Philosophy 2 Week 3 Essay Quiz

● In light of the considerations regarding T (a tree) and W (an aggregate of cellulose molecules), Wiggins revises his original Principle S to the following: S*: No two things of the same kind (that is, no two things which satisfy the same sortal or substance concept) can occupy exactly the same volume at exactly the same time He thinks this principle is necessarily true ● Wiggins offers three considerations in support of S*, these considerations are meant to show why Principle S* must be true (i) space has no intrinsic structure; it can only be mapped relative to its occupants we understand space as the dimension of locations of different occupants one cannot understand a difference in space simpliciter, one can only understand a difference in space relative to a difference in something else, namely, some occupants of it so the distinctness of occupants needs to guarantee the distinctness of locations if this is so, then the non-identity of particulars A and B, both of kind K, suffices to establish that the place of A (at a given time) is distinct from the place of B (at that same time) Principle S* follows from this (ii) a criterion of identity is a principle that states under what conditions A and B are one and the same; it is supposed to tell you what it is that makes a thing itself there are synchronic identity of criteria and diachronic criteria according to Wiggins, a (synchronic) criterion of identity for material objects will have to be something like this: Im: A is identical with B if there is some substance concept f such that A coincides with B under f where f is a substance concept under which an object can be traced, individuated and distinguished from other f’s (other instance of the same kind), and where coincides under f satisfactorily defines an equivalence relation all of whose members <x,y> also satisfy the Leibnizian schema Fx if and only if Fy an equivalence relation is one that is reflexive, symmetric and transitive; it is a relation that divides a set into classes in which all the members of the classes bear the relation to each other but to no member of other classes

(the limit of an equivalence relation is identity, it divides everything into a class of one) S* follows from Im, so if the latter is true (and Wiggins presumes it is), the former must be as well (iii) S* also follows from the following principle: S**: A and a proper part or constituent B of a third thing C, where A is distinct from C and A is distinct from B, and where no part or constituent of A is any part or constituent of B or of C, cannot completely occupy exactly the same volume at exactly the same time Wiggins maintains that these three considerations, (i), (ii), and (iii), indicate that material things have to compete for room in the world and that they must tend to displace one another ● Wiggins concludes with a test for S*: Consider Tibbles the cat, resting on a mat at time, t1. At t1, someone identifies Tib, the entity that is Tibbles minus her tail. Clearly, Tib ≠ Tibbles At t1, both Tib and Tibbles are on the mat. This does not violate S*, because Tib and Tibbles are not exactly collocated. But at t2, Tibbles loses her tail. At t3, it seems both Tib and Tibbles are on the mat. They are distinct, this was already assumed, but now it seems there are two cats exactly collocated on the mat. This violates S*. How does Wiggins respond? He denies that one can identify a thing at t1 that is a tail-less cat (Tib). Wiggins thinks that Tib is just a “cat-part” not a cat. This preserves S*—but does raise other questions, such as what exactly is the difference between the cat-part Tib and Tibbles the cat at t3?