Philosophy 2 Week 3 Essay Quiz

● Here again is the puzzle of Dion and Theon Yesterday there was Dion and Theon. Theon was a proper part of Dion, namely, all of Dion except his left foot. Today, Dion has his left foot amputated. So, if Dion and Theon both still exist, there are distinct things occupying the very same place at the same time and wholly composed of the same matter. Presuming this is impossible, the puzzle is to say which of the two, Dion and Theon, has ceased to exist (and why) ● Burke maintains that when Dion loses his foot, Theon goes out of existence (and a new torso comes to be) A few observations: the new torso is intrinsically indistinguishable from Theon and yet is distinct Theon did not undergo any intrinsic change and yet ceased to be ● Burke claims that the key to his solution is recognizing that yesterday’s torso was merely a torso whereas today’s is also a person everything is many different kinds: a human person is an animal, a mammal, a human being, a material object etc. a computer is an artifact, an electronic device, a material object, etc. Dion is a person and a torso, whereas Theon was just a torso ● Burke’s position relies on three assumptions (1) that the concept of a person is maximal, i.e., no proper part of a person is a person So Theon was not a person (2) that persons are essentially persons and, hence, non-persons are essentially non-persons Theon was a torso and not a person and so essentially a non-person (3) the separation from Theon of Dion’s left foot is a change that would have made Theon a person Since Theon could not have undergone such a change, he was destroyed Burke then examines these three assumptions ● Considering (1)

Burke employs a distinction between the nondissectivity of a kind, on which some proper parts of an instance of that kind are not of the same kind as the whole and the maximality of a kind, on which no proper part of an instance of that kind is of the same kind as the whole Some philosophers have denied the maximality of certain familiar kinds e.g. Geach denies the maximality of the kind cat if a sufficiently large part of a cat were separated from the original cat, it would be a cat (while no longer being a part of a cat); this has not generated a new cat, so it was there all along so wherever there is a cat—or a human person—there are many of them there they are not exactly collocated, but within the volume of the biggest one there are many ● Considering (2) It is pretty plausible that being the kind of thing that a thing is is essential to that thing in other words, it is plausible that things do not and cannot switch kinds what about caterpillars and butterflies? along these lines some reject (2), maintaining that human beings are only sometimes persons Burke thinks he can concede this and preserve his argument by tweaking it ● Considering (3) Here’s where things start to get problematic for Burke (by my assessment) Take a look at (3) again: (3) the separation from Theon of Dion’s left foot is a change that would have made Theon a person But consider again (2): (2) that persons are essentially persons and, hence, non-persons are essentially non- persons If Theon is a torso, he is essentially a non-person, so there is no change that could render him a person

Therefore, the amputation of Dion’s foot is not a change that (had Theon survived) would have made Theon a person—there could be no such change Hence, it does not seem that Burke has given an adequate account of why Theon has ceased to be—and that is the real puzzle on his position Moreover, it is part of Burke’s position that Dion is identical to a new torso but Dion is essentially a person, a torso is not essentially a person if Dion were a person and a torso, this would violate Leibniz’s Law So there are some real problems here