This debate intends to explore what we have so far learned about the Cuban approach to socialism and development through an analysis of its contradictions.

Cuba's New Socialism: Different Visions Shaping Current Changes Author(s): Camila Piñeiro Harnecker Source: Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 40, No. 3, LATIN AMERICA'S RADICAL LEFT IN POWER: COMPLEXITIES AND CHALLENGES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (May 2013), pp. 107-125 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23466007 Accessed: 26-04-2019 15:40 UTC

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Cuba's New Socialism

Different Visions Shaping Current Changes by

Camila Pineiro Harnecker

Three main ideological positions are behind the debate over current changes in Cuba: the statist position, which seeks to perfect a top-down, state socialism; the economicist position, which defends market socialism; and the self-managementist position, which favors democratic socialism and worker participation in company decision making. These visions largely coincide in maintaining that Cuba's main long-term goal should be a more just society, liberated from economic hardship, but they differ markedly in the way they understand justice and freedom and thus socialism. Consequently, different Cubans tend to set different short- and medium-term goals and to propose different means for reaching

them. All three make legitimate points that need to be considered in the making of strategic

decisions. However, pursuing more democracy would appear more desirable than confer ring inordinate power on state functionaries who pledge to represent the interests of soci ety or on resourceful economic actors who direct from the shadows an "invisible hand" that affects us all.

Tres principales posiciones ideoldgicas estdn detras del debate sobre cambios contem poraneos en Cuba: la posicion estadista, la cual busca perfeccionar un socialismo del Estado de arriba para abajo; la posicion economicista, que defiende el socialismo de mercado; y la posicion autogestionaria, que favorece el socialismo democratico y la participation de los trabajadores en las decisiones empresariales. Estas visiones coinciden en gran parte en mantener que el objetivo de largo plazo deberia ser una sociedad mas justa, liberada de apuros economicos. Pero se distinguen marcadamente en el modo en que se entiende la justicia y la libertad y por ende el socialismo. Por consiguiente distintos cubanos tienden a establecer diferentes metas de corto y mediano plazo, y a proponer diferentes caminos para

llegar alii Todos los tres hacen puntos legitimos que se tienen que considerar en la elabo ration de decisiones estrategicas. Sin embargo, la busqueda de mas democracia pareceria ser mas deseable que el conferir poderes desproporcionados a funcionarios del Estado quienes prometen representar los intereses de la sociedad, o ponerlo en manos de adores economicos hdbiles quienes dirigen desde las sombras la "mano invisible" que nos afecta a todos.

Keywords: Cuba, Socialist transition, Enterprise management, Macroeconomic coordination

The shape of Cuba's "reformed," "updated," or "renewed" socialism depends on the relative influence of fundamentally different ways of under standing socialism and envisioning Cuba's future. These visions largely

Camila Pineiro Harnecker is a professor at the Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy, University of Havana. Her research centers on alternative forms of economic organization such as self-management and democratic planning.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 190, Vol. 40 No. 3, May 2013 107-125 DOI: 10.1177/0094582X13476006 © 2013 Latin American Perspectives

107

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coincide in maintaining that Cuba's main long-term goal should be a more just society, liberated from economic hardship, but they differ markedly in the way they understand justice and freedom and thus socialism. Consequently, differ ent Cubans tend to set different short- and medium-term goals and to propose different means for reaching them. This paper identifies the main visions of socialism that are influencing current changes in a nation that, albeit for differ ent reasons, continues to be of great interest throughout the world. As a Cuban committed to our future, I shall analyze the internal debate from an objective standpoint.

I start with a brief contextualization of recent developments in Cuba and then examine three currents of opinion that I call the "statist" (estatista), the "economicist" (economicista), and the "self-managementist" (autogestionaria). No more than analytical tools, these terms are used to characterize different approaches to what should be done in order to save Cuba's socialist project.1 I point to the main goals guiding these positions' visions of socialism, which permeate the problems they identify in current Cuban society and the solutions they propose.21 examine the differences among these positions with regard to social control, private enterprise, market relations, and worker participation in management, in particular whether to establish worker cooperatives in non strategic state enterprises. This discussion seeks to shed light on some of the assumptions on which these positions are based. I conclude with an assessment of the conditions that might cause one position to prevail over the rest in the "battle of ideas" that is currently taking place in Cuba and that will define its future.

The study is based on an examination of public discourse (manifested in formal and informal debates and official declarations) and publications (aca demic, journalistic, opinion) in Cuba. Whereas in the past there was concern that public debate would undermine national unity and make it easier for the U.S. government to implement its destabilization programs, now Cubans are called upon to criticize problems openly and defend diverse solutions, and many are doing precisely that. Despite Cubans' known passionate extraversion and inclination to exaggerate, there is a surprisingly friendly confrontation of different positions. This is reflected in a rich exchange about theoretical con cepts and interpretations of reality that is taking place not only among policy makers and academics but also in newspaper letters to the editor, books and magazine articles, public workshops, Internet articles, blogs, films, and radio and television programs.

While a few government officials, academics, journalists, and bloggers have made explicit their visions of Cuba's future or made statements that roughly correspond to one of the three positions, most people express aspects of all three. This paper seeks not to classify Cubans by position—which could result in polarization—but to contribute to a more productive and thus respectful and nonpersonalized debate that will facilitate achieving a new consensus about the society in which they all want to live.

RECENT CHANGES IN CUBA

The current changes can be traced to a speech given by former President Fidel Castro on November 17, 2005, in which he warned for the first time

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Pineiro / CUBA'S NEW SOCIALISM 109

publicly that the Revolution could be reversed. In contrast to the situation in the past, when the main causes of most economic problems in Cuba were attrib uted to U.S. economic sanctions and geopolitical warfare against Cuba,3 Castro said that the Revolution's major enemies were our own mistakes, especially unfair income inequality, vices such as theft, and lack of control and poor man agement decisions at high levels (F. Castro, 2005). Less than a year later, in July 2006, he became ill, and before undergoing surgery he ceded power to his legal successor and brother, Raul Castro. Soon after, Raul Castro began preparing for the deeper transformations that were needed to tackle those problems.

In a speech on July 26,2007, Raul Castro referred to the need for "conceptual and structural changes" and proposed a national debate to identify the main problems besetting Cuban society. More than 5 million people participated in more than 215,000 meetings between September and November of 2007, and more than 1.6 million criticized the shortcomings of daily life, the under perf ormance of state institutions, and the behavior of public servants in bureau cratic posts. It was not the first time that this type of nationwide debate involving large numbers of people had taken place in Cuba. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 80,000 "workers' parliaments" were held in workplaces, schools, and mass organizations in 1993,4 and more than 3 million people expressed concerns and put forward proposals on how to deal with the new situation.

The 2007 debate served as a prelude to the Sixth Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, but the only official information that immediately resulted from it was what everyone knew: that low salaries and inadequate food, trans portation, and housing were Cubans' main source of concern and that people were tired of prohibitions regarding their daily lives. Only a few of the mea sures that were expected to follow materialized in 2008-2009: the ability to buy certain goods and services previously limited to foreigners, the turning over of idle agricultural land to individuals and cooperatives, the elimination of com mittees in charge of approving the use of hard currency by state institutions (known as the Comites de Aprobacion de Divisas), the creation of a national supervisory institution (Contraloria de la Republica), and initial steps toward reducing the size of ministries. Efforts were concentrated on dealing with the difficult financial situation that resulted from a series of costly hurricanes in 2008 and the international economic crisis.

Since 2010, Raul Castro has more emphatically warned about the importance of overcoming serious economic obstacles. The preservation and sustainability of Cuba's socioeconomic system lay in the balance.5 Reflecting the need to solve long-standing problems with the management of the Cuban economy, the Sixth Congress was scheduled for April 2011 for the purpose of approving general guidelines to improve economic performance, including some social policies and other areas closely related to the economic sphere.

The congress was preceded by debates in workplaces, neighborhoods, and social organizations over a document titled Draft Guidelines for Economic and Social Policy (PCC, 2010). People were encouraged to propose changes, express concerns, or simply make comments on it. The document was organized into chapters that listed expectations of what should happen in specific areas such as economic management, macroeconomic policies, external economic rela tions, investment, science, technology, and innovation, social policy, agro industry, industry and energy, tourism, transportation, construction, housing

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and water resources, and commerce. Many of the objectives listed, such as replacing imports and increasing exports, had been established in previous PCC congresses but remained to be achieved. Cubans were called on to reach consensus on the what, not the how. It was suggested that the more complex discussion about how to reach the goals agreed-upon would occur later on as institutions prepared new legislation and policies. So far, only a few have been passed and with little debate, possibly because they relate to completing ownership rights of personal property, about which there appears to be consensus.6

However, even before the debates in preparation for the congress began in December 2010, some measures were adopted and some experiments were car ried out with the idea of later applying them on a wider scale. The most conse quential economic measure, which has been equated with another agrarian reform, had been in place since 2008. From 2008 to mid-2011, nearly 15 percent of agricultural land (1.13 million hectares) had been given in usufruct to 146,000 individual farmers (70,000 new ones) and, to a lesser degree, to worker coop eratives, while recognizing that permanent (not only seasonal) wage labor was used by both.7 This process is redistributing land from ineffective state farms and cooperatives, mostly to private farmers.

Resolution 9 of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security was passed in 2008 to link state workers' wages with productivity, following criteria approved by the ministry. These rules eliminated the cap on the amount workers could earn beyond their base salary, thus allowing for greater wage differentials. But their implementation has stagnated because, among many factors, the Labor Ministry has ended up imposing productivity-tied pay schedules that are not attractive to either workers or managers.

In early 2010, several municipalities had begun to allow some barbers, beau ticians, and transportation workers to lease barbers' chairs and taxis, respectively, from the state enterprises that previously employed them. Under the terms, the former state employees were obliged to cover all the costs of operation that the state had previously assumed but could freely set prices and keep the profits after taxes, whereas before they had in effect set prices higher than the regu lated ones and kept the difference (in addition to their salaries).8

On October 25,2010, a number of regulations were made public with regard to the process of "availability" (disponibilidad), in which state institutions were expected to relocate "excess" workers who reduced productivity. Excess work ers were estimated at over 1 million or 20 percent of total employment, averag ing 30 percent of state enterprises' payrolls. These workers were to be offered alternative state jobs where there were openings, and if they decided to reject the offer they were to be laid off with only a few months' pay, depending on how much time they had worked. The process was soon suspended because it was impossible to fulfill Raul Castro's commitment that no one would be "abandoned to his fate" (Martinez and Puig, 2011).9

Other rules were passed that made independent work (cuentapropismo) more flexible, including the possibility of hiring wage laborers on a permanent basis. Independent workers are now able to rent spaces, establish economic transac tions with state institutions, and receive bank credit. The number of licenses for independent work more than doubled in less than a year, 10 in part because many simply legalized their status. In spite of high taxes, many have seen

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Pineiro / CUBA'S NEW SOCIALISM 111

benefits from legalizing their activities, such as access to retirement, security for disabilities and maternity, bank credit, and state contracts (Pineiro, 2011: 68-69).

Noting that measures with such great consequences for Cubans' lives (land rights, wages, labor relations, etc.) had been approved in previous years, some argued that the Sixth Congress was only a "show" to ratify decisions already made. Nonetheless, there was massive participation in the discussion of the Draft Guidelines. From December 2010 to February 2011, a significant part of the Cuban population (9 million of a total population of about 11 million, but since most participated in more than one meeting they were counted more than once) discussed the document in their places of work and study, their neigh borhoods, and their social organizations. About 68 percent of the more than 200 guidelines were modified. Nevertheless, only a few of the changes, such as those related to market planning and prices, were substantial.

Some have criticized the congress for concentrating on "economic" prob lems that in reality cannot be separated from political, cultural, and social ones (see, e.g., D'Angelo, 2011a). Given the complexity of the Cuban economic sys tem and the challenges it faces, the decision to concentrate efforts on that front is understandable. Nevertheless, one of the most important goals incorporated into the Guidelines—in addition to the expansion of nonstate enterprises (pri vate and cooperative), greater autonomy for state enterprises, and greater weight for market relations—is that local governments should play a guiding role in state and nonstate economic activities, creating new enterprises, collect ing taxes, and handling funds earmarked for local development.

Other important political measures were announced at the congress. In his closing speech, Raul Castro proposed establishing a limit of two consecutive five-year terms for "fundamental political and state posts" and defended the current law establishing that being a party member is not a requirement for occupying public posts (R. Castro, 2011a). He suggested that substantial changes in the political system and a rejuvenation of the party national leader ship would take place at the PCC conference set for January 28,2012.11 Changes in the newly elected membership of the Central Committee, including greater representation in terms of gender, race, and, to a lesser extent, age could be considered a "first step."12 In contrast, the PCC Political Bureau continued to be dominated by men who came from the ranks of long-time leaders of the Revolution, especially the "historic generation" (those who had led the Revolution since the 1950s).

The congress debate process has also been criticized on grounds that it did not include ideological or ethical issues (see, e.g., Campos, 2011c; D'Angelo, 2011a). Socialism, which was referred to only twice in the draft document, was defined in the final document as "equality of rights and opportunities" (PCC, 2010: 5). Nevertheless, there are plans for the executive commission that over sees implementation of the Guidelines to define the "integral theoretical concep tualization of the Cuban socialist economy" (R. Castro, 2011b; Murillo in Granma, December 24, 2011). Now that Fidel and Raul Castro have acknowl edged the unsustainability of Cuba's current "socialist model" and the need to update or change it, it is important to fill in this "ideological vacuum" so that socially minded Cubans can be less fearful about the future and help shape the new social pact that will emerge. There is also dissatisfaction with the way in

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112 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

which various statements from the debate process were synthesized by PCC functionaries and with the failure to establish a horizontal exchange of ideas among PCC nuclei, workplaces, and neighborhoods (see, e.g., Campos, 2011c; D'Angelo, 2011a). Despite these shortcomings, however, many have argued that the congress served to articulate long-recognized problems in the internal organization and management of the country and to craft a national consensus in favor of reforming Cuban socialism.

Moreover, although some argue that the root causes of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Cuban state have yet to be identified, this reform period can be distinguished from others in that self-criticism by government and state functionaries is more blunt and profound. There is an acknowledgment that the historic generation is obliged to rectify its errors and hand over a country in better shape to the next generation. Recent statements made by Raul Castro and opinions published in Granma13 have addressed concerns that it is not real istic to expect changes from the same people who put the current rules and practices in place and have argued that bureaucrats who create obstacles to change should be forced to resign.

THE STATISTS: PERFECT STATE SOCIALISM

The main socialist goal for the "statists" is a well-managed, representative state in control of society—a stronger state, not necessarily a bigger one but one that functions properly and ensures that subordinates perform their assigned tasks. They stress that such a state differs from a capitalist one in that it responds to the interests of working people, not private capital.

In the statists' view, a centralized state with a vertical structure is best suited to providing all citizens with goods and services to satisfy their basic needs. Faced with the shortcomings of top-down planning, however, some statists have accepted a degree of market relations as inevitable. In their vision of socialism, horizontal coordination of autonomous individual or collective

actors is impossible and will only generate chaos; democratically managed organizations are inefficient and conducive to social conflict and disintegra tion.14 At the center of the statists' strategy is bringing control to the Cuban economy, and the reduction of fiscal and commercial deficits is the number-one priority. This thinking has sometimes been translated into the cutting of ser vices, closing of enterprises, and levying of taxes that are too high for both state and nonstate enterprises.

The statists deny that major changes are needed. They believe that with more control by state managers and the party,15 along with some decentraliza tion and consultation with the people, the current institutions can work properly. However, some accept that the state should withdraw from the man agement of small enterprises and that local governments should have their own resources to solve problems. They repeat Raul Castro's call for a "change of methods" but do not recognize a need to allow institutions to be more autono mous and democratic or to guarantee transparency by means of, for instance, the publication of information on the budgets of local governments and state enterprises.16

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Pineiro / CUBA'S NEW SOCIALISM 113

The main problems of Cuban society according to the statists are lack of discipline; insufficient control; the low standards set by managers, ministry functionaries, and party members, which have led to low productivity; disor ganization; widespread petty theft; and corruption, which, although substan tially less serious than in other countries, is still considered unacceptable. Indeed, an unproductive informal agreement between workers and managers has been established: "We pretend to work, and you pretend to pay us." Control, discipline, and consistency are necessary for any project to be success ful, and they have not been common among Cuban workers and administra tors for decades.

Although advocates of all three positions recognize a harmful lack of control in Cuban institutions, they differ in what they see as its root causes and there fore in the type of control methods they consider effective and fair. Statists stress the cultural nature of the problem and maintain that it could be solved with education by traditional means. A "change of minds/thinking" is pre sented as the key solution. In contrast, the economicists point to low wages and defend the need for adequate material incentives, while the self-managementists propose changing the way Cuban institutions are organized in favor of more democratic, less alienated forms of social relations.17

In short, the solution for statists is more control and supervision in the verti cal structure along with a modicum of autonomy and a wider scope of legal responsibility for managers.18 External supervisory bodies are expected to keep state institutions in check, with directors making sure that subordinates fulfill their responsibilities. There is little recognition of the limits of external and vertical supervision, the advantages of social control and self-monitoring by workers' collectives, or the importance of transparency and true accountability in public institutions.

The statist position is well represented in state bureaucracies among those who fear losing their posts—not an unfounded concern, since state institutions are being reduced or "rationalized." This position is also supported by many ordinary Cubans who are tired of the social disorder that has arisen in recent decades. They want to restore order, and they reject more substantive changes because they are afraid of losing the social achievements of the Revolution. In addition, some intellectuals educated in Soviet-style Marxism reject any kind of decentralization and opening to any organization—whether private or col lective—that is not directly and closely controlled by a heavily centralized state. Some officers in the Cuban military may be close to statism because of their preference for order and control.

ECONOMICISTS: MARKET SOCIALISM

According to the "economicists," the main goal of socialism should be to develop society's productive forces in order to create more material wealth; thus they focus on productive capacity and overlook social relations. For them, economic growth generates an increase in purchasing power and in turn an improvement in the material conditions of people. They argue that socialism implies redistribution of wealth and that if there is no wealth there is nothing to distribute (Marquez, 2011).19

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For those who support this position, current changes in Cuba should aim, above all, at improving the performance of the Cuban economy in order to satisfy the "ever-increasing material needs of the people." They argue that, with effective redistribution of wealth, all institutional arrangements that are efficient and productive are useful for building socialism.20 While for the stat ists private enterprises and market relations are risky but necessary evils to be tamed by the state and for the self-managementists they are evils that can be gradually overcome with the expansion of alternative organizations that fuse economic and social goals, for the economicists both privatization and a market economy are essential for economic development.

Economicists attribute the serious underperformance of the Cuban economy to centralization, state monopoly of commerce and production of goods and services, soft-budget constraints, and lack of private entrepreneurship and market relations. Although it may not be publicly acknowledged, economicists believe that the private capitalist management model (based on autonomous, nondemocratic managers responsive to private interests) is the most effective way to run an enterprise and that markets are the most efficient form of coor dinating enterprise activity, allocating resources, and promoting efficiency and innovation.

Economicists defend the notion that if economic actors are to behave opti mally and, specifically, managers are to make the right decisions and workers are to increase productivity, material incentives and the "discipline of the mar ket" are unavoidable.21 They add that producers should pay the consequences of their poor performance even if it is due to market changes or events beyond their control. They argue against paternalistic relations between Cubans and state institutions in which the former expect to have all their problems solved by the latter.

The economicists play down warnings that their policies would aggravate inequality, the marginalization of social groups, the exploitation of employees in the private sector and in more autonomous state enterprises, and the dete rioration of the environment. These social concerns are to be dealt with at a future date and meanwhile should not be allowed to interfere with the advance

of privatization and marketization.22 They point out that significant inequality in nonwage-related income is already a reality (see Marquez, 2011: 6, and Lambert, 2011). The economicists predict that their policies will produce "win ners" and "losers" depending on their ability to adapt to market imperatives, but they point out that some measures can be taken to limit the "collateral" consequences of the reforms.

"Social justice" is for economicists an uncomfortable, messy word: social goals are too abstract, and a tax system to control the income gap and legisla tion to protect customers, the environment, and wage workers is sufficient. They suggest that we must choose between efficiency with inevitable inequal ity, on one hand, and social justice with poor material conditions, on the other. In contrast, the self-managementists argue that genuine democratic manage ment would lead to efficiency, productivity, equality, and justice (Chaguaceda and Centeno, 2011: 53; Guanche, 2011).

As a means to achieve accelerated economic growth, the economicists pro pose the incorporation of Cuba into international production chains and poli cies to attract foreign investment. They point to the success of China and

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Pineiro / CUBA'S NEW SOCIALISM 115

Vietnam in promoting growth by attracting direct foreign investment and Cuba's need for external financing. In the process, however, they fail to men tion the negative impacts of market reform in those countries, such as increas ing signs of inequality, corruption, social unrest, environmental degradation, spiritual emptiness, and the dismantling of social programs. They offer no sug gestions for avoiding these consequences.

The economicists ignore core Marxist arguments about labor exploitation and alienation. Their line of reasoning has influenced officials at the Ministry of Labor, who fail to recognize that hired workers are in a subordinate position to the person who hires them even if he or she also works (J. A. Rodriguez, 2011) and that this uneven relationship is going to increase as the availability of state jobs decreases. Denying the unequal and largely antagonistic relation ship between business owners and employees allows technocrats to ignore the need to protect the latter with a labor code or some rules that guarantee their minimum rights and the complicated topic of allowing unions that represent workers vis-a-vis management rather than vis-a-vis the state.

Economicists tend to disregard arguments that point to the complexity of human behavior and social factors that explain the effectiveness of demo cratically managed enterprises. They overlook the advantages of cooperation over self-interest. Calls to employ other means of human fulfillment such as harmonious relations among people, professional development, and social recognition and warnings about the dangers of compulsive consumption appear to them irrelevant or even antithetical to individual freedom and therefore dogmatic.

Economicism finds fertile ground among state technocrats and bureaucrats who assume that the private sector will regulate itself through the operation of the market and therefore social concerns can be overlooked. The most fervent

economicists tend to be enterprise administrators who hope that they will be left to manage a state enterprise as they see fit, avoiding all the barriers and restrictions that centralized planning currently creates. Achieving more auton omy and less supervision, less job security, and only formal worker participa tion appears to them an almost perfect arrangement.23 At the same time, economicism characterizes the thinking of many ordinary Cubans influenced by the discourse that favors efficiency over social goals and attributes China's and Vietnam's economic growth to privatization and marketization. Some aca demics, speaking the language of mainstream scholarly circles, are the most outspoken defenders of economicist views.

SELF-MANAGEMENTISTS: DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

The self-managementists defend the need for a social order that is more just and sustainable than capitalism. However, they envision a different path both from the state-centered socialism that has strongly marked the Cuban version of the system and that the statists are now trying to refashion and from the market-guided socialism that the economicists present as the only feasible model. Self-managementists argue that there can be no real socialism without solidarity, equality, and substantive democratic participation of the people in decision making in all spheres of life (political, economic, cultural, etc.). The

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116 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES

essence of socialism is instituting the social relations of self-management or self-government from communities and workplaces up to the national—and eventually global—level, that is, a democratic social control of society, the state, the economy, and all social institutions.24

Inspired by the conceptualizations of twenty-first-century socialism that have been guiding transformation processes in Latin America in recent years25 and reasserting the humanist, emancipatory, and egalitarian ideals that have marked the Cuban Revolution since its inception,26 self-managementists argue that the goal of socialism should be overall human development (Fernandez and Guanche, 2010: 4,10-11). For them supreme happiness, freedom, and ful fillment are achieved by allowing people to develop their capacities through active participation in everyday social activity in an environment where the control of decision making has been democratized or "socialized."27 To build socialism is to free individuals from all forms of oppression, subordination, discrimination, and exclusion that impede the satisfaction of their material and spiritual needs; it is to achieve a society in which people are active, conscious subjects rather than passive beneficiaries of welfare programs. Self managementists seek emancipation both from an oppressive state and political system and from undemocratic economic institutions.28

For self-managementists, the goal of Cuban socialism should not be to sat isfy the ever-increasing material needs of its citizens but to create conditions that allow them to fully develop their capacities as human beings and thus satisfy their material and spiritual needs, assuming that material needs will change under a more liberating daily life. Although wage-labor and market relations are also forms of oppression to be overcome, most self-manage mentists agree that they should not be prohibited and that society can advance toward their gradual conversion or virtual elimination by making democrati cally managed enterprises and socialized horizontal exchange relations more effective and attractive (Pineiro, 2011: 70-76).

The main problem of Cuban socialism for self-managementists has been the lack of substantive participation of workers and citizens in the administration of their lives and society. Decisions at the central state level and all the way down to local governments and enterprises have too often been made without the true participation of the people, and therefore the benefits of participatory democracy have been lost (see Campos, 2011b; Espacio Laical, 2011a: 20-21; Espina, 2008: 137). The requirements of economic activity and social implica tions would have been taken into consideration, they argue, if experts and affected social groups had participated in decision-making processes that have been limited to state functionaries.

The self-managementists attribute the underperformance of state institu tions to the insufficient sense of true ownership (which is not the same as legal property) by workers and even managers. This position sees the realization of the sense of ownership or property as essentially derived from the nature of the decision-making process and thus the social relations that are established, while statists would argue that it derives from education of workers about their rights and duties (see Vascos, 2009:104) and economicists that it derives from material incentives such as linking workers' income to their individual perfor mance.29 It is low democratic participation, insufficient democratic control of

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management and executive bodies, that, in addition to insufficient incomes, results in low motivation to work, mistaken management decisions, and cor ruption (Campos, 2011b). Without true ownership by workers and citizens in general, it is argued, there will be no motivation to ensure that resources are used properly (Espacio Laical, 2011b: 19).30

While for self-managementists workplace democracy is indispensable, both statists and economicists view it as a Utopian concept that challenges the neces sary role of their vanguard cadres and experts or entrepreneurs and would result in underperformance and chaos. Self-managementists argue that self management in the form of cooperatives, co-management, and community enterprises in coordination with democratically managed local governments is not easy to accomplish but is necessary to achieve higher levels of development of both workers' capacities (manual, intellectual, and spiritual) and the produc tive forces, since social control ensures that resources are used effectively at the same time that it provides positive incentives to increase productivity.

Self-managementists argue that transforming nonstrategic state enterprises into cooperatives—without ignoring the need for workers' willingness and preparation—is preferable economically and ethically to both the current situ ation and the proposals for renting them to private entrepreneurs. Economicists do not oppose cooperatives, mostly because they see them as a first step toward the eventual privatization of larger enterprises. Statists distrust any arrange ment in which the state would lose direct control.

Defenders of self-management place great emphasis on the need to democ ratize not just enterprises but the economy and thus society at large, but they have differing viewpoints regarding the degree to which self-managed enter prises should operate through market relations. Most of them favor decentral ized, horizontal exchange relations among economic actors and have faith that worker-managed enterprises will behave responsibly on behalf of the interests of society as a whole. While some self-managementists maintain that the fun damental space of participation should lie in the workplace and overlook the consequences of markets for enterprises' behavior toward society, others warn that democratically managed enterprises are not immune to market logic and envision democratic local governments and social organizations in more direct control of them.31

The self-managementist position highlights the need not only to redistribute wealth but to change the way it is created by establishing relations of freely associated labor and thus achieving the principle of true socialist property, which in turn would stimulate productivity (Hernandez in Espacio Laical, 2011b: 43; Espina, 2008: 134-135; Martinez, 2009: 33-34; Perera and Martin, 2011). Democratization at the point of production is what Marx identified as the basis of a society that has truly transcended the capitalist order (Campos, 2006). The self-managementists note that these changes, and not only higher wages or greater autonomy for managers, are a source of important incentives for productivity and efficiency and at the same time promote the development of the "new" socialist men and women (see Espina, 2008: 135-137; Tablada, 2009:141-145,148-149).32

Those who identify with this position warn of the risks of decentralization of government and enterprises without democratization and without taking

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into consideration the interests of workers and all those affected by their activities.33 Some defend the need to establish—in addition to a sound regula tory framework—spaces for democratic coordination between producers, con sumers, and other social groups (environmentalists, feminists, minorities, etc.) so that the local economy will respond to social interests rather than profit maximization and market laws.34

It is difficult to determine which sectors of Cuban society identify with the self-managementist position. Support is related not so much to any geograph ical or employment situation as to exposure to these "alternative" ideas. Bombarded by bold messages for privatization and marketization, many Cubans not surprisingly consider self-management proposals "utopian" or impractical. Also, the idea of democratic participation may have lost its mean ing among Cubans because authorities have constantly insisted that the nation's political system, local governments, and state enterprises are the most partici patory possible and because the independent decision-making capacity of agri cultural cooperatives has been severely curtailed. The staunchest advocates of the self-managementist position are undoubtedly intellectuals and profession als who have been exposed to alternative, post-Stalinist socialist ideas and the discourse about twenty-first-century socialism that resonates in Latin America. However, as Cubans have started to suffer the consequences of the expansion of private enterprises and the adjustments in state institutions, they have begun to raise concerns about expanding selfishness and insensitivity and about the undemocratic practices of state managers and local authorities.35 Similarly, as the wages of state workers have become tied to the performance of their enter prises, some workers have become increasingly interested in having control over them, even demanding to be able to elect managers.36 Some of these work ers even defend the proposal to convert most nonstrategic state enterprises into cooperatives.37

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Cuban society is currently engaged in defining its future direction, whether toward a better-organized state-led society, a more market-based one, a more democratic one, or—more likely— a combination of the three. Some evidence can be brought to bear on the question of the weight of each position and whether it is likely to grow or diminish in influence.

Without a doubt, the economicist position is the one that currently predom inates both within the state and among a majority of Cubans. After more than 20 years of hardship, Cubans are first and foremost interested in increasing their incomes in order to satisfy basic needs. Heavily exposed to the hegemonic worldview that private enterprise and markets work best, many believe that privatization and marketization represent the best path to sustained economic growth. Faced with the failure of state enterprises and top-down planning and largely unaware of other ways of socializing the economy, they see no alterna tive. At the same time, however, Cubans generally do not consider private enterprise and markets natural and hope to prevent their inequalities and other negative side effects, such as price differentials and higher profits for com merce over production.

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Statist positions are openly recognized as representing the status quo and what Cuba needs to move away from and are thus rejected by the vast majority of the population. The position, however, still enjoys significant support within the state and among Cubans who place a premium on social services. In fact, some argue that the final version of the Sixth Congress's Guidelines is less eco nomicist and more statist than the initial draft.38 Additional evidence of the

economicists' loss of influence are the moratorium on the plan to lay off 10 percent of the Cuban workforce and the increase in subsidies and social security expenditures, at least those related to health issues and injuries, in the first semester of 2011 (Fernandez Sosa, 2011).

There is very little of the self-managementist vision in the Guidelines. The document fails to incorporate the self-managementists' main goals (satisfaction of people's broader needs, such as human development) and means (participa tory democracy, democratic control of social institutions) (se Rafael Hernandez in Espacio Laical, 2011b: 29). Although President Raul Castro had made refer ence to the importance of "participation,"39 the Guidelines mention it only three times, and mostly in the sense of "consultation" (PCC, 2011: 21, 22, 38). The document does acknowledge cooperatives as a socialist form of enterprise but fails to prioritize them over private ones. Its stated goal of providing state enterprises and municipal governments with more autonomy is a positive step but still far from recognizing the need to democratize them. This shortcoming accurately reflects the fact that self-managementists are in the minority, which is partly the result of Cuba's verticalist, older-male-dominated culture.

Nevertheless, the social imaginary of social justice and emancipation is still present. Although the grandchildren of the historic generation are less familiar with socialist and revolutionary ideals, they generally grasp the importance of dignity and justice and reject subordination.40 A culture of solidarity cultivated by the Revolution still endures, making inequality seem particularly unaccept able. Moreover, some have warned that without participation and social con trol of autonomous local governments and enterprises, Cuba is paving the way for the restoration of capitalism.41 Signs of the increasing weight of the self managementist position have emerged recently in the form of articles in official newspapers defending the need for workers to participate fully in manage ment decisions and thus begin to resemble true owners.42

However, the self-managementists are not waging the battle of ideas effec tively. Only recently have the Cuban mainstream, official media begun to air some of their points of view. Some self-managementists behave like outsiders in that they distrust state institutions and fail to interact with the media.43 Furthermore, the defenders of self-management have not yet put forward detailed, realistic propositions that appear feasible. They—as well as the economicists— need to deal with the fact that more autonomous private or even collective enterprises are already resulting in an increase in prices, espe cially of basic goods and services, thus further reducing the real income of Cuban workers.44 Self-managementists also border on voluntarism when they fail to consider that not all Cubans are interested in assuming the responsibility of participating in management decision-making schemes. Their model of democratic socialism rests on the assumption that people are willing and to some degree able to put up with the inconveniences of democratic decision making in their communities, workplaces, and broader organizations. In short,

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defenders of democratic socialism and self-management must do a better job of presenting clear proposals that address questions of feasibility and efficiency.

The three main visions analyzed in this paper (state socialism, market social ism, and democratic socialism based on self-management) cannot be reduced to "good" or "bad" choices. All sides make legitimate points that need to be considered in the strategic decisions that are made. However, the desirability of democracy—not the formal, liberal representative one but the substantive, "participatory" one—is now widely accepted throughout the world. From a normative perspective, pursuing more democracy would appear more desir able than conferring inordinate power on state functionaries who pledge to represent the interests of society or on resourceful economic actors who direct from the shadows an "invisible hand" that affects us all.

A strategy focused just on sustaining economic growth and improving the performance of the Cuban state should improve living conditions for at least part of the population and could help maintain support for the Cuban socialist project. But to the extent to which economic growth fundamentally comes not from democratically managed enterprises and socially controlled markets but from privatization and marketization, as in capitalist and market-oriented "socialist" countries, the interests of the new capitalists are inevitably going to move farther away from social interests, and they will find ways to contribute less in taxes,45 charge higher prices, externalize as many of their costs as pos sible to society, and eventually make sure that the state responds to their pri vate interests. Similarly, to the extent to which state managers are given greater autonomy without democratizing political and economic institutions, abuses of power and inequalities will become increasingly common. The ones who will suffer the most from such reforms are the staunchest supporters of the Revolution today and would be less inclined to sustain a project that does not address their needs and expectations of fairness.

In the current process of redefining the kind of socialism that is desirable for Cuba, there is an alternative to "state socialism" and "market socialism." If the

goal is to create the fairest society possible, more space needs to be opened up for the discussion of self-managementist proposals in the public media, and public discourse should center on the values of equality, justice, and solidarity. The important role that direct, participatory democracy has played in other revolutionary processes currently under way in Latin America should influ ence the Cuban debate. In this way, the principles and social cohesion that have sustained the Revolution could be advanced rather than weakened.

NOTES

1. None of the names have been used by groups to identify themselves. 2. The term "building socialism" is interpreted differently by each position because conceptu

alizations of "socialism" or a "socialist society" differ. The use of the term highlights that advanc ing toward a "superior" social order is a process that is gradual and nonlinear. Some see "communism" (the concept put forward by Marx, not the one associated with countries ruled by communist parties) as the most advanced stage of socialism, while others see it as a Utopia that can never be reached but serves to shed light on the desired direction of the postcapitalist transfor mation process.

3. The impact of Washington policies undoubtedly weighs heavily on Cuba's economic prob lems by largely succeeding in preventing Cuba from accessing U.S. products and markets and,

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Pineiro / CUBA'S NEW SOCIALISM 121

most important, from using the international financial and credit system. The Cuban economy also suffers heavily from Washington's ban on investments in Cuba not only by U.S. firms but by any firm with some participation or presence in the United States. Cuba's Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that these economic sanctions have damaged the Cuban economy by more than US$975,000 million and asserts that the blockade "constitutes the most important obstacle for the development of our country" (B. Rodriguez, 2011).

4. Mass organizations such as the Women's Federation, the Workers' Union, and the Communist Youth League are supposed to represent those particular interests and are invited to most spaces of decision making.

5. "If we do not fix it we will fall into an abyss," because "we cannot spend more than we produce forever" (R. Castro, 2010).

6. New legislation allows Cubans to sell their cars and houses (292 Gaceta Oficial 31, September 27, 2011, and 288 Gaceta Oficial 35, November 2, 2011), and facilitates their access to credit and subsidies for housing construction (289 Gaceta Oficial 40, November 21,2011, and Gaceta Oficial 1, January 4,2012, respectively).

7. According to Pedro Olivera, a director of the Land Control Center of the Ministry of Agriculture (Ravsberg, 2011), and Lugo Fonte, president of Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos (Gonzalez, 2011).

8. On December 1,2011, these experiments were expanded to include all salons with up to three chairs (Gaceta Oficial 36, November 11,2011), while other services such as repairs, photography, and laundry will be governed by similar arrangements in six provinces and will subsequently be expanded to the entire nation (Gaceta Oficial 46, December 23,2011). In December 2011, plans were announced to draft legislation on nonagricultural cooperatives (Granma, December 24, 2011). Some Cuban institu tions are preparing to create services and light industry cooperatives that rent state facilities.

9. Informal estimates set the number of workers that have been declared "available" at

around 150,000 (Reuters, October 5,2011). 10. From 152,000 in October 2010 to more than 350,000 in October 2011. More than 1.8 million

workers are expected to join the nonstate sector by 2015 (Pedraza, 2010), representing 35 percent of total employment.

11. Many expressed disappointment with the draft document for the Conference because it does not suggest real changes in the way the PCC operates in Cuba's political system (Espacio Laical, digital supplement no. 153, November 2011, editorial [http://www.espaciolaical.org, accessed January 23,2012]; retired diplomat and historian Pedro Campos, 2011a; D'Angelo, 2011a).

12. On the 115-member Central Committee, the representation of women increased from 13 percent to nearly 42 percent and the percentage of blacks and people of mixed race increased from 21 to 31. At the same time, although the turnover was over half, the average age of members did not decrease significantly.

13. Raul Castro (2011b), the journalist Felix Lopez (Granma, September 30,2011), and Tamargo Arenado's letter to the editor (Granma, August 5,2011).

14. See Bernal Camero's letter to the editor (Granma, October 7, 2011) arguing against "giving bakeries to workers" on the ground that "state production is the best and most secure option."

15. Garcia Brigos's letter to the editor (Granma, November 8, 2011) argued that what made a local bakery function better than others was that local government delegates and other function aries strongly "controlled and demanded" a good product from workers. A letter by Broche Vidal stated, "If directors are better, then their subordinates will be better" (Granma, September 16, 2011). See also Borges Mujica's letter (Granma, January 8,2010).

16. See Anneris Ivette Leyva's "El derecho a la informacion," Granma, July 8, 2011, and Pagola Berger's, Lopez Diaz's, and E. Gonzalez's letters to the editor in Granma, April 2,2010, February 12, 2010, and July 15,2011.

17. See Campos (2011c) and Rodriquez Perez's letter to the editor (Granma, May 7,2010). 18. Fleites Rivero's letter to the editor (Granma, September 5, 2011) blames administrators for

not exercising sufficient control and adds that their higher salaries should motivate them to do so. 19. Diaz Vazquez (2011: 124,130-131) says that it was Utopian to attempt to build "commu

nism" on the basis of redistribution according to need rather than work contribution. But he does not consider that both are based on the principle "from each according to his capacity." He argues that China and Vietnam, with their "organic implementation of the market," appear to confirm that it is impossible to build socialism without going through a "mercantile period." See also Labrada Fernandez's letter to the editor (Granma, July 23, 2010).

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20. See Cruz Vento's letter to the editor (Granma, February 19,2010). 21. See Hernandez Lorenzo and Gil Leal's letters to the editor (Granma, December 23,2011, and

February 24,2012). 22. Felix Lopez suggests that social justice might be the "enemy of freedom and effectiveness"

(Granma, September 30, 2011). 23. Some managers of small state enterprise units are said to be purposely underperforming

in the hope that the units will be rented to them in a way similar to the arrangements for barber and beauty shops.

24. Ricardo Ronquillo (2011) says that socialism "is possible only when transparent, dem ocratic, and real control by workers predominates." Fernando Martinez (2009: 37) argues that socialism leads to human liberation but requires conscious action by the people. The social scientist Juan Luis Martin (Perera and Martin, 2011) agrees with Martinez that socialism does not result automatically from the development of productive forces and that real participa tion "conditions" the emergence of "social subjectivity." See Guanche (2009: 227-236) and Campos (2011b).

25. The governments of Venezuela, Bolivia (with its concept of "living well" or buen vivir), and Ecuador (with its concept of the "Citizens' Revolution") emphasize the importance of democratic participation in politics and the economy for fully developing the people and thus building a truly just society.

26. The Cuban Revolution has been heavily influenced by the humanism of Jose Marti, Cuba's national hero. Other Cuban socialist thinkers such as Raul Roa defended the need for socialism

and democracy and for emancipation or sovereignty through participation in decision making and the control of elected representatives (Guanche, 2008). More recently Fernando Martinez (2009) has highlighted the emancipatory essence of socialism.

27. Marx's idea of human development through revolutionary practice has been highlighted by the Canadian Marxist economist Michael Lebowitz (2009) and has influenced the analysis of Cuban thinkers such as Pedro Campos (2011c).

28. Alvarez Lopez's letter to the editor (Granma, April 8, 2011) warns that "the law of supply and demand has been questioned in debates I have participated in" and asks, "What is demand? What we need, or what we can really buy?" He points out that the rich will always be able to buy while those who have much less will not. In their letters to the editor (Granma, May 20,2011, and September 11, 2011), Chavez Domfnquez and Lugo Domfnquez denounce the new private busi nesses' practice of making purchases at state stores and hoarding the goods to resell them at higher prices.

29. The philosopher Jose Ramon Fabelo (Bohemia, October 13, 2010) argues for harmonizing moral and material incentives, warning that economic mechanisms by themselves are not ade quate: if "people are not able to decide what they produce and for whom, and to participate in management and planning, and in addition are often not compensated for their work results, how can they feel like owners?"

30. Jose Antonio Fraga Castro, director of the LabioFam state enterprise, argues that "the best way to solve current problems is to establish mechanisms and methods that motivate workers to feel that their enterprises are really theirs and to substantively participate in the management process" (Tribuna, July 12,2011). Manso Borges's letter to the editor (Granma, July 23,2010) warns against privatization and supports the socialization of property and worker management while defending the development of the workers' capacities in terms of their collective and individual interests.

31. The anthropologist Yenisei Rodriguez argues for converting the nonstate sector into self managed enterprises and allowing market logics, "which do not necessarily have to be capitalist ones" (Espacio Laical, 2011b: 31). Alzugaray sees democratic participation and social control as key and adds: "Vietnam and China demonstrate that using money and mercantile instruments is not in contradiction with the purpose of creating a more equal and just society" (Espacio Laical, 2011a: 26). Chaguaceda and Centeno (2011:51) apparently favor market relations because they see dem ocratic planning as an impediment to self-management. Whereas Guanche (2011) and Campos (2008) view democratic planning as a form of self-management at the social level that is necessary to articulate the interests of workers' collectives with those of the communities and society at large. Academics and state officials working on local development projects emphasize the need for "participatory planning" in which "residents participate in the formulation of goals" (Hernandez Porto, 2011).

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32. Aledo Roller's letter to the editor (Granma, April 9,2011) says that "it is the way we organize our economic and material life that, in the end, determines our social consciousness." Roller defends the system of worker cooperatives and explains that in socialism there should be no wage-labor and market competition and the anarchy of production should not "rule our lives."

33. See D'Angelo (2011b) and Martin's letter to the editor (Granma, October 22,2010). 34. Arturo Lopez-Levy (Espacio Laical, 2011a: 30,32) warns of the limitations inherent in real—

as opposed to textbook—markets. He argues against "economicist conceptions" and states that the goal of sustainable development with social and environmental goals should be prioritized over economic growth. See also Sandoval Lopez's letter to the editor (Granma, September 30,2011) complaining that the operators of the new private taxis don't care about people and suggesting "incentivizing solidarity" by reducing taxes for those who charge more affordable prices and enabling supervision by the people. See also Pineiro (2011).

35. Vera Blanco's letter to the editor (Granma, February 10, 2012). Elias Argudin, editor of the Havana's weekly Tribuna, criticizes private barbers for trading their ethics for money and becom ing "wolves of men" ("Barberos de pacotilla," May 27,2012).

36. Gonzalez Cruz's and Marichal Castillo's letters to the editor in Granma, January 7,2011, and May 14,2011.

37. See letters to the editor of Granma by Rodriguez Vega (September 23,2011), Paez del Amo (September 9,2011), and Arteaga Perez (May 20,2011).

38. Instead of combining planning and markets it stressed planning as the central tool while taking into account market conditions. Where originally state enterprises would have set prices freely, in the final version the pricing system is to be "revised" but without specifying how this will be done. Finally, there is no full opening to foreign investment, which is largely restricted to strategic sectors.

39. For example, "The excessively centralized model that currently characterizes our economy will have to transit, with order and discipline and the participation of workers, toward a decen tralized system in which planning will predominate, as a key feature of socialist management, but will not ignore market tendencies" (R. Castro, 2011c).

40. See Reuters, October 5, 2011, "Cubans Look to Private Sector to Make Ends Meet," for the

complaints of an employee that her boss in the private sector (where wages are two to four times the average state wage) sets her schedule and abuses her verbally. See also Espacio Laical's editor Lenier Gonzalez (Espacio Laical, 2011a: 22-23).

41. Regalado Garcia's letter to the editor (Granma, March 12, 2010) warns against "going back to the past."

42. Castaneda and Rubio (2011) propose "co-ownership" or co-management in state enter prises. Many letters to the editor in Granma also suggest allowing for the creation of cooperatives that lease state businesses.

43. Some self-managementists complain that state and official institutions purposely exclude them.

44. See Farinas Carmona's letter to the editor (Granma, September 23,2011) denouncing the fact that private taxis "freely set prices without any control or consideration of people's wages."

45. See Pastor Batista Valdes, "Prestos para el disfrute, escurridizos en el aporte" (Granma, October 4, 2011), on private businesses that pay no taxes.

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