Prepare a 15 presentation on the assigned readings based on those two chapter. Instructions 1. Time: 15 minutes in total for presentation on the assigned readings depending on whether you work as a team or individually (see below under Tasks). The impor

Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

Escalation and Entrapment

Contributors: By: Ho-Won Jeong

Book Title: Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis

Chapter Title: "Escalation and Entrapment"

Pub. Date: 2008

Access Date: May 18, 2020

Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd

City: London

Print ISBN: 9781412903097

Online ISBN: 9781446279366

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n8

Print pages: 154-176

© 2008 SAGE Publications Ltd All Rights Reserved.

This PDF has been generated from SAGE Knowledge. Please note that the pagination of the online

version will vary from the pagination of the print book.

Escalation and Entrapment

Conflict escalation is noted for its rising levels of hostility, driven by the severity of the tactics. New patterns of interaction are accompanied not only by the involvement of extra parties in the struggle, but also by changes within each of the parties. An increase in the intensity of a conflict tends to bring about an expanded scope of participation that engages more people. At the same time, conflict groups are further divided with de-individ- ualization, due to adversarial socio-psychological processes and organizational developments in preparation for an entrenched struggle. Enemy images, stereotypes, and lack of trust result in the destruction or loss of important links of communication, both formal and informal.

The escalation of a conflict is associated with proliferation and generalization of the initial specific issue, the polarization of relationships among parties, deep feelings and the personalization of the situation. The con- tinued escalation reflects efforts to rally allies and the dehumanization of an enemy with hardening attitudes. The value placed on winning substitutes a more pragmatic goal, along with the rise of hard-line leaders, curb- ing the possibility of seeking alternatives. In a nutshell, the self-fulfilling expectations of contentious behaviour are further fuelled by the development of enemy perceptions and decreased contact between the parties as well as strained communication. This chapter examines the various characteristics and processes that are related to conflict intensification and entrapment.

Dynamics of Escalation

The emergence of a number of contentious issues pushes the parties to move further apart, accentuating dif- ferences and submerging similarities between them in order to justify a desire to inflict harm on one another. The increased mistrust of enemy motives hinders an ability to sympathize with the other party and strength- ens a tendency toward zero-sum calculations. Fixed assumptions about the conflict result in the distortion of each party's positions, even generating a strong sense of threat to a group's central values. A disputed terri- tory may have been perfectly divisible, but the fighting and its consequences attach symbolic meaning to the contested land; denying it to the enemy becomes, in itself, a gratifying goal.

In a highly contentious struggle, issue proliferation produces new flashpoints along with the emergence of obdurate positions. Narrow, specific complaints become universalized, with the development of antagonism predicated on the denial of the other's legitimate rights. The shift from a specific disagreement to general group hostilities may shed light on hidden agendas that were previously considered taboo. The prohibition on wearing a headscarf in French schools, for example, provoked a protest against the suppression of Islamic culture; forced assimilation and intolerance of non-French ethnic traditions has resulted in the resurfacing of discussion about French government policies, and mainstream society's attitude toward African and Middle Eastern minorities.

The enlargement of contentious issues is likely to highlight the competitive positions of opposing groups. A widening conflict is inexorable in a clash involving multiple types of contestant over a broad set of issues aris- ing from deep divisions of basic values or interests. When one adversary extends their list of demands, the other may be willing to enlarge an opposing list of contentious issues. Even technical, mundane matters may evolve into attacks on personal or group attributes, being framed as integral to collective identities and even to the party's own existence. Great symbolic significance can be attached to seemingly separate, minor inci- dents of collision once there is a rising sense of grievance. Any harm caused by the imposition of sanctions is attributed to the other's strong desire for vengeance by the use of any means, even if the sanctions may have been carefully introduced, with limited objectives, so as not to alienate the entire population of an adversarial state.

The expansion of a conflict demands heightened personal commitment in conjunction with the devotion of more resources to the fight with optimism. Conviction in the feasibility of total victory generates increased con-

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fidence about the achievement of desired objectives (Kriesberg, 1998). This is well illustrated by the euphoria and surge of Arab nationalism, prior to the 1967 Six Day War, along with a call for sacrifice, exhibited in the capitals of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and other Middle Eastern states.

Parties are unwilling to make concessions and take positions of non-compromise with high aspirations for a victory across a wide range of issues. Embracing more assertive patterns of behaviour complicates the original conflict that became expanded with the growth of issue complexity. Once the solidification of enemy perceptions is tied to one's own survival needs, ideologically or morally characterized struggles defy compro- mise. The war on terrorism was monolithically defined by the US government in terms of a fight against ‘evil’, leaving very little room for the analysis of the political and social causes that might be related to the US role in the Middle East. Such positional rigidity is further strengthened if there are no efforts to properly interpret an adversary's motives.

A fight over an extended list of issues is more likely to solicit support from a wide spectrum of sympathizers with the expansion of recruitment bases. Splinter groups might be formed to push their own agendas to the fore. As people react to calls for outside support, a conflict gains new complexity through an increased num- ber of partisans, each of whom is likely to have their own understandings of the original issues entrenched in primary antagonism.

The creation of opposing camps in support of different protagonists enlarges the conflict with the addition of new ally or patron-client relationships (Maoz, 2006). The tendency toward enlargement exerts pressure on non-aligned parties in the periphery of the conflict to take sides, pulling more groups farther away from moder- ate positions. Formerly neutral observers are increasingly more attuned to the polarized centres in a widening conflict in which vying for external support becomes the latest game of competition.

There are diverse motives for the participation, ranging from shared interests with one of the protagonists and a search for allies in their own conflicts (through links to other conflicts) to the evasion of future costs incurred from non-involvement. The Pakistani government revealed that the US threat through informal channels of ‘bombing [its] country back to the Stone Age’ forced its participation in the US fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan despite domestic opposition.

A high level of polarization accompanies inadvertent escalation associated with very little trust or miscom- munication (Anderson, 2004). The bifurcation of groups between ‘us’ and ‘them’ puts up psychological and physical barriers that reduce interaction with the formation of negative images. Severe forms of violence wipe out cross-cutting ties that used to link multiple sectors of society and sub-groupings across political, cultural boundaries. In the aftermath of various terrorist attacks by al Qaeda and its proxies or sympathizers, the num- ber of Arab professional visits, other travels and students studying in the United States has dramatically de- clined, deepening social distance. Most significantly, inter-group polarization produces a synergy for in-group solidarity with less tolerance of favourable or sympathetic views about a common enemy.

Thus polarized attitudes emerge, in part, from conformity to extreme in-group normative positions along with the derogation of other groups (Cooper et al., 2001). A lack of interest in accommodation is reinforced by such motives as seeking a sense of ‘justice’ and yearning for revenge as well as the expression of anger. These sentiments are supported by the adoption of a militant ideology that rationalizes the high cost of fight- ing adversaries as psychologically redeeming. In the patriotic post-9/11 era, any opposition to US military campaigns in Afghanistan was ridiculed or was subject to ideological criticism, raising very little doubt about extravagant government spending on ‘the war against terrorism’ despite the sacrifice of essential domestic, social and economic necessities.

The projection of fear onto the opponent plays a critical role in rationalizing highly destructive, retaliatory tac- tics in lieu of persuasive argument. Tenacious enemy images, rooted in the predominant public sentiment, are exploited in the justification of a win-lose orientation. The contentious strategies prevail in anger and hatred,

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seeking costly, undesirable consequences for opponents and shutting the door for the promise of reasonable discussion. A stronger party is inclined to bully antagonists into submission when their substantial power su- periority would easily subdue the aspirations of the other.

The magnitude of value incompatibility is misapprehended in a switch from pursuing narrowly defined objec- tives to an attempt to annihilate adversaries. The original aspirations are reinterpreted in the overall prefer- ences of goal hierarchies, supporting agendas seen as integral to the protection of the group's essential core identities. The intense pursuit of uncompromising goals, combined with the use of threats and force, is pri- marily responsible for destructive conflicts.

Psychological and Behavioural Aspects

Escalation is characterized by an increase in quantity, intensity and scope of coercive exchanges among pro- tagonists. The perpetuation of a violent struggle invokes a ‘upward spiral’, comprising a cycle of attacks and counter-attacks. The intensification of violence may proceed from a series of actions, ranging from the denial of rewards to economic threats and boycotts prior to military moves. An increasing employment of deception and pressure tactics becomes the main means of influencing an adversary in seeking an advantage. Even greater coercion is advocated as the only way to curtail resistance from the other side.

A high level of escalation is advanced by a variety of socio-psychological processes such as misperception which stimulates the distortion of the other side's traits and motives. Fear anchored in the distrust of the oth- er's intent might encourage provocative actions that prompt escalatory moves. In general, any conciliatory conduct by an adversary is inclined to be overlooked or, even if it is acknowledged, regarded as deceptive. The amplification of negative stereotypes assists in depicting the opposition as menacing, invigorating the belief that the enemy would completely violate one's own rights (Abrams, 2005). These rising tensions cause deformed patterns of communication with every message viewed through an antagonistic lens. Non-existence of communication at the height of escalation begets dangerous conditions for misjudging the other's inten- tions and taking risky behaviour.

Negative emotions attached to a locked-in struggle encompass a subjective, ethical legitimization of violent acts. An outlet for the mounting hostility depreciates the ability to empathize with the other's needs. De-in- dividualization of enemy group members, based on ethnocentric values and attitudes, spawns demeaning behaviour, along with a display of superiority to outsiders. In particular, a moral disengagement rationalizes harm to, or exploitation of, certain ‘kinds’ of people deemed to be an obstacle to one's own prosperity. Harsh measures are more easily taken with a feeling of contempt for opponents seen as inferior or evil.

In a long-term rivalry, the motivation to inflict physical and psychological injuries is ascribed to a profound desire to seek revenge for one's losses. The parties' ability to envision alternatives is further constricted by a breakdown of open and direct communication. This interruption of communication, in conjunction with a high level of distrust, engenders the misrepresentation of factual matters. Damaging propaganda adds yet further difficulties for blocking fruitful discussion about substantive issues. Most importantly, vicious escalation spirals are stoked by malicious intentions, castigation and revenge.

Once a total commitment is made on the basis of the justification of previous investments, complete with- drawal from even a failing course of action is not considered to be an option despite continuously rising costs. With very little prospect for reaching settlement, an escalatory path of ever increasing commitments is built over a longer time horizon, perpetuating a tendency to persist in the existing course of action. Independent of its originating sources, each action represents a momentum of its own, while the original causes become less relevant. Increasingly hateful confrontations are geared to hurt opponents rather than boosting one's own interests.

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A Malignant Interaction

A threat by one group spurs the other side's counter-threat in a spiral of new coercion and defence. Every escalation step taken by one party provokes the other's defensive hostilities in the absence of any willingness to compromise. Tensions exacerbated by unregulated responses push the upward-spiralling dynamics of a more damaging conflict. In a malignant social process, retreat becomes more difficult, owing to vulnerability to an unacceptable loss of pride and self-esteem. Self-amplifying action-reaction dynamics are founded on the intentional or unintentional instigation of violent acts which become normalized patterns. Brutalized relations, revealed in terrorism or total warfare, are based on the excessive means and extent of destruction without any regard for an adversary's welfare (Eckert and Willems, 2005).

At the initial stage of the second intifada, Palestinians were angered by the killings of a growing number of children following gun battles between Israeli troops and Palestinians in September 2000. After Ariel Sharon's election as Prime Minister, Israelis launched F-16 warplanes against Palestinian targets for the first time in May 2001. In the ensuing months of June and August, Islamic Jihad began its campaign, with the recruitment of Palestinian suicide bombers. They blew up a disco in Tel Aviv, leaving more than twenty people dead and more than sixty others injured. This was followed by another suicide attack on a crowded restaurant in the heart of Jerusalem, claiming the lives of 15 people and injuries to about ninety others.

In the subsequent years, approximately ten more Palestinian suicide bomb attacks detonated buses in Haifa, Jerusalem and Beersheba, a hotel event in Netanya, a social club in Rishon Letzion, a Haifa restaurant, and a popular nightspot in Tel Aviv. The levels of casualties reached their highest between 2002 and 2004. The Israelis reacted with an incursion into the Rafah refugee camp (causing at least forty Palestinian deaths), a massive military assault on Jenin and other West Bank towns (even reaching Yasser Arafat's Ramallah head- quarters) as well as the assassination of Hamas leaders with missile strikes and aircraft bombs. In spite of a seven-week truce in the summer of 2003, these attacks had lasted until a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants in February 2005.

Progressively destructive interactions, represented by strident rhetoric and assertive strategies, push each side to expect a higher degree of coercive action by their opponents (McAdam et al., 2001). A rise in hostilities might even be derived from the anticipation of an enemy's fresh attacks. Higher levels and new types of of- fence, exemplified by suicide bombs, missile strikes and assaults by F-15 fighters on residential areas, can be introduced to alter expectations about future actions and outcomes. The permissible amount of force may go beyond previous boundaries with direct attacks on an enemy's top leadership (for instance, the Israeli mis- sile strike against Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi in May 2004 and air strikes on the spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004). The indication of an expanded boundary for one party's attacks signals a heightened level of pressure on the other side to concede.

The retaliatory spirals driven by blame, anger, and vengeance intensify the desire of one party to hurt the oth- er in response to actions that it finds offensive. The growth in negative stereotypes relaxes inhibitions against the employment of harsh measures. The experiences of each party are justified by hostility originating from past grievances or feelings of injustice in relation to the other's atrocious acts. As perceived injustice exacer- bates rage, the harm suffered becomes a lasting source to seek revenge.

The belligerent actions are reproduced with each round of exchanges in an upward spiralling driven by action- reaction processes. In a mutually damaging interaction, a growing list of grievances is further expanded, while each retaliation action stirs a new provocative action. In malign, escalatory spirals, therefore, every exchange of contentious behaviour aggravates protagonists to step up their pressure. The retaliatory actions of one are countered by the other's coercive responses at even a higher level in a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic. The lower end of the intensity scale, meanwhile, is elevated to an intolerable level with the replication of an enemy's escalatory moves.

This higher pressure, along with a growing perception of threat, arouses self-fulfilling expectations in which

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one's worst suspicion is confirmed by the other's behaviour via one's own false beliefs (Bordens and Horowitz, 2002). False expectations and negative perceptions elicit the feared response to become reality as a conse- quence of inflamed emotions. Once one's initiatives are based on the anticipation of an antagonistic action, this, in turn, evokes its actual realization. Thus self-fulfilling prophecies are materialized by the parties' irra- tional images of, and behaviour toward, each other, in the context of deadly confrontations.

Even if the intention of the initiator is proactive (for example, the construction of a 640-kilometre West Bank barrier by the Israelis in 2002), actions may be seen as menacing by the opponent. The attribution of adver- sarial behaviour to harmful intentions provokes further engagement in a hostile reaction. An excessive reac- tion to a perceived threat is attributed to growing suspicion and mistrust in conjunction with the miscalculation of an adversary's likely move. A mutually destructive spiral is predestined for a highly competitive process felt simultaneously by adversaries. In the mutually assured destruction (MAD) of competition for nuclear ar- mament during the Cold War period, an adversary's move was often regarded as an unacceptable peril with concerns about humiliating defeat. Stereotyped enemy images and historical analogies further tighten a com- mitment to absolute victory.

A Mode of Escalatory Spiral

In a linear arrangement, qualitative and quantitative changes occur in each repetitive pattern of interaction. In an incremental escalation model, a spiral whirls upward in a step-by-step process, with roughly the same, or similar rates, in each antagonistic response. Tension may rise over time through a chain of incidents, each provoking a new level of hostility, eventually reaching a point of crisis. The endpoint of mutual escalation is likely to be an exercise of physical force; a series of events can prompt one or both parties to determine the outcome of contest by attack.

Research on foreign policy-making behaviour suggests that conflict is more likely to escalate into an intense crisis level if it entails a threat to basic values, finite time to react, and a high likelihood of military hostilities (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 2000). After the establishment of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s, the exchange of hostile rhetoric between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union (exhibited by the ‘evil empire’ and ‘a mad man’ respectively) drastically grew into a dangerous psychological warfare and a re- newed arms race, despite mutual avoidance of military provocations. Fortunately, the psycho-political aspect of the confrontation was not further escalated beyond the competitive military build-up and antagonistic emo- tional responses.

The course of challenging and protecting the status quo can be featured by gradual escalation when each party attempts to test the other's strength and resolve with a series of increasing provocations. The unstable competition for advantage, in general, ends up with uncontrollable violence without any steps taken to reverse it. Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and occupied a significant portion of land inhabited by the Greeks as a final step to break through the continual standoff with which neither side to the conflict felt comfortable. The invasion was set in the context of Turkish threats of military intervention in the mid-1960s to alter the political landscape in favour of minority Turks on the island vis-à-vis the original Greek inhabitants.

Prior to the invasion, each clash further escalated the conflict, producing a higher level of political tension. This coincided with a Turkish weapons shipment and aerial bombing as well as Athens' support for hard line Greek nationalists. The Turkish government used a coup orchestrated by Greek militants to depose Cyprus President Makarios as a pretext to dramatically tip the territorial balance. The Turkish action created about 160,000–200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who comprised 82% of the population in the north.

By taking advantage of Greek inaction to the military provocation, the Turkish government was able to further escalate the tension and imposed a new status quo desired by them. In the above case, ‘[t]ensions and vul- nerability build up slowly, until they reach a critical point at which something snaps or some parties decide to

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force a break-through’. In this situation, a long and gradual onset contributes to the unfolding of a pattern of critical incidents with a relatively abrupt termination after ‘the stage was set psychologically and politically for a showdown’ ('tHart and Boin, 2001: 32).

Escalation behaviour is not necessarily restricted to military actions or direct threats of their use (Hewitt, 2003). In the majority of international conflicts, severe political acts encompass antagonistic alliance forma- tion, severance of communication, violation or abandonment of treaties, territorial claims, denial of political legitimacy and diplomatic sanctions. One-sided escalation, imposed on an adversary, can be taken more se- riously by virtue of either stronger verbal or physical acts even if the adversary might not have initially taken the threat seriously.

A status quo is ultimately disrupted by the escalation of a non-violent, diplomatic mode of exchange to military action. Even an escalatory ladder of war entails various types of threshold, ranging from demonstration at- tacks on the interior zone and limited bombing against the infrastructure to increasing assault on the military. Thus a constrained disarming attack and some other forms of controlled warfare may precede full military attacks. A series of thresholds may be pushed further up the escalation curve, while each party is eager to display its own capabilities for and commitment to entrenched battles.

In cautious bullying, adverse statements may escalate to shows of strength, military preparedness, and ma- noeuvres before an ultimatum being accompanied by the employment of force. Intimidation tactics may not necessarily be intended to move farther up escalatory steps and might have been prepared as part of a ‘car- rot-and-stick’ strategy. Pre-threat is devised for probing to get a sense of the other's strategy prior to the first signal of threat along with initial steps toward escalation. Escalating threats culminate in the actual application of destructive force at the end of assertive bullying.

The initial exchange of threats and low-level coercive actions can continue to grow in magnitude and pass one or more salient points, finally crossing the border line of an all-out war. In fact, adversarial actions impli- cated in a war might denote the failure of manipulating enemy psychology with a gradual escalation strategy built initially into diplomatic pressure and warnings as well as a demonstration of strength. In the two US in- vasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the advance of military actions proceeded from diplomatic efforts to form a coalition in support of American policy along with the psychological manoeuvres to scare Saddam Hussein.

As opposed to a progressive escalation of hostile exchanges, a spiral for the eruption of sudden hostilities is embedded in a long-term rivalry. This is well demonstrated by the massive Israeli retaliatory air strikes in Lebanon following Hezbollah's abduction of three Israeli soldiers in summer 2006 as well as swift Israeli bombings on Syrian targets of suspected nuclear laboratory sites in fall 2007. Unrestrained, emotional re- actions to any provocations may slip into open warfare quickly without a regulation mechanism. In surprise attacks, intentions of aggressive moves, exemplified by the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands, may not be so clearly expressed. The Korean War of 1950–53 was also initiated without much of a warning signal. Even though there were a series of antagonistic political and diplomatic moves, no one predicted the North's major military offence in a short time span.

Tensions are easily exacerbated by unregulated responses to surprise attacks. In many crisis situations, quick military strikes are taken to catch enemies off guard. In a show of dramatic offensive moves, the higher end of the intensity scale might be reached without much of a spiral process; adversaries may promptly mobilize the highest destructive forces with great intensity.

A Crisis Mode of Escalation

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An engagement in intense hostile behaviour is often reinforced by a sense of crisis which stems from warn- ings of acute danger requiring immediate reaction. In many escalation cases, the stakes unintentionally rise to crisis levels, especially when each party does not fully assess the broader consequences of individual ac- tions. In the lead-up to World War I, a series of events, escalated by antagonistic diplomatic manoeuvres and the mobilization of coalition armies within a short time frame, rapidly got out of control.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 originated from the Pakistani troops' attempt to infiltrate Indian Kashmir and instigate local armed resistance. Initially it was planned as a quick military campaign to tilt the balance in the disputed territory of Kashmir. After several skirmishes, India attacked Pakistan on multiple western fronts in retaliation. This war started with the miscalculation of Pakistan's leader General Ayub Khan to easily stir a re- bellion in a region controlled by India. The Pakistani leadership underestimated the Indian military's strength after the latter's loss in the 1962 war with China, and misconceived India's will to fight.

The exacerbation of a high-stakes struggle into a crisis evolves from negative reactions to each other's threats. In a vicious spiral of escalation, each party justifies its action as defensive, while perceiving the other's action as offensive. Behaviour involved in such escalation situations as the Cuban Missile Crisis illuminates the fact that the posturing of one side elicits similar behaviour from the opponent who is reluctant to show weakness. Neither party is willing to make concessions, given that the mutual reinforcement of hostile expec- tations involves higher stakes in the outcome of the struggle.

In the absence of caution, competitive risk taking, as part of manoeuvres for advantage, may evolve into a spin-off escalation. Inflicted pain may have been designed to change the behaviour of the adversaries, but its effects would be the reverse if the other side were to overreact out of fear. It is also ineffective if an adversary has anticipated some cost and has been prepared to provide counter-threats.

In a crisis situation, an interaction pattern of contentious behaviour impels high emotional arousal with feelings of anxiety and surprise (Brecher, 1998; Rosenthal et al., 2001). Intense stress and negative emotions stir a chaotic interaction process. Quick escalation leaves limited time to act, developing a sense of urgency with fewer creative, moderate options. In this situation, particular stages are dictated by the leader's emotional re- silience and bureaucratic decision-making styles. Urgency is often generated by public announcements of a deadline or ultimatum. The short time span of conflict alters the quality of decisions by demanding swift action with dire consequences.

Decision makers are usually uncertain as to the effects of particular actions within the crisis context marked by a high level of instability. In general, great uncertainty is unavoidable in the absence of information about the other actors' intentions. An intense level of stress is produced by the elements of surprise, characteristic of an unexpected event, in tandem with time constraints which prohibit full investigation of decision-making choices (Robinson, 1996). Conflict behaviour in crisis conditions is consequently handicapped by fear, panic, rage and other intense emotions. Being overwhelmed by extreme anxiety, decision makers are subject to re- acting more erratically and dysfunctionally, being less concerned about the effects of reckless choices.

Irrevocable commitments tend to be made by narrowing options to force the other side to back down. When one party has an ability to cause damage, aggressive policies serve as a means to subjugate an adversary to put down resistance. A dangerous situation can be pushed to the verge of disaster after opponents depend on brinkmanship for obtaining the most advantageous outcome. As a manoeuvre to press the opposing camp into making concessions, each adversary attempts to fabricate an impression that they are not hesitant to employ extreme methods. In some escalatory processes, thus, a willingness to risk precipitating a dead-end battle by means of such acts as the issuance of ultimatum may be intentionally designed for false impression of invincibility while putting unbearable pressure on an opponent.

Eagerness to back up threats is often displayed by a high level of provocative action. However, such inten- tional shows of commitment further exacerbate volatile situations with an adversary's inclination to adopt a

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similar strategy. Thus escalation may be an outcome of inadvertent steps that follow each party's miscalcu- lated moves (Lebow and Stein, 1994). Escalation to war is more likely to happen in instances of power parity combined with mutually exclusive confidence in success. In a coercive interaction, the majority of communi- cations is presumed to be threatening. As long as an adversary's intent is not to go to an all-out war, each party can reduce the potential for escalation by cooling down the other's provocative actions with a restrained response.

Escalation and Deterrence

In general, manipulation via threat tends to be a primitive method of controlling contentious social relation- ships. As a matter of fact, adversarial interaction, especially in an international conflict, is more likely to be managed by deterrence based on punishment capability and hostile intent. Threats and intimidation have long comprised a major strategy for deterring others from taking antagonistic actions. The administration of threats entails committing certain acts construed as detrimental to the adversaries.

In a stable deterrence system of checks and balances, the opponents may be discouraged from resorting to violence, assuming the availability of information about each other's objectives and intentions. A recognizable risk of war can be deliberately created by displays of the will to deploy destructive forces. Being concerned that an opponent would exploit any sign of weakness, however, protagonists are more earnest to exhibit toughness to mobilize military force even to the point of risking mutually devastating destruction. A party may even believe that inflexible, stringent positions are necessary to prohibit another's aggression.

Escalation is an inescapable outcome of dysfunctional deterrence systems that favour the threat of equal or superior force as a main tool of controlling the chances for potential aggression. The failure of deterrence stimulates spiral dynamics, as exemplified by a war resulting from an arms race. A historical collapse in inter- national deterrence is evident in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and German aggression against Poland prior to World War II (Choucri, et al., 1992).

So long as the capability to ensure severe damage to the other is a basic premise of deterrence, mutual threats are actually intensified once each side engages in certain prohibited actions beyond a permissible boundary. In spite of serious warnings, Hitler believed and hoped that Britain and France would not organize a military campaign to save Poland (van Evera, 1999). On the other hand, the allies felt that there would be no limit on Hitler's demand for endless concessions unless they stood up against Nazi Germany's military oc- cupation of Poland in 1939. The disastrous outcome is inexorable, as a mutual deterrence system unleashes, instead of controlling, a high magnitude of destructive capability.

In a realpolitik approach, a threat to escalation continues to be part and parcel of deterrence mechanisms, with a belief that the demonstration of a resolve to retaliate would successfully check an aggressor's behav- iour. Escalatory exchanges of sanctions are commonly associated with engagement in punitive actions. Neg- ative intentions and attempts to inject fear in the other's calculation bring threats and counter-threats to the forefront of an adversarial relationship. Escalation may even have been designed as a move in strategic bar- gaining that combines threats with offers to be made later (Schelling, 1960).

Threats intentionally made in crisis situations are, however, likely to produce more antagonistic reactions with each round of hostile exchanges. Even the verbal expression of extreme acts may ultimately backfire, inviting pre-emptive strikes when ostensibly well-calculated increases in threats end up provoking unintended desta- bilizing incidents. In an intense conflict situation, limited escalatory activities are not likely to be interpreted as a probe designed to seek local advantage. The actual exchange of punishments means the breakdown of a deterrence system supposed to prevent destructive consequences through the fear of violence. If the opponent is not discouraged from resorting to violence, deterrence systems are a sure avenue to conflict es- calation (Morgan, 2005; Reiter, 2003).

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The danger of escalation strategies to deter the other's action is attributed to psychological decision-making characteristics. There is a tendency that threat or coercive acts harden the attitudes of an adversary in- stead of yielding submission (Gordon and Arian, 2001). Regulating the adversaries' behaviour through military strength is not successful in inducing changes in the positions of determined adversaries for whom sacrifice equals investment. The containment of antagonistic behaviour cannot be solely dependent upon creating the fear of devastating fighting. The attempt to reverse the adversaries' decision through inflicting pain may even reinforce the enemy's resolve. The resentment of an enemy who causes the suffering in the first place further strengthens the positions of a hawkish leadership.

In more cautious actors' calculations, escalated commitments must cease to thwart ever more costly out- comes. It would be preferable to react rather cautiously to an adversary's provocations (especially limited to little damage) by avoiding the option of retaliation. In general, past setbacks in the same or similar clashes are likely to be attributed to the development of a more guarded approach to subsequent escalation decisions. But a high level of simmering grievances ascribed to earlier loss can lessen the fear of continuing loss. In 1973, the Egyptians and Syrians decided to begin another war with Israel, despite their military inferiority, in order to regain self-respect and vindicate pride lost in the 1967 War.

Owing to its high price tag, a commitment to escalation as a means for achieving goals is not always based on a rational calculation of obtaining a desired endpoint with minimal costs. If the other party is willing to display destructive capabilities without any apprehension, tensions over minor issues may easily erupt into costly, protracted battles.

Strategies for Controlled Escalation

In international politics, the exhibition of firmness has been advocated as a main strategy to confront a com- petitive adversary seeking unilateral advantages. However, a clear demonstration of resistance against dom- ination can be combined with efforts not to invite unintended risks by signalling one's non-aggressive aims. Threatening messages could be applied, with diverse degrees of intensity, in an attempt to change the behav- iour of opponents. A high or low scale of severity in the prospective outcome has a dissimilar psychological impact on the parties.

A sudden administration of sanctions is contrasted with small increments over an extended time period. Un- expected escalatory moves leave less control over the development of events in the hands of the initiator as well as the target, especially when the spiral dynamics are more difficult to manage. Independent of its initi- ating rationale, each action may produce unpredicted consequences along with misjudgement of the target's intentions and probable responses. In the pre-World War I crisis, Austria wanted to punish Serbia without inviting Russia to a brawl, but its move brought about a chain effect of escalation that led to the catastrophic war, eventually involving Germany and France as well as Russia.

An escalatory mode of strategies can be adapted either to the higher or lower ends of the intensity scale, depending on changes in each actor's calculations and behaviour. One way in which to avoid uncontrolled escalation is to take gradually punitive steps instead of introducing sudden provocative actions that catch the other side off guard, making them react in panic with disproportionate means. Temporary tactical escalation with restricted punitive measures might be waged to elicit the other's concession without provoking a retalia- tory spiral despite an element of pressure (Brzoska and Pearson, 1994).

In some instances, a warning shot could be undertaken to deter the other's shift to aggressive strategies, while leaving future options open. A lower level threat of punishment at the initial stage of escalation provides more flexibility, given that it can be used merely to send a signal of further action. The intentions of the mes- sages ought to be clearly declared, given the possibility that the adversaries may initiate new levels of hostile moves in a reaction even to cautiously taken measures. The frequency and magnitude of coercive actions

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and counteractions might grow, but the process can be halted, and even be reversed, prior to explosion into all-out conflict (Patchen, 1988).

The gradual escalation may be stabilized by hostile, yet predictable, patterns of interaction that are governed by the implicit or explicit rules of the game. A controlled mode of escalation is more easily managed to avert reaching a threshold for initiating a catastrophic spiral. In US-Cuba relations after the 1962 Missile Crisis, the American government did not resort to military action, being content with the four decades' old econom- ic embargo. Despite its rhetoric and occasional emergence of contentious issues, the Castro government in Havana largely held back provocative action that might raise any security concerns in Washington.

There are various types of condition that inhibit the increasing level of escalation. In general, stability is likely to be fostered by the necessity to maintain strong social bonds as well as the fear of a dangerous escala- tion. The need for contentious tactics is minimized by the existence of conflict management institutions and forums that cultivate conciliatory norms. Broadly based interdependent relationships serve to buttress stability instead of uncontrolled enmity. A short-term intensification of conflict is, however, more likely to happen in the event of a power imbalance that generates perceptions of a quick victory. In addition, a lack of options, com- bined with high expectations about a successful fight, encourages the parties to go for a more contentious approach.

While adversaries have different choices about escalating their commitment, non-violent tactics are preferred as a more viable means of confrontation in more stable relationships. The rules of a struggle can be trans- formed by accepting institutionalized channels for protest. For tactical reasons, some struggles may transition from violent fighting to non-violent confrontation and vice versa. During its four decades old campaign for in- dependence, the Basque separatist movement ETA in Spain has occasionally switched its tactics to declare the abandonment of terrorist attacks, with the emergence of a more liberal government, only to resume the armed struggle later.

Entrapment

After a sustained period of escalation, a conflict may end up being trapped in a longer course of action that is justified by an increased commitment to the pursuit of goals. A malign conflict spiral maintains high cost struggles with no chance of either party backing away. Once the thresholds have been crossed for the inten- sification of overt coercion and outright violence, a conflict is more likely to be entrenched. In a stalemate, perpetually polarized and malignant processes are accepted as a normal and natural reality.

The Sri Lankan government has been locked in armed battles, over the last two decades, with Tamil guerrilla forces, characterized by repeated territorial gains and losses. The conflict originally started with a protest against the government's exclusion of the minority language from an official status, leading to communal up- risings by the Hindu Tamil minority in the late 1950s. Once the conflict turned into deadly military insurgencies with the establishment of well-financed Tamil Tiger rebel forces and attacks on government troops in 1983, the armed struggle has defied any logic of sensible compromise despite various attempts for external media- tion.

The government is not willing to give into the rebels' demand for an independent Tamil homeland in the north and east, being undeterred by the death of more than 60,000 people and damage to the economy in one of South Asia's potentially prosperous societies. The exhaustive nature of internal warfare is well characterized by the government campaign ‘war for peace’, being matched by guerrilla forces' counter-offensive with the atrocious killings of civilians and assassination of political and military elites. Even cease-fires and tentative political agreements reached between the government and rebels in late 2002 easily faded away in an atmos- phere of deep mistrust, only serving as an interval to re-charge armed strength. The entrapment has been marked by a periodic switch between low intensity fighting and all-out war.

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Reflecting various characteristics of a war of attrition, a stalemate and impasse are typical conditions of en- trapment. When increased demand levels by adversaries reach the limit of concessions, heightened resis- tance to further compromise brings a deadlock (Faure, 2005). Neither side has been neutralized or destroyed without losing the capability to fight completely. Bailing out of a costly war on baseless commitments is dif- ficult due to too much investment. However, the main goals may not be obtainable despite all the dedicated efforts. Frustration is attributed to the recognition of little prospect for a clear-cut victory, following the initial underestimation of the other party's capacity and determination to get involved in an entrenched struggle as well as the inflated estimates of one's own commitments.

Although it may belong to the end stage of escalation, entrapment is not necessarily part of an escalatory spiral (Brockner and Rubin, 1985). Whereas each partisan may not be psychologically ready to escalate a degree of commitment to fight further, adversaries may feel that their past struggle has been in vain if they do not continue to devote themselves to a chosen course of action. If someone is absorbed in a certain cause, then they are less likely to be concerned that their decision would increase the duration of being embroiled in the impasse.

Being stuck in a particular type of hostile exchange, each party does not possess an ability to draw back and assess the larger picture. Being too close to daily experiences and operations prohibits the development of awareness about dysfunctional behavioural patterns. It is easy to underestimate an opponent's will by over- looking the propensity of one's attacks to stiffen others' resolve. In spite of short-term gains, longer conse- quences can be harmful and damaging. In situations of entrapment, immediate gains are easily reversed by future losses.

Irrational decisions continue to be made to conduct a violent struggle that has cost more than gains that one still hopes to obtain (Pillar, 1990). Even though they are no longer winning, it is difficult for adversaries to give up their original objectives. When the commitment is emotionally binding, each party is willing to tolerate costs and risks beyond acceptable levels.

Although desires of winning a war may dwindle, a destructive spiral of conflict attains a momentum of its own. As original causes behind antagonism become irrelevant to the persisting struggle, strategies shift from win- ning to not losing by sustaining the status quo. Reversing a chosen policy, along with the admission of defi- ciencies, is also difficult not only politically but also psychologically. The necessity to save face in the eyes of others and look strong becomes a driving force behind sticking to the existing course of action. Decision mak- ers are more anxious about leaving an impression of being co-opted with harm to their domestic influence.

Irrational decision making stays rooted, along with a non-revocable commitment to losing causes, even though withdrawal presents a less perilous future. The benefit that may never be realized rationalizes the expended costs. Likewise, the visions, fixated on victory, act to undervalue the anticipated expenses, while exaggerating potential rewards. In addition, at this point, an increasing desire to damage an adversary over- shadows the necessity to minimize one's overall losses.

The deception of one's own group members can be used to underestimate the extent of the sacrifice made to achieve victory. Unforeseen difficulties arise from desertions by allies and an opponent's stubbornness, but defeats are frequently concealed as mere temporary setbacks from public views for the mobilization efforts. Secrecy about losses hidden by a centralized leadership misleads the population or group members to be- lieve that victory remains ‘just around the corner’. Information guarded in the absence of transparency assists in disguising military setbacks occurring in remote areas, as happened to Japanese armies following Pacific battles during World War II.

The motives of messengers conveying any bad news are often questioned in an internal deception that is designed to hide weaknesses and boost morale. Ultimately, it can create an obstacle for ending armed hos- tilities. Even though the Pakistani army absorbed heavier losses and casualties in its 1965 War than its In-

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dian counterpart, government reports had misguidedly glorified their military's admirable performance. This misinformation later provoked a backlash against an agreement on cease-fire and an initiative for mediated settlement since the public did not see the cessation of hostilities as necessary in a winning war.

In the Iran-Iraq war waged in the 1980s, a history of miraculous victories and courageous acts of heroism functioned as propaganda to distort objective reality and even the leaderships' own subjective assessments about the costs of suffering. Inaccurate historical records may shore up myths concerning the party's own in- vincibility (Blalock, 1989). Irrational decisions may be legitimized by ideological or some other standards that are external to the conflict. A nationalist cause's righteousness rooted in mythology contributes to the rational- ization of one's own claims over an adversary's, fortifying a will to fight. The strength in the myth of invincibility stems from ideological simplicity. The pursuit of an absolute goal, for example, based on unchallenging val- ues, is less likely undermined by the perceptions of setbacks.

Self-Perpetuating Decision-Making Rules

A failing course of action in entrapment persists due to the need to justify previously chosen investments (Brockner and Rubin, 1985). The expended resources are rationalized via the notion of ‘too much invested to quit’ in conjunction with a strongly felt need to recover past expenditures. Emotional obsession is made to validate irretrievable expenses, further expanding the gap between perceived and actual costs. It would sure- ly be unthinkable to accept the accumulated sacrifices for nothing or an unworthy compromise. As is reflected in the Bush administration's policy towards the war in Iraq, a natural inertia reins in decision-making during the entrapment stage, at which point continued obligations may reflect active support for bottomless spending and troop deployments.

The determinants of entrapment include decision rules in which the degree of allegiance to the previously se- lected course of action increases automatically without more conscious efforts towards its reversal. Reflecting on an inevitable choice of a self-sustaining situation, the decision makers' expectations about the likelihood of goal attainment no longer influence views about continuing struggles. Future suffering may be considered relatively bearable and trivial in comparison with past investment in a very costly conflict.

Since an escalated commitment is not ingrained in a calculation of the appropriateness of keeping up the fight, the higher price becomes even more of a reason for carrying on the struggle. The increasing loss is able to justify both psychological and political sacrifices only if it yields a bigger reward. Typical entrapment decision making does not, however, consider the prospects for an optimal outcome. Actions are less moti- vated by rational reasons with a deepening degree of emotional attachment to the fight. The strength of the driving forces toward staying in entrapment is, in part, related to the degree of the desire to avoid the costs associated with having given up one's past investment.

The limitations on the number of decision choices in conflict entrapment are well illustrated by the ‘dollar auc- tion’ game (Teger, 1980). The bidder's calculation is dictated by the rules of the game, indicating that the second highest bidder is obliged to pay the auctioneer the bidding amount for nothing in return. In the endless bidding war, the two competitors attempt to outbid each other whenever either of them is put in the subordi- nate situation. The second highest bidder is always entrapped in the dollar auction, due to the irretrievable amount invested in the unobtainable goal. This dynamic is continuously escalating the bidding. It is difficult to quit if the parties believe that the benefits of success and final victory are only garnered at the very end of the process. The unbearable costs can be transformed into ‘investments’ only if there is a prospect for victory.

Sustainability of Entrapment

If the prolonged acceptance of costs is no longer legitimized or durable, any further devotion of resources

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to the goal, which is not likely to be achieved, can be interpreted as irretrievable. It is impractical to sustain undesirable struggles indefinitely, under growing pessimism, in the midst of unexpected difficulties. The ne- cessity of ending a risky game may arise as a result of changes in balance between the subjective value of goal attainment and additional costs. When a substantial investment may not yield any valuable outcome, policy makers eventually have to grapple with the evidence of mistakes being made (Iklé, 2005).

The price ultimately reaches a threshold for making continued personnel and material devotion no longer bearable. The fatigue factor predominates, owing to difficulties in recruiting new members, declining logistical support, or the increasing vulnerability of a large population to an adversary's bombing campaign. The uneven distribution of expense among group members increases a potential for internal divisions, hurting the ability to fight effectively with enemies. The original belief systems, embedded at the time of conflict initiation, undergo modification. The decision relating to the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972 went through various adjust- ments in response to political, emotional, and financial costs.

Overall, the resilience of each group's cost absorption is affected by the level and nature of support that each garners from its constituents and external allies. Difficulties in ending the struggle come from a refusal to make concessions following long-term suffering. The continued reassessments of subsequent situations are essential to acknowledging the initial underestimation of the total costs and the duration of conflict. The Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, for example, was seen as inevitable, owing to the invader's weak- ened ability and unwillingness to accept further absorption of massive expenses over a prolonged period of time.

Internal Politics and Group Dynamics

The internal dynamics of a party, as affected by inter-group interaction, have an impact on conflict escalation and entrapment. The elite has to manage a difficult domestic political landscape while simultaneously re- sponding to an international crisis. Internal factors of escalation include the selection of militant leaders, the ascendance of radical subgroups, the supremacy of extremist values or ideologies, and uncompromising or- ganizational goals. In particular, the failure to effectively challenge a hard line faction is ascribed to intra-fac- tional polarization among doves as well as the successful mobilization of partisan supporters in favour of hawkish factions.

Factions that bear an uneven share of the burdens of continuing struggles are inclined to look for ways in which to resist the prolonging of conflict. The patterns of gains and losses are directly connected to the morale of different segments of the population. In an enduring conflict, those who carry the greatest costs and receive the smallest benefits are likely to be the least powerful members.

Engagement in intense struggles with an external enemy becomes a safety valve for dissipating internal ten- sions. Indeed, aggressive actions are encouraged by the depiction of the enemy as a grave threat. Intra-group differences are often minimized in the midst of intense hostile inter-group exchanges. The efforts towards in- ternal unity may focus on appealing to common goals against an external enemy. International conflict escala- tion distracts attention away from an internal challenge, contributing to rallying support behind the incumbent leadership.

However, it is difficult to keep unity upon facing an uphill battle which would eventually bring about a major defeat. By invading the Falklands and entering a war with Britain in 1982, the repressive Argentinean military junta was initially successful in diverting public attention from a devastating economic crisis and large-scale civil unrest. When Argentina had to confront a humiliating defeat, public enthusiasm with the war quickly evap- orated along with a deepened mistrust of the ruling military elite. Despite its attempt to stay on by toying with

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long-standing sentiments towards the islands, the Argentinean military dictatorship lost its grip on power.

While increasing cohesiveness within a group can perpetuate external conflict, threats from outside enemies strengthen the control of coercive machinery by the authoritarian leadership. External threats are often utilized as an opportunity to manage internal tensions, even increasing an ideological bond. When the leadership is threatened or challenged by an immediate crisis, it takes more extreme actions to build a sense of solidarity, which may, in turn, create a false perception of psychological security within the group. Especially, a con- tentious interaction with an external enemy rationalizes extreme views within a group.

Relatively little in-group diversity tends to discourage raising any question about severe action especially in combination with organizational developments that restrict control over extreme factions. The rapid escalation of conflict can be more easily initiated and sustained by groups that have the strong cohesiveness. A lack of internal diversity in opinions is ascribed to a demand for conformity to exclusive belief systems. Initiating escalatory moves may depend on a strong consensus on the collective goals of defeating the enemy as well as a high level of grievances. Group members are pressured to adopt a hostile out-group image and develop a perception of an adversary's destructive motives toward them. The validation of group values reinforces a heightened commitment to the goal along with a stronger conviction in a victory.

Decision making, based on group solidarity, often promotes extreme choices by not permitting an opportunity to discuss an alternative course of action. Little internal diversity produces a similar response to events in drowning out dissident voices. The majority swamps a cautious, reasonable minority voice in seeking the ho- mogeneity needed to concentrate on a fight with external adversaries. The fear of being labelled a ‘traitor’ also suppresses doubts, questions, and challenges about the legitimacy of contentious tactics. Meanwhile, the dissemination of information by media arouses negative evaluations of outsiders and institutes hawkish positions. Therefore, the intolerance of alternative views about the enemies, in part, ascribed to a lack of in- ternal diversity, provides a basis for escalatory commitment to engage in more confrontational behaviour.

During escalation, changes in conflict orientation are likely to reflect the emergence of the militant leadership and the replacement of doves by hawks. The nature of partisan support and organizational goals go through dramatic alterations at different sub-stages of escalation. The new organizational objectives may help hawk- ish factions surge to implement the goals of defeating enemies. Above all, hawkish factions may feel a threat to their identity by accepting moderate positions. Mutual hostilities between factions may be directed toward causing harm to each other. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, extremist Hutus assaulted and even massacred a number of moderate Hutus who did not join their violent campaign against the Tutsis.

In the Algerian civil war, two main guerrilla forces quickly emerged after the government intervened to cancel elections for the purpose of blocking the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Party's electoral victory in December 1991. The guerrillas initially targeted the army and police, but the insurgent movement began to diverge af- ter some groups started attacking civilians. Eventually, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), drawing support from the towns, declared a war on the FIS and its supporters when the imprisoned leadership of the FIS accepted the government's offer for negotiations in 1994. At that point, the other insurgent group, the Islamic Armed Movement (MIA) based in the mountains, was re-aligned with various smaller groups to form the FIS-Loyalist Islamic Salvation Army (AIS). Not only in Algeria, but also in Burundi and other African civil wars, factional differences often result in the restructuring of existing groups and the formation of new splinter groups that face the same adversaries, but employ opposing strategies and have different constituent bases.

In leadership struggle, contentious tactics are advocated as if to prove loyalty to group norms. A militant fac- tion does not want to look weak or submissive, and so may step up coercive activities. The strong hand of mil- itants, completely devoid of interest in resolution, is visible in inhumane attitudes that ritualize violence without any remorse. Such methods of brutality as beheadings, designed to impose maximum fear, have been adopt- ed by radical insurgent groups in Iraq.

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The threat from militant rivals in a leadership struggle forces the moderate to take a harsh position in support of escalation. The differences in decision making may not necessarily arise from the goals of, but from the choice of means for, struggle. Maintaining a costly fight is likely to bring about an increase in the number of hawkish members more committed to violent struggle. This change in the composition of a partisan group, or a decision-making body, expands a support base for more radical factions.

The Impact of Group Radicalization

Various group membership characteristics re-define an intra-party political terrain in establishing relations with outside groups. In discussion about different priorities relating to a war, the relative influence of military and intelligence agencies fluctuates according to the degree of an emphasis on the necessity for coercive induce- ments. In inner fighting, extremist groups seize upon an external tension as an opportunity to outrival their moderate opponents with expanded resource bases and control over coercive institutions. In conducting their campaign of violence against the Sri Lankan state, the Tamil guerrilla leadership rejected and annihilated moderate Tamil politicians who sought a dialogue with the government via assassinations.

A widening conflict brings about structural changes in relation to group representation as a result of the real- location of decision-making power and positions. A continuing fight gives more opportunities to those who are predisposed to intense violence and who express the total dedication to an exclusive group value. In addition, violent conflict presents militia group members with an opportunity for upward mobility especially in combat operations and for different kinds of leadership roles that are not available during peacetime.

Consequently, militant subgroups have vested interests in violent conflict that creates a new status and mate- rial compensation, even helping to develop a sense of new meaning for their lives. The incentives for uphold- ing violent struggles are reinforced by the personalization of a group conflict that carries not only a new status but also honour. Members of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Brothers in Solidarity in Egypt have developed a high level of principle and dedication, even surrendering their personal well-being to group causes. Especially for the underdogs, the martyr images, associated with suicide bombings and self-punitive tactics, such as hunger strikes during imprisonment, glorify the group's cause. At the height of their struggle against the policies of Conservative British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, imprisoned Irish Republican Army members chose to die from hunger strikes in 1981, further radicalizing their constituent base.

The widening participation of extremists generates rivalry between new and old militant groups over the radi- calization of tactics adopted for total destruction of enemies with the creation of chaos. Numerous new splin- ter groups have been created, in Iraq, to radicalize the methods of fighting in a total war against common enemies, namely, the Iraqi government and US forces. With the formation of more groups, factional rivalry naturally develops animosities inside the insurgency movement. By directing its attacks toward the general population beyond Iraqi and US occupational forces, al Qaeda has further factionalized the civil war situation. The attacks by al Qaeda on other Islamic insurgent groups have even resulted in collaboration between other Sunni insurgents and the US occupation forces in western Iraq such as the Anja province.

The emergence of new radical groups and the prevalence of those in charge of a more intense means of violence generate newly aroused will at the height of an escalation phase. Even when moderate groups may have larger numbers of members, extremist groups can have a significant impact on conflict escalation with the use of more severe tactics. The entire group's goals can shift to the defeat and even annihilation of an opponent, along with the social endorsement of aggression. Escalation is most likely to be sustained by the rise of militant extremists in competition for leadership and their key decision making roles within a hawkish organizational setting.

Polarizing attitudes of the extreme leadership, accompanied by a radical shift in the public mood and the surge of militant groups, can catalyse counter-responses from the other party. The increased influence of a

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hawkish faction in one party gives the upper hand to the position of its counterpart on the adversarial side, making intransigence become more entrenched. Fluctuation in the management of long-term tensions be- tween Israel and Palestine is, in part, traced to the difficulties related to controlling radicalized groups such as settlers, orthodox Jews and Islamic Jihad whose actions have often sparked off direct confrontation between the two opposing communities.

• entrapment • enemies • deterrence • military • faction • threats • concession

http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446279366.n8

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