Philosophy 2 First Paper

● So we have seen that a single problem—the problem of material constitution—underlies four familiar and ancient puzzles The problem, yet again, is that the following five plausible assumptions lead to a contradiction: The Existence Assumption (i) there is an F and there are ps that compose it The Essentialist Assumption (ii) if the ps compose an F, then they compose an object that is essentially such that it bears a certain relation R to its parts The Principle of Alternative Compositional Possibilities (PACP) (iii) if the ps compose an F, then they compose an object that can exist and not bear R to its parts The Identity Assumption (iv) if the ps compose both a and b, then a is identical with b The Necessity Assumption (v) if a is identical with b then a is necessarily identical with b ● To solve the problem, one must reject: (i) the Identity Assumption (ii) the Necessity Assumption or (iii) some feature of the story that introduces the problem to do (iii) one must reject the Existence Assumption, the Essentialist Assumption or the PACP for whatever F and R are presupposed in the case at hand There is also a fourth way of solving the problem: by denying that some claim relevant to the problem is either true or false Rea calls these (iv) “indeterminacy solutions” ● Consider (i) those solutions that reject the Identity Assumption To deny this, one maintains it is possible that sometimes distinct objects have all of the same parts at the same time This is Wiggins’ solution that we saw when first considering the problems associated with material constitution

● Consider (ii) those solutions that reject the Necessity Assumption To deny this, one maintains that there are cases in which a = b is true and it is possible that a exists or b exists and yet a = b is false ● Consider (iii) those solutions that reject the conjunction of the Existence Assumption, the Essentialist Assumption and the PACP for whatever F and R are presupposed in the case at hand —Denying The Existence Assumption (i) there is an F and there are ps that compose it so one can deny that there are Fs, or one can deny that there are things that compose Fs some philosophers, like Peter Unger, deny that there are any composite objects, any things that have parts—so some philosophers think there are only simples —Denying The Essentialist Assumption (ii) if the ps compose an F, then they compose an object that is essentially such that it bears a certain relation R to its parts —Denying The Principle of Alternative Compositional Possibilities (PACP) (iii) if the ps compose an F, then they compose an object that can exist and not bear R to its parts ● Consider (iv) a so-called indeterminacy solution These solutions turn on denying that a particular claim, for instance, the Identity Assumption, is either true or false So they try to avoid the problem by saying that, with, say, Tibbles and Tib it is not true that they are identical and it is not false that they are identical—it is indeterminate this sort of solution is hard to maintain