voting for

the Five Star Movement is not actually the outcome of real or

perceived economic deprivation, which is commonly attributed to

left‐wing variants of populism. Instead, it could align more closely

with forms of alienation independent from the strictly economic‐ and

resource‐focused sphere. Future research could help to clarify the

ambiguous nature of this movement, and of somewhat similar

phenomena, such as Spain's Podemos, and Greece's Syriza.

Finally, the present research suggests that populism can pick

freely from the rich menu provided by classical ideologies, and

specifically draws from values and orientations based on power and

hierarchies, on rejection of diversity, and denial of pluralism.

Ironically, these tenets are at odds with most democratic values,

the very same values that populist voters perceive as fundamental

and betrayed by traditional parties. Nevertheless, hierarchy‐

enhancing and authority‐binding values seem to favor endorsement

of populist parties.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study was not funded by any grant. Open Access Funding

provided by Universita degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza within the

CRUI‐CARE Agreement.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

DISCLOSURE

No competing financial interests exist.

ETHICAL APPROVAL

All procedures performed in studies involving human participants

were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and

national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration

and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. This

article does not contain any studies with animals performed by any of

the authors.

456 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the

corresponding author upon reasonable request.

ORCID

Valerio Pellegrini http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5735-9239

Valeria De Cristofaro http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4904-785X

ENDNOTES 1 Despite a lack of empirical evidence on linkages between political abstentionism and populism, sharing of political cynicism features could be argued. For this reason, the model was replicated excluding abstainers. Emerged results were analogous to those of the reported model.

2 Indirect effects are separately reported for Samples A and B, since they

are not considered in the model's fit estimation. Equality assumptions between indirect effects were tested by contrasting the related coefficients.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information can be found online in the

Supporting Information section at the end of this article.

How to cite this article: Pellegrini, V., Salvati, M., De

Cristofaro, V., Giacomantonio, M., & Leone, L. (2022).

Psychological bases of anti‐immigration attitudes among

populist voters. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 52,

449–458. https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12871

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